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I. THE QUESTION OF INSPIRATION IN ITS BEARING ON THE DOCTRINES OF GRACE.

HOWEVER Christian men may differ respecting the nature and extent of inspiration, they are all agreed in regard to its importance. In the estimate of all it is looked upon as presenting the gravest question the church has ever encountered. Nor is this estimate of its importance to be wondered at when we consider the relation which this question sustains to all the doctrines of revelation. There is no question respecting the being and attributes of God, the mode of the divine subsistence in three persons, the origin and original state of man, the fall and the state into which it brought mankind, the covenant of works and the covenant of grace, the atonement and intercession of Christ, the office of the Holy Spirit, the nature and prerogatives of the church and her unity as the one body of Christ, the doom and destiny of the finally impenitent—there is not one of these questions whose solution does not depend absolutely upon the testimony of the Bible. Within the sacred volume, and there alone, have we any reliable information on any of these subjects.

It must, therefore, be manifest that all questions in regard to the trustworthiness of the sacred record are questions in regard to the very foundation of Christianity. When a passage from this record is adduced in support of a particular view on any of these subjects, the question arises, of necessity, on what ground is it brought into court, and why should it have any weight in determining the issue? As the ultimate authority on

VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

GIRARDEAU'S "THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS."

THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS. *By the Rev. Professor John L. Girardeau, D. D., LL. D.* Columbia, S. C.: W. J. Duffie; New York: The Baker & Taylor Co. 1891.

This volume is a republication of certain articles in the *Southern Presbyterian Review* of more than a decade of years ago, with other additional papers that have been ripening in Dr. Girardeau's desk. A pathetic interest attaches to the views of this book in the connection of their origin with the lamented Dr. Thornwell. As far back as 1849, when the author was only a "licensed probationer" for the gospel ministry, he fell upon a sermon of Dr. Thornwell wherein was advocated the doctrine of moral necessity in acts of choice—or, rather, Dr. Thornwell's conception of that doctrine as presented by President Jonathan Edwards. In private conversation with Dr. Thornwell, that divine admitted to Dr. Girardeau that the scheme of moral necessity, in his opinion, does not avoid the difficulty of making God the author of sin. Thus was Dr. Girardeau started on a long intellectual pilgrimage in search of a theory concerning man's free-agency that acquits God of responsibility for sin. Unfortunately, throughout that journey he has carried the burden of an error—an error which came to him from Dr. Thornwell's own misconception of Edwards' doctrine—viz., that the theory for which he longs must have no kinship with the teaching of Edwards. After years of searching into the secrets of the mind, with the work of President Edwards constantly under his pillow, Dr. Girardeau has called forth from the vasty deep the long-sought theory. He has had wonderful success in evolving an hypothesis in exact accordance with his wishes at the outset—for the doctrine of this book has naught of resemblance to the creed of Edwards.

In entering the lists against the views of Dr. Girardeau, we wish to say in the outset that we come not as a knight bearing the *name* Necessity. That part of Edwards' armor inscribed with the *title* of his theory we discard. It may be well to pause and state the reason why.

As an eighteenth-century champion of Calvinism, Edwards had to deal with such Arminian writers as Dr. Samuel Clarke and Dr. Whitby, and with such Calvinistic concessionists as Watts and Doddridge. These theologians held up the human will as an instrument self-determined in all its operations. Autocratic sits the will in the seat of intellectual power, yet isolated from intellectual influence; and then, snap-like or automaton-like, determines within itself when to act. Edwards assailed this view as "self-contradictory and absurd." Most successfully did he uplift the insulted human mind, and place it back in the seat of honor as a co-worker in the plans of God's providence, and, at the same time, a responsible, voluntary agent. Unfortunately, however, President Edwards made use of

the term "moral necessity" to indicate the spontaneous working of man's nature in connection either with good or with evil. Writers of the school of Collins and Lord Kaimes at once assumed that Edwards held their view of philosophical necessity—an assumption which Edwards, in a private letter, strongly denied. Nevertheless, while Edwards did vindicate the true kingship of the human soul against all assaults of her enemies, his use of the word "necessity" led him into some statements that seem inconsistent with his general theory. His system, as a whole, has been accepted by subsequent leaders of Calvinistic thought. Even Dr. Thornwell's charges against Edwards do not change the fact that in all essentials he finally accepted the views of Princeton's President. Not so with Dr. Girardeau. The armor that he has donned is most pleasing in his sight because it presents a complete contrast to that of President Edwards. The latter, however, in its fundamentals, and with "Moral Certainty" substituted for "Moral Necessity" as the title thereof—this is the armor we shall assume in the contest.

"In all acts of man, the agent in each act is the will. This agent is not influenced to action by motives external to itself, but is self-determined within itself." Thus shouts the herald at Dr. Girardeau's end of the lists.

