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I. DR. DRIVER ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF ISAIAH XIII. AND XIV.

As shown in the first part of this paper,¹ the validity of Dr. Driver's conclusion as to the non-Isaianic authorship of these chapters hinges upon the validity of the minor premise of his argument. That premise is embodied in the proposition, *the prophecy of these chapters has no intelligible relation to, or bearing upon, the interests of the contemporaries of Isaiah*. We have already noticed one of the propositions laid down by Dr. Driver, presumably in support of this position. We will now ask attention to some others which are laid down, presumably for the same purpose.

I. The first of these is expressed thus: "The circumstances of the exile—while the Jews were still in bondage, and the power of Babylon seemed yet unshaken—constitute a suitable and sufficient occasion for the present prophecy, an occasion of exactly the nature which the analogy of prophecy demands; on the other hand, the circumstances of Isaiah's age furnish no such occasion." Now, in reference to this proposition, there are several points that can scarcely fail to arrest the notice of the thoughtful reader: (1), The first is this: The sting of the proposition, if it has one, is in its tail. In other words, we may admit that the circumstances of the Jews, while still in bondage, constitute a suitable and sufficient occasion for the present prophecy, and the admission will be without prejudice to the position of those who maintain the Isaianic authorship of this passage, and without profit to those

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VI. THE DETERMINANT OF VALUE IN MORALS.

ALL theories of morals resolve themselves into two, the intuitionist or formal, and the utilitarian or hedonistic. The object of this paper is to point out some of the difficulties of the latter theory and to propose a possible basis of harmony, a *modus vivendi*, for the intuitionist and the utilitarian. The inveterate and hardened opposition of these theories might suggest that the human mind is hopelessly divided against itself. The only other view is that there is a higher unity or a middle ground in which differences may be made to disappear. Possibly it may be said that utilitarianism has so far won the field that any provision for the opposition is gratuitous. Should this be the case, if active opposition were to cease altogether the utilitarian could never be at peace with himself, for, as such, he can never complete his theory, while the intuitionist would calmly await the return of the pendulum or seek to hasten its return by such mediating influences as need not impair his original position.

What is the position of the intuitionist? Briefly, that the place of value in morals is to be found in the motive, in the rational, autonomous self. The intuitive perception of law furnishes the ground of obligation. To will the right for the sake of the right is thus the ultimate end of morals. In willing the right for its own sake the moral law is understood to be identified in consciousness, and this defines the motive. The speculative ethics of Cudworth, Clarke, Price, and Kant seek to disentangle the *a priori* element in moral consciousness—to show what is revealed in knowledge independent of experience, although never given except in experience.

The utilitarian takes offence at this view of a moral standard. It is regarded as unphilosophical or as unworthy the scientific spirit. An action performed for the sake of duty or because it is right is thought to be obscure, unintelligible, if not meaningless. The place of value must be determined by our knowledge of pleasure and pain. Utility is the foundation of morals, or the

greatest happiness to the greatest number. It follows that moral action is to be measured by its effects. Morality is independent of motive, except as the motive may increase one's happiness. An action is good if it increases the happiness of mankind; bad if it lessens this happiness. The first principles of morals are to be learned from induction, and not from intuition. Morality belongs wholly to experience, and cannot be determined from the ideals of reason. All our moral life is conditioned by the amount of pleasure which results from our actions, and must be subordinated to it. The principles of intuition and utility, therefore, as regulative of moral distinctions, would seem to present a complete disjunction. The intuitionist sees reflected in his consciousness the moral imperative which compels his action. The utilitarian, on the contrary, calmly eliminates the notion of obligation, and substitutes the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the sole principle of morality.

