

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE RELATION OF LOGIC TO PSYCHOLOGY. II.

RECENT logicians have protested against the old tradition of beginning with an account of terms or concepts, and have insisted that the judgment is the primary act of thought. But, in the reasons given for taking judgment first, I do not think a sufficient distinction is generally made between the logical and the psychological aspects of the question. That 'the sentence precedes the word' in the historical evolution of language, seems proved from an examination of the beginnings of language among primitive races and among children.¹ This is a fact of undoubted psychological interest, but I do not think it has any direct bearing on the logical question of whether the judgment or the concept is prior; for, let it be said once for all, *priority in time is irrelevant in logic*. The only priority that concerns us is logical priority. That is logically prior which is logically presupposed in something else; in other words, the logically prior is that on whose truth or on whose existence something else is dependent, but not *vice versa*. Which of them comes first into any individual's mind, or into the average human mind, is a matter which is of itself of no logical moment. But without any irrelevant anthropology or psychology, it can be shown on purely logical grounds that the judgment is, in a certain sense, prior to the concept; the logical character of concepts cannot be known unless they be

¹ Cf. Sully, *Studies of Childhood*, p. 171.

DISCUSSIONS.

LOTZE'S MONISM.

THE remarks which follow have reference to the paper of Mr. Schiller, on the above subject in this REVIEW for May, 1896. Mr. Schiller's paper has the distinction of being the first of its kind, so far as I can recall, published in this REVIEW. It is to be hoped that other writers of equal knowledge, and equally facile pen, may be stimulated to contribute their views upon this important philosophy.

Mr. Schiller's paper is devoted largely to that metaphysical portion of Lotze's philosophy which treats of the immanence of personal Being in the world, and which concludes *ex contingentia mundi* to the basal Reality which is its Unity. To this conclusion Mr. Schiller strongly objects, on the ground that it does not follow from the premises, or that it is a useless datum in philosophy, or at least in so far as Lotze has availed himself of it. While conceding the vigor and ability with which the critic has stated and maintained his contention, I shall not be able to assent to his views.

In order that the points of discussion may be clearly presented, and for the purpose of easy reference, I shall repeat some of the propositions found in Mr. Schiller's paper, and which he has attempted to prove. They are as follows :

I. That Lotze had not, on his own principles, any ground for seeking an underlying unity of things.

II. That his argument in reaching it is unsound, and conflicts with his own truer insight.

III. That, when reached, it throws no light on any of the problems it is supposed to explain.

These propositions are followed by others equally damaging, but those given here will be all that we can consider ; and these it would seem, if valid, are sufficient to wreck any philosophy, however powerful. If these propositions are capable of proof, it is difficult to see what there is of value left in Lotze's philosophy.

In order to prove the first proposition, Mr. Schiller proceeds to show that the terms *world*, *coexistence*, and *interaction* are equivalent. The object of this is to draw Lotze into a self-contradiction. For, if a certain community can be given to these terms, particularly the terms *world* and *interaction*, it follows that Lotze *might* have used them interchangeably ; and if he might have, it is assumed that he did.

