

ANTIQUARY

An Overview and Analysis of George Gillespie's *Dispute Against the English Popish Ceremonies*

Errors and circumstances of the times have compelled many holding the Reformed faith to engage over the years in contests for biblical truth. None of these contests has been more frequent or compelling than the struggle for purity of worship. This has always been a keenly defended doctrine in Presbyterian history, and it certainly was a tenet of those focused upon in this issue of *The Confessional Presbyterian*. Thornwell, Dabney, Girardeau and others contended strongly for biblical worship principles in their day. Sadly the Southern Presbyterian church abandoned such principles in the general apostasy and unfaithfulness that swept the mainline churches in the early twentieth century. Since then a renewed interest in biblical worship has grown throughout the last century and into the current one. This has resulted in a significant body of literature on the subject which now goes under the moniker of the *Regulative Principle of Worship*, which is simply the doctrine of sola scriptura applied to worship.¹

The continued defense of this Reformation principle owes a significant debt to the trail blazed by *A Dispute Against the English Popish Ceremonies*, which is an exhaustive defense of God's divine prerogative to order the institutions of worship in His church. The work appeared on the eve of the Second Reformation in Scotland, just prior to the English Civil War and the deliberations of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. The author was George Gillespie, then a relatively unknown man in his early twenties. The *Dispute* propelled him to the foreground of the controversies of that age, and it has remained an important work in Presbyterian literature.

1. See Frank J. Smith, Ph.D., D.D. with Chris Coldwell, "The Regulative Principle of Worship: Sixty Years in Reformed Literature. Part One (1946–1999)," *The Confessional Presbyterian* 2 (2006) 89–164; Part Two (2000–2007), *The Confessional Presbyterian* 3 (2007) 155–216.

2. George Gillespie (1613–1648), *A Dispute Against the English Popish Ceremonies* (1637; 1660); *The Presbyterian's Armoury in three volumes: The Works of Mr. George Gillespie*, ed. W. M. Hetherington (1846) vol 1; *A Dispute* (Dallas, Texas: Naphtali, 1993; revised 2013). My thanks go to Ruben Zartman and Paige Britton for their input regarding literary style and for proof reading, and to the Rev. Matthew Winzer for his assistance in the summaries. Their help significantly aided in the pulling together of this overview and summary look at George Gillespie's *Dispute*.

3. The *Dispute* was outlawed by the Privy Council of Scotland, all copies ordered confiscated, and burned by the hangman. See Roy Middleton's Historical Introduction, *Dispute* (xxv).

Certainly the theologians of Southern Presbyterianism knew of and drew from Gillespie's work.

I have long been impressed with the *Dispute*. In 1993 Naphtali Press published the first new edition of Gillespie's work, since the publication of his collected writings in the middle of the nineteenth century. Now twenty years later, that first attempt has not only long been out of print, but upon review, also shown to be in need of revision. Having now traced most if not all of the many references, citations and allusions, recollated the text with all known editions, revised all the Latin and translations, and spent time carefully analyzing and summarizing the whole work, I remain not only impressed but much more appreciative of just why Gillespie's contemporaries were astounded by his disputation. Since 2013 is the four hundredth anniversary of the author's birth, a new edition befitting the book's importance in Presbyterian literature and its continued significance to the subject treated was appropriate. For the Antiquary section of this ninth issue of the journal I will draw on material from the rather extensive overview and summary that will appear in the new edition to give readers a sense of this (then) young author's scholarship and some appreciation for the scope of his *Dispute*.

THE ENGLISH POPISH CEREMONIES

George Gillespie's *Dispute Against the English Popish Ceremonies* was so highly regarded when first published that it was thought to have definitively ended the worship controversy of the time.² Certainly, whatever Anglican sentiment was regarding the work (the only answer it received was to be outlawed and publicly burned in 1637),³ Presbyterian worship principles held firm within that tradition and within other nonconformist churches for many centuries afterward. However, adherence to biblical principles of worship began to wane in the late 19th century, and while there has been, as noted, a recent resurgence of appreciation for the Regulative Principle, it has not come without resistance and opposition, necessitating continued clarification and defense. One help toward this goal is the republication of good editions of those earlier works that blazed pathways which now need to be recovered and maintained. Unquestionably, the importance of Gillespie's *Dispute* to Scottish as well as Presbyterian history, with his valuable insights into issues such as liberty of conscience, biblical rules for reform and of the use of things indifferent in such things as the mere circumstances of worship, the avoiding of scandal and what it is, and all he has to say about idolatry and superstition, which remain not even subtle issues in our day, justify as careful and critical an edition as possible, making his case against illicit ceremonies accessible and useful to this and future generations.

STYLE AND PRESENTATION

Unfortunately, Gillespie's manner of approach and presentation offer some difficulties to the present-day reader. Even the structure of the *Dispute* evokes some initial puzzlement, which Gillespie addressed in his "Order."⁴ As he explained,

... [b]ecause polemic and eristic discourses must follow the adversaries at the heels whithersoever they go, finding them out in all the lurking-places of their elaborate subterfuges, and conflicting with them wheresoever they pitch, until not only all their blows be awarded, but themselves also all derouted; therefore, perceiving the informality of the formalists to be such that sometimes they plead for the controverted ceremonies as *necessary*, sometimes as *expedient*, sometimes as *lawful*, and sometimes as *indifferent*, I resolve to follow the trace, and to evince, by force of reason, that there is none of all those respects to justify either the urging or the using of them" (p. 21).

Therefore, because the arguments of the formalists (the term used for defenders of the forms opposed by Gillespie) lacked fidelity to any one defense of the popish ceremonies (hence their "informality"), but rather ran from their necessity to their expedience to their lawfulness, and finally to their indifference, the *Dispute* is likewise divided into four distinct parts. And while such an arrangement might inevitably lead to repetitiveness, John Macleod noted the main reason for what he considered the work's needless prolixity:

The vice of [the then] current controversial method, however, cleaves to his course of argument. [Gillespie] answered his opponents in detail. Instead of grouping as one all the champions of what was in substance the one line of argument and dealing with their principle once for all, he followed them into minutiae and then he virtually fought all his battles over again and thrice he slew the slain. This, however, was a fault of the method of his age and it did in his case only what it did in that of others—it made for redundancy and prolixity.⁵

Lucid brevity may be a desired quality in difficult theological disputes, but impatience is a fault of the current age; certainly writers and readers of Gillespie's era had more endurance for lengthy, even over-lengthy, argumentation. Nevertheless, while today it may be difficult to appreciate Gillespie's long 17th century polemic, it astounded and confounded the audience of the day. That the author was so young was cause for even more amazement. "The problem that Gillespie handled was the burning question of the hour, and his treatment of it brought him at one bound into the forefront of the polemic divines of his age."⁶

Hopefully, then, once one gets beyond the cultural barrier

of its general presentation, it may be easier to see the scope and value of the *Dispute*, and discover that for all the perceived faults of a previous age, it is not a peculiarly difficult read. James Walker, writing in 1880, noted that "Gillespie, like Rutherford, was all his days in the midst of strife; but his works are not disfigured by the *odium theologicum*. His style is notable for the times, at least among Scotch writers. It is generally clear and nervous.⁷ There is no art, but there is often a terseness and vivacity very different from many of his contemporaries..."⁸ And Macleod noted that Gillespie "was a master of swordplay with his rapier. The type of mental clarity, though not with quite the same lucid style, that one finds in Francis Turretine is found also in George Gillespie..."⁹

Walker's apparent criticism of "no art" may be a more subtle expression of disapproval for the whole form of the book which Macleod, writing six decades later, made more explicit.¹⁰ Or it may simply mean that Gillespie writes straightforwardly; there is no artfulness or artifice in his argument, no roundabout polite argumentation. This disputant against the ceremonies gets to his point—sharply, to allude to Macleod's analogy; Gillespie's writing is tight, functional, straightforward and clear.

Whatever Walker may have meant, "no art" cannot mean a lack of literary style: the young Scot clearly was trained in the classics and appropriately used stylistic embellishments for hortatory effect. These are not overdone, but are fitting and clever, displaying more than a little wit. His initial address to the Reformed churches begins with a colorful 'polemical *dramatis personae*' in which he uses many literary devices in his piercingly perceptive roll call of the various enemies of reform. And while such devices predominate in the opening epistle, his wordcraft continues throughout the whole work (though as Gillespie gets into the argumentation his creativity

4. "If it seems to any that it is a strange method to speak now of indifference, in the end of this dispute, which ought rather to have been handled in the beginning of it, they may consider, that the method is not ours, but our opposites'..." (367).

5. John Macleod, *Scottish Theology in Relation to Church History since the Reformation* (1943; Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1974), 79.

6. Macleod, *Scottish Theology*, 79.

7. Nervous: spirited, marked by strength of thought, feeling, and style.

8. James Walker, *The Theology and Theologians of Scotland: Chiefly of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (T & T Clark, 1888) 15.

9. Macleod, *Scottish Theology*, 80. The comparison to Turretin is apt. Both writers give the sense that they have the whole of their topic at their command, spread out before them like a map.

10. While it is possible "no art" is pointing out that the *Dispute* is not of a high literary quality, some usage from Walker's time would suggest understanding art in this context as meaning literary skill with specific reference to questions of arrangement or the organization of presentation; "[the] gift of shaping and picturesque grouping" (*British Quarterly Review*, 80 [1884]: 170).

focuses more on the task of smoothly weaving together support from his many sources).

There are many apt allusions to and quotations from classical literature. For example:

“Bishop Lindsay will have the will of the law to rule our consciences, which is by interpretation, *Sic volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas*.¹¹ He gives us not the reason or equity of the law, but only the will of it to be our rule” (44).

“We will not then call any man rabbi nor *jurare in verba magistri*,¹² nor yet be Pythagorean¹³ disciples to the church herself, but we will believe her and obey her in so far only as she is the pillar and ground of truth” (47).

“Do I talk of a *chimera* and imagine now that which is not?”

11. “I will it so, I order it so, let my willing stand for a reason.” Juvenal, *Satire VI*, 223–224.

12. “To echo the sentiments of a teacher.” Horace, *Epistolarum*, Book I, *Epistle 1*, line 14.

13. Pythagorean disciples: A philosophy which interpreted reality in terms of numbers and imposed strict ordinances of life on disciples as if they were divine laws.

14. Proteus was a mythical sea god who assumed various shapes; Versipelles implies having the faculty of changing the skin. In other words, the Archbishop is an inconstant person.

15. What drew them over to their side to contend, etc.

16. *They are eager to inveigle [ensnare] my judgment with huge houses*. Publius Ovidius Naso (Ovid), *Heroides*, *Epistola XVI*, Paris Helenæ, line 79.

17. *Aliquid mysterii alunt, aliquid monstri*: “they maintain (or cherish) something of a mystery” and so “something of a monster” too. This is a possible allusion to Terence’s *Andria*, Act 1, Scene 5, line 15.

18. Momus was a Greek god of ridicule who, for his criticism of the gods, was banished from heaven; hence, someone who is hyper-critical.

19. Heraclitus is known as the “weeping philosopher;” and Democritus, the “laughing philosopher.”

20. In Greek Mythology all who gazed upon Medusa were turned to stone. In other words, the defenders of the English popish ceremonies used this one objection to turn away all arguments against them.

21. Icarus—fabled in escaping from Crete, to have flown so high that the sun melted the wax with which his artificial wings were fastened on, so that he fell into the Aegean Sea: hence applied to ambitious or presumptuous acts, which end in failure or ruin (OED).

22. Penelope—wife of Ulysses, who unraveled her web of tapestry at night, in order to put off her suitors, whom she had promised to entertain when the web was completed.

23. “All your winning or losing of a good conscience, is in your first buying; for such is the deceitfulness of sin, and the cunning conveyance of that old serpent, that if his head be once entering in, his whole body will easily follow after; and if he make you handsomely to swallow gnats at first, he will make you swallow camels ere all be done” (page 17). Other usages of metaphor include these examples: “We must therefore be mortised together, not by the subscindings of error, but by the bands of truth and unity of faith” (12); “Moreover, because the foredeck and hinddeck of all our opposites’ probations do resolve and rest finally into the authority of a law, and authority they use as a sharp knife to cut every Gordian knot which they cannot unloose, and as a dreadful pale [peal] to sound so loud in all ears that reason cannot be heard...” (14).

Nay, I will really exemplify that which I say, in that Proteus and Versipelles,¹⁴ the Archbishop of Spalato; for in the narration of the passages which were between his Majesty and him, collected by the Bishop of Durham, we find that he thought the procuring of concord between the church of England and the church of Rome to be easy” (87).

“... so among our opposites, not a few have been overcome with ease, pleasure, riches, favor, preeminence, etc., to like well of the ceremonies which never had their first love, when they had both spoken and disputed against them. What drew them over¹⁵ to contend for them, except (I say not the seeking of, lest I be thought uncharitable, but) their being sought by some worldly benefit? And how could such a one excuse himself but by Paris’s apology, *Ingentibus ardent, judicium domis sollicitare meum*?¹⁶ And what marvel that Balak’s promotion (Num. 22:17) and Saul’s fields and vineyards (1 Sam. 22) prevail with such as love this present world (2 Tim. 4:10)?” (98–99).

“Wherefore I conclude, *aliquid mysterii alunt*, and so *aliquid monstri* too” (148).¹⁷

“Yet let these Momus-like¹⁸ spirits understand that their censorious verdicts do also reflect upon those ancient Christians of whom we read, that with their own hands they destroyed the temples of idols...” (159).

“Which distinction, methinks, would have made Heraclitus himself to fall a-laughing with Democritus” (288).¹⁹

“There is one place which they will have in mythology to stand for the head of Medusa,²⁰ and it they still object to us for all their ceremonies: even that of the Apostle, “Let all things be done decently and in order” (1 Cor. 14:40)” (238).

“... the method is not ours, but our opposites; for they have been fleeing upon Icarus’ wings,²¹ and soaring so high, that their wings could not but melt from them: so have they, from necessity fallen down to expediency; from it to lawfulness, and from thence to indifference... And so being wooed and solicitously importuned by our former arguments against the ceremonies, they take them to the weaving of Penelope’s web,²² thereby to suspend us, and to gain time against us: this indifference, I mean, which they shall never make out, and which themselves, otherwhiles, unweave again. Always, so long as they think to get any place for higher notions about the ceremonies, they speak not so meanly of them as of things indifferent; but when all their forces of arguments and answers are spent in vain, then are our ears filled with uncouth outcries and declamations, which tend to make themselves appear blameless for receiving, and us blameworthy for refusing matters of rite and indifference” (367).

Gillespie also makes use of metaphor and composes the occasional extended metaphor;²³ but his preferred verbal devices are the rhetorical question and alliteration. There are many examples of the latter and these are usually quite effective: “... rotten relics, riven rags, and rotten remainders

of Popery" (14); "what a piacular prevarication is it to borrow from any other church, which was less reformed, a pattern of policy for this church which was more reformed?" (14); "... discuss their best arguments, allegations, answers, assertions, and distinctions" (22); "[a]nd shall a popish prince speak more reasonably than protestant prelates?" (31). In one example from the second part of the *Dispute* Gillespie piles up this alliteration: "He is bold to object, *Where one is offended with our practice of kneeling, twenty, I may say ten thousand, are offended with your refusal.* O adventurous arithmetic! O huge hyperbole! O desultorious declamation! O roving rhetoric! O prodigal paradox!" (127).

An extended quotation shows both effective use of alliteration and a well placed classical line from the satires of Juvenal.

Shall we not then call the ceremonies idols, which are observed with the neglecting of God's commandments, and which are advanced above many substantial points of religion? Idolatry, blasphemy, profanation of the Sabbath, perjury, adultery, etc., are overlooked, and not corrected nor reprov'd, nay, not so much as discountenanced in those who favor and follow the ceremonies; and if in the fellows and favorites, much more in the fathers. What if order is taken with some of those abominations in certain abject poor bodies? *Dat veniam corvis, vexat censura columbas.*²⁴ What will not an episcopal conformist pass away with, if there is no more had against him than the breaking of God's commandments by open and gross wickedness? But O what narrow notice is taken of non-conformity! How mercilessly is it menaced! How cruelly corrected! (188).

Also prominent is Gillespie's use of the rhetorical question, such as: "Oh! transformed virgin, whither is thy beauty gone from thee? Oh! forlorn prince's daughter, how art thou not ashamed to look thy Lord in the face? Oh! thou best beloved among women, what hast thou to do with the inveigling appurtenances and habiliment of Babylon the whore?" (6). "What tyranny is there so great, spoiling men wholly of their liberty, but this pretense agrees to it?" (48). Indeed, at one point Gillespie carries on his argument for a lengthy paragraph largely by this device: "It skills not that many will judge us too precise for doing so. What? Do they think this preciseness any other than that which the law of God requires...?" (88). Other examples abound (for examples see pp. 123, 256, 301, 403, 412; and there is a clear example of false argument on p. 399, answer 1).

Gillespie also often makes use of apostrophe, which is sometimes paired with alliteration. "O land" (7); "O horrible blasphemy"; "O double deceitfulness" (49); "O egregious impudency!" (74); "O strange and monstrous invention!" (86); "O *bellua multorum capitum!*" [*O the beast of many heads!*] (86); "O unhappy ceremonies! woe unto you, you mischievous lets

and prejudices to the edification of the church" (92). "O golden sentence, and worthy to be engraven with a pen of iron, and the point of a diamond!" "Blush, O paper, which art blotted with such a notable lie!" (168). "O desultorious levity" (171). "O prodigious licentiousness, and hellish disorder, worthy to be drowned in the lake of Lethè" (352). "O damnable impiety which makes so small account of the violation of the afore-said oath..." (406).

It may be that Gillespie's writing tends toward the technical and straightforward argumentation, and certainly there are extended sections where he suppresses these flourishes of style. But although Gillespie may not have had the poetic imagination of his friend Samuel Rutherford, the use of these literary devices do show a poetic sensibility and appreciation for their effect.

Questions of style aside, though it is true there are inherent difficulties in reading a work such as the *Dispute*, they are not so much a feature of the writing itself as of the period-bound method of disputation. And, while Macleod sees the negative in this perhaps needless prolixity, it actually affords at least one clear benefit. As Walker noted, "You do not wonder at the impression it made. With an entire self-composure, the youthful theologian debates the points at issue with the great writers opposed to him. The whole literature of the subject seems to be at his call. I do not suppose that from the pen of so young a man there has ever appeared in our country a work of more consummate learning."²⁵ Gillespie's seemingly exhaustive approach does bring the reader into contact with a large number of works and authors, certainly all the writers pro and contra of the period on the questions involved in his *Dispute*.²⁶

The Literature Cited

The *Dispute* contains over a thousand citations from nearly two hundred authors and over three hundred works, from leading Reformers and Protestant works marshaled to defend biblical worship principles, to all the important writers of the time defending the English popish ceremonies, classical literature, church fathers, scholastics, linguists, as well as the leading Roman Catholic writers, commentators, anti Catholic and anti Protestant polemicists, and other works of the period.

Of the Reformers and Protestant writers, Calvin, not surprisingly, is one of the most cited, with over ninety references to various works, including a dozen references to the *Institutes*,

24. "Censure acquits the raven, but pursues the dove." Juvenal, *Satire II*, line 63.

25. Walker, *Theology and Theologians of Scotland*, 14.

26. As noted in the editor's preface for the new edition of the *Dispute*, an attempt has been made to trace and confirm all Gillespie's many allusions and references.

twice that to his letters, and nearly fifty citations from commentaries. The next most cited Reformed theologians are Zanchi and Junius with nearly sixty references apiece, and Paræus with over sixty citations from his commentaries.

Of the defenders of Puritan views, Cartwright's *Confutation of the Rhemish Testament* is cited over forty times, Fulk's works are cited about seventeen times, Ames' works around twenty, but Gillespie's fellow Scot, David Calderwood, is cited only about a dozen times, which is interesting given he may have been one of Gillespie's sources in helping to draft his *Dispute*.²⁷

The *Summa Theologica* of Aquinas is cited three dozen times, and other scholastics occasionally, such as Báñez, Cajetan, Fonseca, Lombard, and Suárez. Of post-Reformation Roman Catholic commentators, Gillespie made use of Jansen (five times), à Lapide (four), Loren (once), Maldonatus (nine), Salmeron (once), Sánchez (nine), Stella (five), and Toledo (once). Earlier commentators cited include Gerson, Nicholas de Lyra, Oecumenius, and Pagnini. From the high middle ages, the learned ritualist Guillaume Durand is cited four times.

From classical and occasionally English literature, there are citations or allusions to Accius (or Macrobius), Silius Italicus (pp. 22, 282, 12), as well as citations from Cicero's *De Officiis* (p. 362) and *De Natura Deorum* (365), Seneca's *De Beneficiis* (368, 374) and *Thyestes* (128), with the occasional reference to Pliny, Plutarch, Juſtin, and possibly Quintilian (101–102, 20, 159, 169). There are several allusions or citations each from Horace (47, 223, 392), Juvenal (44, 188, 240), Ovid (12, 99, 233), Terence (148), and Virgil (21, 93, 282). Of other literature, there is a full stanza cited at one point from the epigrams of John Owen (262),²⁸ and a possible allusion to Spenser's *Fairie Queen* (352). From Scottish literature there is an apparent citation from the first line of George Buchanan's elegy on the dull academic life (257).

Of the fathers and councils, Augustine is cited over a dozen

27. In a letter to his cousin William Spang, Robert Baillie wrote, "This same youth is now given out also, by these that should know, for the author of the English Popish Ceremonies: whereof we all doe marvell; for though he had gotten the papers, and help of the chief of that side, yet the very composition would seem to be farre above such ane age: bot if that book be truly of his making, I admire the man, though I mislyke much of the matter; yea, I think, he may prove amongst the best witts of this Isle" (*The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie*, edited by David Laing, 3 vols. [Edinburgh: Printed for Robert Ogle, 1841–1842] 1.90). Samuel Rutherford, who Baillie noted earlier in a letter to his cousin had been deprived of his charge for preaching against the articles of Perth, may be as likely intended, except that Baillie who freely names him earlier, does not give name to this individual here, though writing to his cousin on both occasions (see vol. 1, p. 8). If "chief" is to be taken in the plural, which would explain the lack of a name, Baillie could well have meant both men as well as other or different opponents of the ceremonies at that time.

28. John Owen (1564–1622), Welsh epigrammatist.

29. John Dowden, *The Church Year and Kalendar* (Cambridge University Press, 1910) xiv.

times in various works or letters, Jerome fifteen times, Tertulian eleven times, Ambrose, Chrysostom and Cyprian, each less than ten times, various church councils and canon law over forty times, and singularly or occasionally, Basil, Clement, Epiphanius' *Panarium*, Hilary, Isidore, Gregory I, Lactantius, Leo I, Gregory Nazianzen, Origen, Rufinus, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, and Theophylact.

Of various other historians and histories, Gillespie made use of Baronius and Casaubon, Bini, Bodin, Buchanan, Conti, Knox, Lonicer, Nicephorus, Perren, Platina, Rosinus, Row, Simson, Sleidan, Speed and Vossius; of linguists and translators of Scripture, Beza, Buxtorf, Calepino, Bellarmine's *Linguae Hebraicae*, Hadrian Junius, Marlorat, Montano, Scapula, Tremellius and Thomas.

Of those often used to either illustrate the similarity of the Anglo-catholic view to the Roman Catholic, or at times to show the error of the former from the latter (Gillespie often used an opponent to refute an opponent), Bellarmine is cited nearly thirty times, and the Roman Catholic, turned Stuart defending Protestant, turned Roman Catholic again, Marco Antonio de Dominis (Archbishop of Spalato), is cited over thirty times.

In addition to other works too numerous to note, other Reformed and Lutheran authors often cited include twenty references to works by Vermigli, seventeen citations from Parker's *Scholastical Discourse against symbolizing with Antichrist in ceremonies*, and eighteen references to works by Rudolph Hoſpinian, whose scholarship in works such as his *Festa Christianorum* was highly regarded at the time.²⁹ The *Synopsis Purioris Theologiae* of the professors at Leyden is cited seventeen times, various works by Perkins fourteen, works by Beza eighteen, and the Scottish-born theologian John Cameron is cited twenty times from his *Prælectiones* and four times from his *Popish Prejudices*. Daneau's *De Politice Christianae* is cited seven times; commentaries of Bullinger, six, and Fenner's *Sacra Theologiae*, four; works of Alſted, nine; Martin Bucer, four; and Gerson Bucer, two. Of Lutheran theologians, Martin Chemnitz is cited fifteen times from his work on the Council of Trent; Johann Gerhard, also fifteen; works of Meisner, three; and Friedrich Balduin's *de casibus conscientiae* is cited nineteen times. Johann Forſter's *Nervosae* is cited once (one of the more obscure works traced); and the Magdeburg Centuries are cited eighteen times. Luther is cited twice, from his commentary on 1 Peter, and from his *de Bonis Operibus*. Melancthon is cited once, from the third edition of his *Scholia* on Colossians.

Of the defenders of the English popish ceremonies against which Gillespie's *Dispute* was directed per the lengthy title, the tally runs to Andrewes with nearly forty citations, Burges with thirty-two, Field with sixteen, Forbes' *Irenicum* with thirty-seven, Hooker with twenty-nine, Morton with nine, Saravia with fifteen, Sprint also with fifteen, Tilen with seventeen, Paybody with twenty-three, and John Davenant, who must

fall within the title's etcetera, is cited seventeen times. The most cited of the defenders of the English popish ceremonies, and the most cited single work of any in the *Dispute*, is *Proceedings at Perth Assembly*, to which reference is made over ninety times, whether to David Lindsay's preface, the narration of the proceedings, or John Spottiswood's sermon. The great number of references to this work illustrates the point noted by Roy Middleton in the historical introduction, that Gillespie's *Dispute* is essentially a polemic against the five articles passed by the Assembly at Perth in 1618, which had been opposed by the then five-year-old George's father, John Gillespie, and grandfather, Patrick Simson.³⁰

OVERVIEW OF CONTENTS

To All the Reformed Churches

No doubt because of the nature of the *Dispute*, published anonymously overseas and smuggled into Scotland, there is no customary "dedication" to a patron or other notable, and the equally customary epistle to the reader, Gillespie casts as an open letter to "All the Reformed Churches," using it as an apology for and a means to stir up his compatriots to "suffer for the truth of Christ and for the purity of His worship" (8). As a whole, the opening epistle is probably the best written section of the work, the genre of an opening preface allowing Gillespie to make the greater use of the rhetorical flourishes noted previously. He forecasts some of the argumentation of the work, and at one point gives one of the clearest and more succinct statements regarding the church's power and the nature of circumstances of worship at the heart of the debate over the English popish ceremonies (which Gillespie pursues later in part three, pp. 261ff).

Besides all this, there is nothing which any way pertains to the worship of God left to the determination of human laws, beside the mere circumstances, which neither have any holiness in them, forasmuch as they have no other use and praise in sacred than they have in civil things, nor yet were particularly determinable in Scripture, because they are infinite; but sacred, significant ceremonies, such as cross, kneeling, surplice, holy days, bishopping, etc., which have no use and praise except in religion only, and which, also, were most easily determinable (yet not determined) within those bounds which the wisdom of God did set to His written Word, are such things as God never left to the determination of any human law (16).

The opening lines of Gillespie's epistle are striking and bear recalling by each generation of Christ's church, each of which will be tested by trials. "As Satan's malice and man's wickedness cease not to molest the thrice happy estate of the Church of Christ, so has the eternal council of the only

wise God predetermined the coming of offenses, persecutions, heresies, schisms and divisions, that professors may be proved before they be as approved and made manifest (1 Cor. 11:19). And hence *it must needs be that offenses come* (Matt. 18:7); neither has the church ever enjoyed both purity and peace any long time together." Speaking generally still, but also clearly with his own church in mind, he continues, "But whiles the Church of God, thus disquieted, as well with dangerous alterations, as with doleful altercations, is presented in the theater of this world, and cries out to beholders, *Have ye no regard, all ye that pass by* (Lam. 1:12)? A pity it is to see the crooked and sinistrous courses of the greatest part, every man moving his period within the enormous confines of his own exorbitant desires..." This crooked cast, that 'polemical *dramatis personae*' noted previously, indifferent and uncaring of the church's estate are: the "atheistical nullifidian," "sensual Epicurean and riotous ruffian," "cynical critic," "scenical jester," "avaricious worlding," "aspiring Diotrephes," "lofty [court] favorite," "subdulous Machiavillian," "turn-coat temporizer," "gnathonic parasite," "mercenary pensioner," "silly idiot," "lapped Nicodemite," and "pragmatical adiaphorist." Gillespie bemoans how few are found who would help the church in her current condition, but encourages himself and his readers that God has reserved a remnant, whom he wished to rightly inform of the state of the reformed churches.

There is a rehearsal of history to that point. The reformation in England had been defective (5); but Scotland experienced a more glorious and perfect reformation in doctrine, worship, discipline, government, and policy, which enjoyed civil sanction and was made a matter of sworn obligation. It also received the applause of foreign divines; but more importantly, it was in all points agreeable to the Word of God. But Scotland suffered a grievous backsliding, and became corrupted with "the symbolizing badges of conformity with Rome." She was now licking up what had not been "purged away from England and Ireland" (5-6).

This corruption is especially seen in the imposition of ceremonies which included kneeling to receive the Lord's supper, the sign of the cross in baptism, bishopping (confirmation of children), and holy days, among others. These had been "pressed under the name of things indifferent," but Gillespie contended that in reality, these obscured the substance of true religion. Far from being indifferent, the imposed English popish ceremonies had led to the persecution of the godly, the expulsion of faithful ministers, and the offence of brethren. They opened the door for unlearned, ungodly ministers to be brought into the church, and there had been a growth of Popery, Arminianism, and movement towards reconciliation with Rome (6-7).

30. Gillespie cites his grandfather's magnum opus once in his *Dispute*. Patrick Simson, *The History of the Church of Scotland* (1634).

Besides these inconveniences of the imposed ceremonies, Gillespie's intention in the ensuing *Dispute* was to demonstrate that they were at root unlawful. The remaining and largest part of the epistle is taken up with twelve admonitions to stir up the reader to defend the purity of Christ's worship.

Gillespie admonished the reader, 1. To follow blindly neither side of the dispute, but diligently to try things which are different by the touchstone of Scripture.

2. To heed the Word of God as the rule, which includes submitting to the cross of Christ. Since the true knowledge of God is contrary to the natural man, this requires self-denial and a view steadily fixed on God's glory and the preserving of a good conscience.

3. Not to be led astray by error, which requires growth both in grace and knowledge (8–9). Error and licentiousness increase daily, requiring a greater measure of the lively work of sanctifying grace to combat it (9).

4. To beware of those who use the pretence of religion to further their errors, and who steal away true devotion by resting in external things; who advance religion by violence (9–10); and who fearfully violate God's own commandments in order to enforce their own (10).

5. To consider that a true church does not mix human inventions with God's ordinances: "a true church, as it retains pure doctrine, so also it keeps simplicity of ceremonies" (10–11). The illicit ceremonies greatly tend to detract from matters which require much more attention (11), as the ensuing *Dispute* demonstrates.

6. Not to let the pretence of peace and unity cool fervor. In actual fact "peace is violated by the opponents of the truth" (12). Bands of truth and unity of faith should bind together. True peace is conjoined with obedience to God's will and separated from "all depravation of the heavenly doctrine and divine worship" (12–13).