Without dwelling upon the points of opposition in these rival theories, the purpose is to direct attention to the incompleteness of the one which makes happiness the regulative principle in morals and thus to emphasize the importance of a new position. Our course of thought will be first critical and then constructive. In this we are not concerned with evolutionary ethics except so far as its expounders assume the truth of the hedonistic principle. In the extensions of biology, sociology, as also ethics, Spencer seeks to lay down a system of rules rather than to justify principles. In the *Data of Ethics* it has been well said, "Spencer's old dogs wear new doublets." The old principles are applied to a great number of new details and illustrations. In his *Justice* and ethics of *Individual* and *Social Life* he assumes as true the ethical principle of Locke and Bentham. In accord with the latter he insists that the moral consciousness does not contemplate obligation as externally imposed, but is "chiefly occupied with recognition of and regard for those conditions by fulfilment of which happiness is achieved or misery avoided." Mr. Spencer does not deny the presence in consciousness of a sense of obligation in the lower forms of human life, the savage and religious devotee and that it still persists in ever weakening forms in nor-

mally cultured life, but contends that this feeling must ultimately fall away and "pro-ethical" ideas give place to those which are strictly ethical. By the "pro-ethical" he distinguishes those ideas which have a popular following in the ethics of the day; those strictly ethical are those which follow legitimately upon the establishment of the pure hedonistic condition. The reading proves to be dreary enough, but serves to show that the contrast of utilitarian and evolutionary ethics is due, chiefly, to the standard of expression. All along the effort is made to confirm the evidence of Locke and Bentham against the *a priori* view of the origin of moral ideas. In his almost exclusively objective treatment of ethics, Mr. Spencer finds no place for some of the deepest facts of our moral consciousness. Utility or "internal sustentation" is not the only or fundamental factor in civilization. The dead fly in the whole of the Spencerian philosophy is an unduly magnified environment. External circumstances are treated as causes for all the perturbations of society. Undoubtedly war, robbery, and in a contrary sense industry and the awards of justice, react upon society, but human nature lies deeper than all social phenomena. The heart is the unresting, disturbing force. Busy with altruism, Mr. Spencer forgets the individual. The issues of life do not proceed from phenomena.

"There needs but a continuance of absolute peace externally and a rigorous insistence on non-aggression internally to ensure the moulding of men into a form naturally characterized by all the virtues."—*Principles of Ethics*, p. 471.

It is remarkable that Mr. Spencer remits to an ideal stage the final test of his philosophy. He is wonderfully gifted with prophecy. He foretells with absolute precision what the coming man is to be, provided his present surroundings fall away. If Mr. Spencer could play both sides of the chess-board in the game of life, no doubt we should have a fair showing of the real merit of his carefully drawn precepts. He has made large contributions to sociology and biology, but his contributions to ethics, in so far as they affect its deeper problems, are opposed to all experience. That the "discipline of peaceful coöperation" can bring humanity into the ideal state of happiness has no value in scientific in-

quiry. It may possess some value as an illustration of the imaginative spirit, it may be Platonic, but it is not science.

Professor Paulsen in his *System der Ethik* attempts to mediate between intuitionism and hedonistic utility. He develops moral laws from the historical conditions of life. Obligation is consistent only when found in conformity with social conditions. Moral law, as such, is not immanent in man's constitution, but is developable from his surroundings. Consequently there is no fixed standard of moral action. The test of moral worth is the pleasure attendant upon the objective realization of the act. Nevertheless the pleasure-sensation is not to be regarded as the formal cause of the act. This system is another illustration of the objective treatment in ethics. It offers nothing new in principle. Indeed, nothing is to be found in evolutionary ethics which throws any new light upon principles. Its whole effort is exhausted in methods to exploit utility in terms of evolution.

The same remark may be made in reference to Darwinism so far as it has attempted to deal with the problems of punishment. While it is true that Darwinism is transforming moral principles, it is not true that it is transforming utilitarianism, which finds its moral end in the welfare of the community. This view of the ultimate ethical end did not originate with Darwin, nor has it been modified by his followers; but in the means to this end Darwinism is an undoubted factor. To this end also it is said Christian ethics supplies no rational basis. Darwinism comes to the rescue of the community in the form of "ethical surgery." Punishment is justified only on the ground of the happiness of society. The retributive idea disappears, or is subordinated to the idea of the general welfare. In the name of society, its evil members must be eliminated. Bad specimens are to be neither educated nor confined at the public cost, but driven off. Weak and worthless children are to be disposed of by heroic measures and in ways which the theorists of this school have not exactly formulated.

