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SPIRITIST THEOLOGIANS

Theologians have rarely been very popular persons, while they lived, and of late years have been very unpopular. After they were dead,—using the word in its ordinary sense,—some of them have become more popular and gained a fame, wide and lasting, in inverse ratio to their former infamy. Now there is arising among us a new order of theologians at present very popular, who derive their popularity from the fact that they are either dead,—still using the word in the ordinary sense,—or consider themselves to be so related to the dead that they can speak for them, become their amanuenses, see to the publication of their posthumous books, and act in a general managerial capacity for them. Thus the dead in a very realistic sense are now speaking (so it is believed) not as having joined

> the choir invisible
> Of those immortal dead who live again
> In minds made better by their presence

but as claiming to revisit the glimpses of the moon, visibly and audibly. Miss Agnes Repplier has with inimitable grace and wit complained to her large circle of admiring readers of "the determined intrusion" of "Dead Authors" who "force an entrance into our congested literary world competing with living scribblers." [1] It must now be added that the spirits have taken to teaching and lecturing on theology using their agents among the living as partners or organs. They announce their presence by apparitions in haunted houses and elsewhere, by sitting, or standing, for their photographs, usually quite uninvited, by showing

[1] *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1918.

"MISERABLE-SINNER CHRISTIANITY"* IN THE HANDS OF THE RATIONALISTS

I. From Ritschl to Wernle

It belongs to the very essence of the type of Christianity propagated by the Reformation that the believer should feel himself continuously unworthy of the grace by which he lives. At the centre of this type of Christianity lies the contrast of sin and grace; and about this centre everything else revolves. This is in large part the meaning of the emphasis put in this type of Christianity on justification by faith. It is its conviction that there is nothing in us or done by us, at any stage of our earthly development, because of which we are acceptable to God. We must always be accepted for Christ's sake, or we cannot ever be accepted at all. This is not true of us only "when we believe." It is just as true after we have believed. It will continue to be true as long as we live. Our need of Christ does not cease with our believing; nor does the nature of our relation to Him or to God through Him ever alter, no matter what our attainments in Christian graces or our achievements in Christian behavior may be. It is always on His "blood and righteousness" alone that we can rest. There is never anything that we are or have or do that can take His place, or that can take a place along with Him. We are always unworthy, and all that we have or do of good is always of pure grace. Though blessed with every spiritual blessing in the heavenlies in Christ, we are still in ourselves just "miserable sinners": "miserable sinners" saved by grace to be sure, but "miserable sinners" still, deserving in ourselves nothing but everlasting wrath. That is the attitude which the Reformers took, and that is the attitude which the Protestant world has learned from the Reformers to take, toward the relation of believers to Christ.

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* *Armesünderchristentum.* The term has become practically a technical term to express the particular attitude of the Christian towards sin in the teaching and life of the Churches of the Reformation.

There is emphasized in this attitude the believer's continued sinfulness in fact and in act; and his continued sense of his sinfulness. And this carries with it recognition of the necessity of unbroken penitence throughout life. The Christian is conceived fundamentally in other words as a penitent sinner.[1] But that is not all that is to be said: it is not even the main thing that must be said. It is therefore gravely inadequate to describe the spirit of "miserable-sinner Christianity" as "the spirit of continuous but not unhopeful penitence." It is not merely that this is too negative a description, and that we must at least say, "the spirit of continuous though hopeful penitence." It is a wholly uncomprehending description, and misplaces the emphasis altogether. The spirit of this Christianity is a spirit of penitent indeed, but overmastering exultation. The attitude of the "miserable sinner" is not only not one of despair; it is not even one of depression; and not even one of hesitation or doubt; hope is too weak a word to apply to it. It is an attitude of exultant joy. Only this joy has its ground not in ourselves but in our Savior. We are sinners and we know ourselves to be sinners, lost and helpless in ourselves. But we are saved sinners; and it is our salvation which gives the tone to our life, a tone of joy which swells in exact proportion to the sense we have of our ill-desert; for it is he to whom much is forgiven who loves much, and who, loving, rejoices much. Adolf Harnack declares that this mood was brought into Christianity by Augustine. Before Augustine the characteristic frame of mind of Christians was the racking unrest of alternating hopes and fears. Augustine, the first of the Evangelicals, created a new piety of assured rest in God our Savior, and the psychological form of this new piety was, as Harnack phrases it,[2] "solaced contrition,"—affliction

[1] Accordingly the first of Luther's Ninety-Five Theses runs: "Our Lord and Master Jesus Christ in teaching, 'Repent,' etc. intended penitence to be the whole life of believers." Cf. *The Princeton Theological Review*, Oct. 1917, pp. 511 f.

[2] *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*. III. p. 59 (E. T. Vol. V, P. 66). "getrösteter Sündenschmertz". Cf. *The Princeton Theological Review*, January, 1905. pp. 97 f.

for sin, yes, the deepest and most poignant remorse for sin, but not unrelieved remorse, but appeased remorse. There is no other joy on earth like that of appeased remorse: it is not only in heaven but on earth also that the joy over one sinner that repents surpasses that over ninety and nine just persons who need no repentance.