"In every act, the agent is the soul of the man himself. This agent, the man's soul, is influenced to action by motives presented by the operations of the mind."—So announces the herald at our station.

The contest is between the theory of Self-Determination of the will and Self-Determination of the soul. The appeal for judgment must be made to the facts of the human mind. In the presence of that tribunal, we invoke a sacred regard for the inviolability of English speech. Let not a double nor a forced meaning be thrust upon any term in its storehouse.

I. *The faculty of will, as defined by Dr. Girardeau, cannot be found in the human mind.*

Let us see what Dr. Girardeau means by the "will." Like a surgeon, he walks into the midst of the "mental powers," and carves us four divisions (page 39): (1.) Intellect; (2.) Feeling; (3.) Will; (4.) Conscience. We take this to mean that the will is a special faculty of the mind, not cognate with the intellect or mind itself, but only a cousin-german thereof. Without stopping to look at the other parts of the analysis, let us examine more closely the natural history of this creature called will. Does the mind own or control this faculty? Not so. The will sustains to the other mental powers the relation of "elective obedience" (p. 39). And yet this creature finds a dwelling-place in the territory of the mind itself. By the right of squatter sovereignty, forsooth, it sulks in its own corner, and runs errands for the mind only when it chooses!

Let us look in upon the workings of this psychological Czar. It is "the leading office of the will to appropriate by its choice, and yield obedience to, the laws furnished by the other faculties: the law of truth, by the understanding; the law of taste (?), by the feelings; the law of duty, by the conscience" (page 41). This provincial sovereign, the will, seems here to be assuming the robes of office that belong to the mind itself; for we are told that the will "*appropriates* by its choice" whatever treasures the other faculties possess—it *discriminates*, and *decides* which of these to put on the market. Now, from time immemorial, each of these functions, *choice*, *discrimination*, *decision*, belongs of divine right to the entire human soul. These functions are the *Magna Charta* that define the prerogatives of the man as

compared with the brute. In spite of its isolation, this special faculty, will, cannot act within its own territory without stealing the powers of the mind.

Can this strange being be bodied forth before the eye? Yes, in some such doubtful shape as Hamlet's cloud; for after Dr Girardeau has summoned the curiosity from its hiding-place, he comes to the conclusion that it is "very like a sponge." Hear him describe it: "If we could suppose a living, self-acting sponge, with a power of assimilating elements from other objects, according to a principle of elective affinity inherent in itself, we should have a faint analogue of the will in its initial process of consent and appropriation" (pp. 41, 42).

But let us hurry on to get a glimpse of the will full-fledged. On pages 43-44 he accords it these elements:

- (1.) The *power* to choose, lying at the root of the faculty.
- (2.) Choice, *appropriating* the offspring of the other faculties as its own.
- (3.) Conation, an habitual *inclination* and appetency *to action*.
- (4.) The determinate choice of action—the *act of willing*—the exercise, in any form, of the energy residing in the will.

Tracing its genealogy further, Dr. Girardeau calls the will "the elective faculty." In this will is there "a fundamental law—that of causal efficiency by virtue of which it chooses." "The faculties may then be distributed as: The intellectual, which is cognitive; the emotional, which is æsthetic; the voluntary, which is elective; and the moral, which is judicial" (p. 44).

To the will as thus defined, Dr. Girardeau ascribes a self-determining power. This he further explains as "power to originate its determinations" (p. 46). The will "appropriates" the cognitions and judgments of the mind, but these do not have the effect of motives, to *move* the will to action. It moves itself. It appropriates the mind's treasures of knowledge and of thought, but the action of the will is not at all connected with these. The "law of causality" is the spring of its movements.

Now very clearly this creature, the will, has gotten itself into a serious dilemma as regards its own nature. Since an impersonal "law" is the basis of its actions, the will has neither personality nor individuality. Since it is unaffected in its movements by rational and moral dispositions of the mind, the will is neither a rational nor a moral agent. Otherwise, it must be an impostor, stalking in the garb of the mind itself. An irrational monster or an impostor must the will needs be. The second horn of this dilemma seems to be accepted by Dr. Girardeau as he carefully arrays the will in its four elements. But these four elements are the recognized property of the *entire soul* considered as facing a crisis that calls for action. Let us recall these elements and restore them to their proper owner, the whole mind of man.

(1.) The *power* to choose belongs to the mind, to the entire soul, and not to a special faculty.

(2.) Choice, appropriating the offspring of the other faculties; this is an erroneous way of stating the function of the soul in unifying its various operations into one controlling disposition of character. This controlling disposition is the mind's motive to action.

(3.) Conation, or habitual inclination to action, belongs to the soul of man as the first article in its constitution. To lodge this characteristic in a special faculty would dismember the rational nature.

(4), The act of willing belongs to the mind itself. The mind thinks its own thoughts, feels its own emotions and wills its own actions.

