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I. THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION AS AFFECTED BY THE ESSENTIAL RELATION BETWEEN THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE.

Do we think in words? Do we think only in words? Do we always when we engage in thought employ for that purpose language? Is it possible to think fruitfully, to think to any advantage, to think at all in any other way? On the assumption that one can think without words, is it possible to express, even to one's self, to formulate,—to communicate one's thoughts, *i. e.*, convey them intelligibly to others,—through any other medium? Must there not be some medium or vehicle for every form whatever of thought-expression; and must or must not that medium be language?

Some of these and kindred questions are not merely of curious interest, but also of profound significance and consequence, and have accordingly not only awakened the attention and occasioned and stimulated the researches of the great body of philologists and logicians, and the specialists in physiology proper, and of course those in mental physiology and what is now known as physiological psychology, but have also occupied the minds of some of the wisest philosophers and greatest intellects the world has ever seen. But what is still more to the purpose at present, the answers given to some of these questions have an incidental bearing on the inquiry as to the fact and extent of an infallible inspiration.

It will be the aim of this essay to indicate and touch upon the main problems which arise from a consideration of the more important of the interrogatories just referred to, and then to point

V. A GENERATION OF DARWINISM.

It is now more than thirty years since Mr. Darwin published his doctrine of evolution. Even the most superficial review of this period would exhibit a more wonderful devotion to the theory of this man, a more popular following, a more noisy proclamation, than has ever been accorded to any of the great philosophers of ancient or modern times. A more critical and philosophic review would disclose a succession of groundless opinions, displaced, in turn, by others equally groundless, old ways suddenly abandoned for new paths of perilous speculation, hereditary faiths reluctantly repudiated or dishonored by false interpretations, and the infallible standard for errant and dying men subordinated to a hypothesis which never is, but always to be, verified.

How such words as these may be regarded, will depend upon several pre-conditions, such as a knowledge of the trend of religious opinion among the thinkers in our day, some knowledge of books, and of what our colleges are doing for their students; but more especially will it depend upon the nature and extent of a personal belief in the divine authority of the Bible.

Some fifteen years ago Professor Stanley Jevons wrote in his *Principles of Science*: "I cannot for a moment admit that the theory of evolution will alter our theological ideas. The precise reason why we have an erect stature, a complex brain, about two hundred and twenty-three bones, and many other peculiarities, is only to be found in the original act of creation." Had his life been prolonged ten years, he no doubt would have been greatly surprised, to read in this year of grace, the language of one of his most distinguished associates in this theory: "That the wide diffusion of the doctrine of evolution has during the past thirty years had a great effect upon religious belief is unquestionable. That it has destroyed in many minds their conviction as to God's existence, we know through our own personal experience, while a much greater number have been thus led, tacitly or avowedly, to abandon their previous belief in Christianity." Here are two ad-

vocates of evolution, the one looking forward and the other looking backward. The one has no idea of the impending change in theological opinion; the other bears witness to the change as an accomplished fact. No thinking man, who has had the opportunity to mark the spread and effect of this doctrine, doubts for a moment that its tendency is strongly opposed to Christianity. One of the leading conservative writers of the day says in reference to Darwinism: "The logical results of this view would be a mortal stab to revealed truth. It would entirely upset all the great doctrines of Scripture. It rejects the Bible order of creation, the fall of man, the nature of sin, the need of a Saviour."

A. R. Wallace, in his recent work on "Darwinism," bears witness to this change in opinion effected by Darwin. "Before his work appeared the whole literary and scientific world held firmly to the belief that *species* were realities . . . and that they had originated by some totally unknown process so far removed from ordinary re-production that it usually was spoken of as a 'special creation.' But now all this is changed . . . The idea of special creation or any other exceptional mode of production is absolutely extinct." And yet his book is confessedly written in honor of Darwin, although excepting to the doctrine of natural selection in some important particulars. Sufficient time has elapsed to discover the animus of evolution; and by evolution we mean that of Darwin, Huxley and Spencer. It has a purpose. The purpose is to remove God out of the range of our every day perceptions and of our belief. Darwin has put himself on record as to the final cause of his theory. In writing to Lyell, in 1859, on the postulate of divine agency, he says: "I cannot see its necessity; its admission would, I think, make the theory of natural selection valueless." Elsewhere, he says: "I would give absolutely nothing for the theory of natural selection if it requires miraculous additions at any one stage of descent."

