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ART. I.—*Life of Joseph Brant Thayendanegea: including the Border Wars of the American Revolution, and Sketches of the Indian Campaigns of Generals Harmer, St. Clair, and Wayne, and other matters connected with the Indian Relations of the United States and Great Britain, from the Peace of 1783 to the Indian Peace of 1795.* By William L. Stone. 2 vols. 8vo. Dearborn: New York. 1838. *Archibald Stevenson*

IT was a matter of surprise to us, at first, to find two ponderous volumes occupied with the life of an Indian chief; but upon perusal, we found that the hero of the history takes up a small space in the body of the work. He is, it is true, a prominent actor in the transactions recorded in these volumes; but if they contained nothing more than the events in which Joseph Brant was personally concerned, they would be of small value compared with that which they intrinsically possess. The fact is, that the American public are indebted to Col. Stone, for an entirely new history of the war of the revolution. This history is not only new as being composed in a lively style, and as containing much graphic description of interesting scenes by an original writer; but by means of new sources of information, and authentic documents, not possessed by any former historian, the author has presented

J. H. Newman

ART. V.—*General History of Civilization in Europe, from the fall of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution.* Translated from the French of M. Guizot, Professor of History to La Faculté des Lettres of Paris, and Minister of Public Instruction. First American, from the second London edition. New York: D. Appleton & Co. pp. 346.

THE new series of leading events which began with the birth of civilization in modern Europe seems destined to extend its widening progression to the end of time. All the preceding states of society are now seen to have been intrinsically defective, even in the rare cases of rapid and brilliant development; and if now the more civilized nations of the world have taken broader and firmer ground as the basis of their social order, a comparison of their present position with that of the primitive societies of Europe, may give them at once a pleasing sense of security and a joyful hope for their advancement.

The chief value of history lies in its faithful representations of the progress of human improvement. The great facts in the annals of the world are the pregnant indications of a progressive intellectual and moral movement, under a wise and righteous superintendence; and it is reading history with eyes that see not, to overlook the significance of the world's vicissitudes, and suffer the thoughts to adhere in the rigid surface of a bare narration. We feel a lively interest in directing the attention of our readers to the history of Europe as an illustration of the progress of the human mind. Although the subject in its general aspect is not new, yet at successive periods, it comes before us with new associations, and is adapted to produce new and useful impressions.

We return, therefore, our cordial thanks to Professor Guizot for his Lectures on the History of Civilization in modern Europe, and to the translator for giving them to the English reader. Whatever may be their imagined adaptation to meet a particular crisis in either Europe or America, they are full of instructive illustrations of the great principles on which real and permanent social order must, in any country and in any age depend. We contemplate, with satisfaction, the state of society, and the course of public thought which have given being to such a book. The appearance of this

work is an interesting social phenomenon. To say nothing of the inherent importance of the subject, or the internal excellence of the work, we regard the publication as the index of an advanced state of society. The very act of surveying the past with the eye of philosophy, implies a readiness if not an ability to draw gratifying comparisons between the past and the present. There is an evident propensity in the intellect of the present century, to test the purity and stability of the existing social systems of the world, and to appreciate their superiority over those of earlier date and briefer duration. It is a favorable omen. The progress of human society has furnished invaluable records of experience to instruct the present and all coming generations; and when these records are explored, and their contents digested and given to the world with the ability displayed in the work before us, we are prepared to anticipate inestimable good to the interests of mankind. Let the friends of humanity consult rather the dictates of a sound philosophy than their preference for favourite theories, let them reason, reflect and act, in their social relations, with the history of the social systems of the world before them, and their course will be attended with less noise, perhaps, and less display, but with more substantial prosperity, and brighter and surer prospects.

An intense desire to draw the attention of our readers to this book of M. Guizot, or to some such views of European history as he presents, has led us to consult that object in the preparation of this article. The work itself is a series of Lectures delivered by M. Guizot, in his capacity of a Professor of the Faculty of Letters, at Paris, and appear to constitute an introduction to a more extended course. We propose to ourselves the pleasing task of placing before our readers, in a condensed view, the outline of this animated, philosophical, and instructive History; presuming it will prove a more acceptable service to the public, than a discursive review of the work, with the selection of a few literal and isolated extracts.

The civilization of the different states of Europe is sufficiently uniform to permit its being collected under one distinctive head as European, and too various to be presented in the history of any single state. Civilization is one of the great moral facts pertaining to the history of the world; the great fact in which all others merge, and in which they find their importance. Hence, we judge of minor facts as they affect this greater one, and even overlook and forgive the

evils of some of the heaviest calamities of nations, if they have but aided the progress of civilization.

The common idea of civilization comprises two elements; the progress of society and the progress of individuals in improvements; the amelioration of the social system, and the development of the faculties of man. We should not recognise our common notion of civilization among a people enjoying only a satisfactory regulation of physical existence, while the moral and intellectual energies are repressed; where the people, like so many flocks of sheep, are carefully tended, but destitute of moral and intellectual activity; nor do we find it in many of the countries of Asia, where the people have less physical comfort, while the deficiency may perhaps be compensated by a stinted allowance of mental light, from which every sentiment of personal liberty is excluded; nor is that civilization which consists in the widest range of personal liberty, where disorder and violence reign, where might makes right, and the weak are oppressed by the strong—a condition of human existence, which once prevailed in Europe; nor, finally, do we discern it in the fullest extent of liberty, and a free acknowledgment of social equality, while there exists no general interest; where the people entertain few public ideas; where men live isolated, with little regard for society, and scarce a sentiment of its influence. No one of these states corresponds with our general idea of civilization. There must be advancement; a progressive development of human nature; improvement of the social system, and improvement in the condition and character of individual man.

The first step in our course will be, to seek out the elements of European civilization at the time of its birth, the fall of the Roman empire. We will then put these elements in motion, and follow their progress through the fifteen centuries which have since rolled away.

Before entering on the history of the civilization of Europe, let us notice one feature by which it is distinguished from all the instances of civilization which preceded it. Take any case of civilization antecedent to that of Europe, and we find it possessed by a single ruling principle. Each case seems to have emanated from a single idea. In Egypt and India the ruling principle was theocracy; in the commercial republics of Asia Minor and Syria, in Ionia, and Phoenicia, the ruling principle was democracy. There were frequent struggles, indeed, between different principles which sought

to prevail; but the war always terminated in the ascendancy of one, which then took sole possession of society, and imparted its hue and form to all the social institutions. This predominance of single distinct principles gave each instance of civilization a peculiar character, and led to different results. In Greece, the unity of the social principle produced a development of wonderful rapidity. The course was brilliant and short. Greece lived fast through her glory. The principle of her civilization seemed exhausted by its own development. In India and Egypt, by the prevalence of a different principle, society became stationary, monotonous, and torpid. The intellectual productions, also, of the different civilized nations, bear the character of unity which distinguished their civilization. The monuments of Hindoo literature, lately introduced into Europe, were all struck from the same die. Religious and moral treatises, history, poetry, all bear the same physiognomy. And even the literature and the arts of Greece were pervaded by this same remarkable unity.