It seems very clear that the capital error in Dr. Girardeau's whole theory has its source just here in his *definition* of the will. The soul of man is a unit in all its operations. When an act is performed, that act springs from the entire mind. This unity does Dr. Girardeau destroy when he ascribes all action to a special faculty, isolated from the mind itself by a self-determining power.

We leave it to the judgment of the reader if Dr. Girardeau's own contradictory statements have not shown the impossibility of the self-determination of the will, and that he has failed to show the existence of any such faculty in the human mind.

Now let some well-known witnesses speak on the matter here at issue:

Sir William Hamilton says, "As to mental powers you are not to suppose entities really distinguishable from the thinking principle or really different from each other. Mental powers are not like bodily organs. *It is the same simple substance which exerts every energy of every faculty, however various.*"—*Bowen's Hamilton*, p. 264.

Hear Dugald Stewart: "Although we divide the soul into several powers and faculties, there is no such division in the soul itself, *since it is the whole soul that remembers, understands, wills or imagines.*" (Quoted from Addison as the best expression of his own opinion, and sanctioned by Hamilton.)—*Hamilton*, p. 264.

Dr. Charles Hodge: "When we say that the will is self-determined, we separate it from the other constituents of the man, as an independent power. . . . In this case the volition ceases to be a decision of the agent."—*Theology*, Vol. II., p. 295.

Dr. Dabney: [According to the self-determining theory of the will] "man might be neither a reasonable nor a moral being. Not reasonable because his acts might be wholly uncontrolled at last by his whole understanding; not moral, because the merit of an act depends on its motive, and his acts would be motiveless." *Theology*, p. 122.

II. Dr. Girardeau's definitions are self-contradictory.

At times in the writing of the genealogy of the will, Dr. Girardeau seems to have glimpses of the truth, and consequently, his statements are not always consistent with his general theory. On one page we find him asserting that the will is a special faculty, the seat of efficient causality in the human soul (pp. 43, 115, &c.), on another page that the will is not a faculty, and that the soul itself is the seat of causality "in willing" (p. 29). On one page we find the will figuring as mind-director, controlling the man according to its own designs (p. 41)—keeping him away from happiness by not choosing the dictates of his soul—on another the will plays the part of the mind's servant, the organ through which the soul expresses its own activity (p. 27). How do these statements, further, accord with the repeated assertion that activity is not possessed by the soul, but by the will?

The core of Dr. Girardeau's theory is that the will determines itself to action without the influence of motives (p. 116 *ad lib.*) but on page 114 occurs a remarkable admission: "Motives are the final, the will is the efficient cause of voluntary acts. . . . On the principle that most effects are produced by a concurrence of causes, we admit that final causes concur with the efficient cause in the production of voluntary acts. Without the final, the efficient would not produce." Between

these two contrary positions, we see Dr. Girardeau's whole theory fall to the ground. By his own admissions he has surrendered his case.

It were hardly necessary to follow Dr. Girardeau in his progress through other definitions up to this climax of claims for a mere abstraction, for his faculty of will is a mere abstraction which he attempts to clothe in the garments of a real entity by the process of definition. His argumentative progress is marked by a slaughter of long-recognized terms and distinctions. He obliterates old landmarks left by Calvinistic writers on this theme, and yet claims our Calvinistic good-fellowship.

Dr. Girardeau's theory of the will prevents his seeing any distinction between *ability* and *liberty*. Ability has reference to character; it "is the power to change our character by a volition."—*Hodge*. Liberty also is used with reference to character; it expresses the prerogative of the soul to determine itself, to decide according to its disposition. We possess no *ability* to make our natures different by merely willing it, but we possess liberty to decide in accordance with our own character. Since Dr. Girardeau's theory separates the soul and the will in the operation of their special functions, he makes ability and liberty mean the same thing, the power to choose. As applied to an irrational automaton, they do, perhaps, express the same idea. But the soul is not such. In one breath, Dr. Girardeau denies any distinction between the man and the will, and in the next he runs his knife through the unity of man's soul, and makes that very distinction. "What is the will but a power of the man?" (p. 28.) What is ability but a power of the will? (p. 24.) In this multiplication of prerogatives, the agent, man himself, is left out of view.

It remains in this connection to show how Dr. Girardeau's *definition* of will has placed him in exact contradiction to Calvin and the Reformed Confessions. He clings to this as his chief glory that his feet have been placing themselves in the very foot-steps of the Reformers. Let us see.

In his Institutes, Book I. Ch. XX. § 7, Calvin makes a two-fold division of the mental faculties, intellect and will. "The intellect is, as it were, the guide and governor of the soul; . . . the will always respects its authority and waits for its judgment in its desires." The will is not in this section, nor anywhere by Calvin made a faculty separate from the soul itself. Will includes the desires with all the active energies of the soul. It is the soul in a certain phase of its character. Calvin means by will, nothing more than a peculiar disposition of mind. This definition is as wide as the poles apart from that of Dr. Girardeau. Hence, in discussing the question at issue, Calvin and Dr. Girardeau do not at all mean the same thing when they speak of the will.