The sage of Chelsea was not slow to point out the destructive aim of these men. With a fine *a priori* spirit he divines their purpose and unmasks their pretensions. "So-called and literary classes," he says, "in England now proudly give themselves to protoplasm, origin of species, and the like, to prove that God did

not build the universe. I have known three generations of the Darwins, grandfather, father and son, atheists all. The brother of the famous naturalist, a quiet man, who lives not far from here, told me that among his grandfather's effects he found a seal engraved with this legend, '*omnia ex conchis*'—'everything from a clam shell.' I saw the naturalist not many months ago; told him that I had read his *Origin of Species*, and other books; that he had by no means satisfied me that men were descended from monkeys, but had gone far toward persuading me that he and his so-called scientific brethren had brought the present generation of Englishmen very near to monkeys. A good sort of man is this Darwin, and well-meaning, but with very little intellect. Ah! it is a sad and terrible thing to see a whole generation of men and women professing to be cultivated, looking round in a purblind fashion, and finding no God in this universe! I suppose it is a reaction from the reign of cant and hollow pretence, professing to believe what in fact they do not believe. And this is what we have got; all things from frog-spawn; the gospel of dirt the order of the day. The older I grow—and I now stand on the brink of eternity—the more comes back to me the sentence in the catechism, which I learned when a child, and the fuller and deeper its meaning becomes, 'What is the chief end of man? To glorify God and to enjoy him forever.' No gospel of dirt, teaching that men have descended from frogs through monkeys, can ever set that aside." Thus writes Carlyle in a letter first published in Scotland, and reprinted in the *London Times*.

Before attending directly to the purpose in view in the preparation of this paper, it may be well to notice certain reactionary tendencies on the part of those who have, with more or less zeal, supported the evolutionary theory. Professor Joseph La Conte was wont formerly to define evolution as "a continuous progressive change according to certain laws, by means of resident forces." However accurate this description of the process may be, it is certain that this definition was intended to teach a mechanical form of development, but his most recent utterance indicates a change of position. "We must," he says, "return to the old idea of direct divine agency. We must believe in a God, not out of

our reach, not one who long ago created forces which continue in themselves to run the machine we call nature, but a God immanent, a God resident in nature at all times and in all places, directing every event and determining every phenomenon, a God in whom, in the most literal sense, not only we, but all things, have their being."

- If all who profess and teach evolution would guard their instructions with similar language it would only be necessary in that case to call attention to the use of a terminology which is becoming more and more misleading.

The address of Professor Stokes last year before the University of Edinburgh marks an epoch in the history of evolution. Speaking from his high position as president of the Royal Society, he says, "The evidence appears to be utterly insufficient to establish on scientific grounds the derivation of man by continuous natural transmission from some different form of living thing. And as to a continuous development of mind leading up to the mind of man, of direct evidence we seem to have absolutely none. The evidence seems to be the other way."

More emphatic still is the language of the Berlin biologist, Professor Virchow, which has been quoted so frequently of late: "We have," he says, "sought in vain to connect man with the ape. The pro-anthropos has not been discovered; he is not even a subject for discussion; he is only a dream. At this moment we are able to say that among the peoples of antiquity no single one was any nearer to the apes than we are. At this moment I can affirm that there is not upon earth any absolutely unknown race of men. It can be positively demonstrated that in the course of five thousand years no change of type worthy of mention has taken place. Twenty years ago the leaders of our science asserted that they knew many things, which, as a matter of fact, they did not know."

Having thus introduced expert opinion in evidence of the character and present status of evolution, or, as it has been called, the theory of derivation, let us now proceed historically and exhibit something of its development and its vicissitudes. A careful and inductive survey of its history would give rise to certain moral and logical judgments, which must inevitably prove unfavorable to

it, and these in turn might be stated in the form of propositions with their appropriate proofs. For it must be confessed, even by the warmest friends of evolution, that the theory is incomplete, and that there is no prospect of its completion. Every attempt to bring the phenomena of mind under the dictum of natural selection, or to annex the realms of morals and spiritual life to their theory has proven conspicuous by its failure.

