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- ART. I.—1. *The History of the Puritans, or Protestant Nonconformists; from the Reformation in 1517, to the Revolution in 1698; comprising an account of their principles; their attempts for a further Reformation in the church; their sufferings; and the Lives and Characters of their most considerable Divines.* By Daniel Neal, M. A., reprinted from the text of Dr. Toulmin's edition: with his life of the author and account of his writings. Revised, corrected, and enlarged, with additional notes by John O. Choules, M. A. With nine portraits on steel. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 534 & pp. 564. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1843.
2. *The Prose Works of John Milton; with an Introductory Review.* By Robert Fletcher. London: William Ball. 1838. One Vol. 8vo. pp. 963.

NONE who watch closely the current of popular opinion, can have failed to remark that the sneer so long conveyed in the popular phrase, "the Reign of the Saints," has already become nearly pointless, and, if they be of like sympathies with ourselves, to have anticipated the time when, like the similar inscription on the cross, it shall come everywhere to stand for a simple expression of

own doctrine makes the atonement a mere symbolical method of instruction, and reduces the whole work of Christ in this matter, to making pardon possible. This again is a doctrine, which we see not how any man can practically believe, and be a Christian. The book in itself is of little consequence. But from its gross and yet confident misrepresentation of the truth, it has more of the power due to falsehood, than any book of the kind we know. That Dr. Cox, in his Introduction, should applaud such a book, neither surprises nor pains us. We are well aware that he knows no better. We say this with no feeling of disrespect. God gives his gifts, to every one severally as he will. To Dr. Cox, he has given many amiable, and some shining ones, but it is notorious that neither Σοφία nor Γνωσις, is of the number. As to the author of the book himself, we have no disposition to sit in judgment on his motives. He has most grievously misrepresented the truth, whether ignorantly or otherwise, it is not for us to say.

ART. VI.—*Anastasis ; or the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, Rationally and Scripturally considered.* By George Bush, Professor of Hebrew in the New York City University. New York and London. Wiley and Putnam. 1845. pp. 396.

WHILE we regard the doctrine of the resurrection as a vital article of religious faith, we are happy in believing that its vitality does not reside in any physical theory of the resurrection itself. With a very indistinct idea, or no idea at all, of the nature of the process, we may believe the revealed *doctrine* of the resurrection with all assurance, and secure, in full, its practical effects. We may believe that men live in another world, though we know not how they live. We may even believe the doctrine as firmly without a knowledge of the physical nature of the fact, as with it. Such is our actual experience. With no certain knowledge of the physical conditions of the life to come, men hold as firm a conviction of the doctrine of their future existence, as of the existence of God, or of their own spiritual nature. The revelation of the doctrine, therefore, gains its end. It gives us the impression that *we* personally, with the clear

consciousness of identity, and the indelible conviction of an unbroken continuance of being, are to live forever.

It is this abiding faith of immortality which sustains our lively interest in all that can be known of the physical conditions of our future life. With an unwavering belief that we shall be hereafter, we desire to have it appear "*what* we shall be." And hence, few inquiries, so hopeless of conclusive answers, are pursued with more assiduity, than those relating to the time and manner of the resurrection of the dead. Nor are we jealous of such inquiries, as tending, of necessity, towards a corruption of faith, or savouring of unwarrantable meddling with things unrevealed. We rather view them as perfectly legitimate; conducive to wholesome mental activity, favourable to salutary impressions from the deep and inscrutable mysteries of the universe, and fruitful, often, of the incidental confirmations of faith in doctrines already received and understood.

If the volume of Professor Bush gives us little hope of advantage to the moral influence of the doctrine of the resurrection, it gives us less fear of any extensive and injurious disturbance of the popular faith on that subject. His call on public attention, manly and emphatic as it is, and sufficiently formal, is producing its effect. But we should not be surprised if many of his more intelligent readers should lay down the book with some disappointment of the expectations with which they took it up. As sincere friends of the author, and admirers of his talents and learning, we are glad that his reputation and usefulness as a writer, a reasoner, and an expounder of the Holy Scriptures, do not depend on this book; and that it is not by this production that the Christian public are to graduate their expectations of valuable service from his pen. His erudition and industry need no commendation; but if there has been heretofore any distrust of his opinions, and of the manner and results of some of his exegetical inquiries, it will, we apprehend, find no relief in this performance.

While we presume that the argument of Professor Bush will change the views of very few believers in the scriptural doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, we take the very fair occasion afforded us by the appearance of his book, to state the principles on which that and all similar arguments on this subject have been and are still liable to be resisted.

Whether his preliminary vindication a priori, on the broad principle that "the knowledge of revelation is progressive,"

will prepare his way to popular favour, must be determined by a very obvious law of human nature. In regard to both the volumes by which God instructs mankind, the Professor entertains (p. 14) the irresistible conviction that the same great law "of gradual developement" prevails. "Natural science has achieved its triumphs by slow and toilsome steps. The arcana of creation have hitherto been laid open fact by fact, and principle by principle. Ages elapsed before even the true *method* of prosecuting physical inquiries was fixed by the genius of the immortal author of the *Organon*. And at the present day, Geology, for instance, is but just beginning to unwrap the bandages which have swathed, for countless centuries, the mummy globe which we inhabit. And so in every other field of the naturalist's investigations the process of discovery has been alike tardy and gradational. Who can question that the most advanced outposts of the territory conquered by the science of this generation will have dwindled and become scarcely perceptible to the retroverted eye of the philosopher of 1944?"

Again, on page 17: "Our knowledge of the contents of revelation is destined to be *progressive*; and in support of this position we certainly have the advantage of the argument drawn from the general analogy of Nature and of Providence. Throughout the whole range of creation we recognise the perpetual presence and operation of this great law. The principle of progressive advance from the imperfect to the finished,—from the rude to the refined,—from the infantile to the mature,—from primordial elements to elaborate formations,—from tender germs to ripened fruits,—from initial workings to ultimate consummations, is every where apparent; and why should it not hold here also? If progress is heaven's law in every other sphere of observation, the *presumption* certainly is, that there is no exception here; and we are at liberty to affirm the fact, unless some adequate reason can be previously assigned for questioning or denying it."

Now this sort of argument for the progressive development of the truth of revelation, will suggest to the reflecting reader the possibility of pushing presumptions from analogy too far. We may reason by analogy from facts to a presumption. But to make that presumption the analogical ground of another is to build upon sand. The analogy of the inhabited earth is ground of fair presumption that the other planets of the solar system are inhabited. But with

what force could we hence presume that the geography of this globe will agree with all the other globes of the system? It may be a fair presumption from analogy that the knowledge of religious truth is progressive, while the presumptive probability that the conditions of its progress will provide for the validity of the particular argument of Professor Bush, may be indefinitely feeble. Conceding the doctrine of progress, in any sense in which a man of our author's intelligence can hold it, an opponent will still demand to know whether he must look for indefinite progress in the knowledge of an ancient tongue, the usages of which are matters of history. Are the terms of language such surds that the ideas they express are to be sought only by an endless approximation?

The knowledge of religious truth in individual minds is indeed progressive; and this is the progress which the Professor's analogy of advance from the infantile to the mature, from the gerin to the ripened fruit, &c. fairly suggests. Doubtless, also, in ages and countries of superior intellectual culture, individuals have clearer and more intelligent views of religious doctrine, are able to discern more of the relations of divine truth, and to set it forth in more ample and brilliant illustration. But it is not so certain that the line of advancement in biblical knowledge is continuous through successive generations. That we know more than the ancients about the meaning of the Bible is more easily asserted than proved. The modern critic derives no doubtful advantage in public estimation from being able to fortify his opinions by antiquity; and Professor Bush himself appears to value his doctrine none the less for its age, or its agreement with the views of Locke and Swedenborg and Manasseh Ben Israel. Few interpretations of obscure passages of scripture are given which have not the authority of some early writers for their support; a fact which might somewhat diminish our expectations of any great discoveries in the department of biblical exegesis. That there will be a general and continuous progress in mental culture, we rejoice to believe. But that this advancement is to effect important changes in the understanding of the scriptures, it will suffice to believe when the changes themselves shall take place. Advancing science will doubtless multiply illustrations of religious doctrine, and assist the reason of man in discerning the laws by which some spiritual operations are conducted; it may increase the use of analogy in

religious instruction, and enlarge and enliven our views of the uniformity of the works of God; but the supposition that the language of revelation is to undergo continuous modifications of its apparent meaning has no literary analogy for its support.

The science of *Hermeneutics*, quoted as a proof of "signal advances made, in latter times, in the principles of biblical interpretation," and represented as "rapidly elevating itself to a high place in the circle of positive sciences," is doubtless worthy the high place to which it aspires. But what is that science, what can it be, more than a formal and systematic statement of the principles, which have, from early time, been applied by common sense in the interpretation of the scriptures? Does this science present discoveries? Its discoveries must relate to principles, not before recognised, perhaps, in form and under specific names, yet doing their silent work in every sound mind, by teaching one man how to ascertain the sentiments of another through the medium of language? Is this science destined to an endless progression? Are the principles on which we are now interpreting the word of God to be lost in the brilliancy of rules, yet in the progress of science to be revealed; and are they to "dwindle and become scarcely perceptible to the retroverted eye" of the future interpreter?

It is probable, as our author implies, that the present age is slow to receive new doctrine, or even new theory relating to old doctrine. But whether or not it is more so than any other age, the fact of its being so at all is evidently the result of some useful property of human nature, which acts with greatest effect in the most pressing exigencies for its useful offices. When we hear it said that the present age is peculiarly "slow of heart" to believe new doctrine, we look back through the years of our remembrance to see what wind of doctrine has been entirely withstood, and what sleight of men and cunning craftiness whereby they lie in wait to deceive, has not taken its full proportion of captives. It probably does not occur to all the readers of the various productions of our author that stability of opinion is an unusual characteristic of this generation; nor would it be found a hindrance to the real progress and final triumph of truth, if some should suffer their theories to lag a little behind the age until the zeal of discovery shall prove to them that its trans-ultima Thule is indeed terra firma. It will prove little to the damage or discredit of our theologi-

cal opinions, that they should be numbered awhile amongst the dingy structures of antiquity, till the modern erections shall put off the glare of novelty, and reveal their superior conformity to the absolute and unchangeable beauty.