But turn to modern Europe, and all the principles of social organization are found existing and acting together. Powers temporal, powers spiritual; theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy; infinite gradations of liberty, wealth, and influence, are here jumbled together, in continual struggle among themselves; no one being able to master the others, and take sole possession of society. You see the same variety of moral character and of sentiments. Opinions of all imaginable sorts crossing and limiting and modifying each other; the advocates of one extreme checked and restrained by the advocates of the opposite; an indomitable thirst for independence dwelling side by side with the greatest aptness for submission, a singular fidelity between man and man, with an imperious preference in each man for his own way. In literature and the arts how vast the diversity. Particular departments may not have reached the same perfection with the products of ancient civilization; but if Europe has not brought any single fruit to so high perfection, she has ripened an infinitely greater variety. Compare too, her long continued progression; not indeed with Grecian rapidity, but with far more than Grecian constancy and perseverance; having advanced for fifteen centuries, and still advancing, with a boundless career before her.

Here it is that European civilization reveals at once its distinctive character, and its immense superiority. It is a

civilization for the world; where various powers and principles incessantly intermingle and contend. It has cast off the special character; penetrated into the scheme of the universal providence, and prepared itself for general propagation among the nations of the earth.

This characteristic of European civilization can be discerned in its very cradle; at the moment of its birth, when the Roman empire fell. For what was the Roman empire? A mere assemblage of municipal institutions. Nations then were only confederations of cities. There was no country population, but slaves, or mere labourers. Rome extended her power in Europe, by conquering or founding cities. Hence Rome could conquer the world more easily than govern it; and an empire was attempted, which should bind the scattered society together. Between the reigns of Augustus and Dioclesian, the improvement of civil legislation arranged throughout the empire a chain work of subordinate functionaries, which knit the people to the imperial court, conveyed abroad the will of the government, and brought in the tribute and obeisance of the people. The incoherent assemblage of little republics, thus held together, acquired a sudden attachment to the central power, and sank rapidly into obedient respect for the sacred name of emperor; but in the fourth century, all these bonds were as suddenly broken; the provinces severally yielded to barbarian invasion, and no longer indulged concern for the common destiny. This crisis suggested the extraordinary idea of a representative system, as an instrument of reviving the patriotic sentiment, and preserving the unity of the empire. The call for a representative assembly of the provinces in the south of Gaul, was made by Honorius and the younger Theodosius in the year 418, but it received no response. The primitive nature of the society was opposed to it; the municipal principle everywhere re-appeared. The Roman empire had been formed of cities, and to cities it again returned.

There were then bequeathed to Europe by the ancient Roman civilization, these two elements of social organization: the municipality, and the empire; the idea of the city corporation, and the idea of imperial power. In intimate conjunction with these, came also another most important element, which had grown in the heart of Roman society; the *Christian Church*, with its independent government, its priesthood, its polity, and its revenues. It is not the Christian religion that is here intended, but the Christian

Church; an ecclesiastical institution, to be contemplated in a political view, in its relation to civilization. At first, a simple association of believers for the exercise and enjoyment of a common faith, with no formal creed, no settled rules of discipline, no body of magistrates; then, assuming a form of doctrine, rules of discipline, and a body of magistrates, still leaving the power in the general body of believers; then, thirdly, separating its clergy from the people, and making an uncontrolled and irresponsible government over the private members of the church. Here were trained men of great strength and zeal, who stood ready to catch the civil authority as it fell from the hands of the expiring municipalities, and who did, without being guilty of usurpation, and by the common law of nature, become gradually invested with immense temporal power and responsibility.

From this point we date the powerful co-operation of the church in the cause of European civilization. The church arose to exercise a moral power at a time when the world would else have fallen under mere brute force. She also, at that period, undertook the separation of temporal and spiritual authority, and revealed the true basis of the strictest and most extensive liberty of conscience; and thus, in the fifth century of her existence, conferred great benefit upon the cause of humanity. Would that she had not subsequently transcended that modest and useful sphere.

These three elements of Roman civilization, are now to be contemplated in that combination with barbarian principles, in which they dropped into European society, in the cradle of modern civilization. In the true picture of a barbarian, you perceive the pleasure of personal independence; of enterprise and adventure; degenerate, indeed, and developed as a gross passionate desire, in connexion with a brutal and stupid selfishness, and yet denoting some of the nobler elements of moral character. It was the pride of personal liberty, not the sentiment of political liberty; and therefore unknown to Roman society, and brought into European civilization by the rude barbarians of Germany. You perceive the features of the warrior; the foundation of a firm fidelity between man and man, and of a graduated subordination which grew into the aristocratic organization of the feudal system.

We have, then, before us, the three sources from which the elements of our society were derived; municipal society, the last remains of the Roman empire; Christian society; and

barbarian society. We find the love of the most absolute independence by the side of the most devoted submission; military patronage, with ecclesiastical domination; spiritual power and temporal power every where together; the canons of the church, the learned legislation of Rome, the almost unwritten customs of the barbarians; a co-existence of nations, of language, of manners, of ideas, of impressions, in endless diversity. What wonder that the progress of European society has been so slow and troublesome!

These elements of civilization thus combined and set in motion, we are to follow in their progress; and we enter first the dark age—the age of barbarism. Here we are met on the threshold with a simultaneous advancement of claims to the exclusive possession of power, and the agitation of the great question of political legitimacy. Theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and even the church; each, would found claims of precedence first on justice and right, then on antiquity, and hence the idea of legitimacy is not attached to monarchy alone, but appertains to all the elements of European society. From this simultaneous advancement of claims by all the principles, we conclude that, during the period of barbarism, Europe was under the sole dominion of no one of them. The dispute respecting which bore chief sway, proves that all existed together, while none so prevailed as to give society either its form or its name.

We find at this period four classes of persons: 1st, Freemen, who depended on no superior; 2nd, *Lendes*, *Fideles*, *Antonstions*, &c. who were first connected with each other as companion and chief, afterwards as vassal and lord; 3rd, Freedmen; 4th, Slaves. These classes were not stationary, as to the persons who composed them; but individuals were constantly passing from one rank to the other. Property was also held in various ways. Institutions were unstable. Monarchy, aristocracy, and free institutions, all existed, but were subject to constant change. States also were created and suppressed, united and divided, and a confusion of principles, governments, nations, languages, formed the chief characteristic of barbarian Europe.