I. The errors and concessions of evolutionists tend to discredit their whole theory.

Twenty-four years ago Professor Huxley introduced to the scientific world his far-famed "Bathybius." It was his name for a transparent substance found in the beds of the deep sea. He called it living matter, an organism without organs, the father of all life in the past and which was destined to become the parent of all life in the future. The gap between the organic and the inorganic was at last to be filled. This mysterious something, matter or life, which Tyndall might have described as bearing "the promise and potency of every form and quality of life," received the great homage of science. Häckel applauded from the University of Jena. Strauss aroused himself from his dying stupor and declared in the name of "Bathybius" that educated men could no longer be Christians. For seven long years the virtues of "Bathybius" were sounded in great physical laboratories. It is true the voices of Carpenter and Beale and Mivart were raised against it. And then came the revelation. The good ship *Challenger* returned from her voyage and "Bathybius" was proclaimed with unerring certainty to be—sulphate of lime—and "crystallizes, when dissolved, like gypsum"! "Bathybius," as representing protoplasm has disappeared. It does not even appear in the index pages of the *Britannica*; Huxley has discarded it. *O, si sic omnia!*

Again, Professor Huxley has been equally unfortunate in his specifications of time. Near the close of his third lecture before his New York audience he said, "We take our time from the geologist. I have no means of guessing whether it took a million of years, or ten millions or a hundred millions or a thousand millions of years to complete these changes."

Now, it is well known, that vast periods of time have been re-

presented as necessary to the theory of evolution. In his *History of Creation*, Hæckel says, that the organic history of the earth must be counted by paleontological periods, each of which comprises many thousands of years, and perhaps millions, and perhaps millions of thousands of years." And this appears evident if the doctrine of the transmutation of species is to stand any reasonable chance. The increment or decrement of change in this process of becoming is admitted on all hands to be indefinitely small. In his second lecture, Huxley affirmed that in the region of Niagara, in the superficial deposits which cover the surface of the rocks, there are found animal remains, and among them shell-fish; the latter exactly identical with the species now inhabiting the still waters of Lake Erie. He assumes that these shell-fish were living thirty thousand years ago, and he asserts that these are identical with their survivors of the same species to-day. He also declares that we find species of animals in the tertiary formations and even in the cretaceous epoch, which the closest scrutiny cannot show to be different in any important particular from those living at the present time. In this conclusion he is borne out by Cuvier, who made a comparative study of animals and corresponding parts of skeletons for the time extending over the greater part of the historic period of man. Professor Huxley admits that the conclusion of Cuvier, that no appreciable change in structure had taken place in this lapse of time, is beyond contradiction. How, then, can evolution, he asks, be tenable? In no wise, he answers except on the assumption that four thousand years, or even thirty or more thousands of years are insignificant in comparison with these vast periods of geologic time which are necessary to the transmutation of species. And it must be remembered, that neither Darwin nor Huxley allow for a moment the possibility of any breach in the continuity of natural causation. What must be thought of a theory which resorts to such desperate expedients as this, especially when it is understood that infinite time is not at their disposal, even if it would save them?

Suppose, then, we take our time from geologists and astronomers, as the evolutionists profess to do, and what have we? A geological time of some twelve or fifteen millions of years, accord-

ing to Professor Newcomb and Sir William Thomson. Will this satisfy the conditions of evolution? Certainly not, says Hæckel, each geological period may contain, perhaps, "millions of thousands of years." And this is manifestly the demand of the theory, and necessary to its existence—indefinitely extended time.

Professor Huxley, when pressed with the objection that four thousand years show no appreciable change in species, takes refuge in almost immeasurable time. When geologists and astronomers reduce their time from four hundred million to less than one-tenth of this, he begs the question by affirming that evolution is true, and that the ultimate reduction of geologic time to a small finite quantity is a matter of perfect indifference. Surely this playing fast and loose with the element of time is not calculated to inspire respect for his theory of evolution!

