

Gisbertus Voetius: God's Single, Absolutely Simple Essence

Translated by R. M. Hurd

The disputation translated below is an articulation of the divine simplicity authored by the Reformed orthodox divine, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676). Born in Heusden, Netherlands, and educated at Leiden, Voetius eventually became professor of theology at the University of Utrecht (1634). His writings range from the well-known *Politica ecclesiastica* (3 vols, published 1663–76) to the *Selectae disputationes (theologicae)* (5 vols., published 1648–69), among many others.¹

As a genre, early modern disputations are a significant earmark of the scholastic method taken over from the high Medievals, among whom the presence of the genre is most notably observed in the larger quodlibetal quaestiones held by the schoolmen. Within the early modern university, disputations served to exercise the student respondent on some matter of philosophy or theology, broadly speaking. An individual set of theses that comprised a disputation might be drafted by professor or student or some combination thereof, and sometimes later were bound and inserted into the larger oeuvre of the presiding theologian. This bundling of numerous disputations honed over several disputation cycles yielded works of extreme significance—e.g., the *Synopsis Purioris Theologiae*, perhaps the most famous disputation set, held at Leiden 1620–24. While many individual disputations of the time are an array of fairly terse theses spread across perhaps a dozen pages, as the early modern period progressed the genre returned to the more extensive quaestio model.² It is the latter, more involved quaestio that Voetius's disputations resemble, as can be seen from their length and complexity.

Albeit the issue of disputation authorship is fraught, the act of including a disputation in a work to which the presiding theologian's name is appended confirms that at least the professor considered the work his own; thus, the *Selectae disputationes* are to be considered as reflective of Voetius's own labor and thought. To

this is added the fact that, at least in the case of Voetius here, many of the disputations likely experienced editing prior to their inclusion, as Beck has pointed out.³ Drawn from vol. 1 of the *Selectae disputationes*,⁴ the disputation found below is “De unica et simplicissima Dei essentia,” responded to by one Johannes Almeloveen on 6 Oct. 1637.

As the title indicates, the piece argues the divine simplicity, and it does so with a particular eye toward the contemporary controversies raised by the unorthodox on this point of doctrine. The frank confession and extensive defense of simplicity is the opposite of strange for the Reformed and in fact is common ground occupied together with Catholics—perhaps one reason why the doctrine did not receive much attention in the

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1. For biographical details, cf. Andreas J. Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676). Sein Theologieverständnis und seine Gotteslehre* (Göttingen: V&R, 2007). I have relied predominantly on Beck for this very short introduction. On Voetius major works see, *Selectarum disputationum theologiarum*, 4 vols. (Ultrajecti: apud Joannem à Waesberge, 1648, 1655, 1659, 1667; Smytegelt, 1669) and *Politicae ecclesiasticae* (Amstelodami: Ex officinà Joannis à Waesberge, 1663–1676).

2. Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius*, 31. “Anfangs bestanden die schriftlichen Disputationen ausschließlich aus einer Reihe von Thesen, die nicht mehr als einen Bogen, also acht Seiten, einnahmen, so etwa an der 1575 gegründeten Universität Leiden. Ab etwa 1600 wurden die Thesen erweitert und die mittelalterliche, Quaestio-Technik lebte teilweise wieder auf. Besonders bei Voetius konnten die Disputationen auf diese Weise zu monographischem Umfang anwachsen.”

3. Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius*, 32. “Insgesamt können die in die fünf Bände der *Disputationes selectae* aufgenommenen ursprünglichen Disputationen somit als genuines Werk Voetius' behandelt werden. Das gilt a fortiori von diesen fünf Bänden selbst, worin die aufgenommenen Disputationen in den meisten Fällen nochmals redigiert wurden. In dieselbe Richtung weisen auch immer wiederkehrende stilistische Eigenheiten sowie verschiedene Hinweise auf eigene Werke und seine Söhne oder Freunde, jeweils in der ersten Person Singular.”

4. For overview, see Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius*, 108–13.

earlier years of the Protestant project, when the hub of controversy lay elsewhere and no one opposed the basics of creedal orthodoxy. For all that is in God is God himself: this is arguably the most basic commitment of theology. Yet the early modern period saw the rise of the Socinians and Vorstians, and this was to the dismay of all orthodox regardless of their communion. The emergence of this heterodox movement met with immediate response that would last until the eclipse of Reformed orthodoxy in the darkness of the modern age. In our own context today, we observe similarly that among the Reformed there are likewise those who uphold orthodoxy and affirm divine simplicity, and likewise those who have emerged and put themselves against it. As a historical testimony, Voetius's disputation underlines several points to both sides:

One, while the divine simplicity belongs to natural theology accessible to and demonstrable by human reason apart from special revelation, it is likewise directly and indirectly affirmed by Scripture in no uncertain terms. Thus as a theologian, Voetius's first proof of divine simplicity is a list of Scripture passages, full stop. Later, he will merge the scriptural portrait of God's incorporeality with the philosophical explanation of what not having a body entails: "With this foundation [i.e., Scripture's statement of God's incorporeality] as a premise, we can mention various other arguments that ensue partly from a body's nature and properties and partly from God's nature." Hence, for Voetius, while supernatural theology is of a higher order to natural theology, the two are never in conflict and in fact mutually inform according to their respective modalities (*fides non destruit sed supponit et perficit rationem*). God is apprehended by man's reasoning powers as simple, and God self-offers himself to man in Scripture as the simple God. The fact that simplicity properly belongs to the sphere of natural theology alerts us to the shape that its presentation will take. Simplicity is philosophical as to its exterior form, and this should not surprise or bother us. This, however, does not entail that, as a product of natural theology and cast in the form of philosophy, simplicity materially will then somehow be transposed into something else in the higher register of Christian theology, when the Christian theologian adopts it and employs it at the service of the theological project: *fides non destruit*. On the contrary, Christian theology will further underline simplicity (*sed supponit*) and to some degree bring it into full bloom (*et perficit*).

Two, simplicity is absolutely most basic to theology and to be affirmed by any monotheist, albeit there are a variety of ways by which the doctrine itself may be

suitably articulated. As to its formal presentation, the doctrine may be argued in various ways philosophically, and these forms may be more or less at odds with one another and more or less satisfactory. But while there is disagreement that arises at this level, "everybody certainly aims at this: removing all composition from God," as Voetius says rather handily. It is this material commitment of simplicity which is properly basic, and it is this material commitment that is the precondition of any monotheism. Thus as Voetius also shows early on in his disputation, those who deny simplicity, either explicitly or by consequence given their position's parameters, have actively set themselves against not just the whole Reformed tradition, but what is the wide and unified array of catholic orthodoxy represented in Protestantism, Catholicism, and Eastern Orthodoxy. Not only this, one who denies simplicity now stands against every commitment of sheer monotheism, be it Christian, Jewish, Muslim, or that of many pagan philosophers. Voetius's amassing of citations from all Christian communions and even diverse faith communities evidences just how unified a lineage the doctrine has as its pedigree. There is zero room for error on the material commitment of this doctrine: all that is in God is God himself.

And three, Voetius shows equally, without retracting the force of the above, that within the Christian tradition there is and has always been a perhaps surprisingly wide room preserved for articulating the doctrine formally. His mediation of two of the major Medieval schools of thought—Thomistic and Scotistic—is illustrative here. Those with a penchant for Thomas should note that Voetius at times compliments even the Duns and defends him against abuse. The one work that appears frequently cited throughout this piece shows just how steeped the Reformed orthodox were in the minutiae and even speculative points of the doctrine of God—the Jesuit Joannes de Rada's *Controversiae theologicae inter S. Thomam & Scotum, super quatuor libros Sententiarum* (4 vols, published 1620) is a prime piece of work. Voetius's commitment to press for the clearest articulation of the commitment of monotheism entailed he would navigate the most difficult aspects of philosophy then available—and this too is a necessity all must follow in articulating this doctrine today. Indeed, the Post-Reformation theologians, with Voetius as exemplar, are one notable churchly instance of the orthodox faith that recognizes orthodoxy is always a word in the present tense, and thus precommitted not only to the historical, material contents of a doctrine but also its formal articulation, which requires the use of the sharpest philosophical tools available. Discontent with the

recitation of formulae or a descent into manualism, eschewing an orthodoxy “in word only” that may be creedally supported yet divorced from lively faith, the Reformed recognize that faith, as faith, entails it is *fides quaerens intellectum*: faith approximating the believer toward greater understanding of God. Defending the divine simplicity dogmatically does not mean selecting an old system of doctrine and making it crisp with life and buffed from the patina of age. It means articulating a lively doctrine by means of the most strident philosophical tools available, even those that are new. For these and other reasons, those who wish to articulate the divine simplicity today will find in Voetius a helpful, historical guide.

GISBERTUS VOETIUS, *GOD'S SINGLE, ABSOLUTELY SIMPLE ESSENCE* (1637)

With a Response by Johannes Almeloveen. Utrecht, June 10, 1637.¹

Because it is hazardous to speak even true things about God, we should, with all reverence and precision, investigate the saving knowledge of God through the established divine attributes. Theologians generally divide these attributes into a first and second kind. The first kind are God's unity, infinity, and immutability, while the second kind are his intellect, will, and power (one can contract all other attributes down to these). Unity is the first attribute of the first kind. We understand three concepts or notions by it: singularity, primacy or independence, and simplicity, which subcontains spirituality or incorporeality as its species. Using the notion of singularity or singular unity, we exclude polytheism, which counters God's unity in a primary and direct way. With the notion of primacy and simplicity, we exclude from God all dependence, posteriority, lesser-status, composition, and multiplicity and division—all these subverting God's unity in an indirect way, and consequently implicating a certain polytheism. At the moment, we are just going to deal with simplicity, working from the light and book both of nature and Scripture. I. First,² we will introduce certain prolegomena; and having done so, II. second, we will demonstrate our principal thesis. III. Then third, we will refute the antithesis along with the arguments for it that our opponents give. IV. And fourth, we will then take note of specific deductions and uses of simplicity.

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GISBERTUS VOETIUS, *DE UNICA ET SIMPLICISSIMA DEI ESSENTIA* (1637)

Resp. IOHANNE ALMELOVEEN, Ultraiectino, Ad diem 10. Iunii 1637.

Quandoquidem de Deo etiam vera dicere periculosum, omni cum reverentia, & ακριβείᾳ salutaris eius cognitio per certa attributa nobis investiganda. Dividuntur ea vulgo in primi & secundi generis. Illa sunt unitas, infinitas, immutabilitas. Ista, intellectus, voluntas, potentia: ad quae omnia alia reduci possunt. Inter attributa primi generis primum est unitas, quo tres illos conceptus seu notiones comprehendimus singularitatem, primitatem seu independentiam, & simplicitatem, sub qua continetur spiritualitas seu incorporeitas, quippe species simplicitatis. Notione singularitatis seu unitatis singularis excludimus πολυθεότητα, quae primo & directe unitari Dei opponitur. Notione primitatis & simplicitatis excludimus omnem dependentiam, posterioritatem, minoritatem, compositionem, multiplicitatem ac divisionem, quae indirecte unitatem subvertit, & consequenter πολυθεότητα quaedam implicat. Nos in praesentiarum tantum de simplicitate ex lumine & libro tum naturae tum scripturae acturi, I. praecognitis quibusdam praemissis II. Thesis principalem probabimus III. Antithesis una cum rationibus adversariorum refutabimus. IV. Porismata & usus quosdam annotabimus.

1. I have made no effort to establish a critical text. The source for this translation is, Gisbertus Voetius, *Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum pars prima* (Utrecht: Waesberge, 1648), 226–45 [sic, 226–235, 244–45, 236–37, 248–49, 240–45]. Pagination of the Latin text is inserted in square brackets in the text, and if the page break fell within a word, the reference is inserted after it.

2. Roman numerals have been inserted to help display the general outline (the editor).

1.

I. To explain this matter more easily, we have to know the following four points beforehand. First, simplicity in general is the mode by which we understand a being to exist as one through itself; and it is opposed to composition, multitude, or both, depending on whether we take the word “simplicity” either strictly or broadly. One can see what scholastics and metaphysicians say about simplicity and composition; and, if students are looking for a compendium on this, among the more recent, go to: Johann Combach’s *Metaphysics*, chapter 5 and 23; [Rudolph] Goclenius’s *Philosophical Lexicon*; or [Henri-Louis Chasteigner] de la Roche-Pozay’s *Distinctions*.³

Speaking strictly, here we understand simplicity not just in a comparative way, as the sort of simplicity in angels and separated souls;⁴ and not just as a “simply simple,” as the simplicity that pertains to prime matter, form, ultimate difference, or things abstracted ultimately. Instead, we understand here the simplicity that they call an absolutely and supremely simple. According to this notion of simplicity, it is the case that a thing is not composite in itself, nor is something composable with it, and it itself is not composable with another thing.

Second, in this disputation we are not just asking whether God is free from all composition properly so-called, where the opposites are really distinct. We are also inquiring whether he is free from composition improperly so-called—the sort that accrues from essence and existence, from nature and suppositum or essence and subsistence, or from genus and difference. And for this reason, we are probing whether God is free from all multiplicity, distinction or division, and priority and posteriority in his essence. The concept of a transcendental distinction and multitude of persons and thus of the modes and relations is a far different matter, as we will see below in thesis 5.

Third, though the word “simplicity” seems positive, it is in point of fact negative. This is because, formally, it expresses the fact that there is not composition or multiplicity in God. The term’s material signification, however, is a positive perfection by which such a negation belongs to God—parallel to how the concept “spirit” is materially signified by the word “incorporeal.” In the same way, this is the case for all God’s negative attributes. The fact that we conceive and render these

[227] 1. Ad faciliorem huius rei explicationem praecognoscenda sunt ista. *Primo*; Simplicitas in genere est modus, quo ens per se unum esse intelligitur, & opponitur compositioni aut multitudini, aut utrique, prout vos presse vel late accipitur. Videantur de Simplicitate & compositione Scholatici ac Metaphysici. Compendium si quaerant studiosi, adeant ex recentioribus *Combachium Metaphys. c. 5. & 23.* aut *Lexicon Philosophicum Goclenii*, aut *Distinctiones Castanei*. Nos stricte intelligimus hic simplicitatem non tantum comparative, qualis est in angelis & animabus separatis, nec tantum simpliciter simplicem, qualis etiam materiae primae, formae, differentiae ultimae & ultimate abstractis convenit; sed eam, quam vocant, absolute & summe simplicem, per quam fit ut *res nec in se sit composita, nec aliquid ipsi componibile, nec ipsa alicui componibilis. Secundo*; In hac ergo disputatione non tantum quaeritur an Deus sit liber ab omni compositione proprie dicta ubi extrema sunt realiter distincta, sed etiam ab improprie dicta qualis est ex Essentia & esse, ex natura & supposito seu essentia & subsistentia, ex genere & differentia, atque adeo an liber sit ab omni multiplicitate, distinctione seu divisione, prioritate & posteritate in essentia sua; nam distinctionis & multitudinis transcendentalis personarum atque adeo modorum & relationum longe alia est ratio, ut infra videbitur, *thesi 5. Tertio*; Vox simplicitatis quavis videatur positiva, revera tamen est negativa, quia formaliter enuntiat in Deo non esse compositionem aut multiplicitatem. Nihilominus materiale eius significatum est perfectio positiva, per quam Deo convenit talis negatio, quomodo per *τὸ incorporeum* materialiter significatur ratio *Spiritus*. Pari modo se habet in omnibus Dei attributis negativis. Quod autem nos negative

3. Johann Combach, *Metaphysica: libri duo* (Oxford, 1633); Rudolph Goclenius the Elder, *Lexicon philosophicum Graecum* (Frankfurt, 1613); Henri-Louis Chasteigner de la Roche-Pozay, *Celebriones distinctiones tum philosophicae tum theologicae* (1614; Coloniae, 1623).

4. I.e., souls as separated from bodies.

attributes negatively arises from their being obtained with reference to creatures. For we signify the divine attributes with creaturely names by the way of negation, and we conceive these attributes as being with reference to said creatures.

Fourth, God's attributes of incommunicability, infinity, immutability, incomprehensibility, incorporeity, and invisibility are of the same kind and significance as simplicity. Indeed, these all flow from simplicity or else cohere with it inseparably by some sort of necessary link—such that, if one abolishes simplicity, one must remove or ruin all these attributes too.

2.

II. We now demonstrate via the following arguments that the simplicity we outlined belongs to God. The first argument is Isaiah 44:6; Revelation 1:8; 21:6; 22:13; and Romans 11:35–36. We derive from these passages God's primacy and independence both in his existence and operation. By independence, I mean his independence from the subject,⁵ from causes both internal and external, and from any prior or superior principle. For as Justin Martyr says, God is "being, with no source or cause."⁶ And as Julius Caesar Scaliger sings divinely,

God is "principle without principle, end without end,
He from whom the past does not depart,
whom the future by no means approaches,
Before all, after all, whole, one: Himself."⁷

But if God were composed from parts, accidents, or modes of being, he would not then be first absolutely. This is because parts are prior to the composite, and principles (on which modes of being or accidents would depend) are prior to what they principled, just as philosophy tells us.

We take the second argument from God's infinite, omnimodal perfection; by this perfection, God is pure act without mixture of any potency. For, if there were potency in God, there would exist in him something imperfect or perfectible for which an act would be perfective, through which perfective act some higher perfection would encroach upon God. We demonstrate the consequence of the major proposition, because every composition is from act and potency, just as every composite is. For genus, matter, integrated part, essence, nature, and subject all have the concept of potency; and, on the other hand, difference, form, integrating part, existence, suppositum, and accident all have the concept of act. We demonstrate the minor proposition in these three points. First, it is incompatible with God's

illa attributa concipimus & proferimus, hoc provenit ex ordine ad creaturas, quia significantur nominibus creaturarum per viam negationis, & in ordine ad illas concipiuntur. *Quarto*; eiusdem generis & momenti cum simplicitate sunt attributa incommunicabilitatis, infinitatis, immutabilitatis, incomprehensibilitatis, incorporeitatis, invisibilitatis; immo ex ea fluunt, aut quocumque alio necessario nexu cum ea à χωρίστως cohaerent; ita ut hac sublata omnia illa tolli aut labefactari necesse sit.

2. Simplicitatem, quam diximus, Deo competere, probamus istis rationibus; quorum, *Prima* est, *Ies.* 44.6. *Apocal.* 1.8. & 21.6. & 22.13. *Rom.* 11.35.36. unde colligimus primitatem & independentiam Dei tam in essendo quam operando; independentiam dico a subiecto, a causis tam internis quam externis, a principio quocumque priori aut superiori; Est enim, [228] ut *Iustinus Martyr*, ὄνσια, ἀναρχος καὶ ἀνάιτιος, & ut divine canit. Iul. Caesar Scaliger Exercit. 365. sect. 10.