The period of barbarism closed with the termination of the invasion; at which time, the progress of civilization was hastened on by the natural aspirations of the people, the remembrance of Roman civilization, the Christian church, and the appearance of great men. These various causes led to several attempts of social organization: 1st, An attempt by

the barbarians themselves, in reducing their rude laws to writing; 2d, In Italy and the south of Gaul, there was a slight resuscitation of municipal order; 3d, In Spain the church undertook the work of civilization, and until the great invasion of the Saracens, her efforts were great and successful; in France, Charlemagne was the great promoter of civilization, and in England, Alfred the Great. But all these causes, however promising, were unsuccessful in putting an end to the period of barbarism, and establishing a general social organization. When the northern invasions had ceased, society gradually became more settled and secure. In the south, the Arabs had settled in Spain, and were still contending with the Christians; the Saracens still infested the coasts of the Mediterranean, but the career of Islamism was arrested. Meantime in the interior of Europe, the wandering life declines, populations become fixed, estates and landed possessions become settled; local attachments and little societies begin to be formed; on one hand, we see the proprietor settling in his domains, on the other, the subordination of services and rights pertaining to a military organization; and thus we perceive the feudal system oozing at last out of the bosom of barbarism.

Wherever barbarism ceased, feudalism prevailed; proving that, in the tenth century, the feudal system was the only social system practicable. Every institution—the church, the free community, royalty, accommodated itself to this new order of things. Churches became sovereigns and vassals, cities became lords and vassals, royalty was hidden under the feudal suzerain. Not that the feudal principle so universally prevailed; it was only the feudal form, under which the different social institutions respectively exercised their own principles. The church retained its theocracy, the free cities clung to their democracy, royalty to its monarchy; and all strove to free themselves from that system whose livery they were compelled to put on. But every thing became feudal in its aspect.

Under this system, as a great physical cause, Europe underwent an important change. The conquerors of the territory, once settled in cities, or moving in bands, were distributed at long distances apart, each isolated in his particular domain; carrying the government of society from the cities to the country, and splitting the public body into a thousand little sovereignties. The possessor of a fief plants himself in his castle, in the midst of his household, who are

now to be his companions; where at once begin to rise into importance the domestic relations, and especially the social character of woman. At the foot of the castle hill, stands a huddle of cottages, inhabited by the serfs, the cultivators of the feudal domain. Here religion has planted a church and a priest. Thus the Baron, the people of his domain and the priest, present us with the original outline of the feudal society.

The feudal family had its characteristics, which distinguished it from all other family systems, and which produced a social development peculiar to itself. The patriarch lived with his children and his servants, had the same occupations, led the same life. The head of the Scottish or Irish clan, separated himself from his servants, and while they were employed in supplying his wants, he lived in idleness, or in war. Yet their common parentage, their common remembrances and associations, created a moral tie, and a feeling of equality between the head and all the members of the clan. Not so the feudal family. The proprietor and his family are separate from the rest of the population, lead not the same life, claim not the same origin. The family is small, forming no tribe, but consisting of only the possessor of the fief, his wife and his children, linked together by domestic affections, and prepared to form, in the progress of their improvement, the domestic character and manners, and to give to the feudal possession a permanent identity by means of the principle of inheritance.

The lord of the domain considers the serfs as his property, indulging towards them, perhaps, those kindly feelings which the relation permits, yet not yielding to them, as men, either rights, guarantee, or society. Hence of all the despotisms which the world has known, the feudal despotism is the only one that has been the object of invincible and invariable hatred to the common people. It tyrannized over the destinies of men, without ruling in their hearts. The religious element of feudalism was no alleviation; the priest could do little to affect the mutual relation or conduct of lord and servant, being himself an inferior and under the sovereign control of the baron. The serfs were not known in any general society. Beyond the fief which sustained them they had no relations, no concern, either with persons, or government. They were no part of a nation, had no common country, no common destiny. But the possessors of fiefs held relations

to each other, and the attempt was made to build on these relations a body of general laws and institutions; in other words, to organize the feudal system. But there was no predominant will, to which the independent barons would submit; there was no united will of individuals to constitute a public power, and the laws had therefore no guarantee, and of course no stability.

Feudalism, therefore, while it produced elevated feelings and character in individual minds, accomplished little in favour of general society. It seemed indispensable as a step from barbarism; but was, in itself, radically vicious, and could neither regulate nor enlarge society. It permitted no substitution of public authority for private will; a substitution which is the chief element of social order. It produced an offspring of noble sentiments, of splendid achievement, of beautiful forms of humanity, but it every where opposed the establishment of social order, and the spread of general liberty.

The influence of the church upon modern civilization has been more powerful, perhaps, than her most violent adversaries, or most zealous defenders have supposed. It was the only institution which, in the fifth century, possessed youth and vigour. All others had the weakness of either infancy or old age. The church existed as an ecclesiastical corporation, a government of religion. It derived an immense force from its respect for equality, and the various kinds of legitimate superiority. It was the most popular society of the time, the most accessible; the only one which opened its arms to all the talents, to all the noble ambition of man. It was, indeed, her great error that she denied the rights of individual reason, and assumed the right of compulsion; that she undertook to govern human thought and opinions. Yet this error notwithstanding, where was there ever a society in which reason and conscience more boldly developed themselves than in the church? Witness her sects, her heresies, the fruit of individual opinions; the proof of the life and moral activity which reigned within her.

When the church erected herself amid the ruins of the Roman empire, and found herself surrounded by barbarian kings, between whom and herself there existed no connexion of interest, she felt herself in danger; and it became her policy to attach these barbarians to her interest. To accomplish this, she increased at once, and largely, the number of her imposing ceremonies, and surrounded herself with great pomp and splendour, to dazzle their senses, and excite their

imagination. And still further to preserve herself against barbarian violence, she announced anew and with increased emphasis, her principle of separation between temporal and spiritual power; and by the aid of this principle, she dwelt freely among those who felt little interest in her welfare.

From this desire for liberty, it was but a step to the desire of power. From independence she aspired to authority. Finding herself in possession of all the intelligence of the age, at the head of all intellectual activity, she very naturally would assume the general government of the world. Add to this, the miserable state of temporal government, at that epoch, when its power was mere brute force, and its moving spring a rapacious ambition; when the interpositions of spiritual authority in temporal affairs were often salutary and welcome to the oppressed and injured people, and seemed like the offices of heavenly pity intended for the refuge of the defenceless;—and we perceive ample cause for the success of the usurpations of the church. She always laboured, however, under this great disadvantage, of having no physical power of her own, and of being obliged to call in the aid of the secular arm, and borrow the civil power to enforce her own authority. Unfortunately also for the church she persisted in completing the separation between the governing and the governed. The independence of the clergy was in process of time fully established. The laity had no other concern with the government of the church than as mere lookers on. The people had, indeed, an influence upon the government, but no legal concern with it; and out of this circumstance arose many of the evils which have cost the church so dear. The clergy and the laity were however bound together by the general dispersion of the clergy through the social system. From the thatched cottage of the husbandman,—from the miserable hut of the serf at the foot of the feudal chateau, to the palace of the monarch—there was everywhere a clergyman. The bishops, also, were mixed up with the feudal system, members, at the same time, of the civil and ecclesiastical government; and by these means a degree of sympathy was ever maintained between the clergy and the laity, while the legal separation of the two classes was complete.

