The Presence of Divine Persons:
Extending the Incarnational Analogy to Impeccability and Inerrancy

By Lane G. Tipton

Introduction

I propose in this essay what I take to be a Chalcedonian incarnational model and draw an analogy between the impeccability of the incarnate Word and the inerrancy of the inscripturated Word. My thesis is that the proper analogy to the incarnation with reference to inspiration and hermeneutics resides not first in anthropology but in pneumatology. The incarnational analogy ought to yield both a theology of Scripture and a hermeneutic that takes into account the primary theological and hermeneutical significance of the Holy Spirit's agency, on the one hand, and the subordinate theological and hermeneutical significance of human agency, on the other hand. The primacy of the divine in pneumatology finds a clear analogue in the person of the incarnate Son of God, who remains forever, even in his incarnate state, a divine person, and this formulation will have implications for the doctrines of impeccability and inerrancy, respectively.

The proper and central theological category from which to draw an analogy to the event of the incarnation must be sought in pneumatology—the divine person and work of the Spirit. And it is the centrality and primacy of the divine that must always and at every point frame the human, placing the human and historical in proper theological context, whether we speak of the human nature assumed by the eternal Son of God in the incarnation or the human agents inspired by the eternal Spirit of God in inscripturation. The *person* of the Son and the *word* of the Spirit remain divine in both the acts of incarnation and inspiration/inscripturation, while relating truly and meaningfully to the human nature (incarnation) and human author (inspiration/inscripturation), yielding an impeccable incarnate Word and inerrant inscripturated Word.

The Incarnational Model: Its Analogical Application to Inspiration

Preparing the Way Forward: A Chalcedonian/Reformed Incarnational Model

Chalcedonian orthodoxy offers us much more about the incarnation than a statement regarding the full deity and true humanity of the Son of God. Chalcedon also provides a formulation that maintains both the *proper distinction* and the *real relationship* between the divine person of the Logos and the assumed human nature.

According to Chalcedon, in the incarnation the eternal Son of God assumed a human nature, without ceasing to be a divine person:

> … our Lord Jesus Christ: the same perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, the same truly God and truly man . . . consubstantial with the Father as regards his divinity, and the same consubstantial with us as regards his humanity … begotten before the ages from the Father as regards his divinity … as regards his humanity, one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only begotten, acknowledged in two natures which undergo no confusion, no change, no division, no separation; at not point was the difference between the natures taken away through the union but rather the property of both natures is preserved and comes together into a single

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> person and a single subsistent being; he is not parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the same only-begotten Son, God, Word, Lord Jesus Christ….[1]

The same conception is reflected in the Westminster Confession of Faith as well:

> so that two whole, perfect, and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in one person, without conversion, composition, or confusion. And this person is truly God, and truly man, yet one Christ (WCF 8.2).

Chalcedon affirms with admirable clarity and cogency both the dual natures and unipersonality of the God-man, avoiding the errors typically associated with Nestorianism, on the one hand, and Eutychianism, on the other hand.

But this formulation raises the question *how* we ought to relate the divine person of the Logos to the assumed human nature.[3] Understanding more precisely how the divine and human relate in the incarnation will allow us to locate a sufficiently nuanced incarnational model in terms of which we can begin to draw appropriate analogies to inspiration.

First, Chalcedonian orthodoxy maintains that the Son of God is essentially and eternally divine, yet contingently and truly human. This is the baseline logic of the incarnation.[2] This affirmation is clear in statements found within *The Westminster Confession of Faith*, Chapter 8 section 2, that "the eternal Son of God became man." The Son of God preexists that point in history in which he assumed a human nature. For this reason the Son of God is essentially divine, yet contingently and truly human, by virtue of the hypostatic union.

Second, and more specifically, the human nature of Christ has no personality in itself, but derives personality from its union with the person of the Logos. As such, there is no human nature of Christ *per se*. For this reason it is not *possible* to speak coherently about the human nature of Christ apart from its union to the divine Logos. To isolate the human nature of Christ as a thing in itself, or to focus on the human nature of Christ independently of the hypostatic union, is an abstraction.