In its deliverances concerning free-agency the Westminster Confession (Chapter IV.) declares man to be the doer of his own acts and responsible for them because they spring out of his own character. Will is used to define the volition of the soul. There is naught here to substantiate Dr. Girardeau's definition of the will, but altogether the contrary. From the second Helvetic Confession, quoted by Dr. Girardeau on pp. 167-168, we draw the closing instance to show the contradictions made in the statement of his theory. The passage is brought forward, as are all those just instanced, with dozens beside, to prove Dr. Girardeau's complete harmony therewith: "The intellect, indeed, is obscured, but the will (*voluntas*), from having been free, is made the servant of sin. For it serves sin not unwillingly, but willingly; for indeed it is said to be will (*voluntas*, willingness) not unwillingness

(*non voluntas*, not not-will)." Here Dr. Girardeau commits himself to the translation, *willingness*, as the proper rendering of *voluntas*. *Willingness* is a disposition of mind, and so stated here. Contradictions do indeed meet and kiss each other if this view of the function of the mind in willing be the same with Dr. Girardeau's self-determination of the will.

III. *Dr. Girardeau's theory of a self-determined will is not even a working hypothesis—for he fails to explain it.*

"No elective act of the will ever takes place without some motive to its occurrence" (p. 105). Let us hold fast to this admission that there must needs be a motive to move the machine. But whence that motive? "In the power of the will we have [a cause of which volitions are legitimate effects]" (p. 93). As each act of the will comes out of the depths of the will's power, it must be pushed forth by another act of will. For the will determines its own acts; it must do this by a determining act; this act is also an act of will and must be due to a prior determining act, and so on without end. Here have we the impossible case of an infinite series of acts, so strongly urged as an objection by Edwards.

Dr. Girardeau's only attempt to meet the force of this objection is to urge the same objection against Edwards' theory in regard to an act of the understanding (pp. 98-118). But of this:

(a.) The cases are not at all parallel. The understanding, in Edwards' theory, is the whole mind in the attitude of judging—and the mind has an active spontaneity which lies at the beginning of the processes of reason. The will has no such rational spontaneity. The mind expresses the life that is within. There is no life within the will needing expression.

(b.) "Thou art in a leaky boat my friend, thou art sinking."

"Mine is as good a boat to sink in as yours." This answer of Dr. Girardeau is no proof against the fact that there is a fatal rent in the bottom of his boat.

(c.) On page 118, Dr. Girardeau admits that in this respect his theory belongs to the tribe of "insoluble difficulties," of "great absurdities." That he places moral certainty in the same category does not break the force of his admission. Along with this negative concession, let us couple the more positive one already quoted from page 114, that "the *final* causes" of voluntary acts are the motives furnished by the mind. Here he surrenders even his objection to Edwards' theory. He finds a beginning for the series of acts of the will in the operations of the mind, and in so doing he surrenders his guns.

We beg the special attention of the reader to the state of the case at this point of the discussion. Dr. Girardeau admits, *in terminis*, that he has found his Waterloo—and this admission of defeat may be stated in three particulars:

(1.) He acknowledges his failure to meet the argument of an infinite series of acts in the operations of a self-determined will—nay, he admits that acts must find their primary springs of life in the mind and not in the will.

(2.) He acknowledges the claims of the theory of moral certainty to explain the acts of the human soul as a power which spontaneously expresses itself in accordance with its own nature. Let us feast our eyes on the words: "That the spontaneity belongs to the man himself, and in acting in accordance with it, he is only expressing himself," that may be true, but that accounts only for self-expression, "not for self-determination" (p. 50). "Man acts with spontaneous freedom whenever he sins" (p. 56). Dr. Girardeau has here spiked his own guns.

(3.) After destroying his own position, Dr. Girardeau runs away from the field which he himself had chosen. In continuing the quotation just given from page 50, we find this: (Moral certainty accounts only for self-expression, not for self-determination, but) "How came the man to be conditioned thus and so? Did he have any voluntary agency in inducing that moral type of being which now characterizes him beyond his power to change it?" Again, on page 56, he asserts that in Adam's case "is the real place at which the discussion of the self-determining power of the will must be had. It is idle to transfer the question to the will in its present sinful condition." It is useless to give further quotations, for Dr. Girardeau has left the theory of moral certainty on the field of man's present sinful condition, and lo! he is marching off to another quarter, to the entirely different question of the *genesis* of the soul itself, to the origin of sin.