These illustrations of evolutionary ethics will suffice to show that no new principle has been introduced into utilitarianism.

We may now fall back upon the authorities to whom the present form of the theory under notice is mainly due. It is not de-

nied that some of the fathers of utilitarianism have been misrepresented. This has been done in the interest of those who desired to unify the theory or to give currency to some of its grotesque forms. Thus Hutcheson, while a professed hedonist, resolving all virtue into the primary necessity of seeking the happiness of others, was one of the foremost of the sentimental school which explained conscience by the postulate of an original, implanted, moral sense. In like manner Hume, while essentially a utilitarian, maintained one of the distinctive doctrines of intuition. His language is emphatic: "As virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account without fee or reward, it is requisite that there should be some sentiment which it touches, internal taste or feeling, whatever you choose to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil." And yet both these writers have been described as advocates of the experiential theory of morals, or, in other words, that all our ideas of morality have been derived from experience, and that any suspicion of obligation, apart from the desire of pleasure and aversion from pain, is simply an illusion. The student of the history of morals cannot fail to notice the evidence afforded by these illustrations that the disjunctive classification so common with later writers is by no means a necessity. It means that ideas founded on intuitive morals do co-exist, presumably logically, with similar ideas derived from utility. Both Hume, who insisted that all virtue must stand the test of utility, and Hutcheson, who defined virtue in terms of happiness, founded their opinions upon the *a priori* structure of human nature. Generally speaking, however, utilitarian writers have divorced themselves wholly from intuitive moralists. They teach openly that there is no interest for us apart from our own interest. There is no voluntary restraint upon our actions which cannot be accounted for on our desire for pleasure. Hobbes, in his *Leviathan*, puts it sweetly thus: "Good and evil are names which signify our appetites and aversions." Goodness, as seen in God or men, is no more than goodness to us. "The goodness we apprehend in God is his goodness to us." (Hobbes's *Human Nature*.) To speak of the love of the good for its own sake is to speak untruly. "*Il lui est aussi impossible d'aimer le bien pour le bien, que d'aimer*

le mal pour le mal." (*Helvétius*.) Philosophers of this school proceed with great deliberation and seriousness to derive the dearest sentiments of the human heart from pleasure as the ethical principle. Pity is aroused in us by a realistic suggestion of our own sorrow had the calamity which has visited our neighbor fallen upon us. Charity consists in the conception of ourselves as benefitted by the return of our gifts either in kind or in the increased ability to accomplish our own desires. Reverence is no more than our view of the power of another over us to do us good. Even piety itself is degraded to the conception of one's self as favored in the councils of heaven: "The pleasures of piety are the pleasures that accompany the belief of a man's being in the acquisition or in possession of the good-will or favor of the Supreme Being." (*Bentham*.)

It follows that morality is no part of an uncultured or uncivilized life. Apart from the education which persuades men into the self-appropriation of their own interests as seen by themselves, or in the collective experiences of the race, there is no morality. It is not easy to conceive of that state of society whose animating principle is wholly selfish, and which is described by *Hobbes*, *Helvétius*, and *Bentham* as actuated by no motive but self-advantage. "Dream not that men will move their little finger to serve you, unless their advantage in so doing be obvious to them. Men never did so, and never will while human nature is made of its present material."—*Bentham's Deontology*.

It is a doctrine as old as *Plato* that vice is another name for ignorance. The utilitarian, who reduces all value to happiness, reaches the above conclusion by the precept that all virtue consists in knowing how to pursue successfully one's own pleasure with a due regard for the happiness of others. Every one is supposed to know what pleasure is, but not every man knows how to attain it. This knowledge enables its possessor to be virtuous, and his grade of virtue must, therefore, be measured by this knowledge. Each man necessarily pursues his own happiness, and as all pleasure is self-regarding, hedonistic utilitarianism in its last analysis appears to be but the apotheosis of self. "All pleasure is self-regarding, for it is impossible to have any feelings

out of our own mind. . . . Such terms as unselfishness, disinterestedness, self-devotion, are applied to the vicarious position wherein we seek our own satisfaction in that of others."—Professor Bain's *Emotions and Will*, page 113.