As "*positive proof*" that "heaven's law" of progress shall hold in the interpretation of the scriptures, Professor Bush adduces the two facts that many obscurities now exist in the Bible, and that the languages of the Bible are to us foreign and dead. The *probability* that these obscurities will not always "remain to cloud the lustre of the word of God," is a part of his *positive proof* of the progressive developement of scriptural truth. The four pages, however, in which our respected author serves up this fallacy in luxuriant style to the reason of his readers, we notice merely as one among "some errors in reasoning" for which he bespeaks indulgence in his preface.

As to the fact that the languages of the Bible are to us foreign and dead, it suggests indeed the probability of an improved understanding of the scriptures by the increase of oriental learning. Yet the modern student cannot forget that these stores of oriental learning, now so rare and valuable and rapidly accumulating, were the familiar possessions of the ancients; and that those very forms and usages of life, now so precious for the light they shed upon the sacred record, gave all their light to minds as capable of discerning and appreciating truth as any of the present day. There were minds who loved the truth, and had the promised special aid in learning it; and although the early expositors wrote less than the moderns, and published fewer opinions, yet their writings sufficiently show that many views of the meaning of scripture now taken by the most learned of our critics, received due attention from them, and were retained or dismissed according to their apparent value. Now if, to the most serious and candid readers of this class, the scriptures shall be found to have conveyed the impression that the bodies of the dead will be raised to life, similar readers in any age of the world may be expected to receive the like impression; and such will continue to be the faith of such readers, until the article shall be shown to be absurd. When that absurdity shall be actually shown, we doubt not that the laws of belief which have produced the existing faith, will allow, with all desirable promptness, the old opinion to give place to the new. It seems reasonable and cheering to anticipate such improvement in sacred learning as will

enable us to recover what has been lost to us by the death of the languages of the Bible ; but reason will hardly presume that this improvement can result in more than a conformity of our exposition to that of the learned and pious interpreters to whom the languages and the customs of the scripture times were more familiar. Few hold the presumption that no new knowledge is to be expected ; yet it seems quite improbable that the general theory of progress, in its discernible bearings on the scriptural doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, will go far to conciliate intelligent and reflecting minds to the reasonings and exegesis of our author.

On the principle that knowledge of the doctrines of revelation is to be progressive, Professor Bush proceeds in his attempt to show that the present advanced state of knowledge enables us to see that the resurrection of the body is not taught in the Bible. It is the first step of his course to "state the inevitable deductions of reason" with which men will "compare the averments" of scripture, and by which they will determine beforehand what God might be expected to teach on the subject of the resurrection. He expects that the discoveries of science, which "have enabled us to put a more correct interpretation upon many points of scripture," "will give us a clew to conduct us somewhat nearer the truth on the great theme" before us. As the formation of the caterpillar might suggest to the naturalist a probable transformation into something like a butterfly, so "a more intimate knowledge of the interior elements and functions of our physical and psychical constitution may finally enable us to educe the permanent laws of our future being, and bring us to a true 'Physical Theory of another Life.'"

His argument from reason respecting the doctrine of the resurrection takes its departure from the trodden path of common thought, at the point where reason loses sight of the elemental particles of the body that died. It is impossible to follow the mortal body through any *natural* transformation into the body immortal. "The common view of the resurrection labours fatally on the score of a conceivable connexion between the present and the future body." "The original, putrefied, decomposed and dissipated body" presents to the eye of reason no elements out of which the "sublimated, glorious, incorruptible fabric" may, even by the power of God, be built. "The *letter* of the inspired record announces a fact apparently at variance with other facts which carry with them an authority no less imperative

to our rational understanding. How can a body come out of the grave that is not there?" Millions of human bodies have been burned; millions have been buried in the sea; millions have been devoured by ravenous birds and beasts; and all have been decomposed and distributed into countless animal and vegetable formations; and how are these bodies to be restored? In Paul's illustration from the seed and the plant springing therefrom, there is the manifest preservation of life in the vital germ. If that germ dies there is no production of life to be expected from it. In the case of insect transformations there is a discernible connexion between the primitive and the ultimate organism. If the caterpillar dies and is dissolved, we lose sight of a vital connection between it and any other organization whatever. And since the body of man does thus die, and the elements pass into other combinations, the conclusion is that the prevailing notion of the resurrection of the same body is irrational, and that such a doctrine cannot be taught in the scriptures.

As the scriptures do, however, suggest the resurrection of something that may be called the same with that which lived before, it becomes desirable for the author to adopt the distinction between personal and bodily identity. The body is not the same at different times, yet the consciousness of *personal* identity remains unimpaired. He quotes Newnham's assertion that "the consciousness of personal identity does not depend on the body but on the mind; that it has nothing to do with the material particles, but rests on the immaterial spirit, and upon the sense of its continued existence." The inference is that a spiritual body not containing any of the elements of the material organization and inseparable from the vital principle in the man, may, without violence to the known conditions of the consciousness of personal identity, constitute the body of the future life. "If we could find in the human being, some thing that continues to live in spite of the constant process of decay and dissolution, something of which we could predicate an immovable identity in the midst of perpetual transition, should we not feel that we had obtained a clew to the true resurrection body?" "The resurrection body is a part of our present being to which the essential life of the man pertains." "It is called a body for the want of a more fitting term by which to express it." "There is no greater error (p. 72) than to suppose that at death the soul goes forth from the body as a *bare power of thought*,—bodi-

less and formless *mens.*” “While our reason assures us that the power of thought does not pertain to the gross physical fabric which remains when the inhabiting spirit has taken its flight, we are still unable to resist the impression that it does inhere in something which goes forth at the same time with the vital principle; and that something we believe to be the ψυχή, the seat and substance of *nervous sensibility.*” “We lack evidence (p. 77) that the *vital* principle adheres to any ethereal relics of the inhumed body, as this unquestionably pertains to that part of our nature which we term the *soul*, and which we deem capable of assuming a spiritual corporeity without reference to the body which it forsakes at death.” “It would seem, then, on the whole, (p. 78) from a collation of all the grounds on which an opinion can be formed, that the judgment of reason would be, that *a spiritual body is developed at death.* By *spiritual* in this connexion we mean refined, subtle, ethereal, sublimated. By the developement of a spiritual body we mean the disengagement, the extrication of that physical part of our nature with which the vital and animal functions are in the present life intimately connected; and which differs from the pure spirit, the intellectual principle, as the Greek ψυχή or *sensitive principle* differs from the νοῦς the *self-conscious intelligence.*” “As this view completely disembarasses the subject of difficulties which are insurmountable on any other, we must hold its claims on our credence to be imperative.”

We cannot doubt that most unbiassed readers will feel a strong repugnance against this parade of “the inevitable deductions of reason,” on the very account of their dictatorial bearing upon the interpretation of the holy scriptures. The very attitude of this “argument from reason” awakens jealousy. The argument seems boldly to assume the prerogative of deciding what is and what is not truth, on a subject which no man can understand except by revelation from God. The axiom with which the argument begins, no reader will dispute. We may safely assume that revelation will not contradict reason. But what has that to do with a question about which reason knows nothing, and which revelation alone must decide? Reason is liable on such a question, to assume the most preposterous and perilous position. John Wesley repudiated the doctrine of predestination, not because he found it to be contradicted in the scriptures, but because it disagreed with his precon-

ceptions of human freedom, and of the justice of God. Then every passage of scripture which savoured of divine decrees must be wrested into conformity to the "inevitable deductions" of his reason. Socinus formed a rational theory of the unity of God; and whenever he met in the scriptures, an explicit or implied suggestion of a divine Trinity, or of the Deity of Christ, he did not hesitate "to compare the averments of revelation with what he knew of its author from other sources;" a process which finds great favour with an exceedingly rational portion of each generation of biblical interpreters. The Pelagian theory of sin and of regeneration suffers no lack of scientific defenders, whose philosophy, being to them unquestionably the "true philosophy, can never be in conflict with true faith." And even Baron Swedenborg, whose reveries in theology were the natural flesh upon the bones of his psychological system, perceived no discord between the voice of his inward oracle, and the accommodating tenor of the word of God. Few if any are the heresies which have not originated in the pretence of throwing the light of rational deductions upon the pages of scripture.

Still Professor Bush is right in his assertion that "all truth must of necessity be eternally consistent with itself. No man is required to hold views of revelation to which a sound and enlightened science or philosophy can solidly object." In admitting this, however, we cannot forget the infirmity of reason in its present state, especially when handling the things of God. What if ancient science, in its difficulty with the scriptural prediction of the final conflagration, had accommodated the prediction to its want of a chemical theory, on which the literal event might be explained? Even the present discoveries of science may be only incipient; and if we propose to give a scientific version of the Bible, let us wait till our science gets its growth, and we can feel assured that what now seems truth to us will not turn out to be falsehood. The discoveries of science and the deductions of reason may now present apparent inconsistencies with scripture which future discoveries and deductions will completely remove. It may be premature, for instance, to assert that the mortal bodies of men are *not* subject to a natural law of resurrection inherent in their elements, and destined under the hand of Omnipotence, to regulate their re-formation. Let him deny who knows.

As we enter on the more particular examination of "the

argument from reason," we will venture to remark that in relation to the prevalent theory of the resurrection, our author assumes a position unnecessarily belligerent. A great part of his conflict seems to us to be with a man of straw. The views of the mass of Christian people on this subject are unquestionably very vague. Few persons have ever thought of any physical theory of the resurrection as an article of faith. Most of our Christian readers, if requested to state their views, would probably say they believed in the resurrection of the same body that died; but as to the identity of the particles, or any of the physical conditions of conscious identity, they have scarcely ever raised a question, and never made a serious attempt to settle one. These persons, we presume, if Professor Bush would give them some plausible account of the disposal of the flesh-body in the case of those who do not die, would doubtless feel little difficulty in adopting his spirit-body. The only question of his which would embarrass them, relates to the *time* of the resurrection. The great body of Christians hold no opinion respecting the resurrection more clearly than that of a future and simultaneous rising of the dead. On this point, therefore, they would look with interest for the proof of his position. The more intelligent and studious, whose attention has been drawn to the subject for the purpose of deciding for themselves upon the nature of the resurrection, have generally rested in the obvious sense of the scriptures, understood literally only so far as they might be without glaring absurdity. This class of readers have always felt the philosophical difficulty of the literal resurrection, and would gratefully receive help in solving the problem. Divines who were invited by their vocation to explain the doctrine, have rarely done more than to follow out the leading suggestions of the scripture as far as any natural conditions of the resurrection could be consistent with the spiritual, and there to stop. Even the majority of *writers* have scarcely thought of adopting and upholding any physical theory of the resurrection; but have rested in the views they had until they might correct them in clearer light; hardly expecting, however, that science and the deductions of reason would so soon "completely disembarass the subject of difficulties." None of these classes could properly be said to have any system to be overthrown; but all would doubtless receive with due deference, any suggestions which might help their reason to see through the process of a scriptural resurrection.