"What determined the moral spontaneity? What is its origin? What is the *genesis* of the contents of the soul's subjectivity?" When we heard such questions as these from the learned Doctor, we felt sure that he was off in search of an evolution theory, but he quieted us with the avowed purpose of investigating the first entrance of sin into the soul of Adam.

Now we hope Dr. Girardeau will pardon us for reminding him that he himself joined the issue as to man's freedom in his present state:

(a.) "The question before us is not in regard to the possession of faculties, but of the power to act" (p. 25).

(b.) The unregenerate mind has been analyzed to show the will as a special faculty.

(c.) The unregenerate mind has been used in denying the distinction between liberty and ability (pp. 23-25).

(d.) Illustrations have been drawn from the exertions of a pedestrian, terrified boy and practiced musician, to show relation of will to present activity (pp. 37-38).

(e.) All of Dr. Girardeau's *principles*, and all of the discussions up to this point have been *psychological*, and now he wants to say that the question is one of man's spiritual state.

Be it so. We are willing to go back to Adam's case, and join issue with Dr. Girardeau in the garden of Eden. But we insist on noting these points: First, that our author himself says that Adam's case is exceptional, and not logically a type to measure the present question of moral freedom. But, secondly, we notice as the discussion proceeds that Dr. Girardeau has gone off the first ground of battle, carrying his guns with him. Strange to say, the principles he used here he means to use in that case so different! Yea, we shall soon see him bringing forth his same theory of a self-determined will, with an additional attachment called the power of contrary choice. What that means we shall see.

Since, therefore, he means to use the same *psychological* principles in discussing Adam's case as he has used in regard to fallen man, we take this opportunity to state more fully what is the creed of moral certainty.

The theory of moral certainty in regard to human acts is based upon the unity of the human soul. By its very constitution that soul is endowed with the power of determining or deciding what shall be its acts. The soul thinks its own thoughts, feels its own emotions, and *wills* its own volitions. The *entire* soul is present in any one of its acts, present as the cause and agent of that act. A veritable fountain of spontaneous action is man's soul. Therefore are his acts the expression of

his own nature. The soul is said to be *free* because it can and does express and record its own character in its acts. It gives expression to no other dispositions, sentiments or opinions than those which belong to itself. The act of stealing brands the agent as a thief. He has simply used his liberty to express his character by an outward act.

Hence, the cause of any act is the state of character immediately preceding the act. This it is which puts the soul in motion and hence is this frame of mind called the *motive* causing the act. That *motive* is the result of the soul's previous operations as a thinking and feeling unit. For example, the judgment of that man's soul has affirmed the gold-purse before him to be valuable. The desire of his soul has admitted its desirability. The result of these mental operations is that state of mind called cupidity. From his mind has come forth no moral judgment, or a very faint moral judgment, concerning his right to possess the purse. His prevailing state of character may be described by the term *thief*. He puts forth his hand and he is a thief in fact. The relation of the man's character to his action is expressed by the title, moral certainty. An act of exactly the same *color* with the soul itself, is *morally certain* to follow the movement of that soul.

Now we are willing to apply this moral metre to *any* case, psychological or spiritual, or even to the case of Adam, which Dr. Girardeau claims is peculiar.

"A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." "I say unto you that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." In this field of spiritual teaching, our Lord

- (1.) Acquits himself of responsibility for man's sin.
- (2.) Makes man responsible for his own sin.
- (3.) Affirms the *certain* connection of moral results with moral character.

Judas Iscariot "was a *thief*"; from the position of apostleship he "by *transgression* fell, that he might go to his *own place*." Yea, the deed of treachery was *morally certain* before its commission. The words italicized above show the elements of that certainty in Judas' career. Likewise did Jesus say concerning him, "I know whom I chose." He foreknew the act in knowing the character of Judas.

The theory is the only creed that dignifies the human soul by making its acts a part of itself—the only creed that tears aside the veil from human life and leaves it not an enigma, but a great net-work of sequences that have a sure basis in moral character; it is the creed that can allow God foreknowledge of the action of his creatures, and hence the only creed that exalts God into absolute sovereignty and demands from man absolute responsibility.

IV. *Dr. Girardeau's theory, applied to the fall of Adam, fails to quadrate with the facts in the case.*

The first sin of Adam is the test-case, unto which Dr. Girardeau appeals. In order to plant the two cornerstones of Calvinism, viz.: Adam's *responsibility* for his sin, and God's complete *acquittal* of blame as to the origin of that sin, he affirms that his moral calculus must be applied to the problem.

Let us pause here to express gratefulness for one thing. In opening the discussion, Dr. Girardeau glances backward into the period before time began and before the world was. Into past chaos does he look to consider the opinion that in an ante-mundane and timeless state of existence, every individual member of the human race was infected with the germ of sin. But the chimeras of Schelling and

Schleiermacher and Müller are too fantastical for Dr. Girardeau, and so he accepts the scriptural ground, that in Adam all men have met spiritual death. We are very grateful that the discussion has been narrowed down to a single issue.