The influence of the church on individual character and manners was confined chiefly to the bosom of her own society. For the instruction of the clergy she was anxiously alive. She excited and kept alive a general activity of mind by the

offer of her dignities to select individuals; but beyond this she did little for the mental improvement of the laity.

To the social state her influence was more beneficial. The great vices of the social world, particularly slavery, she perseveringly opposed. She laboured worthily for the improvement of civil and criminal legislation; preserving and defending those mild and rational ideas of justice which had been derived from Roman society, as well as those which she derived from her own code of divine morals. The system of penance, so far as the application of moral law was concerned, accorded with those notions of modern philosophy which make repentance and example the ends of punishment. And her steadfast opposition to the practices of violence and war, was calculated to ameliorate the social system by an infusion of gentleness and conciliation.

An immense influence has, then, been exerted on the moral and intellectual order of Europe by the Christian church. The progress of Europe has been essentially theological. Down to the time of Bacon and Descartes, theology was the blood in the veins of the European world. It possessed and directed the human mind; every idea bore its stamp; every question of philosophy, politics, history, was considered in relation to it; and even the mathematical and physical sciences were compelled to submit to its doctrines. Bacon in England, and Descartes in France, were the first who carried the human mind out of the pale of theology. The influence of the church thus kept up the salutary intellectual movement in Europe, and stamped upon that movement its own superior impress. It gave unprecedented extent and variety to the mental development of the world. The intelligence of the east was altogether religious. In Greece there was nothing religious. In Europe religious intelligence is mingled with all other knowledge; and thus the two great sources of human development, humanity and religion, have been open at the same time, and flowed in plenteous streams.

While we admit that the church has exerted a salutary influence on the moral and intellectual character of man, and largely contributed to ameliorate the social condition, we cannot deny that in a purely political view, her influence has been baneful. Her political spirit was either the spirit of theocracy or of imperial tyranny. In her weakness she sheltered herself under absolute power in the empire; in her strength she laid claim to that power herself; and whenever

a question arose between power and liberty, the church always took the part of despotism.

Look now at the several states of the church from the fifth century to the twelfth. First, she appears the church imperial. Just as the Roman empire fell, the church believed that she had conquered paganism and heresy; and thus attained the summit of her hopes. But she found herself among new pagans and new heretics; among Goths, Vandals, Burgundians, and Franks. The fall was great. She tried to re-establish the empire, and besought the barbarian kings to become emperors, and take the same relation to the church which had been taken by the Roman emperors. The struggle was in vain; and the church, like the civil world, sank into the arms of barbarism. This was her second state; and in this period came a new separation of the temporal power from the spiritual, that the church might again assume her independence; and there came also the establishment of monasteries, where religious men could defend themselves by peculiar sanctity against barbarian spoliations. Her next state was her connexion with the feudal system, divided and weakened, and dispersed among the independent fiefs, and struggling to keep herself together by some federating principle, yet without success. She lost her order and harmony, and even her moral character. In the eleventh century she entered upon her fourth state, that of a theocracy supported by monastic institutions. In this period the holy see was raised to the summit of its power, and strenuous efforts were made to reform the abuses which were prevailing in the church. Important advances were also made towards the attainment of intellectual liberty. A serious struggle occurred between the clergy and the advocates of free inquiry. This was the nature of the strife between Abelard and St. Bernard; and it was the great event of the twelfth century.

About this time, corporate cities begin to make a figure in history. Their previous existence indeed merits attention, but it was not till the eleventh or twelfth century that they performed any important part in the world, in connexion with modern civilization. Between the fifth and tenth century, the towns were neither in a state of servitude nor freedom. They suffered all the evils to which weakness is liable; they were a prey to the continual depredations of the strong; yet impoverished as they were they maintained a certain degree of importance. There was commonly a bishop, whose presence gave a sanctity to their independence; and there

were some valuable fragments of Roman institutions. But all seemed to decline. The bishops having incorporated themselves into the feudal frame, thought less of their municipal life, and the rising importance of agriculture drew the people out of the cities into the country; and thus from the fifth century to the time of the complete organization of the feudal system, the cities languished. Then they began to resume activity and importance. When society had become settled under the feudal system, the proprietors of fiefs began to feel new wants, and acquire some taste for improvement, and for the benefits of commerce and industry in the towns of their domains. The cities also afforded a refuge to fugitives from oppressive powers, and thus acquired accessions to their population in some instances, of high character and rank. They gradually grew, therefore, in strength, in wealth, and in the importance of their interests, and about the beginning of the eleventh century, broke forth in rebellion against the lordly and overbearing proprietors of fiefs. Each town arises in open resistance against its lord, and commences an enterprise against the neighbouring castle. The towns become confederate for the common benefit, and by united resistance are able to sustain a protracted struggle, till at length, both parties incline to peace; and Europe, particularly France, which had, for a whole century, abounded in insurrections, now abounded in treaties of peace and charters. As the royal power was frequently called upon to interfere in the quarrel, there arose a close connexion between the citizens and the king. By the enfranchisement of the cities a new general class of society was produced, the merchants, and little land or house proprietors of the cities. These were the elements of the present class of European citizens.

Then came the struggle between the different classes of population; and this struggle, perpetual and universal, is the grand characteristic of European civilization. In Asia, one class has completely triumphed, and the conflict of classes has resulted in the system of castes; and society has there become entirely stationary. In Europe, no class, thank God, has ever yet conquered and subjugated the others; and the continual conflict of ideas, interests, and manners, is an unquestionable source of the activity and the progressive development of European society.

We have now arrived at the crisis when the monarchical principle began to be decidedly developed. Until nearly

the twelfth century, the civilization of Europe was in a process of formation; then succeeded a period of attempts, and experiments, during which the different elements of society approach and combine, and prepare to act together, a period extending to the sixteenth century; after which came the period, in which human society in Europe takes a definite form, and proceeds with a rapid and general movement towards a clear and precise end; this is the period which began in the sixteenth century and is now pursuing its course.