Locke, whose ethical principle was happiness, and Paley, who is classed among the utilitarians, seem to have embraced the prudential scheme: "We are obliged to nothing but we ourselves are to gain or lose something by; for nothing else can be violent motive to us. The Christian religion hath not ascertained the precise quantity of virtue necessary to salvation."—Paley's *Moral Philosophy*, Book II., ch. ii., and Book I., ch. vii. Still further, in discussing the difference between an act of prudence and an act of duty, he says: "The difference, and the only difference, is this: that in the one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world; in the other case we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come." Locke, in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, argues that, in view of the threatened punishments of the future world, ordinary prudence would require men to regulate their conduct so as to avoid them. (Book II., chapter xxi.)

On the question of the nature of the Christian's love, the Church of England generally took sides against the selfish view of Hobbes, while in the Romish Church Bossuet took the selfish side, and was opposed by Fenelon and Molinos. The opinion of Bossuet was judicially sustained by the church, and the opinions of his opponents were condemned.

The most subtle form of hedonism known to utilitarian moralists is that derived from the association of ideas. First traceable in Aristotle, applied by the Epicureans to friendship, rediscovered in modern times by Locke, it was developed by Hutcheson, Hartley, and the elder Mill. It is the most plausible, if not the most logical, form of utilitarianism. As employed by the Epicureans, this principle was illustrated by the love for a friend, which, beginning in the pleasure derived from the acquaintance, was in time transferred to the personal object. Wealth and power are first loved as means of pleasure, but afterward as objects in themselves. Money, although not in the least lovely in itself, is asso-

ciated with our happiness, and thus becomes an object of affection. Thus the passion of the miser is accounted for. He loves the money, not for its use, but for itself. Virtue is associated in our minds with the pleasure with which we acknowledge the esteem and honorable mention of men. Our deepest pleasures are associated with acts of benevolence, justice, and truth. Contrariwise, a life of vice is associated with pain and terms of obloquy. Hence virtue, in time, becomes lovely in our eyes; we practice it with pleasure, we violate it with pain. Hence, also, virtue, while not originally and naturally a part of the universal human end, may become so. The means, ultimately, becomes the happiness desired. Thus conscience is accounted for. It is a product, not an original cause. The moralists of the associationalist school, it will be observed, in place of identifying conscience as an abiding element of consciousness, are entitled to claim as a discovery only an important instrument for its training. Conscience is, *a priori*, moral insight. The inductive moralist fails to see that the explanation of virtuous conduct is one thing, and its identification quite another. Without dwelling upon this point, it seems evident that all forms of utilitarianism, however refined, reduce our ideals of praiseworthy conduct to selfish elements. All the vast and complicated schemes of modern ethics, when subjected to analysis, seem adjustable under the four laws of Epicurus: Pleasure without pain is to be sought; pain without pleasure is to be avoided; shun the lesser pleasure, which hinders the greater pleasure, or results in the greater pain; endure the pain which prevents a greater pain, or leads to a greater pleasure. (Cicero, *De Finibus*, i. 2.) Judged by the common sentiments and actions of men, the morality of the utilitarian must be condemned. The noblest deeds, the greatest self-sacrifices, must fall under the sharpest criticism, if not condemnation, if subjected to the authority of its canons. This is admirably brought out by Palacio Valdes in a speech of one of his characters: "I maintain that what my son-in-law did this morning is an immoral act. And why an immoral act? Because it attacks the very foundations of morality. And what are the positive foundations of morality? Until recently, it was believed that this was something extraneous to the forces

which are at work inside our physical nature. A profound error! One of the many dreams which have disturbed the infantile mind of our ancestors! Morality is the result of one of the many combinations in which the organic development of the human animal rests from its labors. Morality is nothing more than the social instinct taking deeper root with every succeeding generation. But this purely animal instinct, which man honorably shares with all other living beings, and in particular with the seals and the male bison, whose moral sentiment is admirable, has no other reason for its existence than the general welfare. Morality is founded, accordingly, on the general welfare. What did the general welfare demand when that old man flung himself into the water? Did it demand that my son-in-law should risk his life to save him? No, certainly not, for the life of that unhappy man, without any salient quality, was useless to humanity, while that of my son-in-law, young, active, and intelligent, is important. Consequently Mario, by risking his life for another which has no value, has attacked the general welfare; consequently he has committed an immoral act."