Chalcedonian Christology therefore ought to constrain our christological formulations in at least two ways. First, we must never construe the human nature of Christ to have any significance independent of the divine person of the Logos to which it is united in the hypostatic union. Second, we must always maintain that the eternal person of the Son of God remains the primary theological category. *The divine and human in the God-man therefore are not equally ultimate, existing in some sort of parity with one another. The divine is primary; the human, while real, is subordinate.*

1. Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie R Hotchkiss (eds.), *Creeds & Confessions of Faith in the Christian Tradition*, vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 181.

2. Cf. Scott Oliphint, "Something Much too Plain to Say," *Westminster Theological Journal*, Fall, 2006 for a helpful treatment of this point.

3. This statement encapsulates the dominant Reformed view of anhypostatic (literally "no person") Christology. Louis Berkhof writes, "*The Logos furnishes the basis for the personality of Christ.* It would not be correct, however, to say that the person of the Mediator is divine only. The incarnation constituted him a complex person, constituted of two natures…. The human nature has its personal existence *in the person of the Logos. It is in-personal rather than impersonal*…. His human nature is not lacking in any of the essential qualities belonging to that nature, and also has individuality, that is personal subsistence, *in the person of the Son of God* … the Logos assumed a human nature that *was not personalized, that did not exist by itself*" (*Systematic Theology* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986], 322, emphasis added). In addition, Francis Turretin makes precisely the same point when he observes, "By this union ... the human nature (which was *destitute of proper personality and was without subsistence* [*anypostatos*] because otherwise it would have been a person) was assumed *into the person of the Logos* … (*the Logos may be said to have communicated his own subsistence to the flesh by assuming it into the unity of his own hypostasis so that the flesh is not a hypostasis, but real* [*enypostatos*]; *not existing separately, but sustained in the Logos* [*as an instrument and adjunct personality joined to it*] in order to accomplish the work of redemption)" (*Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, vol. II [Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P&R, 1994], 311, 317, emphasis added). Herman Bavinck summarizes anhypostatic Christology within the Reformed tradition with characteristic penetration: "This, now, is how Christ's human nature is united with the person of the Son. T*he Son does not just become a person in and through human nature, for he was that from eternity. He needed neither the creation nor the incarnation to arrive at himself, to become a personality, a spirit, or a mind.* The incarnation does mean, however, that the human nature that was formed in and from Mary did not for an instant exist by and for itself, but from the very first moment of conception was united with and incorporated in the person of the Son. The Son increated it in himself and, by creating, assumed it in himself. Yet that human nature is not for that reason incomplete, as Nestorius and nowadays still Dorner assert. *For though it did not complete itself with a personality and selfhood of its own, it was nevertheless from the start personal in the Logos*" (*Reformed Dogmatics: Sin and Salvation in Christ* [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006], 306-307, emphasis added). John Murray observes: "…the consciousness of his intradivine Sonship is in the foreground as *defining the person that he is*. And the inference would seem to be that our Lord's *self*-identity and *self*-consciousness can never be thought of in terms of human nature alone. *Personality cannot be predicated of him except as it draws within its scope his specifically divine identity.* There are two centres of consciousness but not of self-consciousness" ("The Person of Christ" in *Collected Writings of John Murray* [Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Banner of Truth, 1977], II:138, emphasis added). John Owen makes virtually identical observations when he says, "We deny that the human nature of Christ had any such subsistence of its own as to give

The Analogy: Christology and Pneumatology

How might we go about correlating this incarnational model with a theology of inspiration? I believe we do well to recognize this guiding principle: in the strict sense the hypostatic union remains distinct from all other divine-human relations. While there may be analogies between incarnation and inspiration, there certainly can be no identity regarding the relationship between the divine and human in the incarnation of Christ, on the one hand, and the divine and human in the inspiration of Scripture, on the other hand. Any analogy we suggest will need to be clearly articulated, carefully qualified, and presented in a way that avoids ambiguity and misunderstanding. In other words, the incarnational analogy is something that needs careful, even painstaking, theological articulation and is therefore not to be introduced or applied in a popular or loose way. The issues are too complex and far too important for such a treatment.