*Sine principio principium; absque fine finis,
Cui praeteritum non abit, haut subit futurum.
Ante omnia, post omnia, totus, unus. Ipse.*

Atqui si Deus ex partibus, aut accidentibus, aut modis compositus esset, iam non esset simpliciter primus; quia partes sunt priores composito, & principia (unde modi aut accidentia dependerent) sunt priora principiatas, ut notum ex Philosophia. *Secunda*, Ex omnimoda & infinita Dei perfectione, qua est actus purus sine ullius potentiae admixtione. Si enim esset potentia in Deo, esset quid imperfectum seu perfectibile, cuius actus esset perfectivum, per quem accederet illi ulterior aliqua perfectio. Maioris consequentia probatur, quia omnis compositio ut & compositum est ex actu & potentia: nam genus, materia, pars integrata, essentia, natura, subiectum habent rationem potentiae; contra differentia, forma, pars integrans, existentia, suppositum, accidens, habent rationem actus. Minor probatur. *Tum* quia repugnat absolutae Dei perfectioni, ut in ipso sit

5. Possibly the subject or terminus of the divine action; i.e., as Thomas says, the terminus is the "whole substance of the thing."

6. The Greek given by Voetius (expanded from the old style, ὄνσια, ἀναρχος καὶ ἀνάιτιος) cannot be located in Justin Martyr. Compare with chapter 5 of the Dialogue with Trypho, "God alone is unbegotten and incorruptible," and chapter 13 in the First Apology, "the unchangeable and eternal God," and in Dialogue with Trypho, chapter 128, "as if the essence (ὄνσια) of the Father were divided."

7. Scaliger, Exercit. 365, sect. 10. Cf. Julius Caesar Scaliger, *Exotericarum exercitationum liber XV de Subtilitate, ad Hieronymum Cardanum* (1557; Hanover, 1620), 1076.

absolute perfection for there to be something perfectible in him. Second, parts or principles by which something composite is composed are more imperfect than the composite itself. Thus, nothing could be made or composed from parts or principles which would be endowed with absolute, infinite perfection. Third and finally, there would then be in God passive potency, which is the root of mutability; and God could be broken down into his composing parts or principles and be corrupted—contrary to Psalm 102:27; James 1:17; Numbers 23:23; 1 Timothy 1:17; and Romans 1:23. It is thus the case that God is only what he is, and he cannot not exist, nor be something else. For this reason, John of Damascus says correctly, “Composition is the source of conflict, and conflict the source of separation, and separation of dissolution. But dissolution is entirely foreign to God.”⁸

The third argument is, God is most absolutely and most perfectly one and the same (Deut. 6:4; Ps. 102:27), and there is nothing that is really different in his essence. Now, no composition exists through the union of distinct opposites, where you have no distinction. Furthermore, the following [four arguments] demonstrate that all that is in God is God, and is one and the same, and his very self.

(1) The name “Jehovah,” אֱהוָה אֲשֶׁר אֱהוָה, or in Greek, ὁ ὢν shows this (Exod. 3:14–15; cf. Rev. 1:8, ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, “the one who is, and who was, and who is to come”). (2) This is proved from the fact that those things that seem to be in the mode of accidents or adjuncts are predicated of God properly by synonymous direct predication—such as light (John 1:9; cf. 1 John 1:5) and love (1 John 4:8, 16), for example. Therefore, he who is what he is, and for whom whatever is in him, is himself—he is one who has no parts, accidents, modes, or principles that are something other than himself. (3) This is the case because the attributes we conceive as diverse are predicated essentially of each other—seeing they are essentially one and the same among themselves, as we will explain below. (4) This is because if these attributes (e.g., power or wisdom) are not God, then either they are infinite and supremely perfect, or they are not. If they are, then something besides the one God will exist that is infinite and supremely perfect. Therefore, there will be two infinite things—that is, two equal Gods. But if the attributes are not infinite and supremely perfect, then God will not know his own essence and infinite perfection in an

aliquid perfectibile; *tum* quia partes seu principia, unde componeretur, essent imperfectiora composito, & sic ex iis nihil posset fieri aut componi, quod absoluta & infinita perfectione praeditum esset; *tum* denique quia in Deo esset potentia passiva, radix mutabilitatis, possetque Deus in partes aut Principia componentia resolvi, & corrumpi contra *Psal.* 102.28. *Iacob.* 1.17. *Numer.* 23.23. 1 *Timoth.* 1.v.17. *Rom.* 1.v.23. Unde constat Deum tantum esse quod est, nec posse non esse, & aliud esse. Hinc recte Damascenus *Orthod. fidei lib.* 1.c.4. Σύνθεσις γὰρ ἀρχὴ μάχης, μάχη δὲ διαστάσεως, διάστασις δὲ λύσεως· λύσις δὲ ἀλλότριον Θεοῦ παντελῶς. *compositio enim pugna principium: pugna vero separationis: separatio autem solutionis. Atqui solutio alienum quid penitus a Deo est. Tertia, Quia Deus est absolutissime & perfectissime unus ac idem Deuter.* 6.4. *Psal.* 102.28. nihilque in ipsius essentia realiter diversum. Atqui ubi nulla distinctio, ibi nulla per extremorum distinctorum unionem compositio. Probatum autem omnia, quae sunt in Deo, esse Deum, esse unum, idemque ac ipsum I. ex nomine *Iehova,*” אֱהוָה אֲשֶׁר אֱהוָה [*sic*], Grk, ὁ ὢν, *Exod.* 3.14.15. cum *Apocal.* 1.8. ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος. 2. Ex eo, quod proprie, synonymica & directa praedicatione ea, quae se videntur habere ad modum accidentium aut adiunctorum, de ipso praedicerentur, ut e. gr. *Ioh.* 1.9. cum 1 *Ioh.* 1.5. *caritas* 1 *Ioh.* 4.8.16. Qui ergo est quod est, & cuius, quidquid est in ipso, est ipse, is nullas habet partes, accidentia, modos, aut principia quae aliud sint [229] ab ipso. 3. Quia attributa, quae nos tanquam diversa concipimus, de se invicem praedicantur essentialiter, quippe quae essentialiter sint unum idemque inter se, ut infra explicabimus. 4. Attributa illa ex. gr. potentia, sapientia si non sunt Deus, sunt aut infinita & summe perfecta, aut non sunt. Si illud, iam erit praeter unum Deum aliquod infinitum & summe perfectum, atque adeo erunt duo infinita, hoc est duo aequales Dii: sin istud, iam Deus propriam essentiam & perfectionem suam infinitam adaequate non cognoscet, sed tantum aliquatenus & pro modulo, quia

8. Cmp. *PG* 94, 797. See John of Damascus, *Orthodox Faith*, book 1, chapter 4. *NPNF2*, vol. 9, page 3 (second pagination).

adequate way, but just to the best of his (small) ability, because there is no proportion between a finite cognitive power and the infinite object or thing known.

The fourth argument is, say we grant there exists in God opposites that are distinct so that they could engage in composition. Even so, such opposites would not be able to be united or coalesce with each other except by the action of some efficient cause. But where and what is that cause, prior and superior to God, that might compose his substance?

The fifth argument proves simplicity belongs to God by detailing, that is, denying all species of composition. All composition in general is from act and potency. This is due to the fact that in composition, one part of the composing elements is in potency to another part, and both are in potency to the whole's existence which they participate in. However, we just said above that all in God is from himself in ultimate actuality, and there is not some passive or perfectible potency in him.

Now, regarding specific composition, we learn from John 4:24; Romans 1:20; 1 Timothy 1:17; and Isaiah 40:18, that composition from essential or integrating parts—that is, corporality, and even that of a human body (as the Anthromorphites desired)—does not occur in God. With this foundation as a premise, we can mention various other arguments that ensue partly from a body's nature and properties and partly from God's nature. For these arguments, see John of Damascus' *On the Orthodox Faith*, book 1, chapter 4;⁹ Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Contra Gentiles*, book 1, chapters 19–21; the scholastics on book 1, distinction 8,¹⁰ and Ia question 3, article 1; ¹¹ Alfonso de Castro on the word "God," haeres. 2;¹² Vázquez's *Metaphysical Disputations* 17;¹³ and our own Girolamo Zanchi's book 2, *On God*, chapter 2.¹⁴

Regarding composition from subject and accident, we deny such of God because he is infinitely perfect in himself, containing in himself all possible perfections either formally or eminently. Therefore, he cannot be perfected to a higher degree. Conversely, there would be passive potency and deficiency in God, and he would receive a higher perfection if he were to take on real accidents, which are specific, real perfections.

On composition from genus and difference, we deny this of God very easily because God is not in a category, nor does the notion of genus and difference properly pertain to him—as logicians and metaphysicians prove and scholastic theologians as well. On this, see among more recent works, Vázquez's *Metaphysical Disputations* 16 and those who are the opponents of Conradus Vorstius—namely, George Eglisam.

Now God is exempt from composition from essence

non est proportio inter potentiam cognoscitivam finitam & obiectum seu γνωστόν infinitum. *Quarta*, quia dato in Deo esse extrema tam distincta ut compositionem ingredi possint, tamen non possent inter se uniri & coalescere, nisi per actionem alicuius causae efficientis. Atqui ubi & quae est illa causa prior & superior Deo, quae Dei substantiam componeret? *Quinta*, probatur ex enumeratione seu remotione omnium specierum compositionis. Compositio omnis in genere, est ex actu & potentia quia in ea altera pars ex componentibus est in potentia ad aliam, & ambae in potentia ad esse totius, quod participant; at in Deo omnia ex se esse in ultima actualitate, nec esse potentiam aliquam passivam aut perfectibilem iam supra dictum est. In specie compositionem ex partibus essentialibus aut integrantibus, hoc est corporeitatem & quidem corporis humani (quod volebant Anthromorphitae) non cadere in Deum discimus ex *Iohan* 4.24. *Rom.* 1.20. 1 *Timoth.* 1.17. *Iesa.* 40.18. Hoc fundamento praemisso, varia argumenta proferri possunt, partim ex natura & proprietatibus corporis partim ex natura Dei; quae vide apud *Damascenum Orthodox. fidei lib.* 1.c.4. *Thomam lib.* 1. c. *Gentes cap.* 19.20.21. *Scholasticos in dist.* 8.lib.1. & *in partem* 1. qu. 3. art. 1. *Alphonsum a Castro in verbo Deus, haeres.* 2. *Vasquez disputat Metaphys.* 17. & ex nostris *Zanchium lib.* 2. *de Deo cap.* 2. De compositione ex subiecto & accidente probatur, quia Deus in se infinite perfectus est continens in se omnes perfectiones possibles vel formaliter, vel eminenter; ergo non potest ulterius perfici. Atqui esset in Deo potentia passiva & defectus, ipseque ulteriorem reciperet perfectionem, si acciperet accidentia realia, quae sunt perfectiones quaedam reales. De compositione ex genere & differentia facillime probatur, quia Deus non est in praedicamento nec in illum proprie cadit notio generis & differentiae: ut ostendunt Logici & Metaphysici pariter ac Theologi-Scholastici. Vide ex recentioribus *Vasquez disput.* 16. & Antagonistas Vorstii, nominatim *Eglisemnum*. Compositio ex essentia & existentia, ex natura & supposito a Deo removetur, quia

9. John of Damascus, *Orthodox Faith*, book 1, chapter 4. *NPNF2*, vol. 9, page 3 (second pagination).

10. This appears to be a reference to a compendium of some sort that I have been unable to locate, or it may simply be a direction to see various commentators on the *Summa*, such as Gregorius de Valentia, Cajetan, etc.

11. Likewise, but this is most likely Thomas, *ST*.

12. Alonso de Castro, *Adversus omnes haereses* (1534; Paris, 1565), Book Five, 257v.

13. Gabriel Vázquez, *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1617), 28v.

14. Girolamo Zanchi, *Opera omnia theologica*, tom. 1 (1619), De Natura Dei sev, de Attributis, Book 2, Cap. II, De Simplicitate Dei, col. 63–73.

and existence or from nature and suppositum for these reasons: God is absolutely pure act; he is supremely perfect; he is first and independent; he is what he is; and whatever he is, he is by his essence and not by participation. Zanchi notes these things in his *On God*, chapter 2, as does Thomas in his *Summa Theologia*, Ia question 3 articles 3–4.

The sixth argument: let us add the consensus of the ancient church and the fathers to the preceding arguments. See Augustine's *On the Trinity*, book 6, chapter 6, book 5, chapter 1, books 7, 8, and 10;¹⁵ Irenaeus's [*Against Heresies*] book 2, chapter 16;¹⁶ Athenagoras [of Athen's] *Plea for the Christians*;¹⁷ Tatian's *Address to the Greeks*;¹⁸ Origen's *On First Principles*, book 1;¹⁹ Eusebius's *Preparation for the Gospel*, book 8, chapter 2;²⁰ Athanasius's *On the Decrees of the Nicene Creed*;²¹ Dionysius (called the Areopagite)'s *On Divine Names*, chapter 5;²² Gregory Nazianzus's *Oration 49* or his *Book on Faith*;²³ and his *Oration 2, On Theology*;²⁴ [Gregory] Nyssa's *Oration 1*, at the words, "Let us make man," etc.;²⁵ Cyril of Alexandria's *Epistle to Calosyrium* and *Against Julian*, book 10;²⁶ [John] Cassian's *Institutes*, book 8, chapter 4;²⁷ John of Damascus' *On the Orthodox Faith*, book 1, chapters 4 and 17 [*sic* 7];²⁸ Aeneas of Gaza's *Theophrastus*;²⁹ the author of *On the Spirit and Soul*, chapter 18;³⁰ together with Gennadii Massil's *On Ecclesiastical Teaching*, chapter 11;³¹ the works of the "scholaestics" both on book 1, distinction 8,³² and on Thomas's [*Summa Theologia*] Ia question 3 throughout the whole question, especially article 7. And the consensus of all the more recent authors on the commonplaces and theses, especially the opponents of Socinius, Vorstius, and the Remonstrants. Among these opponents, see of the Catholics, Martin Becanus's *Treatise against Vorstius*;³³ and of our own

Deus est actus purissimus, quia summe perfectus, quia primus & independens, [230] quia est quod est, quia quidquid est per essentiam est & non per participationem, de quo Zanchius loco cit. & Thomas dicta quaest. art. 3. & 4. Sexta, Accedat his argumentis consensus antiquae Ecclesiae & patrum, Augustin. de Trinit. lib. 6.c.6. & 4. lib. 5.c.1. & lib. 7 & 8. & 10. Irenai lib. 2.c.16. Athenagor. in legatione pro Christianis. Tatianus Orat. ad Graecos. Origen. lib. 1. περι ἄρχῶν. Euseb. praepar. Evangel. lib. 8.c.2. Athanas. in decret. synodi Nicen. Dionysius dictus Areopagita de divin. nomin. cap. 5. Nazianzen. Orat. 49. seu lib. de Fide; & Orat. 11. de Theologia. Nyssemi Orat. 1 ad illa verba: faciamus hominem &c. Cyrilli Alexandr. epist. ad Calosyrium & l. 10. contra Iulianum. Cassiani l. 8. Instit. c. 4. Damasceni loc. cit. & cap. 17. Aenae Gazai in Theophrasto fol. 91. Authoris de Spiritu & anima cap. 18. apud Augustin. tom. 3. Gennadii Massil. de ecclesiast. dogmat. c. 11. Scholaesticorum ad lib. 1. dist. 8. & ad Thomae p. 1. qu. 3. per totum; imprimis ad artic. 7. Recentiorum omnium in locis communibus & thesibus; praesertim Antagonistarum Socini, Vorstii, & Remonstrantium, inter quos ex Pontificiis Becanus in tract. contra Vorstium; ex nostris Broeckerus, Sladus,

in its nature, and imperishable and immortal; but the sensible as being always in flux and decay, and in change and conversion of its substance. And all things being summed up and referred to one beginning, we hold the doctrine that the uncreate, and that which has proper and true being, is One, which is the cause of all things incorporeal and corporeal...." Eusebius of Caesarea: *Praeparatio Evangelica* (*Preparation for the Gospel*). Trans. E.H. Gifford (1903), Tomus III, Pars Posterior [pars 2. Libri X–XV anglisce redditi], 523bff.

21. Athanasius, *NPNF2*, v. 4, 150ff.
22. Dionysius the Areopagite, *The Works*, ed. John Parker, vol. 1 (1897), 73.
23. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Spuria: De Fide Orthodoxa Contra Arianos* (alias *Oration 49*), PG 36.674.
24. *Oration 2 on Theology* (*Oration 28*), *NPNF2*, vol. 7, p. 288, see vii, vii, ix, 290–291.
25. Gregory of Nyssa, "On the Making of Man," ch. 16, *NPNF2*, vol. 5, p. 403.
26. Cyril of Alexandria, *Epistle to Calosyrium* and *Against Julian*, book 10, PG 76, col. 1066, *ibid.*, 1002.
27. John Cassian, *Institutes*, book 8, chapter 4, *NPNF2*, vol. 11, p. 258.
28. John of Damascus, *Orthodox Faith*, book 1, chapter 4. *NPNF2*, vol. 9, page 3, 5 (second pagination). "But in the case of the divine nature, which is simple and uncompound...." (Chapter VII on the Holy Spirit, p. 5).
29. *Aeneas of Gaza: Theophrastus*, trans. Sebastian Gertz, John Dillon and Donald Russell (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013).
30. *De anima et spiritu*, PL 40, col. 793.
31. Gennadii Massiliensis, *Liber de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus veteris cuiusdam theologi homilia sacra* (Hamburg, 1614), 8.
32. See footnote 10.
33. Martin Becanus, *Tractatus de Deo et attributis diuinis* (1611).

15. Augustine, *On the Holy Trinity*, *NPNF1*, vol. 3, 100, 89, 104, 115, 134.

16. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, Book 2, chapter 16, *ANF* 1, 379.

17. Athenagoras, *Plea for Christians*, *ANF* 2, 133.

18. Titian, *Address to the Greeks*, *ANF* 2, 65.

19. Περι ἄρχῶν. See PG 11, col. 107. Cf. Origen on first principles: being Koetschau's text of the *De principiis translated into English, together with an introduction and notes*, ed. and trans. G. W. Butterworth, Paul Koetschau (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1936).

20. This reference does not appear to be correct. Cf. Eusebius of Caesarea, Book 11, chapter 9. "MOSES in his declarations of sacred truth uttered a response in the person of God: 'I AM THAT I AM. Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you,' and so represented God as the sole absolute Being, and declared Him to have been properly and fitly honoured with this name.... In accordance with them we also divide the All into two parts, that which can be perceived only by the mind, and that which can be perceived by the senses: and the former we define as incorporeal and rational

theologians Frederik Broeckerus,³⁴ Matthew Slade,³⁵ and Eglisam.³⁶ Add to these also the Christian philosophers and metaphysicians. Even the Platonic philosophers as well, and all foreign Gentiles, Jews, at least those called theists, can be brought forward to assent to God's single, simple essence. Look at the writers as well on natural theology, and those who have written in defense of the truth of Christian religion. Among the Jews, Maimonides's *Guide for the Perplexed*, part 1, chapter 51–52,³⁷ provides notable witness to this truth. He also gives arguments there that we should not despise. This truth is opposed by that fiction regarding the Sephirot found in Menasseh ben Israel in his small book on *Creation*,³⁸ which we remark on in our *Disputation on Creation*, part 2.³⁹ The Muslims also agree with us—at least those who are philosophers and learned, as you can see in the Persian Achmedum's *Politor Speculi*, as Filippo Guadagnoli notes in his *Apology against Achmedum Alabadin*, treatise 3, in the preface.⁴⁰

3.