Without considering the question how far hedonistic morals have affected society, or what would be its probable effect if virtue were generally regarded as no more than transformed selfishness, we now turn our attention to a form of mediation between the two theories—a place of value in morals repugnant in philosophy neither to the intuitionists nor to the utilitarians. And here let it be said, that while the latter have generally reduced utility to terms of pleasure, so that the theory has usually been described under some form of hedonism, this view is by no means necessary. The emphasis of value has not always fallen upon pleasure. Dr. Samuel Clarke, one of the most pronounced of intuitionists, admitted into his doctrine a utilitarian element by making the welfare of all men a fit and universal end, good and useful in itself, and determined the ground of this fitness as logical. To find similarly a determinant of value which is neither primarily to be sought as hedonic nor because it emerges in consciousness as the moral law, is, as already stated, the object of our investigation. The reasons for this attempt have been sufficiently given.

The probability of a successful issue is quite another thing. No mediation is possible except as posited upon some firm basis. This may be metaphysical, scientific, or both. If we find a middle ground it must be an end which has the element of utility, and at the same time must be such as to contain implicitly, at least, the *a priori* elements common to universal consciousness. To collect these elements, and to connect them with the proposed end, it is necessary to bring together and compare the two poles of ethical thought. Let us select for this purpose Mill the younger, the utilitarian, and Kant, the intuitional moralist. These writers are polar opposites in theory. Mill declares that the foundation of morals is in the principle of greatest happiness, which means that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, and wrong if they tend to produce pain.

With each the first question is, whence is the ideal? Mill does not profess to show that the moral end, which he claims is scientific and universal, is intuitively known, but claims that our ideal is induced by our accumulating experiences of pleasure and pain. From Mill we learn that the morality of conduct can be learned only from the effects which attend or follow the action. Mill teaches that "the motive, when it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality." He contends for a progressive morality, thus: "The contest between the morality which appeals to an external standard and that which grounds itself on internal conviction, is the contest of progressive morality against stationary, of reason and argument against the deification of mere opinion and habit." Also, he teaches that actions done without regard to the greatest happiness, as, for instance, an action simply inspired by a feeling of duty, have no value except to indicate a disposition which is calculated to result in happiness. He offers no solution of the great problem of the utilitarian: How is it that happiness is most likely to come when unsought? That is, how shall this anomaly be treated?—a principle having been scientifically attained, it is best realized when neglected!

The doctrine of Kant avoids this paradox by placing all value in the moral ideal of the self. This is just the contradictory of Mill, who places all moral value in the object. The latter finds