B.B. Warfield is helpful along these lines. Regarding the limitations of an analogy between incarnation and inspiration, he observes that

> It has been customary among a certain school of writers to speak of the Scriptures, because thus "inspired," as a Divine-human book, and to appeal to the analogy of our Lord's Divine-human personality to explain their peculiar qualities as such…. Between such diverse things there can exist only a *remote analogy*; and, in point of fact, the analogy in the present instance amounts to no more than that in both cases Divine and human factors are involved, though very differently.[4]

Commenting with greater precision, Warfield observes,

> There is no hypostatic union between the Divine and the human in Scripture; we cannot parallel the "inscripturation" of the Holy Spirit and the incarnation of the Son of God. The Scriptures are merely the product of Divine and human forces working together to produce a product in the production of which human forces work under the initiation and prevalent direction of the Divine (Warfield, 162).

Certainly Warfield is basically correct. The hypostatic union is ontologically unique, and the analogy between incarnation and inspiration is in a sense remote. But this raises the question: what does a Chalcedonian model of the incarnation actually yield in terms of an incarnational analogy for Scripture? What is the "remote analogy" between incarnation and inspiration? Can we specify more precisely the sense(s) in which the analogy might prove useful?

I suggest that the incarnational model outlined earlier demands that we correlate as closely as possible Christology and pneumatology in the development of an incarnational analogy, recognizing the appropriate limitations in such a correlation.

Laying some groundwork for this observation, Vern Poythress has recently observed that, strictly speaking, there is no human author of the Decalogue. The oral form of delivery is simply the divine voice, whereas the written form of delivery is the finger of God. And this model becomes paradigmatic for divine communication to and through prophets. Hence, the formula of the prophet, "Thus says the Lord."[5] Divine authorship is therefore paradigmatic and central for understanding Old Testament prophetic literature.

Notice, then, the extremely close correlation of Christology and pneumatology that grows out of a biblical framework and Chalcedonian formulation. Just as the primary theological category for classifying the incarnate Word is the *divinity* of the Son in his person, work and *words*, so also the primary theological category for classifying the inscripturated Word is the *divinity* of the Spirit in his person, work and *words*. The eternal Son assumes a human nature; the eternal Spirit inspires human authors of Scripture. This is one area where the incarnational analogy appears both warranted and useful.

Therefore, the primary *locus* for our discussion of both incarnation and inspiration is the *divinity* of the person and word of the Son and Spirit, respectively. The primacy of the divine with respect to inspiration does not deny human authorship of Scripture any more than it denies the assumed humanity of Christ (cf. Phil. 2:6–8 and 2 Pet. 1:21). But it does deny that divinity and humanity are *equally basic*, or share some sort of ontological parity, when it comes to either incarnation

it a *proper personality*, being *from the time of its conception assumed into the subsistence with the Son of God*" (*The Works of John Owen*, vol. 12 [Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Banner of Truth, 1979], 210, emphasis added). In addition, Owen makes a critical and nuanced distinction between the assumption of the human nature and hypostatic union proper (cf. *Works*, I:225-226 [my thanks to Carl Trueman for these references from Owen]). The quotations above, spanning the 17th to the 20th century, represent the historic Reformed doctrine of anhypostatic Christology.

4. B. B. Warfield, *The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible* (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P&R), 162.

5. Vern Sheridan Poythress, "The Presence of God Qualifying Our Notions of Grammatical-Historical Interpretation: Genesis 3:15 as a Test Case," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 50, no. 1 (March 1, 2007), 91-93.

or inspiration. The divine is *always* primary in matters pertaining to incarnation and inspiration,[6] *since the divinity of the Son and the Spirit supply the presuppositions for the possibility of incarnation and inspiration.*

And this critical fact of the inspiration of the Scriptures of the Old Testament must provide the presuppositional point of departure for understanding the analogy between the incarnate and inscripturated Word in relation to mere human persons and texts. For example, if we investigate the phenomena of Scripture in relation to ANE literature, the place where we must *begin* is with the categorical uniqueness of Scripture as the divine Word of God, just as if we investigate the phenomena of Jesus in relation to his Jewish context, the place we must *begin* is the categorical uniqueness of Jesus' divine person. *We must never temporarily suspend the full truth of biblical revelation as the Word of God in order to investigate historical matters in some neutral manner (i.e., in the sense of being blind to that revealed truth).* On the contrary, we must affirm from the outset the non-negotiable ontological distinction between the Word of God (incarnate and inspired), on the one hand, and all other human beings and human documents, on the other hand.