III. Now that we have confirmed the truth of the matter, it still is necessary to examine our opponents' opinion. Among the pagans, there have been people who claimed God was a body, either as the soul of the world or the universal world; and due to this that he was composed either in himself or with another thing outside himself. See Epiphanius's *Heresies* 5;⁴¹ Eusebius's *Preparation for the Gospel*, book 4, chapter 6;⁴² and John of Damascus, *On Heresies*.⁴³

Among the Christians, the Audians (wrongly called the Vadians by Prateolus and other more recent authors) attributed to God a body, even a human one. See Epiphanius's *Heresies* 70; Augustin's *On Heresies*, chapter 50;⁴⁴ Theodoret's *Compendium of Heretical Accounts*, book 4, chapter 13,⁴⁵ and his *Ecclesiastical History*, book 4, chapter 19 [*sic* 11];⁴⁶ Nicephorus's book 2, chapter 14.⁴⁷ Those whom the Greeks later called the

Eglisemnius &c. Adde philosophos & metaphysicos Christianos. Quin & Platonici philosophi, omnesque extranei Gentiles, Iudaei, qui saltem Theistae audiunt, ad suffragia hic vocari possent pro unica & simplici Dei essentia. Videantur scriptores theologiae naturalis; & qui pro Veritate Religionis Christianae scripserunt. Ex Iudaeis illustre testimonium huic veritati praebet *Maimonides More Nebuchin part. 1.c.51. & 52.* ubi etiam adfert argumenta non contemnenda. Cui veritati repugnat commentum illud de Sephirot apud *Menasse ben Israel in libello de Creatione: de quo notamus quid in disputatione de Creatione part. 2.* Mahumedistae consentiunt: saltem Philosophi & eruditi, uti videre est in *Politore speculi Achmedi Persae, referente Phil. Guadagnolo apologiae c. Achmedum tract. 3. in praefat.*

3. Veritate iam confirmata restat adversariorum sententiam examinemus. Fuerunt inter Ethnicos qui Deum corpus dicerent, aut animam mundi, aut mundum universum, atque adeo aut in se, aut cum alio extra se compositum *Epiphan. haeres. 5. Euseb. prepar. Evangel. lib. 4.c.6. Damascen. lib. de haeresib.* Inter Christianos *Audiani* (perperam *Prateolo* aliisque recentioribus dicti *Vadiani*) Deo corpus & quidem humanum attribuebant *Epiphan. haeres. 70. Augustin. de haeres. c. 50. Theodoret. lib. 4. haeret. fabul. c. 13. Idem histor. lib. 4.c.19. Nicephor. lib. 11.c.14.* qui a Graecis postea dicti

34. Frederik Broeckerus, *Antidotum errorum praecipuorum comprehensorum in tractatu de deo ... et apologetica exegesi Conradi Vorstii* (1612).

35. Matthew Slade, *Matthaei Sladi cum Corrado Vorstio de blasphemis, haeresibus et athëismis a Magnae Britanniae Franciae et Hiberniae rege Iacobo huius nominis primo Christianae Fidei defensore in ejusdem Vorstii de Deo tractatu & exegesi apologeticâ, nigro theta notatis, scholaisticae disceptationis pars prima* (1612)

36. See at footnote 63.

37. Maimonides, *Guide for the Perplexed*, trans. M. Friedlander (1885), 1.172

38. Menasseh ben Israel, *De creatione problemata XXX* (1635).

39. See *De Creatione, Pars Secunda*. Resp. Luberto Spruitio

Ultraject. Ad diem 15. Septemb. 1638, in *Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum pars prima* (Utrecht: Waesberge, 1648), 583.

40. Philippus Guadagnolo, *Apologia pro christiana religione* (1631).

41. "5. Against the Stoics," in *The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis: Book I (sects 1–46)* (Brill, 2009), 22.

42. This reference also appears incorrect. Cf. Book 14, chapter 16. "Thales held that god is the mind of the world; Anaximander that the stars are celestial gods; Democritus that god is like a sphere amid fire, which is the soul of the world." *Preparation for the Gospel*, trans. E.H. Gifford, Tomus III, pars posterior (Oxford, 1903), p. 754a.

43. John of Damascus, *De Haeresibus*, PG 94, col. 675.

44. Cf. Liguori Müller, *The De Haeresibus of Saint Augustine* (CUA Patristic Studies, The Catholic University of America Press: Washington, D.C., 1956), 111.

45. Theodoret, *Haereticarum fabularum*, PG 84, 435. See the translation in Glenn M. Cope, An analysis of the heresiological method of Theodoret of Cyrus in the *Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium*, Diss. (Catholic University of America, 1990).

46. Theodoret, *Ecclesiastical History*, NPNF2, vol. 3, p. 114.

47. Nicephorus Calistus, *Ecclesiasticae Historiae libri XVIII, in duos tomos distincti* (Paris, 1630), 154–156.

Anthropomorphites, Lactantius called the Anthropians—see Lactantius, book 4, chapter 30.⁴⁸ Tertullian held to something akin to this error, as you can see clearly from his *Against Marcion*, book 2, chapter 16,⁴⁹ and *Against Praxeam*,⁵⁰ as well as from Augustine's testimony in his *On Genesis*, book 10, chapters 25–26,⁵¹ though in his book *On Heresies*, chapter 84, he intimates that it was more a discrepancy in terminology or misuse of such, than it was heresy.⁵²

In ages to follow, people who opposed God's simplicity arose now and then; and scholastics and ecclesiastical persons promptly suppressed and condemned their errors. See the condemnations subjected against the Master of the Sentences in 1226 and 1340.⁵³ Becanus, in his *Summary of Scholastic Theology*, chapter 1, question 1,⁵⁴ also has mentioned a certain Walter, who distinguished God's essence and attributes in a real way.⁵⁵ In recent memory, the Socinians revived anew these horrendous conjectures up from hell—with no other end but overthrowing the foundation of Christianity, namely, God one and three. Hence, in the Racovian Catechism, in the passage dealing with knowledge of God, chapter 1, the Socinians strike from the list of God's attributes his spiritual nature, simplicity, infinity, and invisibility.⁵⁶ The Remonstrants in their *Confession* seem to lean toward nearly the same thing.⁵⁷ Yes, they even assert in their *Apology*, chapter 2, folio 41, that there is “not, in fact, a single iota about God's simplicity in Scripture,” and that “the whole disputation is metaphysical.”⁵⁸ And they rail quite skeptically against this whole Christian doctrine, folios 41–42:

You have to drench your mind with the whole of metaphysics, before you understand what composition is, and then “Is there composition from existence and essence?” and “What is it?” and “Is there composition from act and potency?” “What is that?”⁵⁹ whether this composition is true composition; whether it is

sunt Anthropomorphae a Lactantio lib. 4.c.30. Anthropiani. Affine quid erroris istius adhaesisse Tertulliano non obscure colligi videtur ex lib. 2. *adversus Marcionem* c. 16. & *adversus Praxeam*, & testimonio Augustini. lib. 10. *de Genesi* c. 25.26. quamvis lib. *de haeresibus* c. 84. innuat fuisse magis discrepantiam in voce seu absum [231] vocis, quam haeresin. Sequioribus saeculis emergerunt subinde qui simplicitatem Dei oppugnarunt, quorum errores ilico a Scholasticis & ecclesiasticis oppressi & condemnati sunt. Vide condemnationes subiectas *Magistro sententiarum*, anno 1226. & 1340. &c. Meminit etiam *Becanus cap. 1. qu. 1.* cuiusdam Walteri, qui essentiam & attributa Dei realiter distinguebat. Nostra memoria Sociniani haec monstra opinionum ab inferis denuo suscitaverunt, nullum alium in finem, quam ut Christianismi fundamentum Deum scil. unum & trinum convellerent. Hinc in *Catechesi Racoviensi loco de cognitione Dei cap. 1.* ex classe attributorum Dei expungunt, spiritualementem Dei naturam, simplicitatem, infinitatem, invisibilitatem. Eodem fere tendere videntur *Remonstrantes in Confessione*. Quin & in *Apologia* asserunt, *ne iota quidem de simplicitate Dei in scriptura esse* cap. 2. fol. 41. *deinde totam disputationem esse metaphysicam*, Ibid. & sceptice satis totam hanc Christianismi doctrinam exagitant ibid. & fol. 42. *Tota pene metaphysica proluendus est animus, antequam intelligas quid sit compositio, tum an & quid sit compositio ex esse & essentia, ex actu & potentia; an compositio haec sit vera compositio; An simplicitati Dei repugnet, si volitiones &*

48. Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, book 4, chapter 30, ANF 7, p. 133.

49. Tertullian, *Against Marcion*, book 2, chapter 16, ANF 3, 91.

50. Tertullian, *Against Praxeam*, ANF 3, 602.

51. Augustine, *On Genesis*, trans. Edmund Hill, *The Works of Saint Augustine, A Translation for the 21st Century*, I/13 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2002), 425.

52. Müller, *The De Haeresibus of Saint Augustine*, 121

53. The 1226 and 1340 dates refer to condemnations of teachings found to be unapproved in Lombard, which lists became commonly attached to editions of the *Sentences*. See for example, “Collectio Errorum Parisiis Condemnatorum. Errores Parisiis Condemnati a Domino Guilermo Episcopo Parisiensi,” in *Magistri sententiarum libri quatuor* (Lugduni: apud haeredes Iacobi Iuntae, 1564), 401, 402v.

54. Cf. Martinus Becanus, *Summa Theologiae scholasticae*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1622), 8.

55. This is likely Walter of Winterburn (d. 1305), who among other things wrote a commentary on the *Sentences* and on theological questions.

56. Cf. *The Racovian Catechism*, trans. Thomas Rees (London: 1818), 26.

57. Cf. *The Arminian Confession of 1621*, trans. Mark Ellis (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2005), 45–46.

58. Simon Episcopus, *Apologia pro confessione sive Declaratione sententiae eorum, qui in Foederato Belgio vocantur Remonstrantes, super praecipuis articulis religionis Christianae* (1629), 41.

59. The first two scholastic questions are whether something exists (an sit) and second what that something is (quid sit), here asked of both composition *ex esse et essentia* as also *ex actu et potentia*.

incompatible with God's simplicity if you say his free volitions and actions are distinct from his essence. Because if there were no distinction, how God's will could be free is inexplicable—indeed, how his will could cease and desist, because his essence is not free, but always remains utterly the same and cannot ever cease. Likewise, it is clearly said of God that he hates and opposes the just man whom he loves when he falls away from his justice. How then is that love and the hatred that follows it, in respect of the same subject, God's same essence, which always stays the same; and other things of this sort. And how few mortals understand these questions! The extremely sharp minds have here something on which to exercise their industry. And after they do this, then their disputes are drier than sand. You might say they put a cross on themselves on which they might hang suspended. Thus the Remonstrants leave these decisions to their academic teachers and to all those for whom it is permitted to wrestle in this dry dust and slay themselves. Third, and why should they do otherwise?—it is not necessary for them to be understood, according to the very foundation of their censors, which they proposed in their *Synopsis of Purer Theology*, disputation 3, thesis 19: "Whatever Scripture does not contain, although it does not differ in the slightest way from Scripture, is not a dogma necessary for salvation."⁶⁰

(See, if you would, the rest of this.) All this is not surprising, seeing as the Remonstrants made Conrad Vorstius' profane disputation on God their own by approving of it in 1611. Vorstius had sketched out in his book *On God*, pages 207, 209–10, 214, 219, 221, 224, that God was bodily, visible, mutable, subject to accidents, had many things in him, etc.⁶¹ He continued to persist defending these horrendous speculations with various exegesis, defenses, and other polemical writings against all of Christianity. For this, you can look at the following: *Apologia Regis Magna Britannia*;⁶² Eglisam, *Crisis et Hypocrisis*;⁶³ *Examen Responsi Vorstii ad Articulos ex Anglia transmissos*;⁶⁴ the writings of Slade;⁶⁵ those of the ministers at Leovardia;⁶⁶ the writings of Johannes Piscator;⁶⁷ and those of Sibrandus Lubbertus against Vorstius⁶⁸ and against Grotius, Vorstius's patron,⁶⁹ the

actiones Dei liberae ab essentia Dei dicantur distincta; quia inexplicabile videtur, quomodo, si distinctio nulla sit, volitio Dei libera esse possit, imo quomodo volitio desinere ac cessare possit, cum essentia libera non sit, sed semper eadem prorsus maneat, nec desinere unquam possit: Item, cum de Deo expresse dicatur, quod iustum; quem amat, a iustitia sua deficientem odio habeat & aversetur, quomodo amor iste & odium subsequens amorem, respectu eiusdem subiecti, sit ipsa Dei essentia, quae eadem semper manet, & quae sunt eius commatis alia. Et quotusquisque mortalium quaestiones istas intelligit? habent ibi acutissima ingenia, in quo exerceant industriam suam. Et postquam id fecerunt, altercationes eorum aridiores sunt arena. Crucem dices eos sibi ipsi fixisse, ex qua suspensi haereant. Remonstrantes itaque earum decisiones Doctoribus Academicis relinquunt, & iis omnibus, quibus licet in arido isto pulvere luctari & se iugulare. Tertio, Et cur faciant aliter? ut intelligantur necesse non est, iuxta ipsum horum Censorum fundamentum, quod in Synopsi suae Theologiae purioris posuerunt. Dipsut. III. Thes. 19. Quicquid Scriptura non continetur, quamvis simpliciter ab ea non dissentiat, non est necessarium ad salutem dogma. Vide, quaeso, reliqua. Nec mirum, cum anno 1611. profanas disput. Conr. Vorstii de Deo, approbando suas fecissent. Ille enim in libr. de Deo p. 207. 209. 210. 214. 219. 221. 246. delinearat Deum corporeum, visibilem, mutabilem, accidentibus subiectum, in quo essent res plures, &c. quae monstra opinionum exegibus, apologiis, aliisque scriptis polemicis adversus totum Christianismum defendere non destitit. Videatur Apologia Regis Magna Britannia, Eglisemii Crisis & Hypocrisis, Examen Responsi Vorstiani ad [232] articulos ex Anglia transmissos, scripta Sladi, Ministrorum Leovardiensium, Piscatoris, Sibrandi Lubberti contra Vorstium, & contra Grotium Vorstii patronum, & Bogermann

60. This is cited from *Apologia*, p. 41–42. [See Polyander et al., *Synopsis Purioris Theologiae (Synopsis of a Purer Theology)*, volume 1 (Brill, 2014), 86–87.]

61. Vorstius, *Tractatus theologicus de Deo, sive de natura et attributis Dei* (1610).

62. *Declaratio serenissimi magnae Britanniae Regis, qua quid cum generalibus foederatarum Belgii Provinciarum ordinibus super re Vorstii actum tractatumque sit, singillatim explicatur* (Norton, 1612), Ex *Apologia*, 24ff.

63. George Eglisam, *Crisis Vorstiani responsi, qua D. Conradus Vorstius denuo atheismi, ethnicismi, judaismi, turcismi, haereseos, schismatis et ignorantiae arguitur* (Delphis, 1612). *Hypocrisis apologeticae orationis Vorstianae, cum secunda provocatione ad D. Conradum Vorstium* (Delphis, 1612).

64. *Examen Responsionis quam D. Conradus Vorsius edidit ad Articulos ex Anglia transmissos* (1612). 12pp.

65. Matthew Slade, *Cum Corrado Vorstio theol. doct. de blasphemiiis, etc.* (1612).

66. *Specimen candoris & veracitatis Conradi Vorstii, per Pastores Ecclesiae Leovardiensis* (Lugd. Bat., 1612).

67. Johannes Piscator, *Ad Conradi Vorstii, S. Theol. D. amicam colationem* (1613); *Tractatus de gratia Dei: in quo disputatur quaestio* (1614); *Tractatus de divina praedestinatione* (1618).

68. Lubbertus, *Commentarii ad nonaginta novem errores Conradi Vorstii* (1613).

69. E.g., Lubbertus, *Responsio ad Pietatem H. Grotii* (1614).

writings of Johannes Bogerman and Gottfried Sopingius against the same Grotius;⁷⁰ and finally, the judgment of the National Dordrecht Synod, in 1619, on Vorstius's doctrine and writings.⁷¹ And recently, the Socinian [Jan] Crell, in his supplement to Völkel's *Institutes*, described God's essence in a very similar way, Vorstius's book *On God* having been cited for the sake of honor and mentioned in the margin.⁷²

4.⁷³

We will now briefly resolve the arguments [against simplicity] which we are aware that either our just reviewed opponents have brought forward or else somebody might think one could offer. The first argument is that you do not find one bit of it in the Scriptures. *Response*. If everything is not established by the terms of the schools or those used today, or explicitly through theses and antitheses—nevertheless, we gather this teaching from Scripture by consequence, as we showed in thesis 2 above. See our disputations, *On Human Reason in Matters of Faith*;⁷⁴ and, *On Fundamental Articles and Errors*.⁷⁵

The second argument is that the entire teaching is philosophical, scholastic, and metaphysical. So none of it pertains to the Christians' faith and piety. *Response*. We deny that the teaching is materially and in itself philosophical, even though one could say it is formally such, insofar as one presents simplicity and vindicates it from the opponents' pseudo-philosophical tricks by using philosophical or scholastic terms. One could also raise the same objection against the teaching about all God's attributes, even those that the Socinians and Remonstrants themselves propose; and likewise the teaching on the Trinity, teaching on the person and natures of Christ against Eutychnus and Nestorius—in fact, even almost all of theology.

The third argument is that the entire doctrine is uncertain and inexplicable. Therefore, it is better to at least go the skeptic route, if you do not take the Vorstian or Socinian one. Our opponents prove the antecedent proposition, because metaphysicians do not agree about the explanation of the terms "simplicity" or "composition." *Response*. The criterion for truth is not that all

ac Sopingii contra eundem Grotium, denique iudicium Synodi Nationalis Dordracena anno 1619. de Doctrina & scriptis Vorstii. Nuper etiam Crellius Socinianus in supplemento Institutionum Volckelii simili fere modo Dei essentiam descripsit, citato etiam honoris causa, & in margine allegato libro Vorstii de Deo.