the necessary law of morals in the effects of actions. The former finds the same law in the law-originating subject. According to Kant, the only way to a law of moral judgment is by first excluding all contingent matter. According to Mill, this law is possible only by excluding all *a priori* elements. Experience alone furnishes the true ground of moral law. Mediation between these opposites seems impossible, except by considering Kant's course of thought. He is carrying over into his ethics the same analytical process which distinguishes his first *critique*. It is to separate matter from form in judgment. Law is simply the *form* of our experience, or rather the form of the self in obtaining knowledge. As natural law is the form of our perceptions in nature, so moral law is the form of our perceptions in morals. Thus the law obtains its universal element—it is derived from the subject. Mill holds that the law of morals must, on the contrary, be derived from the object—the consolidated experiences of mankind. Here also must be considered Kant's notion of freedom. His transcendental exposition of the ego brings out the well-known dual representation of self as noumenal and phenomenal, or as causal experiential. Beneath the veil of the phenomenal self is the thing-in-itself—the postulate of cause as necessary in mind as the postulate of the conservation of energy in the physical universe, which it contradicts. In this contrast between phenomena and thing-in-itself, autonomy is made possible, and this autonomy is the basis and sole condition of freedom. Now, moral action is nothing more than the visibility of will—the reflection of the innate self or character woven in the intellect in space, time and causality. What the will is, in itself, appears as thing, *dingheit*, in time as life, in causality as those actions out of which external life is constituted. As the will, so are the actions. Will is, then, the necessary determinant of actions. Setting aside the mere forms of our intellect and directing our gaze upon the thing-in-itself, which is the will within us, the consciousness of freedom overtakes us, which no logic can cancel. There is, then, according to Kant, nothing good in all the world but a good will. Manifestly, if experience were to determine the will there could be no freedom, since our experience, being constituted by natural law,

would bring self, and therefore freedom, under the dominion of external causality. Consequently autonomy, freedom and morality are mutually dependent.

All that belongs to the phenomenal world lies under the constraint of space, time and causality; but will, as thing-in-itself, is free from the mental forms by which, in our intellectual perception, the world is constructed. If I look at my actions I see them necessitated, since my motives, with a given environment, could not be otherwise than they are. On the contrary, if I look within, and behind the phenomenal, I see myself as free, able to will to do or not to do; and thus, with the consciousness of freedom, I have the consciousness of responsibility. From this exposition of the will, a good will must be the first thing to be desired, and thus we reach the first canon of Kant. The second canon lies implicitly in the first. Let your act be such that you can will it to become universal. The first effect of the autonomous self is spontaneous respect for its own legislation. It wills for law, and by law, as given by itself. It wills the right for its own sake. The law is the expression of the good will. The good will is the ideal. From this point all morality must be viewed. We cannot will falsehood and theft to be universal, because such an act of will would involve a contradiction. You cannot will that all men should steal, for in that case there would be nothing to steal. The second canon is thus vindicated at its weakest point. The logical result of willing in opposition to self is absurdity. But what is gained by the determination of this principle? What practical good in a will which is concerned alone with itself? We have reached the form of the law, how shall we reach its concrete expression? We have here to remember the peculiarity of the Kantian exposition. It is to detach form from matter. Our knowledge is a union of these elements—separable in analysis but not in experience. They have no reality considered as existing apart and alone. Nevertheless they exist in synthesis—the *a priori* part running through every concrete reality. What is true of knowledge in general must be true of morals in particular. Every moral judgment must re-combine the moral elements which have been separated and identified in our analysis. Here

the object was to identify and describe the universal element in moral judgment. It is moral law, necessary and regnant for its own sake. Having described this element, it is next necessary to define the object of the will in every act of willing. This introduces the third canon, which means, in its simplest form, Let your act be such as to treat each person of all humanity not as a means, but wholly as an end. This law is really implicate in the second, since if a man is to will nothing but himself—the will willing itself—the principle, as universal, must include all men. The principle of self-legislation makes self, as rational, the end. But this personal end is the universal end. What is thus individual becomes also common to all humanity. The good will becomes self-realizing in the end of humanity. The end which all have in view is also the end of each particular self. The categorical imperative directed to the self as object, defines the true nature of the autonomous self as subject. The end of humanity is simply another name for the end of the rational self. Moral judgment is thus determined by an external end, but this end is at the same time the exact equivalent of the legislating self. The form of law, in this view, receives its content. The abstract which at first was the basis of thought becomes concrete. The form and the matter of morality, which were separated for the purpose of study, are now recombined in experience. The next question would be, What is that end of humanity which gives content to the form of universal law? The answer distinguishes the Kantian ethics from that of Mill's.