These assertions must not be taken for some species of Docetism, which would imply a denial of the humanity of Christ or human authorship of Scripture. We must never lose sight of the human nature the Son of God assumed in the act of incarnation nor the human agents the Spirit used in the acts of inspiration. But we must always recognize that the human aspect of both the incarnation of the Son and the inspiration of the human author is nonetheless subordinate to the divine in theological importance and hermeneutical significance.

In fact, certain theologians within the Dutch Reformed tradition have argued in precisely this way. A Chalcedonian and Reformed incarnational analogy has accented the essentially divine, yet contingently and truly human character, of *both* the *incarnate* Word *and* the *inspired* Word. Abraham Kuyper is representative on this point. He says,

> In Christ and the Holy Scripture we have to do with related mysteries. In the case of Christ there is a union between divine and human factors. The same is true of Scripture; here, too, there is a primary author and a secondary author. To maintain properly the relationship between these two factors is the great work of dogmatics…. Everything depends here on the right insight that the Word has become flesh in Christ and is stereotyped in Scripture.[7]

Richard B. Gaffin Jr. pinpoints Kuyper's concern nicely when he observes,

> The basic thrust … is plain: Scripture, like Christ, is both truly human and truly divine. Yet in the case of Scripture, as for Christ, these two factors are not equally ultimate; the priority and originating initiative belong to the divine, not the human. Specifically, the Word, in his antecedent identity as the Word, became flesh; and God is the primary author of the Bible, in distinction from the secondary human authors. This specifies the 'related mysteries' of Christ and the Bible (Gaffin, *Old Amsterdam*, 267).

In short, then, a Chalcedonian/Reformed incarnational analogy turns on the fact that both in Christ and in Scripture, the divine and human are *not* equally ultimate. Rather, the priority and originating initiative belongs to the divine, not the human. And this entails that God is the primary author of Scripture, with human authorship being an important, yet subordinate, consideration.

The Extension of the Analogy: Impeccability and Inerrancy

The correlation between the primacy of the divine Son in the incarnation and the primacy of the divine Spirit in inspiration grows directly out of two central Pauline texts, Philippians 2:6–11 and 2 Timothy 3:16.

The structure of the *Carmen Christi* of Philippians 2:6–11 captures well the basic theological categories expressed in the hymn. The stanzas, lines and couplets appear as follows:

A. Preexistence: vs. 6
1. ὃς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων
2. οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ,

B. Incarnation: vs. 7–8
1. ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν
2. μορφὴν δούλου λαβών,
3. ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος·
4. καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος

6. For a good example of a model that misses entirely this critical point regarding the priority of the divine person in the incarnation, consult Peter Enns' *Inspiration and Incarnation: Evangelicals and the Problem of the Old Testament* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2005), 17.

7. Richard B. Gaffin Jr., "Old Amsterdam and Inerrancy," *Westminster Theological Journal* 44 (1982): 266.

5. ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν
6. γενόμενος ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ.

C. Exaltation: vs. 9–11
1. διὸ καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσεν
2. καὶ ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα,
3. ἵνα ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ πᾶν γόνυ κάμψῃ [ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ καταχθονίων]
4. καὶ πᾶσα γλῶσσα ἐξομολογήσηται ὅτι κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς [εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ πατρός.]

The movement is critical to grasp: eternal preexistence (vs. 6), incarnation/death on a cross (vs. 7–8) and exaltation (vs. 9–11). There is nothing *more basic* to Paul's Christology than these categories.