The first step in "the argument from reason" is to state and illustrate the insurmountable difficulty of conceiving a resurrection of the same material body, viz. the want of a connexion between the former and the latter body. The thought of some connexion between the two bodily states has come into the minds of men from the scriptures; and it has come by these means: The terms describing and signifying the final resurrection are used with reference to bodies known to have been dead and made alive again and are not used with reference to the reception of a spiritual body by persons who, as Enoch and Elijah, "did not see death." The resurrection is represented by Christ as the coming forth of those that are in their graves; and Christ also speaks of raising up men at the last day. This is the natural language for expressing a relation between the mortal and immortal body. And we presume, no one has ever read 1 Cor. xv. without receiving a suggestion of some connexion between the body that dies and that which is to live. In this way the notion is accounted for, and its origin will therefore appear quite legitimate.

Now by what is this suggestion contradicted? Not by the scriptures. The immediate entrance of souls into Paradise after death does not oppose it; for we know nothing of the soul to warrant a presumption that it may not live and act, and enjoy, and suffer without a body. To pronounce it one of "the greatest errors to suppose that the soul goes forth at death as a *bare power of thought*—a bodiless and formless *mens*," Professor Bush knows as well as we do, is to assert what neither of us can prove. What do we know of the manner of the soul's existence out of the body? Such conjectures of ours have no weight against the language of the Bible. The literal and obvious sense of the inspired passages referred to, is contradicted by nothing but the alleged impossibility "of *conceiving* a connexion between the present and the future body.

The difficulty is not suggested by any established principle of natural philosophy. Science would demonstrate no more of a natural connexion between the body of Lazarus raised to life and the body which had been four days dead, than between the body of Abel supposed to be raised to life at the end of the world, and the body which was mangled by violence and perhaps devoured by beasts six thousand years ago. The difference between the dead body of Lazarus and that of Abel, is not a difference of natural ten-

dencies, of mechanical or chemical laws, ordained to be unto life or promotive of resurrection. That is to say, had Christ stood where Abel was murdered, and said, Abel, come forth, the effect had been as much promoted by the predispositions of matter, as was the effect of his call on the body of Lazarus. The dry bones of the valley of vision were, in the eye of the philosopher, no nearer being living bodies after bone had come to its bone, and all were covered with flesh, than when they were scattered promiscuously through the valley and were very dry. The difficulty raised here is therefore only sensible. The connexion of the former body with the latter is rendered inconceivable in the view of Professor Bush, by the entire dissipation and the untraceable re-combinations of the sensible corporeal particles. Parts of the body of Goliath have crept into Alexander's horse, and thence into "some dancing dervish of an eastern city," and thence no mortal knows where ! Still every mortal takes for granted they are somewhere ; and the question now before us relates to the *possibility* of some sort of latent vitality naturally pre-determinant towards resurrection, or to the *positive proof* that no such vitality remains.

The reasonings of Professor Bush demand that the resurrection of the body, if wrought at all, shall be wrought in analogical conformity to other operations of God. He sees between the caterpillar and the butterfly "an unbroken thread of life." He discerns in the caterpillar the corporeal rudiments of the butterfly. And he requires this "vital continuity" and this provisional organization or something analogous to them, as the natural prerequisites of resurrection in the human body. It being only as a philosopher that the Professor makes this demand, he will expect that from particular facts we shall determine the notion of vitality in general, together with the general conditions of vital activity.

The life of the oak is associated with the notion of seminal vitality in the acorn ; the life of the eagle with the notion of life in the egg ; the life of the fawn with the life of a certain seminal secretion in the parent deer. The existence of this vitality in particular cases is known by one of these two methods only : experiment or inspection. We know the acorn to be alive when it germinates ; the egg when it hatches ; and it either is the fact, or may be, that by diligent and skilful observation upon the conditions of experimental

phenomena, we may establish optical, tactile or olfactory tests of vitality, which may supersede experiment and diminish practical inconvenience. But one or the other of these evidences of life is indispensable to our conception of the existence of life, or of a connexion between the acorn and the oak.

Now it here demands attention, that in these elementary bodies the sensible tests of vitality can be established only by satisfactory experiment. Every body seems sure that wheat sown in whole kernel and in proper circumstances will grow; and that flour sown will not grow; but either the experiment has in some form been tried, or it is not now certainly known whether the grinding of wheat destroys its seminal vitality or not. The *nature* also of this principle of life is known to us only by its effects. That the fig tree will produce figs and not grapes we know not until we see that figs and not grapes grow on it. It is only by satisfactory experiment that men have learned that the acorn will produce an oak, and not a bramble. Nothing but experiment upon the bodies in question can determine, in the first instances, the presence and the nature of life; and our only definition of vitality in general seems to be: that principle in one body which tends in given circumstances to the production of a like body. We should not attribute complete vitality to the kernel nor to the egg unless we saw satisfactory proof of its tendency in given circumstances to the production of its like. It is then by the use of these principles that the question of a resurrection vitality in the substance of the human body must be decided.

The terms of our proposed resurrection require a pre-resident vitality of a peculiar sort. The life of the acorn is its tendency in given circumstances to produce its like. But the supposed resurrection vitality of the substance of the human body is its tendency, in given circumstances, to *resume the like form in connexion with the same person*. Now supposing the vitality in question to be *similar* to that of the kernel or the egg, then the known fact that the crushing or boiling of the kernel and the egg destroys their life, affords presumption that the mechanical or chemical dissolution of the human body annihilates its resurrection property. It affords presumption only, not proof. And this presumption is indefinitely weakened by the extreme dissimilitude of the supposed vitalities in the two cases. Who will not admit, that though we knew certainly that the disintegration

or the decomposition of the human body will destroy its tendency in *any* circumstances, to produce its like in *another person*, we do *not* know certainly, and have only the slightest ground of presumption that either will destroy a tendency, which, for aught we know, is *totally* different from the other, viz. a tendency in given circumstances to resume its like *form* in connexion with the *same* person? He who would not admit this, would argue that since ground wheat will not grow and boiled eggs will not hatch, therefore, alum in solution will not crystallize on thread.

To us, this indefinitely feeble presumption against the existence of a vital resurrection principle in the decomposed materials of the mortal body, is something quite different from "the clearest evidence of facts and the soundest process of reasoning," which, as Professor Bush would have it, (p. 81) "demand the reconciliation of scripture" to their conclusions. The positive proof that no such principle is possible thus dwindles into the weakest presumption that such principle does not in fact exist. This is all the objection suggested by analogy against the hypothesis of a natural connexion between the mortal body and the body of the resurrection. It will be readily seen that this objection can weigh little against a declaration of the scriptures that "they that are in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of man, and shall come forth."

To try further the conceivableness of a relation between one body and the other, let it be considered how a connexion is rendered conceivable between an acorn and an oak. From some language used on this subject it would almost seem that the connexion between the seed and the plant was thought to be a matter of intuitive perception. But how does this connexion become discernible to our minds? How come we by the notion of a vital continuity, an unbroken thread of life, bridging the chasm between the caterpillar and the butterfly, the seed now ripening, and its future germination, the egg now deposited and the eaglet hereafter to spring from it? A fact of the greatest importance at this point of our inquiry must here be carefully noted: That we come to the knowledge of the vital connexion of these phenomena only by witnessing the occurrence of the phenomena themselves. The suggestion of a connexion between facts comes in the first instance from observation of the facts themselves. The naturalist sees the scion with the acorn at its root; and here springs his first thought of vitality in the

acorn. He then dissects the seed, not to find the principle of life, but to ascertain what he can of the organic and sensible conditions of the life; and he finds in the seed the rudiments of the vegetable product. By the aid of his optical devices, and still more by the aid of an imagination occupied with the tree, he discerns in the acorn the miniature of the oak. But before his observation upon the germination of the seed and the growth of the tree, the seminal configuration, even had it been distinguished at all by his inspection as a vegetable likeness, would have suggested to him any thing but vitality; still less would it have suggested the peculiar vitality of the oak. Before any observation of the growth of the tree, let the philosopher examine the section of an acorn in which he shall discern all that exists of the outline of the embryo tree; then let him inspect a fragment of granite with a sprig of fossil fern imprinted on its surface, and he shall not know whether the one possesses more vegetable vitality than the other. We insist on this remark here, not because any one is likely to deny it, nor because it did not probably occur to the philosophical mind of our author, but because it appears not to have impressed his mind with what we deem its real bearing and force in relation to this point of his argument from reason. It is only the observation of the actual phenomena of life that renders conceivable to us the vital connexion between them.

When will the true philosopher feel himself competent to pronounce upon the vital continuity of the body of man, from death to the resurrection? Plainly when he has witnessed the events in their order, and not till then. Will he who cannot tell *à priori* whether a grain of wheat falling into the ground will die or live, venture to pass judgment *à priori* upon the animal vitality of the human body, and its susceptibility of resurrection by some natural laws? Professor Bush calls for a relation between body and body, to be made conceivable, without submitting his mind to the only process by which relations of phenomena are made conceivable in any case.

We present, then, to the imagination of our philosopher the dispersed corporeal elements of a man, and invite him to show us proof by inspection, by experiment, or by analogy, that the vitality of those elements *is* annihilated by their dispersion. We invite him to present just ground of strong probability that it is so. And while he shrinks from this, we challenge him to offer the basis of a fair presumption

of such annihilation. And since we do not expect him to do so much as that to his own satisfaction, we will assume against him on this subject the principle which Butler applies to the soul, and say, that the existence of vitality at all in the particles of a human body is ground of presumption in favour of its continued existence, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary. We then ask whether the fact of such vital organization of these particles in certain circumstances is not presumptive evidence of an inherent tendency in those particles to a similar vital organization in similar circumstances; a tendency which must be presumed to remain in existence till positive proof is given of its annihilation. Thus sound reason can hardly evade the conclusion that the continued existence of vitality in the dispersed particles of the human body is, in the present lack of all positive evidence to the contrary, a matter of fair presumption. If, as the reasonings of Professor Bush presuppose, the particles of the human body possess at any time that which may be called vitality, we have no positive proof that they lose that vitality by a mere dispersion or decomposition; and we therefore have a clear presumption that they retain their vital quality latent, and awaiting the proper circumstances of its destined developement.