7. Not to be deceived with appeals to the practices of the ancient church or of the reformed churches of Gillespie's day; it cannot be proved the illicit ceremonies were ancient, and some were only tolerated in reformed churches until they could be seasonably removed (13–14). Having been removed from the Church of Scotland it would be detestable to bring them back (14), and at root, even if historical basis could be found for the ceremonies, it still would not justify them because the Word of God is the rule.

8. Not to rest in bare human authority. "We are to obey the church but commanding and teaching right things." As for civil authority, faith, obedience, and a good conscience are not under that power (15). The magistrate only has power for good and the church only has power for edification (15–16). Only circumstances of worship are left to the determination of human laws (16). Refusing to obey such illicit laws is not inconsistent with subjection to those in authority.

9. Not to think that good intentions are sufficient. A good conscience is one that is "rightly informed out of the Word of God" (16–17). The fact that a person intended to do good is no excuse for an evil action (17).

10. To understand that yielding to the ceremonies will open the door for greater corruptions to follow. It is a deceitful and dangerous temptation to yield to the beginning of evil, and God is just to leave men to what follows.

11. To demonstrate disapproval of the ceremonies in both profession and action.

12. Not to ignore the means for the church's recovery, which consist mostly in prayers and crying; but also in secondary means useful to convince adversaries and to exonerate conscience (17–18).

Gillespie concludes his epistle by warning the reader against disregarding the admonitions (18). The Church of Scotland, blessed with the gospel, and with the reformation and preservation of purity, had broken sacred bonds and God had borne long with her. Ordinarily this would bring down judgment, and hence there was urgent need to avert judgment by turning again. He ends by noting that true reformation carries with it the promise of sweet consolation here and an everlasting crown of glory hereafter (19).

Prologue

The Prologue and Order both stood as separate introductory pieces in the 1637 edition, and some of the language of the former may indicate it could have begun life as the original stand alone introduction before Gillespie penned the masterful epistle. Perhaps he initially thought another would write the epistle and thus the prefatory type language in the prologue? Whatever the case, the prologue does have some language to evoke compassion for the state of the Scottish Church. Gillespie then lists three endeavors to employ to "succor their dear, though distressed mother," the Church of Scotland. Besides prayer, reformation is to be attained by refusing to let disagreements detract from the doctrine of godliness and practice of piety heretofore attained (19–20); making diligent search into truth (20); and testifying to the truth which has been attained and contending for it earnestly (20–21).

Gillespie then notes that these considerations have led him to "take some pains in the study of the controversies which are agitated in this church about the ceremonies, and (after due examination and discussion of the writings of such as have played the proctors for them) to compile this ensuing dispute against them, both for exonerating [exonerating] myself, and for provoking of others to contend yet more for the truth, and for Zion's sake not to hold their peace, nor be at rest, until the amiable light of long-wished-for peace break forth out of all these confusions...."

Order

As already stated, the Order is one of the three original introductory pieces to the *Dispute*, and the shortest. The purpose is to explain Gillespie's order of proceeding which he obviously realized presented some initial puzzlement. As a disputant against the English popish ceremonies, he felt obliged to follow the order established by their proponents; and therefore he collects their arguments and answers them under four main divisions: their necessity, their expedience, their lawfulness, and their indifference. He is not fearful of "the vain flourish of their great words," and aimed to combat them where they thought themselves strongest (21–22). Gillespie explains that "lawfulness" refers to that which may be done, "indifference" to that which may be done or left undone, "expedience" to that which is done profitably, and "necessity" to that which may not be left undone (22). As "necessity" was the weightiest of the pretences urged in behalf of the ceremonies, the *Dispute* commenced with those arguments.

I. Against the Necessity of the Ceremonies

Summary. Part one of the *Dispute* handles the arguments advocating the necessary observance of the English popish ceremonies urged by the formalists upon the Church of Scotland. There are nine chapters, a structure continued in the three subsequent parts. In part one, after proving that his opponents did indeed urge the ceremonies as necessary to be observed, in chapter one, and in chapter two proving that Acts 15 cannot support such an imposition, the next four chapters are spent proving in four ways how the urging of the ceremonies violates Christian liberty. Gillespie directs his attention in the last three chapters specifically to the imposing of unscriptural holy days upon the church, first proving that this violated Christian liberty from the Old Testament (chapter 7), and then from the New (chapter 8), before spending the final chapter showing the weakness of arguments for such days.

One of the more notable exchanges in part one occurs in chapter nine where Gillespie handles the alleged support of Calvin for holy days of man's devising. Some lesser known passages from some of the Reformer's letters were miscited and our disputant gave the fuller text and sense (64–68). This is of interest still because the same misunderstanding of Calvin crops up in modern discussions of the observance of days of the so called 'Christian calendar.' Much of the case made against this particular of the English popish ceremonies is directed toward the urging of necessary observance of such days by church and state authority, and while that is not so much the case today, and some of the other arguments against holy days as unlawful may be of more immediate pertinence, these other arguments may still be applicable to the more subtle urgings of necessity Christians tend to face in this age.

This opposition to holy days will strike many readers as

strange. This is only because there has been over a century and a half of encroachment against biblical worship views in Presbyterian and other Nonconformist traditions, and the church calendar has become common place through modern merchandising and advertising. Such days have become part of culture in becoming holidays as well as holy days. It is true many churches simply use the calendar to preach topically, even perhaps against the superstitions and idolatry which still attach to such days in much of Christendom. In this day Gillespie's arguments in part three are all the more pertinent, that observances which have become superstitious or idolatrous should be removed, else they will remain a means for superstition and idolatry to return at any time (pp. 149ff).

Detailed Description of Part 1, Chapters 1–9

Chapter One. That the necessity of the English popish ceremonies was urged is proved by Gillespie from his opponents' practice and their pleading. Their practice was to tie the people of God to the heavy yoke of ceremonies and demand observance of these more than the weighty matters of God's law, and the people were legally proceeded against if they did not comply. Their pleading was to urge compliance to the ordinances of the church under pain of sin. They claimed the law of the church was greater than a man's own judgment, even if the law was not right (23–24), making the church's appointment a matter of conscience, not simply of practice (24). Some claimed the ceremonies were necessary in themselves; others claimed that though they are unnecessary in themselves, yet they were necessary because they did good (24–25). Gillespie concludes that the urging of the ceremonies as necessary was sufficient reason to refuse them because this added to the Word of God and created superstitions (25).

Chapter Two. Here Gillespie refutes the argument from Acts 15 that the church's appointment made observance of the popish ceremonies necessary, by countering that it was not the church's authority, but the avoiding of scandal which made it necessary to avoid meat sacrificed to idols (25–26). The church added its authority as an act of charity (26).

Chapter Three. Chapters three through six contain Gillespie proofs that the urging of the ceremonies takes away Christian liberty. In this chapter he adduces the reason that they do so, because it restricts practice in the use of things indifferent, which is contrary to Colossians 2:20–22 (27–28), and to 1 Corinthians 7:23, for "to tie ourselves to the doing of anything for the will or pleasure of men, when our conscience can find no other reason for the doing of it, were indeed to make ourselves the servants of men" (28–29). In §3 he then counters the argument that there could be no order unless the people obeyed rulers (29), by noting that men's precepts must be tried by the sure rule of God's Word. If the precept is against or beside the Word in the worship of God, it is to

be modestly refused as the only way for keeping order, and he notes that subjection is still present even where obedience is absent, so long as there is no contempt of authority. In §4 Gillespie answers the claim that conscience is still left free even where practice is restrained, because the individual's persuasion is not affected (29–30), by observing that bare law without reason takes away liberty of conscience (30), and Colossians 2:21 requires us to avoid restraints on liberty of practice, “touch not,” and not merely restraints on liberty of persuasion, “think not.”

Chapter Four. This chapter demonstrates that conscience itself is bound by the popish ceremonies. Gillespie then covers three questions, “1. What the binding of the conscience is. 2. How the laws of the church may be said to bind. 3. What is the judgment of formalists touching the binding-power of ecclesiastical laws” (31). Regarding the first, after adducing some imperfect definitions of what such binding is, Gillespie observes from Ames:

[W]hatsoever urges, or forces conscience to assent to a thing as lawful, or a thing that ought to be done, or dissent from a thing as unlawful, or a thing which ought not to be done, that is a binder of conscience, though it did not bind the spirit of a man with the fear of such punishments as God alone inflicts. For secluding all respect of punishment, and not considering what will follow, the very obliging of the conscience for the time, *ad assensum* [for the purpose of agreement], is binding of it.

To the second question (§3, 32), human laws as coming from men, cannot bind the conscience. The purpose of ecclesiastical laws is to discover what God's law requires, which binds the conscience, and to declare what is most fit in a matter of indifference. The first is necessary, the second is expedient. The latter kind of laws are more properly called directions, instructions, or admonitions; and when they fall into general neglect they should be abolished (33). §4. It is the reason of the law that binds, not the church's authority *per se* (33–34). It is only contempt if obedience is refused when there is no certain persuasion that the thing is unlawful or inexpedient (35). §5. There is no breach of conscience when things indifferent are omitted as long as no offence is given and no contempt is shown. §6. Rites which serve public order and edification bind the conscience because the matter is warranted by God's Word. They are to be kept so far as they maintain decent order and prevent open offence (35–36).

The formalists objected that respectful non-observance derogates from the authority of the church because it is no more than should be done for a brother (§7, 36). Gillespie answers that there are clear differences. The church is given ministerial respect while the brother is given fraternal respect; the one is given authoritatively while the other is given charitably;

the one is public while the other is private; the church is many while the brother is one; and the church is respected in things the brother is not. Secondly, the church is obeyed in many things that the brother is not; that is, in indifferent things that are not inexpedient. The church's constitutions are either lawful or unlawful. Lawful things are necessary or indifferent. When necessary, the necessity of the thing is binding whether the church ordains it or not. When indifferent, as in times of worship, the church adds its authority to one expediency over another, and so the constitution is lawful because authority and expediency are joined together (36–37).

Formalists argued that conscience will accuse for disobedience to human laws without any other consideration (§8, 37). Dr. Field argued that the usefulness of the law itself is binding. Gillespie answers that if this were the case no blame could be laid on those who disobey the law where they see no use for it. To argue that it sufficed for superiors to see the usefulness of the law only leads back to the position that human authority binds the conscience of itself, because the conscience is not free to judge otherwise (§9, 37–38).

To the possible argument that the usefulness is not in the law itself but in the removal of scandal and contempt (§10, 38), Gillespie replies that nonconformity is not scandal and contempt; and formalists themselves have argued that subjection and obedience are different.

To the idea that the obligatory power of the church's laws comes from the church's own authority which makes the laws for the sake of order (§11, 38–39), Gillespie answers: 1. This does not differ from the opinion of the Roman Catholics (39). 2. The apostles never made things indifferent to be necessary except in the case of scandal, and were careful to leave the conscience free even in the case where eating meat sacrificed to idols was causing a scandal. 3. Not obeying does not infer despising of authority, but only the contemning of those laws that are disobeyed (40). 4. The church's precept cannot bind except as it is lawful and convenient for shunning of scandal.

To the argument adduced from Bishops Spottiswood and Lindsay, that the sentence of superiors is sufficient ground for conscience, and the church binds the conscience to obedience even when the law is not prescribed rightly, Gillespie counters that only the reason of the law, not the bare will of it, can be a rule to conscience (§12, 40–41).

The chapter concludes with Gillespie affirming that indeed the formalists clearly taught a binding of opinion and conscience, and not merely of practice, in the imposition of human ceremonies (§13, 41), and that these are substantial tyrannies over God's people that are rightly resisted in order to maintain Christian freedom. With the professors of Leyden he affirms, “that this is a part of the liberty of all the faithful, that in things pertaining to God's worship, *they may have consciences free from any yoke of human traditions, since it is*

the dominion of God alone to prescribe matters pertaining to religion" (41).

Chapter Five. This chapter discusses the third reason the ceremonies take away Christian liberty, because they are urged upon those whose consciences condemn them. Gillespie observes that if liberty is taken away in any, then much more in those who are persuaded they are unlawful (§1, 41–42). And when formalists argued the conscience is to yield to the sentence of superiors, that evidenced that they exercised dominion over men's consciences and undermined that "full persuasion" which is required in obedience (42). Secondly, the formalists argued such consciences were in error and needed correcting, to which Gillespie replied, that it is sin to do what conscience condemns (Rom. 14:23), even where there is an erring conscience. When conscience errs we are not obliged to do what it prescribes, but we are bound to omit what it condemns. Conscience should be rightly informed so the man can do what he should and not do what he should not do. If he retains his error, in a necessary thing he should be urged to do it rather than neglect his duty in the service of God (§2, 43); in an unnecessary thing it is safest not to urge men to do what conscience condemns. The ceremonies are unnecessary and therefore should not be urged; they may be omitted without peril to salvation. In the final section of the chapter, the disputant against the English popish ceremonies notes that the fact that even an erring conscience binds, is sufficiently cleared from Scripture (Rom. 14:14, 23). Those who judged it unlawful to eat all sorts of meat were in error; yet they were bound not to eat unclean meat. The verdict of conscience is taken to be God's will, which means an intention to act contrary to conscience equates to an intention to disobey God.

Chapter Six. The fourth and last reason Gillespie adduces to demonstrate that the urging of the ceremonies takes away Christian liberty, is because they are pressed by bare will without reason to satisfy conscience (44). Gillespie argues that nothing should be done because it is the bare will of men (1 Cor. 7:23), and that God's will is to be done even in the service of men (Eph. 6:6–7). As the apostles only enjoined what was necessary according to the law of charity (Acts 15:28), no synod should do more. Men are not to be used as sticks and stones and borne down by bare will and authority. Even one of Gillespie's opposites granted "that the church doth not so deal with them whom Christ hath redeemed" (45). They rule God's flock with force and cruelty who make their will the reason of obedience (46). The chapter concludes with Gillespie arguing that all things should be proved and examined, including what is proposed by ministers and councils; even canon law and the schoolmen left room for discretion and dissent (§2, 47). The church is to be believed and obeyed only in so far as she is the pillar and ground of truth.

Chapter Seven. The last three chapters of part one provide

the first of several extended sections of the *Dispute* aimed explicitly at the imposing of holy days not commanded in Scripture. This chapter demonstrates from the Law of God that obligatory festival days take away Christian liberty. Gillespie argues that God's law permits six days for labor, which no law of man can inhibit (§47–48). Formalists replied that God gave dominion to man over animals but this can be inhibited by human laws (§2, 48). Gillespie's answer is that God did not give dominion to every man over all animals, but the charge is kept when some men do exercise dominion.

The formalists argued that God's liberty to labor is not absolute but subject to government. Gillespie replies that it is tyranny to spoil men of liberty (§3, 49); it begs the question, for the power of governors is the very point under dispute; and being subject to governors does not require one to submit his liberty to them. Formalists contended that if God did not rob the Israelites of liberty when He made them rest on certain days, then why may not the king or the church set apart days without spoiling men of their liberty? Rightly outraged, Gillespie's reply is that it is blasphemy to give God's power to man. God did not take away the Israelites' liberty absolutely, but only by prerogative as the Lawgiver. The king and the church are not lords over God's law (§4, 49).

The formalists' argument continued in noting that the king may require cessation from work for a civil or public reason; why may he not for the honor of God and exercise of religion? Gillespie explains that the magistrate has power to command cessation from some work, e.g., private work, in order to free a man to put his hands to public work; but he has no power to cause cessation from all work (§5, 50). It is a cessation from ordinary to extraordinary labor, not to no labor at all. The forced pretended holy days of Gillespie's age required no work be done at all. It is a leap in logic to say that since the king may act in a civil matter he may therefore do so in a sacred one.

The formalists' argument then ran that the church has power to appoint occasional festivities; why not ordinary times for constant blessings? The reply is that there are two reasons for occasional fasts: for obtaining some great blessing, or for averting some great judgment. Feasts are testimonies of thankfulness for the benefit received from fasts or from extraordinary providences. They are extraordinary and do not agree with ordinary festivities. Anniversary days are no means to commemorate the benefits of redemption, because the Sabbath and every other day give occasion to call them to mind in hearing, reading, or meditating on the Word. "I esteem and judge that the days consecrated to Christ must be taken away," says Danæus: "Christ is born, is circumcised, dies, rises again for us every day in the preaching of the Gospel." If it is argued that the command for preaching and hearing the Word suffices as a reason, it is answered that there is

no command for annexing these to anniversary days more than to other days (§6, 51). There is only a general command for fasting at some times more than others. There could be no command for particular causes of fasting, as these would have been infinite; yet there could have been a command for festivities on set days, as these were limited.

To the argument that people are called from labor to divine service during the week in great towns, Gillespie answers that festival days require the whole day, whereas weekly meetings only require the time of service. Cessation of labor may be omitted in weekly meetings, but not on festival days (§7, 52); people are exhorted to come to weekly meetings, but commanded to come to festivities.

Chapter Eight. This chapter continues the case against the festival days, showing from the gospel that they take away liberty. Gillespie's argument is as follows: From Galatians 4:3, 10, the observing of days is a yoke of bondage and unbecoming the Christian church freed from the pedagogical instruction of the ceremonial law (52–53); and from Colossians 2:16, we are not to allow ourselves to be judged for not observing a holy day (53). It was merely an accommodation to the weak Jews, who had not been instructed fully in Christian liberty and the abrogation of the ceremonial law, when the apostle permitted them to observe days (Rom. 14:5). Adducing the simile of Augustine, that the Mosaical rites were as a dead man not yet buried, he concluded that now when the gospel is fully preached, they are dead and buried, and thus provide no support for holy days.

It was countered that the apostle only condemns Judaical days, not ecclesiastical ones instituted for order and policy (§2, 53–54). But Gillespie answers that this is the argument of the Roman Catholics (54). Protestants answer that if feasts of God's institution are not to be observed, much less those of man's devising. The Old Testament days could not be kept as typical because they believed Christ had already come (55). The Jewish feasts Paul condemns were observed in the same manner as Christian feasts are; and therefore the condemnation of Jewish feasts applies equally to the Christian.

Gillespie contends that the apostle's arguments hold good against memorial feasts. They bring men under a yoke of bondage (Gal. 4:3); in fact the bondage is even greater because this is man's yoke, not God's. They are rudimentary (Gal. 4:9), and the infancy of the church is at an end (§3, 56)—babes in the Christian church are greater than John Baptist. The shadow is unprofitable when the substance itself has come (Col. 2:17; see §3, 56–57). Man's ordinances about the things appointed by God ought not to be obeyed (Col. 2:20); much less should the precepts of men be received in things God never ordained, and which are contrary to what he made lawful and free (§3, 57).

The formalists argued that the apostle only condemned the typical use of days, and their memorial use may only have

been of typical benefits such as deliverance from Egypt. Our disputant's counter is that this is a doubtful conjecture, and it equally may not have been the case; it tries to prove a position by a supposition. It yields that they were not observed as types, and could have been memorials of types; but types shadow an antitype (57–58). If these memorials were mystical, it must be granted that Christian feasts are mystical, and more so as memorials of spiritual benefits (58). Thus holy days are more mystical than Jewish days, and it is a pretence to say they are only for order and policy. But the Jews did not observe these days for a mystical use; they merely observed Mosaical rites along with their faith in Christ, because they had been educated in them and accustomed to them, and were not yet convinced that they were exempt from them (Acts 15:21; see §4, 58–59).

The formalists argued further that they necessarily observed these days as instituted by God, and the apostle only rejected the necessity of observance, especially if salvation was made to depend on it (§5, 59). Gillespie's answer makes clear that, even so, it applies equally to the "necessity" of Christian holy days as to Jewish. They only regarded them as instituted by God; it cannot be proved that they saw them as necessary to salvation. If days of God's institution were not to be observed, much less days of man's institution; and it has been proved that these days are pressed under a necessity, and the actions of the imposers demonstrated it (59–60).

Chapter Nine. The three chapter section against the imposition of holy days not commanded by God, concludes with this chapter addressing the weakness of some of the arguments for the use of such days.

Noting that Davenant advanced some cautions to prevent abuses and superstitions ensuing upon the use of such festival days, Gillespie replies that cautions do not suffice when men's souls are endangered; when a thing can be abused to superstition it should be removed.

The practice of the ancient church, which was advanced as a justification at Perth Assembly (1618) for imposing such days, is no warrant (§2, 61). There was no law to observe holy days in the purest times of the church. Easter which came by custom, not by commandment, was left to men's own judgment, and such days then were not accounted more excellent than other days (61–62).

Gillespie rejects the next argument for such days, which was from the practice of other reformed churches and the opinion of contemporary divines (§3, 62); because the abstainers can equally appeal to other churches and divines for abolishing festival days. More importantly, it cannot commend them in Scotland, since in rejecting them outright, she is more obliged to abhor them. Scotland even swore a solemn oath to God against popish rites and dedicating of days; which was not a rash or superstitious oath, but taken under deliberation with

preparation and humiliation, imposed by lawful authority, and sworn throughout the land. Even if it were rash, the nation is still bound to it because the matter was lawful (63).

Gillespie notes that many divines disallowed festival days, including the Belgic churches and Luther; and if it were argued that they were discontent only at the number and corrupt nature of them, he answered that they make no such qualification, but simply speak against festival days. The number and corrupt nature of them suffices to prove they should be discarded (§4, 64).

The formalists specifically adduced the words of Calvin, Zanchius, and Perkins in support of the observance of such days. When they drew on words from Calvin's letters, Gillespie argued strongly, by citing Calvin at length—in one of several important uses of Calvin in the *Dispute*—that his statements should not be perverted as if he supported festival days. Gillespie argued from his letters that Calvin was against schism and would not divide the church where the festival days could not be abolished peaceably, but the full context and words showed he desired their abolition (65).

Zanchius is also cleared from some apparently selective use (66, and note 1). Lindsay had charged Calderwood with abusing a passage from the Italian born theologian's work on the fourth commandment. Gillespie asks, "What meant the Bishop to say that this place is falsified and mutilated by his antagonist, who quotes it not to prove that Zanchius disallows of festival days, but to prove that, in Zanchius's judgment, the sanctification of the Sabbath only, and no other day in the week, agrees best with divine and apostolical institution?" While they were not cited, Zanchi's words are: "Primum quidem, 'magis consentaneum esse cum prima institutione, & cum scriptis Apostolicis, ut unus tantum dies in septimana solenniter totus sanctificatur, quam si plures: cum interim tamen plures sanctificare, cum sacris literis non pugnet.'" "Indeed the first, namely, 'that it is more agreeable with the first institution, and with the Apostolic writings, that only one day in seven be sanctified entire and solemnly, than if many be thus sanctified: yet at the same time to sanctify many does not quarrel with the scriptures.'" Zanchi also made it clear that "they have not acted incorrectly, who have abolished all days except 'the Lord's Day'" (Non male igitur fecerunt, qui omnia praeter 'diem Dominicum' aboleverunt).

Perkins on Galatians 4:10 is also cleared (66); for although he partially excused their use in England, yet he considered them to be more respected than they should be; he did not condone celebrating the benefits of redemption, but only allowed that men should come to the church to hear the Word; he maintained that only God can appoint a day of rest; and he preferred the practice of non-observance in imitation of the apostles (66–67).

Finally, Gillespie argues that the foreign divines never

required the resumption of observance of such days, when they had been removed (67). Calvin's words are again cleared from misrepresentation. He called them Judaical when (purportedly) kept to God's honor (67–58), and he allowed them to be refused though enjoined by the prince (68). Gillespie closes by again noting that the Church of Scotland removed them and swore against them, so the case is unique from that standpoint.

II. Against the Expedience of the Ceremonies

Summary. Part two of the *Dispute* is directed against claims that conforming to the English popish ceremonies is expedient, i.e., that they are profitable to the edification of the church. In the first chapter, again of nine, Gillespie addresses those who agreed the ceremonies should not have been imposed, but since they had, all should yield to them for the peace of the church. In chapter two, our disputant handles claims that it is expedient to conform, and in chapters three through eight, demonstrates the ceremonies are inexpedient to edification, because they prepare for greater evils (chapter three), hinder edification (chapter four), are occasions of injury and cruelty (chapter five), harden Roman Catholics in their errors (chapter six), disturb the peace of the church (chapter seven), and scandalize the weak believers (chapter eight), in which chapter Gillespie gives twelve propositions regarding scandal. In the last chapter, Gillespie answers arguments that scandal should not be imputed to the ceremonies.

The stand out section of part two surely is chapter eight, containing twelve propositions regarding scandal (pp. 102–107), which are generally useful beyond the controversy at hand. Within that section, the citations from Paræus and Parker are notable, clarifying the scandalizing of the malicious and how that is to be handled and regarded 106–107).

... Paræus, who also infers well from this place that we are taught to beware of two extremes: to wit, the scandal of the weak on the one part, and the perversity of false brethren on the other part: "For if we see," he says, "either that those men are offended, that is, weakened in faith, or that other such men are rendered steadfast in false opinion by the practice of indifferent matters, they must rather be laid aside, because at such a time, through circumstance, they become unlawful."

But Parker answers well: "The scandal there not cared for is, when the Pharisees are offended at His abstaining from their washings and His preaching of true doctrine—both of which were necessary duties for Him to do. And when He defends his healing on Sabbaths (Luke 13:15), and His disciples' plucking ears (Matt. 12:7), upon this reason they are duties of necessity and charity, He plainly insinuates there is no defense for deeds unnecessary when the malicious are scandalized. When the

thing was indifferent, does He not forego His liberty for to please them, as when He paid tribute, lest He should offend them, although He knew they were malicious (Matt. 17:27)?"

Detailed Description of Part 2, Chapters 1–9

Chapter One. Part two of the *Dispute* opens with Gillespie taking on the arguments of those who agreed the ceremonies should not have been imposed, but since they had, all should yield to them for the gospel's sake; nonconformist ministers should conform rather than allow themselves to be deprived of their ministry.

Most of this, the second longest chapter of part two, is spent answering three arguments by John Sprint, the author of *Cassander Anglicanus* (*Cassander Anglicanus: showing the necessity of conformity to the prescribed ceremonies of our church in case of deprivation*, 1618), who was formerly a staunch Puritan. He had preached strongly against the English ceremonies, suffered imprisonment, and was forced to read a statement of submission in convocation. He was later persuaded to conform. Sprint first contended, "granting the controverted ceremonies to be, in our use and practice of the same, many ways evil and inconvenient, yet to suffer deprivation for refusing to conform to the same is contrary to the doctrine and practice of the apostles." (69–70). He argued that the apostles advised submission to ceremonies which were just as inconvenient and evil as the English ceremonies (§2, 70). Gillespie first refutes that the two cases were the same. The case is entirely different and those "Jewish ceremonies in the use and practice of the apostles were no way evil and inconvenient." He gives fourteen differences. 1. The Jewish ceremonies might be used to avoid scandal (Acts 15:28), but the popish ceremonies had no necessary use and should not be imposed. 2. The popish ceremonies held manifold inconveniences; the Jewish might win obstinate Jews and the weak (1 Cor. 9:20, 22). 3. The Jewish were indifferent; the popish unlawful (71). 4. The Jewish were not observed as parts of God's worship nor was any holiness placed in them; not so with the popish. 5. There was no mystical signification in the Jewish as with the English ceremonies. 6. The Jewish did not make the doers idolaters, as with the popish. 7. Unlike the popish, the Jewish were not imposed by necessity. 8. Reason was given for the Jewish, not bare will as with the English popish ceremonies. 9. The Jewish were not urged on those who judged them unlawful. 10. The Jewish were originally instituted by God, not by human superstition as were the popish. 11. The Jewish were part of the Mosaic policy, these part of popish idolatry. 12. The Jewish were not observed always and in all places. 13. The Jewish ceremonies in question were before the full promulgation of Christian liberty, and 14. were not to the detriment of more pressing duties.

Sprint's second argument was that one must perform the

greater duty and neglect the lesser if both are in competition, and preaching is greater than omitting ceremonies (§3, 71–72). Gillespie counters that the argument supposes the substantial of the second table overrule the ceremonials of the first table (Matt. 12:7); but to practice scandalous ceremonies is soul-murder, a substantial breaking of a second-table duty and greater than preaching of many sermons (72). Deprivation does not cause omission of preaching; the proud prelates caused it. The deprived ministers would most gladly preach, but were not permitted.

The third argument from Sprint was that deprivation for nonconformity is more scandalous than the imposed ceremonies. First, he argued it was contrary to the royal law of love (§4, 73), because something indifferent in nature would deprive men of the ordinary means of salvation. Gillespie responds that the popish ceremonies had not been proved to be indifferent, and that nonconformity does not deprive men of the ordinary means. Only the prelates deprived men of it.

Secondly, Sprint contended that all churches including the apostolic church, practiced inconvenient ceremonies; but as our disputant had already shown, the apostolic church practiced *convenient* ceremonies. Those later churches were not to be followed in practicing *inconvenient* ceremonies. "Better go right with a few than err with a multitude" (74).

Sprint argued thirdly, that nonconformity breeds scandals, such as fraternal discord. Gillespie hotly rejects this audacious claim, stating that it was the imposed illicit ceremonies which sparked the fire of contention. Sprint also contended that nonconformity scandalized Catholics who beheld godly ministers cast out instead of wearing the surplice, and that nonconformity scandalized atheists and the profane who rejoice to see the godly silenced. In response to these, Gillespie supposes that those who replaced the godly ministers would give small opposition to such parties, and that it would rather grieve the Catholics to see men suffer rather than conform to the popish ceremonies, and would confirm many professing believers who saw the nonconformists' constancy and courage.

Fourthly, Sprint disputed that it was more scandalous to God-fearers who chose to suffer inconvenient ceremonies rather than lose their pastor and the means of salvation. Gillespie answers Sprint's contention wryly, "who is the puritan now? Is not Mr. Sprint who stands in such a huge distance from all who are of our mind, and so far prefers himself and his followers to us, as if we did not truly fear the name of God?" (75). And on the granted supposition that the conformists taking the nonconformists' place would not be dispensing the means of salvation, Gillespie wonders how that concession would go down with Sprint's fellows (75). Gillespie observes that the fear of God requires departing from evil, including inconvenient ceremonies, and while it is a scandal to deprive

ministers for nonconformity; yet the ministers' suffering is edifying to those who fear God.

Fifthly, SPRINT argued nonconformity offended the magistrate and provoked him to use the sword of authority. Gillespie points out that as nonconformity is necessary, the individual is blameless, and the magistrate acts as Pharaoh against Moses; and besides, the magistrate was misinformed by the nonconformists' adversaries.

Sixthly, SPRINT argued that nonconformity unjustly condemned those churches that maintained inconvenient ceremonies without ministers suffering deprivation from office, which maintenance had been universal (§5, 75). Gillespie in response again notes that the contention that the apostles had practiced inconvenient ceremonies was proved false. While he does not deny that others afterwards practiced them, Gillespie points out that even his opponents would not defend all such inconvenient ceremonies that had ever been, and that it was false that all sound teachers had defended the use of them rather than for ministers to suffer deprivation from ministry; the Waldenses, Calvin, and others objected to them, and many suffered rather than conform (75–76). Gillespie then adduces the common theological rule that even in rites and ceremonies, such must be profitable to edification, have a manifest utility, be no mere idle ceremony, and that the godly are not bound to subject themselves to anything which "they perceive neither to be right nor profitable" (77). In further defense of which, Gillespie cites the tenet (noting and clearing some general exceptions from SPRINT), that negative precepts are always binding; positive precepts, though binding at all times, do not bind to all times (77).