4. Rationes quas ab abversariis iam recensitis unquam adductas scimus, aut alioquin adduci posse quis putaret, breviter sic diluimus. *Prima*, est, ne iota haberi in sacris literis. *Resp.* Si terminis scholarum & hodie usitatis, aut si explicite per theses & antitheses omnia ibi non decidantur, per consequentiam tamen doctrina haec inde colligitur, ut *thesi 2.* super ostensum est. Confer. *Disput. nostram, De ratione humana in rebus fidei;* & alteram, de *Articulis & erroribus fundamentalibus. Secunda*, tota doctrina est philosophica, scholastica, metaphysica. Ergo nihil ad fidem & pietatem Christianorum. *Resp.* *Negamus* materialiter & in se esse philosophicam, quamvis formaliter dici posset talis, quatenus terminis philosophicis & scholasticis proponitur, & ab adversariorum strophis pseudo-philosophicis vindicatur. Idem posset obiici doctrinae de omnibus attributis Dei, etiam iis quae Sociniani & Remonstrantes ipsi proponunt, item de Trinitate, Christi persona & naturis contra Eutychnus & Nestorium, immo de tota fere Theologia. *Tertia*, Tota doctrina haec incerta & inexplicabilis est, ergo praeſtat hic si non Vorstianos aut Socinianos, saltem Scepticos agere. Antecedens probatur, quia Metaphysicis non convenit in expositione terminorum simplicitatis & compositionis. *Resp.* Non est hoc κριτήριον

70. Johannes Bogerman, *Ad Scripti Hugonis Grotii Partes priores duas, in quibus tractat causam Vorstii & Remonstrantium, sive Pastorum illorum, qui sequuntur sententiam J. Arminii, Annotationes In gratiam Lectoris veritatis studiosi conscriptae a Johanne Bogermano Ecclesiae Leovardiensi* (1614). Gottfried Sopingius, *Apologetica responsio ad libellum anonymum qui vocatur Bona fides Sibrandi Lybberti et ad Hugonis Grotii pietatem cui annexa est ipsa Bona fides anonymi & Vita auctori* (1616).

71. Session 150–152, May 4, 1619. Cf. *The Judgement of the Synode Holden at Dort, Concerning the five Articles: As also their sentence touching Conradus Vorstius* (London: John Bill, 1619), 101–106.

72. Johann Völkel, *De vera religione, libri quinque quibus praefixus est Iohannis Crellii Franci liber De Deo et ejus attributis, ita ut unum cum illis opus constituat* (1630). Vorstius' *De Deo* is not cited in the margin, but the margin title of the first chapter title is similar. Crell does cite other works by Vorstius (*Responsio ad Matthaei Sladii and Apologetica exegesis contra Becanum*) on page 278 in the margin.

73. The marginal numbering of the sections which may have been supplied by the printer, skip "5" and start again at "6"; however, these are all subpoints to the fourth point, with 1–5 being omitted in the numbering in the margin. A second error is made in numbering the eighth argument as "7" in the margin.

74. "De ratione humana in rebus fidei," in *Selectarum disputationum textualium prima de insolubilibus (ut vocant) scripturae* (1636).

75. "De Articulis et Erroribus Fundamentalibus," *Resp.* Johanne Alemloveen, Ultrajecino, Ad diem 18. Mart. 1637." See *Selectarum Disputationum theologiarum*, vol. 2 (1655), 511.

authors understand something the same way. However the metaphysicians and scholastics (Thomists and Scotists) vary in their explanation of terms and of this controversy, nevertheless, everybody certainly aims at this: removing all composition from God. Just look at Joannes de Rada's *Controversies between Thomas and Scotus*, part 1, controversy 4.⁷⁶

The fourth argument is that the Scriptures ascribe members, parts, and affections to God. Therefore, there is one different thing and another different thing in him. *Response*. Scripture says all these things anthropopathically, and we should understand them as suited to divine majesty. Let us say, though, that someone did not want to understand these metaphorical things figuratively. On that line of reasoning, it would be proven that God is a stone, a lion, has wings, and is something conflated with various creatures (banish the blasphemy!). For he is called a fire, a rock, a lion, and so on; and Scripture attributes members to him—not just those of people, but even of other creatures. What is more, he is said to sleep, forget, be distant, grieve, repent, be angry, etc. Yet we are taught we should explain these phrases metaphorically by: Augustine's *On True and False Religion*, chapter 50, letter 112, and his book *On the Essence of Divinity*;⁷⁷ under Tertullian's name, Novatian's *On the Trinity*, chapters 6–7;⁷⁸ Jerome's letter 15;⁷⁹ Isidore's *Etymologies*, book 3;⁸⁰ Gregory [the Great's] *Morals on Job*, book 14, chapter 22;⁸¹ and the John of Damascus' *On the Orthodox Faith*, book 1, chapter 14.⁸²

The fifth argument is this. Because there is a plurality of attributes in God that are really distinct from him and from each other—at least so distinct as not to be God himself—therefore, God is not simple. *Response*. We deny the antecedent. Such attributes are God himself; nor do goodness, righteousness, power, intellect, and will, for example, really differ. There are certain people, such as Scotus and his school, who grant that the attributes are distinguished formally “according to the nature of the thing.” This is because, though the attributes are the same simple thing, nevertheless they are formal distinct concepts “according to the nature of the thing.” For the formal concept and definition of one attribute (e.g., intellect or righteousness) is not the definition and formal concept of another (e.g., will or mercy). Among recent authors, Rada, bishop of Patti, subtly defends this opinion [of a formal distinction on

veritatis, ut omnes authores eam aequae intelligent. Quidquid in explicatione terminorum & controversiae huius varient sive Metaphysici, sive Scholastici Thomistae & Scotistae, omnes tamen hoc certatim agunt ut omnem compositionem a Deo removeant. Vide modo *Rhadam controversiarum inter Thomam & Scotum part. 1. controvers. 4. Quarta*, In scripturis Deo membra, partes, affectus adscribuntur, ergo est in ipso aliud & aliud. *Resp.* ἀνθρωποπαθῶς haec dicuntur, quae θεοπρεπῶς intelligenda. Si quis enim metaphorica illa proprie velit intelligi, iam eadem methodo probatum esset Deum esse lapidem, leonem, habere alas, esse quid (absit blasphemia) ex variis animantibus conflatum. Vocatur enim ignis, rupes, leo &c. & membra non tantum hominis sed & aliorum animantium illi tribuuntur. Dicitur praeterea dormire, oblivisci, procul esse, dolere, poenitere; irasci &c. Sed metaphorice has phrases explicandas docent *Augustinus de vera & falsa religione cap. 50. & epist. 112. & in libr. de [233] Essentia divinitatis, Novatianus sub nomine Tertulliani de Trinitate cap. 6. & 7. Hieronymus epistol. 15. Isidor. lib. 3. Etymolog. Gregorius lib. 14. Moralium cap. 22. Damascen. lib. 1. de Orthod. fide cap. 14. Quinta*, Quia in Deo sunt plurima attributa realiter ab ipso & inter se distincta, saltem ita distincta ut non sint ipse Deus, Ergo. *Resp. Neg. antecedens*. Sunt ipse Deus, nec realiter differunt ex. gr. bonitas, iustitia, potentia, intellectus, voluntas. Sunt qui concedunt distingui ex natura rei formaliter, ut *Scotus* cum suis, quia quamvis sint eadem res simplex, tamen ex natura rei sunt distinctae rationes formales, non enim ratio formalis & definitio unius ex. gr. intellectus aut iustitiae, est definitio & ratio formalis alterius ex. gr. voluntatis aut misericordiae, quam sententiam subtiliter contra omnes Thomistas defendit ex recentioribus *Rhada* Episcopus Pactensis *loc. cit.* Alii vero ut

76. Joannes de Rada, *Controversiae theologicae inter S. Thomam & Scotum, super quatuor libros Sententiarum*. 4 vols. (1620).

77. Augustine, *De vera religione*, PL 34, col. 165. Letter 147 alias 112, *De Videndo Deo*, PL 33, col. 596; *Works: Letters, volume 2, 100–155*, trans. John E. Rotelle, *The Works of Saint Augustine, A Translation*

for the 21st Century (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2003), Letter 147, 317–349. Pseudo-Augustine, *De essentia divinitatis*, PL 42, 1199–1206.

78. Novatian, *A Treatise of Novatian Concerning the Trinity*, chps. 6–7, ANF 5, pp. 615–617.

79. Letter XV. To Pope Damasus. NPNF2 v6, pp. 18–20.

80. *Isidore of Seville's Etymologies: Complete English Translation*, Volume I: Books 1–10, trans. Priscilla Throop (2006).

81. *Morals on the Book of Job by St. Gregory the Great*, translated with Notes and Indices, volume 2 (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1845), 118–171, 546–597.

82. NPNF2, vol. 9, p. 17 (second pagination).

the part of the thing] against all the Thomists.⁸³ On the other hand, others, such as the Thomists and more recent Catholic theologians (which I think includes Reformed philosophers and theologians) more truly and accurately establish the distinction between the reason reasoning and the reason reasoned. The former, the reason reasoning, occurs with respect to our intellect; and this is both on account of God's wholly eminent perfection, which cannot be represented by a single concept, as well as on account of the finitude and narrowness of our intellect, which cannot conceive God's whole perfection adequately under a single concept, but needs many inadequate concepts to conceive that perfection. For this reason, it is the case that our intellect conceives one and the same thing dividedly by many formal concepts really distinct—in fact, concepts that are taken up by analogy from created things, which supply these concepts through many distinct qualities that the divine essence is through itself. The latter, the reason reasoned, occurs with respect to the thing itself, because the objective concepts are not really distinct, in act, or in the thing itself; they are virtually or eminently distinct in the effects, outworkings, and terminations. These [Thomists] properly call this distinction of the reason reasoned a virtual or eminent distinction; or (to accommodate to Scotist terms) a formal distinction “according to the nature of the thing,” not as that thing is in act but as it is virtually or eminently, so that there is some foundation for this second distinction on the part of the thing—but, not in God himself, but in his effects. For though the divine essence and perfection is one and simple, it still does not operate according to its own adequate concept. Hence we say that God punishes the wicked according to the concept of justice and saves his own people according to the concept of mercy. He draws Bucephalus out per the idea of horse, and not of man, while Alexander per the idea of man, and not of horse.⁸⁴ Indeed, God's attributes of justice and mercy as they are in act, just as the ideas of man and horse, are not multiplied or distinguished in God himself. Instead, they are only distinguished virtually in the effects themselves, or in the termination in such and such work or effect. Younger theologians should learn the nature of this distinction from common authors, both metaphysicians and logicians, and then apply it to the present issue. Usually authors offer here two examples (among many others): the example of the soul and the light of the sun. In man, the soul is really one; yet it is

Thomistae & recentiores Pontificii plerique (cum quibus puto facere philosophos & Theologos reformatos) verius & accuratius statuunt hic distinctionem rationis ratiocinantis & ratiocinatae. *Illam* quidem a parte intellectus nostri, tum propter eminentissimam Dei perfectionem quae non potest unica ratione repraesentari, tum propter finitudinem & angustiam intellectus nostri, qui non potest totam Dei perfectionem unico conceptu adaequate concipere, sed indiget ad eam concipiendam multis conceptibus inadaequatis, hinc fit ut pluribus conceptibus formalibus realiter distinctis divisim unam eandemque rem concipiat, conceptibus, inquam, analogice desumptis a rebus creatis, quae per multas distinctasque qualitates praestant ea, quae essentia divina per se. *Hanc* vero a parte rei, quia varii sunt conceptus obiectivi non realiter, actu, in se; sed virtualiter seu eminenter in effectibus, egressibus & terminationibus distincti. Hanc distinctionem proprie vocant rationis ratiocinatae, virtualem aut eminentem; seu (ut terminis Scotisticis eam aptemus) ex natura rei formalem non actu sed virtute aut eminenter. Ita ut huius posterioris distinctionis aliquod sit fundamentum a parte rei, non quidem in ipso Deo, sed in effectibus Dei. Quamvis enim una & simplex sit essentia & perfectio divina, non tamen operatur secundum adaequatam suam rationem. Unde dicimus Deum punire malos secundum rationem iustitiae, salvare suos secundum rationem misericordiae, producere bucephalum ad ideam equi, non hominis; Alexandrum vero ad ideam hominis non equi. Actu quidem attributa iustitiae & misericordiae, ut etiam ideae hominis & equi in ipso Deo non multiplicantur aut distinguuntur; sed distinguuntur solummodo virtualiter in ipsis effectibus, seu in terminatione ad opus aut effectum talem & talem. Distinctionis [244 sic] huius naturam ex vulgaribus authoribus Metaphysicis, & Logicis, suis discant iuniores, & rei praesenti applicent. Exempla duo plerumque solent produci, animae & luminis solaris. Anima realiter una in homine, virtute seu

83. Loc. Cit.

84. Bucephalus was the horse of Alexander the Great.

threefold in its power or eminently: vegetative, sensitive, and rational. This is because in man one form [i.e., the soul] renders what is vegetative in plants and sensitive in non-human animals. And, although the sun's light is singular, it still contains in itself drying and heating power virtually or with respect to its effects. So when the sun's light enlightens, heats, or dries, it does not act according to its whole concept [of "sunlight"]. For in the action of enlightening as such, the sun's light does not dry or heat, despite the fact that its drying or heating power is not separate from its luminating power; rather, drying and heating power are related to illumination accidentally. This is because light does not operate according to its whole concept, but only according to its concept of illuminating.

Further objection 1. If the persons i.e., real subsistent relations in God really differ, therefore the attributes really differ much more. *Response.* We deny the consequence. The former is a far different idea: the persons are really the same as the essence in such a way that they are still relatively opposed to each other. Further, the persons are not of concern in "essence"—that is, they are not essential predications, which are included intrinsically in the essence. And neither of these are found among the attributes.

Further objection 2. This is Walter's objection.⁸⁵ The attributes are in different categories—for example, essence is in the category of substance and goodness is in that of quality. *Response.* Well now, boys in school have learned that God is only in a category analogically.

Further objection 3. When we cannot predicate things about each other reciprocally and about the essence in the abstract, nominative case, and by synonymous predication, they are not really the same. The former is true; the latter is therefore true as well. *Response.* This is a figure of speech fallacy, because the identical sense is switched to the formal sense. We predicate something of another thing either in an identical sense or in a formal sense. As we consider the attributes on the part of the thing itself and insofar as they exist in God, and as they are utterly the same as the essence and among themselves, we can predicate such attributes of each other reciprocally in an identical sense. Thus, it is correct and entirely true to say that "the essence is life on the part of the thing itself, and the will is the intellect on the part of the thing itself;" and vice versa—and this pertains to everything else in God. But, as we conceive the attributes, and as they are in our conceptions, we cannot predicate them of each other reciprocally in a true and proper way—that is, in a formal sense. The reason for this is because on that line the attributes are

eminenter triplex est vegetativa, sensitiva, rationalis; quia una illa forma praestat in homine, quod vegetativa in plantis, sensitiva in brutis. Lumen solis unicum cum sit, virtute tamen seu quod ad effectus suos, continet in se vim exsiccativam & calefactivam. Sed cum illuminat, aut calefacit, aut exsiccatur non operatur secundum omnem suam rationem. Illuminandi enim actione, qua tali, non exsiccatur aut calefacit quamvis a vi luminativa non sit separata vis exsiccativa aut calefactiva, sed habent se ad illuminationem per accidens; quia lumen non operatur secundum omnem suam rationem, sed tantummodo secundum rationem illuminandi. *Instantia 1.* Si personae & relationes in Deo differunt realiter, ergo multo magis attributa. *Resp. Neg.* consequentia. Longe enim diversa est ratio: Personae ita sunt realiter idem cum essentia, ut tamen relative inter se opponantur; ad haec non sint de essentia; hoc est non sint praedicata essentialia, quae intrinsece in essentia includantur: quorum neutrum in attributis locum habet. *Instantia 2.* quae est Walteri. Attributa sunt in diversis praedicamentis, ex. gr. essentia in substantia, bonitas in qualitate. *Resp.* Iam pueri in scholis norunt Deum esse in praedicamento analogice. *Instantia 3.* Quae de se mutuo & de essentia non possunt in abstracto, casu recto, & synonymica praedicatione praedicari, illa non sunt realiter idem. Sed verum prius. Ergo. *Resp.* Est fallacia figurae dictionis: mutatur enim sensus identicus in formalem. Praedicatur aliquid de alio aut in sensu identico aut in sensu formali. Attributa ut considerantur a parte rei & quatenus sunt in Deo atque adeo cum essentia & inter se plane idem sunt, possunt de se invicem praedicari sensu identico, sic recte & verissime dixeris: *Essentia ex parte rei est vita, voluntas ex parte rei est intellectus,* & vice versa, & sic in aliis. Sed ut attributa concipiuntur a nobis, & ut sunt in nostris conceptibus, vere ac proprie de se invicem praedicari non possunt, in sensu scilicet formali, ratio est, quia sic non sunt plane idem sed ratione ratiocinante & ratiocinata (virtuali scilicet) distinguuntur: plures enim sunt conceptus obiectivi virtualiter distincti qui respondent pluribus conceptibus formalibus realiter distinctis. Non potest ergo dici: *Conceptus obiectivus voluntatis est conceptus obiectivus intellectus,* aut, *attributum misericordiae est attributum iustitiae*

85. See Becanus, *Summa Theologiae scholasticae*, 8.

not utterly the same; they are instead distinguished by the reason reasoning and the reason reasoned (namely, by a virtual distinction). For many objective concepts are virtually distinct that correspond to many formal concepts really distinct. So you cannot say, “The objective concept of will is the objective concept of intellect,” or, “The attribute of mercy is the attribute of punitive justice.” But still, we have to note that there are some propositions we can take in either sense. These are the ones that deploy the copula “is”: e.g., “the intellect is the will,” “understanding is willing,” “mercy is justice.” When you take these propositions in the abstract and in the identical sense, they are true; but they are false when you take them in the formal sense. There are also other propositions that we always take in the formal sense. Under these limits, the propositions in which you signify essential and notional acts are absolutely and always false. Essential acts are ones such as “the intellect understands” or “the will wills,” while the notional acts are ones such as “the Father generates,” “the Son is generated,” or “the Holy Spirit proceeds.” These are only true when you signify something as belonging to God according to the same concept to which it truly pertains. But they are false when you signify something as belonging to God according to some other concept that relates accidentally and that it does not truly pertain to: for example, “the intellect wills,” “the will understands,” “justice shows mercy,” or “mercy punishes.” Yet, these propositions can be true under other limits—that is, when you take them in the abstract, absolutely, and as they are in God on the part of the thing itself, not as they are observed in distinct effects, as the principles of different productions, or according to different emanations from God, such as, “that thing, which is the will, understands,” or “that thing, which is mercy, punishes.”

6.