But what particles? "What body?" Every human body that dies at seventy years of age has had ten different sets of particles. Which set of these particles retains the supposed vitality? All of them, we reply; and for this reason, that we know not certainly that any which have had it lose it, and we know no reason why one set should retain it rather than another. And then, asks the objector, are all the particles which have ever been in a human body to be resumed at the resurrection? We answer, the supposition that they *are*, is by no means absurd; for they may all be wanted to furnish the rising multitudes of all mankind. Nor would it be absurd if they should not be thus resumed though all should have the properties which, by our supposed law of nature, would fit them for resumption. But how are these particles, by their blind tendencies, respectively to know their places, and with their uniform prepensions, to regulate amongst themselves, their due distribution and appropriate collocations? A most interesting question indeed! And we have thousands like it, suggested by every department of the works of God. How came the particles of all the bodies of all mankind to know their places in the

corporeal systems they have successively formed? What causes the sun to know his place? What keeps the comet in his erratic path? What determines the floating particles of the impregnated fluid to their respective places in the crystal, as if each knew the precise number, the shapes, the areas, and the mutual relations of the surfaces and angles of the diamond which all were to form? Let our objector walk with us through that mountain of anthracite, and tell us whether his reason is satisfied to insist that there *is not* a pervading crystalline vitality (we will presently vindicate this use of the word vitality) inherent in select particles of the mass, ready to act when due time and circumstances shall disengage it from its present antagonists, and invite it to its natural regular and brilliant concretions? And let him tell us whether this latent tendency to crystallization does not suggest a conceivable connexion between the blackness and darkness of the mountain of coal, and the rich splendours of ten thousand diamonds. With such facts before him he must show that there is absurdity in the supposition of a resurrection vitality, pervading all the particles which are to constitute the immortal bodies of men, and suited to sustain a conceivable relation between the mortal and the immortal body.

Whatever difficulties relating to the identity of the former with the latter body, should arise from the above remarks, may be disposed of thus: It is on all hands admitted, from Mr. Locke, nay, from Plato to Professor Bush, that personal identity does not depend on identity of corporeal particles. Our author indeed supposes that complete personal identity does not demand the appendage of a material body at all. He argues on the tacit presumption, that without the earthly concomitant, the person may retain undisturbed his sense of identical completeness, and even feel that in his disembodied enlargement, there is more of himself than there was before. Whether this be so or otherwise we shall not now stop to inquire. But, assuredly, it will not be taking greater liberty than this with the doctrine of identity, to assert that identity of particles enters not at all into the common view of identity of body. If the consciousness of bodily identity be one of the principles to which the resurrection of the body must conform, it will suffice for our theory to impose only those conditions of bodily identity which have prevailed in the present life.

It is a fact that in this life *personal* identity is never dis-

sociated from *bodily*. We carry through all the changes of the body as clear a conviction of bodily identity as of mental. Sameness of body is here involved in sameness of person, and is, in this life, never separated from it. Through all the processes of abstraction and accretion incessant in our mortal frame, no man ever yet conceived himself to have another body. And this sameness of body has nothing to do with sameness of particles. It is not a conclusion of reason, but a fact of consciousness. On this principle it will, therefore, be readily perceived that the doctrine of bodily identity suffers no violence from any remarks above presented, respecting the promiscuous distribution of corporeal particles among the resurrection bodies of men.

It ought, however, on this point to be added that whatever of identity the scriptures may be understood to imply *must* be the identity mentioned above. When it is asked, how can the same body be raised from the grave while the same matter is not there, the objector overlooks the nature of bodily identity. He does not consider that the soul makes no demand for the same particles as a condition of recovering the same body. It does not even demand identity of substance to satisfy its consciousness of bodily identity. Let it be remembered, what modifications the body may undergo, and still report itself to the soul as the same body. Not only may you remove its particles and put others in their place, but change its stature, as from infancy to manhood; change its form, proportions and complexion, as from those of the child to those of the man; change its strength, as from health to sickness and from sickness to health; change the sensations it awakens in the mind; and when all this is done, it would surely seem that the sense of bodily sameness, if it could be destroyed at all, would be destroyed. But when all this is done, the same body, in the judgment of the soul, is yet there. We say the same body in the judgment of the soul; for in this matter, the soul is to be the only judge. Indeed, all that we have here supposed is actually done, in the case of every person who passes through the common course of human life, while the bodily subject of all these changes remains the same. The conviction of its sameness is immovable in the mind. If, therefore, the scriptures be understood to assert the resurrection of *the* body, they assert an event which in the eye of reason is sufficiently provided for by the visible course of the material nature, and the known bodily conditions of conscious identity in the soul.

To form *the same* body in the resurrection, there is nothing demanded but what is at hand on the spot where the mortal body fell. The only identity of body which the soul has ever recognised here, is recoverable from materials abounding at the place of the previous dissolution. How then can a mind in due submission to reason satisfy itself with an objection against the resurrection of the body, from any supposed want of identical particles in its new constitution?

To return to the subject of continued vitality. We promised, in a previous parenthesis, to vindicate our use of the word vitality in so broad a sense. To the demand for proof of a connecting vitality between death and the resurrection, we reply, first, that the demand is absurd; inasmuch as it calls for the proof of what could not be proved though it were true. Then we suggest the *possibility* of a vitality residing in the dispersed materials of the mortal body. And we farther suggest the commendation which this *possibility* receives from reason, on account of the broad sense in which the word "vitality" may be legitimately used. Let vitality in general be defined as the tendency of a substance in given circumstances towards the result appropriate to its nature. Now all life is not the same life. There is one life of animals, another of plants, and another of minerals, and so on. There is a life of the human body; and who is competent to say that there is *not* one life of bodies which are to have a resurrection, and another life of bodies which are not to have a resurrection? Assuming, then, that the scriptures teach a resurrection of the human body, we are led by the analogies of that Providence which makes things tend towards their proper results, to presume that somewhat inheres in the destined material of the immortal frame, which renders a resurrection of the body possible, by the power of God, in conformity with natural laws. If this somewhat be not as worthy of the name "vitality" as is the principle of life in a seed or in the particles of the soil into which the seed is cast, let us be taught the reason why. And no reason being given, we have precisely the same proof of vital continuity from the death to the resurrection of the body as we have of a vital continuity from the ripening of a corn of wheat to its germination when cast into the earth.

But these hints of a possible vitality inherent in the scattered relics of the mortal body, although as consistent with reason, to say the least, as any objection that can be urged

against them, embrace only a small part of the strength of this argument. In the case of vegetable and animal transformations, the living principle of the creature continues with the body through all the bodily changes. The same life is continued from the larva through the chrysalis into the butterfly. In the intermediate state the life has not departed from the body. It is considered as inseparable from the body, and as having no existence without it. The vital property of the seed is considered as a property of the material body; perhaps developed by means of the seminal organization; perhaps being itself the cause of that organization. In these instances of life, the vital principle has a bodily representation. When the body is placed in the circumstances required for its germination, the property of life reveals itself by means of the organic changes; and establishes, on the part of the seed, a material medium of communication between the vitality of the seed, and the vitality of the elements without. Through this medium the seminal virtue acts on the circumambient vitality, and is acted upon by it.

Now it is this material medium which the argument of Professor Bush demands to render vital continuity conceivable. It avails nothing, in his view, that the life of the creature cannot be proved to have been destroyed; nor that it be proved to exist; so long as no organized material body is observed in which this life may be conceived to reside. His reasonings require that the life of the seed should have a material representation to give us a conception of its presence and power. And were it only the life of a seed which we are investigating, we should, perhaps, be compelled to assent to that requisition. For we have no knowledge of the existence of vegetable life apart from the vegetable body. We have no evidence of the existence of such a thing as the disembodied vitality of a plant or an animal.

Still reason does not countenance the notion of the materiality of either vegetable or animal life. On the same principle, it denies the materiality of the life of man, and the materiality of the life of a plant. And it is at least as conceivable *a priori* that the life of a plant should exist apart from the body, as that the life of a man should thus exist. Now let it once be announced, on competent authority, that the life of plants does *not* perish with the body, but exists in a disembodied state; and let

reason adapt to that fact her theories of vital operation. Suppose that by the law of vegetable change, the living principle goes forth from the body of the seed at the instant of maturity, enters a separate state of existence, and so continues until the time when a new product is to be formed by its agency. During this interval, let the body of the seed be dissolved, and, as a grain of wheat, cease to exist, and let its particles disappear from the most discriminating eye of a human observer. At the appointed time and after due preparation of the soil, let the disembodied and departed vitality of the grain be recalled to the spot of its previous departure, to apply its vital agency in beginning and conducting the process of the new formation. The body arising from the operation is precisely the body proper to that species, and of the same kind as the body that died; for God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body. Let this become the familiar process of the husbandman in replenishing his granaries. It will be seen that the only change of the common phrascology on this subject, required in describing the operation, would be in the words denoting the act of sowing. The process would be called as now, the *raising* of wheat, not the *creating* of it; the life of the article having previously existed. Taking the whole process into view from the maturity of the seed to the maturity of the new product, it would be the dying and rising again of wheat. This would be its appropriate designation; the language being, of course, understood of the body of the grain, and not of the vital principle. But since in this case the product is supposed to be many grains from one, and therefore the result is stated in the terms of the species, wheat from wheat; let it be supposed, that the new product was a single grain only, for each grain that died. The true description then is, the dying and rising again of *the* wheat; grain from grain being undistinguishable. Let it further be supposed that each grain which died had its peculiarities; some corporeal dimension, proportion, complexion, or mark, distinguishing it from every other; and let each grain of the new product correspond in all particulars with the parent grain which died. The process would now be called the dying and rising again of *a grain* of wheat. Let it still be added, that the living principle is conscious of life, and of the changes which affect it; that it recognises in the new production, the body it had previously relinquished, and feels the re-investiture as a

recovery of its personal completeness. Then how can the process be otherwise faithfully described than as the dying and rising again of *the grain* of wheat?