Gillespie expounds further on this tenet, which necessitates nonconformity at all times to inconvenient ceremonies (§6, 77–78): 1. Negative precepts bind to all times and can never lawfully be done, and to abstain from things scandalous is such a precept (78). 2. The use of a lawful thing must be expedient; something "which is lawful in the nature of it is never lawful in the use of it, except only when it is expedient for edification" (1 Cor. 6:12; 10:23). 3. All things must be done to edifying (1 Cor. 14:26). 4. No offence must be given (1 Cor. 8:13); as long as meats offended, while the world stood, the apostle would refrain. 5. We must refrain from anything which is not expedient for edification, including inconvenient ceremonies: something even conformist bishops taught. 6. If something is scandalous it is therefore unlawful. 7. Evil is not to be done that good may come (Rom. 3:8) (79).

Concerning the last point, Mr. SPRINT argued the rule must be limited to things evil in nature, not in the use of them. But this begged the question and Gillespie explains that things evil in use are evil at that time and so equally unlawful as things evil in nature. We may not choose a lesser fault to shun a greater. To SPRINT's allegation that unlawful things may be

done lawfully to further greater duties, e.g., priests breaking the Sabbath (79–80), etc., Gillespie rejects the examples as irrelevant, because the circumstances changed the kind of action so that it was not unlawful in itself (80). Mr. SPRINT's example of the people eating the Passover while unclean was also irrelevant, because the people prepared themselves and repented, and, so doing, it was God's will that they draw near, notwithstanding legal uncleanness. They did not choose to be unclean to further God's worship, but chose to keep the Passover and repented of their uncleanness in order to do so.

Taking his leave of SPRINT's arguments, the chapter concludes with Gillespie turning to Bishop Spottiswood's claim that a great inconvenience comes from refusing the ceremonies, because the king is offended (§7, 80). Gillespie answers that the nonconformists willingly obey the king in those religious matters the Word gives him power to command; but they regarded the ceremonies as unlawful and inexpedient, and therefore beyond his power (80–81). But even if such were lawful, Christian liberty is an article of faith which should not be relinquished; and conscience should not be hazarded because it is God's deputy (81). Gillespie contends that the king should graciously accept this, as a Protestant defender of the faith, seeing the same plea had even been made by Protestants to Popish princes. Gillespie observed that the king had no more loyal and true subjects than the nonconformists (81–82).

Chapter Two. The following seven chapters are relatively brief; and the second chapter is directed against the plea that the English popish ceremonies were expedient (82). Morton alleged that the difference of garments is convenient to distinguish ministers and that therefore the surplice is expedient. The answer is that a black gown suffices; the surplice is unnecessary. To those who alleged that confirmation caused children to drink in God's knowledge while tender of age, and that this was best done by bishops, Gillespie responds that then prelates should catechize children; ordinary ministers can catechize. What use is the imposition of hands in such confirmation? "Unbishops" children who did not go through confirmation, are just as well catechized.

Tilen asserted that holy days are expedient to imprint the knowledge of the benefits of redemption (§2, 82). Gillespie answers that catechizing and preaching are best for this purpose at all times, and there are examples of better instruction without such days. He notes that there were a lot of topics of the catechism which had no corresponding holy day. Why just nativity, passion, etc? "Why do they not keep one way, and institute a holy day for every particular head of catechism?"

Lindsay claimed the use of holy days abolished profaneness, when men are most prone to it (83); to which Gillespie replies that this was a bad cure; it is in word only but without deed, as the holy day defenders did not preach against the superstitious observances of such days. And even if they

did, the best cure, shown by experience, was not to observe them at all. Lindsay also alleged private communion to the sick was expedient for comfort, to which Gillespie responds, that the Spirit is not tied to sacramental signs, as is seen in the glorious departure of many who have not had private communion (§3, 83).

Thomas Paybody alleged that kneeling at the Lord's Supper was expedient for reverence. Gillespie answers that too much reverence is given to the sacrament by kneeling, and that many sufficiently show reverence who never kneel at it (83–84), and concludes the chapter generally, “we see that these expediences pretended for the ceremonies, are attained unto as well and better without them than by them. But I will go forward to show some particular inconveniences found in them.”

Chapter Three. In this chapter Gillespie begins covering specific inconveniences or inexpediences of the ceremonies, here noting that they serve as preparations for greater evils (84). He observes that: §1. The holy faith had received no small harm from the ceremonies and that conformity to popish ceremonies draws men to conform to their dogmas. Formalists had already espoused heterodox doctrines, and preached such from Scottish pulpits (84–85). §2. That there was a sect among the formalists urging reconciliation with Rome who professed unity of faith with her. The Archbishop of Spalato found Protestant books written to refute Roman doctrine to be the most detestable, and Field argued against contending with Catholics because the learned papists' doctrine of justification was orthodox (85). §3. Roman Catholics will not meet Protestants half-way but expect them to come all the way back to Rome (86); and the middle party creates a third party which raised even more controversy. “He had good reason for him who objected to the Archbishop of Spalato, that *he who is everywhere is nowhere*; for instead of reconciling Protestants and Catholics, they make themselves a third party, and raise more controversy. *O bellua multorum capitum!* [O the beast of many heads!]” §4. Gillespie also contends that the formalists who are not reconcilers with Rome are encouraging the reconcilers (e.g. Cassander, de Dominis), by retaining Roman rites, and that the English popish ceremonies were viewed as a positive means for reconciliation with Rome (86–88). §5. Even if these evils had not followed, the ceremonies should still be shunned as inconvenient, because they are preparatives for worse evils and evil should be resisted in its beginning (88). The law of God requires this preciseness and the practice of the godly exemplifies it. Gillespie ends by observing “O! from how small beginnings did the mystery of iniquity advance its progression? How little motes have accesssed to mountains! Wherefore, ‘it is necessary for us to cultivate the simplicity of Christ, away from which, once vanity has advanced its foot, superstition follows vanity, error superstition, presumption error, impiety presumption, and all idolatrous’” (88–89).

Chapter Four. The next “inconvenience” of the ceremonies which Gillespie adduces is that they hinder edification (89). §1. This they do in that they “obscure the substance of religion and weaken the life of godliness by outward glory and splendor, which draws away the minds of people so [far] after it, that they forget the substance of the service which they are about” (89–90). Purity and simplicity are most expedient for edification (90). “But ‘superstition’ (says Camero), ‘the mother of ceremonies, is lavish and prodigal; spiritual whoredom, as it is, it has this common with the bodily: both of them must have their paintings, their trinkets, their inveiglements.’” §2. The English popish ceremonies were fleshly and external and thereby impeded inward and spiritual worship (90–91). Circumstances which serve for decency are different from sacred significant ceremonies (91). The English ceremonies derogate from the true inward and spiritual worship, and even a formalist such as Cameron recognized that the admirable simplicity of the apostolic church was a part of its flourishing (91–92). §3. The ceremonies were inexpedient because they took up time and effort which might be spent in godly edification (92), and pulpit and press urged these things when they could have been urging more profitable things. Moreover, faithful men were shut out of the ministry because of them, or thrust out for no other reason.

Chapter Five. In this chapter it is argued that the ceremonies were inexpedient because they were occasions of injury and cruelty (93): §1. They were instruments of cruelty against sincere servants of Christ; they occasioned fining, depriving, imprisoning, and banishing. Christians are rather to show kindness and mercy to all, but especially towards good Christians, and chiefly in matters of ceremony and indifference. §2. Gillespie argues it is better to take away the ceremonies than to throw out ministers because of them (93–94), and made clear again the inequity of blaming the nonconformists for losing their ministries: “This is even as Nabal blamed David for breaking away from his master, when he was chased away against his will (1 Sam. 25:10); and as Julian, when he had impoverished the Christians, laughed them to scorn, as if they had impoverished themselves to get that blessing which Christ had promised to the poor.” §3. In addition to all the injury caused by the ceremonies, as with the Waldenses before, godly and zealous Christians were nicknamed Puritans, ancient heretics, who were far different from the nonconformists of Gillespie's day (94).

Chapter Six. A fourth inexpediency of the ceremonies is that they hardened and confirmed the Catholics in their error (95). Gillespie argues in this chapter: §1. That Catholics used the ceremonies to create strife among Protestants. §2. The course of conformity was the way of returning to Popery and made Catholics resolute to stay where they are (95–96). §3. That far from gaining the Catholics, the ceremonies served

to harden them in Popery; that they would not change for those they regarded as heretics (96–97). The best way to win Roman Catholics is to shine as lights in the world by maintaining a steadfast profession and practice of the truth (97). §4. While the apostle observed some Jewish ceremonies for winning of the Jews (Acts 18:21, 20:16, 21:26), that is no reason to have some popish ceremonies for winning of the Catholics, because the case is not the same between the weak Jews uninstructed in Christian liberty and obstinate Catholics; nor is the same thing to be done now under the full light of the gospel as was done then. Also, the Jewish ceremonies were commanded by God and were to be allowed for a while until honorably buried; antichristian ceremonies deserve no such treatment. And finally Gillespie asks, “Can the same things be done at Antioch which are done at Jerusalem?” At Antioch those Jewish ceremonies were forbidden because the greater part were Gentiles. Scotland was to be likened to neither city, “for Scotland has been filled both with preaching and practice contrary to the ceremonies;” and “spewed them out openly and solemnly, with a religious and strict oath never to lick them up again” (97).

Chapter Seven. A fifth inexpediency of the ceremonies was that they disturbed the peace of the church (98). Gillespie in this chapter contends that, §1. The ceremonies are unhappy instruments of discord. §2. He outlines four marks for discerning who were the true troublers of the church—the motive, measure, matter, and manner. The motive of the formalists was worldly respect; they were moved by ease and preferment, and feared to cause the king offence (98–99). Nonconformists were only moved by conscience (99). §3. The second mark, measure—the opponents exceeded in contention. They disallowed in nonconformists what they allowed in others; they contended intensively against nonconformists, but remissly against Roman Catholics (99–100); which contentions produced hurtful and pernicious effects, such as defamation, deprivation, spoliation, and incarceration (100). §4. The third mark, matter—to contend is not a fault if it is about a weighty matter, but to be contentious in a light matter is faulty. Those who urged the ceremonies contended for something unnecessary; those who contended against them were contending for the doctrine and discipline warranted by God's Word. §5. The fourth mark, manner—nonconformists urged truth and reason, but conformists resolved all into the will of the law (100–101), which Gillespie proved from the proceedings of the Perth Assembly of 1618 (101–102).

Chapter Eight. A last inexpediency of the ceremonies adduced is that they scandalized, and hinder spiritual edification and growth in faith and assurance, and caused stumbling to the weak instead of going forward. After defining scandal, the rest of the chapter is devoted to twelve propositions concerning scandal (102).

§2. Proposition 1. A scandal is an occasion of stumbling; it is not simply the grieving or displeasing of a fellow believer (102–103). Proposition 2. This occasion of stumbling or scandal may be given, taken, or both given and taken (103). Proposition 3. All three of these occasions of stumbling or scandal are sinful. The first is sin on the part of the offender, the second on the part of the offended, and the third is the sin of both. §3 Proposition 4. An active or given scandal is not only one that is intended, but of itself may induce stumbling despite intention. Proposition 5. Gillespie gives several ways an active scandal may be given. §4. Proposition 6. A passive scandal is taken while not given. This may be from ignorance or infirmity (the scandal of the weak) or from malice (such as the scandal of the Pharisees). §5. Proposition 7. A passive scandal may evolve into an active scandal (the examples given are Gideon's ephod and the bronze serpent). Proposition 8. Unless it is a necessary thing, the occasion of a passive scandal should be removed. Proposition 9. Just because something may be indifferent or lawful in itself, does not make a scandal taken to be only passive, because the thing may be done uncharitably. Nor does a civil or ecclesiastical command or law make an otherwise active scandal passive, because human authority does not have the power to change the nature of scandal and remove the occasion of it. Proposition 10. Someone giving the occasion of a passive scandal is only blameless when it was beyond his intention to cause his brother to stumble, but the occasion itself must be not only not evil in itself, but lacking in an appearance of evil. §6. Proposition 11. The only scandal that should be ignored is that occasioned by good and necessary things, such as hearing the Word of God, etc. Proposition 12. We should be as circumspect in scandals regarding the malicious as in scandals involving the weak. The kind of scandal remains the same even though the fault is greater in relation to the weak (105–106), which rule is confirmed by the practice of both the Apostle Paul and of the Lord Jesus Christ (106–107).

The chapter ends with Gillespie making a key point, that when scandal is known to follow upon an unnecessary action, nothing can justify it (107).

Chapter Nine. The final and longest chapter of part two contains refutations of several defenses of the ceremonies from the charge of scandal imputed to them (107–128). Gillespie first dispenses with the hateful view which some formalists taught, that the weak must be left to perish. “If they perish, they perish,” according to Hooker (§1, 107). Gillespie already refuted this sort of thinking in chapter one.

The chapter proceeds by taking up a general answer made to the charge of scandal brought against the English popish ceremonies (107–114). Formalists argued that the scandal attributed to their ceremonies was taken, but was not given (§2). Gillespie answers that this was impertinent because the

ceremonies were unnecessary and should therefore be removed as the occasion of offence (107–108). Additionally their answer was false because the offence was known to be taken, and therefore it was given (§3, 108). Keeping something unnecessary after scandal rises from it is an active scandal (108–109). Definitions out of Polanus, Aquinas, and de Dominis, underscore that the scandal of the ceremonies was active and given (109).

The least that could be said was that the ceremonies gave an appearance of evil upon which followed an active scandal. The “appearance of evil” may be taken as referring to doctrine or action. Taken of doctrine, there should be no doubt that Roman Catholics drew bad consequences and confirmed their errors from the ceremonies (§4, 109–110). While it might be argued that they had no ground to draw such consequences (§5, 110), even granting that, they should be abstained from because of the appearance of evil, just as the idolater had no reason to confirm himself in idolatry from the eating of food sacrificed to idols (110–111). 2. But they did indeed give grounds to Catholics because they saw conformists siding with them against nonconformists and thereby reckoned their practices to be better (111). Taking the “appearance of evil” to relate to sinful actions, the ceremonies obviously gave the appearance of partaking with idolaters and were therefore an active scandal to be removed (§6, 111–112).

To the objection raised by the formalists that they gave reasons for the ceremonies (§7), Gillespie replies that if this were sufficient it would put an end to the duty of bearing with the weak in things indifferent, because the weak by definition are ignorant of such reasons. When they further objected that it was simple obstinacy to reject the reasons given and to still take offence, the answer is that the only reason commonly given was will and authority (113). And besides, even if formalists could give a good reason, they still bore the burden of resolving consciences on a matter of indifference. The formalists then protested that there was no intent to draw into sin by the ceremonies, so there is no scandal given. However, the action which induced to sin was scandalous irrespective of the intention, which is obvious in Peter constraining the Gentiles to Judaize by mere example without intention (§8, 113–114).

For the balance of the chapter Gillespie addresses more particularly his adversaries’ objections against his argument of scandal, taking up first the Lord Chancellor’s argument recorded by Lindsay, that it is simply the nonconformist’s own fault for being grieved by things lawful in themselves (§9, 114). Our disputant answers this defense by noting that scandal is not to be equated with grief; that fault is in all scandal received and must be removed because it gives occasion of ruin, though not cause of ruin; and that lawful things must still edify or be removed. He argues that if to be offended is a sin, none could ever be scandalized for anything, not even for

unlawful things (114–115), and points out that things lawful in themselves may scandalize if they lead the weak to condemn lawful deeds or cause them to follow examples against conscience (115).

The next objector addressed is David Lindsay, Bishop of Edinburgh, who objected that scandal is removed by the law (§10). The answer is that the pretext of obedience to superiors does not excuse before the Supreme Judge. A thing may be lawful in itself and yet not lawfully ordained if it is inexpedient (116), and it is unlawful obedience to yield to an inexpedient ordinance. The points are made that the ordinance of superiors cannot be of greater weight than the law of charity, which is God’s law, and that while offense at a lawful thing is caused by the man himself, it is occasioned by the thing he is offended at, which should therefore be removed. He concludes by clearing Tertullian’s statement from misinterpretation, that “a good thing offends none except an ill mind.”

Gillespie’s third objector is John Forbes of Corse, and he addresses five arguments from Forbes’ *Irenicum* (John Forbes, *Irenicum Amatoribus Veritatis et Pacis in Ecclesia Scotiana*, 1629) (§11). 1. The first argument is that a thing deemed unlawful cannot be rejected on the grounds of scandal because scandal presupposes lawfulness (117). The response is that the argument from scandal proves more than the argument from their unlawfulness, because the scandal is more than the unlawfulness of it, and because it serves to convince the opposites on their own grounds. There is no need to fall back on the argument that they are unlawful when it suffices to show that they have an appearance of evil; much like a pastor convincing a fornicator on the basis that his action causes scandal when he will not recognize it is a sin (117–118).

2. In the second objection to the argument from scandal, Forbes turned the accusation around against nonconformists and charged them with causing scandal (§12, 118), to which Gillespie answers that while formalists may be displeased, they cannot be scandalized in this, because nonconformity is necessary.

3. Thirdly, Forbes denied there was any appearance of evil, but he failed to explain what an appearance of evil is (118–119). He gives the example of kneeling at communion and denies that it induces to spiritual ruin (119). Gillespie’s response is that the ignorant cannot make Forbes’ subtle distinctions, but see the same action performed by Roman Catholics who adore the host; and those who have knowledge are led by example to go against their consciences.

4. Forbes then urged that when Paul forbore his liberty of taking wages he still maintained his liberty against the malicious; and, in any case, it was not a matter of church law. But Gillespie replies, 1. That this concedes the point that the offence required abstinence from something lawful in itself. 2. Forbes cannot know what the Corinthians thought as to the

lawfulness of taking wages. 3. The judging of the weak as if they were malicious is the judging of another man's servant (120). 4. Even if it were malice in being offended, care must still be taken not to make the malicious worse. 5. An ecclesiastical decree cannot make a scandal to be no scandal or restrain liberty in things indifferent. 6. It is not a contemning of authority to disobey a command where subjection is still given.

5. The last objection from Forbes addressed by Gillespie, is that the minds of the weak are simply to be better informed, especially to obey (§13, 120–121), to which he answers that obedience does not purge the scandal (121); neither does information, and it is a chief mark of the man of sin to make indifferent things to be a sin.

Gillespie's fourth specific opponent to the charge of scandal against the ceremonies, is Richard Hooker (§14). He argued that ceremonies which are not evil in their own nature must be devised unto evil in order to be scandalous, and that the English ceremonies are not devised unto evil. Gillespie responds to the objection, that it is enough that they are abused by Roman Catholics unto idolatry; this gives them an appearance of evil. The examples are exhibited, that kneeling at communion is evil in its own nature because it requires adoration before a mere creature; and the surplice was devised unto evil because of its superstitious use (121–122). Gillespie points out that the ceremonies are abused in England, noting out of Perkins that the feast of Christ's nativity was not spent in praising God, but the people behaved more like those celebrating a heathen feast of Ceres or Bacchus (122).

Hooker reasoned against the argument for abstinence on account of weak brethren, that the Jews were generally weak, but now only some few are, and that the meats involved private action whereas the ceremonies are public, and public laws are for the general good even if they are inconvenient for some; the few should simply be taught (§15, 122–123). Gillespie answered that Christ's woe (Matt. 18:6), strikes upon those who offend even one (123), and the greatest part of Scotland are scandalized by the ceremonies one way or another, and what the apostle writes concerning scandal holds good whether there is a public law or not. Teaching does not take away scandal.

The last specific opponent objecting to the argument from scandal addressed by Gillespie, is Thomas Paybody (Thomas Paybody, *A Just Apology for the Gesture Kneeling in the act of receiving the Lord's Supper*, 1629) (§16). "Now, if I reckon Paybody to be no body, perhaps some body will not take it well. I will therefore examine how he handles this argument. Four things are answered by him to those places, Romans 14:15; 1 Corinthians 8:10; Matthew 18:6, which are alleged against the use of things indifferent, when we cannot use them without scandal." 1. Paybody objected that the Scriptures alleged only speak of scandalizing the weak. Gillespie responds that

weakness pertains to lack of knowledge and to lack of prudence, and the ceremonies impede Christians from going on in their Christian course (123–124). He also observes that it is a fault to give offence to the strong as well as to the weak (Peter offended Christ); even to the malicious (124).

2. Paybody argued that "all those Scriptures condemn only the scandal of the weak which is made at that time when we know they will be scandalized" (§17, 124). The disputer against the popish ceremonies counters, that only God knows certainly who will be scandalized, but formalists know from past actions that the ceremonies will usually cause scandal, and whether scandal ensued or not, it is still scandal given because the ceremonies were occasions of ruin.

3. The objection is then made that the Scriptures alleged speak of things indifferent, not things enjoined by authority (§18, 124–125), and the reply is given, that authority does not take away scandal (125), and cannot without reason take away liberty to use or not use a thing indifferent. Forbearing an action to avoid scandal is better than bare obedience to authority.

4. Lastly, Paybody argued that the Scriptures alleged suppose a smaller scandal is to be preferred to a greater (§19). Peter should not have withdrawn from the Gentiles in order to avoid scandalizing the Jews. To this Gillespie replies at length through the end of the chapter: 1. It is a great mistake to think scandal cannot but be chosen one way or another. 2. The principle of choosing the lesser of two evils only applies to punishments, not to sins. 3. Peter gave no scandal to the Jews by eating with Gentiles, and his eating with Gentiles was necessary to avoid making the Gentiles to Judaize or confirming the Jews in their Judaism (125–126). Scandalizing and displeasing are two different things. 4. The argument appears to be saying that nonconformity is a greater scandal to conformity and that more are scandalized by nonconformity (126). {1} Many are displeased with nonconformity, but none are scandalized by it; that is, made worse. {2} Even if refusal to conform were scandal, the number of people scandalized is no argument for a greater scandal. How many are scandalized by the preaching of the cross? The number does not determine the greatness of the scandal. {3} The unlawfulness of the ceremonies requires that they be refused regardless of the scandal which might follow from doing so. {4} It must be shown that the ceremonies do not give scandal before nonconformity thereto can be charged with scandal. {5} Those grieved at nonconformity are not scandalized because it is for their good; whereas conformity confirms the superstitious in their errors and causes the doubting to condemn them (126–127). {6} The perpetual condition of the church is one of mixture; of great and small, of weak and strong, of healthy and sickly, of greater and fewer gifts, of those sooner or later called (127).

III. Against the Lawfulness of the Ceremonies

Summary. By far the largest and most involved portion of the *Dispute* is the third, which is larger than all the other parts combined, and directed to prove that the English popish ceremonies were unlawful. Gillespie spent so much of his energies here, because “[T]he strongest tower of refuge to which our opposites make their main recourse, is the pretended lawfulness of the ceremonies, which now we are to batter down and demolish, and so make it appear how weak they are even where they think themselves strongest” (129). This will likely be the most challenging section for readers, not only due to the often extended and relentless argumentation, but also because the argumentation leaves little room for much that is not only tolerated in worship practices in our day, but which was openly embraced anew and eagerly reintroduced, and has now been of long standing practice. In chapter one it is argued that the disputed ceremonies are superstitious, and therefore unlawful, instancing examples in the pretended holy days and private communion. Chapter two begins a three chapter arc in which it is argued that the disputed ceremonies are unlawful because they are monuments of past idolatry (chapter two), because they are “badges of present idolatry” (chapter three), and because they are formally, by definition, idols of themselves (chapter four). Chapter five puts forth the case for the unlawfulness of the ceremonies because of their mystical and significant nature. Chapter six begins a four chapter arc stretching through the end of the section, in which it is argued that the disputed ceremonies cannot be warranted from Scripture (chapter six), by church authority (chapter seven), by the state (chapter eight), or from the law of nature (chapter nine).

Given the size and significance of the contents in part three, it is difficult to single out just one important or key feature. Amongst several that might be noted, certainly the proposition and syllogism that is at the head of chapter two is significant, since it guides much of the argumentation.

All things and rites which have been notoriously abused to idolatry, if they are not such as either God or nature has made to be of a necessary use, should be utterly abolished and purged away from divine worship, in such sort that they may not be accounted nor used by us as sacred things or rites pertaining to the same.

31. “This rule ruins all the man-made inventions in the papacy’s so-called worship of God, which has so much pomp and foolishness. All of that is nothing but sheer trash before God, and is in fact an abomination to him. Hence, let us hold this unmistakable rule, that if we want to worship God in accordance with our own ideas, it will simply be abuse and corruption. And so, on the contrary, we must have the testimony of his will in order to follow what he commands us, and to submit to it. Now that is how the worship which we render to God will be approved.” *Sermons on Second Samuel*, trans. Douglas Kelly (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1992) 246.

But the cross, surplice, kneeling in the act of receiving the communion, etc. [i.e. the disputed ceremonies imposed by the Perth Assembly] are things and rites [which have been notoriously abused to idolatry], and are not such as either God or nature [has made to be of a necessary use].

Therefore they should be utterly abolished [and purged away from divine worship, in such sort that they may not be accounted nor used by us as sacred things or rites pertaining to the same].

In defending this proposition, perhaps one of the more important theologians cited is Calvin, because he often in modern times is put forward to defend tolerating (if not approving) some of the things Gillespie disputes against (though it is hard to see much support in the reformer’s willingness to put up with trifles, 67, which under a church in better health would have been removed with the relics of idolatry).³¹ In defending this proposition against the objection of Forbes, Gillespie writes (chapter two, 156–157):

Calvin, answering that which Cassander alleges out of an Italian writer, *abusu non tolli bonum usum* [abuse does not take away the good use], he admits it only to be true in things which are instituted by God himself, not so in things ordained by men, for the very use of such things or rites as have no necessary use in God’s worship, and which men have devised only at their own pleasure, is taken away by idolatrous abuse. *Pars tutior* [The safer part] here, is to put them wholly away, and there is, by a great deal, more danger in retaining than in removing them.

The reference is to Calvin’s tract against George Cassander, *Responsio Ad Versipellem Quendam Mediatorem*, (p. 41–44; cf. CR 37 (CO 9), 542; [French] “Response a Un Certain Moyenneur Rusé {Response to a Certain Tricky Middler},” *Recueil des Opuscules* (Geneva: Stoer, 1611) 2191–2192). While Gillespie only summarized Calvin, a first time translation of the referenced passage has been provided for this edition of the *Dispute* (*Dispute*, page 156; see a full translation of the Calvin tract, in the 2012 issue of *The Confessional Presbyterian* journal).

Similarly, what is alleged of an Italian writer, that abuse does not take away good use, will not be true if one holds to it without exception: because it is clearly commanded to us to prudently watch that we would not offend the infirm brothers by our example, and that we should never undertake what would be illicit. For Saint Paul prohibits offending the brothers in eating flesh that was sacrificed to idols [1 Cor. 10:28], and speaking to this particular issue he shows a general rule that we are to keep ourselves from troubling the consciences of the weak by a bad or damaging example. One might speak better and more wholesomely if he were to say that what God

himself ordains may not be abolished for wrong use or abuse that is committed against it. But even here, it is necessary to abstain from these things if, by later human ordinance, they have become corrupt with error, and if their use is harmful or scandalizes the brothers.

Here I marvel how this "Reformer," after granting that superstitions sometimes have such strong popularity that it is necessary to remove from the realm of man those things once ordained by public authority (as we read of Hezekiah doing with the bronze serpent), finally does not consider even a little that his shrewdness is a horror to the ways of good action: as if in defending supportable rituals, he would oblige that all superstitions should be considered as safe and whole because they are weighty. For what is there in the papacy now that would not resemble the bronze serpent, even if it did not begin that way [Num. 21:9]? Moses had it made and forged by the commandment of God: he had it kept for a sign of recognition. Among the virtues of Hezekiah told to us is that he had it broken and reduced to ash [2 Kings 18:4]. The superstitions for the most part, against which true servants of God battle today, are spreading from here to who knows where as covered pits in the ground. They are filled with detestable errors that can never be erased unless their use is taken away. Why, therefore, do we not confess simply what is true, that this remedy is necessary for taking away filth from the church?"

If one other passage may be singled out, probably one of the most cited, if not important, passages in part three is Gillespie's definition of circumstances of worship (as opposed to elements or "ceremonies") in the context of delimiting lawful ecclesiastical power.

That which the church may lawfully prescribe by her laws and ordinances, as a thing left to her determination, must be one of such things as were not determinable by Scripture, on that reason which Camero has given us, namely, because *individua* are *infinita*. We mean not in any wise to circumscribe the infinite power and wisdom of God, only we speak upon supposition of the bounds and limits which God did set to his written word, within which he would have it contained, and over which he thought fit that it should not exceed. The case being thus put, as it is, we say truly of those several and changeable circumstances which are left to the determination of the church, that, being almost infinite, they were not particularly determinable in Scripture; for the particular definition of those occurring circumstances which were to be rightly ordered in the works of God's service to the end of the world, and that ever according to the exigency of every present occasion and different case, should have filled the whole world with books. But as for other things pertaining to God's worship, which are not to be

reckoned among the circumstances of it, they being in number neither many, nor in change various, were most easily and conveniently determinable in Scripture. Now, since God would have his Word (which is our rule in the works of his service) not to be delivered by tradition, but to be written and sealed unto us, that by this means, for obviating Satanical subtilty, and succoring human imbecility, we might have a more certain way for conservation of true religion, and for the instauration [*restoration*] of it when it fails among men, how can we but assure ourselves that every such acceptable thing pertaining any way to religion, which was particularly and conveniently determinable in Scripture, is indeed determined in it; and consequently, that no such thing as is not a mere alterable circumstance is left to the determination of the church (261–262)?

Detailed Description of Part 3, Chapters 1–9

Chapter One. Gillespie's first argument against the lawfulness of the English popish ceremonies, is that they are superstitious. §1. To the formalists' charge that the nonconformists were superstitious for their 'thinking to do service to God' in not observing the ceremonies, Gillespie explains that it is no more superstitious to abstain from unlawful ceremonies than other corruptions. §2. Superstition is defined as that which displays more in God's worship than He prescribes; it is that which is done beyond that which is established. §3. Superstition is that which exhibits worship to whom it is not owed or not in the way it is owed. This is why private baptisms are inordinate as well as private communion. Calvinists "reject that custom by which the eucharist is offered to the sick as a farewell provision, and they hold the opinion that it is taken unlawfully if it is not in a public meeting" (130–131). §4. The illicit ceremonies are superstitious because there is no necessary nor profitable use for them, and therefore they cannot but be used superstitiously. They "occasion error and superstition, rather than edification to salvation" (131). They are superstitious because they are a hindrance to necessary duties, and (§5) because they render a grace-defacing external worship to God: fleshly observations in the place of His spiritual worship. Carnal ceremonial observances are superfluous in religion and consequently superstitious. §6. Gillespie maintains that holiness and necessity (i.e., worship) are placed on the English popish ceremonies, making them highly superstitious. This he proves out of Hooker and Burges, with comparisons to Aquinas. Just as worship rendered to God which has not been commanded is superstition, so is anything assumed sacred or holy which has not been so prescribed in Scripture. Gillespie contends that the formalists placed as great necessity in their observances as the Catholics did theirs, even a greater necessity in some cases, which he demonstrates out of Bellarmine and Jansen compared with Forbes, who wrote that the articles of Perth were necessary for God's glory (134), and Hooker,

whose argument for private baptism insinuated baptism was absolutely necessary, at least the desire for it, something even rejected in arguments at the Council of Trent. Private baptism implies such a necessity, which is why Geneva resolved that baptism must be in public services (135).