As to the concessions of evolutionists, one paramount and determinative consideration ought to be borne in mind, *i. e.*, no proof of evolution exists. This admission, frankly offered by all who defend the hypothesis, should have great weight. No doubt it will be suggested that there are many things we believe which are not susceptible of proof. Whether evolution ought to be received into this category is just the question at issue. Undoubtedly the inductive sciences are accustomed to fill many a hiatus with deduction. Precisely how far induction should preponderate before we are entitled to fill a gap by deduction it is impossible to state in general terms. But surely science has no right to draw a conclusion outside of the premises. Of course this is freely admitted in theory; nevertheless the admission is immediately cancelled in practice. And this seems to be a prominent vice of physical science. The haste to settle premises involves hasty generalization. Induction without principle leads nowhere. Hence the inductive method requires frequent recurrence to intuitive, as distinguished from demonstrative, knowledge, and a rigid adherence to the laws of thought. Herein is reasonable safety. Beyond this lies the region of the grotesque, and wild, objectless chimera. In the inductive sciences the process of thought is from the special to the general—from many individual experiences to a general law. In the act of deduction the natu-

ralist, for instance, returns from the general law of nature to an individual case. The biologist asserts, as a great inductive law, the theory of descent, as an empirical fact, emerging from the widest possible experience. Now man, Hæckel tells us, is a special case. The general inductive law of evolution being true, the derivation of man from the lower animals is a deductive law, which follows as a special and inseparable part of the inductive law. Evolutionists assert the general inductive law of the derivation of species, and then, assuming this law to be proved, assert the right to intercalate, by deduction, the special case of the derivation of man from ape-like mammals. Now, it is conceded that natural selection proceeds by exceedingly small increments or decrements, and hence can take no leaps, and that many links must have existed between man and the highest apes. It is conceded that not one of these links has been found. Here, then, is a chasm in the general law. It cannot be filled by induction. The resort is to deduction. But this is manifestly illicit except on the sole ground of the validity of the inductive law. This revives the whole question. Is the theory of the origin of species made good by the inductive law? Or is the inductive process discontinuous—*i. e.*, broken by frequent gaps which must be filled by deduction? This is certainly the fact, as is evidenced by the number of concessions which evolutionists are compelled to make.

1. That the theory of human descent from apes is the product of speculation, and not of observation.
2. That the difference between the cubic capacity of the brain of the highest ape and that of the lowest man is one-half, and further, that there is no link between the two.
3. That the eye of the trilobite, a remote fossil form, is full and perfect.
4. That the derivation of species is impossible, if the sterility of hybrids is a fact.
5. That man as well as every other animal presents structures which, so far as we can judge, are not now, nor have been at any time, of any service to him; so says Darwin, so say they all. Professor Huxley could not have been ignorant of these concessions of his associates when he said in the last of his New York lectures: "An inductive hypothesis is said to be demonstrated when the facts are shown to be in entire accordance with it. And the doctrine of evolution at

the present time rests upon exactly as secure a foundation as the Copernican theory." *Credat Judæus Apella!* Not only are not all the facts in accord with evolution, but many are conceded to be wholly against it. The list as given above, to which many other concessions could be added, is conclusive on this point. As long as these stand, all talk about an inductive argument in proof of evolution is mere declamation and would never be risked except before a popular audience.

Undoubtedly naturalists discover many facts in fossil remains, in zoölogical geography, in unity of type, in rudimentary organs, and in zoölogical classification which favor the hypothesis of evolution, but when we come to consider its defects, the helpless concessions of its friends, their utterly irreconcilable statements, their failure to find intermediate forms to fill inconvenient gaps, we find abundant reason to discredit their whole argument.

II. Darwinism tends to obscure the idea of intelligent design.

Darwinism saves itself from blank atheism by describing four typical forms—mollusks, radiates, articulates, vertebrates—as representatives of creative action, and from which all species have been derived, with the reserved hypothesis, however, that even these forms may have arisen from one primordial cell.

Whether in deference to religion or to science this last view should be permitted to survive, is a question of debate; some evolutionists preferring to take refuge in spontaneous generation, which is not, but which was, rather than to posulate what Huxley calls an "inconceivable creation"; some prefer to save science at the expense of religion, while others would save both by a judicious modification of each. But this question immediately divides again on the subordinate issue, Which is more scientific, the conception of supernatural interference in nature to span bridgeless chasms, or to dismiss the supernatural altogether? It is contended that the *Deus ex machina* while adapted to the Greek mind is altogether unworthy of modern science. Some, therefore, prefer to be consistent, if anything, and proceed to out-Darwin Darwin. Others reluctantly admit divine agency into a few first terms of the series, but continue the development absolutely by means of natural selection.