In this series of suppositions our departure from the facts of the vegetable nature is less than at first sight might be presumed. That the life of the seed is something different from the body, none will deny. We supposed the life to be separated from the body; and we now observe that this supposition does not, in the least, impair the conceivableness of the connexion between the seed and the plant. Abstract from the seed the vital principle, and take the seminal organization by itself. What discernible connexion remains between that lifeless and diminutive coil of rudimental vegetation, and the beautiful, vigorous and stately plant? Restore the vitality, and witness its workings; and what can we know of the help it receives from what seems to us the provisional arrangement of particles in the seed? It is the appointment of nature indeed that the life of such a plant shall act through such organic matter; yet the fact of this appointment we learn not from the perception of any necessity for it inherent in the principle of vegetable life, but by observing the process of nature. So far as we can see, the organization of the seed is no less debtor to the vitality, than the vitality to the organization. Hence, to assert the peculiar dependence of the vital principle on the structure of the seed, is to speak without reason. The life made the seed what it is, and, when circumstances permit, will repeat the operation; while between any one stage of the process and another, the "vital continuity" is preserved in the principle of life, and not in the mere form of the matter. No conformation of the matter can, of itself, help us to a conception of the *vital* connexion between one form of the vegetable organization and another.

It is therefore plain that even in the dying and rising again of a grain of wheat, the connecting vitality between the body that is and the body that shall be, is not the material organization. By our observation of the uniform relation between the form of the seed and the life of the seed, the organized body of the grain becomes to us the *sign* of life. It is not the life, but stands to bear witness of the life. When the seed falls into the ground and dies, it loses even the form of its seminal vitality. All its particles, so far as human eye can see, undergo a local transmutation as complete as that which takes place in the particles of the soil

composing the enlarged bulk of the plant. No two portions of the original grain can be presumed to retain, through the process of germination and growth, their former mutual relations. Every pin and joint in the fabric is loosened. The whole mass is dissolved and reorganized. Foreign matter is introduced which seizes and absorbs the primitive elements; and builds up, under the direction of the invisible principle of life, a structure truly and properly new.

What then is that circumstance which is made by our author's philosophy essential to "vital continuity." It comes to be the mere interval of time between the dislocation of organic materials in the old body, and their subsequent collocation in the new. In the actual course of vegetable nature, the particles, upon leaving their former mutual relations in the seed, *immediately* assume their new mutual relations in the plant. In the case described above, the particles are supposed to continue longer separate, and to come together through a protracted and circuitous transition; the identity of the particles, however, being no more certainly lost in the longer transition than in the shorter.

To show now the decisive bearing of this extended and minute discussion upon the subject in hand: We have seen that the organized body of a living thing is a *sign* only, and not the *essence* of vitality; and although Professor Bush rests (inadvertently, as we charitably presume,) his *conception* of the vital relation between body and body on this material sign, yet even he will not insist that the bodily organism *constitutes* the relation. The human vitality unlike that of the caterpillar or the acorn, has a known and acknowledged capability of existence apart from the material body. The organized but breathless body of a man, is not to us even a *sign* of the presence and power of life. Put that body in what circumstances you will; place it erect, clothe it, warm it, apply your philosophic devices for extorting its muscular activity, command all your chemical artifices to stay its dissolution—and you have not awakened in the mind of the observer the conception of a vital relation between that body of death and a body of life. The absent spirit carried with it every ligament which was wont to unite, in any conceivable relation, the body of one stage of human life with the body of another. The form lies lifeless there, not because the blood was exhausted from it, nor because the bones were broken, nor because the nervous sensibility was benumbed, nor because the

muscular fibres were mangled or dissolved; but because the spirit is gone out of it. After the departure of the spirit, the continuance of the form and organization of the body is nothing to any purposes of life. Were the spirit about to resume an earthly abode, who shall tell us whether it were easier for it to form the walls of its new tenement out of the collapsed remains of the old habitation, or to rear them from fresh materials? To insist, then, upon a preserved bodily organization as the only legitimate sign of a vital relation between the body of death and the body of the resurrection seems to us to be walking rather by sense than by reason. This is the fundamental error of Professor Bush; and his entire theory "labours fatally" under it. While the acorn has no conceivable relation to the oak except through the life abiding in it, and while the vital principle in rearing the oak, makes use of the acorn only by taking it in pieces and joining its particles in new relations, he insists that a human body, known to be lifeless, shall be the sign of a conceivable relation between life and life. And because he cannot find that body he denies that there is any resurrection. Let the body only lie whole in the grave, though ever so dead, nay, let only a thimbleful of its ashes stay collected there till the hour cometh, then might he acknowledge some connexion between the dying of the body and its rising again.

Our author re-asserts the old distinction between the $\psi\chi\eta$ and the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, the vital principle in man, and the intellectual. Without admitting the truth of the distinction, we feel no repugnance against its bearings on the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. His theory requires in the $\psi\chi\eta$ properties which will account not only for the phenomena of life, but also for the developement of a spiritual body. For the conception of this latter property, he is indebted to his hypothesis of the spiritual body. Unless some property of the $\psi\chi\eta$ be discovered or supposed, adapted to produce this psychical investiture, the result cannot, of course, be expected. Now it is most true that to suppose a spiritual body, and then assert, on the foundation of that supposition, an adequate provision for such a body in the vital part of the soul, "completely disembarasses the subject of difficulties insuperable by any other" process. The exceeding convenience of this circle in the very foundation of his "Anastasis," the Professor cannot too highly prize. Without it he could not have laid a stone in his logical edifice; but with it he has reared a gorgeous structure. He presents us at the instant

of death with ‘a spiritual body in full developement; refined, subtle, ethereal, sublimated; disengaged,—extricated from that psychical part of our nature with which the vital and animal functions are, in the present life, intimately connected, and which differs from the pure spirit,—the intellectual principle, as the Greek $\psi\chi\eta$ or *sensitive principle* differs from the $\nu\omicron\varsigma$, the *self-conscious intelligence*. It is a *tertium quid*,—an intermediate something between the cogitative faculty and the gross body.’ A most valuable something it is, and the proof of its existence is its casual relation to the ‘refined, subtle, ethereal, sublimated body *supposed* to be disengaged or extricated from it.’ As a mere theory, professedly hypothetical, offering some plausible solution of known phenomena, it would be liable to no objection, and might pass for what it is worth. But coming forward with confident pretensions of certainty, asserting a resurrection body which ‘we are to know to exist because we know that we ourselves exist,’ (p. 70) and claiming for itself to be the only view in which *the* reason is well pleased, it provokes resistance against its arrogance, and scrutiny into the ground of its claims.

This psychical part of our nature, whether essentially distinct from the intellectual or not, is altogether apposite to what we are endeavouring to present as the scriptural theory of a bodily resurrection. It supplies the requisite link of vital continuity. As to its being a body or having a body “which has nothing to do with the gross material particles which enter into the composition of our present earthly tenements,” we have nothing to say, because we know nothing. But this we know, that this principle of life has once held a vital connexion with a material body; that it held control over the bodily conformations, and that, by laws common to itself and the matter of the body, it conducted the corporeal system through its allotted course of vicissitude. We see no reason why this connexion with matter may not be resumed; and since the scriptures *seem* to say it shall be so, we think it reasonable that the return of this departed principle of life into vital connexion with a material organization should be expected. As it before produced a physical structure from materials which fell in its way, it may do it again. But whereas it before carried on a gradual process of conformation corresponding to the demands of a changing body, now it *may*, by an instantaneous act, raise for itself a fabric which shall remain unchanged forever.

We wish to state distinctly the grounds on which we suggest this capability of the vital principle in man. The scriptures speak of an event which in the course of the vital operation, puts such a property in requisition, if that event shall take place by natural laws. That such a property should exist, is by no means absurd or inconceivable; and a ground of presumption in its favour is found in analogous operations actually carried on in the present life. If we judge that, by means of the vital energy of the soul, the divine power *may* raise a material body at the last day, it is because, by that means, it has already raised a material body, and sustained it through its appointed course. If the promised work should be instantaneous, instead of being, as now, continued through a gradual and protracted course, it will only present a difference in time; and of such a difference we have a faint analogical shadow in the diverse times in which individuals, in diverse climes and other diverse circumstances, arrive at bodily maturity; showing that, as circumstances vary, the vital principle *may* vary the periods of its operation. If the body thus raised from the dust should assume a peculiar property of permanency and power and glory, according to the scriptures, there will then be presented a diversity in the *kind* of operation. For this we may observe a slight analogy in the various degrees of corporeal beauty and vigour, in different persons and in different ages of the same person; in the diverse *kinds* of working exemplified by the vital principle, in maintaining the sound body and in overcoming a leprosy or healing a wound; where the same vitality presents known operations of obvious diversity in kind; and teaches that the glorious and immortal life *may* be wrought into the material fabric without such hostility to the present diversified laws of the vital principle, as will, of necessity, exclude their agency.