In the remaining sections of chapter one (§7–§15), Gillespie applies his argument from superstition against pretended holy days (and places). Determining one day is more holy than another is superstitious (Beza). Lindsay denied formalists thought such days more “holy,” saying the appointed festival days were no more different than the church setting times during the week for prayers and worship (§7, 135–136). In answer, Gillespie notes the distinction of the terms *designation*, *dedication* and *sanctification*. *Designation* is when one appoints something to a use but reserves the right to use it for some other purpose, such as preaching on a Tuesday night one week, but doing something else the following week on that night. When something is *dedicated* to some purpose, the right to use it for some other purpose is given up. *Sanctification* is similar but involves setting apart a thing to a holy use. The formalists’ holy days were holy to them both by dedication and consecration. Gillespie calls Lindsay’s novel equivocation between ‘holy’ things consecrated to holy mystical uses (e.g. the water in baptism) and holy political uses (e.g., consecrated buildings for worship, hospitals, etc.) crude speculation. Citing both Calvin and Sanctius on Isaiah 13:3 and Jeremiah 1:5, Gillespie maintains that something is sanctified and made holy when God designates it to serve for His glory. The church cannot make anything holy by appointing it to a holy use, because it can only be consecrated by God’s command, “by virtue of the Word and prayer” (citing Fenner, Polanus and the Leyden professors). If common ordinary things such as food and drink are sanctified to us by the Word and prayer (1 Tim. 4:5), how can the church make anything “holy” like the ground for a church, or a hospital building?

§8. Gillespie postulates, that if days, buildings and other things are made holy by consecration to ‘holy political uses,’ they are made so either by the holy use to which they are dedicated, or by the church’s appointing them to such uses. The first is not possible, else, citing Ames, the air into which the minister preaches, and the light by and his glasses through which he reads the Word are sacred. Neither is the latter possible because the church has no power to make anything holy by dedicating it to holy uses.

Following this there is a discussion of what is a legitimate and what a superstitious dedication of church buildings (138–140). Vermigli is cited rejecting Roman Catholic hallowing of churches, but he also acknowledged piety demands that at the first use of anything we should thank God for his goodness (for which he adduced the dedication of city fortifications in Nehemiah). Gillespie argues that churches may only

be consecrated in the sense our ordinary food is, or the walls of Jerusalem were, or in the sense of *dedication* where there is nothing sacred intended (a sense he finds in Calvin, Montanus and Tremelius on Deuteronomy 20:5, and Sanctius on Ezra, 139). Any other sort of church dedication is superstitious. Gillespie notes that Peter Waldo of the Waldenses taught dedication of temples was Satanic, and the authors of the Magdeburg Centuries opined that even the bare dedicating of a building by prayer and preaching lacked divine command and seemed “born out of Judaism.” Bellarmine warranted making buildings holy by consecration from Moses’ consecration of the tabernacle, but out of Hospinian Gillespie counters, that Moses had God’s commandment, and that there is no such command anywhere in God’s Word to warrant Christians likewise consecrating their churches. The section concludes by Gillespie noting that what is said against dedication of church buildings applies equally to dedication of altars or the tables upon which the sacrament elements of the Lord’s supper are placed.

Gillespie next takes up the consequence, that if some things, places and times are holy because consecrated by the church to holy uses, then other things, places and times not so consecrated, though used in the same manner, are some way more profane, for which he adduces Hooker who maintained as much (§9). Gillespie concludes rather, that “the presence of Christ among two or three gathered together in His name, makes any place a church;” and approves the saying of Rainolds, that for Christians, “no land is strange, no ground unholy—every coast is Jewry, every town Jerusalem, and every house Sion—and every faithful company, yea, every faithful body, a temple to serve God in” (140–141).

As with places, so the formalists were superstitious of times. Hooker maintained, as with God’s presence hallowing places, so His works hallowed times; and that all who would honor God should treat such days as more holy than others, and that such days are holy even without the church’s consecration. Citing the Rhemists and Bellarmine, Gillespie labels such a view as “popish superstition.” The Catholic apologists say the very same, that Christ consecrated his nativity, passion and resurrection by the works done thereon.

Gillespie thus brings into question Lindsay’s frequent protestation that such days are only holy for the church’s consecration of them to “holy political uses,” rejecting that he honestly portrayed the true convictions of his fellow defenders of the English popish ceremonies. The rest of the chapter is devoted to demonstrating this (141–148), which he proves by showing the formalists observed their holy days no differently than the Lord’s day (§10); denied the church had power to change the pretended days, that they therefore were not simply appointed for order and policy (§11); that it could not be for order and policy if they esteemed some of the pretended days over others

of them (§12); that they cannot be appointed simply for order and policy if they are claimed holy because of the works of God which were said to have sanctified them (§13); the formalists' actions belied the claim the days were simply appointed for order and policy (§14); their own words showed the pretended holy days were not simply appointed for order and policy (§15), which Gillespie proves with citations from Bishop Andrewes' sermons. Rather than observing them "as circumstances of worship, for order and policy," the formalists maintained the pretended holy days "as having certain sacred and mystical significations, and as holier in themselves than other days" (146). And after citing the actual reasons given by Andrewes for why "there is 'but one day appointed between the passion and the resurrection, forty days between the resurrection and ascension, and ten between the ascension and Pentecost,'" Gillespie concludes the chapter saying "*aliquid mysterii alunt*, and so *aliquid monstri* too," to underscore the argument that the pretended holy days were superstitious with a play on words, equating the claim of mystery to an act of divination.

Chapter Two. Here begins an argument spread across three chapters in which Gillespie contends that the disputed ceremonies are unlawful because they are monuments of past idolatry (chapter two), because they are "badges of present idolatry" (chapter three), and because they are formally, by definition, idols of themselves (chapter four). For the first, the young author begins by encouraging himself to 'double down' on his case because much is granted by his opponents as to the idolatrous nature of pagan and Roman Catholic rites. §1. The case that Gillespie pursues is that "All things and rites which have been notoriously abused to idolatry, if they are not such as either God or nature has made to be of a necessary use, should be utterly abolished and purged away from divine worship, in such sort that they may not be accounted nor used by us as sacred things or rites pertaining to the same." He contends the English popish ceremonies (crossing, surplice, receiving communion kneeling, etc.) are such rites that have been notoriously abused, are not of such necessary use, and therefore should be completely abolished from the worship of God.

Our disputant begins by explaining the proposition (§2, 150). The definition includes the word "notoriously" because an abuse must be known in order to be avoided as a matter of conscience. The word "unnecessary" highlights the fact that certain things are naturally inevitable (like opening the mouth to preach) or were commanded by God (such as the sacraments) and therefore cannot be abolished even if they are abused. The description of the rites as "sacred" points to the fact that nothing would necessarily be wrong about using some things outside of a religious context (e.g. eating the idolatrous host, or wearing pretended holy garments, if no others are available). "Things abused to idolatry are only then

unlawful when they are used no otherwise than religiously, and as things sacred" (150).

With the proposition explained, Gillespie defends it with five proofs (§3). 1. The first proof is from God's precepts: Isaiah 30:22, which, Gillespie concludes from Sanctius, teaches that one must avoid the smallest accoutrements of idolatry; Jude 23, which Gillespie takes with Rollock to command that "the very appearance either of evil or of sin is to be detested"; and Exodus 34:13, Numbers 33:52, and Deuteronomy 7:5, 25, 26 and 12:2, 3, which prove anything "irrecoverably polluted" with idolatry is forbidden.

2. It is proved by God's promises such as in Numbers 33:52, 53 and Isaiah. 27:9, which make clear that acceptable service requires abolishing idolatrous relics (151).

3. The proposition is proved by the specific reproofs for "suffering idolothites" in Revelation 2 and 1 Corinthians 10 (§4). Gillespie affirms the distinction made from Beza and Paræus and others of two sorts of idolothites: of meat offerings which may be eaten in private if there is no potential of scandal, and public offerings and sacrifices to idols which are "simply and in themselves unlawful" and are to be avoided. Arguing from the lesser to the greater, Gillespie concludes if the second sort of meat offerings are unlawful, how much more unlawful is it to use in God's pure and holy worship, deeply defiled rites and things, of long and public association with idol worship (151–152).

4. The proposition is supported from approved examples of those who abolished idols, such as Jacob (Gen. 35:4), Elijah (1 Kings 19:30), Jehu (2 Kings 10:22–28), Hezekiah (2 Kings 18:4), Josiah (2 Kings 23), penitent Manasseh (2 Chron. 33:15), Moses (Exod. 32:27, 20), and Daniel (Dan. 1:8). Of particular note is the considerable example of Hezekiah who not only abolished monuments of idolatry which when first instituted were but the inventions of men, but he destroyed the bronze serpent when it was idolatrously abused, though it had been originally set up by the command of God. Gillespie cites Pope Steven saying this example is for imitation, Farel who maintained magistrates and kings should take a lesson from it, and Andrewes, from amongst the formalists, who acknowledged "that whatsoever is taken up at the injunction of men, when drawn to superstition, comes under the compass of the brazen serpent, and is to be abolished" excepting only that prescribed by God (§5, 152–154).

5. Gillespie's fifth proof is a "twofold reason," that those things notoriously idolatrously abused should be abolished, because they both "remind" and "move" (§6, 154–155). (1) Not even the name of idols should be remembered amongst God's people (Exod. 23:13; Deut. 12:3; Joshua 23:7). (2) Idols not removed serve to ensnare again and should be abolished (Deut. 7:25; 12:30; Zech. 13:2, and by analogy, Deut. 22:8 and Hosea 2:6, 7).

Having proposed, explained, and given proofs of his proposition, Gillespie turns in the rest of this chapter to: I. answer some objections (§7–§13), and II. refute what he calls some particular subterfuges (§14–§20).

I. The formalists objected, 1. That it is not necessary to abolish things which have been abused unto idolatry, but it is sufficient to simply purge the abuse and restore the right use (§7–§11, 155–161). (1) To this Gillespie replies that while “abuse does not take away the good use” is true in things of divine institution, it is not true “in the things ordained by men” (156), for in the things which men have ordained idolatrous abuse does take away the good use. (2) Gillespie’s proofs demonstrate that such things must be removed, with no exception for removing the abuse and restoring right use. (3) Forbes objected that thoughtfully introduced things otherwise indifferent in nature, may be reformed and retained; things such as those idolatrously abused by Catholics, like church buildings, bells, matrimonial benediction, etc. (156). To this Gillespie replied (§8,157) that buildings to meet in, bells for summoning to services, and the like, are of necessary use from the light of nature, and the benediction is of divine institution. Forbes objected that it is indifferent to use this or that place, etc. and denied the latter was commanded in God’s Word. Gillespie’s response is that while it is indifferent to choose one place over another in which to worship, some definite place is necessary, which excepts such things from the argument. But it is not necessary to choose to kneel in communion in one place more than another, or observe Christmas or Easter upon this day or that day. Such things are not necessary “in their kind;” “it is not necessary to keep any festival day, nor to kneel at all in the act of receiving the communion” (158). Also such things as this or that building or this or that vessel for ministering the sacraments, are not used as things sacred in worship or as more holy than other buildings or vessels, but only for “natural necessity,” which have use in civil as well as religious assemblies. From this respect it is not absolutely necessary to destroy buildings and like things that were used idolatrously. However, Gillespie does make the case that while not always of necessity, it may be prudent in some cases to remove some buildings more singularly noted for idolatry (§9, 158–160). Gillespie then defends the giving of the marriage benediction by a minister as divinely instituted, arguing by analogy from Numbers 6:22–27, and from Hebrews 7:6 that the duty of blessing by a minister of the Lord predates the law of Moses and was not peculiar to the Levitical priesthood (§10). Gillespie closes his argument with Forbes and the first objection by noting the judgment of Calvin, again against Cassander, that ancient and lawful rites otherwise agreeable to Scripture, must be removed if abused wickedly and superstitiously (161).

2. The formalists additionally argued that preaching and

teaching against the idolatry and superstition that might ensue upon retaining abused rites, was a means to avoid the harm in retaining them (§12, 161). (1) Gillespie argues that the same might be pretended for retaining images in churches, citing Zanchi, “that it is not enough to teach by word that an evil thing must not be done; but the slight obstacles, the incentives, the causes, the occasions of evil doing must be abolished;” and Thomas Naogeorgus, that while Hezekiah could have simply warned the people, he rather destroyed the bronze serpent and removed it completely from sight. (2) Gillespie cites from Calvin’s letters to show how little such preaching and teaching precluded subsequent abuse of misused rites which were not removed (161–162).

3. The formalists complained that if they were to follow Gillespie’s course, nothing could ever be retained, including the sacraments, because they had been notoriously abused by the Catholics (§13). But Gillespie answers out of Zanchi again, that such divinely instituted things are in themselves necessary and so it is sufficient to remove the abuse; the bronze serpent though divinely appointed was not of necessary use.

II. In the rest of chapter two, Gillespie addresses some specific subterfuges of the formalists raised against the argument from idolatrous abuse.

§14. Lindsay maintained that if the ceremony in question is of divine institution, such as he claimed kneeling in receiving communion was, we must determine if the abuse proceeded from the nature of the action or the opinion of the actor. If the former it must be abolished. If the latter, once the opinion is removed, the rite may be used without profanation of idolatry. “For example, the abuse of kneeling in elevation, etc., proceeds not only from the opinion of the agent, but from the nature of the action, which is idolatrous and superstitious, etc., and, therefore, both the action and gesture ought to be abolished. But the sacrament of the supper, being an action instituted by God, and kneeling being of [its] own nature a holy and religious ceremony, it can never receive contagion of idolatry from it, but only from the opinion of the agent: then remove the opinion, both the action itself may be rightly used, and kneeling therein, etc.”

To this Gillespie first points out that if Lindsay grants that rites of mere human appointment which have been abused to idolatry, may be abolished (noting Lindsay fails to answer the argument unless he says “must” rather than “may”), he must grant that on that basis alone, the disputed ceremonies being so polluted with idolatry should be abolished (since they are only of human institution). 2. He then questions why Lindsay defends kneeling in general as having a divine institution. He asks where is such kneeling as a rite is commanded. As did the Perth Assembly, Lindsay might have adduced Psalm 95:6 (“let us kneel before the Lord our Maker”). In which case, whether kneeling there is taken to commend the Jews in that particular setting before the ark of the covenant (citing

Calvin), or generally commending kneeling as appropriate while not necessary, it allows kneeling generally, excepting only "a certain kind of worship" in particular. Kneeling in the general nature of it is not a divine institution, "but in itself indifferent" (as other postures), all which are only good or evil in the act under the particular circumstances. 3. If that is true, since kneeling is not necessary, its past abuse requires its present abolition. 4. Gillespie objects that the nature of the action (such as kneeling) cannot be the cause of the abuse, nor can it proceed from the nature of the action as used, "as one effect from the cause; for 'nothing can be a sufficient cause of sin to a man,' except only 'his own will'" (164). 5. "It is the will of the agent only which both makes the action of elevation to be idolatrous, and likewise kneeling in this action to receive the contagion of idolatry." 6. If Lindsay's contention is that the rite may be retained if the agent is merely better instructed, this is refuted by Hezekiah's destruction of the bronze serpent, the abuse of which did not proceed from the thing in itself, which was instituted by God, but proceeded from the perverse will of those who treated it idolatrously.

§15. Gillespie observes that this example of the destruction of the bronze serpent is disagreeable to Lindsay, who maintained that the use of the serpent (healing) had long since ceased, but the action of kneeling continues of necessary use "for the better expressing of our thankfulness to God." 1. In answer, Gillespie notes that his proposition and this use of the destruction of the bronze serpent as a proof of it, is a common place of theologians; even Lancelot Andrewes, a fellow formalist, as already cited, acknowledged as much: that rites of mere human invention abused to idolatry but lacking necessary use, must be abolished. 2. Gillespie rejects that the serpent had no use; it was retained as "a monument of that mercy" received in the wilderness, "and it served for the better expressing of their thankfulness to God, which the Bishop here calls a necessary use." 3. To Lindsay's contention that kneeling remains in necessary use, Gillespie contends that he must mean "kneeling in the act of receiving communion; else he makes no point for the case at hand" (165). Gillespie points out the consequences of Lindsay's view, that it condemns many Reformed churches who do not kneel in the act of receiving communion, which he said was necessary for better expressing thankfulness to God. If it is necessary to so do to show thankfulness in the greater act of receiving communion at the Lord's table, so in the lesser of giving thanks at common meals at our own tables. 4. The apostles sat and did not kneel; did they not "well enough express their thankfulness to God?" 5. "God will never take a ceremony of men's devising for a better expressing of our thankfulness than a gesture which is commended to us by the example of His own Son, and His apostles, together with the celebration of this sacrament in all points according to his institution." 6.

Lindsay and his fellows are inconsistent; sometimes they say it is indifferent as to the posture one receives communion; here he says kneeling is necessary. 7. Gillespie concludes that Lindsay does not know how to refute the condemnation of kneeling in receiving communion by the example of the serpent, except to show that kneeling is necessary; which he failed to do. "All things, then, which are not necessary (whereof kneeling is one), being notoriously abused to idolatry, fall under the brazen serpent" (166).

§16. Gillespie next addresses some subterfuges from Paybody, who claimed three conditions under which it would be allowable to retain idolatrous accessories to worship. 1. If there was a needed use for them in the worship of God. 2. If they were altered to no longer honor the idol or the worship of it. 3. If certain danger that people would be ensnared again in idolatry was removed (166). If Paybody requires all of these conditions, the last two are superfluous, as that which is necessary in God's worship cannot tend to honor idols nor give danger of entrapping people in idolatry. If any one condition is meant, Gillespie grants the first; but that does not aid Paybody, for formalists will never prove the disputed ceremonies, "have either a needful, or a profitable, or a lawful use in God's worship." The second Gillespie had already refuted and he rejects Paybody's additional proofs as nonsensical. As to the third condition, Gillespie asks why limit it to "certain danger"? Are we not to avoid even the appearances of evil and remove apparent dangers? What danger is more apparent than the unnecessary and disputed popish ceremonies, which have been abused idolatrously and if retained serve to entice to remember old idolatry and to return to it, as previously argued? (167)

Gillespie next affirms and demonstrates that the popish ceremonies have indeed been notoriously abused to idolatry and superstition, because they have been dedicated and consecrated to service of idols, and deeply polluted and employed commonly in idolatrous worship (§17, 167–168). He then takes Paybody to task again for audaciously denying that kneeling has been abused in Roman Catholicism (§18). Gillespie reproves Lindsay's contention that kneeling had only been abused in the elevating and circumgestation of the bread and not by participation (of the worshippers), by noting that "a liar should at least have a good memory." Elsewhere Lindsay had allowed that the Catholics kneeled to the sign in the sacrament, but formalists kneel "by the sacrament to the thing signified" (169). If the Catholics so kneel, the rite of kneeling has been abused to idolatry "even in the participation." 2. Gillespie asks, why do Protestants dispute with Catholics about the adoration of the host, if the latter do not adore it in the participation? 3. Catholics kneel before the bread intending to give it divine worship, and so "in the participation they abuse it to idolatry." 4. Out of Durand and the Rhemists

Gillespie gives proof, and asks how Lindsay can free their participation in the sacrament from idolatrous kneeling. 5. Out of Honourable III and Chemnitz Gillespie demonstrates various actions adoring the sacrament were “ordained in reference to participation.”

In the next to the last section of this chapter (§19), Gillespie deals with objections from John Burges rejecting again that Catholics adored the host in the act of receiving; and after some paragraphs of answers, concludes “what is the point?” The doctor admitted “that after transubstantiation was embraced, and when all the substance of the visible creature was held to be gone, they did intend the adoration of the invisible things, as if there had been now no substance of any creature left therein, whereby he destroys all which he has said of their not intending the adoration...” In the last section (§20), Gillespie argues that he needs no other proof that the ceremonies are unnecessary than the formalists’ pleading for their indifference. While sometimes they plead for the necessity of rites such as kneeling in the act of receiving communion, yet without recanting their arguments for the indifference of the ceremonies, formalists cannot hold that view. Gillespie contends they have offered no law, example or reason for such necessity, and how can it be necessary if Christ and the apostles omitted it? And if it is necessary, why is it many formalists often receive the sacrament sitting?

Chapter Three. Gillespie continues his three part argument that the disputed ceremonies are idolatrous, in showing secondly, in this chapter, that they are so by “participation,” as badges and monuments of present idolatry. “By communicating with idolaters in their rites and ceremonies, we ourselves become guilty of idolatry...” (§1, 172). Ahaz was an idolater for the very reason that he patterned an altar after that in Damascus (2 Kings 16:10). We cannot conform to the disputed ceremonies because that would be taking a pattern as it were from the very “badges of Popery; the ensigns of Christ’s enemies...” We make ourselves idolaters by participating with them in their idolatry if we do so.

Gillespie then raises the following rhetorical questions:

Shall the chaste spouse of Christ take upon her the ornaments of the whore? Shall the Israel of God symbolize with her who is spiritually called Sodom and Egypt? Shall the Lord’s redeemed people wear the ensigns of their captivity? Shall the saints be seen with the mark of the beast? Shall the Christian church be like the Anti-Christian, the holy like the profane, religion like superstition, the temple of God like the synagogue of Satan?

Gillespie’s opponents were unmoved by such entreaties from the nonconformists; indeed, they were determined to plead for conformity to such ceremonies for the very reason that the Reformed churches should come as near as possible

to Roman Catholics so that the Catholics would not reject the idea of reformation.

For proof of his second proposition, that all such identification with the idolatrous badges of Catholicism should be rejected, Gillespie adduces, 1. Scripture (§2), 2. a Reason (§6), 3. Antiquity (§7), 4. Canon law; 5. the Scholastics, 6. Papiists themselves (§9), and 7. Protestant theologians (§10). He further strengthens his argument by noting that the idolatrous badges, the disputed ceremonies in question, are the very ensigns by which the Catholics distinguished themselves from others (§11). And rounding out the chapter, Gillespie answers the few objections formalists struggled to make against this argument (§12–§14).

1. Gillespie first argues from Scripture that we are not to take up in our worship the practices of idolaters. From the Old Testament he produces Leviticus 18:3; 19:27–28; 21:5, Deuteronomy 12:30; 14:1, Exodus 23:24, and by consequence, Leviticus 19:19 and Deuteronomy 22:9–11. The Israelites were severely reprov’d for taking patterns from and attempting to be like other nations (2 Chron. 13:9; 2 Kings 17:15). From the New Testament Gillespie brings proof from 2 Corinthians 6:14–17, Revelation 14: 9, 10, and Jude, verses 12 and 23.

Amongst the formalists, Richard Hooker objected to the proofs requiring dissimilarity from the nations about Israel, that this was only in things that were repugnant to God’s laws and ordinances (§3, 173–174). Gillespie’s reply is that this grants all that is required in his argument, for we have the same reason to abstain from idolatrous rites repugnant to God’s Word. Hooker was only begging the question as far as Gillespie’s Scripture proofs demonstrating “that all the rites and customs of those nations were repugnant to the ordinances and laws of God, and that Israel was simply forbidden to use them.” This was not a total distinction from those nations in food, raiment, trade, etc. Gillespie is arguing from the proofs that as Israel was “forbidden to be like those nations in such unnecessary rites and customs as had neither institution from God nor nature, but were the inventions and devices of men only,” so now, the Protestant church was to be dissimilar from the idolatrous rites of Catholicism (174).

Thomas Paybody objected to 1 Corinthians 6 (§4), that it simply warns against communing in the sins and idolatries of unbelievers. Gillespie responds by asking why, when Paul forbids being unequally yoked or having fellowship with idolaters, and requires coming out from them and being separate, touching none of their unclean things, we should not understand that we are not only forbidden to partake of their idolatries, marry them, attend their feasts and plays, go to law before their judges, but also to use any of their rites. Such rites lacking God’s and nature’s institution are to be reckoned amongst those things in which Protestants are not to partake; they are unprofitable “works of darkness, all which

Calvin judges to be in that place generally forbidden, before the apostle descends particularly to forbid partaking with them in their idolatry" (174).

As to that prohibition of "diverse mixtures," Paybody understood it to mean that the Jews were forbidden to mix "true and false worship." Gillespie responds that he should then grant that there should be no mixture of holy and idolatrous rites since he identifies kneeling as a "worship gesture," and Burges calls the disputed ceremonies the "worship of God" (174–175). There should therefore be no mixture of God's true worship, such as His sacraments, with the false ceremonies of Catholicism, such as crossing, holy days, etc. The prohibition against mixing true and false worship by consequence requires shunning all occasions of producing such a mixture, such as symbolizing and identifying with the rites of idolaters.

Hooker objected to the passages requiring the Jews to not shave the sides of their heads, cut themselves, etc., that in themselves such were indifferent, but not so as expressions of immoderate grief and lamentation for those who had died (§5, 175). Paybody objected that this prohibition was not because the heathen did so, but because lamenting so did not agree with faith and hope in Christ.

To this Gillespie responds with Calvin's sounder judgment, that while in itself it may be indifferent, the Jews were not to follow the heathen in their superstitious practices, and that it does follow from this law to the Jews, that believers are not to be like idolaters even in things indifferent in nature, if they are known to be used by them superstitiously. And he writes, this "law says nothing of the immoderate use of these things, but simply forbids to round the head, or mar the beard for the dead; and that because this was one of the rites which the idolatrous and superstitious Gentiles used, concerning whom the Lord commanded His people, that they should not do like them..." (176)

2. Gillespie argues this reason for the proposition, namely that we partake by consequence in the religion of idolaters when we partake of their rites and ceremonies. As Balduin argued, "mutual participation in rites of worship, is as it were, a symbol of mutual participation in religion." Those who ate the Jews' sacrifices were partakers of their altar (1 Cor. 10:18); as Paræus commented, "they publicly declared that they were partners of the Jewish religion and worship" (§6).

3. Our disputer against the ceremonies next adduces antiquity for support of his argument, that in appropriating idolatrous rites one becomes a partaker of the idolatry of the authors of such rites. Gillespie cites Origen, who said it was unlawful to observe the rites of the Jews and Gentiles; the Council of Nice, which condemned keeping Easter on the fourteenth day of the month because of its connection with Judaism; Augustine, who condemned fasting on the Lord's day as scandalous because that was a practice of the Manichees;

Gregory, who advised abolishing triple immersion because it was a practice of heretics; and many councils, which condemned things such as decorating houses with green boughs and to observe the calends of January, because these were pagan practices (§7, 177–178).

Hooker objected to this, that these prohibitions were due to "some special accident which the church, not being always subject unto, has not still cause to do the like" (§8, 178–180).

(1) Gillespie first responds by noting the highly conjectural nature of this objection, being made up of *if's*, *peradventure's*, and *might be's*. (2) Then he notes that it is simply not true; the only reason given by the cited fathers and councils is "because it was held unlawful to symbolize with idolaters in the use of such rites as they placed any religion in." (3) As to the example which Hooker gave from the time of the persecution of the early church when weak Christians feared for their lives and joined in external customs of the pagans, it was then that the church drew up those prohibitions against wearing pagan garments, etc., to dissuade such, Gillespie responds by arguing from the lesser to the greater. If the early church forbade such things when the difference was so great between the Christian religion and the pagan, now when there is so much more in common between Protestants and Catholics (Word, sacrament, etc.), much more should Protestants not conform to Catholic rites and ceremonies lest in the dangers facing them they join themselves externally in the idolatrous Catholic worship. (4) Gillespie repeats again that the reason of such as the Council of Toledo, Augustine and others in condemning what they did, was clearly because they condemned conformity with heretics in their rites. (5) Gillespie proposes that he would have thought, "if conformity with heretics... in their customs and ceremonies, was condemned as a scandal, a dishonor to the church, and an assenting unto their heresies, might [Hooker] not have much more thought that conformity with the customs of pagans was forbidden as a greater scandal and dishonor to the church, and as an assenting to the paganism and idolatry of those that were without?"

4. Gillespie adduces canon law itself, including let "him be accursed who observes the worship of pagans and their special days" (§9).

5. Gillespie cites Aquinas, supporting his interpretations of the Scriptures he had adduced, and 6. he gives citations from Catholic writers themselves, including Bellarmine who would "have Catholics to be discerned from heretics, and other sects of all sorts, even by ceremonies, because, as heretics have hated the ceremonies of the church, so the church has ever abstained from the observances of heretics" (181).

7. Protestant writers also confirm Gillespie's argument: for instance, the Magdeburg Centuries, Hospinian, Rainold, Beza, Zanchi, Calvin, Paræus, and the Leyden professors (§10).

After citing what these Protestant writers had to say,

Gillespie then moves to significantly strengthen his argument that the disputed ceremonies he has been contending against as badges of Catholic idolatry, are the very rites Catholics account as “special badges” of their religion. Gillespie cites theologians who by the mark of the beast (Rev. 13:16–17), variously understand confirmation, the sign of the cross, their festival days and all the rest of their ceremonies. Gillespie contends that this is so clear that in the formalist Joseph Hall’s contentions against the Brownists, to their persuasion that the disputed ceremonies are the “badges and liveries of the man of sin,” he replied nothing against it (183).

§12. Gillespie returns to the argument that formalists made, that the church should come to as close conformity to Catholics as possible, else they will be driven away from reformation. To this strange argument, Gillespie replies with Bastwick out of Romans 15:2, “that we are to please every one his neighbor only in good things to edification, and that we may not wink at absurd or wicked things, nor at anything in God’s worship which is not found in Scripture;” and he had already made clear previously that Catholics are hardened in evil by conformity with them in their ceremonies, and that it is as hard to purge the disputed ceremonies of superstition “as to purge superstition from itself.”

In the remaining sections (§13–§14) Gillespie addresses some remaining arguments made by the formalists. Some stooped to argue that their ceremonies are different from the Catholic. Some defended the sign of the cross in that they used an immaterial (aerial) as opposed to a material cross, but as Gillespie notes out of Bellarmine, the Catholics idolatize the immaterial as well. So even if the formalists did not make an idol out of it, because it was a badge of Catholicism (as made clear), we are not to conform to them in the use of it. Lindsay defends kneeling in the act of receiving communion because while Catholics “kneel to the sign,” the formalists only kneeled “to the thing signified.” Gillespie refutes this more at length in chapter four, where he proves indeed that the formalists kneel as the Catholics do to the sign. Here he notes a possible problem in Lindsay’s analogy. Gillespie observes, “The analogy of the antithesis required him to say, that we kneel *IN the sacrament* to the thing signified; but changing his phrase he says, that we kneel *BY the sacrament* to the thing signified. Now, if we kneel *by the sacrament to Christ*, then we adore the sacrament as *objectum materialè*, and Christ as *objectum formalè*. Just so the papists adore their images; because *per imaginem*, they adore *prototypon*.” (184). To Lindsay’s defense that formalists observe holy days differently, Gillespie responds by noting that Catholics observe days like Easter and Pentecost yearly in memory of the resurrection and for “the sending down of the Holy Ghost.” He asks rhetorically, how differently formalists observe them.

Gillespie continues his argument with Lindsay by allowing, that even if it were true (and it is not), that kneeling and holy days were applied and used with a different meaning from Catholics, that does not allow conformity to them in the outward use of these rites. “The very external use, therefore, of any sacred ceremony of human institution, is not to be suffered in the matter of worship, when in respect of this external use we are sorted with idolaters” (185). Why did the church in former times forbid the things noted earlier by Gillespie, if all that they really needed to do was clarify “a difference in the substance of the worship and object whereunto they are applied”? Indeed, why did God forbid Israel to cut their hair as the Gentiles, if that had been enough?