(a.) *The charge against moral certainty not sustained.*

The indictment is this, that "moral certainty in relation to Adam's fall, accounts neither for self-expression nor self-determination" (p. 121). Let us bring the charge before the tribunal of the actual facts.

Adam's character was "very good" as God looked upon it at the close of the sixth day's work. There he stood lord of all other creatures, formed "in the image of God"—"after his likeness." Knowledge, righteousness, and holiness were the marks of his nature. Adam was possessed of a *rational* nature as the solid basis of these special marks of character, for God entered into a mutual contract with him. Moreover his nature was *moral*, for God indicated a right and a wrong course of action with penalty and reward, in the terms of the contract, and Adam understood. Now, therefore, Adam was possessed of *knowledge*, of *data* concerning his relationships, for God revealed this in making the contract; he had *righteousness*, that is, conformity to God's standard, for was he not just new from the moulding power of God's "image"?—he had *holiness*, for God pointed to the future as the time of *deterioration in character* through failure to obey: "In the day that thou eatest . . . thou shalt surely die."

Unto Adam in this state external inducements were offered. They were offered to his *mind*, to his *soul*. Now did a *new* knowledge and a *new* desire follow. A disposition of soul, a state of character was the result of this spontaneous working of the mind, and this *new* disposition became a controlling *motive* to action. That *motive* was unbelief—the resulting action was disobedience—the just penalty was the taint of sin in all of Adam's seed. The act was the expression of Adam's own self-hood. It was the *certain* moral result of Adam's disposition of unbelief—and the responsibility for the act was all his own. Adam's sin was, as it were, the child that sprang from his own nature. He must needs acknowledge it, for it was stamped with the image of his character and the penalty consisted in the sealing of its death-face upon Adam and all his line.

Dr. Girardeau interposes here, that God made man's *nature*, and that moral certainty cannot acquit him of blame in thus laying the train for the sinful act. The Doctor is again getting away from the point at issue. We are discussing the origin of Adam's sinful *act*, not of Adam's *nature*. As a different question, we reserve that for the close of the debate. We leave it to the reader to decide whether our theory is amenable to the charges made against it by Dr. Girardeau.

(b.) *Adam did not possess a self-determining will.*

This follows as a necessary result of the position already substantiated, that Adam *did* possess a self-determining soul. But we wish to put Dr. Girardeau on the witness-stand: "He [Adam] *saw clearly* the issues involved, and *deliberately resolved* to break with his God, and ruin his race. But we cannot avoid the conclusion that, as his moral dispositions and tendencies were all in the direction of holiness, the intrinsically blind impulses of his constitution started the train of inducements, inflamed the desire which enticed the will in the direction of sin. Here were motives brought to bear upon the will; but it is obvious that in their first presentation they were in the control of the will" (page 88). Here in the closing sentence we see the old chimera of an impossible faculty coming to the surface only

to be pushed under by the previous admissions. The *clear view* of the mind in an act of knowledge, the deliberate *resolution* of the mind in an act of judgment, and the impulses of the constitution springing up in the flame of *desire*—there was a distinct state of character that determined the soul to take its awful plunge into sin. There was the *evil tree* which *could not* bring forth good fruit. According to Dr. Girardeau's own application of his theory, the self-determined will is superfluous.

(c.) *Adam did not possess the power of contrary choice.*

Dr. Girardeau affirms that Adam, in his first estate, possessed the power of contrary choice; that he lost this power by the fall. He defines the said power as that of "otherwise determining." Adam, at the very moment of sinning, had a power lodged in his will not to do the sin. Even in that moment, his will might have done the opposite. But as soon as Adam committed the act, this power was gone. Henceforth his will and that of all his sons, except in regard to things natural and civil, must be under the bondage of sin. "Since the Scriptures teach that there was a free will, which was lost by the fall, . . . therefore," says Dr. Girardeau, "it was the freedom of contrary choice" (page 135).

But Dr. Girardeau's contradictions administer a fatal blow to this special power of a special faculty. Let us listen as he strikes his special power dead. In three strokes the work is done.

(1.) The chief premise in his chain of reasoning is false.

Here is the logical machine which the Doctor forges to found his theory:

A. "The Scriptures teach that there was a *free will* which was lost by the fall."

B. "There is only one other kind [kind of liberty not taken account of by the moral-certainty theory], the liberty of deliberate election between opposite alternatives."