In conformity with the views above suggested, the following may be stated as a rational and scriptural process of bodily resurrection. At the appointed time and signal, the soul, with its psychical affinity for a material organization, and its unimpaired capacity for holding and enjoying a corporeal investment, is present, and ready to submit its vital energy to the direction of Omnipotence in the work of raising the dead. The end of the present order of nature in this world of perishable things has come; and if some of the laws of the animal, the vegetable and the mineral kingdoms are suddenly repealed; if the instant disengagement of sub-

stance from substance, the abrupt decomposition of air, earth and sea, and all that is therein, takes place, to supply material for the rising millions, it provides also, as the chemist will testify, for the universal burning. Through the vital agency of the living spirit of man, now resuming one of its intermitted offices, the dissolved and dissipated relics of human mortality hear the voice of the Son of man, and every depository of death becomes a scene of returning life. Where any bodies remain entire from recent death, or any portion of the dust into which a mortal body was reduced is recognised in a collected state, it would be a natural conformity of the sensible process with the scriptural intimations, if each spirit should select the material mass which was its own before; and thus in literal fulfilment of scripture, they that are in their graves shall come forth. What proportion of the buried generations can be said in any sense to be in their graves, those may judge best who best know how long the traces of an animal deposit in a grave or a tomb can, either by the organs of sense or by the tests of science, be discerned; and how long those traces may be discernible by the psychical vision, after the eyes of our bodily sense and of our purblind science have lost sight of them. To a reflecting mind it would not, perhaps, awaken surprise, if some local indications of a bodily presence should thus be found for a large majority of all the dead. As for those that are not in their graves, a portion are expressly accommodated by the words of scripture, which represent the sea as giving up the dead that are in it; and when Death and Hades are said to deliver up the dead that are in them, we are taught in a figure, that wherever the materials of man's corporeal frame may be hidden, they will be summoned forth by the piercing and awakening voice of the Son of man, to take their places in the incorruptible bodies of the resurrection. Each spirit retains its law of individual conformation, by which it governed the corporeal developement before, and by which it now produces, with only such exceptions in the bodies of the righteous, as the absence of all disorder will account for, an exact bodily resemblance of the man to his former self. Each person takes to himself those peculiar powers and modes of sensible representation by which he was distinguished in the mortal body. If local associations can contribute to enliven the triumphant joy of the rising saint, or aggravate the horror of the rising reprobate, they may be provided for by circumstantial adaptations, not per-

haps minute, yet sufficiently effectual, to the local recollections of individuals. If the soul should require, as we grant it may, that the conditions of conscious identity should be complied with in the new body, it may be done; for from whatever quarter the particles may be collected, or however few of the particles which ever had place in the old body may enter into the new, the consciousness of identity is satisfied on the very grounds on which it rested during the earthly life. Should the rising body conform in some perceptible measure to the one that died, in its individual peculiarities, especially in those which distinguished its period of greatest vigour and beauty, the notion of an exterior sameness will be among the natural cognitions of the mind upon the recovery of its material complement. Thus far then, at least, we are assisted by the analogies of nature in conceiving a physical process of resurrection, corresponding with the common interpretation of the sacred writers.

We have been led to discuss thus minutely the subject of a vital connexion between the dying and the rising body, by the important place which that subject holds in the theory of Professor Bush. It is upon the alleged absurdity of supposing such a connexion that he rests his main objection against the doctrine of a material resurrection. If such a connexion has been shown to be as conceivable as the connexion between the seed and the plant, the objection fails. The necessity for any other than the common theory is precluded. Our argument from reason coincides with the more obvious and literal sense of the scriptures, and is, in the language of geometry, the argument from scripture produced.

A point of acknowledged difficulty still remains;—the change which takes place in the material body at or after its rising from the dead. It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption. We shall all be changed. Some great change is here suggested as an indispensable preparation of the body for the heavenly state. Analogy suggests, as we have before observed, the *possibility* of our receiving a body more durable, vigorous, and glorious as the natural result of the vital operation in the process of resurrection. Beyond this, what kind or what degree of change must come to prepare the corporeal frame for its immortal existence we cannot, in the present life, expect to know. It doth not yet appear what we shall be. The essential dif-

ference between the spiritual body and the natural, who can define? On this point Professor Bush's theory and our own are equally at fault. Who shall tell us whether any corporeity can be evolved by nature from the physical element of the soul, to answer the conditions of the future life of man? This sort of spiritual body, of which if our space would permit we should say more, was a figment of the ancients, employed to assist their conception of a separate state of departed souls. To some of the ancients it was inconceivable that the soul should suffer without a body; and supposing all souls to pass through a purgatorial ordeal in Hades, the possession of some sort of a body after death they deemed an indispensable condition of that invisible existence. "If," says Philoponus,* "the soul be incorporeal, ψυχὴ ἀσώματος, it cannot suffer. How then is it punished? There must be joined with it some sort of a body which being inordinately distracted or constricted, by excessive cold or heat, puts the soul to pain through sympathy." This doctrine of a spiritual body was confirmed in the faith of its advocates by the phenomena of apparitions. "For how," exclaims the same writer, "do the shadowy spectres become visible among the tombs?"† The theory thus suggested, and found to correspond with many supposed, and some known conditions of the spiritual existence, was in some form adopted by most of the Grecian poets and philosophers, and by some of the most distinguished of the early Christian writers. But Irenæus, Origen, and others of the Christian fathers who adopted this notion of an immaterial corporeity, regarded it as altogether consistent with a resurrection of the material body; the soul being capable, as they expressed it, of wearing as it were, one coat over another. We lack as yet the proper authority to determine whether the material corporeity is less capable of adaptation to the exercises of the heavenly life than the immaterial. Although it would be highly entertaining to ourselves to prolong ad libitum a statement of plausible hypotheses respecting the nature and changes of matter in connexion with the physical theory of our future state, we can here only remark that we see no possible advantage arising to our conception of the life to come, from the admission of this ancient pagan theory of a spiritual

* Proœm. in Aristot. de Animâ.

† Πόθεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τάφοις τὰ σκιαιοῦς φαίνονται φαντάσματα;

body inseparable from the soul. It seems to us far less conformed to the Apostle's idea of a spiritual body, as we gather it from some of his forms of speech; and since we have no surer guide on this subject than the hints of scripture, we think it most reasonable and safe that the minds of Christians should remain predisposed to disaffection towards a hypothesis which seems to us so groundless and so fruitless.

We have thus far confined our attention to Part I. of the "Anastasis," relating to 'The Argument from Reason,' 'The Doctrine of Identity,' and 'The true Body of the Resurrection.' Our aim has been to offer what occurred to us as some of the reasons why most considerate believers of scripture will probably be better satisfied with the common view of the resurrection, than with the theory of Professor Bush; and we have gone to some length and minuteness in trying the truth of his hypotheses. He pronounces it utterly incredible that any vital connexion should exist between the mortal and the immortal body; and his objection, if we have rightly understood the substance of it, as gathered from the different forms in which he states it on different pages, may be viewed in two parts; first, that the scattered materials of the dead body must be presumed to have no inherent vitality by which a conceivable connexion can be formed between the two bodies; second, that no property of the present body can be conceived as a natural antecedent to the ethereal and glorious body of the future state. To the former part of the objection we reply, first, that, supposing the same material substances which shall have composed human bodies to be wrought into human bodies again at the resurrection, we are incompetent to decide whether all the matter shall not have a vital preparation for that purpose. Second, that the fact of its having had some sort of adaptation to constitute a human body, is ground of presumption in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the vital adaptation continues, and in the proper circumstances will reveal itself in the appropriate functions of life; and although this property be no other than that which is supposed to belong to all similar substances, it yet destroys the presumption that a bodily resurrection in conformity with any material laws conceivable by natural reason, is impossible. But not pressed to rely on the supposition of this form of preserved vitality, we present another which may be joined with it, or may, if so preferred, be taken as an alternative. We observe that

the body of the seed is not the life ; and that in the view of reason the life, as something conceivably distinct from the body, would be, if conceived to exist after the dissolution of the body, a proper vehicle of vital continuity between grain and grain. The vital spirit of man may therefore be regarded as the proper ground of a rational connexion between the dying and the rising body, and the conception of this connexion is not at all affected by the question whether each body embrace the same particles or not. Although no identity of particles be preserved, yet since the vital principle is known to have pre-existed, the process will be properly called the *dying and rising again* of the human body, and not the *creating* of it as at first. We also observe particularly that the fundamental importance given by Professor Bush to the mere preserved but lifeless organization of the body,* is utterly unphilosophical. To the second part of the objection we reply, that a natural relation between the gross material body of the present life, and that glorious spiritual body of the heavenly state, cannot be pronounced absurd, until the essential difference of the two is certainly known ; and until we are more capable than now of conceiving all the forms of manifestation which matter may assume consistently with substantial identity. Our profound ignorance of the very nature of matter and of the spiritual body is a conclusive answer to all objections against the possibility of the one arising by some natural laws out of the other. We, then, venture to suggest the outline of a process of resurrection which seems to us agreeable with the statements of the scriptures and with sundry analogical facts of the present life.

Of 'The Argument from Scripture' we have room for but few words. If the true argument from reason overthrows the objections against a resurrection according to the more literal sense of scripture, there arises from this subject no necessity of departing from the more obvious meaning of the sacred writers. We are sure that a rational relief from such necessity is gratifying to most of the devout readers of the word of God. It cannot but cause great disquietude in minds of pious reflection, to have the page of revelation darkened by speculations into which they cannot enter, and the value of which they cannot appreciate ; especially when their reason finds comfortable exercise in those views which

* See pages 40 et seq., also 52, 152, 180, et passim.

their understanding of scripture opens before them. On this account we entertain a cordial preference for that theory of the resurrection, which, while it involves no absurdity, permits the scriptures to mean what they most obviously seem to say.

The meaning of one of the terms denoting *resurrection* in the New Testament includes the idea of raising a *dead body* to life. This is unquestionable. Professor Bush would admit this, were it not that "*the sense of the term must be governed by the truth of the doctrine.*"* He quotes Mr. Locke's attempt to establish a distinction between "the dead" and "the bodies of the dead;" where the philosopher asserts, in substance, that the scriptures when speaking of the general resurrection at the last day, nowhere use language which declares the resurrection of *the dead bodies* of men. As an evidence that Paul makes such a distinction, Mr. Locke refers to 1 Cor. xv. 35, "How are the dead raised up, and with what bodies do they come?" "Which words 'dead' and 'they' if supposed to stand precisely for 'the bodies of the dead,' the question will run thus, 'How are the dead bodies raised up; and with what bodies do the dead bodies come?' which seems to have no very agreeable sense." Had we any doubt that these terms were sometimes used in different senses, we could not be convinced by such criticism as this. Is it not plain that the objector whom Paul quoted referred to a resurrection of the body, and that he intended to raise the question respecting the manner or process of a bodily resurrection and the kind of body produced? But not to enlarge on this particular passage, it is true that 'the dead' is the phrase usually applied to the final resurrection; yet it is also true that the same phrase is applied to 'the bodies of the dead.' Christ commanded his disciples to raise 'the dead,' and sent word to John in prison, that 'the dead are raised,' in the same language which Paul uses of the final resurrection. So far then as the known fact can explain the term for the unknown, it, of course, confines the language to the sense of a resurrection of the material body. As to Paul's application of the terms denoting resurrection, in 1 Cor. xv. we find ourselves entirely unable, in our most frequent and patient study of that remarkable and invaluable chapter, to resist

* Pp. 145, 146. We are then to determine the sense of the term by the truth of the doctrine, while we are trying the truth of the doctrine by the sense of term!

the conviction that, whatever else the writer had in his mind, he embraced a view of the resurrection of the dead in the sense in which Christ was raised; of the resurrection of a material body, and of some intimate connexion between the body that died and the body that is raised. Most readers probably define the apostle's language concerning the general resurrection by the fact of the Saviour's resurrection, as far as they can make such a definition apply. It becomes indispensable, therefore, to ascertain and illustrate the nature of that most important fact.