Out of this confusion of opinion one result clearly appears: the retirement of creative power, either wholly, or almost wholly, from the field of nature. This statement requires no debate; it is conceded. The common theistic argument from design is superseded by a more scientific and comprehensive view of nature. Evolutionists regard this as one of their most valuable results. This view of Darwin's labors prevails with, perhaps, but one respectable exception, Professor Kölliker, whose remarks may be quoted for the purpose of introducing the critical testimony of one or two distinguished evolutionists. In seeking to define the philosophical position of Darwinism, Professor Kölliker says, "Darwin is in the fullest sense a teleologist. He says quite distinctly that every particular in the structure of an animal has been created for its benefit. The teleological general conception of Darwin is a mistaken one." Upon which Professor Huxley remarks: "It is singular how differently one and the same book will impress different minds. That which struck the present writer most forcibly on his first perusal of the *Origin of Species* was the conviction that teleology, as commonly understood, had received its death-blow at the hands of Mr. Darwin." And after demolishing Paley's watch, as he supposes, he proceeds to illustrate Darwinism in this wise: "Far from imagining that cats exist *in order* to catch mice well, Darwinism supposes that cats exist *because* they catch mice well—mousing being not the end, but the condition of their existence. . . . So far from being a teleologist in the fullest sense of the word, we should deny that he is a teleologist, in the ordinary sense, at all."

It must not be supposed from this evidence that Professor Huxley proposes to break with teleology altogether. He has a good word for teleology, but as "commonly understood" its days are numbered. When reconciled, however, to morphology by the hypothesis of Darwin, it will no longer prove false to the fundamental principles of a scientific conception of the universe. From all this we learn, that intelligent design in nature, as commonly understood, must be abandoned. It will no longer serve the theist either as an argument or as an illustration of the divine existence.

More explicit and more spirited is the testimony of Professor

G. J. Romanes, whose competence to expound evolution will nowhere be doubted. "Let us," says he, "weigh the evidence in favor of organic evolution. If we find it wanting, we need have no complaint to make of natural theologians of to-day; but if we find it to be full measure, shaken together and running over, we ought to maintain that natural theologians can no longer adhere to the arguments of such writers as Paley, Bell and Chalmers without deliberately violating the only logical principle which separates science from fetichism. To avoid misapprehension, however, I may add here that while Mr. Darwin's theory is thus in plain and direct contradiction to the theory of design, or system of teleology, as presented by the school of writers I have named, I hold that Mr. Darwin has no point of logical contact with the theory of design in the larger sense." To the small philosophers who attempt to generalize the particulars of a hypothesis which they do not understand, and to restless theologians who are ever on the alert to disport themselves in the garb of some new speculation, he administers the following implied rebuke: "Some minds, even highly cultured, unaccustomed to scientific modes of thought, make a radical misconception of the whole logical attitude of science. The objection is made merely to his (Mr. Darwin's) interpretation of the facts, because these facts might *equally well* be ascribed to intelligent design. And so undoubtedly they might, if we were all so childish as to rush into a supernatural explanation whenever a natural explanation is found sufficient to account for the facts." These extracts from two eminent naturalists evidently reveal an animus, and contain a warning. This animus is a spirit of hostility to supernaturalism. The warning is that any attempt to apply evolution to theism, as commonly understood in nature, will be resented as childish or as a return to fetichism. But I shall, no doubt, be reminded that our most respectable evolutionary literature is nevertheless theistic, regarded as a comprehensive view of the operations of nature. The answer would be that Darwinism has indeed given rise to many so-called systems of evolution, but that in so far as these systems are entitled to share in the name evolution, so far they must be held responsible for the doctrines of Darwin. The question would then recur, What

is the theistic standing of Darwinism? Manifestly the only authoritative interpretation must come from those who know it best. What do Huxley and Romanes say? The former that the doctrine of Paley has received its death-blow; the latter that natural theologians can no longer adhere to Paley and Chalmers without passing over to superstition.