The sixth argument is, [God is not simple] because there is a plurality of persons in God, which are three if not more. For the Father is one thing, substance or essence, the Son is another, and the Holy Spirit is yet one more. Or so Vorstius philosophizes in his *Treatise on God*, and *Apologetic Explanation*, in *Fuller Response*, in *Catalog of the Errors of Sibrandus Lubbertus*.⁸⁶ And these

punitivae. Notandum tamen, esse aliquas propositiones quae in utroque sensu accipi possunt; illae scilicet quae constant copula *est* ex. gr. *Intellectus est voluntas, intelligere est velle, misericordia est iustitia*. Quae in abstracto & in sensu identico acceptae sunt verae, in sensu vero formali falsae. [245 sic] Sunt & aliae quae semper accipiuntur in sensu formali, atque adeo sub illis terminis absolute & semper sunt falsae, in quibus significantur actus essentialia aut notionalia. Essentialia, ut, *intellectus intelligit, voluntas vult. Notionalia, ut, pater generat, filius generatur, spiritus s. procedit*. Quae tantum verae sunt, quando significatur aliquid Deo convenire secundum eam rationem, secundum quam vere convenit: sed falsae sunt, quando significatur aliquid Deo convenire secundum aliam rationem, quae se habet per accidens & secundum quam vere non convenit. ex. gr. *intellectus vult, voluntas intelligit, iustitia miseretur, misericordia punit*. Quae tamen sub aliis terminis verae esse possunt, sumptae scilicet in abstracto, in se, ut sunt a parte rei in Deo, non vero ut attenduntur in distinctis effectibus tanquam principia diversarum productionum, aut secundum diversas Dei emanationes: ut, *res illa, quae est voluntas, intelligit, res illa, quae est misericordia, punit*.

6. *Sexta*, quia plures sunt personae in Deo, quae sunt tres res si non plures; alia enim res, substantia, sive essentia est pater, alia filius, alia spir. s. Sic Philosophatur Vorstius tract. de Deo p. 205. 209. 219. & in Exegetic. apologetic. p. 39. in Responso pleniori p. 11. in Catalogo errorum Sibrandi p. 2. & 5. Et haec Socinianis favere

86. *Traclatus theologicus de Deo*, 205, 209, 219; *Apologetica exegesis sive declaratio locorum aliquot quae ex libro ejusdem de Deo excerptae pro erroneis impositae emanaverunt ... accessit app. adversus iniquas M. Becani criminationes* (Lugdunum Batavorum, Patius, 1611), 39; *Prodromus plenioris responsisuo tempore cum Deo secuturi* (Lugdunum Batavorum: Patius, 1612), 11; *Catalogus Errorum D. Sibrandi Lubberti* (Lugdunum Batavorum: Patius, 1612), 2, 5.

points seem to favor the Socinians to assail the Trinity of persons. The Jews and Muslims hound the Trinity with the same absurd point,⁸⁷ as you can see in Rabbi David Kimhi's *Responses to the places in the psalms adduced on behalf of the Trinity*,⁸⁸ and in *Polisher Mirror* by Ahmed Ibn Zin Alabedin with Filippo Guadagnoli's *Apology for the Christian Religion in Arab and Latin against the said Achmed*, tract 2, cap. 10, sect. 8.⁸⁹ *Response*. The divine persons are compared in a twofold way: either together with the essence or reciprocally.

In the former way, we deny that the divine persons are really distinguished from the essence. Rather, we say that the persons are really the same as the essence and distinguished only eminently "from the nature of the thing itself."⁹⁰ This is generally how one distinguishes nature and suppositum in created things. Though nature and suppositum are really the same, it is still not the case that whatever we predicate truly, singularly, and affirmatively of one thing we predicate of the other; rather, we affirm something singular about one and truly deny it about the other. So, "being communicated" is affirmed of nature, and denied of suppositum; and, vice versa, "being incommunicable" is affirmed of suppositum but denied of nature.

The persons are really distinguished in the latter way. This is because Scripture speaks of the Father as one, the Son as another, and the Holy Spirit as still one more (John 5:32; 14:16), and because the persons are opposed relatively—and when things are opposed, they as such cannot be the same as each other. The persons however are not distinguished essentially; in fact, every essential distinction is real, but not vice versa. By way of comparison: in the creation of an angel, you have the substance of an angel and the creation of an angel; and despite this, these two [i.e., the substance and creation] do not entail composition. This is because creation is nothing else but the simple substance of an angel with respect to the Creator, as though with respect to him from whom the angel exists; notwithstanding, this respect does not introduce some new entity. Likewise, the multiplication of persons in God does not imply composition, because there is no multiplication except through a relation. (For all things in God are the same, and one absolutely simple entity.) The real relation that "goes-toward" can still though render a real distinction without any composition.

87. The opponent's point is that both Muslims and Jews have noted that the Trinity account falls prey to opposing divine simplicity. Thus, "that there are three" entails there are at least three things in God—and therefore he is not simple.

88. David Kimhi (1160–1235) argued vigorously against the divinity

videntur, ad impugnandam personarum trinitatem. Iudaei & Mahumedistae eodem absurdo urgent trinitatem ut videre est in *R. Davidis Kimchii responso ad loca ex psalmis pro Trinitate allata*; & in *Politore speculi Ahmedii filii Zin Alabedin Persae*, apud Philippum Guadagnolum in *apologia pro Christiana religione Arab-lat, contra dictum Achmedum tract. 2. cap. 10. sect. 8. Resp.* Personae divinae conferuntur dupliciter aut cum essentia, aut inter se. Priori modo negamus personas divinas realiter distingui ab essentia: sed dicimus eas realiter idem esse cum essentia, distingui tantum ex natura rei eminenter. Quomodo fere in rebus creatis distinguuntur natura & suppositum; quae quamvis realiter idem sunt, non tamen quidquid vere, singulariter, & affirmative praedicatur de uno, etiam praedicatur de altero, sed aliquod singulare quod affirmatur de uno vere negatur de altero. Sic *communicari* affirmatur de natura, & negatur de supposito; & vice versa *incommunicabile* affirmatur de supposito & negatur de natura. *Posteriori modo*, personae distinguuntur realiter, quia scriptura alium dicit patrem, alium filium, alium spiritum sanctum *Iohan 5.v.32 & 14.16*. & quia relative opponuntur: atqui opposita qua talia non possunt esse idem. Non tamen distinguuntur essentialiter; omnis quidem distinctio essentialis est realis, sed non contra. Simile hoc potest adferri: Sicut in creatione angeli habetur substantia angeli, & creatio angeli: & tamen haec duo non faciunt compositionem: quia creatio nihil aliud est quam simplex substantia angeli cum respectu ad creatorem, tanquam ad [236] eum a quo est. Atqui respectus hic non infert aliam & novam entitatem. Sic in Deo multiplicatio personarum non infert compositionem; quod non sit nisi per relationem; (omnia enim in Deo idem sunt & una simplicissima entitas): atqui relatio realis adveniens potest facere distinctionem realem

of Christ, his two natures, and against the doctrine of the Trinity in his various commentaries in Hebrew, e.g. on Psalms 2 and 22 in his work on the Psalms. *Commentarium Hebraicum Rabbi David Kimhi, in decem primos Psalmos Davidicos* (1544).

89. Filippo Guadagnoli, *Apologia pro christiana religione qua a R. P. Philippo Guadagnolo Malleanensi, clericorum regul. Minorum s. theologiae & arabicae linguae professore, respondetur ad objectiones Ahmed filii Zin Alabedin, Persae Asphahensis, contentas in libro inscripto Politor speculi* (Rome, 1631), 341; in in Arabic, 1637.

90. On this distinction, see the discussion in Sebastian Rehnman, "The Doctrine of God in Reformed Orthodoxy," in Herman Selderhuis, *A Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy* (Brill, 2013), 394ff. Rehnman cites this passage on page 395–6, n197. Rehnman also refers to the discussion in Van Mastricht on "The distinction of the persons from the essence," 2.24.8 (cf. *Theoretical-Practical Theology*, vol. 2 [Reformation Heritage Books, 2019], 503), Turretin, 3.27.3 (*Institutes* (P&R, 1992), 1.278), and Polyander et al., *Synopsis Purioris Theologiae*, 7:xi (*Synopsis of a Purer Theology*, volume 1 [Brill, 2014], 232).

Further objection 1. The persons as such are either nothing or they are something. Now if they are nothing, the Trinity is denied. If they are something, if they are entities, they therefore have essence. Consequently, when you consider the persons formally, they are three distinct essences. *Response.* We deny that whatever is something or has some entity or formality has essence also. For on that line, among created things, existence and suppositality (because they are not nothing but something) would have essence, and consequently there would be an essence of that essence, and again an essence of that—and so on unto infinity, which is entirely ridiculous. In his *Crisis and Hypocrisis*, Eglisam for the most part tried to teach this to Vorstius.⁹¹

Further objection 2. Where opposites are really distinct, some composition obtains. The persons as such are really distinct. Therefore, some composition obtains. *Response.* Composition requires not only distinction of opposites, but a union of them also. But there is no union of the persons as such, as one takes them formally. This is because there is not one person, but three.

Further objection 3. When the essence is communicable and the personality is incommunicable from both of which a divine person results, composition of essence and mode obtains. *Response.* We do not want to say, “The modes do not compose, but distinguish,” or, “Composing opposites should be things that are really distinct,” as this objection is commonly resolved. (Because this does not remove secondary composition of nature and suppositum, essence and existence, and genus and difference.) Yet denying the consequence will suffice. “[Divine] essence” does not pertain to a mode of potency, nor does “person” pertain to the mode of act. Yet you have to have act and potency in every composition, whether you speak of it properly or improperly. In point of fact, “person” refers to the essence and personality or a certain mode of subsisting, but without any composition, which is how one usually conceives of it in a created “person.” The reason for this difference between a divine and created person is that “essence” in created things concerns imperfect actuality and is divisible through that which brings it together to be an individual or person—namely, through an individual or personal difference. Of course, the divine nature or divine essence has no potentiality, such that it could be determined, brought together, or actualized through the personal properties. This is because something which from itself is thus “this” thing and singular and existing from itself, in such a way that its singularity

absque ulla compositione. *Instantia 1.* Personae qua tales aut nihil sunt aut aliquid; si nihil iam negatur Trinitas; si aliquid, si entia, ergo essentiam habent, & per consequens formaliter consideratae sunt tres distinctae essentiae. *Resp. Neg.* quidquid est aliquid, seu quod habet aliquam entitatem, seu formalitatem, habere etiam essentiam. Tum enim in creatis existentia & suppositalitas, quia non sunt nihil sed aliquid, haberent essentiam, & consequenter essentiae esset essentia, & huius rursus essentia, & sic in infinitum; quod absurdissimum est. Sic fere Vorstio hoc inculcabat *Eglisemnius in Crisis* p. 20. 21. *Instantia 2.* Ubi sunt extrema realiter distincta ibi est aliqua compositio, sed personae qua tales sunt realiter distinctae, Ergo. *Resp.* Compositio requirit non tantum distinctionem extremorum, sed & unionem. Sed personarum qua talium, ut formaliter sumuntur, non est unio; quia non est una persona, sed tres. *Instantia 3.* Ubi est essentia communicabilis & personalitas incommunicabilis, ex quibus resultat persona divina, ibi est compositio ex essentia & modo. *Resp.* Nolumus dicere, ut vulgo solvitur haec obiectio; *Modi non componunt, sed distinguunt;* aut *extrema componentia debent esse res, realiter distincta* (quia hoc non tolleret compositionem secundariam ex natura & supposito, essentia & esse, genere & differentia) sed suffecerit negare consequentiam; quia essentia non habet se ad modum potentiae, nec persona ad modum actus; quod tamen requiritur in omni compositione sive proprie sive improprie dicta. Dicit quidem persona essentiam & personalitatem seu certum subsistendi modum, sed absque omni compositione, quae alias in persona creata concipi solet. Ratio autem discriminis est, quod essentia in creatis imperfectae sit actualitatis & est divisibilis per id quod ipsam ad esse individui aut personae contrahit, per differentiam scil. individualem aut personalem: deitas vero seu essentia divina nullam habet potentialitatem, ut per proprietates personales determinari, contrahi, actuari, possit; nam qui de se ita est haec, & singularis, & per se existens, ut singularitas &

91. Eglisam, *Crisis Vorstiani responsi*, 20–21.

and existence from itself pertain to its formal and essential concept—such a thing also has final unity and actuality in and from itself. Hence, it follows that the divine essence cannot be brought about, actualized, or perfected through paternity, filiation, or procession. Though each of these are acts proper to a person, in no way do these acts pertain to the divine nature itself in such a way that, considered precisely this way, these acts perfect or inform this divine nature. So we have to delimit this axiom, “Where you have two opposites that are distinct by some concept that unite for the constitution of a third thing, you have some composition,” to “one of which pertains to potency and the other to act,” or “when both of which are not in ultimate unity and actuality.” But in a divine person, we need to conceive either act (if I can distinguish for teaching purposes) as ultimate and absolutely perfect: both God’s quidditative act, by which he is quidditatively God, and his relative or personal act. Respecting these acts, the prior act is not actualized by the posterior in itself nor is the posterior act perfected; rather, both these formal concepts are in God according to ultimate proper unity and actuality. On the other hand, a created quiddity and its singularity or personality are two acts, of which the posterior as the last act actualizes and determines the prior.

I believe this is the right solution for this question [manifest in the objection]. To me, what certain other scholastics advance do not seem to sufficiently resolve nor correspond sufficiently to what is taught about the types of composition (and in their *Apology*⁹² the Remonstrants upbraid philosophers for their perplexity and lack of certainty). I think therefore that the learned author, a close friend of mine while he lived, concedes too much about composition in God in his more recent *metaphysics compendium*. Even Becanus himself, though otherwise quite subtle and perspicuous, yields too much for me, when he is moved by this and other arguments and thus concedes in his *Scholastic Doctrine* that “we allow for virtual composition in God ‘according to the nature of the thing,’ because we grant substantial compositionals that are distinguished among themselves virtually or eminently, such as ‘essence and existence, ‘essence and attributes,’ and ‘nature and personality.’” He further says that “we grant actual composition through the operation of our intellect, because we grant substantial compositionals that are distinguished among themselves through the operation of our intellect.”⁹³

Refutation 1. I overturn what Becanus says because composition of reason or of our mind is not composition—just as likewise that virtual distinction unknown in philosophy. One could with equal justification

per se existentia sint de conceptu eius formali & essentiali, etiam de se & ex se habet ultimam unitatem & actualitatem. Hinc ergo sequitur eam per paternitatem aut filiationem, aut processionem non contrahi, actuari aut perfici: quamvis enim sint proprii actus personae, nullo modo sunt actus ipsius naturae divinae ut sic & praecise consideratae, eam perficientes vel informantes. Axioma ergo illud: *Ubi sunt duo extrema aliqua ratione distincta, quae concurrunt ad con[237]stitutionem tertii, ibi est aliqua compositio*; sic limitandum est, *quorum alterum sit potentiae alterum actus vel, qua utraque non sint in ultima sua unitate & actualitate*. Sed in persona divina uterque actus (ita liceat docendi causa distinguere) & *quidditativus*, quo quidditative est Deus, & *relativus* seu personalis debet concipi ultimus & perfectissimus, quorum prior a posteriori in se non actualatur aut ulterius perficitur, sed ambae illae rationes formales sunt in Deo secundum ultimam unitatem & actualitatem propriam. Contra quidditas creata & eius singularitas aut personalitas sunt duo actus, quorum posterior tanquam ultimus priorem actualat ac determinat. Hanc puto esse genuinam solutionem huius dubii. Nam quae ab aliis quibusdam scholasticis adferuntur, non satis expedita mihi videntur, nec cum doctrina de compositionibus (ubi perplexitatem & incertitudinem Philosophis obiiciunt Remonstrantes in *Apolog. loc. cit.*) satis convenire. Puto ergo in recentiori quodam *compendio Metaphysico* circa compositionem Dei nimium concedi ab erudito autore mihi, cum viveret, amicissimo. Quin ipse *Becanus in doctrina scholastica* alioquin satis subtilis & perspicuus, “nimium mihi labascit, cum hoc aliisque argumentis motus, concedit dari in Deo compositionem virtualem ex natura rei, quia dantur componentia substantialia, quae virtute seu eminenter inter se distinguuntur, ut *essentia & existentia, essentia & attributa, natura & personalitas*. Praeterea dari compositionem actualem per operationem nostri intellectus, quia dantur componentia substantialia, quae per operationem nostri intellectus inter se distinguuntur.” c. 1. qu. 2. praesertim in *tract. 2. theolog. Scholastica cap. 3. qu. 11. Refut. 1.* quia compositio rationis seu mentis nostrae nulla est compositio. Ut & virtualis illa ignota philosophiae. Pari iure posset statui unitas &

92. Remonstrants, *Apology*, loc. cit. Cf. *The Arminian Confession of 1621*, *ibid.*

93. Chapter 1, question 2; especially in treatise 2 in his *Summa Theologiae scholasticae*, chapter 3, question 11.

establish unity and composition between God and creatures or between the sun and minerals, vegetables, and souls, because God and the sun, as universal causes, contain virtually all these other things in themselves.

Refutation 2. This whole speculation rests upon the false hypothesis that wherever there is a distinction, however large and whatever sort it be, there also is composition equally large and of such sort. This hypothesis, nonetheless, is false. Beyond this, composition requires the union of distinct things and also something that has transitioned from potency to act. We distinguish an angel from a stone, man, heaven, and earth; yet an angel is not in composition with any of these. And, to get at this more properly, the Father's personal property is distinct from the Son's personal property. But still, when you take these personal properties precisely and formally, they are not united among themselves and in themselves. This is because union in and with the essence is in some other third thing.

Refutation 3. Becanus seems to have forgotten his own teaching that he set out a bit before, when he gives the following argument (among others) to prove there is no actual composition in God: "This is because things actually distinguished from the nature of the thing cannot be united or cohere among themselves except through the action of an efficient cause. But there is no efficient cause prior to God," etc. Becanus then applies this argument to composition from nature and personality, and essence and existence. But this same argument actually works against virtual composition (as he calls it), if you just add (from the same Becanus) that every composition is from act and potency. Nevertheless, there is no more room in God for virtual potentiality and actualization than for actual potentiality and actualization.