C. "That, *therefore*, was the liberty which was lost; and consequently it was originally possessed" (page 135).

In regard to "A," we deny that the Scriptures teach the loss of "a free will" in the sense that Dr. Girardeau attaches to the term. "*Death* passed upon all men" by reason of Adam's sin; "by the offence of one, *judgment* came upon all men to condemnation." Through Adam's disobedience it hath followed that "There is none *righteous* . . . there is none that *understandeth*, there is none that seeketh after God." That which Adam did lose was his *character*, and so do Scripture and the church teach. The inspired word nowhere says that Adam lost a *special psychological* faculty. In so many words does Dr. Girardeau admit this: "There was a certain free will which Adam lost *when he lost himself*" (p. 134). Two distinct meanings are drawn out of this term, "a free will": In "A" it designates an independent faculty of the mind; in the sentence just quoted it means a condition or state of moral character. The first premise "A" has vanished.

(2.) In his second premise he "begs the question."

Now examine "B." "There is . . . the liberty of deliberate election between opposite alternatives." Here is what Dr. Girardeau has promised to prove. This is a bald "begging of the question." The conclusion "C" has been brought in to do service as "B" until he can form the insubstantial creed.

(3.) The conclusion "C," even if true, destroys the theory of Dr. Girardeau.

That which was possessed and then lost by Adam was a mutable will—capable of doing its work independent of Adam's character. But Adam did lose character. Dr. Girardeau says so: "When the unregenerate sinner commits sin, he acts

spontaneously" (p. 133). "The liberty of spontaneity remains—the sinner pleases to sin." From holiness down to *unholiness* of nature is the step which measures Adam's loss and our loss in him. Dr. Girardeau means this by the above statements, or he means nothing at all. A complete change in character has caused the death of this special power of the will—although, the will had no organic connection with the character. Strange contagion of death between creatures completely *isolated* from each other. The will, as defined, a faculty beyond the control of the man's nature, is yet shorn of half its prerogatives by a change in that nature.

(d.) *Calvin does not agree with Dr. Girardeau in any one of his claims.*

(1.) Nearly six pages of Calvin in minute type are quoted to show that the Genevan Reformer distinguishes between "the necessity of sinning in our unregenerate condition, and the free and unecessitated sin of Adam" (pp. 138-143). The simple meaning of this is that Adam's "first sin did not originate from his natural make and constitution," that the psychological machinery of Adam's soul was not the same *before* and *after* his sin. To explain farther, Dr. Girardeau's point seems to be this, that Adam had two natures—the first one of these was created by God, and was possessed of a will that had power of contrary choice—the second of Adam's natures was made by this autocratic will, and this second nature of Adam committed the sin. Not the God-created nature, but the will-created nature did the sin. Thus would Dr. Girardeau acquit God of the blame of Adam's sin, by making Adam's soul at the moment of sinning a creation of a mere power of his mind. All this does he claim to find in Calvin. But there is nothing of the kind in the great Reformer. In the pages here quoted, he speaks of the "voluntary fall of the first man," and affirms that our ruin is attributable to our own depravity" (p. 140). Calvin holds in these very pages, that *psychological* freedom belonged to Adam before the fall, and still belongs to his seed, but that spiritual inability binds the sinner. Dr. Girardeau has already denied any difference between the *liberty* of expressing one's nature, and the *ability* to change the nature. Hence, when Calvin makes that very distinction here, Dr. Girardeau fails to apprehend the whole tenor of his reasoning. Calvin, *in terminis*, vindicates the certainty of character in giving color to moral activity, whether in Adam fallen or in Adam unfallen.

(2.) When Calvin speaks of Adam's will as "pliable in either direction," he is clearly stating the openness of Adam's soul to conviction—his capacity of receiving knowledge on both sides of a question, for in the same section (*Inst.* Book I., Ch. xv., § 8) Calvin adds, that Adam "possessed reason, understanding, prudence and judgment, not only for the government of his life on earth, but to enable him to ascend even to God and eternal felicity. To these was added choice to direct the appetites and regulate all the organic motions, so that the will should be entirely conformed to the government of reason."

In these declarations there is no intimation that the will has power of contrary choice.

(3.) Triumphantly does Dr. Girardeau draw an arrow from Edwards' quiver, and one from Calvin's, to show that the points are set in opposition to each other (pp. 163, 164.) That between these writers there is "a radical difference touching the very nature of the inquiry as to the freedom of the will."

We turn to those writers and quote (what Dr. Girardeau does *not* quote) sentences in exactly the same connection:

"The will itself is not an agent that has a will; the power of choosing itself

has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of volition, or choice, is the man or the soul, and not the power of volition itself."—*Edwards' Inquiry*, Part I., § 5.

Now from *Inst.* Book II., Ch. IV., § 8, let Calvin speak: "In the dispute concerning free will the question is not, whether a man, notwithstanding external impediments, can perform and execute whatever he may have *resolved in his mind*, but whether in every case his *judgment exerts freedom of choice* and his *will freedom of inclinations*." Where is the "radical difference" between these men?