We have already stated the position of the latter in common with other utilitarians. The only universal ethical principle is happiness. In the Kantian view this principle is perfection, that is, personal perfection, and then, secondarily, the happiness of others. The first duty, which is our own perfection, easily follows from the nature of the first canon. The good-will is first posited as the highest concept of any and all good. To perfect this will must ever be the aim of the rational self. This, then, becomes the first duty which, in part, defines the nature of the end of humanity. But how shall the second duty, the happiness of others, be explicated? The Kantian doctrine seems, after all,

to be about to degenerate into the happiness theory. Having saved the intuitionist, he is now intent on saving the Epicurean! If the happiness principle will not hold in reference to myself, how can it hold in reference to my neighbor? If it is not lawful to seek my own happiness, how can it be my duty to seek the happiness of humanity, or the duty of humanity to seek it for me? But Kant is not unaware of this difficulty, as it would appear from his conception of the ideally perfect will. When the commands issuing from self are loyally accepted and obeyed, the constraint of obligation falls away. The relation of self to law is radically changed. The feeling of duty is transformed into the feeling of pleasure. It was duty to obey the law; it is now pleasure. Kant saw perfectly that it is impossible to exclude wholly the element of happiness from the ethical theory. Perfection itself would not compensate for the loss of happiness, even if the idea of pain could be eliminated. What place, then, does pleasure hold in the conditions of human life? It is manifest that what may be my pleasure in one condition may be my duty in another. Experience may verify my intuitive perceptions, but it cannot act independently of them, and, as an able arbiter, determine moral values. No experience can assure me that my neighbor ought to be happy. His one supreme condition of happiness is obedience to moral law. To promote this obedience is to promote his happiness. No other means to this happiness are possible. Logically, then, the duty of the individual to seek the happiness of all men is deduced. On the other hand, the duty of all men to seek their own happiness, while affirmable, is never felt as obligation. A law of nature, in sensible experience, inclines all men to seek their own pleasure. The use of the term "duty," then, in this relation is unmeaning; but the question remains, What is there in intuitive morals to compel men to seek the happiness of others? It is the unresting moral imperative of the rational self seeking to realize itself in experience. It is that element of consciousness, often the weakest element in our constitution, which makes itself known as supreme and authoritative. This is the hidden spring of morality, the categorical imperative of Kant. That Kant has rightly designated this power is abundantly sup-

ported by the moral literature of every age. Carlyle has well represented this feeling in *Hero Worship*: "It is calumny to say that men are roused to heroic actions by ease, hope of pleasure, recompense—sugar-plums of any kind in this world or the next. In the meanest mortal there lies something nobler. The poor, swearing soldier, hired to be shot, has his honor of a soldier, different from drill regulations and the shilling a day. It is not to taste sweet things, but to do noble and true things, and to vindicate himself, under God's heavens, as a God-made man, that the poorest son of Adam dimly longs. Show him the way of doing that, and the dullest day-drudge kindles into a hero. Difficulty, abnegation, martyrdom, death, are the allurements that act on the heart of man." No intuitionist opposes the general theory of utility as an end indicated by law, but as a motive. The true motive is the self-impelling desire to objectify the ideal of moral law in personal experience and in the experience of all men. The above question, then, presents no difficulty to the intuitionist. It is quite different from the view-point of the utilitarian. The word "duty," or the feeling of obligation, is spoken of in an equivocal sense or openly rejected. His philosophy provides no tenable answer to the question why he should seek the happiness of all men. He may prefer his own to another's happiness. If he cannot be certain that he is entitled to an equal share in the common happiness, and no more, there is a strong suspicion that he will be tempted, if occasion offer, to appropriate unduly and to the full extent of his desires. There is only one recourse for the utilitarian. He must show that the happiness principle is given in immediate perception. This he cannot do except by concession to the intuitionist. To save himself he must sacrifice a portion of his theory. He must show some deeper impulse than the love of happiness before he can proclaim to the world a universal, moral law. It is for this reason that we desire to mediate between the two theories, not because the efforts of Janet, Jouffroy, and a crowd of more recent writers have not been good, but because they have proved ineffectual.