In the last portion of the chapter Gillespie entertains a final argument from Saravia, who adduced the common objection that formalists are not conforming to Catholics in their ceremonies, but to the orthodox customs of the early church. Gillespie first replies out of Rainold, that even if some rites were used innocently back then, they are not now, and the example of Hezekiah destroying the bronze serpent suggests what should be done with abused rites of a lower pedigree than the serpent. Secondly he notes that not all the rites were used by the orthodox fathers, such as the surplice and kneeling in receiving communion. Lastly, and with this Gillespie ends this chapter, he argues that even conceding that the ceremonies in dispute were used of old by the fathers, what is important is how the ceremonies are meant by the formalists; not what the fathers meant by them in their time.

Chapter Four. This section of the *Dispute* ends the three chapter arc begun in chapter two where Gillespie has been showing that the disputed ceremonies are not only idolatrous retrospectively as monuments of past idolatry (chapter two), and idolatrous by participation in badges of present idolatry (chapter three), but also regardless of past or present idolatry, the ceremonies are actually made idols by the formalists themselves (chapter four). In his third case, Gillespie argues I. That all the disputed ceremonies in general are made idols by the formalists. II. That in particular kneeling in the act of receiving communion is idolatrous in their own practice of it.

Gillespie begins by commending Ainsworth’s warning that things offered to idols and monuments to idolatry should be destroyed, else those things take the place of and become idols themselves. He adduces Lancelot Andrewes’ sermon on “the worshipping of imaginations,” from which, though he finds it in some ways misapplied by the bishop, he aptly concludes: “that the ceremonies are the imaginations which are magnified, adored, and idolized, instead of the idolatrous images which were put down.”

I. First, our disputant argues that all the English popish ceremonies are idols: 1. Because they are looked upon as more important than “the weighty matters of the Law of God.” The

disputed ceremonies are idols because "observed with the neglecting of God's commandments, and advanced above many substantial points of religion." Burges conceded the point, "that more grievous penalties are inflicted upon the refusal of the ceremonies than upon adultery and drunkenness" (§2, 187–188).

2. From 1 Samuel 2:29, Gillespie notes that Eli made his sons idols in putting up with their behavior to the hurt of God's worship (§3, 188). So too the ceremonies are idols to the prejudice of divine worship; the ceremonies must stay but many nonconformists are cruelly treated, called Puritans, thrust out of their ministries, etc. Joseph Hall objected that it cannot be helped; nonconformists should have obeyed the Bishops, not because the laws requiring the ceremonies were necessarily good in doing so, but for the sake of obedience to the lawgiver. He attempted to prove this in God's trying Adam with the eating of a mere apple, and in the (to Hall) small if not capricious command to Shimei not to leave Jerusalem on pain of death, for which he was slain when he did so ("the act was little, the bond was great"). According to Hall, what is commanded is of little importance, however small; what matters is by whom the command is given.

(1) Gillespie answers Hall first by asking, if obedience to the law is the important thing, why are other laws not urged as strictly as those concerning the disputed ceremonies? (2) Gillespie had already made the case that the ceremonies were urged as necessary to the binding of consciences, and this argument of Hall's proves the case yet again. Gillespie had also proved that laws of men only bind to obedience insofar as they agree with what God's law prescribes. Even Hall called it "superstition to make any more sins than the ten commandments." Unless it can be shown that nonconformity to the disputed ceremonies is a fault, it is a fault to bind by the laws of men in those matters where the Law of God has left men free. (3) Gillespie dismisses Hall's examples as wide of the mark. God could just as well have commanded Adam to eat the apple, and the eating would have been good; however the will of man is not a regulating rule but a rule regulated. Man's law cannot make something good or evil; human laws must be examined by "a higher rule." The laws of man should not be capricious, and the example of Shimei was not an instance of caprice; from Vermigli Gillespie shows that Solomon had good reason to command him to stay in Jerusalem. But even granting it was capricious, that does not argue that the magistrate has as great power to command whatever he pleases in religious matters as in civil. Hall's examples of breaking the command are also wide of the mark. The sins that followed upon Adam eating the forbidden fruit were many and far reaching; but what great sin follows upon nonconformity to the disputed ceremonies? Shimei no less transgressed greatly against the king's mercy in breaking the command for such a

light matter as he did. Gillespie demands proof that the nonconformists are comparably wicked.

3. Gillespie adduces the example of Rachel who made her husband Jacob an idol in ascribing to him the power of giving children (Gen. 30:1–2). From Rainold he notes that the covetous man makes his money an idol in trusting it to preserve him. Likewise, the formalists give unto the disputed ceremonies an idolatrous "operative virtue" to strengthen and preserve against sin; "to have their minds stayed in the instant of temptation." Quotations from de Dominis and Hooker regarding the sign of the cross prove as much. They ascribed to the sign of the cross no less virtue than the Catholics did. (§4, 191). The same idolatrous "operative virtue" is given by formalist to "bishops" or confirmation of children (§5, 192), which Gillespie again demonstrates out of Hooker. Gillespie asks, "What is idolatry, if this is not, to ascribe to rites of man's devising, the power and virtue of doing that which none but He to whom all power in heaven and earth belongs can do?"

4. Wrapping up the first part of his argument that the disputed ceremonies as a whole were formally idols, Gillespie proposes "that whereunto more respect and account is given than God allows to be given to it, and wherein more excellency is placed than God has put into it, or will at all communicate to it, is an idol exalted against God..." (§6). Festival days are adduced as idols because formalists place an eminence on one day over another, which God nowhere ordained. Does God allow anywhere in Scripture that a thing indifferent may be urged as necessary at the mere "pleasure of men?" Gillespie observes that he had previously shown that worship was placed in the disputed ceremonies, thus making them idols, because exalted above God's Word, the rule of all worship matters. And he concludes that the ceremonies "are idolatrously advanced and dignified, in so much as holy mystical significations are given them, which are a great deal more than God's Word allows in any rites of human institution" (which he demonstrates further in part three, chapter five).

II. Next, Gillespie takes the remaining and largest portion of chapter four to demonstrate in particular that kneeling in the act of receiving communion "is direct and formal idolatry" (§7–§27, 193–225). He states the question thus: "Whether kneeling, at the instant of receiving the sacrament, before the consecrated bread and wine, purposely placed in our sight in the act of kneeling as signs standing in Christ's stead, before which we, the receivers, are to exhibit outwardly religious adoration, be formally idolatry or not?" And he qualifies the matter, that the kneeling is 1. "at the instant of receiving"; 2. concerns "outward adoration"; and 3. as the elements are purposely set in sight, and 4. in sight "as signs standing in Christ's stead"; 5. when the recipients "have the consecrated bread and wine in the eyes both of their bodies and minds, as things so

stated in that action, that before them they are to exhibit outward religious adoration as well as inward" (193–194).

§8. Gillespie argues the affirmative to this question, first from the words of the formalists themselves, citing de Dominis, Lindsay, Spotswood, Burges, Morton and Paybody. Lindsay affirmed that formalists "kneel by the sacrament to the thing signified," and de Dominis, that "when we take the eucharist, we adore the body of Christ 'through its sign'" (194). Since the formalists affirm the kneeling in question "is divine worship given by the sign to the thing signified, and done to the sacrament respectively or in relation to Christ," any who would acquit them of idolatry must also acquit Catholics who worship before their images, who say they only give the image "relative or respective worship." Gillespie concludes that "the same kind of adoration" is shown by formalists in kneeling before the elements, as is shown by the Catholics worshipping before their images. For confirmation of the Catholics' view, Gillespie cites Franciscus à Sancta Clara and Bellarmine, and concludes "we see that the worship which papists give to the species of the bread is only relative to Christ, and of the same kind with that which formalists give to the bread and wine" (195).

§9. Secondly, Gillespie confirms the affirmative in that the kneeling in question "is the very bowing down and worshipping forbidden in the second commandment" (196). That the eucharist is called the image of Christ's body by the fathers is affirmed by Usher, and Gillespie cites Hospinian who confirms it from Origen, Nazianzen, Augustine, Hilary, Tertullian and Ambrose. Albeit such proofs are not necessary since the formalists asserted the same—Dr. Burges confirmed that the sacraments are images of the Lord. Gillespie writes "that a man who adores before the painted or graven image of Christ, though he profess that he intends his whole adoration to Christ, and that he places the image before him only to represent Christ, and to stir up his mind to worship Christ, does nevertheless commit idolatry," and then cites Lindsay who said as much. Yet in an attempt to remove the comparison, Lindsay argued "that no true worship can be properly occasioned by an image," and that the sacraments "being instituted by Christ to call to our remembrance His death" give "a most powerful and pregnant occasion of thanksgiving and praise." Gillespie adduces Burges attempting the same "difference-making" who rejected that idolatrous images can be compared to the sacraments "which are images of God's making and institution." 1. Images have no institution from God and 2. are not occasions of worship.

Gillespie answers the first attempted distinction, and asks, "May I not commit idolatry with images of God's institution no less than with those invented by men, when (*cæteris paribus*) there is no other difference between them, considered as objects of adoration, but" God's institution? For proof, he

poses hypothetically, "What if I fall down at the hearing of a sermon, and religiously adore before the pastor, as the vicarious sign of Christ Himself, who stands there in Christ's stead (2 Cor. 5:20), referring my adoration to Christ only, yet in or by that ambassador who stands in Christ's stead?"—and concludes that by this distinction his opponents would have to concede any defense of such an act as not idolatrous.

As to the second, "that no true worship can be occasioned by an image," Gillespie first moves a doubt as to whether Lindsay really meant it since many formalists allowed "the historical use of images." And while Lindsay said that the sacrament was instituted by Christ "to call to our remembrance His death, this infers not that it is an occasion of thanksgiving and praise in the very act of receiving; as we shall see afterward. Our question is only about kneeling in the act of receiving." Gillespie grants "that the sacrament is an occasion of inward worship," however, "[t]he point which the Bishop had to prove is, that whereas an image cannot be the occasion of outward adoration and kneeling to God before it in the act of looking upon it, the sacrament may be, and is, an occasion of kneeling, when it is set before us in the act of receiving."

§10. Thirdly, Gillespie addresses the objection that formalists made, that two things are necessary to find their kneeling in the act of receiving communion to be idolatrous. 1. There must be the intention to adore the element, or the kneeling is no idolatry. To Paybody's rejection of any such intention, Gillespie reminds the reader that he has already shown that Paybody defended Morton's adoration "which he calls relative from the sign to Christ." But, giving Paybody his pretense that adoration to the sign is not intended, Gillespie asks "will this save their kneeling from idolatry?" He says not, for that would mean "the three children should not have been idolaters, if they had kneeled before Nebuchadnezzar's image, intending their worship to God only, and not to the image." He then adduces Calvin against the Nicodemites in support and concludes out of Paræus, "Idolators formerly in paganism were not intending, nor those in the papacy do intend, to offer to demons. What then? The apostle proclaims the contrary [1 Cor. 10:20], whatever they intend."

§11. 2. "The other thing which our kneelers require to the making up of idolatry is, that the creature before which we adore be a passive object of the adoration." The formalists denied this and claimed the elements were only active objects of the adoration. Gillespie argues that this is patently false. For the elements to be but active objects, their presence would need to be accidental to the kneelers, and he proves out of Lindsay himself that this is not true: who wrote that formalists "kneel before the elements *having them in our sight, or object to our senses, as ordinary signs, means, and memorials, to stir us up to worship, etc.*" And so Gillespie concludes, "Now if we have them in our sight and before our senses for this purpose,

that they may be means, signs, and memorials to stir us up to worship, then, surely, their being really before our senses, is not accidental to us when we kneel." Or "put the case" says Gillespie that the elements are only active objects for the kneeling worshipper. This is no less than how some Catholics treat their image worship—citing for support de Dominis, de Cabrera (and Durand) and Becane the Jesuit. (199–201).

§12. Gillespie concludes this point by noting "that the using of the sacramental elements, as active objects of worship only, cannot make kneeling before them in the receiving to be no idolatry; for then might we lawfully, and without idolatry, kneel before every active object which stirs up our minds to worship God." He then clears this from some weak arguments by Lindsay, who equivocated in not distinguishing inward and outward worship, and made the argument that one may kneel in private worship before any creature, "but kneeling before the sacramental elements, when thereby we are moved to worship in the assemblies of the church," must be done, which nonconformists rejected on both accounts. "As for us, we hold that we may not kneel before every creature which stirs up our hearts to worship God; kneel, I say, whilst the eyes both of body and mind are fastened upon it as the active object of our adoration" (202).

§13. Fourthly, Gillespie argues that kneeling "in the act of receiving, for reverence to the sacrament, is idolatry." "For if they exhibit divine adoration (such as their kneeling is confessed to be) for reverence of the sacrament, they do not only give, but also intend to give, divine adoration to the same. This is so undeniable that it dashes Bishop Lindsay, and makes him give a broad confession, that it is idolatry to kneel at the sacrament for reverence to the elements." Gillespie proceeds to demonstrate that this is true from the words of the formalists themselves, including Lindsay, whose words once cleared say the same thing.

§14. Those who spoke more plainly than Lindsay, objected that reverence is indeed due the sacraments and nonconformists themselves showed as much when they sat with head uncovered at the communion table. Gillespie in reply brings in Calderwood who distinguishes between veneration and adoration and gives an analogy from civility, and concludes, as "in civility, there is a respect and reverence different from adoration, so it is in religion also," and observes that while Paybody and Burges reject the distinction it is affirmed by Belarmino, de Dominis, and Spotswood. To the objection that nonconformists despise the Word because they show more respect to the sacrament in sitting uncovered at the communion table, Gillespie argues that "a higher degree of veneration is due to the sacrament than to the Word preached, not by taking aught from the Word, but by adding more respect to the sacrament than the Word has" and shows by several reasons why this is so, and concludes the sacrament "is more merely

and immediately divine than is the Word preached" (205). A last objection was "that if a man should uncover his head at the sight of a graven image, we would account this to be an adoring of the image; and why then shall not we call our uncovering at the sacrament adoration also?" Gillespie answers, "Though veneration and adoration are distinguished in holy things to show that adoration given to them is idolatry, but veneration given to them is not idolatry, yet in profane things, such as images are, veneration given to them is idolatry, as well as adoration; and we are idolaters for doing so much as to respect and reverence them as things sacred or holy" (206).

§15. Fifthly, given Lindsay's obfuscation, Gillespie asks "if the kneeling in question is not idolatrously referred to the sacrament, wherein is it specially intended?" Their kneeling at this time must arise from somewhere. Gillespie adduces from Spotswood "that we ought to adore the flesh of Jesus Christ in the eucharist," and from Lindsay that we must "worship the flesh and blood of Christ in the sacrament, because the humanity of Christ is there present, being ever and everywhere joined with the divinity." From this he discerns a twofold idolatry which he addresses: 1. "that they worship the flesh and blood of Christ"; 2. "that they worship the same in the sacrament" (206).

1. Gillespie argues against the adoration and worshipping of Christ's flesh and blood or his humanity with divine worship because (1) his humanity is not God, nor (2) can it help and save us. (3) None of the defenses of the adoration of Christ's humanity with divine worship have warrant, nor are they expressed very well.

First, the Schoolmen argued that "that the flesh of Christ is adored by him who adores the Word incarnate, even as the king's clothes are adored by him who adores the king": arguing for such adoration *per accidens*. This makes very little sense: Gillespie adduces de Dominis saying that he didn't think the king's clothes should be adored by anyone.

Secondly, Gillespie cites others, using Sancta Clara as representative, arguing that Christ's humanity is only adored as subjoined to the Godhead. Gillespie answers that Christ's humanity remains only a creature, and not something to be worshipped.

Thirdly, Field argued that when divines "speak of the humanity of Christ, sometimes we understand only that human created essence of a man that was in Him, sometimes all that is implied in the being of a man, as well subsistence as essence." By this same distinction, Field defended attributing adorability and other divine attributes to Christ's human nature. To this Gillespie remarks that this argument was not better "than if a man should say, by blackness sometimes we understand blackness, and sometimes whiteness." As the Schoolmen observed: while God considered in the concrete and in the abstract differs not, because God and Godhead are the same, in creatures

(such as is Christ's humanity), "they are really differenced." "For *concretum* signifies [*something complete subsisting*], and *abstractum* (such as humanity) signifies something, [*not as subsisting, but by which something is*], as whiteness does not signify that thing which is white, but that whereby it is white. How comes it then that Field makes humanity, in the abstract, to have a subsistence? Antonius Sadeel censures Turrianus for saying that *whiteness accompanying a wall is the very same thing as a white wall*: his reason is, *because whiteness is said to be not along with the wall but in the wall*. An abstract is no more an abstract if it has a subsistence" (208).

Augustine held to a fourth sense which Gillespie argues is misconstrued, his meaning being "better than his expression." Augustine said that it was a sin "not to adore the flesh of Christ," erroneously basing what he said upon the words, "Worship at his footstool" (Ps. 99:5): understanding by footstool, Christ's flesh. But by this Augustine did not mean that one should adore the flesh of Christ, but to worship the Godhead, which is plain even from the words cited by Dr. Burges. So with Polanus, Gillespie argues that we should understand "when the flesh of Christ is said to be adored, it is not a proper, but a figurative, proposition; since the flesh is not properly adored in itself, because it is a created thing; but God manifest in the flesh, or God clothed in flesh" (209). However Gillespie is still not happy with the expression. First, though being expounded in this way gives it a sounder sense, "yet the expression is very bad, and violence is done to the phrase when such a meaning is drawn out of it. For how can we, by the flesh of Christ, understand His Godhead? The communion of properties admits us to put Christ for God, but not His manhood." Second, he observes that the formalists do not even have such a forced orthodox understanding when they say "they adore the flesh of Christ in the sacrament": that thereby they (citing Lindsay) do not understand the Godhead as Augustine, "but that created nature which is united with the Godhead."

2. As for worshipping Christ's flesh in the sacrament (§16, 209), Gillespie writes, "Now, they who worship the flesh of Christ in the sacrament, must either consider it as present in the sacrament, and in that respect to be adored, because of the personal union of it with the Word, or else because of the sacramental union of it with the outward sign, which is a respect supervenient [*subsequent*] to that of the ubiquity of it in the person of the Word." But he concludes of the first that "the personal union of the flesh with the Word can neither infer the presence of the flesh in the sacrament to those who worthily receive, nor yet can it make anything for the adoration of the flesh." As to the second "respect, of the sacramental union of the flesh of Christ with the sacramental sign," as reason to worship the flesh of Christ, Gillespie contends that the formalists' argument for adoration "must suppose the bodily presence of Christ's flesh in the sacrament" (210). The Roman

Catholics only "adore the body of Christ in the sacrament" upon "the supposition of the bodily presence of it." Gillespie goes on to remind the reader,

that the sacramental presence of the body of Christ, or that presence of it which is inferred upon that sacramental union which is between it and the outward sign, is not the real or spiritual presence of it ... but it is figuratively only so called, the sense being this, that the body of Christ is present and given to us in the sacrament, meaning by his body, the sign of his body. These things being so, whosoever worships Christ's body in the eucharist, and that in respect of the sacramental presence of it in the same, cannot choose but hold that Christ's body is bodily and really under the species of the bread, and so fall into the idolatry of bread-worship... (211).

§17. Gillespie's sixth and final argument to prove kneeling in the act of receiving communion is idolatry "is taken from the nature and kind of the worship wherein it is used." The receiving of the sacrament is mediate worship. "For in every mediate worship, wherein some creature is purposely set between God and us to have state in the same, it is idolatry to kneel before such a creature, whilst both our minds and senses are fastened upon it" (212).

The formalists attempted to weaken this argument by alleging the bowing of the people of God before the ark, temple, holy mountain, altar, burning bush, cloud, and fire which came down from heaven. Lindsay alleged 2 Chronicles 6:12-13 and Micah 6:6 to prove the people bowed before the altar, which Gillespie rejects as proving any such thing. The first has Solomon kneeling before the congregation, and the second only of bowing before God. All the other examples concern God's immediate presence. God is now only present mediately in the sacrament. The formalists failed to present examples of what is necessary to prove their case: examples of kneeling "in a mediate and ordinary worship."

§18. The examples alleged of Abraham falling on his face when God spoke, and of the people doing so when fire came down from heaven when Elijah prayed, suffer from the same defect. "[H]ow shall kneeling in a mediate and ordinary worship be warranted by kneeling in the hearing of God's own immediate voice, or in seeing the miraculous signs of His extraordinary presence?"

The formalists further alleged examples of the penitent bowing before the congregation, of kneeling and giving thanks at common meals, and of the pastor kneeling or bowing when he prays before the sacrament. Gillespie dismisses the example of kneeling at common meals as beside the point, and rejects the example of the pastor praying because it is in immediate worship.

As for the penitent, his kneeling is an act of immediate

worship: "neither does the congregation come between him and God." The congregation is present, but circumstantially, as he kneels and confesses his sin. In regards to kneeling before the sacramental elements: "the very kneeling itself (simply considered)" respects the elements "as then purposely set in our sight that we may kneel before them" (213–214).

§19. Similar examples of bowing down (Lev. 9:24, 2 Chron. 7:3, Micah 6:6, 2 Chron. 29:28–30) are rejected by Gillespie. These all likewise confuse mediate and immediate worship, a distinction the formalists consistently failed to make (214–215). To a last objection in the section that one has liberty of kneeling, Gillespie argues that whether or not this is true (and he deals in part three, chapter seven with the liberty in things generally necessary but not determined in God's Word), there is no liberty for unlawful idolatrous gestures, "such as kneeling in the instant of receiving a sacrament" under the conditions so noted. "The indifferency of such a gesture in such a mediate worship should have been proved before" assuming this general liberty applied in the case.

§20. Formalists raised, in objection to the argument against their kneeling in mediate worship before the sacrament, the lifting of the eyes and hands heavenward while worshipping God; praying before the bed at bedtime; and similar examples from Psalm 116, Acts 27:35, and Exodus 4:31. And Hall objected that kneeling before the sacrament was no different than when they kneeled before the pulpit in joining in prayer with the minister. To all these, which Gillespie marveled any learned men would propose, it is clear that "these things were and are accidentally present to the worshippers, and not purposely before them, nor respected as having a religious state in the worship" (216). To the examples proposed by Forbes, of kneeling to receive imposition of hands at ordination, and of those kneeling at baptism who do so without worshipping the font, Gillespie similarly refutes them, by again noting these have nothing to do with kneeling in mediate worship before the sacrament under discussion.

§21. Gillespie concludes against all the examples alleged by the formalists, that "there is nothing to prove the lawfulness of kneeling in such a mediate worship, wherein something belonging to the substance of the worship comes between God and us, and is not accidentally, but purposely before us, upon which also our minds and senses in the action of worship are fast fixed. Howbeit there is another respect, wherefore none of these examples can make aught for kneeling in the act of receiving the sacrament (which I have shown before), namely, that in the instant of receiving the sacrament, the elements are actually images and vicarious signs standing in Christ's stead."

The formalists attempted to get around this argument concerning the mediate nature of the worship by then claiming "that when they kneel in the act of receiving, they are praying and praising, and so worshipping God immediately" (217). To

the alleged example of simultaneous prayer for God "to make him a worthy table guest" while kneeling and receiving the sacrament, Gillespie questioned "how a man, when he is actually a banqueter, and at the instant of his communicating can be made in any other sort a banqueter than he is; for *quicquid est, dum est, non potest non esse*. Wherefore if a man in the instant of his receiving is an unworthy banqueter, he cannot at that instant be made any other than he is" (217).

§22. Gillespie further opposes this argument that an immediate worship can be going on during the mediate worship of receiving the sacrament while kneeling by maintaining that one shouldn't be praying or praising then, but meditating upon Christ's death and the immeasurable benefits brought thereby, as prescribed (1 Cor. 11:24). And while meditation may be interlaced with short ejaculatory prayers, ordinary continued conceived prayer to God (as proposed by Lindsay) cannot be contemporaneous with meditating within ourselves.

§23. Lindsay tried to prove the contrary, arguing for prayer and praise while kneeling and receiving the sacrament: "Whatsoever spiritual benefit, we should receive with a spiritual hunger and thirst, and with a spiritual appetite and desire after the grace and virtue that is therein to salvation, the same we should receive with prayer, which is nothing else but such an appetite and desire; but the body and blood of Christ is such a benefit," etc. (218).

1. Gillespie replies first, that this is just an assertion and there is no proof given. He then counters with the example of the Word read or preached, which "is a spiritual benefit" to be received "with spiritual hunger and thirst." He posits Lindsay would not say that one should be engrossed in prayer while hearing the Word, because we should be attending attentively to that ordinance. Prayer should be prior to receiving a spiritual benefit, but not in the act of receiving it. "For how can the heart attend, by serious consideration, to what we hear in the Word, or what is signified and given to us in the sacrament, if in the actions of hearing the Word and receiving the sacrament, it should be elevated out of the world by prayer?"

2. Gillespie refutes Lindsay's uncouth, if not also conflicting, descriptions of prayer. "Prayer is not meditation, because meditation is a communing with our own souls, prayer a communing with God. Nor yet can it be said that prayer is nothing else but a spiritual desire; for prayer is the sending up of our desires to God, being put in order" (219).

§24. According to Gillespie, Lindsay was also wrong in arguing for immediate worship in the receiving of the sacrament, by pairing it with thanksgiving. 1. The offered scriptures from 1 Corinthians 11:24, 26 do not prove Lindsay's contention. 2. "We show forth the Lord's death in the act of receiving, by using the signs and symbols of his body broken, and his blood shed for us, and by meditating upon his death thereby represented." 3. We do show forth the Lord's death by praise, that "is not in

the act of receiving” the sacrament. After citing Paræus, that we do show forth the Lord’s death apart from the very act of receiving, Gillespie refutes Lindsay’s adduced support from the 1560 Confession of Faith, chapter 22, which is not correctly “expounded of the very act of receiving the sacrament.”

§25. Gillespie concludes, “having so strongly proved the unlawfulness and idolatry of kneeling in the act of receiving the holy communion,” by cautioning his readers to not be dismayed by the modern authorities Lindsay adduced for kneeling. 1. Human testimonies cannot assail clear truth. 2. Morton admitted many Protestant writers copiously condemn kneeling in receiving the sacrament. 3. Lindsay misrepresents the case, since the very same theologians he said were for him such as Calvin, Beza and Vermigli are on record against the practice (220).

§26. Gillespie also responds at length to Burges’ “adventurous” attempt, largely from Tertullian (220–223), to prove that an adoring gesture was used by the early church before corruption set in concluding that the actual meaning of that father was:

There were many who came not to the sacrament upon the station days, because (in their opinion) the receiving thereof should break the station, i.e., the service of the day, and that because it should break their fast, a principal duty of the same. Tertullian shows they were in error, because their partaking of the sacrament should not break their station, but make it the more solemn and remarkable. But if they could not be drawn from that false persuasion of theirs, that the sacrament should break their fast, yet he wishes them at least to come and stand at the table, and receive the sacrament into their hands, and take it away to eat after (for permitting whereof he had no warrant), so should they both partake the sacrament and also (according to their mind, and to their full contentment) keep their stations, which were often prorogated till even, but ever and at least till the ninth hour. Finally, from this place, which the Doctor perverts for kneeling, it appears that the gesture or posture in receiving the sacrament used in that place where Tertullian lived, was standing; because, speaking of the receiving of the sacrament, he says, *if you would stand also at the altar of God* (222–223).

§27. As to the rest of the fathers Burges alleged, Gillespie notes they mean either “the inward adoration of the heart, which we ought to direct to Christ when we receive the sacrament, or else they speak of adoring the sacrament . . . by a reverence of another nature called *veneration*,” which Gillespie proves out of the formalist author Antonius de Dominis (223).

§28. Gillespie concludes the chapter by showing that the posture of kneeling in receiving the sacrament did not come into use until transubstantiation got a footing about the time

of Honorius III; and that the most frequently mentioned posture of the fathers is that of standing—citing Chrysostom, Dionysius Alexandrinus and Tertullian. However, the posture instituted by Christ and practiced in the early church (citing the Laodicean council, canon 28) was that of sitting (223–225).

Chapter Five. Gillespie’s fifth argument against the lawfulness of the disputed ceremonies is that they are laced with mystical significations, and “ordained to be sacred signs of spiritual mysteries, to teach Christians their duties, and to express such holy and heavenly affections, dispositions, motions and desires, as are and should be in them.” Gillespie again proves as much from the formalists’ own words. “Morton calls the cross a sign of constant profession of Christianity.” “Burges maintains the using of the surplice to signify the pureness that ought to be in the minister of God. Paybody will have kneeling at the Lord’s supper to be a signification of the humble and grateful acknowledging of the benefits of Christ.” Laud’s liturgy maintained that the confirmation is “a sign whereby those children are certified of God’s favor and good-will towards them.” “In the general, our opposites defend that the church has power to ordain such ceremonies, as by admonishing men of their duty, and by expressing such spiritual and heavenly affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, as should be in men, do thereby stir them up to greater fervor and devotion” (§1, 225–226).

§2. Reasoning for this argument Gillespie disputes: 1. the nature of sacraments are in large part given unto them. Paybody’s answer to this reason, cited from the *Abridgement* of the Lincoln ministers, was “that it is not a bare signification that makes a thing participate of the sacrament’s nature, but such a signification as is sacramental, both in what is signified and how.” But this simply begged the question; and Gillespie asks, what is “a sacramental signification” if not “a mystical resemblance and representation of some spiritual grace which God has promised in His Word”? Hooker granted the ceremonies are “as sacraments”. Gillespie then rebuffs Burges’ attempt to explain away the statement of Augustine’s, that “signs that concern divine matters are called sacraments” (226–227). Lastly, Gillespie reminds his readers, “that the ceremonies are not only thought to be mystically significant for setting forth and expressing certain spiritual graces, but also operative and available to the begetting of those graces”: so it is all too clear “that the ceremonies are given out for sacred signs of the very same nature” as sacraments.

§3. Next Gillespie reasons: 2. that it is a delusion to think men can ordain “mystical and significant ceremonies.” “For to what other purpose do *signa instituta* serve, if it is not in the power of him who gives them institution to give or to work that which is signified by them?” Gillespie reasons “that all significant signs which are not ordained of Christ, nor taught by His apostles, must be vain, false, and superstitious” (228).

§4. Gillespie reasons: 3. that it is Judaizing to introduce into the New Testament dispensation, along with God's appointed sacraments, sacred significant ceremonies of man's devising—for which he cites Polanus, Perkins, Chemnitz and Junius. Gillespie then adduces that which Christ said to the Pharisees: that "the law and the prophets were until John," etc. (John 16:16–17), from which it is clear that "the people of God are no longer to be instructed concerning the things of the kingdom of God by outward signs, or visible shadows and figures, but only by the plain word of the gospel;" "the Word only is appointed to teach the things belonging to the kingdom of God" (229).

§5. To the possible objection that this only proves the church should not observe the Jewish ceremonies, but that the church may introduce ceremonies of "some spiritual significance," Gillespie replies: (1) "That which has been said in this argument holds good against significant ceremonies in general." (2) Gillespie asks, how can that argument of the *Abridgement* be answered: "It is much less lawful for man to bring significant ceremonies into God's worship now than it was under the law"? "If those ceremonies which God Himself ordained to teach his church by their signification may not now be used, much less may those which man has devised" (230).