The resurrection of Christ is an auxiliary at once to our belief and to our understanding of the doctrine of the final resurrection. The readers of Professor Bush, therefore turn with curiosity to his chapter on that subject, expecting him to reconcile the history of that event with the theory of no resurrection of the body. And here he meets us with the bold denial that the material body of the Saviour was raised to life at all. He finds that fact nowhere explicitly asserted. If his readers have not before been prepared by his startling assertions, to receive almost any declaration from him without astonishment, we are sure they must be surprised at this. What can he call an explicit assertion that the dead body of Christ was made alive? We will suppose him to have been at the sepulchre with the Marys "early in the morning while it was yet dark," and before the news of the resurrection was announced; and with all the light of the present advanced period of the Christian economy, to have witnessed what then and there transpired. The stone is displaced and the sepulchre is open. The two angels meet him with their unexpected information; "ye seek *Jesus who was crucified*. *He* is not here; *he* is risen, come, see the place where the Lord lay." He steps forward, and while stooping and looking into the sepulchre, says to himself, "It is even so. Jesus who was crucified, and whom I seek is not here. But—what then? *He is risen*." Now what does the witness understand by that word *He*? The living soul of the Saviour? That had not been there, but had all the time been with his penitent fellow-sufferer in Paradise. Besides, our witness went to the sepulchre inquiring not for the soul of the Lord but for the body. And the absence of the body fills him with disappointment and surprise. It is that absence which he wishes to have explained. And what does the angel mean when he says, *He* is risen, but that the body is

restored to life? Supposing the fact to have been so, what better language could have been used to assert it? Who would have thought of specifying the body in terms as if to meet some philosophical doubt which no inquirer had, in either speech or act, suggested? And can it, in the face of the announcement "He is risen," be asserted with due deliberation and candour, that the resuscitation of that body is nowhere explicitly stated? But turning round from the sepulchre, the witness sees a person whom he soon recognises as the Saviour himself; shortly afterwards, meets and recognises him again, falls down before him and worships him, *holding him by the feet*. He is present when Christ appeals to his incredulous disciples to handle him and satisfy themselves that his body is real flesh and bones; and when he bids the doubting Thomas, put his hand upon the wounds; and when the Lord eats before his disciples expressly as a test act; and thus, in the appropriate phenomena of a material body, gives and professes to give his friends the true sensible proofs of his re-incarnation. Now under all this testimony of the senses, what position does reason assume? Is that the body that was crucified or not? Is there nothing in all these acts and words, in this more than mere affirmation that he has flesh and bones, and that this body was to be known by its marks as the same that died; is there nothing in all this amounting to an explicit assertion that the body of Jesus was raised? The whole form and style of the testimony transcends mere explicitness. Compared with this vivid and emphatic strain of address, the frigid indicative would have been feeble and ineffectual. And yet says Professor Bush, "the language that is used respecting that event, is such as is capable of being consistently understood without the *implication* that his material body had any share in the resurrection."

His other reasons for denying the resurrection of the material body of Christ are, that the body which ascended was not material, and that body was the same which rose from the dead; that his different manifestations were in a body not subject to the laws of matter; that his apparel is not accounted for; and that he probably ascended to heaven in the intervals of his several manifestations. The probability of this latter supposition is derived from his saying to Mary, 'Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my Father; from his assuring them they should see

him after a little while, "because I go to the Father," and that their heart should rejoice, which word was fulfilled by making "the disciples glad when they saw the Lord;" from his conversation on his way to Emmaus which implied that he had "entered into his glory;" from his saying to them in Galilee, "all power is given unto me," &c., and his breathing upon them as a token of imparting to them the Holy Ghost, which presupposes his previous ascension; from a plurality of ascensions being implied by Luke in the beginning of Acts; from the nature of the Saviour's priestly office which required that he should ascend immediately after his resurrection; and from his having finished his work. The material body of Christ is not thought necessary by Professor Bush, for the purposes of testimony in favour of his resurrection, inasmuch as all those purposes may be answered by a spiritual body; and although the disciples from "their carnal apprehensions" may have had no other view than that the body which was crucified was the body in which the Lord appeared to them, yet he thinks it reasonable to suppose that deeper instruction in the Christian mysteries taught them more correct views on this subject. It is true, concedes Professor Bush, "that an unsophisticated upon hearing or reading the evangelical narrative would inevitably receive the impression that the body raised and manifested to the disciples was the literal, material body of Christ." But "the same inspired truth which is milk for babes is at the same time strong meat for grown men." "We live at a more advanced period of the Christian economy, and have the advantage of all those ulterior developements of its essential genius which were wanting to the first age of the church; and why should we close our eyes to the brighter light that is shining around us for fear of seeing more than was seen in the earliest dawn of Christianity?" p. 166. To the very natural inquiry, what became of the body which was crucified, if it was not raised from the dead; the Professor thinks it a sufficient reply, that to suppose a miracle in disposing of it, is as reasonable as to suppose a miracle in spiritualizing and preparing it for the heavenly state, which latter miracle is required on the supposition that the material body was raised to life; and to dispose of that body was as worthy an occasion for a miracle, as was the miraculous disposal of the body of Moses to prevent the Israelites from bestowing idolatrous worship upon it.

Thus is disposed of by our author, that wonderful and instructive event in the life of our Saviour, to which believers have in every age of Christianity resorted for a triumphant attestation of the certainty of a general resurrection, and their idea of its nature. And in such views as these we are to recognise those ulterior developements of the essential genius of Christianity which were wanting to the first ages of the church. If these are the ulterior developements, we tremble to imagine the ultimate.

To bestow a moment's notice in detail upon a few things here advanced: "The evidence is certainly conclusive," says the Professor, "that it was not a material body which ascended into heaven." We suppose this conclusive evidence consists of the ascension itself of the body; that is, its independence of the law of gravity; for we presume he will not go quite the length of asserting it as certain that heaven does not admit any thing material. We presume the doctrine of no material bodies in heaven is more congenial to his views than the opposite; let him say, if he please, more probable; but will he say it is *absolutely certain*? and while he remembers that "flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom of God," he remembers also that there is matter which is not flesh and blood. The certainly conclusive evidence must, therefore, be the suspension of the law of gravity, or the release of that particular body from the general law of bodies *in this world*. This is just as conclusive evidence of the immateriality of the Lord's anastatic body, as his walking on the water would be of the immateriality of his body before death. But is it *certain*, in the next place, that the same body which rose from the dead ascended to heaven unchanged? Join this uncertainty with the other, and their sum is the value of this proof that the Lord's material body did not rise.

"The circumstances of his appearance to his disciples in repeated instances, subsequent to his resurrection, are far more consistent with the idea of his possessing a spiritual body than the reverse," p. 153. The reference here is to his standing in the midst of his disciples when *the doors were shut* and other like facts. No doubt these appearances were attended by circumstances more consistent with a spiritual body; but then, they were attended also by circumstances more consistent with a material body. The Professor seems to be holding as nice a balance of probabilities here as if he had not a ton weight of positive testimo-

ny in one of his scales. He was as we just now supposed, told more than "explicitly," at the sepulchre, that "*Jesus who was crucified and had lain there, was risen* ; he held that bodily person by the feet ; he handled the body and saw the wounds, and put his finger on them, and saw the body take food, in undisguised and professed testimony of its materiality ; yet against all this he is turned, by 'the superior consistency of some *circumstances* of his appearance with a spiritual body.' We speak thus because, of all the considerations here arrayed against the affirmed fact of the bodily resurrection, this one, relating to the supernatural appearance of Christ on certain occasions, is the only one which we before thought any man of sense could deliberately urge. Can the Professor expect to carry his idea of a spiritual body by the aid of its 'more consistent circumstances,' against all possible proof given to all the senses ? If he can, we are glad that *his* power of reason is not *the* reason ; for if we must present to mankind the evidences of religious truth to be weighed in such a balance, we shall despair of the progress of Christianity so far as reason has anything to do with its reception.

But one word more on the appearances and their circumstances. We are not inclined to employ an incredulous criticism on the terms which so generally convey the impression that the Saviour's entrance and exit were with closed doors. We are willing the facts should be so understood ; for we know not but they were really so. Yet with only a moiety of Professor Bush's philological dexterity, and a tithe of his temerity, we could make it appear, that 'the language used of those events, is such as to be capable of being consistently understood without the implication,' that in the cases of our Saviour's appearance, there was, on the supposition of a material body, any supernatural phenomenon at all. For instance, Jesus is said to have *stood in the midst of them*, the doors being shut. It is not said "explicitly" that the doors were shut when he came in ; and how natural the conclusion, that while the doors were open he entered and sat ; and after the doors were shut, rose and addressed his disciples. Or on the other occasion, while the two disciples were relating the occurrences on the way to Emmaus, and at the table there, and Jesus himself stood in the midst of them, it is not said even that the doors were shut, and the presumption is allowable that he entered in the natural way. And as to his evanishing at the house

in Emmaus, it was at the instant of the disciples' confusion after their sudden and overwhelming discernment of him as their Lord, while their faces, *perhaps*, were hidden with astonishment, and their hearts "burning within them" with the lingering fire of his eloquence along the road, that he abruptly and silently withdrew, *they knew not how*. Moreover since "the meaning of terms must always be governed by the truth of the doctrine so far as it is possible to ascertain it on satisfactory grounds," and we profess to have ascertained on grounds quite satisfactory, that the material body of our Lord arose from the dead; and whereas it is not according to nature that a material body should go in and out at a closed door, therefore the terms must be understood to accommodate the idea that when the Saviour entered, the door was open; and so on, for the other cases. If this brief example may be taken as a feeble hint of what the ulterior developements of the essential genius of Christianity would, in the hands of their powerful discoverer, have done on our side of this interesting question, we might have expected, *mutatis mutandis*, to see our doctrine completely disembarassed of difficulty, and the antiquated fancies of the "Anastasis" annihilated.