We have seen that, in the rival theories under notice, the motive is the moral determinant in the one, and the effects of action, or

happiness, is the test of morality in the other. We now propose *character and happiness* as the *summum bonum*, the mediate ground for both theories. We are led to this by considering the term *perfection*, which Kant postulated as the necessary end of the practical reason. The reasons for this preference are various: The term *character* is easily resolvable into terms of the cardinal or representative virtues, while the word *perfection* is not. Character presents to our minds a synthesis of those attractive qualities which are associated in our minds with happiness. In terms of evolution, perfection may mean that completeness of organism which maintains the actions of greatest pleasurable consciousness. It is not intuitively known that happiness is the necessary complement of perfection, but surely we have an immediate perception of those elements which combine in that unity which we call character, and which we pronounce deserving of happiness. The term character also has an advantage in concreteness. And finally, it is a return to the Aristotelean conception of the moral end. It is admitted that the intuitionist has nothing to gain by this substitution. It is a concession which rather mars the inner harmony of the Kantian metaphysics, but is not destructive of its cogency, considered with reference to Kant's ethics. Indeed, it is a direct corollary of his third canon. The highest empirical end which we can offer humanity is character. The supreme worthiness of character cannot be dissociated from the moral element. Granting, then, that character cannot be conceived apart from morality, we have to see how the utilitarian, by a necessary implication of his own principle, connects his theory with it. As a hedonist, his own experience and the accumulated experiences of society soon assure him that character is the necessary antecedent of happiness. He can feel no obligation to be happy apart from this character. He may, therefore, dismiss the thought of obligation, since by his theory he recognizes no worthiness to be happy disconnected from the causes of happiness. But utility demands that he shall recognize the empirical causes of happiness. He must, therefore, place value on character, not for its own sake, nor for any feeling of obligation, but for its utility in producing happiness. The hedonistic principle is thus vindicated as respects

himself, but how is he to proceed from the individual to the many? How is he to identify the interest of one with the interest of all? It is true that the utilitarian has made it clear to himself that his own interest in the general allotment of happiness is to count no more than that of his neighbor. How is he to maintain this impartial view, and how is he to give concrete expression to what Mill calls the Golden Rule of utility? Surely, in no other way than this, by making the place of happiness logical. Happiness has no reality apart from the objects which produce it. It is in itself an abstraction, and must be sought in the concrete. Moreover, objects must take rank in importance with reference to this quality. The object must be conditioned by the greater happiness, and the greatest object is that which produces the greatest happiness to the greatest number. Utility is required to select this object. Furthermore, it is required to select this object, not as an end, but as means. If he were to choose in reference to end, without objective reference, he would change his conception of morality. With this in view, he is logically led to choose character as the greatest instrument of the greatest happiness to the greatest number. If he were to identify character, in itself considered, as the sole end of action, he would cease to be utilitarian. He, as utilitarian, is interested in the external result, not in the supreme worthiness, of character. This result, if regarded as pleasure, is, considered abstractly and in this sense, an end. But in experience the concrete subject must go along with the abstract notion. From this point of view the intuitionist and the utilitarian may be conceived as having the same determinant of value. The one would view character as the end in itself, with the necessary consequent, happiness. The other would view pleasure as the abstract end, with character as the concrete instrument. All pleasure-producing objects would then be subsumed under character. Each object would, as now, be acknowledged in its relation to pleasure, but would take rank in importance and influence according to its relation to character. The life of the utilitarian would probably show as little obliquity from the common moral ideal as the life of the intuitionist. The philosopher no more lives his moral philosophy than the plain man lives his own moral ideal.

The only object of mediation, as proposed in these pages, is to seek from the intuitionist a closer determination of value in morals, and from the utilitarian a much-needed aid in exploring the nature and extent of our moral consciousness. The phenomena of experience are, of course, the same for both theories. Inductive morality must content itself with what is, and is, so far forth, scientific. The metaphysic of morality must transcend that which is merely external to the subject, and must exhibit the rational grounds of moral judgment. The determinant of value is, as we have endeavored to show, common to both, while the basis and method of exposition will be ever necessarily different. The transition from every form of exposition to Christian ethics should be easy, and in accord with the dictum of revealed morality.

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