Refutation 4. In a word, where you do not find all the things composition requires, there is no space for composition (however you call it) to occur. The things composition requires are these. First, you have to have opposites that are naturally distinct — namely, they are distinct either really, formally, or modally. Second, these opposites must be united or must have been united. Third, they must presuppose and include potentiality or potency. Fourth, you have to have some efficient cause for this union. Fifth, the following logical consequents have to follow from all these last essential, constitutive requirements for composition: dependence, multiplicity and division, resolution and change. Yet these requirements cannot accord with the divine essence. Therefore, there is no composition. Thus, writers or teachers of metaphysics (which, among all sciences, has to be a

compositio inter Deum & creaturas, inter solem & mineralia, vegetabilia, animalia, quia tanquam causae universales virtualiter ea in se continent. II. Tota haec speculatio nititur falsa ista hypothesi. Ubicunque est distinctio & quanta ac qualis illa est, ibi etiam & tanta & talis est compositio. Sed hoc falsum: requiritur insuper distinctorum unio, & transitus a potentia ad actum. Distinguitur angelus a lapide, ab homine, a coelo, a terra, sed cum eo non componitur. Et ut proprius accedamus, distinguitur proprietates personalis patris a proprietate filii, sed tamen praecise & formaliter ita sumptae non uniuntur inter se & in se: nam unio in & cum essentia est in aliquo tertio. III. Oblitus videtur Becanus propriae doctrinae, paulo ante positae, ubi probaturus in Deo non esse actualem compositionem, inter alia adfert & hoc argumentum: "quia quae actu ex natura rei distinguuntur, non possunt inter se uniri & coalescere nisi per actionem causae efficientis, at nulla causa efficiens prior Deo" &c. & applicat ad compositionem ex [248 sic] natura & personalitate, essentia & existentia. Atqui idem hoc argumentum valet contra virtualem, quam vocat, compositionem, si modo addas ex eodem Becano, omnem compositionem esse ex actu & potentia. Atqui in Deo non magis virtualiter quam actualiter potentialitas & actualitudo locum habet. IV. breviter, ubi omnia requisita compositionis non inveniuntur, ibi nulla compositio, quocunque nomine vocetur, locum habet. Requisite autem sunt, *Primum*: Ut sint extrema distincta ex natura rei scilicet sive realiter, sive formaliter, sive modaliter. *Secundum*, ut uniantur, seu ut sint unita. *Tertium*, Ut praesupponant & includant potentialitatem seu potentiam. *Quartum*, Ut sit aliqua causa efficiens hanc unionem. *Quintum*, Ex essentialibus & constitutivis illis requisitis profluunt haec consecutiva, *dependentia*, *multiplicitas & divisio*, *resolutio & mutatio*: atqui illa requisita divinae essentiae aptari non possunt, ergo nec ulla compositio. Rectius ergo fecerint scriptores & Doctores metaphysicae (quae inter omnes scientias imprimis theologiae ancillari

handmaiden to theology especially) would do better if they define composition with greater accuracy and restriction in this way: a distinction of many things of which one is implicated as act and another as potency. Among more recent authors, this is the way Meurisse does it in his *Metaphysics per Scotus's Intent*.⁹⁴

Further objection 4. If the persons are really identical with the essence, then they are really identical among themselves. The reason for this is because two things that are identical to a third thing are identical among themselves. *Response.* We need to delimit this axiom, thus: things that are identical to a third, singular, incommunicable aspect are mutually identical. But the divine essence is communicable to the three persons. This is what Becanus does in his *Scholastic Theology*.⁹⁵ And there is no problem with adding the commonplace limitation to the axiom: these two things are identical with each other with respect to that third thing. The persons are thus identical with each other with respect to the one, same essence.

The logical consequences are as follows. First, the personal relations are real, and really distinct from each other reciprocally. Indeed, these relations are opposed—I mean, opposed not formally but fundamentally, as pertains to opposed relations that are really distinct. Second, lest you concede that the four relations in God are really distinct, active spiration is not really distinguished in the Father from his paternity or in the Son from his filiation—as the scholastics commonly argued correctly against Durandus [of Saint-Pourcain]. Third, though the persons are really identical with the essence, they are still eminently distinguished from the essence by the reason reasoned—namely, “according to the nature of the thing”—but not actually distinguished. This is because (1) they are so disposed with respect to each other that the essence is absolute while the personality is respective, and the essence is common while the personality is not at all such. And (2) because certain things, for example, pertain to the Father under the concept of his paternity that do not pertain to him under the concept of the essence—such as, “being related to the Son.” And vice versa, certain things pertain to him under the concept of essence, and not under the concept of paternity, such as “being similar to the Son.” So, essence and paternity virtually and eminently contain a formal distinction, because they are related as if they were formally distinguished. Fourth, rightly, it seems to me, the Scotists precisely avoid allowing essence and relations to constitute in God one thing in unity absolutely or accidentally according to composition or quasi-composition, or one thing through aggregation—lest

debet,) si accuratius & pressius definiant Compositionem, *Quod sit distinctio plurium, quorum unum se habet ut actus, & aliud ut potentia.* Quomodo ex recentioribus Meurisse, in sua *metaphysica ad mentem Scoti lib. 1. quaest. 23. Instantia. 4.* Si personae sunt realiter idem cum essentia, sunt realiter idem inter se; ratio est, quia quae sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem inter se. *Resp.* limitandum est hoc axioma: *quae sunt eadem uni tertio singulari incommunicabili ea sunt eadem inter se.* Sed essentia divina est communicabilis tribus personis. Sic Becanus *Theolog. Scholastic. tract. 2. cap. 2. qu. 3.* Nihil vetat etiam vulgatam limitationem axiomatici illi addere: *Sunt eadem inter se respectu illius tertii:* Et sic personae sunt idem inter se respectu unius eiusdemque essentiae.

Consecar. I. *Relationes illae personales sunt reales: & realiter a se invicem distincta, immo etiam opposita; opposita, inquam, non formaliter sed fundamentaliter, quod ad ipsas relationes oppositas, quae realiter distincta.* II. *Spiratio activa non distinguitur realiter in patre a paternitate in filio a filiatione, ne dentur in Deo quatuor relationes realiter distincta: ut recte contra Durandum communiter statuitur a Scholasticis.* III. *Personae quavis realiter idem sint cum essentia, distinguuntur tamen ab ea ratione ratiocinata eminenter soli ex natura rei, non actualiter. Nam ita inter se sunt affecta, ut essentia sit absoluta, personalitas respectiva; essentia communis, personalitas minime. 2. Quia quaedam conveniunt ex. gr. patri ratione paternitatis, quae non conveniunt illi ratione essentiae, ut referratur ad filium: & vicissim quaedam illi conveniunt ratione essentiae, & non paternitatis, ut similem esse filio. Ergo essentia & paternitatis virtute & eminenter continent formalem distinctionem, quia ita se habent ac si formaliter distinguerentur.* IV. *Recte mihi videntur Scotistae hoc praecise cavere ne ex essentia & relationibus, in Deo constitutur unum [239 sic] unitate per se vel per accidens secundum compositionem aut quasi compositionem, nec unum per aggregationem; ne etiam*

94. Martin Meurisse, *Rerum metaphysicarum* (1623), Book 1, question 23, *Utrum ex essentia & existentia fiat compositio in rebus creatis*, p. 239.

95. Treatise 2, chapter 2, question 3.

we refer to God's essence as also modified and determined properly speaking through relation. See here the bishop of Patti Rada's *Controversy among Thomas and Scotus*.⁹⁶ Fifth, Vorstius does the greatest injustice to Scotus and the Scotists, in that he called them to a defense and battle with the gods. For nobody disdains more than Scotus and his followers that any improper composition, large or small, be permitted in God, and similar ridiculous things the Vorstians do. You can see this in Rada's *Controversy among Thomas and Scotus*⁹⁷ and in Meurisse's *Scotist Metaphysics*;⁹⁸ and Eglissham criticized Vorstius's ignorance on this score.⁹⁹ Sixth, that Ringleader and Predecessor of the Anabaptists, Dietrich Philips, says wrongly that in the Old Testament, God was named by many names according to his properties and operations, while in the New Testament, he was named by three names: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.¹⁰⁰ Seventh, Luther rightly uses the German word *Dreifaltigkeit*—that is, triplicity—even though he wanted everyone to exchange what was used in every age into something more suitable and less ambiguous, and Bellarmine unjustly puts Luther under suspicion of Arianism for this.¹⁰¹ See Franciscus Junius's remarks on this. We think that the Belgians and Germans can very safely represent and express the Greek τριῦς by their *Dreiheit*, and the Latin *trinitas* through their *Dreieinigheit*.

7.

Seventh, all God's actions are entailed in simplicity; these actions are either *ad intra* or *ad extra*. *Ad intra* actions are those that terminate in God himself. We divide them into those that are common to the three persons—such as God's natural understanding and willing by which he understands and wills himself—and into those that are proper or personal—such as generation, spiration, and procession. *Ad extra* actions are those that terminate in creatures, and we divide them into immanent or internal actions or emanating or external ones. The former *ad extra* actions are undetermined knowledge and determined knowledge, or the actual decrees of God. The latter are either general ones—such as creation, conservation, and governance—or particular—such as the work of redemption.

When treating of God's actions which we call the decrees, Vorstius and his followers the Remonstrants, before anything else bring up this issue; their arguments

dicatur essentia Dei per relationem proprie modificari ac determinari. Vide Rhadam Episcopum Paçt. controv. inter Thomam & Scotum part. 1. controv. 4. append. 2. p. 82. 83. 84. V. Maximam itaque iniuriam fecit Vorstius Scoto & Scotistis, quod eos in patrocinium sua θεομαχίας hic advocarit. Nemo enim magis abhorret ab ulla vel minima ac maxime impropria compositione in Deo admittenda, & similibus absurdis Vorstianis, quam Scotus cum suis; ut videre est apud Rhadam modo cit. Et Meurisse in Metaphys. Scotistica lib. 1. qu. 23. Inscitiam Vorstii hac in parte iam perstrinxerat Eglisemmius loc. cit. VI. Male Anabaptisarum Coryphaeus & Antecessor, Theodoricus Philippi in Enchiridio fol. 4 in V.T. pluribus nominibus Deum fuisse nominatum secundum proprietates & operationes suas, in N.T. tribus, Patris, Filii, & Spir. S. VII. Recte Lutherus vocem Germanicam Dreifaltigkeit, i.e., triplicitatem, quamvis ab omni avo sic usitatem voluit in commodiorem & minus ambiguam commutari; & iniuste propterea Bellarmino in Arianismi suspicionem vocatur, praefat. ad controv. generalem II. ad quam vide notas Fr. Iunii. Nos putamus Belgas & Germanos tutissimo posse imitari & exprimere Graecorum τριῦς per suum Dreiheit aut latinorum trinitas, per Dreieinigheit.

7. *Septima*, Obtenduntur simplicitati omnes actiones Dei. Quae sunt ad intra, vel ad extra. *Ad intra* sunt quae terminantur in ipso Deo: & dividuntur in *communes tribus* personis, quales intelligere & velle naturale Dei, qua intelligit ac vult seipsum; & in *proprias* seu *personales*, quales generatio, spiratio, processio. *Ad extra* sunt, quae terminantur in creaturis; & dividuntur in immanentes seu internas, & emanantes seu externas. Illae sunt scientia indefinita, & definita seu ipsa decreta Dei. Istae sunt vel generales, ut creatio, conservatio, gubernatio; vel speciales, ut opera redemptionis. De actionibus Dei, quas decreta vocamus, imprimis quaestionem movent Vorstius & asseclae eius Remonstrantes. Rationes

100. Theodoricus Philippi, *Enchiridio*, fol. 4. Dietrich [Dirk] Philips, *Enchiridion* (1564), page 4. This occurs in the Confession of Faith at the beginning of the volume. See the translation, *Enchiridion, or Handbook of the Christian doctrine and religion, compiled (by the grace of God) from the Holy Scriptures for the benefit of all lovers of the truth* (1910).

101. Preface ad controv general II. Robert Bellarmine, *Secunda Controversia Generalis, De Christo Capite Totius Ecclesiae*, praefatio. See in *Opera Omnia*, tom. 1 (Paris: Vives, 1870), [235]–246. Franciscus Junius (François Du Jon), *Animadversiones ad controversiam secundam Christianae fidei, De Christo Capite Totius Ecclesiae*, In Praefationem, cf. in *Opera theologica*, 2 vols. (Geneva: Caldorianis, 1607) 1.547.

96. Part 1, controversy 4, appendix 2, page 82, 83, 84.

97. Part 1, controversy 4, appendix 2, page 82, 83, 84.

98. Book 1, question 23.

99. Loc. Cit.

[against God's simplicity] are as follows. First, because there are many decrees, while there is one God; second, because the decrees are free, while God is absolutely and supremely necessary being; third, because the decrees have God as their efficient cause, and they are posterior to him; fourth, because God is from eternity, and the decrees are not; fifth, because the decrees are mutable, conditioned, and dependent, while God is an immutable, absolute, and independent essence. These arguments collapse in part of their own accord, and the proofs our opponents provide do not support them; and in part the scholastics and theologians who stand against Vorstius have refuted such arguments firmly and clearly enough—namely, theologians such as Becanus; Alsted in his *Natural Theology*;¹⁰² and Maccovius in his *Collection of Miscellaneous Questions* in the year 1621, Disputations 17, 20, 23, 24, 25, and 26.¹⁰³ It is thus sufficient here for us to lay out sources for the solutions.

The first one is that God's decrees with respect to their real existence and according to the perfection that they indicate in God are necessary, essential to God, and are, in fact, one and simple act; as a matter of fact, they are the decreeing God himself. But the decrees are distinct from God, free, not essential to God, nor God himself with respect to their species, termination, or according to their extension to this or that object. In brief, God's intellect and intellection and his will and volition are one and simple, allowing neither multiplicity nor division and separating, not to mention opposition, priority, posteriority, or succession, dependence of cause and effect, or any other order of whatever sort. But, we should attribute the whole of this to the things intellect and willed as absolutely really distinct from God's essence, intellection, and volition—that is, as in these objects themselves. And in this sense, the fathers and scholastics speak about "being," "being able," and "working" as not differing in God.

The second source for solutions is, there are three things we need to think about in God's decree: (1) God's essence, as signified through the mode of a vital act, insofar as it necessarily terminates in loving the divine goodness itself, and in everything possible or producible by God, according to the ideas in the divine mind. (2) The termination of that essence as actuated, which termination is for the producing and ruling of creatures, or for not producing and so not ruling—the former we refer to as positive, and the latter as negative, for the sake of teaching better. (3) The rational relation that results from this termination. On (1), we say that the essence and indeed as it is actuated is in fact absolutely necessary, and that it terminates necessarily in God's

ipsorum sunt istae. *Prima*, quia decreta sunt multa, Deus est unus. *Secunda* quia decreta sunt libera, Deus est ens simpliciter & summe necessarium. *Tertia*, quia decreta habent causam efficientem Deum, & sunt illo posteriora. *Quarta*, quia Deus est ab aeterno, decreta minime. *Quinta*, quia decreta sunt mutabilia, conditionata, dependentia: Deus autem est essentia immutabilis, absoluta, independens. Argumenta haec partim per se concidunt, nec probationibus ullis ab adversariis fulciuntur, partim a Scholasticis, & Antagonistis Vorstii, nominatim a Becano, ut & Alstedio in *Theologia naturali*, & D. Makkovio in *collegio Miscellan. quaest. anno 1621. disput. 17. 20. 23. 24. 25. 26.* solide & perspicue satis refutata sunt: Itaque suffecerit hos fontes solutionum annotare. *Primus* est decreta Dei quoad realem existentiam [240] & secundum perfectionem, quam dicunt in Deo, sunt necessaria, Deo essentialia, & quidem unus ac simplex actus; atque adeo ipse Deus decernens; sed quoad speciem seu terminationem seu secundum extensionem ad hoc aut illud obiectum a se distinctum & libera sunt & nec Deo essentialia, nec ipse Deus. Breviter intellectus & intellectio, voluntas & volitio Dei una est & simplex, nec multiplicatam aut divisionem & distractionem, nedum oppositionem, nec prius & posterius aut successionem, nec dependentiam causalitatis & effectus aut cuiuscunque alterius ordinis admittens; sed rebus intellectis & volitis ab essentia intellectione & volitione divina realissime distinctis, quippe eius obiectis, totum hoc tribuendum est. Et hoc sensu dicitur a patribus & Scholasticis non differre in Deo, *Esse, posse, operari*. *Secundus* est, In decreto Dei tria spectanda sunt. 1. Essentia Dei per modum actus vitalis significata, quatenus necessario terminatur ad ipsam divinam bonitatem amandam, & ad omne possibile seu a Deo producibile, secundum ideas in mente divina. 2. terminatio illius essentiae actuosae ad creaturas producendas & sic regendas; aut non producendas & sic regendas: illam melioris doctrinae causa dicemus *positivam*, istam *negativam*. 3. Relatio rationis, quae resultat ex illa terminatione. Quod ad *primum*, dicimus essentiam & quidem ut actuosam, esse simpliciter necessariam, & terminari necessario ad increatam Dei bonitatem.

102. Johann Heinrich Alsted, *Theologia naturalis exhibens augustissimam naturae scholam; In qua creaturae Dei communi sermone ad omnes pariter docendos utuntur: Adversus Atheos, Epicureos, et Sophistas huius temporis, Duobus libris pertractata* (Antonius Hummius, 1615).

103. Johannes Maccovius, *Collegium theologicum miscellaneorum quaestionum: Publice disputatarum in Acad. Franekerana, anno 1620 et 1621 sub praesidio Johannis Macowii* (Uldericus Balck, 1632), no pagination.

uncreated goodness. Pertaining to (2), the termination is absolutely free in the former or latter sort of creatures, so that they either exist or do not exist, act or do not act. That is to say, on the latter line we speak of the essence dividedly, even though it is necessary compositely or conjointly. For example, it is necessary that God decree something about the existence of possibles, whether a man, a dog, or a tree: it must be such and such. But God is free to decree this or that part of the contradiction—namely, that something exist or not exist. For (3), the relation results necessarily toward a thing that is to exist—that is to say, hypothetically speaking and having posited that positive termination. Still, it is able to not result if the positive termination should not be posited, but only a negative one.

The third source for solutions is, we can conceive of God's decree according to three moments or instances of reason or nature, but not of time or duration, because God's decree is coeternal with him. In the first instant, we conceive the divine essence as signified through the mode of a vital act, inasmuch as the essence terminates necessarily in God as the primary object, and as yet is indifferent toward creatures. In the second instant, we conceive the same essence inasmuch as it terminates freely in the production or governing of creatures, without any mutation or real addition to that essence—because God immediately by his essence understands, wills, and decrees and terminates freely in creatures, and his intellect, love, and decree are simultaneous. Such do not produce in him new actions of the intellect and will, which actions would then be accidents distinct from his substance. The only thing that is added is a certain external denomination and relation of reason, by which God's essence through the mode of understanding, loving, and decreeing is referred to some thing he understood, loved, and decreed. So in the third instant, we conceive the decree inasmuch as this relation of reason results therefrom, which with respect to God has its foundation in the decree itself at this instant freely having terminated, while with respect to the creature it has its foundation in that futurity or its existence.