The second of these periods is the one on which we now enter. The great event of this period was the crusades; an event which wrought an important change in the condition of nations.

They were universal; all Europe concurred in them. They were the first European event. In relation to each separate nation, they were a national event. All classes of society yielded to the same impulse, and the moral unity of nations was now for the first time made manifest.

There were two great causes which impelled Europe to the crusades, the *first* was moral, the impulse of religious feeling and belief. These enterprises were the continuation, and the height of the great conflict of Christianity with Mohammedanism. The *second* cause was social. The lapse of time, after the organization of society, discovered that the limits of human enterprise were too narrow; that the thoughts and energies of men aspired beyond their contracted sphere; and the people threw themselves into the crusades, as into a new state of existence, in which they had more space, and more variety. At the end of the thirteenth century these causes ceased to exist; and the crusades consequently came to an end; leaving, however, a new and distinct aspect upon the condition of the human mind. We observe an immense advance towards enlarged and liberal ideas. The crusaders became travellers. They observed different nations, different manners; and their minds were disengaged from their old and narrow prejudices. They saw in both Greek and Mussulman society, something superior to their own degree of civilization, and were struck with the riches and elegance they beheld on every side. They collected a vast amount of information, much of which was useful, and returned to their families, full of the remembrance of incidents, marvellous and often exaggerated by their own imaginations, yet expanding, by their natural tendency, the range of thought and interest. Religious doctrines

underwent no essential change; but thought had become more free, and religious creeds were not the only subjects which exercised the mind. The social state was partially revolutionized, by the necessity under which the feudal proprietors fell, of selling their fiefs to the kings, to raise money for the crusades. Property and power fell into fewer hands, and feudal power began to exist on a larger scale. The extension of great fiefs, and the consequent dependance of the smaller fiefs upon them for protection, were important results of the crusades in reference to feudalism. And as to the towns, the crusades created great civic communities, and gave to maritime commerce the greatest impulse it had yet received.

The European mind had now expanded beyond the exclusive dominion of the few contracted religious ideas, which had moved to the crusades; and the progress of the social relations had furnished a greater variety to life in Europe, and removed the necessity of going abroad for mere entertainment. Now kings began to see the road to political aggrandizement. The people saw the road to wealth open before them, and gave up foreign adventures to engage in industry. The feudal nobility only, not being disposed to industry, retained their former manners, and endeavoured to renew the crusades. All things seemed now to wear a new aspect as the effect of these remarkable movements. On the one hand we observe the emancipation of thought, on the other a general enlargement of the social sphere; more individual freedom, and more political unity. Society was drawn from a narrow road to follow broader paths, and European society assumed the form of *governments and nations*, the grand characteristic of modern civilization.

We are now to contemplate the connexion of monarchy with the progress of human society in Europe. When society had seemed to complete its organization, and government and people were the only objects of historical interest, the settled form of government in all the great European states was that of monarchy. It is a significant fact that we find monarchy holding the most prominent place, and the most general and permanent of all institutions, the one most difficult to preclude where it does not exist, and where it does exist, the most difficult to extirpate. It has penetrated every where and accommodated itself to all situations.

In surveying the effects of monarchy in modern Europe

we are not considering the effects of the individual will of a sovereign. We take monarchy as the personification of legitimate sovereignty; of the collective wisdom and will of the people. That there is a legitimate sovereignty, is the doctrine of every people; for they have always endeavoured to place themselves under its empire. Human nature must believe in legitimate sovereignty. All political philosophy labours to discover it. Theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, all boast of having found the seat of legitimate sovereignty, and promise to place society under the authority of its rightful master.

European monarchy has been in some sort, the result of all the possible kinds of monarchy. The barbarian monarchy was essentially elective. The rulers were military chiefs, whose power was accepted by many of their companions; and who were obeyed as being the bravest and most competent to rule. As the families from which the monarchs were selected grew powerful, the election was more confined to them, until the course of things gradually gave rise to the idea of hereditary succession. Meanwhile, religion spread its sanctity over the origin of the ascendant family, and suggested the doctrine that kings were decendants of the Gods, and the proper objects of religious veneration. The monarchy of the Roman empire was the personification of the state; the emperor was the representative of the whole republic; as, in France, the sovereignty of the people was transferred to Napoleon; and the people, represented in him, were the real monarch. After three centuries of these monarchies had passed away, the principle began to assume a religious form, and the monarch began to be regarded as a representative, or delegate of God. These three kinds of monarchy, the barbarian, the imperial, the religious, made their appearance, in the fifth century, on the ruins of the Roman empire, and proceeded in their different courses.

In France, under the first race, barbarian monarchy, with some mixture of inheritance and of religious notions, remained predominant. In Italy, the imperial monarchy prevailed. In Spain, the monarchy was more religious. In England, it was essentially barbarian. In the eighth century, the principle began to assume a more uniform character; its varieties were more blended together, and especially did there enter into the composition a stronger infusion of the religious character. In the reign of Louis le Debonnaire the king fell into

the hands of the clergy, and a monarchy subordinate to religious authority was on the point of being established. Through the tenth and eleventh centuries the prevalence of the feudal system produced a fourth kind of monarchy, of the feudal stamp in which the king became in theory a *suzerain* over *suzerains*, a lord of lords. But in the twelfth century, the institution of monarchy began to assume the character of a great magistracy, whose office was to maintain peace in society, to protect the weak, and decide differences which could not otherwise be settled. Here originated the vital principle of modern monarchy. At different periods of history we observe the reappearance of all the varieties, each in its turn striving for the ascendancy; and while the clergy preached a religious monarchy, and the civilians contended for the imperial, and the nobility for the elective, or the feudal system, monarchy itself made them all contribute towards the advancement of its own power; and at last reduced all the elements of society to two:—the government and the nation.

All attempts to bring the various portions of society together without destroying their diversity failed. The attempts were very numerous and occupied the space of time during which the metamorphosis of European society was accomplished. Too many of them arose from selfishness and tyranny, yet some were pure and disinterested. They were of two kinds; one intended to exalt to supreme rule one of the social elements, and making all the others subordinate to it; the other proposing to unite them all, ensuring to each its due share of influence.

The first was, the attempt at theocratic organization; the effort of the clergy to obtain the government of Europe. It proceeded naturally from the political and moral superiority of the church. But it was met by a series of obstacles which it could never overcome. One was the nature of Christianity, a system of moral influence only. Of course the church, however great its moral influence, could not obtain the political power. Another obstacle was the feudal nobility, who would never give way to the power of the church. A third was the celibacy of the clergy which rendered the church dependent on the laity, for the perpetuity of its own existence; and the fourth, the greatest of all, was the divisions and disputes of the ecclesiastical world itself. The national churches of most of the European states quarrelled with the Roman court; the councils, with the popes;

heresy, schism, dissension, disturbed the peace and destroyed the unity of the ecclesiastical body. These obstacles, however, did not prevent a vigorous and protracted effort; till in the reign of Gregory the seventh, the pompous proclamation of the designs of the church awoke a general and irresistible reaction, first, in the people, then in the sovereigns. At the end of the thirteenth century, the church gave up the project of temporal dominion, and thence forward acted only on the defensive.