§6. Gillespie's next reason is: 4. that "sacred significant ceremonies devised by man are to be reckoned among those images forbidden in the second commandment." He had previously shown that "sacraments get the name of images": so consequently all "significant and holy ceremonies" are to be accounted such. The second commandment forbids images, and also all "religious similitudes" agreeable to them.

Paybody objected to this argument, that gestures used by God's people in the past and presently were and are significant in worship; yet such things as lifting up the hands, kneeling, etc. are not forbidden in the second commandment. Gillespie responds to this by outlining three sorts of signs which must be distinguished: 1. Natural signs (smoke is a sign of fire); 2. Customable signs (uncovering of the head as a sign of subjection); 3. Voluntary signs, which are called instituted signs, which can be in sacred or civil matters. It is God's prerogative only to "appoint sacred signs of heavenly mysteries or spiritual graces" such as the sacraments of the New Testament. Men may appoint civil signs for civil and moral uses for both church and state, such as ringing a bell to assemble people to worship or to call them to secular assemblies (230). In addition to sacred signs, natural signs have use in God's worship. So in response to Paybody's examples, Gillespie explains: "kneeling in time of prayer signifies the submission of our hearts and minds; the lifting up of our eyes and hands signifies the elevation of our affections; the rending of the garments signified the rending of the heart by sorrow; standing with a religious

[respect] to that which is before us signifies veneration or reverence, sitting at table signifies familiarity and fellowship." Customary signs similarly have place in divine worship, "for so a man coming into one of our churches in time of public worship, if he see the hearers covered, he knows by this customary sign that sermon is begun." So also moral or civil signs of man's institution have place in divine worship, "for that common order and decency which is respected both in civil and sacred actions." A basin set beside a pulpit signifies baptism is to be administered. General "decency teaches us to make the same use of a basin" "in civility, which a minister makes of them in the action of baptizing." "All our question is about sacred mystical signs. Every sign of this kind, which is not ordained of God, we refer to the imagery forbidden in the second commandment" (231).

§7. Gillespie continues: 5. that "the significance and teaching office of mystical ceremonies invented by men, must be drawn under those doctrines of men condemned in the gospel" (231). "In vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men" (Mark 7:7). The error of the Pharisees "was in their addition to the law, and in that they made their own ceremonial washings, which were only the commandments of men, to serve for doctrines, instructions and significations." The Colossians are rebuked (Col. 2:20–22) because false teachers, without God's prescription, in their distinction of and requiring abstinence from meats, placed the same signification of holiness as did God in his law. And considering 2 Timothy 3:16–17, "it cannot but be evident how superfluously, how superstitiously, the office of sacred teaching and mystical signification is given to dumb and lifeless ceremonies ordained of men, and, consequently, how justly they are taxed as vain worship" (232).

§8. In addition to these five reasons, Gillespie appends a bit of history from Knox's debate with the superior of St. Andrews Abbey about the unlawfulness of ceremonies of mere human devising, ending with the exhortation of Moses: "All that the Lord thy God commanded thee to do, that do thou to the Lord thy God; add nothing to it, diminish nothing from it" (233).

§9. Gillespie then proceeds to answer the formalists' alleged Scripture proofs against this fifth argument. Of their alleged support from the days of Purim and of the feast of dedication, Gillespie only notes here (since he addresses these more fully later in part three), that his opposers must show 1. that the feast of dedication was lawfully instituted; and 2. that Purim was instituted as more than a civil festivity and therefore, under a warrant that the church may still possess. Gillespie dismisses briefly the example adduced of the rite between Abraham and his servant (Gen. 24:2), which was a moral sign of the subjection inferiors owe their superiors. He then, at some length, reasons against the formalists' allegations from the altar erected by the Reubenites, Gadites, and half tribe of

Manasseh (Josh. 22), noting that some argue that it merely had a civil rather than a religious use; but regardless, there is simply nothing in the history which shows any approbation for what those tribes did (234–235).

§10. As to the allegation of the “new altar” Solomon erected (1 Kings 8:64), Gillespie observes that this was not a new altar; but only that the pavement was sanctified to make room for all the sacrifices in that extraordinary circumstance. As for the example the formalists adduced from the building of synagogues, 1. the case was necessary (and the disputed ceremonies are not). 2. The formalists must prove (which they did not) that these were built, not by an extraordinary warrant from the prophets, but by an ordinary power still retained by the church. The example of the love feasts (1 Cor. 11) Gillespie rejects, because it had no religious place in worship. And to the thought that they might be taken as “sacred signs of Christian charity”: that cannot be, because the Apostle forbids them in the assembly of the church (citing Pareus). The example of the holy kiss was simply a moral sign of friendship then in use.

§11. “As for the veils wherewith the apostle would have women covered whilst they were praying,” this “covering was a moral sign for that comely and orderly distinction of men and women which civil decency required in all their meetings.” Further, it is the case “that it is also a natural sign, and that nature itself teaches it; therefore he urges it both by the inferiority or subjection of the woman ([1 Cor. 11:] 3, 8, 9; for covering was then a sign of subjection), and by the long hair which nature gives to a woman (v. 15); where he would have the artificial covering to be fashioned in imitation of the natural” (236).

The last example (of imposition of hands) is not helpful to the formalists, because it has the authorization of Christ and the apostles. In closing Gillespie addresses a last shift from Burges, who argued that the disputed sacred significant ceremonies are compassed under that edification “required in things that concern order and decency.” Gillespie observes that this is a “sorry conceit”. He concludes: “Divines, indeed, do rightly require that those alterable circumstances of divine worship which are left to the determination of the church be so ordered and disposed as they may be profitable to this edification. But this edification they speak of is no other than that which is common to all our actions and speeches.... Now, such significations as we have shown to be given to the ceremonies in question ... belong not to that edification which divines require in things prescribed by the church concerning order and decency....” (237).

Chapter Six. Chapter six begins a four chapter dispute against the pretended warrants given by the formalists, in which Gillespie argues that the disputed ceremonies cannot be warranted from Scripture (chapter six), by church authority (chapter seven), by the state (chapter eight), or from the law of

nature (chapter nine). After noting these various warrants (§1), Gillespie begins by addressing what is alleged from Scripture generally (§2–§3, 237–241), before addressing the warrants of the disputed ceremonies in particular (§4–§14, 241–254).

I. 1. The general warrant which the formalists adduced for the disputed ceremonies which they relied upon to turn away all objections to them, was the Apostle Paul’s injunction to “Let all things be done decently and in order” (1 Cor. 14:40). Gillespie demonstrates how forced and absurd this argument is by giving Dr. Burges’ particular defense for this warrant: who “will have the controverted ceremonies to be allowed of God, though not commanded”—allowed in God’s “commanding the general kind to which these particulars do belong.” The “general kind commanded” is “order and decency.” Gillespie then poses: “if further we demand, how such ceremonies as are instituted and used to stir up men, in respect of their signification, unto the devout remembrance of their duties to God, are in such an institution and use, matters of mere order? As a magisterial dictator of *quodlibets* [*as-you-wishes*], he tells us that they are matters of mere order, *sensu largo*, in a large sense.” The example Burges adduced of “worship commanded in the general, and not commanded, but only allowed in the particular,” was that of the free will offering, where one was left at their liberty to offer “a bullock, goat, or sheep at his pleasure, if he chose a bullock to offer, that sacrifice, in that particular, was not commanded, but only allowed” (§2, 239).

In answer Gillespie asks rhetorically: “How absurd a tenet is this, which holds that there is some particular worship of God allowed, and not commanded? What new light is this which makes all our divines to have been in the mist, who have acknowledged no worship of God, but that which God has commanded? Whoever heard of commanded and allowed worship?” He answers Burges’ example of the free will offering from Ames (239–240):

that though the particulars were not, nor could not be, determined by a distinct rule in general, yet they were determined by the circumstances, as our divines are wont to answer the Papiſts about their vows, councils, supererogations: NOT BY A GENERAL LAW, BUT BY CONCURRENCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. Deut. 16:10, Moses shows that the freest offerings were to be according as God had blessed them; from whence it follows, it had been sin for any Israelite whom God had plentifully blessed, to offer a pair of pigeons, instead of a bullock or two, upon his own mere pleasure. Where that proportion was observed, the choice of a goat before a sheep, or a sheep before a goat, was no formal worship.

Gillespie further observes that Burges is arguing little different from Bellarmine, who “comprehended” all the Catholic ceremonies “under order and decency” (§3, 240). In answer

to both, Gillespie contends that the "apostle only commands that each action and ceremony of God's worship be decently and orderly performed, but gives us no leave to excogitate or devise new ceremonies, which have not been instituted before." After quoting at length from John Baſtwick and briefly from Balduin, Gillespie sums and concludes:

order is not to the rites of the church a general kind, but only a concomitant circumstance; neither are the rites of the church comprehended under order as particulars under the general kind to which they belong; but order belongs to the rites of the church as an adjunct to the subject. And, I pray, muſt not the rites of the church be managed with decency and order? If ſo, then muſt our opposites either ſay that order is managed with order, which is to ſpeak nonsense, or elſe, that the rites of the church are not comprehended under order. But if not, then it follows that the rites of the church are to be managed with levity, confuſion, and ſcandal; for every action that is not done in decency and in order muſt needs be done ſcandalouſly and confuſedly (241).

Gillespie then obſerves againſt Burges' "large ſenſe" that, whether in a broad or narrow ſenſe, order and decency is ſomething required of all human actions, civil and religious: the requirement is not proper only to religion. "Wherefore ſacred ſignificant ceremonies ſhall never be warranted by the precept of order and decency, which have no leſs in civility than in religion."

II. Gillespie proceeds to the warrants formalists adduced for the particular diſputed ceremonies (§4). Gillespie ſhows that Matthew 9:13 cannot warrant the ceremony of confirmation of children, finding ſupport in the Jeſuit commentator Maldonat and from Cartwright againſt the Rhemiſts (241–242). Perth Aſſembly warranted kneeling in the act of receiving the ſacrament from Psalm 95:6; but that is, according to Gillespie, as much as to ſay, "We may worſhip before the Lord, ergo before a creature; we may kneel in an immediate worſhip of God, therefore in a mediate." This was dealt with at length in chapter four. Forbes warranted private baptism from Acts 8 and 16. To the firſt, Gillespie counters there were likely others preſent; and in both caſes, that they were extraordinary, given the unſettled nature of the early church (§5, 242).

§6. Hooker, with Bellarmine, argues for the ſign of the croſs from Ezekiel 9:4 and Revelation 7:3. To the firſt of theſe, Gillespie objects that neither the ſign noted there nor the uſe of it ſupports the ceremony of the ſign of the croſs. Not even the *tau* of the Greeks and Romans represents a croſs; and the Hebrew ſurely does not. He cites Junius, who commented that no myſtery is "to be ſought in that letter more than in any other" (243). The uſe of the ſign in Ezekiel does not ſupport ſuch a claimed warrant: "the uſe of the ſign of

the croſs pretended by formalists, is not to ſeparate us in the time of judgment, but to teach that at no time we ought to be aſhamed of the ignominy of Chriſt." So neither the ſign nor uſe of it in Ezekiel ſupports the formalists. "Now, the ſureſt interpretation of that place (Ezek. 9:4), is to take *Tau* for an appellative noun, ſignifying generally and indefinitely a mark or ſign, ſo that there is no mark determined by this word; only there was a commandment given to ſet a certain mark, ſome ſign or other, upon the foreheads of the elect." Even Sanctius noted that this expoſition is followed by almoſt all the Hebrew maſters and ancients; Bellarmine affirms it; and this meaning is given in Buxtorff's lexicon (rendering *tau* as *ſignum*). Laſtly, if what the formalists contended were the caſe, likely the lone character *tau* would have been inserted in the text inſtead of fully written out, *vehithvith a tau: mark a mark*. As to the [uſage] in Revelation 7, Paræus obſerved "that there is no figure or form of any ſign there expreſſed;" and Fulke pointed out that the ſign in that place "is proper to God's elect." It could not be the ſign of the croſs, becauſe many reprobates have received that.

In the remaining part of chapter ſix, Gillespie contends with the alleged Scripture warrants which the formalists adduced for the pretended holy days (§7–§11), ending with a brief refutation from the argument from church cuſtom (§12–§14). Gillespie firſt diſputes with Lancelot Andrewes' and his deſenſe of Eaſter from 1 Corinthians 5:8 (§7), and then briefly covers a deſenſe from the fourth commandment (§8) before at length dealing with the examples of Purim in Eſther 9 (§9–§10), and from the feaſt of dedication in John 10 (§11).

§7. Andrewes' alleged 1 Corinthians 5:8 as a commandment for keeping Eaſter; and that the keeping of it was of apoſtolic inſtitution becauſe in the diſputations over when to obſerve it, one ſide alleged the Apoſtle John, the other the Apoſtle Peter. Gillespie brings forth the teſtimony of Socrates as of better credit than the biſhop's, who records that the obſervance of Eaſter came by private cuſtom. And whereas Andrewes diſmiſſed Socrates as only one private opinion, Gillespie replies that Socrates baſed what he ſaid on the very reaſoning of the biſhop: that while each ſide alleged a different apoſtle, none could confirm this from any writing for proof of their cuſtom.

§8. Downname claimed warrant for holy days from the fourth commandment (§8, 245). Gillespie notes that Baſtwick more truly alleged the fourth commandment againſt holy days: "Six days ſhalt thou Labor." Since Gillespie already covered this argument in part one, chapter ſeven, he moves on to handle two other alleged Scripture warrants for holy days: Eſther 9 and John 10. Gillespie begins by noting that both the days of Purim and the feaſt of dedication were with the conſent of the people: therefore no warrant is here for tyrannically impoſed days. He alſo notes that the days of Purim were appointed as civil obſervances.

§9. In this section Gillespie turns to six proofs from Lancelot Andrewes' attempt to prove that the days of Purim were holy days. 1. Andrewes, rejecting the English translation and insisting on the marginal reading, contended that Esther 9:31 proved these were holy days, because the Jews took upon themselves a soul matter: "they bound themselves 'upon their souls.'" Gillespie explains that the common meaning of hundreds of examples of the Hebrew is simply "bound themselves." 2. Andrewes argued that the bond reached "to all that wished to be joined to their religion." Gillespie replies that there is no such word in the text (KJV), nor in Montanus or Tremellius. It is in the old Latin Vulgate; however, no such reading can be drawn from the Hebrew. But "let it be so," Gillespie says: could not those "of the Jews' religion" have bound themselves to a civil observance? 3. Andrewes contended that the term *rite and ceremony* is expressly used in the text (Esther 9:23, 28). Gillespie responds by noting that in the first verse, there is only the Hebrew word for "undertook," citing Pagnini and Tremellius: to read it as the bishop did is to add to the text. Verse 28 does not call it a *rite* but *days of remembrance or festive days*. Andrewes rejected that this could have been a civil rite: rites and ceremonies must "pertain to the church and to the service of God." Gillespie notes that the Vulgate has *rite* but not *ceremony*; and it is certain that rites belong to the commonwealth as much as to the church. 4. The bishop argued from verse 31, that since they fasted and prayed prior, the following day was a holy day. Gillespie contends that the Vulgate is very corrupt at that place, and notes that "the best interpreters take the fasting and prayer spoken of v. 31, to be meant of the time before their delivery. Now, after they were delivered, they decreed that the matters of their fasting and crying should be remembered upon the days of Purim, which were to solemnize that preservation ... 'which they obtained from God by fasting and prayers,'" as noted by Tremellius. 5. Andrewes added that, in addition to fasting and praying, alms were enjoined. But the former were memorials of their deliverance, as shown: so the mere taking of alms warrants no holy day. 6. Andrewes argued from the current practice of the Jews' keeping of these as holy days, to mean they were instituted as such. But Gillespie responds that there is no proof that the Jews did this from antiquity, and that their "manner of observation whenever it began, had no warrant from the first institution;" and was not particularly commendable as far as bolstering Andrewes' claimed warrant (246–248).

§10. After dealing with the bishop's six reasons, Gillespie goes on to note that even if the days of Purim were instituted as holy days, there was an extraordinary warrant in that Mordecai was a prophet (Esther 4:13). Lindsay believed they only had a general warrant (because he argued for the same general warrant for the New Testament church to appoint

such days), but this ignores the extraordinary warrant from a prophet of God (248).

§11. For the alleged warrant from the feast of dedication in John 10, Gillespie cites 1. Cartwright's argument that it was unduly instituted by Judas Maccabeus. 2. The feast was not free of Pharisaical invention: for which Gillespie cites Tremellius' observation from the Talmud that "the wise men of that era established" it in recurring years—meaning by "wise men," the Pharisees. Lindsay rejected this contention; but Gillespie makes the case for it from Matthew 13:2, Calvin, Cameron and Josephus (249).

3. Gillespie rejects the allegations made to prove that this feast was lawful. That Christ did not rebuke the observing of this feast is not proof of anything (John 21:25); and his mere presence does not prove his approbation. Christ had come up for the feast of tabernacles (John 7), and remained to preach for the great number of people that were there: Paul similarly made use of such gatherings to preach the gospel. Some also make it uncertain which feast is spoken of in John 10 (250–251).

§12. Gillespie spends the rest of this chapter disputing the defense of the ceremonies from church custom. Andrewes made the defense from 1 Corinthians 11:16, that the apostles' example teaches us regarding "points of this nature, of ceremony or circumstance, ever to pitch upon 'we have, or we do not have such a custom.'" 1. Gillespie flatly rejects that this passage gives any such grounds for such a doctrine as this. "For the custom of the church there spoken of, is not concerning a point of circumstance, but concerning a very substantial and necessary point, namely, not to be contentious" (referencing Chrysostom, Ambrose, Calvin, Martyr, Bullinger, Marlorat, Beza, Fulke, Cartwright, Paræus, as well as the formalist Spotswood). He concludes by drawing the consequence that the bishop's argumentation undermined the sufficiency of Scripture (252).

§13. 2. Gillespie observes that custom is not sufficient to retain a practice, and it is often needful to change it—citing Basil, Cyprian, Augustine, Ambrose, and Gratian. He quotes Calvin, citing Cyprian, that "we must not follow the customs of man, but the truth of God." Even the formalist Forbes despised all argumentation based upon "the custom of the church."

§14. 3. We clearly are not to blindly follow the custom of the church: in church history past abuses, such as infant communion, were corrected and changed. 4. While the ceremonies are allegedly warranted from the custom of some churches, other churches have no such custom: the disputed ceremonies cannot be proved to be customs of the universal church. 5. Much of the alleged support from custom is from the corrupt observances of Antichrist (which is reason enough against them, as argued in part three, chapter two). 6. Gillespie wryly adduces Hooker's saying that "the law of common indulgence permits us to think of our own customs as half

a thought better than the customs of others;” and closes by asking: if custom should hold sway, why were the customs of the Church of Scotland attained by the Reformation forcibly changed by the formalists?

Chapter Seven. In this chapter Gillespie shows that the disputed ceremonies are not warrantable by church law. The question stated is: what power, and to what extent, does the church have “to make laws about things pertaining to religion and the worship of God?” Our disputer against the ceremonies adduces and interacts with the answers given by Field (§1), Lindsay (§2–§3), and Cameron (§3–§4), before showing the true limits of church power, by proposing three necessary conditions that must be met for any church law to be legitimate (§5–§7). In the balance of the chapter, Gillespie proves by three arguments that the disputed ceremonies cannot be warranted by ecclesiastical law (§8–§14), and then concludes the chapter (§15).

§1. The opinion of the matter as it stood between the Protestants and Catholics is adduced from Field, which Gillespie dismisses by noting four incongruities. 1. Field oddly limited the difference between the two groups to the power Catholics annexed for their devised ceremonies to work “spiritual and supernatural effects” (255). 2. Field maintained the formalist position that the law for all things to be done in decency and order required adding ceremonies, in order to cause respect and regard for “the works of God’s service, and thereby stir men up to greater fervor and devotion” (refuted previously: part 3, chapter 6, §3, p. 240). 3. Gillespie faults Field for including the silence of women in the churches as amongst things the church prescribed, when it was rather by Christ’s command in Scripture. 4. Gillespie shows that Field’s argument from decency and order was the very same argument as the Catholics’ which Field himself had rejected earlier (255–256).

§2. Lindsay maintained that the church had power “to determine the circumstances which are in the general necessary to be used in divine worship, but not defined particularly in the Word.” By this, Lindsay meant that when there is such a circumstance, no one could question the expediency of it as a church law, nor claim consciences were bound, thus making church law the rule of consciences (256). In response, Gillespie observes this would bring all sorts of consequences: such as bringing in the whole garb of the Levitical high priest, since “apparel is a circumstance in the general necessary, yet it is not particularly defined in the Word”; several holy days a week, etc. Under Lindsay’s argument, one could not complain against the corruptions that led, in church history, to communion once a year at Easter, and baptism only on pretended holy days (256–257).

§3. Finally Gillespie adduces and interacts with Cameron’s ‘copious’ handling of the question. John Cameron was a significant Scottish born theologian of the period; and while of

the formalist camp, Gillespie often cites him approvingly to support an argument against them (as he does with Catholic apologists and other formalists, such as Davenant). Here our disputant takes issue with Cameron, refining what he had to say on the matter.

Cameron wrote that the church commands two sorts of things: those that belong to faith and manners, and such as conduce to the same. Both are prescribed plainly in God’s Word: the first are particularly commanded, and those that conduce to faith and manners are but generally commended. The first are set and unchangeable. The second are infinitely variable based upon circumstances; but it is generally commended by God that these be done orderly in public and decently in private. In neither case does the church have power to create laws: the first are already prescribed; and for the second, there is a general law because particular laws would vary with the circumstances, and would have been infinite in number (257–258). Cameron continued:

What faith is, what righteousness is, what love is, is shown by the Word of God. Whatever is useful for these things, whether it coincides by reflecting upon the matter in general, or by reflecting upon the matter individually, to that extent depends on knowledge of the circumstances. Now God wished to determine that to be in the possession of the church, but with this law, that what the church determines should agree with the general determination of God.

Cameron illustrated this with the example of fasting. Scripture only generally commands that we are to fast, and to fast publicly; but there could be no definitions given in particular, since the occasions of fasting are infinite. So the church must consider the circumstances, in setting occasions for public fasting.

§4. Gillespie observes from these citations, that Cameron’s discussion “cannot satisfy the attentive reader, but deserves certain animadversions.” 1. Cameron’s reasoning places him in a contradiction. He said Scripture plainly and expressly and generally commends things that conduce to faith and manners by a general law; but this cannot stand with his claim “that it is in the church’s power to define what things conduce to faith, piety, and charity, even *reputando rem in universum* [by reflecting upon the matter in general].” 2. This latter claim also does not square with Cameron’s position that the church has no power to make laws for things belonging or conducing to faith and manners. 3. Why does he divide the apostles’ injunction? Both decency and order are required in public services. 4. “Whereas he says that such things as conduce to faith and manners do depend upon the circumstances, and so could not be particularly defined in the Word, either he speaks of those things as they are defined in the general, or as they are

defined in the particular," Gillespie reasons; and rejects that he can mean the first. In the case of the second: "to say that things conducing to faith and manners, as they are particularly defined, do depend upon circumstances, is as much as to say that circumstances depend upon circumstances." 5. Scripture sometimes defines things that conduce to faith and manners in particular. Taking Cameron's example of fasting, Gillespie notes that God's Word "defines very many occasions of fasting (Ezra 8:21; 2 Chron. 20; Jonah 3; Joel 2; Acts 13:3; Joshua 7:6; Judges 20:16; Esther 4:16; Ezra 9 and 10; Zech. 7)—from which he finds that Scripture defines fasting is to be used for supplication when in need; deprecation when fearing some evil; and for humiliation for sins when God's wrath has been provoked. "Neither can there be any occasion of fasting whereof I may not say that either it is particularly designed in Scripture, or else that it may be by necessary consequence defined out of Scripture; or, lastly, that it is of that sort of things which were not determinable by Scripture, because circumstances are infinite, as Camero has told us" (258–259).

§5. In the next several sections, Gillespie defines the true limits of church power in prescribing laws, proposing three necessary conditions that must be met (§5–§7, 259–263). The three conditions required to be met in those things the church has power to command by ecclesiastical law are:

1. "It must be only a circumstance of divine worship; no substantial part of it; no sacred significant and efficacious ceremony. For the order and decency left to the definition of the church, as concerning the particulars of it, comprehends no more but mere circumstances" (260). Gillespie rejects Lindsay's, and answers Andrewes', confusion of ceremonies and circumstances, adducing definitions and distinctions from Field and Junius; as well as answering Bellarmine's definition of a ceremony from Ames. Gillespie derides Dr. Burges' rejection of the distinction between circumstances and ceremonies as a "nicety or fiction". Burges wrote: "For that all circumstances (I mean extrinsical) which incur not the substance of the action, when they are once designed or observed purposely in reference to such a matter, of whose substance they are not, they are then ceremonies." This simply makes a world full of ceremonies. "When I appoint to meet with another man at Berwick, upon the 10th day of May, because the place and the day are purposely designed in reference to such a matter, of whose substance they are not, namely, to my meeting with the other man, for talking of our business, therefore the town of Berwick, and the 10th day of May, must be accounted ceremonies. To me it is nice, that the Doctor made it not nice, to let such a nicety fall from his pen" (261).

§6. 2. "That which the church may lawfully prescribe by her laws and ordinances, as a thing left to her determination, must be one of such things as were not determinable by Scripture, on that reason which Camero has given us, namely, because

individua are *infinita*." Since the many and variable circumstances left to the determination of the church are practically infinite, they were not enumerated or determined in Scripture (or the books describing such would fill the world). But those parts of worship that are not merely circumstantial are both few in number and easily prescribed in God's Word.

§7. 3. "If the church prescribe anything lawfully, so that she prescribe no more than she has power given her to prescribe, her ordinance must be accompanied with some good reason and warrant given for the satisfaction of tender consciences" (262). Gillespie cites Cameron approvingly and agrees with Tertullian that "No law owes to itself alone the conscience of its equity, but to those from whom it expects obedience. Moreover, it is a suspected law which will not have itself to be proved, but a wicked law, which not being proved, yet bears rule." He cites Chemnitz and Calvin "that in rites and ceremonies the church has no power 'to destruction, but to edification;' and that the observation of our ecclesiastical canons 'must carry before them a manifest utility.'" "But it is hard for pious brothers to subject themselves to those things which they perceive neither to be right nor useful."

Gillespie then proposes and answers the objection that if there are two convenient things, and the church prescribes one over the other, we are bound to do that by the church's authority. But even in that case "the conveniency of the thing itself is anterior to the church's determination." Therefore, "the conveniency of a thing must always go before the church's prescribing of it," if it is indeed such a thing when it is actually done, it is convenient to be done. "Neither can the church prescribe anything lawfully which she shows not to have been convenient, even before her determination" (263).

Having proposed and proved his three conditions, Gillespie adduces three arguments that the English popish ceremonies cannot be lawfully prescribed by any ecclesiastical law (§8–§14, 263–270).

§8. The first argument is that the disputed ceremonies are not consonant with the three necessary conditions just set out and proved. 1. They are "sacred, mystical, significant, efficacious ceremonies," not mere matters of circumstances. This has been clearly proved in the *Dispute*, and admitted by the formalists themselves. 2. The ceremonies are not of those things undeterminable in Scripture, but of those things that could be easily prescribed if it had been God's desire they be observed in His Worship. 3. The ceremonies in question are not urged and supported by reasons to satisfy conscience, but merely imposed by naked authority.

§9. The second argument reasons from the basis of the ceremonies' lawfulness. They are only lawful because of the bare authority of the church, or they are lawful as they are "grounded upon and warranted by the law of God and nature" (264). Reformed theologians reject the first basis (Gillespie

cites Junius as representative), and the formalists themselves reject it. Paybody granted that "it is unlawful to do in God's worship anything upon the mere pleasure of man."

This left the formalists with the second basis. Gillespie then argues another choice between two reasons: ceremonies are lawful only because church authority judges them agreeable to God's law and nature, or because the church proves them by evident reasons to be so. If the formalists were to grant the second choice, their whole case alleging the lawfulness of the ceremonies merely from the church's power and authority collapses. Nevertheless, if the second choice is granted, Gillespie asks, where are these reasons? Why he asks, "are they so long kept from us?" If they hold to the first choice, then it is lawful to do anything however repugnant, simply because the church judges so, however wrongly judged from the Law of God and of nature. Gillespie anticipates the reply that if something is not really lawful, and is repugnant to God's Law and nature, then people are not bound to receive it as something lawful, in spite of the church's judgment. But otherwise, they would further reply, if the thing is indifferent in nature, it is to be embraced as convenient to be done and agreeable to God's Law and nature; and the lawfulness of it ought not to be questioned.

In response, Gillespie gives yet again a choice: a thing is repugnant or not, or indifferent or not, because the church merely judges it so; or else the church proves it so by obvious reasons. If the second alternative is granted, the argument is over: Gillespie has what he wants. If the first is doggedly stuck to, the case is back where it was. We must receive anything as indifferent however bad, just because the church says it is so. "So that if we receive anything as indifferent, for this respect, because the church judges it to be so, then shall we receive everything for indifferent which the church shall so judge of" (265).

§10. Gillespie's third argument is that "[t]he church is forbidden to add anything to the commandments of God which He has given unto us, concerning His worship and service (Deut. 4:2; 12:32; Prov. 30:6); therefore she may not lawfully prescribe anything in the works of divine worship, if it be not a mere circumstance belonging to that kind of things which were not determinable by Scripture." Here the formalists presented no other argument than the same distinctions made by Catholics when defending "their unwritten dogmatical traditions," that 1. while "destructive addition" is unlawful, "perfecting addition" is not. 2. The Christian church was not bound, as the Jewish church was, from adding to God's commandments. 3. While "the church may not add to the essential parts of God's worship," she may add to that which is accidental to it.

This first distinction itself adds to God's Word: it begs the question. It is also blasphemous since it implies that the

Scriptures are not perfect, and human addition may perfect it. Christ's reproof of the Pharisees' washings removes any pretended distinction of corrupting or perfecting addition: the washings were unlawful because they were mere commandments of men (Matt. 15:9).

§11. The second distinction is also false. The second commandment is moral and perpetual, forbidding all inventions of men in God's worship. There is no more liberty in the Christian church than in the Jewish to add to God's commandments. Gillespie notes that the New Testament church is even more forbidden to add to God's commandments, citing Calvin and a portion of one of Knox's letters. And he dismisses, as beside the point, the arguments of Hooker (positive law for the church is not as particularly determined as in the law of Moses for the Jews), Cameron (that the church is free from restrictions on things indifferent as opposed to the Jews), and Lindsay (that the Christian church has a prerogative the Jewish did not, in being free to determine circumstantial matters). To the last, Gillespie answers from *Course of Conformity*: "There were many points of service, as sacrifices, washings, anniversary days, etc., which we have not; but the determination of such as we have is as particular as theirs, except wherein the national circumstances make impediment." With the inclusion of every nation, such restrictions were removed; but it is not the case the church is freer in worship particulars than the Jews were.