Now that we have set out these premises, providing solutions to Vorstius's objections will be easy. There is less difficulty regarding God's external actions or emanations, and our opponents do not press this matter. See Vasquez's *Metaphysical Disputation*, disputation 25¹⁰⁴ and Thomas's *Summa Contra Gentiles*.¹⁰⁵

Quod ad *secundum*, terminatio ad creaturas has aut illas ut illae sint aut non sint, hoc agant, aut non agant, est simpliciter libera; divisim scil.: quamvis sit necessaria composite seu coniunctim. Est ex. gr. necessarium, ut Deus quid decernat de istius possibilis aut hominis, aut canis, aut arboris existentia & actione tali aut tali: sed liberum est, ut decernat in istam aut istam contradictionis partem; ut scil. sit aut non sit. Quod ad *tertium*, relatio illa ad rem futuram necessario resultat, ex hypothesi scil. & posita illa terminatione positiva: potest tamen non resultare, si non ponatur terminatio positiva, sed tantum negativa. *Tertius fons solutionum est*, Decretum Dei potest a nobis concipi secundum tria momenta seu instantia rationis, aut naturae, non vero temporis seu durationis, quia decretum est Deo coaeternum, In primo concipimus essentiam divinam per modum actus vitalis significatam, quatenus necessario terminatur ad Deum tanquam obiectum primum, & adhuc indifferens est ad creaturas. In secundo concipimus eandem, quatenus libere terminatur ad creaturas producendas aut gubernandas, sine ulla sui mutatione, vel reali additione: quia Deus immediate per essentiam intelligit, vult & decernit, & ad creaturas libere terminatur, estque ipsius intellectio simul intellectio, amor, & decretum; nec in se producit [241] novas actiones intellectus & voluntatis, quae sint accidentia a substantia eius distincta. Tantummodo accedit externa quaedam denominatio & respectus rationis, quo essentia Dei per modum intelligentis, amantis, decernentis refertur ad rem intellectam amatam & decretam. In tertio ergo instanti concipimus decretum quatenus hinc resultat respectus rationis, qui ex parte Dei fundatur in ipso decreto iam libere terminato; & ex parte creaturae in ipsa futurity seu existentia illius. His praemissis, iam facile erit Vorstii obiectionibus solutiones aptare. De actionibus Dei externis seu emanantibus, minor est difficultas, nec ab adversariis hoc ita urgetur. Vide Vasquez *disput. Metaphysicam* 25. & Thomam lib. 2. c. Gentes cap. 12. 13. 14.

104 Gabriel Vázquez, *Disputationes metaphysicae* (Antwerp: Keerbergium, 1617), 116r.

105. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. 2, c. 12, 13, 14. Cf. Franciscus de Sylvestris [Silvestri] of Ferrara, *Commentaria in libros quatuor*

The logical consequences are as follows. We have just asserted this doctrine of the simplicity and perfection of the divine essence, knowledge, and will. All of this will overthrow whatever our opponents advance against God's providence and absolute, immutable, independent decree of predestination—including all the wicked novelties about middle knowledge, a conditioned will, the order of decrees, simultaneous concursus, etc.

8.

Eighth,¹⁰⁶ all other divine relations could be given as objections. *Response*. We dealt just now in the last thesis with relations that are *ad intra* and indeed proper—such as paternity, filiation, active spiration, and procession. But what pertains to internal relations that are common to all the persons—relations such as identity, similitude, equality, ἐμπεριχώρησις [*emperichōrēsis*], or mutual presence of the persons among themselves¹⁰⁷—we refer to these as rational relations, not real, along with the Thomist commentators.¹⁰⁸ Capreolus, book 1, distinction 31,¹⁰⁹ and Becanus.¹¹⁰ Though Rada subtly, for the sake of his Scotus, takes pains to maintain the contrary,¹¹¹ Hence, therefore, there is not any composition, not even the slightest, that arises on the part of the thing itself. For identity is opposed to distinction and is nothing else but the transcendental relation and denomination that has its foundation upon the unity of the essence, as it denotes the comparison of the essence to itself totally indistinct “according to the nature of the thing.” Likewise, similitude has its foundation upon the unity of the attributes, and equality upon the unity of magnitude. Now turning to what concerns external relations, these are threefold. (1) Either they are founded upon God's transitive actions—relations such as creator, governor, redeemer; (2) upon his immanent actions—relations such as predestinator; (3) or partly upon his immanent actions and partly upon certain attributes that necessarily belong to God from eternity—relations such as the divine ideas, God's knowledge of simple intelligence, and as Becanus adds,¹¹² of a word or λόγου, which beyond its relation as it bears respect to the Father is also referred to creatures. (We will perhaps investigate the last of these some other time.) Thus we say that the relations *ad extra* founded upon God's actions and taken precisely and formally are only extrinsic denominations, but not real relations in God. And

Consectar. 1. *Doctrina hac de simplicitate & perfectione essentiae, scientiae, ac volitionis divinae asserta, corruunt, quaecunque contra Providentiam Dei & absolutum, immutabile, independens praedestinationis decretum ab adversariis adferuntur, cum omnibus profanis novitatibus de scientia media, de volitione conditionata, de ordine decretorum, de concursu simultaneo &c.*

7. *Octava*, Possent etiam obiici omnes aliae relationes divinae. *Resp.* De relationibus *ad intra* & quidem propriis, ut paternitate, filiatione, spiratione activa, processione iam diximus thesi praeced. De relationibus *ad intra*, quae omnibus personis communes, quales sunt *identitas, similitudo, aequalitas*, ἐμπεριχώρησις seu mutua praesentia personarum inter se (de qua *Rhada part. I. p. 320. 321.*); dicimus eas esse relationes rationis, non reales cum Thomistis ad *I. qu. 42. art. I. & Capreolo ad dist. 31. lib. 1. & Becano tract. 2. cap. 1. qu. 2. para. 7.* Quamvis subtiliter pro Scoto suo contrarium tueri satagat *Rhada super 1. contr. 26.* Hinc ergo nulla vel minima exurgit compositio ex parte rei. Identitas enim opponitur distinctioni, & nihil aliud est, quam transcendentalis relatio & denominatio fundata super unitatem essentiae, notans habitudinem eiusdem totaliter indistincti ex natura rei ad seipsum. Et sic similitudo fundatur super unitatem attributorum, aequalitas super unitatem magnitudinis. Quod ad *relationes ad extra*, illae sunt triplices; vel enim fundantur in actionibus Dei transeuntibus, ut *creator, gubernator, redemptor*; vel in immanentibus, ut *praedestinator*; vel partim in actionibus immanentibus, partim in quibusdam attributis, quae necessario Deo conveniunt ab aeterno, ut *idea, scientia simplicis intelligentiae*, addit *Becanus cit. capite quaest. 1. verbi seu λόγου*, qui praeter relationem, qua respicit patrem, etiam refertur ad creaturas. De quo postremo alibi forte disquirendum. Dicimus ergo relationes *ad extra* fundatas in actionibus Dei praecise & formaliter sumptas, esse tantum extrinsicas denominationes, non vero reales relationes [242] in Deo. Itaque

Contra Gentiles S. Thomae de Aquino, (1612), 111v–113. For just Sylvestris' commentary, see, volume 2 (Rome, 1898), 41–49.

106. The sidehead numbers repeated “7” at this point and are off by one through the end of the text. The numbering in the text remained correct.

107. Concerning which see Rada, [*Controversiae theologicae* (1620)], volume one, page 320–321.

108. Ad 1, qu. 42, art. 1.

109. Johannes Capreolus, *In libros Sententiarum amplissimae quaestiones, pro tutela doctrinae s. Thomae ad scholasticum certamen egregie disputatae*, volume 1 (Venice: Scoti 1589), 434.

110. Treatise 2, chapter 1, question 2, paragraph 7.

111. Book 1, controversy 26, *Controversiae theologicae*, 1.406.

112. Cited chapter, question 1.

hence there is no composition. This is because God the Creator is nothing else but God denominated by a vital act, if you leave off its termination in a creature. Concerning the idea and knowledge of simple intelligence, we say that this implies nothing other than denominations; for they are nothing else but the divine essence inasmuch as it is knowledge of creatures, or inasmuch as it represents creatures through the mode of actual cognition of them, whether they are about to be made or are possible. We will handle this in our disputation on God's knowledge.¹¹³

9.

Ninth,¹¹⁴ God is in all things, and all things are in God. From this arise the following bizarre notions: God is prime matter; man's soul is a particle of the divine breath; God is even the soul of the world; God communicates himself to us, and we are participants then in his divine nature with the result that we should refer to people as being deified and, once transformed into God, even essentially united with him; and other such statements that occur among fanatics and Enthusiasts, the Henric-Nicolaites, and the Weigelians. (We will deal with these elsewhere.) You could in the meantime consult Philips van Marnix's treatment,¹¹⁵ as well as Josua Stegmann's *Photinianismus*, the appended *II. De vero Christianismo*,¹¹⁶ and confer with Thomas's *Summa Theologica*¹¹⁷ and *Summa Contra Gentiles*.¹¹⁸ *Response*. Let the following sources for solutions capture in brief the interest of these lovers of learning, and from this let them apply the solutions to their silly reasonings, or better, ravings.

First, God is not in all things as an essential or integral part in a whole; as something having been contained in its thing that contains it; as a subject under its accident; or as an accident in its subject. Rather, God is in all things as a cause is present to that in which it acts immediately. God is present, yes, to all things by his essence, but not such that he is of the essence of things or something of their essence; as matter transient or constituting; as form informing; or as an accident perfecting these things. For God is supremely one, alone, separate, and distinct from all things—yes, what theologians have well supposed that God's attribute of holiness intimates in Scripture. Moreover, if God were to enter into composition with some thing, that composite would be more perfect than God. This is because every composite is more perfect than its parts or composing

hinc nulla compositio. Quia Deus creator, si non attendas terminationem in creatura, nihil aliud est quam Deus denominatus ab actione vitali. De idea & scientia simplicis intelligentiae, dicimus nihil inferre quam denominationes; sunt enim nihil aliud nisi essentia divina quatenus est cognitio creaturarum, seu quatenus representat creaturas per modum actualis cognitionis illarum, sive futurarum, sive possibilium. De quibus agendum in *Disput. de Scientia Dei*.

8. *Nona*, Deus est in omnibus rebus, & omnes res sunt in Deo. Quo pertinent teratologica illa: Deum esse materiam primam, hominis animam esse divinae particulam aerae, & Deum esse animam mundi, Deum se nobis communicare, nosque divinae ipsius naturae ita participes esse, ut homines deificari & in Deum transformari, cum illo essentialiter uniri, dicendi sint; qualia apud fanaticos & Enthusiastas, Henric-Nicolaitas, Weigelianos &c. occurrunt, de quibus alibi. Interim consuli poterit *tractatus* Nobiliss. Domini *Sancti Aldegondi contra Libertinos*, & *Stechmannus in Photianismi sui appendic. 2. de vero Christianismo* cum quibus conferatur *Thomas 1. qu. 3. a. 8. & contra Gentes lib. 1 c. 17. 20. 26. 27. Resp.* Fontes solutionum breviter istos capiant φιλομαθεῖς, inde ad ratiunculas seu potius insanias illas applicent. I. Deus est in omnibus rebus non ut pars essentialis aut integralis in toto, aut ut contentum in suo continente, aut ut subiectum sub suo accidente, aut ut accidens in suo subiecto, sed ut causa adest ei, in quod immediate agit. Deus adest, inquam, omnibus per essentiam; non quod sit de essentia rerum, aut aliquid essentiae earum, sive ut materia transiens aut constituens, sive ut forma informans, sive ut accidens eas perficiens. Est enim maxime unus, solus, divisus, distinctus ab omnibus: quod etiam attributo *sanctitatis* in scriptura innui posse non male quidam opinantur. Ad haec si in compositionem veniret cum aliqua re, illa esset Deo perfectior; quia omne compositum est perfectius

114. The original marginal note numbered this as 8, but the text is correct with *Nona*.

115. Philips van Marnix van Sint Aldegonde, *Ondersoekinghe en grondelijcke wederlegginge der geestrijuische leere* (1595), and *Response apologeticque* (1598).

116. Josua Stegmann, *Photinianismus, hoc est, succincta refutatio errorum Photinianorum quinquaginta sex disputationibus breviter comprehensa, & in Academia Rinthelensi diventilata & excussa a J. Stegmanno ... Editio altera ... auctior. (Τριας Ἐπιστολῶν I. De quinque syllogismis Photinianis contra satisfactionem Christi. II. De vero Christianismo, sive de unione fidelium cum Christo & imitatione ejusdem. III. De justificatione, ex dicto Jacobo, Fides sine operibus mortua, etc.* (1626).

117. I q 3 a 8.

118. I. c. 17, 20, 26, 27.

113. *De Scientia Dei*, in *Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum pars prima* (Utrecht: Waesberge, 1648), 246ff.

principles. See the particular arguments that Thomas and his commentator Silvestri of Ferrara supply, loc. cit.,¹¹⁹ and in the *Summa Theologica*.¹²⁰

Second, all things are in God in a threefold way: regarding his power as in an efficient cause; regarding his idea as in an exemplar cause; and with regards to his knowledge as in one who knows. For this reason, there is a threefold existence of creatures in God: eminent, ideal, and intelligible existence. But this whole existence [creatures have in God] is objective, without any composition or mixture, just as with light in the air or air in the light, per Augustine¹²¹ and Cyril of Alexandria's on John, book 9, chapter 40.¹²² See furthermore the scholastics on Thomas's *Summa Theologica*;¹²³ [Francisco] Suarez's *On God*;¹²⁴ and commentators on Acts 17:28 and 2 Peter 1:4; as well as philosophers who explain this axiom: all things are in a certain way four: God, heaven, prime matter, intellect.¹²⁵

Third, God communicates his essence, life, and goodness outside himself or externally, doing so in the genus of an efficient, exemplar, and final cause; and in fact he does not do so naturally but freely, not by his essence but by grace. He does so in such a way that, for example, all things participate in his goodness; and they are good extrinsically and causally, but meanwhile they remain formally, in their own proper goodnesses (Thomas¹²⁶), both in their individual and in their species or univocal genus, the most distinct essence or goodness of God, and his essence or goodness produced according to the divine similitude or image in creatures. Further, this communication of the divine essence is fivefold: (1) by creation; (2) by grace of adoption; (3) by glory and blessedness; (4) by love and desire; and (5) by incarnation. We shall speak about this last one here.

10.

Tenth,¹²⁷ one could allege the composition of Christ's divine nature with human nature in one person. *Response*.

119. See *Contra Gentiles* and Silvestri of Ferrara's commentary cited above.

120. P. 1., qu. 8, a. 1.2

121. Augustine, *De Genesi ad lit. lib. 4.*, c. 12. et lib. 14 [sic?], de Trinit., c. 12. Nothing exactly along the lines suggested could be found in book 4 in Hills' translation and there is no book 14. Voetius would have been reading a text long before the critical Benedictine edition of the works 1679–1700 and later work by Joseph Zycha (1894). "The Literal Meaning of Genesis," in *On Genesis*, trans. Edmund Hill (New City Press, 2002), 481. *On the Trinity*, Book 12, in *NPNF1*, volume 3, p. 155–165.

122. This refers to Trapezuntius's Latin text which has chapter divisions (translated before 1486 and first published in 1508). *D. Cyrilli Archiepiscopi Alexandrini opera in tres partita Tomos: in quibus habes*

partibus aut principiis componentibus. Vide rationes speciales apud Thomam eiusque commentatorem Ferrariensem loc. cit., & p. 1. qu. 8. a. 1. II. Omnia sunt in Deo tripliciter, in potentia eius tanquam in causa efficiente, in idea tanquam in causa exemplari, in scientia tanquam in cognoscente. Unde triplex esse creaturarum in Deo, eminens, ideale, intelligibile. Sed totum hoc esse est obiectivum, absque ulla compositione aut permixtione sicut lumen est in aere, & aer in lumine, August. de Genesi ad lit. lib. 4. c. 12 & lib. 14. de Trinit. c. 12. Cyrillus Alexandrin. in Iohann. lib. 9. c. 40. Vide porro Scholastic. ad 1. qu. 18. a. 4. & Zwarez de Deo lib. 2. c. 2. & comentatores ad Act. 17.28. 2 Petr. 1.4. Et Philosophos explicantes axioma illud: Quatuor quodammodo sunt omnia, Deus, coelum, materia prima, intellectus. [243] III. Deus communicat extra se, seu ad extra essentiam, vitam, bonitatem suam, in genere causae efficientis, exemplaris, finalis, & quidem non naturaliter sed libere non per essentiam sed per gratiam; ita ut ex. gr. omnia participant de eius bonitate, eaque sint bona extrinsece & causaliter, sed bonitatibus propriis formaliter Thomas 1. qu. 7. a. 4. maneat interim & individuo & specie seu genere univoco distinctissima essentia aut bonitas Dei, & essentia aut bonitas ad similitudinem sive imaginem divinam in creaturis producta. Est autem communicatio illa essentiae divinae quintuplex 1. per creationem. 2. per gratiam adoptionis, 3. per gloriam & beatitudinem, 4. per amorem & desiderium, 5. per incarnationem; de quo postremo mox dicemus.

9. Decimo, Obtendi posset compositio divinae Christi naturae cum humana in unam personam. *Resp.* Unio illa

non pauca antehac Latinis non exhibita. Tomi tres (Basileae: Apud Andream Cratandrum, 1528), 169r–172r. See the section in book 9 on John 14:12 in English translations. Cf. *Commentary on John*, volume 2 (IVP, 2015), 173; *Commentary on the Gospel according to S. John*, vol. 2 (London: Walter Smith, 1885), 291.

123. I. q 18 a 4.

124. Francisco Suarez, *Commentarii ac disputationes in primam partem Summae Theol. D. Thomae: De Deo uno et trino* (Juncta, 1608), 36. *Opera Omnia*, 27 vols. (Paris: Vives, 1856–1878), 1.48.

125. Quatuor quodammodo sunt omnia, Deus, coelum, materia prima, intellectus.

126. I q 7 a 4.

127. The original marginal note numbered this as 9, but the text is correct with Decimo.

We refer to that [hypostatic] union as composition just as we say improperly that Christ is one whole. Otherwise, it would then follow that the divine nature is a part of some thing, and that there exists something from that union which is more perfect than the divine nature itself. We ought to say, therefore, that the person of the Word assumed human nature—that is, he united human nature to himself substantially, and human nature terminated through his subsistence or personality, not as a part or accident by which the Word might be perfected, but as an adjunct or instrument enhypostatized, which the Word bears intimately in his person, so that he might perfect that nature and by that nature redeem man. So, because nothing has been added to the divine nature, nor has the divine nature coalesced with human nature into some third essence, nor have the properties of either nature been mixed, nor was the person of the Word in the mode of perfectible potency, nor was human nature in the mode of an act perfecting the divine nature—from all this, it follows that nothing has been taken away from God’s simplicity due to this hypostatic union, nor should we allow any or even the smallest semblance of composition. I believe this solution suffices. Now in his *Scholastic Theology*, Becanus using Thomas disputes against Bonaventure, Richard [of St. Victor], Scotus, and Cajetan about the composition of the person [of the Word].¹²⁸ But I do not see how these things fit sufficiently with what Becanus himself asserted regarding the metaphysical doctrine of simple and composite things, and also with his opinion about God’s simplicity; and how even the Anabaptists and Schwenkfeld concepts can be uncovered and refuted well enough by this determination. The Scotists, with Rada,¹²⁹ appear to me to philosophize more accurately here.