The second attempt was that of a republican organization. The free cities of Italy had grown more vigorously than those of any other state in Europe. The barbarian nobles became extensively residents in the cities; the conquerors and the conquered were mixed together within the same walls. The Italian towns acquired in this way an immense and precocious superiority; while the towns of other states remained poor, insignificant communities. This is the reason why the republican organization was so successful in this part of Europe. In the Italian republics, however, with all their brilliancy and energy and wealth, there was no security of life; there was no progress of institutions; and to this day, the best of Italian patriots regret the success of republican organization in their country in the middle age. If this attempt thus failed in Italy, much more elsewhere. The democratic organization attempted by the Albigenses in the south of France was resisted by the feudal interest of the north. Among the Swiss it succeeded better a little later. In the north of France, it triumphed in the internal government of cities, but was confined to them. The feudal nobility terrified and jealous formed coalitions to arrest the progress of republican principles, and after a long and wearisome struggle, there appeared a very general disposition for mutual concession, and an attempt at mixed organization. We now see coming forth upon the history of Europe, the States-general of France, the Cortes of Spain and Portugal, the Parliament of England and the States of Germany; all assemblies in which the nobility, the clergy, and the cities or commons, met and laboured to unite themselves into one sole society.

The first was an indifferent affair, resorted to by all parties from a feeling of necessity, regarded with interest by none. It was indirectly useful to France, in keeping alive the remembrance and the claims of liberty, but it never became a means of government, and never answered its original design.

The Cortes of Spain and Portugal came to the same general result, and like the states-general have been a mere accident in history; never a system of government.

England experienced a different fortune. There were no great vassals sufficiently powerful to maintain a contest with the crown. The high aristocracy were forced to unite for common defence, while the minor proprietors of fiefs were brought with the burgher class, into the House of Commons, composing a body capable of influencing the government of the country. Thus the effort to unite the various elements of society into one body politic succeeded in England, while it failed in every part of the continent.

In Germany, the attempts at a mixed organization, though undertaken, were coldly followed up, and the various elements have remained more distinct in Germany to the present day. Here feudal interest appears in the election of royalty; ecclesiastical sovereigns were continued, and free cities were preserved with a true political existence and sovereignty.

All these efforts then failed, except in England. Society was not yet sufficiently advanced to adapt itself to unity. Political ideas were not yet truly public. It was necessary that an active and powerful civilization should assimilate the incoherent ingredients of society, and that a public authority and a public opinion should be created. We are now approaching the period when this great consummation was effected. It was in the sixteenth century that modern society really commenced.

It is the characteristic of the fifteenth century that it constantly tended to create general interest and general ideas; to produce what had not till then existed on a large scale, nations and governments. This process was begun in the fifteenth century, but carried out in the two centuries next following.

Let us glance at the political and moral facts of the fifteenth century. In France, the last half of the fourteenth century and the first half of the fifteenth were occupied in great national wars with England, for the independence of her territory and her name. Thus the nationality of France began to be formed. The history of the French as a nation began with the princes of the house of Valois; when, for the first time, the nobility, the citizens, the peasants were united by the tie of a common cause and a common honour. At the same time also did France enlarge, fix and consoli-

date her territory. Then, too, began a unity of government. Taxation, administration of justice, military force, became parts of one great system, and the feudal powers were superseded by the power of the state.

In Spain, we observe movements simultaneous and similar. By the conquest of Grenada, in the fifteenth century, the conflict between the Christians and the Moors was brought to an end; the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella united the two kingdoms of Castile and Arragon under one dominion, and Spain was consolidated into one kingdom. The monarchy was extended and confirmed. It had indeed, the inquisition instead of a parliament; an institution which though, at last, employed in defence of religious faith, was at first erected for the support of civil order.

Germany also came forward in her order. In the middle of the fifteenth century, the house of Austria came to the empire; the election thence forward became a mere sanction of hereditary right, and unprecedented permanence was given to imperial power.

The fifteenth century in England was occupied in war with France abroad, and between the two houses of York and Lancaster at home. At the end of these struggles, the English nobility were diminished in wealth, number and power; the Tudors ascended the throne, and with Henry VII. began the era of political unity in England.

Italy reared no monarchy, but, in the fifteenth century, she reduced her republicanism and extinguished its spirit; and foreign sovereigns asserted dominion over the different parts of the peninsula.

The change we are now contemplating was every way momentous. The old elements of society every where disappeared. There was something deeply melancholy in the process. In France, in Germany, above all, in Italy, the patriots of the fifteenth century resisted the revolution with ardour, and lamented it with despair; denouncing as despotism, and that justly, what they saw rising every where around them. It was, however, inevitable—it was useful. The old forms were hopeless as means of security and progress to society, and the social destiny of human nature demanded that the primitive system of Europe should fall.

In this century of political wonders, the moral phenomena were scarcely less imposing. The church awoke to a pervading energy in ecclesiastical reform; the people awoke with equal energy to a religious reform; and an intellectual

revolution gave birth to a quenchless ardour of devotion to literature and the arts. It was the period of physical activity; of voyages, travels, enterprises, discoveries, and inventions, hitherto unparalled in their extent and their results. The Portuguese now made their expeditions along the coast of Africa, De Gama discovered the new passage to India by the cape of Good Hope, Columbus discovered America, and European commerce was vastly and suddenly extended. In this century gunpowder changed the system of war; the compass, the system of navigation. Painting and engraving were cultivated and filled Europe with masterpieces of art. Paper made of linen became common, and finally printing was invented, the art of arts, the subject of so many eulogies, which no eulogies however can sufficiently praise. It is impossible to form an adequate idea of the greatness of this fifteenth century, in its relation to the civilization of the world.

Descending now to the sixteenth century, we come at once upon the reformation; the great revolution of the world. The causes to which this event has been attributed are, on the one hand, accidents and mischances, such as the sale of indulgences being committed to one order of monks, which thus excited the jealousy of the others; or, on the other hand, a pure desire of reforming the abuses of the church. But, in a larger view, there was a general cause to which all others were subordinate. The reformation was a vast struggle of the human mind for freedom; a great endeavour to emancipate human reason; an insurrection of mind against absolute power. The labours of the mind in religion and philosophy had been long accumulating; and the time was now come when they must have a result. More men were educated, and educated men wished more to think for themselves. At last came the revival of the literature and the arts of antiquity; and all these causes aroused the intellect of this period to an invincible purpose of going forward. The spiritual power, on the other hand, was imbecile and stationary; sufficiently indulgent, far from being unusually tyrannical; its indulgence favoured the boldness of its subjects, and its weakness tempted their attacks, till, at a providential juncture, the open and eventful conflict began.