On the supposition of our Lord's material corporeity, the deportment he assumed towards his disciples appears consistent with truth and honesty; on the other supposition it appears disguised and guileful. If he appeared in supernatural movements at times amongst his disciples, they could see such movements accounted for in the same manner as they long before accounted for his walking on the sea. They could call his movements miraculous, and be satisfied; for they knew, from other facts, that the power of working miracles was with him. But reverse the supposition, and although the unsuspecting ignorance and simplicity of his followers might have screened him, in their esteem, from the *reproach* of falsehood, yet the *fact* of deception would be there, and would have its corresponding principle within; a consequence on which we cannot think the Professor will insist. And the reproach of deceit must follow, for the material body was expressly asserted then, and how could it be afterwards denied without reproach? It is entirely consistent with truth, not to say all that is true; to assert what is false can be justified on no pretence of useful design. Besides, "a miracle must be supposed in either case;" in the first the miracle is supposed to account for the circum-

stances of the appearance ; in the other, to account for the appearance itself. In the first case the miracle would be recognised with revived admiration often excited before, and by a cause known by previous and frequent occurrence ; in the other, it would bring up no associated recollections of the Lord in the minds of his disciples, and would leave them confounded with a new wonder. In the one case, there would be the ingenuous presentation of appearance accordant with facts ; in the other, an assumption of appearance which could not serve its purpose but by giving countenance to a lie.

If the reasonings of Professor Bush are valid against the evidences of the Saviour's material body after his resurrection, they equally avail against the evidences of his incarnation at any time. The only real proof we have that Jesus ever had a material body, is precisely that which was given of his material body after he rose from the dead. It is true, we have it said in the terms of inspiration, The Word was made flesh, and so forth. But what are words of inspiration before Professor Bush ? Most unfortunately for "the averments of scripture," these latter days are so prolific of light, that the old course of reflection is reversed. What was the sun is now the moon, and the former moon has become the sun. The scriptures cannot tell us anything conclusive on the subject of the Saviour's incarnation. But we begin now with philosophy, and settle "the truth of the doctrine," and then turn and correct the scripture. If the Lord spent forty days without food, if he was transported by the tempter from pinnacle to mountain, if he shone on the mountain and walked on the sea, such facts are far more consistent with the idea of his having a spiritual than a material body. The material phenomena are easily resolvable into "*optical acts*."

It is commonly regarded by prudent critics, as a matter of great delicacy to disturb the general confidence of believers in the competency of the inspired writers in reference to matters which they profess to treat as with authority. The disciples of Christ were chosen witnesses of his resurrection, and are mostly supposed capable of bearing witness to *the truth* in every matter touching that event, and requiring attestation. But, says Professor Bush, while he insists that the body of Christ was really spiritual, "we may admit indeed that the disciples *supposed* that the body which they saw and handled was the veritable body of their crucified

Lord; and that in their preaching the resurrection of Jesus, they had no other idea than that of the re-animation of his body of flesh." And yet, on such a subject as this, what they supposed to be true was false! Happy was it for Origen that Celsus did not think of this sort of argumentation against the apostles. We need not accord to those men knowledge of things which they did not profess to know and to teach; but if they may not be thought competent to testify truth on this subject, and such truth as all men, in their circumstances, would have seen and believed, what could they hold an unmolested claim to know? "It is reasonable indeed to suppose that as they subsequently became more deeply instructed in the mysteries of the kingdom and were able to penetrate more fully its spiritual character, they may have come by degrees to more correct views on this subject; at any rate we know no reason why the measure of their intelligence, on this point, should be the limit of ours." On what point? Why on the question whether Jesus appeared in his 'veritable body.' We should be glad to know in what respects the Professor, with all his knowledge, could tell better than Peter, whether the body of Jesus was flesh and blood or not? And in what respects would Peter's views be improved by subsequent light? Peter had heard an angelic servant of his Master affirm that *he*, that is, his body was raised from the sepulchre "where the Lord lay." He had heard his Master himself declare that his body was flesh and bones, and to be told afterwards that this was not so, that his Lord had a sublimated, ethereal and glorious body, would elevate, a little perhaps, his views of his Saviour's corporeal glory, but how would it sink his estimation of his moral glory!

Upon the whole, for we must come to a close, it seems to us impossible that the doctrine of the "Anastasis" on the subject of our Lord's resurrection should find the least toleration amongst candid, reflecting and religious people. We may misjudge, and perhaps our prepossessions are somewhat strengthened by the "exigencies of theology." We trust they are. But for our own part, we could imagine no severer penance, than to be forced to go into all the world, preaching such a doctrine and sustaining it by such facts amongst reasonable men. We sincerely hope that our highly respected friend will not long be able to read his own book with complacency. We have done what we could to make him disrelish it; and if we shall have failed

to awaken even a stronger and more sacred emotion than is expressed by that word, though we may feel no disappointment, we shall feel sorrow. As we have advanced in the careful and candid examination of the book, our conviction has been greatly increased, not so much of the grievousness of the specific errors of the work, as of the intellectual peculiarity, may we say infirmity, apparent on its pages. Of our men of extensive and varied learning, our eloquent writers, and our devoted and successful scholars, he is certainly among those who hold the fewer qualifications for appreciating and presenting "the inevitable deductions of reason."

In this book more particularly, his extreme infelicity appears in the incessant, varied and broad flourish of propositions, which have more harmony for rhetoric than sense and truth for logic, and for the application of which he almost seems at times to have less taste and less concern than for the sound. He has, therefore, written with more satisfaction to himself than he will give to his thoughtful and serious readers. With a copious and lofty style, an active imagination, vigorous power of invention, and extensive acquisitions of learning, he is capable of assuming an enviable eminence in a most important and influential department of literature. But the power of language thus cultivated and indulged seems in his case dangerous to the power of ratiocination. There are passages in the book, evincive of no common power of description; and the concluding two or three pages are eloquent with words and thoughts and feelings which cannot fail to overwhelm an intelligent and considerate reader. While the public will continue to look with interest for the future productions of Professor Bush's able and prolific pen, they will probably feel less confidence and find less advantage in his original speculations than in his vivid illustrations and powerful enforcements of uncontroverted truth.

We have offered no particular criticisms on his examination of the passages of scripture supposed to relate to the subject of the resurrection. While we agree in several of his conclusions in reference to some of the passages examined, particularly those of the Old Testament, we discern throughout, that prevailing lack of candour which is the natural result of strong theoretic prepossession. It would appear to most readers, we think, even were those criticisms the whole of the book, that each passage was taken

up and examined with the feeling that somehow, 'peaceably if it may, forcibly if it must,' every word shall hold its peace for the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, and either speak against it, or speak on some other subject. For ourselves we fear such criticism, and the more, if it is fraught with learning and skill. But the author professes no other design than that of bringing the word of God to his points. It is in keeping with his avowed intent. He draws up his argument from reason, which holds for him supreme authority in the matter of truth; and then resolves that with this oracle the scriptures, rightly understood, cannot disagree. What has he then to do, but to see that the scriptures be *so* understood as his argument from reason requires; to carry round his test among the words of revelation, and hammer and hew, until every piece works in? So preposterous a proceeding will, we doubt not, be noticed with due displeasure. Let us have arguments from reason on subjects which the scriptures leave unsettled; it would be violence to nature to disparage them, if their subjects come within their legitimate scope. If astronomy presents to us her demonstrations of the magnitude, the motions, and the relative positions of the heavenly bodies, we will adopt her theories; and such phraseology of scripture and of common conversation as is inconsistent with those theories we will either discard, or use it with the full understanding of its philosophic impropriety. We will either change our forms of speech respecting the rising and setting of the sun, or use them without countenancing the philosophical paradox they imply. But, wanting such demonstrations, we may hold the language of the scriptures as the form of sound words. If the philosopher fails to give us such a proof of his theory as would lead a prudent man to think of warping a syllable of revelation an hair's breadth for his accommodation, and then proceeds against obnoxious passages with an air of confidence and decision which could not have been exceeded, had he felt himself supported by demonstrations like those of astronomy, and far stronger than any to which geology can pretend, he presents such an example of philological adventure as we should hope would be harmless to all but himself, by appearing too rash to invite imitation. Of the doctrine of the resurrection, philosophy cannot settle a single principle. As well might she attempt to affirm or deny respecting the nature of the Trinity, or the date and manner of the creation of the uni-

verse. It is purely a doctrine of revelation. So far as it is known at all, as to either its certainty or its nature, it is known from the Bible. By any other way than through the word of God, who can hope to reach the true theory of the resurrection? While then we find delight and profit in following even the faintest lines of analogy from things known to things unknown, we may well indulge astonishment and sadness at the temerity which obtrudes a bewildered and delirious philosophy behind the written word, and asserts in the name of reason a command over mysteries which God hath kept in his own power.

That the doctrine of the resurrection, as revealed in the scriptures, is profoundly mysterious, we are sure; but no more sure, than that to mortals its mysteriousness will never be diminished. If the past progress of knowledge gives any hint on this subject, it is that for farther light upon this doctrine than is given in the scriptures, we must wait until this mortal shall put on immortality. We have here no clue to conduct us through its labyrinths. Science can give us none. Anatomy, physiology, chemistry, of late so keen-sighted and eloquent respecting our present corporeal life, are utterly blind and dumb in relation to the bodily life to come.

Yet among the uncertainties or the mysteries presented for our investigation, there is no other, pertaining to our physical condition, so entertaining and so profitable as this. Here is a point in which, according to the scriptures, we can discern a distinct and peculiar relation between the Lord Jesus Christ and a portion of our physical destiny. He is the resurrection and the life. He himself has become the first fruits of them that slept. Every one in his own order; Christ the first fruits, afterwards they that are Christ's at his coming. A glorious series of events in a glorious order! Resurrection is, in itself, a joyful prospect to the believer; how much more joyful in such a connexion as this! We rise, indeed, to immortality and glory; but we rise in the train of the conqueror of death. We rise under the hand of one who shall change our vile body that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body; himself the model and the builder of an incorruptible and glorified humanity.