Speaking in sweeping terms, the point noteworthy for our purpose is that the reality of the incarnation does not negate the fact that the Son remains at every point the "form of God" and "equal with God" (vs. 6). Specifically, when the Son "empties himself" (ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν) he does so by *means of* taking (force of the aorist active participle, λαβών) to himself "the form of a servant" (μορφὴν δούλου), which the rest of vv. 7 and 8 specify as a (sinless) human nature (cf. Rom. 8:3). Keeping in view the entire transaction of emptying (vs. 7) and humbling (vs. 8), the Son remains the "form of God" and "equal with God" which is expressed by the force of the present participle "ὑπάρχων" in 2:6. That is to say, the Son remains the form of God and equal with God in the event of emptying himself, assuming the form of a servant, and humbling himself to the point of death on a cross.

Incarnation, far from being subtraction, is addition. The eternal Son of God assumes a human nature *en route* to death on a cross as a substitutionary sacrifice for the sins of his people, all the while remaining the form of God, equal with God. It is for this reason (i.e., the sinless perfection of the Son's person; cf. Heb. 1:3; 4:15; 7:26–28) that his work is rewarded with exaltation (2:9a).[8]

Paul maintains throughout his presentation that the eternal Son of God remains the subject in view when speaking about the incarnation. The eternal identity of the Son supplies the ontological condition for the possibility of an incarnation, insofar as the *form of God* supplies the context for the assumed *form of a servant*.

Agreeably, 2 Timothy 3:16, the well-known *locus classicus* for the doctrine of inspiration, offers a conception of Scripture that is thoroughly and unapologetically *pneumatic*, focusing on the Spirit's agency in the *divine authorship* of Scripture. Scripture is the "expiration" (or out-breathing) of the eternal Spirit of God, the third person of the ontological Trinity. And this pneumatic qualification supplies the *most basic category* in terms of which we must proceed in our understanding the nature of Scripture. Regarding Scripture as "θεόπνευστος" that is, "breathed out by God," Warfield observes as follows.

> The Greek term has nothing to say of inspiring or inspiration: it speaks only of a spiring or spiration. What it says of Scripture is not that it is breathed into by God or that it is the product of the divine inbreathing into its human authors, but that it is breathed out by God. It is God-breathed, the product of the creative breath of God. In a word, what is declared by this fundamental passage is simply that the Scriptures are a Divine produce, without any indication of how God has operated in producing them *(Inspiration and Authority of the Bible*, 133).

What we understand Scripture, as a whole, to be proceeds in terms of Scripture's own self-witness to its pneumatic origin; it is God-breathed, the product of the Holy Spirit.

Yet it is also the case that the Spirit superintends what the human authors spoke and wrote, ensuring that human agency in no way compromises or obfuscates the purity of the God-breathed Word. 2 Peter 1:21 is instructive in this respect. Peter not only construes the prophetic Word as a more certain Word than first-hand, eye-witness exposure to Christ (vs. 1 6–19), but he argues that the authority, reliability and certainty of the written Word is rooted in the fact that "men spoke from God as they were carried along *by the Holy Spirit*." It is the superintending agency of the Spirit that ensures all and only what God wants communicated is actually communicated through subordinate human agency. Additionally, this superintending agency of the Spirit is set over against that which originates in the will of man (vs. 21a). Peter could not be clearer that the primary agent in view with regards to the production of Scripture is the Holy Spirit, *not* the will of man.

It is at this point that the incarnational analogy seems warranted and useful. Just as Christ's person remains *divine* in the act of incarnation, so also the Spirit's Word remains *divine* in the act of inspiration. To extend this point a bit more, just as assuming a human nature in the incarnation in no way compromises the impeccability of the incarnate Word, so also using human intermediaries

8. For a helpful discussion of this text, consult Geerhardus Vos, *The Pauline Eschatology* (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P&R, 1979), 274.

in the act of inspiration in no way compromises the inerrancy of the inspired Word. Jesus Christ remains truly divine and without sin in the assumption of his human nature in the incarnation. The Spirit's Word remains truly divine and without error, even though He employs subordinate human authors in the act of inspiration.