Wherever the force of this religious revolution was felt, whether it achieved its full and immediate object or not, its general result was an immense progress in mental activity and freedom. The very reproaches cast upon this event

prove the fact here asserted; the multiplicity of sects, the excessive license of thought and speculation, show that the mind of man felt and enjoyed its emancipation.

This rising spirit of free and independent thought, having shaken off the bonds of ecclesiastical oppression, came at once into conflict with the temporal powers. The first shock occurred in England, where the right of free inquiry, and the desire for general liberty, had been most fondly cherished, and where, at the same time, the power of monarchy was most systematic and overbearing. The leading fact of the English revolution—the struggle between the spirit of free inquiry and pure monarchy—was sure to be repeated in France, and such was the event, when this spirit arose in the eighteenth century against what remained of the government of Louis XIV.

The last two lectures of our author are devoted to a philosophical description of the English and the French revolutions; the first of the two to that of England, the other to that of France.

Our readers will not need to be reminded of the imperfection with which so vast a subject must be represented in so small a compass. If the view given above of the course pursued in the book of M. Guizot, shall recommend the work, and particularly the general subject of it, to the careful attention of any of our fellow citizens, our object in this article will be mainly accomplished.

The believer in Christianity must contemplate the part taken by the church in the cause of civilization with a mixture of satisfaction and mortification. That the church should lead the van of the world, in the career of intellectual as well as moral improvement, was the natural result of her moral constitution. That she should be found with the most perfect organization, amid a general chaos of the social elements, was to be expected from the operation of her divine economy. She was officially concerned with all the great questions which engage the attention of the human mind. Her intellectual activity and vigour, and the rules of her order and discipline, brought her into constant intercourse with the principles of social organization, and gave her, in this respect, an advantage over all other conditions of human society. Nor need we wonder that her influence upon the cause of civilization was so great. She had all the means of influence within her reach. The educated intellect of the world was within her pale. She had constant access to the sources of

moral power. The greatest interests of men were committed to her charge, and her sanctity and divine authority became objects of veneration. No other institution, in the infancy of society, could have a power, for good or for evil, like that which was held by the church. Her superior influence was the natural ascendancy of truth; and with all the weakness and deformity of great corruption, she still proved herself comparatively mighty in the greatest affairs of mankind.

But we look with grief on those pages of her history which show that her heaven-descended laws which were ordained to life, became the instruments and occasions of death. It is mortifying to be told by a cool and candid philosopher that at any period of the world, the church exerted a baneful influence on human society; that she so far forgot her office, and abandoned her province, as rather to retard than accelerate the progress of human improvement, even in political affairs. That this were ever the fact, would be deplorable, and next to be regretted would be the plausible occasions afforded by her history for preferring the charge, even though that charge should be found upon examination to be groundless. It is undeniable that the church transcended, in the middle age, the proper sphere of a religious institution; that her example, as the light of the world, was not only defective, but pernicious; that her course tended to propagate false views of both the faith and the practice of Christianity; that, in this respect, she exerted a baleful influence on the interests of mankind. But as to the relative political evil of her influence, a hasty judgment would be very liable to be unjust. It must be estimated with a careful regard to the state of society around her. The struggles for liberty against which she is charged with having taken her stand, where in many cases such as, under any government, would be resisted by the friends of order, and dreaded as the eruptions of anarchy.

We presume that no citizens of our republican country can read this work of M. Guizot, moderate as it really is, and impartial as it claims to be, without feeling their own principles courteously and gently, yet firmly assailed. The whole work is, by implication, an insidious argument for monarchy; not, indeed, for an absolute, despotic monarchy; but a neutral and powerless form; a shadow, an attenuated abstraction of monarchy, perched on the apex of a popular government, to meet the innate craving of mankind for legitimate sovereignty. We are thankful for his philosophical

suggestions even on this point. We allow his opinions, and honour them, though we may not adopt them. There is however an ambiguity about certain of his speculations on the notion of legitimacy which betrays either diffidence in his assumed positions, or a conscious necessity of adapting his definitions of legitimate sovereignty to the actual state of society in this country. The old doctrines of legitimacy require modification to adapt them to the views of a people who never received them into their political creed. And we cannot but notice the apparent efforts of this writer to expand his construction of legitimacy, in order to cover the idea of a prosperous republic, which his definition must of necessity embrace. Such evidence of the influence of our social system on the theories of an intelligent advocate of monarchy is both gratifying and instructive; proving that the eye of the most discerning philosophy sees more of promise than of discouragement in the progress of our civil institutions.

The American partakers of European civilization are so solemnly concerned in the question relating to the proper elements of permanent social order, that the simplest rules of political wisdom recommend a careful application of all such discussions to our own constitution. It would betray no want of a rational firmness, or of a settled and conscientious preference for our national institutions, to hold ourselves respectfully open to the hints which such a writer so modestly offers for our benefit. As a disinterested philosopher, in the application of his principles to our case, he doubtless would coolly remind us, that the ascendant principle of our social order was brought from the midst of European society in times of a peculiar character; that the spirit which animated the fugitive May-Flower, in her voyage to plant the germ of this nation by the rock of Plymouth, was evolved from the effervescent compound of social elements, then in temporary agitation in Great Britain; the excess of one of the constituents of the mass, after the natural solvent had been saturated; that, unable to subject the monarchical and aristocratical ingredients of English society to its own control, or to neutralize their opposition to itself, it sought escape from their power; and was separated from the mixture, by the joint impulse of a forcible ejection, and its inherent volatility; that the necessity of its expulsion lay in the same principle which must prevent its quiet residence in any of the fixed states of society, and which will introduce, wherever it governs, a pervading contingency into the progress of civiliza-

tion; that it left behind the proportion of mingled elements, to which the progress of social improvement has, for fifteen centuries, been tending, and at which it has now taken its final stand, the only proportion in which the elements of society have ever yet been permanently combined; nay, that it was itself expelled, that this proportion might be preserved.

He would, then, perhaps, proceed to suggest the inquiry, whether, in the form of our social organization, we are not attempting to repeat the frail and shallow simplicity of the old world. In England, he would say, where alone the identity of civil institutions has survived a protracted advance of civilization, and where it seems likely yet long to survive, the great principles of society are wonderfully blended. Theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, all find a response to their respective claims in the nature of man. The history of the world asserts this truth; and hence, the perfection of the social organization may yet be found in the skilful combination and mutual adjustment of these great elements in the constitution of society. Now the principle of social order in the United States, is but one of the several elements combined in European society; and therefore the same narrow basis, from which the societies of the old world have, for centuries, been tumbling, is the only basis of those popular institutions.