After a short dialectic Mr. Schiller declares that "coexistence and interaction have been shown to be equivalent"; and states further that "the existence of interaction is just as primary a fact as the existence of the world itself, and the assertion that things act on one another is an analytical proposition which merely expands what was already asserted in saying there is a world." Hence the conclusion follows that "if it is an error to attempt to derive the existence of the world, it must be equally mistaken to derive the interaction of the world's elements." The implication contained in this quotation is that Lotze has undertaken "to derive the interaction of the world's elements." It is on the truth of this implication that Mr. Schiller relies for proof of his statement, that Lotze has come into conflict with his own principles. Lotze confesses the folly of attempting to derive the existence of the world. But it is an equal folly, Mr. Schiller submits, to attempt to derive the interaction of the world's elements, inasmuch as, in his view, "the existence of interaction is just as primary a fact as the existence of the world itself; and the assertion that things act on one another is an 'analytical' proposition which merely expands what was already asserted in saying 'there is a world.'" I dwell upon these statements, because they are fundamental to the first proposition. If Lotze has treated the terms *world* and *interaction* as equivalent, and has protested against all efforts to derive the world, and yet, nevertheless, proceeds to derive its interactions, the contention of the critic as stated in the first proposition is valid, otherwise not. It is admitted at once that Lotze has repudiated any attempt to derive the world; but whether he has used the terms *world* and *interaction* as equivalent terms, and whether he has attempted to derive interactions remains to be seen. When we remember that, as a matter of history, the possibility of 'interaction' in the world of things has been denied by the Cartesians and Leibnitz, and that the notion itself has been expounded by Herbart, what is the antecedent presumption as to its use by Lotze? Would he probably mistake its meaning? And how many besides his present critic would regard the proposition 'things act on one another' as 'analytical'? As a matter of fact, Lotze does not seek to derive the interaction of the world's elements. It is not his object to 'deduce' the process of interaction, but to indicate its rational implications. His method is clearly defined in the *Microcosmus*, Bk. IV, c. 3, § 2: "We cannot undertake to deduce the world. . . . We can follow out only those consequences which flow from the formal character of Unity, and which, in any creature supposed to

be derived from a Unity, would occur as necessary consequences of its organization, independently of the nature of the Supreme Cause." Lotze accepts the doctrine of interaction as taught by Herbart and then proceeds to show what metaphysical consequences are involved in the fact as stated. This is again evident from Lotze's *Outlines of Metaphysics*, c. 1, § 13, where the passage quoted below, although in that place differently applied, precisely meets our critic's own objection. "This objection," says Lotze, "confounds the useless question how a world would get itself made, with the metaphysical question, in what forms of coherence the existing world can consist."

From the above showing we are now prepared to insist, that the critic has grounded his first proposition on two errors: (a) in treating *world* and *interaction* as equivalent, and (b) in assuming that Lotze has undertaken to derive the interaction of the world's elements. The assumptions which led to these errors having been shown to be groundless, we pass to other assertions which we conceive to be equally groundless.

Before proceeding, however, I desire to recall an illustration which is Mr. Schiller's own happy thought. "In the case of Hamlet and the Chimera," he tells us, "it [interaction] takes place through the medium of a mind which connects them." This illustration must have slipped unadvisedly from the pen of the critic. It accurately illustrates Lotze's position, while it is positively fatal to his own. If the inner determinations of our minds require a subject which mediates their interactions, equally so, it would seem, do our objective determinations require a medium through which, by which, and, as Lotze contends, *in* which, their interactions take place. And, as Hamlet and the Chimera first existed in the mind which conceived them, and have no being apart from this mind, so likewise this mind must have existed prior to their interactions.

Resuming now the thread of criticism under notice, we are not surprised to find ourselves led into a maze of misconceptions. Mr. Schiller proceeds to investigate Lotze's theory of Substantiality and constructs a sentence which, he assumes, illustrates that theory. His illustration turns out *mutatis mutandis* similarly to the one just noticed above. Mr. Schiller finds (*Meta. Trans.*, p. 100) that Lotze maintains "it is not in virtue of a substance contained in them that things are; they are, when they are able to produce an appearance of there being a substance in them." He now connects this sentence with "the single truly existing substance" (*Trans.*, p. 167), and continues, "we ought then to say 'it is not in