This way of formulating the matter suggests an analogy exists between the impeccability of the incarnate Word and the inerrancy of the inspired Word. Louis Berkhof makes explicit the theological rationale for the impeccability of Christ when he says,

> We ascribe to Christ not only natural, but also moral, integrity or moral perfection, that is sinlessness. This means not merely that Christ could avoid sinning, and did actually avoid it, but also that it was impossible for him to sin *because of the essential bond between the divine and human natures.*[9]

The reason that the person who assumes the form of a servant remains impeccably sinless rests in the fact that he remains the form of God, equal with God (Phil. 2: 6–7). The rationale for the impeccability of Christ therefore does not arise first from his sinless human nature (since Adam likewise had a sinless, yet peccable, human nature); rather, the rationale lies in a unique relationship sustained between the divine person of the Logos and the assumed human nature. By analogy, the inerrancy of human authors of Scripture does not rest in their humanity existing in some elevated state *per se*, but on a special relationship the writer sustains to the Holy Spirit, who superintends every word written (2 Pet. 1:21), so that what is written is "θεόπνευστος" (2 Tim. 3:16). Whether we think of the reality of impeccability or inerrancy, the focus will fall on the unique presence of the eternal Son or Spirit relative to the human nature or human author, respectively. While more can be said, and additional qualifications and distinctions delineated,[10] certainly an *analogy* exists along these lines between the impeccability of the incarnate Word and the inerrancy of the inscripturated Word.

When formulated this way, the defender of impeccability has a theological paradigm in place that helps articulate the pneumatological foundations of inerrancy. The doctrines of impeccability and inerrancy mutually reinforce and clarify one another. To attack the doctrine of inerrancy requires a corresponding assault on impeccability, and *vice versa*. In the final analysis, it is the unique personal presence of the eternal Son in the incarnation and the Holy Spirit in inspiration that give rise to the notions of impeccability and inerrancy. Both doctrines grow on the fertile soil of Trinitarian orthodoxy expressed in the ecumenical creeds and Reformed confessions.

Summary and Conclusion

I have sketched what appears to be the proper analogue to the incarnation with reference to inspiration, which is found in the divine person and work/word of the Holy Spirit. The correlation of the presence and activities of the divine persons in incarnation and inspiration yield an analogy between the impeccability of the incarnate Word and the inerrancy of the inscripturated Word. This way of speaking accents the full humanity of the Son of God in the incarnation and human authors in inspiration/inscripturation. In fact, it is just because we presuppose the full humanity Jesus Christ and human authors of Scripture that we invoke the unique presence and activity of the eternal Logos and Spirit in their respective roles relative to impeccability and inerrancy. The way forward in both biblical and systematic theology is a recovery of the theological function of divine agency, whether incarnation or inspiration comes into view. What Reformed theology needs at this juncture of its development is more, not less, attention given to the reality and theological-hermeneutical implications of divine agency, which supplies the ultimate theological rationale for the impeccability of the incarnate Word and the inerrancy of the inscripturated Word.▪

9. Louis Berkhof, *Systematic Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 318. Emphasis is mine.

10. This is not to deny the absence of the Holy Spirit relative to the unique way He equips and sanctifies the human nature of Christ, particularly in the Gospels, which relate that the Holy Spirit is given to the Son without measure (John 4:34). As Herman Bavinck notes, the Holy Spirit equips the human nature for its hypostatic union to the person of the Logos (cf. *Reformed Dogmatics: Sin and Salvation in Christ* [Grand Rapids: Michigan: Baker Academic], 292–3). But the point remains that the human nature is sinless (and impeccably so) given the agency of a divine person working upon it, so that whether we think of the incarnation itself, and the special presence of the divine Logos relative to the human nature, or the unique role of the Spirit in sanctifying and preserving the humanity of the Son from sin, the accent falls on a unique relationship the humanity sustains to the presence and activity of a divine person. Moreover, and this would move beyond the scope of this essay, because all of the works of God *ad extra* are one, and because of the functional identity of the Son and Spirit in redemption (1 Cor. 15:45; 2 Cor. 3:18) and creation (Genesis 1:2; Col. 1:16), a reference to the personal presence of the Logos will imply the presence of the Spirit, and *vice versa*. A Trinitarian theology is inescapable. Nonetheless, the point above remains with regard to the distinctive presence and activity of the Eternal Son regarding incarnation/impeccability and the Holy Spirit regarding inspiration/inerrancy.