§12. Continuing on the same topic, Gillespie reminds of the distinction between moral circumstances and sacred ceremonies. In moral circumstances (recalling such are infinite and not particularly determinable in God's Word), the Jewish synagogue had the same power of determining time, length of service, order of worship kept, etc. as the church. But in ceremonies of God's holy worship: is the fidelity owed to the Son of God to be less than that owed to the servant Moses (Heb. 3:2)? He concludes, "Albeit the worship of God and religion, in the church of the New Testament, is accompanied without ceremonies, 'very few in number, very easy to observe, most remarkable in meaning' (as Augustine speaks of our sacraments), yet we have in Scripture, no less particular determination and distinct direction for our few, easy, and plain ceremonies, than the Jews had for their many heavy and obscure ones" (268).

§13. As for the third distinction, allowing addition to the accidentary or non essential parts of worship: Gillespie first dismisses the distinction of *pars accidentaria* as unheard of in the rules of logic, and not equating with the rules of good distribution (the *distribution ought to exhaust what is being distributed*). Granting the distinction for the sake of argument, Gillespie argues against the formalists' contention that the church may add to the non essential parts of worship:

1. First let them define the essential parts, and beware in case it is the same definition as the non essential.

2. There are non essential parts of God's worship to which nothing is to be added. He demands, "Were all the ceremonies commanded to be used in the legal sacraments and sacrifices essential parts of those worships? No man will say so. Yet the synagogue was tied to observe those (and no other than those) ceremonies which the Word prescribed" (citing also Numbers 9:3, 5).

§14. 3. If God's prescribed non essential parts of worship are necessary and sufficient to their end, any human addition cannot but be superfluous and superstitious.

4. Gillespie recalls another maxim of logic. *Sublata una parte, tollitur totum*: "An essential part being taken away, *totum essenziale* [the essential whole] is taken away also" (268–269). "In like manner, an integral part being taken away, *totum integrum* [the undiminished whole] cannot remain behind." So if any of the disputed ceremonies are reckoned parts of the worship of God, it must be judged that if they are removed, only a part rather than the whole of God's worship remains or "at best, a defective, wanting, lame and maimed worship."

5. The formalists' own treatment of the disputed ceremonies as equal to the chief parts of the worship of God negates any argument from their being non essential additions.

6. Gillespie concludes the case by adducing various Reformed divines who condemned adding rites and ceremonies to God's prescribed worship, as well as the addition of things thought more essential. He cites Martyr, Zanchius, Fulke, and ends by referencing Calvin, who "pronounces generally, 'the Lord's supper is such a sacrosanct matter that it ought to be held a crime to defile it by any additions of men.'"

§15. Gillespie ends the seventh chapter of part three believing he has proved his case that the English popish ceremonies cannot be warranted by the laws of the church. He ends by citing the examples of Nadab and Abihu and the Jews who burned their sons and daughters: whatever wickedness might be noted in their actions, God "stops their mouths with this one answer: 'I commanded it not, neither came it into my heart'" (Lev. 10:1; Jer. 7:31).

Chapter Eight. In this chapter Gillespie argues that the lawfulness of the disputed ceremonies cannot be warranted by the civil magistrate, and he explains the power which civil government has in spiritual and ecclesiastical matters. He begins by explaining that this is the stronghold of the formalists, and denies that nonconformists intend rebellion (§1). He then examines the views of de Dominis regarding the jurisdiction and office of the magistrate in ecclesiastical matters (§2–§12). Before examining the power of princes in ecclesiastical matters, he adduces three propositions and defends them (§13–§17). Gillespie then proceeds to examine the power of princes to make laws and ordinances regarding the worship of God by means of three distinctions (§18–§33). Because this subject concerns more than the formation of ecclesiastical law,

he then concludes by filling out the chapter with four digressions. 1. The vocation of men of ecclesiastical orders (313–329). 2. The convocation and moderation of synods (329–332). 3. The judging of ecclesiastical controversies and questions of faith (333–336). 4. The power of the keys and ecclesiastical censures (337–358).

§1. Gillespie begins by noting that the king's authority is the hiding place and stronghold of the formalists; and then he plies questions to them, the answers to which should have made them more than a little ashamed. "If they did mean, in good earnest, to qualify the lawfulness of the ceremonies from holy Scripture, why have they not taken more pains and travail to debate the matter from thence? And if they meant to justify them by the laws and constitutions of the church, why did they not study to an orderly peaceable proceeding, and to have things concluded in a lawful national synod, after free reasoning and mature advisement? Why did they carry matters so factiously and violently? The truth is, they would have us to acquiesce, and to say no more against the ceremonies, when once we hear that they are enjoined by his Majesty, our only supreme governor." Gillespie then rejects the charge that he derogates from the king's authority by denying that the magistrate has power to legislate sacred rites and ceremonies. Nor are nonconformists rebelling against the king, because "to say that subjects are not bound to obey such laws and statutes of their prince, as impose upon them a yoke of ceremonies which he has no power to impose, is one thing, and to say that they are not bound to subject themselves unto him faithfully and loyally, is another thing." Gillespie then cites support from Gerson (Catholic), Field (formalist), and Gerhard (Lutheran).

§2–§12. Gillespie begins this section by examining the views of the great formalist of that day, the Archbishop of Spalato, Marco Antonio de Dominis, regarding the jurisdiction and office of the magistrate in ecclesiastical matters (272–280). The bishop's great work was *De Republica Ecclesiastica, and Gillespie interacts with the material in book six*, which defends that divine and ecclesiastical things are to be ruled and governed by the authority and laws of princes. The bishop limits this to the external things of worship, not internal (deciding controversies, binding and loosing, peaching, administering the sacraments, etc.)—things which while spiritual are not purely spiritual.

1. Gillespie generally objects to this view by demanding why the bishop confuses the power of the king over ecclesiastical persons with the alleged power over ecclesiastical things; and 2. why he confounds governing such things with merely protecting the same? (§3, 273). 3. Additionally, the bishop said that the prince does not have power over internal or purely spiritual things; but are not rites and ceremonies such? 4. Gillespie adduces the example that a supreme civil authority

does not preclude other jurisdictions. He gives the example that, just as in the ship the king may sail in, the captain is in charge, so ecclesiastical persons are in charge of the church within the king's domains. 5. Gillespie objects to the example of translating the Scriptures as an external thing: is that not to be under the authority of a king who does not know Hebrew and Greek (§4, 274)? 6. The distinction between spiritual things and purely spiritual things is nonsensical. "All sacred and ecclesiastical things belonging to the worship of God are spiritual things" (275). 7. The bishop "contradicts himself" in that he denies that the king may judge questions of faith; and then in another place, he exhorts kings to compel Protestants and Catholics to compose their differences.

Next Gillespie contends with some of the reasons de Dominis adduced in support of his view, beginning with the human authorities. Not to weary his readers, Gillespie simply notes seven general things about these sources that obviate them as supports (§5, 275–276).

Gillespie then proceeds to examine some of the Scriptures which the bishop gave in support of his contention that the prince had power in the external matters of God's worship (§6–§10). In sum, he notes the passages do not support the contention, because either the kings concerned were acting as a prophet or at the behest of a prophet; only doing what they were commanded to do; only setting up worship to the pattern that had previously been ordained; or only doing as commanded by priests. The example of Solomon removing the high priest and replacing him was simply by consequence of Abiathar's treason; and Zadok was the successor designated by the rule of God's Word (278).

§11. As to the example of Hezekiah, who removed high places and destroyed images and the brazen serpent, etc.: he did nothing but what he was commanded, because Scripture required the removing of such things. And Gillespie remarks, "Now, we wish from our hearts that from this example all Christian kings may learn to remove and destroy the monuments of idolatry out of their dominions."

§12. "Finally, says the Bishop, the kings of the Jews (1 Kings 23; 2 Chron. 19) have in the temple propounded the law of the Lord to the people, renewed the covenant of religion, pulled down profane altars, broken down idols, slain idolatrous priests, liberated their kingdom from abomination, purged the temple (2 Chron. 34, 35; 1 Maccab. 4:59); proclaimed the keeping of the passover, and of the feast of dedication (Esther 9:26); and have also instituted new feasts. For all which things they are in the Scriptures much praised by the Holy Spirit (2 Chron. 29:2; 34:2, etc)." In reading the law to the people and making a covenant before the Lord, Josiah "prescribed nothing at his own pleasure; only he required of the people to walk after the Lord, and to keep His commandments." Nor did he do this by himself but called a council made of priests,

prophets and the elders of the people. And if he had done this by himself, the occasion was more than ordinary and admits of some exception, as "the reformation of a church generally and greatly corrupted, craves the more immediate intermeddling of princes..." (279). The feast of dedication and days of Purim are beside the point, as Gillespie proved previously.

§13. In the next sections of this long chapter, before showing what princes may do in matters of religion and the worship of God, Gillespie proposes three propositions:

Proposition One. Gillespie first proposes, "whatsoever the power of princes are in things and causes ecclesiastical, it is not sure, absolute nor unbounded." To the fawning praises given by Spotswood to King James' learning, Gillespie counters that it is rare indeed that one man knows better than a synod of godly theologians what is for the good of the church; and one man, being more prone to error, poses the greater hazard for the church. The Catholics do not defend all the personal actions of the pope. And are we to make idols of kings more than Catholics idolize popes? Gillespie adduces Saravia and Cameron advocating an unquestionable authority of kings in external matters of religion—a thing which he found amazing and horrifying, causing him break out with this entreaty to the Lord, admonishing the kings of the earth:

O wisdom of God, by whom kings do reign and princes decree justice, upon whose thigh and vesture is written, "King of kings and Lord of Lords," make the kings of the earth to know that their laws are but *regulae regulatae* [regulated rules], and *mensurae mensuratae* [measured measures]! "Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings: be instructed, ye judges of the earth. Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son" (Ps. 2:10–12), and lay down your crowns at the feet of the Lamb that sits upon the throne, *discite iustitiam moniti* (Virgil, "Having been warned, learn justice"). And remember that this is the beginning of wisdom, by casting pride away, to addict yourselves to the dominion of Christ; who, albeit He has given the kingdoms of this world to your hands, and *non aufert mortalia, qui regna datio caelestia* (in distributing heavenly authority, he does not remove mortal things), yet has He kept the government of His church upon His own shoulder (Isa. 9:6; 22:21). So that *rex non est proprie rector ecclesiae sed reipublicae; ecclesiae vero defensor est* (The king is not properly the ruler of the church, but of the state; but he is the defender of the church).

O all you subjects of kings and princes, understand that in things pertaining to the church and kingdom of Christ, you are not the servants of men, to do what they list, and that for their listing (1 Cor. 7:23). The apostle urges (Rom. 13), not obedience to magistrates for conscience' sake, but only subjection for conscience' sake; for he concludes his whole purpose (v. 7), "Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute

is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor." There is not in all that chapter one word of obedience to magistrates.

And as touching the binding power of their laws, be they never so just, they cannot bind you any other way, nor in respect of the general end of them. For, *per se*, they cannot bind more than the church's laws can. Which thing Dr. Forbes has also told you out of Calvin.

And hence it follows, that whensoever you may omit that which princes enjoin, without violating the law of charity, you are not held to obey them for the majesty of princely authority. Be ashamed, O ye formalists, of your ascribing to princes a jurisdiction so absolute! Bury it in the grave of eternal silence. Tell it not in Rome; publish it not among the vassals of AntiChrist, lest the daughters of Babylon rejoice, lest the worshippers of the Beast triumph! (281–283).

§15. Proposition Two. Secondly, Gillespie proposes: whatever "princes can commendably either do by themselves, or command to be done by others, in such matters as any way appertain to the external worship of God, must be both lawful in the nature of it, and expedient in the use of it; which conditions, if they be wanting, their commandments cannot bind to obedience." 1. The prince is not the minister of God (Rom. 13:4) when commanding unlawful things. 2. Kings cannot claim a greater power than the Apostle Paul had or the church has in ecclesiastical matters. If the latter may not urge a rite or anything that is not edifying, neither may the king (2 Cor. 13:8, 10; Eph. 4:12). 3. God's law binds that we may only do that which is good, profitable and edifying (1 Cor. 6:12; 14:26). No law of any king trumps God's law of charity (284).

§16. Proposition Three. Thirdly, Gillespie proposes that because the power of kings in ecclesiastical matters is not absolute, their laws must be lawful and expedient; and because kings often transgress these boundaries, while claiming the lawfulness and expedience of their actions, it is necessary that subjects have the freedom to judge the laws a king may seek to enjoin, as to whether they are agreeable to God's Word: and if not, to freely abstain from what they require. 1. Gillespie supports this proposition from Scripture (1 Cor. 2:15; Phil. 1:10; Heb. 5:14; 1 Thess. 5:21). 2. "It is the Word of God, and not the arbitration of princes whereupon faith is grounded" (Rom. 14:23). 3. Every person will give an account of himself before God (Rom. 14:13) and so must have the freedom to examine what is required of him by rulers. 4. Else we could not be judged for doing unwillingly or in ignorance that which is unlawful; but we are so judged (Ezek. 18:20; Matt. 15:14). 5. Everyone "is bound to walk by a rule (Gal. 6:16)," and may not follow every vain conceit or do anything he pleases. The

laws of princes are not a just rule unless they are found to be in keeping with God's Word. 6. The Word of God is the only sure and stable rule by which to judge all actions: for instance, in a case where a king prescribes two contrary things, only God's Word can resolve the right course. 7. Only the freedom of private discretion prevents rendering to the king the same level of honor as ought to be given to God alone: only the Law of God is unquestionable. 8. We are not to be the servants of men (1 Cor. 7:23), or live to their lusts, or obey them in anything contrary to God's will (1 Peter 4:2; Eph. 6:6–7), and must in all that we do prove that which is acceptable unto the Lord (Eph. 5:20). 9. We must be granted this discretion because we are to take heed to God's Law in cleansing our manner of life (Ps. 119:9); walk as the children of light in the light of God's Word (119:105); and be wise and walk circumspectly in understanding God's will (Eph. 5:17). 10. "God would have us to exercise that measure of the gift of discretion which he has bestowed on us, in discerning of things which are propounded to us, whether they ought to be done or not" (1 John 2:27; 1 Cor. 2:15). 11. Protestant theologians insist on this right of discretion contrary to Catholicism. 12. Gillespie's opponent John Davenant copiously plead for "the same judgment of discretion which we stand upon, and holds it necessary for them to try and examine whatsoever either princes or prelates command them to do" (285–288).

§17. Before proceeding on, Gillespie addresses the formalists' wriggling around this right of private judgment. The formalist said that of course, they agreed that there should be this discretion: that when the king requires something unlawful, he ought not to be obeyed. But when the thing is lawful or indifferent, the king must be obeyed without discretion. Gillespie rejects this silly and absurd distinction as it prevents the discretion of judging whether anything is lawful or indifferent, and resolves back to the absolute authority of the magistrate (288–289).

§18–§33. For the remainder of chapter eight of part three, Gillespie addresses the magistrate's power to make laws and ordinances regarding the worship of God, by propounding and examining three distinctions.

§18. First Distinction. We must distinguish between substantial and circumstantial things in the worship of God. Substantial matters of worship include the necessary, essential parts as well as all sacred ceremonies: "all things which are not mere external circumstances, such as not particularly determinable" in Scripture. The magistrate has no power over these substantial parts of the worship of God. They may and should make known God's commandments, and by "their coactive temporal power, urge and enforce the observation of the same" (289). But Gillespie warns that we must beware, and not confuse that which is plainly warranted in Scripture with the devices of man. That Old Testament kings enjoined

God's prescribed worship and forbid idolatry and corruptions, does not give the slightest warrant or pretext for magistrates to enjoin anything that lacks divine warrant.

§19. Gillespie supports this lack of power in magistrates over the substantial parts of God's worship by adducing negative examples from God's Word (because there is no warrant in Scripture for innovations in religion, or for sacred rites of man's invention). The first example is that of Jeroboam, who made substantial changes in God's worship (1 Kings 12:28). While he may have pretended fair political excuses for doing so, or other reasons, "the innovations which he made about these ceremonies of sacred signs, sacred places, sacred persons, sacred times, are condemned for this very reason, because he devised them of his own heart (1 Kings 12:33), which was enough to convince [*convict*] him of horrible impiety in making Israel to sin" (290–291).

Gillespie adduces another negative example in King Ahaz, who took a pattern for an altar from one in Damascus (2 Kings 16:10, 18), which "innovation of taking the pattern of an altar from idolaters is marked as a sin and a snare."

And for a third example: "whereas many of the kings of Judah and Israel did either themselves worship in the groves and the high places, or else, at least, suffer the people to do so, howsoever they might have alleged specious reasons for excusing themselves," yet God admits "no excuses; but ever challenges it as a grievous fault in the government of those kings, that those high places were not taken away, and that the people still sacrificed in the high places" (291–292).

§20. The other matters of worship are the merely circumstantial (which Gillespie previously defined at length, 260–262). If the magistrate finds himself in position to institute anything regarding circumstantial matters, he must follow the Scriptural rules that govern the use of things of an indifferent nature. Gillespie forecasts that he will explain these rules at length in part four of the *Dispute*. Summarizing here, he says that those rules state we must do all things to the glory of God (1 Cor. 10:31), unto edification of others (1 Cor. 14:26), and in faith (Rom. 14:5, 23).

After mentioning these three rules, Gillespie turns to another objection. Some (amazingly) dared to say that these rules are only binding with regard to private matters, where we have liberty. But wherever there is a law, that must be our rule; and in that case, we cannot "examine and order our practice by the rules of the Word." Gillespie replies 1. The plain English of this objection is that in this case, man's rules trump God's rules. 2. If this were true we would not be free to examine if we do right or wrong in obeying superiors. 3. "The law of superiors is never the supreme, but ever a subordinate rule" (as Gillespie has already argued). 4. Scripture leaves no room for exception. "Whatsoever ye do' (though commanded by superiors) 'do all to the glory of God' (1 Cor.

10:31). 'Let all things' (though commanded by superiors) 'be done to edifying' (1 Cor. 14:26). 'Whatsoever is not of faith' (though commanded by superiors) 'is sin' (Rom. 14:23)." 5. As already shown, nothing may be done at "the sole will and pleasure of men" (293).

§21. In light of these rules, Gillespie rejects the repugnant view of Saravia giving absolute power to kings to "make constitutions of the places and times, when and where the exercises of piety may be conveniently had, also with what order, what rite, what gesture, what habit, the mysteries shall be more decently celebrated."

§22. Gillespie grants, for the sake of argument, that the disputed ceremonies are circumstantial matters, and notes that even so, they cannot stand with these three rules governing indifferent things. The disputed ceremonies cannot serve for the glory of God because they are offensive to many of the little ones of Christ, and give occasion to many enemies of God (such as atheists and papists) to blaspheme. Nor can the English popish ceremonies edify, because of all the injuries and inconveniences that attend their imposition, as Gillespie has shown (294). Nor can they be done in faith, because there is no warrant in Scripture for them (295).

§23. Second Distinction. Gillespie argues that there is a distinction to be made of times. A magistrate may do more under extraordinary circumstances when the church and ministry are corrupt, than under ordinary ones. At such times magistrates may use their power to cause reformation of abuses, enjoin the true faith and prescribed worship of God, and order such circumstantial matters of divine worship according to the rules of Scripture as best meet the particular case at hand. Otherwise, in the ordinary case when the church and ministry are sound, the magistrate is not to impose innovations and ecclesiastical laws without the church's advice and consent.

§24–§25. To Field's resolution of this question, Gillespie makes two objections relative to the imposition of the ceremonies upon Scotland, discussing the nature of the power of the law and of three sorts of laws (296–297). Following upon this, Gillespie contends firmly that 1. The civil magistrate "may not innovate any custom or rite of the church, nor publish any ecclesiastical law, without the free assent of the clergy, they being neither unable for, nor unwilling unto, their ecclesiastical functions and duties. Yea, further, that so far as is possible, the consent of the whole church ought to be had whensoever any change is to be made of some order or custom in the church" (298). And further when any change is to be made, in addition to the consent of the clergy is to be added the consent of the elders and learned laity. 2. It belongs to synods "to define and determine what orders and customs are fittest to be observed in such things, that thereafter the prince may approve and ratify the same, and press them upon

his subjects by his regal coactive power.” Concerning which synods, the magistrate “may command a synod of the church to judge of ecclesiastical things and actions,” and “define what order and form of policy is most convenient to be observed in things pertaining to divine worship.” After which “he may command the particular ministers of the church to exercise the works of their ministry, and to apply themselves unto that form of church regiment and policy which the synod has prescribed, yet he may not by himself define and direct such matters, nor make any laws thereanent” (299).

§26–§28. In order to prove this, Gillespie makes eight arguments. 1. Citing Tilen and Danæus, he observes that magistrates govern earthly things, while ecclesiastical ministers govern the things pertaining to God; and he draws the conclusion from a lengthy quotation of Junius, that “the very circumstances which pertain to ecclesiastical order and decency are exempted from the compass of civil government” (300). 2. Reason tells us that the judgment of a thing pertains to those who devote themselves to the study of the same. Since ministers of the church are those who look after the church and “devote themselves to the care and knowledge of things pertaining to God and His worship, whereabout they profess to bestow their ordinary study and painful travail; were it not most repugnant to the law of natural reason to say that they ought not to direct, but be directed by, the magistrate in such matters?” 3. By the Word of God, ministers are the watchmen and the overseers of the church, not the magistrate (Micah 7:4; Acts 20:28). 4. “Christ has committed the power of judging, defining, and making laws about” the spiritual good of believers” not to magistrates, but to the ministers of the church” (Eph. 4:12). 5. From Hebrews 13:17, Gillespie gathers “that in things pertaining to God, and which touch the spiritual benefit of the soul, the ministers of the church ought to give direction, and to be obeyed, as those who, in things of this nature, have the rule over all others of the church (and by consequence over princes also), so that it be in the Lord” (301–302).

§27. 6. Gillespie brings forward the historical examples of Constantine the Great and others who would not make any change in rites or ceremonies of themselves, but called for synods to deliberate upon the matters. 7. Gillespie also adduces theologians supporting this practice, notably Junius, Danæus, Wolphius, Cartwright, and Paræus, as well as the authors of the Second Book of Discipline. After which, Gillespie digresses into a discussion of whether magistrates have any spiritual power, or only civil power (302–305).

§27. 8. Formalists acknowledge the very thing for which Gillespie pleads: in proof of which, he cites Bilson, Davenant and Cameron. “To devise new rites and ceremonies is not the prince’s vocation, but to receive and allow such as the Scriptures and canons commend, and such as the bishops and pastors of the place shall advise.”

§29. At this point Gillespie makes a preliminary conclusion from the preceding that clearly,

the lawfulness of our conforming unto the ceremonies in question can be no way warranted by any ordinance of the supreme magistrate, or any power which he has in things spiritual or ecclesiastical. And if our opposites would ponder the reasons we have given, they should be quickly quieted, understanding that, before the prince’s ordinance about the ceremonies can be said to bind us, it must first be shown that they have been lawfully prescribed by a synod of the church, so that they must retire and hold them as the church’s ordinance. And what needs any more? Let us once see any lawful ordinance of the synod or church representative for them, we shall, without any more ado, acknowledge it to be out of all doubt that his Majesty may well urge conformity unto the same.

Now, of the church’s power we have spoken in the former chapter; and if we had not, yet that which has been said in this chapter makes out our point. For it has been proved, that neither king nor church has power to command anything which is not according to the rules of the Word; that is, which serves not for the glory of God, which is not profitable for edifying, and which may not be done in faith; unto which rules, whether the things which are commanded us be agreeable or not, we must try and examine by the private judgment of Christian discretion, following the light of God’s Word.

§30. Gillespie has yet a third distinction to speak of, regarding the binding nature of laws. He adduces Gerhard on the distinction between the absolute and hypothetical nature of how laws bind. God’s law binds absolutely, while the laws of magistrates bind hypothetically. 1. Gillespie makes the analogy that if church law does not bind absolutely, but hypothetically, neither can any law of magistrates regarding the worship of God bind absolutely. 2. “If we are not bound to receive and acknowledge the laws of princes as good and equitable, except only in so far as they are warranted by the Law of God and nature, then we are not bound in conscience to obey them, except only conditionally, in case the violating of them include the violating of the Law of God and nature; but the former is true, therefore the latter” (307). 3. “If we are bound to try and examine, by the judgment of discretion,” then the magistrate’s “laws cannot bind absolutely” and of themselves. 4. “If neither princes may command, nor we do anything which is not lawful and expedient, and according to the other rules of the Word, then the laws of princes bind not absolutely, but only in case the neglecting of them cannot stand with the law of charity and the rules of the Word”: the former was demonstrated, and the latter has to follow by consequence. 5. “If the laws of princes could bind absolutely

and simply, so that in no case, without offending God and wounding our conscience, we could neglect them, this bond should arise either from their own authority, or from the matter and thing itself which is commanded; but from neither of these it can arise, therefore from nothing" (308).

6. If a bond of conscience is not warranted from Scripture, such as the absolute binding to the laws of magistrates, there is no bond. If it is objected, "Ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake" (Rom. 13:5), Gillespie's answer is that we must be subject for conscience' sake: how often "shall we need to tell our opposites that subjection is one thing, and obedience another?" (2) If Paul had been speaking of obedience for conscience' sake, this necessarily would have to have been a hypothetical bond of obedience. When Titus 3:1 is also objected, again Gillespie replies that this is not speaking of an absolute bond to always obey magistrates, but of a hypothetical bond subject to discretion and judgment based upon the general rules of the Word.

§31. Gillespie thus concludes that he has gained a key point: that the laws of civil magistrates bind only conditionally and not absolutely. It follows that unless the superior law of charity is breached, one is not bound to observe laws enjoining the disputed ceremonies: but it is the obedience, not the breach, of such laws that violates the greater law of charity.

Gillespie then proposes: "Whensoever the laws of princes about things ecclesiastical do bind the conscience conditionally, and because of some other law of a superior bond, which cannot be observed if they be transgressed (which is the only respect for which they bind, when they bind at all), then the things which they prescribe belong either to the conservation or purgation of religion; but the controverted ceremonies belong to neither of these, therefore the laws made thereanent bind not, because of some other law which is of a superior bond." Gillespie cites the 1560 Scottish Confession of Faith chapter 24 and Calvin to underscore that "all the power which princes have in things ecclesiastical is comprehended in "the conservation and purgation of religion" (310–311).

§32. Gillespie adduces that the disputed ceremonies cannot be comprehended under the magistrate's power in things ecclesiastical, because they have not served for the conservation, but for the "hurt and prejudice" of religion. There had been a "doleful decay" of religion: Scotland had fallen far from the golden days of the Reformation. The superstitious rite of confirmation had replaced careful catechizing. Festival days rather than serving the pretended religious purpose served more to "Bacchanalian lasciviousness". And he quotes the observation of Zanchi regarding the surplice and other popish ceremonies, "that these things are of no value in kindling righteousness, but they are of great value in quenching it."

§33. Neither, says Gillespie, do the disputed ceremonies serve for the purgation or purifying of religion, because "a

church is not purged, but left unpurged, when the unnecessary monuments of bypast superstition are still preserved and kept in the same" (312).

§34. Gillespie concludes chapter eight proper at this point. However, because in addition to the making of laws about ecclesiastical things, there are other sorts of matters in which the magistrate may have interest, he makes four digressions in which he discusses the magistrate's power and concern, lest "a mistaking in one may possibly breed a mistaking in all." These topics of digression are 1. "the vocation of men of ecclesiastical order"; 2. "the convocation and moderation of councils"; 3. "the judging and deciding of controversies about faith"; and 4. "the use of the keys" to bind and loose (excommunication and absolution).

Chapter Eight, Digression One. This digression covers the vocation of men of ecclesiastical order (313–329, the digressions are not sectioned). Gillespie states that in "the vocation and calling of ecclesiastical persons, a prince ought to carry himself "in the manner of one procuring the kind, not of one designating the individual." He covers the topic under three propositions.

Proposition One. "Princes may and ought to provide and take care that men of those ecclesiastical orders, and those only which are instituted in the New Testament by divine authority, have vocation and office in the church." There are only the two ecclesiastical orders of elders and deacons. Princes do well to support these orders and to remove the host of pretended orders of archbishops, bishops, abbots, etc. There are two types of elders: teaching elders and ruling elders—the latter of which, are ordained for discipline only.

Proposition Two. "Princes, in their dominions, ought to procure and effect, that there be never wanting men qualified and fit for those ecclesiastical functions and charges which Christ has ordained, and that such men only be called, chosen, and set apart for the same." The magistrate should ensure that there are qualified men for church office by supporting schools, etc.; and they ought to hinder unfit men from office by ensuring that instead of disdainful prelates, a presbytery or company of elders makes trial of their gifts and graces. Ruling elders and deacons should be elected with the choice and consent of the congregation.

Proposition Three. "Nevertheless, princes may not design nor appoint such or such particular men to the charge of such or such particular churches, or to the exercise of such or such ecclesiastical functions, but ought to provide that such an order and form be kept in the election and ordination of the ministers of the church, as is warranted by the example of the apostles and primitive church." The minister must have an inward call from God, and an outward call made up of election and ordination. "The right of election pertains to the whole church" (318–323). Because of abuse, patronage and

presentation to benefices should be abandoned (322). The act of ordination sets a man apart to office with power and authority to perform the functions thereof. Neither prayer nor the imposition of hands is necessary, nor any other church rite: it may be done by the Word only, and without any ceremony. No rite should be used with the opinion that it is necessary. Imposition of hands may be retained as it was not only used by the apostles but by the presbytery, but without opinion of necessity or as a sacred significant ceremony. The power of ordination was delivered by Christ to the presbytery, *jure divino*. Later the presbytery conferred it *jure humano* to bishops. 1. "The whole church has the power of ordination communicated to her from Christ" (Matt. 18:18): Christ appointed the ordinary way in which the church may provide for herself ministers of the gospel (1 Cor. 3:21–22); and if the ministry of the church ceases or is lacking, Christians have the power to ordain when necessary. 2. "The church has, by divine institution, delivered the power of ordaining to ordinary ministers to the presbytery, whereof the church consists" by representation (325–329). 3. While in the past the honor to confer the rite and sign of ordination was conferred to one, this was not by divine institution, but only by custom. 4. Later bishops appropriated this power to themselves "as if it had been their own" by peculiar right.

Chapter Eight, Digression Two. The second digression of chapter eight concerns the convocation and moderation of ecclesiastical synods (329–332). "Touching the convocation of synods, we resolve with the Professors of Leyden, that if a prince do so much as tolerate the order and regiment of the church to be public, his consent and authority should be craved, and he may also design the time, place, and other circumstances. But much more, if he is a Christian and orthodox prince, should his consent, authority, help, protection, and safeguard be sought and granted." The "power of convocating councils pertains directly to ecclesiastical persons, and to princes only indirectly." 1. "The apostolical councils (Acts 6:2; 15:6), and so many as were assembled before the first council of Nice, were not convocated by princes, but by ecclesiastical persons without the leave of princes; therefore, in the like cases, the church ought to use the like liberty." 2. "The church is fully committed (and that directly) to the ministers whom Christ has set to rule over the same." So if the magistrate is not cooperative, the church ought to go ahead and convocate. Gillespie does affirm a right of princes to convocate church synods: (1) in ordinary cases when they are not the church's enemy, the church should seek the prince's consent to convocate. (2) "Ecclesiastical persons may convocate councils simply, and by a spiritual power and jurisdiction; but to convocate them by a temporal and coercive power, pertains to princes only." (3) "In the main and substantial respects, the convocations of councils pertains to the ministers of the church." However,

because councils have to meet within territories and have right of safe passage, and because it is expedient for the prince to be informed of the council's doings so that he may better assent to, promote and establish what the church determines within his domains: such circumstances make it expedient for the prince or his representative to be present. Regarding "the right of presidency and moderation," they are of two sorts: "moderation of ecclesiastical action and moderation of human order." The first should be done by someone elected by the council. Human order, such as ensuring a peaceful proceeding and open deliberations, belongs to the magistrate.