virtue of a single substance underlying them that things are; they are, when they are able to produce the appearance of there being such a substance.'” It will be observed that the words *single* and *underlying* are not contained in Lotze’s sentence, but are interjected by the critic. He no doubt supposed that these words would serve the excellent purpose of pointing out the inconsistency of Lotze, and the total untenableness of his doctrine, without doing injustice to its statement. On the contrary, it perverts it. It is true that Lotze does admonish, exhort, and entreat his readers to waste no faith on the underlying ‘stuff’ or kernel of things; but he allows no judgments of the nature of substance to be subsumed under the concept substantiality. He relegates this task to crude realism, and to hard and fast dualism. As to the content of the truly existent substance, Lotze affirms nothing. “As to the concrete content of M (the truly existent) we know nothing.” (*Meta.*, p. 170.) The error of the critic in this particular, then, consists in applying to the “truly existent substance” what was asserted only of things, and thus making it appear that Lotze is in conflict with his own view of substantiality; whereas his whole metaphysic is a protest against the uncritical notion of substantiality. While retaining the term *substance* as classic, Lotze defines his views of substance in terms of causality. To Lotze all existence is not only causal, but unitary. (*Microcosmus*, bk. IX, c. 1, § 5; also bk. III, c. 5, § 4.) This is the Monism for which he contends, and its bare statement seems valid as against the objections of Mr. Schiller.

Let us now consider one or two criticisms under Mr. Schiller’s second proposition. “In tracing,” he says, “the further development of Lotze’s conception of the Unity of Things, the point of capital importance is the process whereby the unity becomes hypostasized into a real existence superior to the plurality which it unites.”

Here the points of “capital importance” are the charges of *hypostasization* and *unity*. Now where is this unity which is declared to be hypostasized? Mr. Schiller tells us that it is “in the Many and of the Many.” But it may be asked, How is this unity discovered, What are its grounds? The temptation may be to answer that it is due to, and comprehended in, the synthetic unity of self-consciousness, and that the relating activity of the mind simply reflects itself in the manifold. But this fancy disappears, when the deeper question is asked, What is this unity of self? It is then seen that the mind is no self-included identity, but exists itself as conscious, only in relation with other substances — exists only in connection with a not-self, as

its inseparable correlate. Mr. Schiller seems to think we have but to open our eyes to have an immediate perception of the unity of things. A similar assumption was made in his discussion of interaction. Interaction seemed to him a primitive datum of experience. But as a matter of fact, merely *given* experience tells us nothing of action or interaction. Similarly with Unity. The relational system in which things stand is not the product of sense-perception. Starting now from this system, we seek for the conditions under which alone it is possible; and the system itself is found to be possible only on the condition that there exists a unitary ground which is immanent in the system itself. Mr. Schiller, on the other hand, refuses to seek for any ground whatsoever. He leaves things standing in a hard and fast identity. The unity which he affirms, is postulated as existing *self-evidently* in the Many. But this is a naïve presupposition of immediate perception. "To explain interaction," he tells us, "there is only needed a unity in the Many, not a One creating and embracing the Many, a union, not a unit." Now such a unity as is here described, is both a logical and metaphysical impossibility. For, if the pluralism contains its own sufficient unity, it must exist as an independent whole. This whole is independent, but the elements which enter are dependent; since, by definition, they mutually determine each other by their interactions. Thus a sum of dependent elements is constituted into an independent whole merely by a process of addition. What, then, is the basis of this 'addition'? How is the 'union' itself to be explained?

We are now prepared to say, in opposition to the critic, that the ground of unity is the same as the ground of things. The efficient source of things is also the efficient source of life, and both life and things have no reality apart from the Infinite. The Infinite posits its unity in two ways: (*a*) primarily under the category of causality, so that His activities appear, for us, in orderly sequence producing in our minds the conviction of the uniformity of nature; and (*b*) in the production of phenomena by which things, or rather the images of Being, are made to appear in our minds, and bear witness to the immanence of the One in the Many. Lotze does not, of course, leave the reality of things in this obscure fashion. He vindicates his Realism as against Idealism. But the above is his well-known doctrine on the question of unity. This being recognized, it may be seen that the charge of the critic, that Lotze, on his own principles, had no need to seek a unity behind things, fails. The charge of hypostasis fails with it.

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