Eleventh,¹³⁰ in his book on baptism against Skarga [sic],¹³¹ the Socinian Moskorzewski places the passage 1 Timothy 6:16 with Hebrews 12:27 in opposition to the axiom, “whatever is in God is God.” From these verses, Moskorzewski creates a place for God that is uncreated and eternal, which despite this is not God. Vorstius devised something similar with the help of Stuchi Eugubinus’s opinion¹³²—for whose depraved fabrication, see Sladus.¹³³ *Response*. In short, we say that this is of no consequence plain and simple, and that this “light inaccessible” is nothing but the splendor of divine majesty and glory. That is, it is the infinite God himself, who exists and abides in himself. Moreover,

dicitur compositio, sicut Christus improprie totum dicitur. Sequeretur alioquin naturam divinam esse alicuius rei partem, & ex illa unione existere aliquid perfectius, quam est ipsa natura divina. Sic ergo dicendum: personam λόγου assumpsisse naturam humanam, hoc est, eam sibi univisse substantialiter, eandemque terminare per suam subsistentiam seu personalitatem non tanquam partem aut accidens quo perficiatur; sed tanquam adiunctam aut instrumentum ἐνυπόστατον, quod intime in sua persona gestat, ut illud perficiat & per illud hominem redimat. Quia ergo divinae naturae nihil accessit, nec cum humana in tertiam quandam essentiam coaluit, nec proprietates utriusque naturae permixtae sunt, nec persona λόγου habuit se ad modum potentiae perfectibilis, nec humana natura ad modum actus divinae naturae perficientis: sequitur nihil hinc decedere simplicitati Dei, nec ullam vel minimam compositionis speciem admittendam. Hanc solutionem puto sufficere. Quae cum *Thoma contra Bonaventuram, Richardum, Scotum, Caietanum de compositione personae* disputat *Becanus Theolog. Scholastic. part. 1. tract. 1. c. 6. qu. 3.* non video sane, quomodo cum Doctrina Metaphysica de Simplici & composito, ut & cum sententia de Simplicitate Dei ab ipso Becano asserta satis convenient; quomodo etiam eiusmodi determinatione Anabaptistici & Zwenckfeldici conceptus satis dextre detegi & refutari possint. Accuratius mihi philosophari videntur Scotistae apud *Rhadam ad 3. controvers. 3. artic. 3. Undecima*, Opponit etiam Socinianus *Moscorovius libr. de baptismo adversus Scargam* huic axiomati: *Quidquid est in Deo, est Deus*, locum 1 *Timoth. 6.16.* cum *Hebr. 12.27.* unde fabricat locum Dei increatum & aeternum, qui tamen non sit Deus. Simile quid agitabat *Vorstius, in subsidium advocata opinione Struchi Eugubini*; cuius commentum profligatum vide a *Slado disceptat scholastic. part. 1. p. 50. 51. 52. Resp.* Breviter dicimus meram esse inconsequentiam [244], & lucem illam inaccessam nihil aliud esse quam splendorem maiestatis ac gloriae divinae, hoc est, ipsum infinitum Deum, qui est & habitat in seipso. Est autem haec descriptio metaphorica, quales *Psal.*

in polish directed against Piotr Skarga. See Hieronim Moskorzewski, *Refutatio libri de baptismo Martini Smigleccii jesuitae* (Raków, 1617), 73, 75. *Zniesienie zawstydzienia, które X. Piotr Skarga, jezuita, wnieść niesłusznie na zbór Pana Jezusa Nazareńskiego usiłował* (Raków, 1607) and *Zniesienie Wtorego zawstydzienia, które X. Piotr Skarga, jezuita, na zbór Pana Jezusa Nazareńskiego wnieść usiłował* (Raków, 1610). Moskorzewski does quote Smiglecki referring to him boasting against Skarga, *Refutatio*, p. 13, and that may be the cause of the mistake.

132. Agoštino Steuco was an Italian humanist and polemicist for the Counter Reformation.

133. *Matthaei Sladi cum Corrado Vorstio ... scholasticae disceptationis pars prima* (1612).

128. Part 1, treatise 1, chapter 6, question 3.

129. Ad 3 controversy 3 article 3.

130. There was no marginal note at this point.

131. It appears Voetius confused the name as there are only two works

this is metaphorical description—of a piece with Psalm 93:1; Isaiah 6:2; 57:15; Ezekiel 1; and Ezekiel 10. See commentators on the passages just cited, especially Daneau on 1 Timothy 6:16.¹³⁴ Confer also without disputations about God's immensity and illocality.¹³⁵

Twelfth,¹³⁶ God is called a whole; therefore he is not absolutely simple. Likewise, God is not an individual, as Clement of Alexandria argues.¹³⁷ Finally, God is not only in the category of substance, but also in many of the categories of the accidents; and whatever other many Socino-Vorstian subtleties there are of this sort. *Response*. What would resolve these issues are the rules dialecticians supply in their *compendia*, and the book of terms or the philosophical dictionary. Therefore, there is no reason for us to linger here. For now, if you have the time, look over Alsted's *Natural Theology*.¹³⁸

IV. We¹³⁹ are now going to derive the deductions and uses from this doctrine of simplicity; they are as follows. First, we should number God's simplicity among his attributes or properties. This is demonstrated because simplicity belongs to God alone; it follows immediately upon God's nature; and it has been distinguished from other properties by reason reasoned or eminently. Second, we should guard God's unity, identity, and simplicity in particular, with the purpose of removing from him imperfection, mutability, finitude, multiplicity, distinction, and composition, and so we do not fall into the madness of the pagans or the old heretics—the Valentinians, Marcionites, and Manicheans, etc.—or even the more recent Enthusiasts and Socinians. Third, we should handle this doctrine of simplicity with complete fidelity and reverence and in a clear way for praxis in churches and schools, as the circumstances arise and according to the capacity of the hearers, and do so both on its own as well as especially as a hypothesis and necessary foundation for the doctrine of infinity, immutability, eternity, and spirituality of the divine essence, knowledge, and will, as also the hypothesis and necessary foundation for the doctrine of the Trinity of persons. Fourth, from simplicity especially we gain light for that sublime mystical and pious contemplation that three persons subsist in God's single essence, and these singular things have the whole essence, and one person continually and inseparably is in another and with the other, and embraces, permeates (per the Greek fathers: they have mutual perichoresis), possesses, loves, and glorifies it (John 1:1, 5, 18; 14:10–11, 23; 17:21; Prov. 8:22, 30). Fifth, the Remonstrants err who remove simplicity from the series of divine attributes. And, the nearer they come to the Racovian Catechism and the Socinians, the farther they recede from Belgic Confession article

93.1 *Iesa.* 6.2. & 57.15. *Ezechiel.* 1. & 10. Vide commentatores ad loca cit. imprimis *Daneum in 1 Timoth.* 6.16. & confer. disputationes de Immensitate, & illocalitate Dei. *Duodecima*, Deus totum appellatur, ergo non est simpliciter simplex; Item, Deus non est individuum ex *Clemente Alexandrin. Stromat.* 5.1. denique Deus non tantum est in praedicamento substantiae, sed etiam in multis praedicamentis accidentium; & si quae plures sint istius commatis subtilitates Socino-Vorstianae. *Resp.* Tyrones Dialectici ex compendiis suis, & libro terminorum seu dictionario philosophico haec solverint: non est ergo quod illis immoremur. Videat interim, cui vacat, *Alstedii Theologiam Naturalem part. 1. cap. 5.*

10. Nunc Porismata & usus ex hac doctrina educimus, quorum I. Simplicitas Dei numeranda est inter attributa seu proprietates Dei. Probat, quia soli Deo convenit. Quia immediata naturam Dei sequitur. Quia distincta est ab aliis proprietatibus ratione ratiocinata, seu eminenter. II. Unitas, identitas, simplicitas Dei imprimis vindicanda est, ut imperfectionem, mutabilitatem, finitudinem, multitudinem, distinctionem, & compositionem ab illo removeamus; nec in deliria Ethnicorum, & veterum haeticorum Valentinianorum, Marcionitarum, Manichaeorum &c. aut etiam recentiorum Enthusiastarum, Socinianorum incidamus. III. Doctrina haec tum in se, tum etiam imprimis ut hypothesis & fundamentum necessarium doctrinae de infinitate, immutabilitate, aeternitate, spiritualitate essentiae, scientiae, & voluntatis divinae, ut & de Trinitate personarum pro re nata & pro captu auditorum omni cum fidelitate ac reverentia & plane ad praxin in Ecclesiis ac scholis tradenda est. IV. Vel imprimis hinc lumen infertur sublimi mysticae, & piaei istius contemplationi; quod in unica Dei essentia subsistant tres personae, eamque totam singulae possideant, & una persona perpetuo ac inseparabiliter sit in altera ac cum altera, eamque complectatur, permeet, (mutuam ἐμπεριχώρησιν vocant patres Graeci) possideat, amet, & glorificet *Iohann.* 1. 1.5. 18. & 14. 10. 11. 23. & 17.21. *Proverb.* 8.22. 30. V. Errant Remonstrantes, qui ex classe attributorum divinarum Simplicitem eximunt; in quo tanto proprius ad Catechesin Racovianam & Socinianos accedunt quanto longius ab artic. 1. Confessionis Belgicae, & a communi

134. Lambert Daneau, *In D. Pauli priorem Epistolam ad Timotheum commentarius...* (Geneva: Vignon, 1577), 483ff.

135. This title is not in the 1648 *Selectarum disputationum* and could not be located in print.

136. There was no marginal note at this point.

137. *Stromata* 5.1. CF. *ANF* 2, 444.

138. Part 1, chapter 5.

139. The text has a "10" in the margin at this point which is the last of the marginal numbers and of the errors in the same.

1, and from the common most Christian doctrine of the whole confession. They do worse because they add their stubbornness to the error, and they fiercely insult the most learned Leiden professors, in their *Censure* of the confession,¹⁴⁰ as also the divine Bodecherus in the Socinian-Remonstrant,¹⁴¹ who are faithfully warning them. Sixth, let us think on God's absolutely simple and absolutely perfect essence in a spiritual way. Let us cast away all crass, earthly concepts, all sensible images, and all phantasms of our imaginative faculty. And let us perceive about him what we cannot perceive, as Julius Caesar Scaliger says piously,¹⁴² and ascend by the way of negation, causality, and eminence. Seventh, just as God is absolutely simple in essence, so is he in his will, promises, and deeds. There is no deceit in him, no hypocrisy. Therefore, let us imitate him and strive after simplicity and sincerity. Let us stand on his words and promises, and expect their fulfillment with an unshaken hope. He who is true in his promises and powerful in their execution will do it. Finally, let us worship God, who is spirit, by means of spiritual, pure worship in spirit and truth. Let us flee as far as we can away from all pomp of superstitions and empty observations, and from every "work worked." Eighth, we can add other practical uses besides the foregoing in an analogical and consequential way from the rest of the attributes of the first kind that are connected with simplicity. We will thus see that this doctrine [of simplicity] is not just speculative, scholastic, metaphysical, or unproductive of all confidence and piety. Arminius says rightly in a disputation: "These supereminent modes in God's life and faculties of life have infinite use in theology, and are no small foundation for true religion."¹⁴³ Here we need to note that Arminius includes even those attributes of God that the Remonstrants exclude together with the Socinians. Hence one can see how far these Remonstrants have withdrawn and led away their inexperienced, foolish students from Arminius's theology, expressed in his theses on God.

totius Christianismi doctrina recedunt. Peius faciunt, quod errori addant pertinaciam, & DD. Professoribus Leidensibus in *Censura Confessionis*, ut & D. Bodechero in *Sociniano-Remonstrantismo* fideliter ipsos monentibus [245] tam ferociter insultent. VI. De Dei simplicissima & perfectissima essentia spiritualiter cogitemus; omnes crassos & terrenos conceptus, omnes sensibiles imagines, omnia imaginativae facultatis phantasmata procul habeamus; & de illo sentiamus quae sentire non possumus (ut pie *Iul. Caesar Scaliger exercit.* 165. sect. 9.) ascendamus per viam negationis, causalitatis eminentiae. VII. Ut Deus simplicissimus est essentia; sic & voluntate, promissis, factis: nullus in illo dolus, nulla hypocrisis: Illum ergo imitemur, & studeamus simplicitati ac sinceritati: illius etiam verbis & promissis stemus & spe firma impletionem expectemus. Ipse faciet, qui verax in promissis, & potens in executione. Denique Deum spiritum spirituali puroque cultu in spiritu & veritate colamus. Ab omni superstitionum & inanum observationum choragio, ab omni opere operato quam longissime fugiamus. VIII. Alii usus practici ex reliquis attributis primi generis cum simplicitate connexis analogice aut per consequentiam huc applicari possunt. Ita videbimus doctrinam hanc non esse mere speculativam, Scholasticam, metaphysicam, aut omnis fiduciae ac pietatis sterilem. Recte Arminius Disput. privat. XV. thes. 10. *Hi modi supereminentia &c. in vita Dei & vita facultatibus considerati infinitam in Theologia utilitatem habent, & religionis verae non minimum sunt fundamentum.* Ubi notandum ipsum attributa illa Dei etiam includere, quae cum Socinianis Remonstrantes excludunt. Ut vel hinc perspicias, quantum illi recesserint, & imperitos aut imprudentes auditores suos ab Arminii Theologia, thesibus de Deo expressa, abduxerint.

140. Johannes Polyander et al., *Censura in Confessionem: sive declarationem, sententiae eorum qui in foederato Belgio Remonstrantes vocantur, super praecipuis articulis christianae religionis* (Lugduni Batavorum: Ex officina Bonaventurae & Abrahami Elzever, 1626).

141. Nicolaus Bodecherus, *Sociniano-remonstrantismus. Hoc est, evidens demonstratio, qua remonstrantes cum Socinianis sive reipsa, sive verbis, sive etiam methodo, in pluribus confessionis suae partibus consentire ostenditur* (Lugduni Batavorum: Ex officina Jacobi Marci, 1624).

142. Exercit. 165, section 9. *Exotericarum exercitationum liber XV, de subtilitate* (1557; Hanover: Wechelians, 1620).


143. Disputation 15, thesis 10 [on the nature of God]. Jacob Arminius, *Private Disputations*, in *Works*, trans. James Nichols and W. R. Bagnall, 3 vols. (Auburn: Derby, and Miller; Buffalo: Derby, Orton and Mulligan, 1853), 2.33.

ISSUES

Consider the following errors. Someone says the rational soul is composed from four elements, or is temperate, or animal spirit, or the condition of the mouth or of the breath. Likewise, if someone says angels are animals, stars, or souls separated [from bodies]. Or further, that God is a body, visible, the soul of the world, the form of heaven, one by an accidental unity, or by analogy, or by species only, not truly individual. Or that the divine persons are properties of God or different denominations only. Or finally, that Christ the mediator is composed of one nature or two persons, etc. Respecting these, can we and how should we defend the truth of dogma firmly against these errors, and convince individuals of the errors just listed by the bare texts of Scripture, without adding rules of consequences, without logical and philosophical terminology? And should all these disputations be relegated to the classrooms of the scholastics and philosophers as useless? Should union with the Remonstrants and ecclesiastical tolerance not wrestle with these matters?

PROBLEMA.

Si quis dicat animam rationalem esse compositam ex quatuor elementis, aut esse temperamentum, aut spiritum animale, aut halitum & flatum oris: item angelos esse animalia, esse astra, aut animas separatas; praeterea Deum esse corpus, visibilem, animam mundi, formam coeli, unum unitate accidentali, aut analogia, aut specie tantum, non vero individuo; personas divinas esse proprietates Dei seu diversas denominationes tantum; denique Christum mediatorem constare ex una natura aut duabus personis &c. an & quomodo veritas dogmatum solide defendi, & errores modo indicati convinci possint ex nudis scripturae textibus absque adhibitis regulis consequentiarum, absque terminis Logicis aut Philosophicis? Et an omnes illae disputationes tanquam inutiles ad Scholasticorum & Philosophorum subsellia relegandae sint? An Remonstrantium unio & tolerantia ecclesiastica de his non laboraret? ■



Detail, *Selectarum disputationum theologiarum* (1648), p. 226. Next page, detail of page 228.

nim, ut *Iustinus Martyr*, οὐσία, ἀναρχὸς καὶ ἀναίτητος, & ut divinè canit. *Iul. Cæsar Scaliger Exercit.* 365. sect. 10.

*Sine principio principium; absque fine finis;
Cui præteritum non abit, haut subit futurum.
Ante omnia, post omnia, totus, unus. Ipse.*

Atqui si Deus ex partibus, aut accidentibus, aut modis compositus esset, jam non esset simpliciter primus; quia partes sunt priores composito, & principia (unde modi aut accidentia dependerent) sunt priora principiatas, ut notum ex Philosophiâ. *Secunda*, Ex omnimoda & infinita Dei perfectione, qua est actus purus sine ullius potentiæ admixtione. Si enim esset potentia in Deo, esset quid imperfectum seu perfectibile, cuius actus esset perfectivum, per quem accederet illi ulterior aliqua perfectio. Majoris consequentia probatur, quia omnis compositio ut & compositum est ex actu & potentia: nam genus, materia, pars integrata, essentia, natura, subjectum habent rationem potentiæ; contra differentia, forma, pars integrans, existentia, suppositum, accidens, habent rationem actus. Minor probatur. *Tum* quia repugnat absolutæ Dei perfectioni, ut in ipso sit aliquid perfectibile; *tum* quia partes seu principia, unde componeretur, essent imperfectiora composito, & sic ex iis nihil posset fieri aut componi, quod absoluta & infinita perfectione præditum esset; *tum* denique quia in Deo esset potentia passiva, radix mutabilitatis, possetque Deus in partes aut Principia componentia resolvi, & corrumpi contra *Psal.* 102. 28. *Iacob.* 1. 17. *Numer.* 23. 23. 1 *Timoth.* 1. v. 17. *Rom.* 1. v. 23. Vnde constat Deum tantum esse quod est, nec posse non esse, & aliud esse. Hinc rectè Damascenus *Orthod. fidei lib.* 1. c. 4. σύνθεσις γὰρ ἀρχὴ μάχης, μάχη δὲ διασάσεως. Διασάσις δὲ λύσεως, λύσις δὲ ἀλλότριον θεῶ παντελῶς. compositio enim pugna principium: pugna vero separationis: separatio autem solutionis. Atqui solutio alienum quid penitus à Deo est. *Tertia*, Quia Deus est absolutissimè & perfectissimè unus ac idem *Deuter.* 6. 4. *Psal.* 102. 28. nihilque in ipsius essentia realiter diversum. Atqui ubi nulla distinctio; ibi nulla per extremorum distinctorum unionem compositio. Probatur autem omnia, quæ sunt in Deo, esse Deum, esse unum, idemque ac ipsum 1. ex nomine *Iehova*, יְהוָה יְהוָה יְשׁוּבָה Gr. ὁ ὢν *Exod.* 3. 14. 15. cum *Apocal.* 1. 8. ὁ ὢν, καὶ ὁ ἰὼν, καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος. 2. Ex eo, quod propriè, synonymica & directæ prædicatione ea, quæ se videntur habere ad modum accidentium aut adjunctorum, de ipso prædicentur, ut e. gr. lux *Ioh.* 1. 9. cum 1 *Ioh.* 1. 5. caritas 1 *Ioh.* 4. 8. 16. Qui ergo est quod est, & cuius, quidquid est in ipso, est ipse, is nullas habet partes, accidentia, modos, aut principia quæ aliud sint