(e.) *Calvin does not agree with Dr. Girardeau concerning the relation of God's decree to Adam's fall.*

Dr. Girardeau has reached the core of the question, he affirms, in the relation of God's decree to Adam's sin. In presence of this problem he causes to march by in solemn review the whole tribe of theodicy writers from Dr. Twisse of Westminster Assembly fame to Dr. Bledsoe. They all pass by as vanquished theorists. Last in the procession, like a Roman conqueror, comes Dr. Girardeau himself, sitting, as he claims, in Calvin's chariot. The peculiar faculty of will which he has forged out for Adam's use has solved the question. Here is his creed: "Adam fell by the permissive will and ordination of God," . . . but "the case, as a whole, could not pass out of the controlling hand of the Supreme Ruler." The middle term, of course, that bridges the gap between God's ordination and the act of Adam is the power of contrary choice in a self-determined will. God "permitted" this will to be an autocrat just long enough to have the disobedience consummated and then he took away "contrary choice" from the minor lord. Let us see whether Calvin holds this view.

Concerning the fall Calvin says, "He [Adam] not only was ensnared by the allurements of Satan but *despised the truth* and turned aside to falsehood."—*Inst.* Book II., Ch. I. § 4. Of the effect of the sin: "Wherefore I have asserted that sin has possessed *all the powers of the soul* since Adam departed from the fountain of righteousness."—*Idem.* . . . § 9. With Adam as a being controlled by his own character, ruled by rational motives, did God deal in this matter. Concerning such a nature, Calvin says that "God permitted Satan to tempt man." But the permission thus granted to a rational soul differs widely from permission given to an irrational, irresponsible machine, such as our author's theory makes the will. It is one thing for a king to grant authority to a trusted minister whose actions are already foreknown from his very character, but it is quite a different thing to bestow the prerogative of important decisions upon an independent princeling who is beyond the reach of the king's reasonable influence.

On the same plane of agreement with Calvin, and of absolute variance from Dr. Girardeau's view, stand all the Reformed Confessions. It were needless to quote extensively. Brief reference to Westminster may here suffice. This creed declares that our first parents were "left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject to change." This liberty of will that was liable to change was that spiritual liberty that belonged to spiritual character. How was the liberty changed? By the change of man's character—that foundation underlying and controlling all acts of will. Now, we affirm that this position is entirely foreign to that of Dr. Girardeau. So likewise is the teaching of all the Reformed creeds.

Assuredly, Dr. Girardeau's theodicy fails to solve the problem. The creed of moral certainty holds the field. In conclusion, we wish to state the claims of this

theory concerning the question of the Origin of Sin. The theory makes no claims of a clear solution beyond the facts revealed in God's word:

"Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man. But every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then, when *lust* hath conceived, it *bringeth forth sin*; and sin, when it is finished, bringeth death." Out of the moral character of man hath sin its origin, and man is responsible.

But if God's creature sins out of the very constitution of his being, is not God primarily responsible for the sin? "Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he still find fault? For who withstandeth his will? Nay; but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why didst thou make me thus?"

These assertions of Scripture rear up two great bulwarks—the absolute sovereignty of God, and the responsible choice of man. As regards man himself, the controlling force of character is clearly and fully revealed. The reason for God's choice that sin should enter man's nature—that reason hath not yet appeared. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be" hereafter, and in like manner hath it not yet been told how we came to be what now we are. Nor does it limit the truth of our theory that this is so. No theory concerning man's freedom of action is able to find out facts which God has not chosen to reveal. But the creed of moral certainty is the only one that can build up a symmetrical structure from the facts already spoken through inspired tongues and by the voice of God himself.

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DRIVER'S INTRODUCTION TO THE LITERATURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LITERATURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. *By S. R. Driver, D. D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford; formerly Fellow of New College, Oxford.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1891. Pp. xxvii. 522. \$2.50.

"Of making many books there is no end." So said the Preacher twenty-eight centuries ago. Had he lived now, he might have added—Of projecting libraries there is no end. The book before us is the first volume of a library which proposes to compass the field of Theology, and to bring the discussion up to date all along the line.

This new library is to have a fine name, quite in keeping with this age of International Conventions and World Fairs. So it is to be called the *International Theological Library*, and its projectors propose to make it international and inter-confessional. Already twelve treatises are arranged for at the hands of eminent scholars of the Presbyterian, Anglican, and Congregational communions in Britain and America. This new library is to be under the joint editorship of Professor C. A. Briggs, of New York, and Professor S. D. F. Salmond, of Aberdeen. Thus across the sea scholars clasp hands in international amity, and over denominational barriers scholarly hands are reached to build up this *new* Theological Library. How far the cause of truth will be served thereby remains to be seen.

As already stated, Dr. Driver's treatise on the literature of the Old Testament, is the first of the series which is to make up this library. In a well written preface the author is at pains to tell us what his subject of discussion really is. He says