Chapter Eight, Digression Three. Gillespie's third digression concerns the judging of controversies and questions of faith (333–336). "There is a twofold judgment which discerns and judges of faith." God's is absolute; His authority binds to believe all that he declares in his Word. The other is limited and subordinate to that absolute judgment, and it is public or private. "That which is public is either ordinary," pertaining to the normal ministry in instructing and teaching men what to believe from God's Word, or extraordinary, when the church in council meets to determine points of faith and what is error. The private subordinate judgment is the right of discretion to examine matters in order to be clear in conscience, which Gillespie has described and defended previously. Magistrates may convocate synods as already noted in the second digression; but they may not 1. determine matters of faith on their own without a council, nor 2. "having convocated a council," "take upon them to command, rule, order, and dispose the disputes and deliberations according to their arbitrament;" 3. "nor, may they, by virtue of their regal dignity, claim any power to examine the decrees concluded in the council, otherwise than by the judgment of private discretion which is common to every Christian." The right of private discretion also is the basis whereon, in extraordinary times of corruption when councils are not possible, the magistrate may "by the power of the civil sword, repress and punish" heresies and heretics.

Chapter Eight, Digression Four. The last and longest of the four digressions of chapter eight concerns the power of the keys of discipline and ecclesiastical censures (337–358). "Ecclesiastical censures and punishments, wherewith delinquents are bound, and from which, when they turn penitents, they are loosed, are of two sorts: either such as are common, and agree unto all, as excommunication and absolution; or such as are peculiar, and agree only to men of ecclesiastical order, as suspension, deprivation, etc." Neither the civil magistrate nor his deputies have the power of the keys to excommunicate or absolve. This is proved: 1. That Christ has delivered the power of such discipline to the "whole church, that is, to every particular church collectively taken" (338). The "whole church has the power of punishing a man, by denying her communion unto him; therefore, the whole church has the

power of judging that he ought to be so punished. The whole church has the power of remitting this punishment again; therefore, the whole church has the power of judging that it ought to be remitted." 2. This is proved by 1 Corinthians 5, where it is noted the purging of leaven from their dwellings belonged to the "whole congregation of Israel" (339). 3. That the power of binding and loosing is committed by Christ, not to the universal church, but to every particular congregation, taken collectively, is proved from Matthew 18:17–18. And when Christ says to "tell the church," he means the governors thereof, as the representatives of the church. 4. "The apostle, writing to the whole church at Corinth (1 Cor. 5:4–5), will have them (being gathered together) to deliver that incestuous person to Satan; therefore, every particular church or congregation has power to excommunicate such a contumacious sinner as that incestuous person was" (340). Also, Paul would not have this done by his sole power alone, but by "the authority of the church of Corinth"—proved by five reasons. Next Gillespie shows that this power of discipline in its judicial execution pertains to the elders of every congregation, called a presbytery by the apostle, and in Scotland, a session. The "common promiscuous multitude" does not examine the case and voice a vote on such matters (345). To prove the point of judicial execution by elders only, Gillespie adds four observations: 1. That there is a twofold nature of the power of the keys: the key of doctrine, and the key of discipline. 2. If there is not a competent body of elders in a particular church, let them draw upon the eldership of neighbor churches. 3. The elders execute the discipline not in their own name, but in the name of the church over which they rule. 4. Though the church body does not judge the case, the consent of the whole congregation is necessary. "Now, from all this which has been said of the power and authority to excommunicate and absolve, it is manifest how unjustly usurping prelates do arrogate and appropriate to themselves this power, which Christ has committed to every particular church or congregation, and ordained to be executed by the ecclesiastical consistory within the same" (351). As to the responsibility of the civil magistrate in this matter: "he ought, by the private judgment of Christian discretion, to try and examine whether this discipline be rightly executed or not. If he find the execution thereof to be unreprovable, and that yet the sinner goes on in his contumacy, then, by his civil power, he ought further to punish him in his person or worldly estate, that he may either reform or repress such an one as has not been terrified by the church's censures. But if, after trial, he understand that the sentence given forth is unjust and erroneous, either through the ignorance or the malice of the ecclesiastical and regular judges, then he ought to interpose his authority, and cause a due proceeding; for, in such extraordinary cases of the failing of ecclesiastical persons, princes may do much in

things spiritual, which, ordinarily, they cannot" (353). Gillespie spends the balance of this digression on the censures and punishments of church officers (suspension and deposition). The magistrate should not allow bishops to usurp this power (355). The consent of the particular congregation must be sought in the deposition of their minister (356). Gillespie concludes by addressing the unbiblical nature of the High Commission, which mixed civil and ecclesiastical authority and punishments, removing church discipline from its legitimate court: the presbyteries of the church.

Chapter Nine. In the last chapter of part three, Gillespie shows that the disputed ceremonies cannot be warranted from the law of nature. Some of the formalists simply adduced the law of nature for holy days and for kneeling at communion. "This is a smoke to blind the eyes of the unlearned." The formalists had put forward no specific proofs for the ceremonies from the law of nature, and Gillespie shows why there can be no such proofs forthcoming.

§2–§3. In the first two sections Gillespie discusses what is meant by the law of nature from lawyers, scholastics and theologians. At creation, the law written on the heart of man was the moral law, the ten commandments. This is now quite defaced. "*Natural law, is that which nature has taught all living beings.*" While some distinguish the law of nature and the law of nations, Gillespie takes them to be the same.

§4. Gillespie agrees with those "who comprehend under the law of nature both the common principles of good and evil, virtue and vice, right and wrong, things be seeming and things not be seeming, and likewise the general conclusions which, by necessary consequences, are drawn from the said principles." There are three things which natural law requires of man: 1. That men seek to preserve their lives. 2. It requires that men propagate and conserve their species.

§5. 3. As a reasonable creature, the law of nature teaches man (1) some things about God (it teaches man to know God and to worship Him), (2) some things about his neighbor (it teaches man to seek friendship and peace with his neighbors), (3) some things about himself (general notions of good and evil; it teaches man that he should not live like a creature without reason).

§6. With the preliminaries covered, Gillespie gives four reasons that sacred significant ceremonies can neither be proved from the law of nature in the general, nor in particular instances (holy days, etc.). 1. "The law of nature cannot direct us unto a supernatural end." The disputed ceremonies, due to the supposed mystical signification in them, direct toward a supernatural end. The law of nature can teach no further than the general truth that God is to be known and worshipped.

§7. 2. "As the ceremonies, by their sacred, spiritual, and mystical significations, direct us unto a supernatural good, so they are thought to guide us unto the same by a way which

nature's light could never discover unto men. But, in the law of nature, as we are directed unto no other good than such as is proportioned to nature, so are we guided unto the same *natura duce* [with nature in the lead], that is to say, by such common notions as God has imprinted in the nature of all men." Formalists might have said in defense that the law of nature teaches man to "use certain rites in the worship of God, to observe set times of His worship, also to kneel down in reverence of God whom we worship." Grant it so, Gillespie says, but how can the formalists make the "necessary connection between certain rites and significant ceremonies of human institution; between set times, and some more days than one of seven; between kneeling in the worship of God *in genere* [in general], and kneeling at the sacrament *in specie* [in particular], unless they by that nature require us to kneel in every act of worship, and never to worship God without kneeling on our knees?"

§8. 3. Whatever is required by the law of nature must "follow upon those principles which are written in every man's conscience" (364). Thus those who would prove the disputed ceremonies from the law of nature must "take their premises from every man's conscience." Every man must be convinced within himself of these things. But it is simply not the case that conscience in general testifies to the disputed ceremonies.

§9. 4. On what precept of nature do the formalists ground their ceremonies? Order and decency perhaps: yet this ground for the ceremonies has already been removed. As a reasonable creature, man is taught by nature not to offend or harm his neighbor. But the ceremonies are "repugnant to nature, because of the detriment and offense which they offer unto us." "Now, albeit nature (as was said) teaches all men that there is an eternal and mighty God, who should be worshipped and honored by them, yet it descends not unto such particular precepts as can have any show of making aught for significant ceremonies" (365). "Concerning the worship of God, it speaks only *de genere* [of the general], not *de specie* [of the particular]. Wherefore there can be no inference from that worship which the law of nature requires, either of any distinct kind of worship or of any ceremony in that kind, no more than it follows, *Si est animal, est Asinus* [if it is an animal, then it is an ass]; for *à genere ad speciem non valet consequentia affirmando* [from the general to the specific, the consequence is not proven by assertion of the protasis]."

IV. Against the Indifference of the Ceremonies

Summary. The fourth and last part of the *Dispute* concerns whether the ceremonies in question are things indifferent in nature; things that may "either be done or left undone" (22). Gillespie explains, "If it seems to any that it is a strange method to speak now of indifference, in the end of this dispute, which ought rather to have been handled in the beginning of it, they

may consider, that the method is not ours, but our opposites'; for they have been fleeing upon Icarus' wings, and soaring so high, that their wings could not but melt from them: so have they, from necessity fallen down to expediency; from it to lawfulness, and from thence to indifference." And in the end many of Gillespie's opposites would have been quite satisfied if nonconformists "would only acknowledge the indifference of the things in themselves" (367), as that would effectively end the controversy. Chapter one explains why indifference is addressed at this point and exhibits that the formalist did indeed plead for the ceremonies' indifference. Chapter two defines the nature of indifferent things. Chapter three determines whether or not there are effectively things indifferent (*in actu exercito*; actually; in the act exercised), covering the circumstances which make an action good or bad, and the three rules governing the use of indifferent things (the rule of piety, of charity and of purity). Chapter four lays out and confirms the rule against which we are to gauge and measure indifferent things, which is "that not only we ought to obey the particular precepts of the Word of God, but that also 'we are bound to imitate Christ, and the commendable example of His apostles, in all things wherein it is not evident they had special reasons moving them thereto, which do not concern us'" (388). In the next three chapters propositions are built from this rule and defended. Based on commendable example as explained in chapter four, chapter five defends that "it is not indifferent for a minister to give the sacramental elements of bread and wine out of his own hand to every communicant" (390). Chapter six proposes and defends that "it is not indifferent to sit, stand, pass, or kneel, in the act of receiving the sacramental elements of the Lord's supper, because we are bound to follow the example of Christ and His apostles, who used the gesture of sitting..." (392). Chapter seven defends three propositions, that "it is not a thing indifferent to omit the repetition of those words, 'This is my body;'" that it is not indifferent "to omit the breaking of the bread" (402); and that it is not indifferent "for a minister, in the act of distribution, to speak in the singular number" (403). Chapter eight contends that the ceremonies cannot be indifferent for the Church of Scotland, because they rejected them by a solemn oath. Chapter nine recaps several reasons against the indifference of the ceremonies.

Some significant content of part four, again of the nature of general propositions or rules, are the rule already noted above from chapter four, and the section in chapter three covering the use of things indifferent in nature, governed by three scriptural rules.

Every thing which is indifferent in the nature of it, is not by and by indifferent in the use of it. But the use of a thing indifferent ought evermore to be either chosen or refused, followed

or forsaken, according to these three rules delivered to us in God's Word: (1) The rule of piety [1 Cor. 10:31; Rom. 14: 7–8; Col. 3:17] (2) The rule of charity [Rom. 14:21; 19; 15:2; 1 Cor. 10:23]. (3) The rule of purity [Rom. 14:5; 14: 23] (375–377).

Detailed Description of Part 4, Chapters 1–9

Chapter One. As noted, Gillespie begins part four by explaining why the alleged indifference of the disputed ceremonies is addressed at the end of his arguments instead of at the beginning. He proves that the formalists did indeed plead for their ceremonies' indifference, and chastised nonconformists for opposing such indifferent things (367–368).

Chapter Two. In chapter two our disputant explains the nature of things indifferent. Indifference is something distinct from both good and evil, and yet susceptible to either. The formalist Dr. Forbes contradicted this meaning, regarding indifference as something opposite to necessity (368–369). He defined goodness as either general or special, and special goodness as requiring the commandment of God (369). This left open the possibility of a "goodness" which is not dependent upon a command. Gillespie argues that Scripture teaches we must give account at the judgment for every word and deed, and accordingly receive reward or punishment; yet Forbes taught the "goodness" was remunerable though the action was not. Gillespie answers that while an action without circumstances of goodness is not remunerable, that does not require that the circumstances without the action is remunerable. Secondly, what Forbes called necessary is remunerable in no other way than an action he calls indifferent (370). The nature of a thing is defined by its species or kind. An action is by nature either necessary or indifferent. Hence it is either necessarily good or indifferent. Goodness might be referred to the action or its mode (371). These cannot be separated. God's commandment makes an action moral in itself and it is the mode of acting which individualises a moral action. Hence the mode of acting is as necessary as the action itself. To call an action good and remunerable is all one. Dr. Forbes' twofold goodness has no use in this question, because every morally good action is remunerable whether it is necessary or not (372). If it is agreeable to right reason the action is morally good. If an indifferent action is agreeable to right reason it is morally good and remunerable. Concerning Forbes' idea about the nature of things indifferent, Gillespie notes that moral things are not opposed like physical things since it is impossible for one moral good to be opposed to another. Secondly, theologians are agreed that indifference means neither good nor evil, so the doctor is departing from the standard tenet (373). Thirdly, he disagrees even with himself because elsewhere Forbes quoted the traditional definition with approval.

Chapter Three. In this chapter Gillespie takes up the question of the indifference of an act exercised (*in actu exercito*).

Our author first proposes several considerations for clarification, before addressing the actual question. 1. Our author notes that circumstances, as well as the object and end of an action, are necessary to measure the goodness or badness of it (373–374), and he lists the well known seven principle circumstances, "who, what, where, by what means, why, how, and when" (374). 2. An action is individuated by its circumstances (374–375). 3. Human actions proceed from the deliberation of reason or from bare imagination only (375). 4. Morally good actions agree to right reason, morally evil actions disagree with right reason, and indifferent actions include nothing belonging to the order of reason. 5. Indifferent individual actions are either absolute or comparative.

6. Gillespie's sixth consideration as noted in the summary, is one of the most important sections of part four. He notes that indifference in nature does not mean indifference in use. God's Word requires the rules of piety, charity, and purity. From 1 Corinthians 10:31 and Romans 14: 7–8, Gillespie argues that the rule of piety requires every action to be done to God's glory and ordered by His will (375–376). From Romans 14:21; 15:2 and 1 Corinthians 10:23, he contends that the rule of charity requires the disuse of anything which gives rise to scandal (376–377). From Romans 14:14, our disputant notes that the rule of purity requires us to regard our own peace and quiet of conscience, so that conscience must not be contradicted when it condemns an indifferent thing as unlawful (377). Gillespie concludes then, that where these three rules are followed, an indifferent thing may be used as expedient.

Our own will, without the reason of these rules, is no warrant for using a thing indifferent. Contrary to Dr. Forbes, expedience is not arbitrary and Gillespie cites another formalist, Dr. Davenant, to correct him. The church, likewise, must follow these rules, and not follow her own pleasure (378). Dr. Forbes attempted to subject the given rules to the church's authority; but these are God's rules and men are to be subordinate to them, including the church. Our nonconformist notes from Acts 15, that the church only has power for that which is edifying (378–379). Practice may not be ruled by any law of men except it is according to the rules of the Word (379).

With these considerations noted, Gillespie turns to address the question proposed, whether there is actually anything indifferent in practice (*in exercise, in actu exercito*). He maintains that things proceeding from imagination are liable to reproof according to their circumstances (379–380). Secondly, those things which proceed from deliberation derive their quality from reason, so that the reason determines the kind of action and whether it is good or evil (380). Once individuated the action cannot be indifferent (380–381).

Though Dr. Forbes acknowledged these things, he still insisted that some actions are indifferent as to their individuation merely because they are neither commanded nor

forbidden (381). The example given is that of a widow choosing to marry. But 1. He failed to individuate the action according to its circumstances. As Paræus showed, if an action does not edify, it destroys (381–382). It is either for profit or vanity, which means the effect renders the action good or evil (382). The widow choosing to marry would not be indifferent. 2. Actions are indifferent comparatively, but positively they are good or evil. The act of marrying is either according to the rules of the Word or it is not (382–383). 3. Things indifferent in their own nature may be used or not used, but the use of them is not indifferent because it must be according to God's Word (383). The Apostle teaches the Corinthians that indifference is not ground enough for the use of a thing. It is expedient or unlawful in respect of the circumstances and according as the rules of piety, charity, and purity are observed or not observed. The widow's marrying must be examined accordingly (383–384).

The rules of the Word limit so strictly that nothing can be used arbitrarily (384). Actions must be done in faith, so they must be approved by God's Word and proven by the mind of the doer. Forbes contended it was enough that the doer regarded the action as lawful, though indifferent (384–385). Gillespie answers, 1. It has been proven that expediency must also persuade the doer. 2. Indifferent things must be examined positively, as already shown. 3. Doing a thing in faith infers it is profitable, which takes away indifference and the freedom to leave it undone. 4. Indifference cannot be equated to non-necessity, because deliberation takes into account whether the thing is profitable and expedient. When Paul circumcised Timothy, once it was shown that it was profitable for the people of Lystra, it would have been wrong not to do it (385–386). Conversely, if it is profitable to abstain from an action, it becomes unlawful to do it, as with eating of blood in Acts 15 (386). Expediency is binding; for example, giving liberally (2 Cor. 8:8, 10). There is an obligation to glorify God by good works when there is an ability and opportunity to do so.

In the concluding section, Gillespie points out that in the case of God's worship, where liberty is especially limited, the rules of the Word tie so strictly that actions are never left to be done or omitted at pleasure, and ends the chapter by noting that it is a wonder that Dr. Forbes argued for indifference at all, when he had urged not only profitability but necessity for the popish ceremonies (386–387).

Chapter Four. Our disputant next takes up the rule by which indifferent things are measured and tried (387). He notes that God's Word is the only rule to judge the indifference of things. This was accepted by his opponents also. He notes further that not only precepts, but examples are also used to judge the morality of things (387–388). Gillespie further proposes the rule that we are bound to imitate Christ and the commendable example of His apostles where there is no special reason for

their actions (388). He adduces the example of Cyprian who applied this rule to the sacrament of the Lord's supper, and brings in Bishop Lindsay objecting, that this would bind the church to give thanks for each element (388–389). Gillespie answers (389), 1. The blessing and distribution of elements can be construed to follow Christ's example. 2. Though it were not followed, there were two suppers which moved Christ to bless the elements severally, in order to distinguish the Lord's supper from the ordinary meal; and it impressed the solemnity on the minds of the apostles. Gillespie then examines Lindsay's own rule, that there is nothing exemplary but what is moral, replying that this is a false rule which would leave no warrant for numerous other practices which are universally followed (389–390). That rule also argues against Lindsay's fellow formalists who defend the custom of the church as exemplary. Finally, Gillespie notes that Christ's actions are either to be loved, as works of redemption; admired, as miracles; noted, as done for a particular reason; or imitated, if there is no special reason which excludes us from following them (390). It is inexcusable presumption to leave Christ's example to do what seems right to us, as if we were wiser than He.

Chapter Five. In this and the next two chapters, Gillespie further applies the rule proposed previously of following Christ's example. 1. He maintains from this rule that it is not indifferent for the minister to give the elements out of his own hand to every communicant. Christ called for them to be distributed among the receivers (390–391). 2. While Lindsay maintained that the elements are distributed when the minister gives it; Gillespie points out that dividing a cup and drinking a cup are two different things (391). This is clear from the man who asked the Lord to tell his brother to divide the inheritance with him, who did not ask the Lord to divide it.

Chapter Six. Gillespie proposes and proves a second position based upon Christ's example (392), that posture in receiving the elements of the Lord's supper is not indifferent because of the binding example of Christ and His apostles. The formalists objected to this with three arguments.

Argument 1. Formalists maintained that it is uncertain they were sitting, as there were five acts between the Passover and the Supper. Gillespie replies, 1. They were sitting at the instant they took bread (392–393). The actions between are reducible to three, and the text knits all three together so as to make one continued action without interruption (393). 2. That it was an uninterrupted action is shown by an illustration and supported by quotations from Protestant and Papist authorities (393–394). 3. Paybody questioned whether they were sitting because it is recorded elsewhere that the bread was taken "after they had done eating" (394). Gillespie points out that this argument denies what the previous argument had already granted (394–395). Our author makes a digression on two opinions on the suppers, either of which destroy the objection (395).

4. The first opinion is that the Passover was kept, followed by an ordinary supper, with the notice of the betrayal. The reasons he gives for this view are: [1] The Passover was eaten by groups of twenty, which could not have been fed by the lamb; thus an ordinary meal followed (395–396). [2] The Passover lamb was for religious thanksgiving, not for filling the belly (396). [3] No broth was ordained in the Passover, yet it was eaten that night. [4] John 13 shows two suppers, one before and one after the washing of the disciples' feet; and there was no warrant for dividing the Passover into two. 5. The second opinion is that the second course was part of the Passover, as the Jewish writers show; the sop and the two suppers being a part of Jewish custom (396–397). 6. The two opinions could be reconciled by accepting the second supper was common, but held the same night as the Passover, and added to the Passover meal (397). In either view there is no intervening action between this supper and the taking of the cup, but the taking, blessing, breaking, distributing, and eating of the bread (397–398). Hence there is no basis for denying they ate while they were still sitting (398).

Argument 2. The formalists argued that the Western form of sitting is different from the form of the Jews. Our disputant answers, 1. Even if so, they kept the table-gesture of their nation, which binds us to keep the table-gesture of our nation. 2. However, the argument is false, because the words used indicate sitting upright as well as lying. 3. The Jewish custom was to sit leaning upon the left arm, which is not very different from sitting upright (399). Further, Gillespie rejects Lindsay's assertion from Amos 6:4, that they stretched along the table, by noting: [1] The text upbraids drunkards and gluttons; it does not indicate ordinary table-gesture. [2] This text only indicates the gesture of lying down to sleep, not to eat at table. [3] Opening the words, it is clear that luxury is intended by the Hebrew term translated "stretching" (399–400). The point is that they indulged in excessive pleasure; there is no intention to refer to the ordinary gesture used at a table (400). [4] The apostles could not have been lying down without spilling the drink. [5] The word for "sitting" is used in John 6:11 for sitting on the grass to eat the loaves and fishes (400–401). [6] Others such as Jansen, Martyr, Paræus, Meisner, and Stella, explain it as "sitting" (401). [7] Their own writers explain it this way.

Argument 3. The formalists argued that Christ's sitting is no more exemplary than other circumstances. Gillespie answers that there are special reasons in the other circumstances, whereas the gesture of sitting was purposefully chosen to be exemplary, and there is no other reason for it. The choice shows it is most fitting for the holy banquet (401–402). Hooker acknowledged that by kneeling he and his fellow formalists departed from the example of Christ (402).

Chapter Seven. Continuing with the rule proposed in chapter four, Gillespie defends three more positions derived from

Christ's example. The third position is, "This is my body" should be announced in distribution of the bread, not replaced by a prayer. 2. The fourth position is, the minister must not omit to break the bread (402–403). 3. The fifth position is, the minister should not speak in the plural, but in the singular, "take thou, eat thou, drink thou" (403). 4. Gillespie then challenges his opponents, not for omitting these actions and words, but for failing to do them as Christ did. 5. The formalists would have the bread consecrated in a manner different to the way it was consecrated by Christ. The bread was blessed before He broke it. "This is my body" did not consecrate the bread (403–404). 6. "This is my body" is still required (404). [1] The formalists used the Word alone whereas Word and prayer is necessary. [2] The minister must declare Christ's whole institution, including taking the bread, giving thanks, breaking it, etc. (404–405). [3] Though the element is sanctified by prayer, declaring the appointment of bread and wine is essential to the rites of the sacrament (405). [4] Consecration should not be made to depend on a set form of words when Christ has not prescribed them.

Chapter Eight. In this chapter Gillespie shows from history that by an oath the Church of Scotland solemnly repudiated the English popish ceremonies. 1. The Church of Scotland rejected the controverted ceremonies upon oath, in the Confession of Faith (1580, 1596), with the authority of the king; therefore they are not indifferent to that Church (405–406). 2. No reformed church in Europe was bound by such an oath as the Church of Scotland was, and all the conditions of a binding oath are applicable in this case (406). It was as binding to posterity as was the oath made by the princes of Israel to the Gibeonites in 2 Samuel 21 (406–407). 3. The formalists attempted to derogate this binding power (407). Dr. Forbes alleged that the covenant made with the Gibeonites was against the commandment of God. Our disputant argues that even if this were true, God patronised it. Further, how much more is the Church of Scotland bound when its oath was consonant to the Word of God (407–408). 4. Rather, the covenant with the Gibeonites was agreeable to God's express commandment, as the command to destroy the cities of Canaan only included those who would make war on Israel, which excluded the Gibeonites (408). Gillespie adduces Junius who noted from Deuteronomy 20, that there were two laws of war. In general, peace was to be offered to all cities, which was done when Israel put the Canaanites to tribute; and it is noted that the cities taken in battle did not make peace with Israel, Joshua 11:19–20 (408–409). The second law of war prescribed how Israel should deal with those who did not make peace; and this distinguished between cities afar off and the cities of the Canaanites, whereas the first law was common to all (409).

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The author of the Psalm is called “Ethan, the Ezrahite.” There are many faithful men who identify this Ethan with one of the original chief musicians, Jeduthun. Joseph Addison Alexander states,

Maschil. By *Ethan the Ezrahite*. From the fact that Ethan and Jeduthun are both named with Asaph and Heman, but never named together, it has been inferred that they are two names of the same person, or rather that *Ethan* is the personal name, and *Jeduthun* (derived from a verb which means to *praise*) the official title. Heman and Ethan are both described as Ezrahites, *i.e.* adopted sons of Zerah, 1 Chron. 2:5, but by birth were no doubt both *Sons of Korah*, 1 Chron. 6:18, 22 (33, 37). To the lamentations and complaints of Heman in the first part of this double psalm (Ps. 88) is now added an appeal to the divine promise by Ethan in the psalm before us.⁸

This affixes the time of writing early in the monarchy, and the lamentable events described correspond perhaps to the division of the monarchy under Rehoboam, or to some other affliction that befell the nation early in his reign.⁹ The Psalm is titled a *Maschil*, meaning a didactic or instructive Psalm, and the truths contained in it are accepted by all as timeless, for all ages of the Church. Covenant promises, encouragement in times of affliction according to the faithfulness of Yahveh, hope in Christ and His work, joy and jubilation to hear the trumpet-sound of mustering for worship, praying in times of deprivation and loss, and looking with confident hope in Christ for a glorious resolution of all things are those eternal things, holy instructions, by which the people of God in all ages have offered their praise to God.

As for our portion, it is a song of praise to the Lord for His Messiah, and for the care and exaltation that Messiah procures for the people of God, who know the jubilant sound. Messiah is also given the rank of “Firstborn” and in Him a seed is blessed as well, because of His faithfulness, and because of the Covenant Mercy, the *chesed*, promised to Him. God’s own revelation, by His “holy ones” to His people is set forth as the hope of God’s own, the seed of Messiah. Finally, in the repeated blessing of the Father upon His Son, we are reminded that all our hope is in Christ, for all the blessings of God are poured out upon Him who is the Anointed, the Firstborn, and who enjoys the benevolent hand, arm, and favor of His Father. We look away from ourselves, and to Christ as our only

8. J. A. Alexander, 369. See also C. F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, *Commentary on the Old Testament*, vol. 5 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1995) 583–584.

9. Keil and Delitzsch, 584.

hope in this inspired praise. We hope you are instructed and encouraged in Christ as you take this Psalm upon your lips.

Todd L. RUDELL ■

Antiquary. Continued from Page 275.

5. Joseph Hall supposed the deceit of the Gibeonites freed Joshua from the oath (409), but Gillespie answers that the violation of the oath was afterwards punished (2 Sam. 21). There was no caveat qualifying the oath. A substantial error releases from the bond of an oath, but not a circumstantial error (409–410).

6. The Bishop of Edinburgh alleged from the Scots Confession of Faith that an order in ceremonies cannot be appointed for all, therefore the oath does not bind in relation to ceremonies (410). Gillespie answers that the article only speaks of alterable circumstances: Those devised by men, and those that foster superstition rather than edification. Neither are true of sitting to receive the Lord’s supper.

7. The Bishop argued that the oath did not bind to maintain alterable things, but only what is unchangeable and commanded in the Word (410–411). Gillespie replies: [1] This contradicts the former argument (411). [2] The discipline prior to the Articles of Perth was well grounded on the Word and therefore unalterable. [3] It is unlawful to be bound by oath to future ordinances because an oath requires judgment of the matter (Jer. 4:2). One should not swear to what he cannot examine. [4] The oath does not oblige to what shall be ordained afterwards, because: {1} It relates to what was used in the church at the time of the oath. The promise is not of things future but of things present when the assertory part of the oath was made (411–412). {2} As the doctrine refers to what was openly professed, there is no reason to think the discipline was otherwise (412). {3} The word “continuing” in the oath requires obedience to something already begun. {4} The schoolmen and the canon law confirm that an oath does not oblige to future ordinances.

8. Lindsay also argued that the contended points of discipline were not contained in the matter of the oath. Gillespie counters that, [1] In the matter of an oath the safest course is to be taken, and it is not certain that these points are omitted (412–413). [2] “Discipline” is to be taken in its widest extent for the whole policy of the church. This is clear from the two Books of Discipline; the oath comprises all church requirements under the heads of doctrine or discipline (413).


9. Bishop Lindsay made three further objections. [1] That the doctrine and discipline is limited to that revealed by the Gospel. [2] It is limited to what is received by many notable churches. [3.] It is particularly expressed in the Confession of Faith. To all these Gillespie replies that the formalist misapplied the words of the oath, for it does not mention discipline

in this context (414). It only refers to that which brings salvation to man.

Chapter Nine. In the final chapter of the *Dispute*, Gillespie recaps other previous arguments against the indifference of the English popish ceremonies. 1. In the carrying out of the act they cannot be indifferent; for it must have all the circumstances which make it good, or not have them, which makes it evil (414–415). 2. The guides of God’s church may only prescribe what is good and profitable for edifying, yet the ceremonies are prescribed as indifferent (415). The magistrate’s power is likewise for good. Hence the good of the ceremonies must be enjoined before they can be lawfully enjoined. 3. They cannot be indifferent if the will and authority of men compels the use of them (415–416). 4. The Papiſts take advantage of them to confirm their errors and superstitions (416). 5. In the case of scandal indifferent things become evil (416–417).

6. Indifferent things must be expedient to be done in order to be lawful, 1 Corinthians 6:12 (417). 7. The ceremonies have been abused to idolatry; therefore they are not indifferent, but must be abolished (417–418). 8. They depart too far from the example of Christ and His apostles, and are removed from Christian-like and soul-edifying simplicity (418). 9. There should be a great distance between the church of God and the synagogue of Satan; but the ceremonies make the church appear like the Papiſts (418–419). 10. The ceremonies are superstitious, because holiness and worship are placed in them (419). 11. They are not for mere order when they are intended to teach men the mysteries and duties of piety. 12. The Church of Scotland had been purged of them and enjoyed the bright shining goſpel of Christ without shadows and figures; therefore there is no indifference in turning back to them.

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