Now this understanding of nature did not obtain before the time of Darwin. An atheistic view of nature seemed impossible. The book of living nature was the one unassailable text-book of the evidences. Contrivance, design, instinctive actions, pointed to God. Now all this is changed. Blind physical force comes to the front. Chance seizes upon useful variations and preserves them. Relation of variation to environment determines selection. Species are derived by eliminating the weak and conserving the strong. Purposive action is denied. The whole pull of physical science, if evolution is accepted, is away from God. And this certainly must have been Darwin's view when he wrote to Lyell: "I would give absolutely nothing for natural selection if it requires miraculous additions *at any one stage* of descent."

As a philosophy, evolution neither has, nor can have, any standing. It professes to explain the universe, including man, science and religion. But environment is treated as if it were no part of nature. Also the processes of reproduction, death and survival, are considered independently of their ground. This process, together with the proposed environment, requires a metaphysical basis, and it is precisely this basis which evolution cannot provide. And the reason is obvious. The evolutionary hypothesis demands, in order to a philosophical standing, a regress of thought to a beginning, a first term, which must be conceived as actuated by supernatural or spontaneous agency. The latter results in intellectual suicide, the former, it is said, in superstition! Hence evolution treats us to a groundless show upon a groundless environment.

But surely, it may be replied, the system of Spencer, reflected as it is in modern scientific thought, must be regarded as an exception. By no means. It illustrates our position. It is not necessary to attack his system in detail. It wrecks itself on its own inner contradictions. It posits two factors, matter and force. What

is this force? A spectre, blind, objectless, unintelligent — a mere physical activity. Were there no mind, no will in our experience to be accounted for, his system, no doubt, would achieve a grand philosophic unity. But mind is a fact. Between mind and matter is a logical chasm. This Mr. Spencer admits. Yet from his two factors, mind must somehow be obtained. He therefore resorts to the desperate expedient of deducing mind from a premise which contains no mind.

Then as to will. He rightly maintains the Cartesian doctrine of consciousness as the underlying principle of certainty. On this sure ground we also affirm the freedom of the will. He denies this. His denial springs from the necessity of his system, otherwise he must deny the "persistence of force." He therefore discredits consciousness of freedom to save his determining principle. Thus, in evolving mind and will from matter—order from mechanical unintelligence, he discredits himself, and falls a prey to the unavoidable contradictions of his philosophy. His ethical system is utterly baseless. His *Data of Ethics* and *Justice*, divorced from freedom and conscience are simply a dream. His evolution of a perfect society is as groundless in philosophy as it is inconsistent with observation and experience. In following the doctrine of evolution, he obscures intelligent design. He thus fails in logical unity, and his whole system, vast as it is ambitious, falls, on examination, into hopeless incoherence.

III. The doctrine of evolution tends to obscure Christianity.

This, of course, follows from the preceding proposition. It is plain that whatsoever is antitheistic is also antichristian. But the converse is by no means true. Many persons assault Christianity who exhibit no hostility to theistic doctrine. Thus we distinguish two tendencies, differing in their strength and their effects. Under adverse influences, other things being equal, Christianity must suffer more than theism. This is obvious when we consider the greater number of assailable points which it offers. Before the advent of the *Origin of Species* by Darwin, physical science as written and as taught, seemed always on the side of design and contrivance, and therefore impliedly in the interests of theistic belief. Natural theology was considered to be a strong support of

Christianity The organisms which the naturalists described, and the functions which the anatomists brought to light became at once the capital of the natural theologian to illustrate his theme. Now, the latter will have science to reckon with if he undertakes to prove design by facts drawn from the storehouse of nature. Thus religion has suffered in what was formerly the house of its friends. There has been a defection from accustomed standards, which is without parallel in the history of religious opinion. Says Professor Mivart: "We know no records which show us that the change from geocentric to heliocentric astronomy was accompanied by anything like the religious devastation which has attended the promulgation and wide acceptance of the doctrine of evolution," and again: "It is a fact within our personal knowledge, that a certain number of young men have assigned evolution as the reason why they gave up Christianity; while it is notorious that opponents of that religion have loudly proclaimed the incompatibility of evolution therewith."