Should we meet him with our favourite argument from success and unrivalled prosperity, he would turn our argument against ourselves. He would admonish us that this rapid development is the very proof of our imperfection. The portentous precocity of states, like that of individuals, is matter of history and of general observation. Greece was a wonder during her brief day; but where now is Greece? The single principle of our social organization will now, as it did then, produce a rapid and surprising evolution of some of the properties of human nature; but these productions will soon fade and fall, like false blossoms from boughs which live on the single material for luxuriant bloom, without the elements of rich and durable fruit.

Such suggestions we understand to be legitimate inferences from the statements and reasonings of our author. We disclaim, for our country, any peculiar or pressing necessity for such admonitions as he indirectly offers; yet the exceeding plausibility of his hints is calculated to awaken a salutary caution among the firmest believers in republican doctrine. From the degree of freedom which would suit all the friends of a popular government, it is but a step to political licen-

tiousness. Liberty may degenerate into lawlessness. The love of freedom is not always distinguished from aversion to moral restraint. The vicious propensities of our prosperous republic are now unquestionably under strong excitement, and if it be true that they have not the requisite checks in the spirit of our constitution, the final results of our political experiment will soon be known. May our country profit by the seasonable admonitions of history, and not spurn, to her future sorrow, the counsels of the dark and troublesome, but instructive ages of the world.

We are encouraged to believe that nations are becoming more thoroughly established in the principles of peace. The advance of civilization in each nation must necessarily produce improvement in the laws of its intercourse with other nations. Whatever tends to the perfection of society at home, must promote a proper deportment abroad. International civilities will increase in their value and popularity, as society in the different nations becomes completely organized, and enjoys quiet and prosperity. We consider every step of advancement from barbarism a step of approximation towards the ascendancy of reason and justice over brute force; and towards the destruction of the absurd practice of war for the settlement of national disputes. The practice of suspending individual claims of justice on the event of a battle was among the first to fall before the power of civilization, and the kindred practice of war, either to ascertain or to procure justice between nations, must fall in its turn. We are so sanguine as to believe that, notwithstanding all the recent warlike manifestations, it would be now difficult to involve any two of the most civilized nations of the world in war with each other. It seems to us cheerfully evident that the leading nations of the civilized world were never before so fully prepared to entertain sentiments of peace, as at this moment. The solemn dissuasives from expensive, bloody and demoralizing warfare, may now be urged with the hope of unprecedented success; and the friends of civilization may derive from this fact the most substantial encouragement in relation to the future progress of their cause. War may once have contributed to the improvement of society. But the state of society which war would improve must be at the lowest extreme of barbarism. The civilized nations have risen above the elevating influence of military discipline, and are prepared to practice and enjoy the higher and more refining arts of peace.

If our hopes in this matter are not entirely groundless, we cannot easily exaggerate the promise which the present state of the world affords, of the future progress of civilization. The prevalence of universal peace will give fair opportunity for the resources of the nations to fall into permanent channels of intellectual and moral improvement. These channels will grow deep and broad, and the waters which fill them will grow active and pure. The religion of the Bible which has been the leading instrument in bringing the world to this stage of advancement, will impart fresh impulses of increasing power, to which the human mind will be better prepared to yield. Nations will be as emulous of moral excellence and moral power as they now are of commercial and intellectual importance, and the world will speedily recognise the predicted reign of peace and light and love.

We are most agreeably indebted to the French minister of instruction, for the variety of interesting reflections which his *History of European civilization* has awakened in our minds. We esteem his views on most of his subjects worthy of the high station he holds. We deem it creditable to France that she sustains in one of her high offices, and honours with her confidence, a man of so genuine public spirit, and so lofty and magnanimous principles as M. Guizot. We admire the elevation from which he surveys the world, and the dignified, philosophical calmness of his speculations on the most confused and violent revolutions in human affairs; and we take peculiar pleasure in inserting at the close of this article, a paragraph from one of his pages, not less honourable to his views of philosophy than to his respect for a doctrine of theology.

"It is thus that man advances in the execution of a plan which he has not conceived, and of which he is not even aware. He is the free and intelligent artificer of a work which is not his own. He does not perceive or comprehend it, till it manifests itself by external appearances and real results; and even then he comprehends it very incompletely. It is through his means however, and by the development of his intelligence and freedom, that it is accomplished. Conceive a great machine, the design of which is centered in a single mind, though its various parts are entrusted to different workmen, separated from, and strangers to each other. No one of them understands the work as a whole, nor the general result which he concurs in producing; but every one executes, with intelligence and freedom, by rational and vol-

untary acts, the particular task assigned to him. It is thus that, by the hand of man, the designs of Providence are wrought out in the government of the world. It is thus that the two great facts, which are apparent in the history of civilization, come to co-exist; on the one hand, those portions of it which may be considered as fated, or which happen without the control of human knowledge or will; on the other hand, the part played in it by the freedom and intelligence of man, and what he contributes to it by means of his own judgment or will." p. 257.

QUARTERLY LIST
OF
NEW BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS.

A Grammatical Analysis of Selections from the Hebrew Scriptures, with an exercise in Hebrew Composition. By Isaac Nordheimer, Doctor in Philosophy, &c. &c. 8vo. pp. xii and 148.

This volume is a companion to the author's Hebrew Grammar, and, as a specimen of printing, still more beautiful. Its use is, not to supersede the study of the grammar, but to point out the right method of pursuing it. By carefully referring to the rules here cited, the learner will, on finishing the course, have mastered the substance of the grammar, learning each thing as he wants it, and that not abstractedly, but in connexion with the study of the text. He will then be prepared for a full and systematic perusal of the grammar in detail, which, if undertaken earlier, would only serve to puzzle and disgust him. The omission of the Hebrew text not only saves much room, but accustoms the student to the complex notation of the Masoretic Bibles. The author has availed himself of this opportunity to rectify some inadvertent errors in the Grammar, as well as to anticipate some portions of the syntax, which is not yet published. The least valuable part of the Analysis consists in the translations, which, if never incorrect, are often infelicitous, and in a majority of instances, superfluous. Many of the idioms which are thus explained, are perfectly familiar to our students through the literal versions of the English Bible. Another fault is the unnecessary repetition of the same references after the reader must be perfectly familiar with the rule referred to. As an instance, we may mention the extraordinary frequency with which the use of *shurek* with the *vav* conjunctive is explained, at length, or by a reference to the grammar. Even