This evidence from a friend of evolution is significant. Its occasion should be noticed. He is preparing the way not to sacrifice evolution, but to destroy natural selection. He proposes to show how a doctrine, professedly evil, can be made innocuous. On what grounds a theory which has no justification in experience is worth saving, he fails to explain. He does, however, confess that "not one single instance of evolution can be demonstrated to have occurred." By evolution he here means, of course, Darwinism, in which natural selection plays a dominant part; this term being applied to a supposed process of nature whose destructive and preservative influences are maintained by a mere sightless and purposeless force. Nevertheless, this force selects and preserves all useful variations, themselves accidental, and rejects all those less favorably developed in the struggle for existence. In this way species are conceived to have originated. If it is inquired as to the cause of these variations, the answer is, chance. If a reason is asked why the destructive forces of nature fall on these less perfected variations, we are told that the fittest survives. If we ask for the law or purpose, we are informed that purposive law is a mistaken conception of nature, or that it is unknown,

or unnecessary. Physical force, other organisms and environment, to the exclusion of mind, account for the selection of different kinds. No wonder that Mivart, many years ago, called this a "puerile hypothesis." Failing, therefore, to account for evolution which he still maintains, and which he sometimes calls "a fact," and sometimes "a speculation without proof," he proposes a solution of his own. He attempts to put evolution on a metaphysical basis, by positing in nature, in every form of life, especially in all lower animals, a progressive spirit, analogous to the human spirit—a life whose becoming continually transcends itself. That is to say, objects of sense must be interpreted from the side of the self-conscious spirit rather than from the side of sense perceptions. He illustrates his theme by reference to the genesis and growth of the body. The mind also exhibits an ever-increasing variety of modes of being. Change follows change. The man is more than the boy. There is a real psychogenesis due to an internal force, and this he describes as evolution. But Mivart strangely forgets that change and variety are not inconsistent with identity. He must know that he can never escape from himself. Out of the past and present he can never fail, by self-consciousness and memory, to constitute his own oneness of personality. The *ego* remains the *ego*. And as there is no consciousness of ancestors, he can never know by any metaphysical process that his selfhood has been differentiated from his progenitors. Thus his argument is barren of result; so far from affording any probability in favor of evolution, it recoils upon himself.

But this Proteus-like theory escapes all restraint. No argument can bind it. Like the demoniac of the tombs, it seems possessed of many desperate spirits which drive it everywhere but into the abyss. Morals, society, religion must be subjected to its authority. Students of physical science make it a term of communion among themselves. Its compulsory demands warn the recalcitrant. The fear of losing caste keeps men silent. And why do we object? Because its fruits are sufficiently apparent. The tree is not good. And if the fruit is corrupt we are entitled to lay the axe at its root. Perhaps if man were not implicated in evolution, we might consent, as Professor Tyndall suggests, to the derivation of animal

and vegetable life from inorganic nature. But such exception would necessarily leave the theory incomplete. It, therefore, enters the field of anthropology, and teaches, so far as it may possibly be regarded as theistic, the remoteness of God from man.

(a), Christianity teaches the nearness of God to man. "Wherefore if God so clothe the grass of the field which to-day is and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?" Here the doctrine seems to be that even the ephemeral life of the grass is *to-day* made the intimate concern of God. In opposition to this let us hear Romanes: "The law of parsimony constitutes the only logical barrier between science and superstition. For it is manifest that it is always possible to give a hypothetical explanation of any phenomenon whatever, by referring it immediately to the intelligence of some supernatural agent; so that the only difference between the logic of science and the logic of superstition consists in science recognizing a validity in the law of parsimony which superstition disregards." Ordinarily evolutionists do not regard the providence of God worthy of notice. Even the doctrine of creation appears as a vanishing quantity. Thus again Tyndall: "Diminishing gradually the number of progenitors, Mr. Darwin comes at length to one primordial form; but he does not say, as far as I can remember, how he supposes this form to have been introduced."

In opposition to this, Paul taught from Mars Hill: "God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth . . . giveth to all life and breath and all things; and hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him, though he be not far from every one of us." When we consider that the nearness of the Heavenly Father, who "knoweth that ye have need of all these things" is the rock of confidence which Christ offers to his disciples, and that this is the foundation upon which it becomes possible for them to secure "the kingdom of God and his righteousness," and compare this teaching with the notion of evo-

lution, our moral judgment and our moral feeling revolt against it, as untenable as it is unchristian.

Professor Tyndall told his Belfast hearers, "If to any one of us were given the privilege of looking back through the æons across which life has crept towards its present outcome, his vision would ultimately reach a point when the progenitors of this assembly could not be called human." This is sound Darwinism which finds evidence, it is said, to make it demonstrably certain that man must be placed in structural unity with the rest of the animal world, and more especially and closely with the apes. In the discussion of man's moral nature and mental faculties, Mr. Darwin's argument tends to the conclusion that mind, howsoever or wheresoever exhibited, has been derived from its rudiments in the lower animals, in the same manner and by the action of the same general laws which mark the development of his physical structure.

As this contradicts Scripture it cannot be true. The first chapter of Genesis takes us back to the beginning of things. At the very outset of organic life, animal and vegetable, each is represented as bringing forth after its kind. Here we are introduced not to primordial cells and protoplasm, but to cattle and fowls and creeping things, distinct from one another. Over these man is created to have dominion. He is further distinguished, in creation, by the image and likeness of his maker, as his crowning dignity. He is also differenced from the brutes by his destiny. The spirit of the one returns to God who gave it—that of the other goeth downward to the earth. Over such a creation we should expect to hear its Author exclaim not only that the sparrow's fall is noticed by the Father, but that the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Christianity accepts the Bible as true, and is itself true only upon this ground. Revelation is not subject to the doctrine of evolution, neither indeed can be. Hence it is taught, not wisely but too well, that if Bible doctrine cannot be brought into harmony with evolution, such failure proves revelation unworthy of credit! To secure this harmony, sundry theologians have set themselves to the task of showing how Scripture can be made to converge upon evolution. Some, more wise than their fathers, have ventured to assert that the human body may have been derived

from the lower animals. Such an assertion is both groundless and gratuitous. It is groundless since there is no evidence to justify it—it is gratuitous since theologians are not set for the defence of the theories of physical science. As to the motive for their zeal only an unavoidable surmise remains, and this would be unwise and perhaps uncharitable to express.

(b), Again, evolution finds itself in direct antithesis with the fact that Christianity teaches the possibility of miracles. Evolutionists do not insist upon the absolute exclusion of the supernatural from the universe, neither do they defer at all to the claims of Christianity. Mr. Darwin suddenly becomes metaphysical, and assumes that continuity must be the law of the universe. He then proceeds to verification by attempting to show that all the rudimentary forms of nearly all the faculties of mind are discoverable in some animals. He makes a wide induction of particulars, embracing instances of animal memory, wonder, shame, kindness, etc., as manifestations of intelligence. A sense of beauty also, and even evidences of incipient religion are noticeable. In this manner he arrives by a continuous development to the phenomena of savage life. Darwin holds with Spencer that the moral sense arises from the exigencies of life and the social instincts. Then follow the mental struggles incident even to society in its lowest estate—then conscience and the elementary principles of morality.

The continuity of structure and adjustment of man's physical nature must necessarily be followed by a corresponding development of his mental nature. And it is described with great care as proceeding by small increments from the lower animals up to savages, and from savages up to man in his highest estate. It is progression without a break, and, since continuity holds equally in vegetable life, the presumption against miracles amounts almost to a demonstration. Of course such an event as a miracle could not be so much as named among evolutionists, at least if the following remark of Wallace can be verified: "The whole scientific and literary world, even the whole educated public, accepts as a matter of common knowledge the origin of species from other allied species by the ordinary process of natural birth." The

ground taken by Wallace in his *Darwinism* reflects undoubtedly the position of evolutionists who, by the nature of their studies, have a right to the name. And it is his opinion that the idea of special creation, or any other altogether exceptional mode of production, is absolutely extinct.

It needs no argument to show that if special creation is inadmissible, much more so, in consistency, are the miracles of Christ. But the proof of Christianity is suspended upon his moral and physical miracles, and he is himself the greatest of miracles. But perhaps it will be said that there are forms of evolution which certainly are not antitheistic, and may be interpreted in favor of Christianity. In regard to this statement two important facts should be noticed: First, every theory finds its best explanation and ultimate definition in its chief representatives; second, Darwinism as represented by Huxley, Spencer, and Wallace has won the day, along the line of average academic thought. What, then, should be the attitude of Christianity? This paper has sought to answer the question. No student of physics need fear that a denial of evolution is a denial of any ascertained truth of science, and no believer in Christian doctrine need hesitate to repudiate the whole theory of evolution in the name of the infallible word of God.

W. J. WRIGHT.

Westminster College, Fulton, Mo.