The type of piety brought in by Augustine was pushed out of sight by the emphasis on human graces which marked the Middle Ages. Luther brought it back. His own experience fixed ineradicably in his heart the conviction that he was a "miserable sinner," deserving of death, and alive only through the inexplicable grace of God. What we call his conversion was his discovery of this bitter-sweet fact. He had tried to think highly of himself. He found that he could not do so. But he found also that he could not possibly think too highly of Christ. And so it became his joy to be a "miserable sinner," resting solely on the grace of Christ; and to preach the gospel of the "miserable sinner" to the world. This is the very hinge on which his Reformation turns, and of course, Luther gave expression to it endlessly in those documents in which his Reformation-work has been preserved to us.

He is never weary of setting the two aspects in which the "miserable sinner" may be viewed side by side. "These things," he says, in one place,[3] "are diametrically opposed,—that the Christian is righteous and loved of God, yet is at the same time a sinner. For God cannot deny His nature, that is, cannot but hate sin and sinners, and this He does necessarily, for otherwise He would be unjust and would love sin. How then are these two contradictories both true: I am sinful and deserve the divine wrath and hatred; and the Father loves me? Nothing at all brings it about except Christ the Mediator. The Father, He says, loves you, not because you are worthy of love, but because you have

[3] *Ad Gal I,* 338 (1534) The three quotations from Luther which follow are taken from J. Gottschick's article, *Propter Christum,* in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche,* VII, (1887), pp. 378-384.

loved Me and believed that I came forth from Him. Thus the Christian remains in pure humility, deeply sensible of his sin, and acknowledging himself, on its account, to be deserving of God's wrath and judgment and eternal death.... He remains also at the same time in pure and holy pride, in which he turns to Christ and arouses himself through Him against this sense of wrath and the divine judgment, and believes not only that the remainders of sin are not imputed to him, but also that he is loved by the Father, not on his own account but on account of Christ the Beloved."

"A Christian," says Luther again,[4] "is at the same time a sinner and a saint; he is at once bad and good. For in our own person we are in sin, and in our own name we are sinners. But Christ brings us another name in which there is forgiveness of sin, so that for His sake our sin is forgiven and done away. Both then are true. There are sins and yet there are no sins. The reason is that for Christ's sake, God will not see them. They exist for my eyes; I see them, and feel them, too. But Christ is there who bids me preach that I am to repent—and then believe in the forgiveness of sin in His name....Where such faith is, therefore, God no longer sees sin. For thou standest there for God not in thy name but in Christ's name; thou dost adorn thyself with grace and righteousness although in thine own eyes and in thine own person, thou art a miserable sinner (*armer Sünder*) . . . Let not that, however, scare you to death. Speak, rather, thus: Ah, Lord, I am a miserable sinner (*armer Sünder*), but I shall not remain such for Thou hast commanded that forgiveness of sins be preached in Thy name . . . Thus our Lord Jesus Christ alone is the garment of grace that is put upon us, that God our Father may not look upon us as sinners but receive us as righteous, holy, godly children, and give us eternal life."

"We, however, teach," he says again,[5] "that we are to

[4] II. 197 (*Works*, Erlangen Ed.).

[5] XVIII. 294f, (1582).

learn to know and regard Him, as Him who sits there for the poor, stupid conscience, if so be that we believe on Him, not as a judge . . . but as a gracious, kind, comforting mediator between my frightened conscience and God; and says to me—You are a sinner, and are afraid that the devil will drag you by the law before the judgment seat; come then and hold fast to me, and fear no wrath. Why? Because I sit here for the very purpose that if you believe in me, I can come between you and God so that no wrath or evil can touch you. For if wrath and punishment go over you, they must first go over me, and that is not possible . . . Therefore we are all through faith altogether blissful and safe, so that we shall abide uncondemned, not for the sake of our own purity and holiness, but for Christ's sake, because, through such faith, we hold on to Him as our Mercy-seat, assured that in and with Him no wrath can remain, but pure love, indulgence, forgiveness."

Embedded in the Protestant formularies, both doctrinal and devotional, this "miserable-sinner" conception of the Christian life has moulded the piety of all the Protestant generations. Throughout the Protestant world believers confess themselves to be, still as believers, wrath-deserving sinners; and that not merely with reference to their inborn sinful nature as yet incompletely eradicated, but with reference also to their total life-manifestation which their incompletely eradicated sinful nature flows into and vitiates. Their continued sinning, indeed, is already confessed whenever they repeat the Lord's Prayer, since, among the very few petitions included in it, is the very emphatic one: "Forgive us our trespasses."[6] Naturally there-

[6] Ἁμαρτίας, Lk. XI. 4; ὀφειλήματα, Mt. VI. 12; "trespasses" in the Anglican *Book of Common Prayer; "debts"* in the Presbyterian *Book of Common Worship*. The meaning is the same in every case, and the constant repetition of the Lord's Prayer in either form is a constant confession of continual sinning. It is admitted on all hands that Jesus did not look upon His followers as men who had ceased to sin. For recent statements from writers who would not allow as much of Paul see Weinel, *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, 1913, p. 189;

fore, the expositions of this prayer, designed for the instruction of the several churches in their attitude toward God, are the special depository of pointed reminders to believers of their continual sinning. Luther, for example, incorporates a very full and searching exposition of "the Fifth Petition" into his Large Catechism, in which he affirms that "we sin daily in words and deeds, by commission and omission," and warns us that "no one is to think that so long as he lives here below he can bring it about that he does not need such forgiveness"; that, in fact, "unless God forgives without cessation, we are lost."[7] It is by his Short Catechism of 1529 however that Luther has kept his hand most permanently on the instruction of the churches. In it he teaches the catechumen to say that "God richly forgives me and all believers every day, all our sins," "for we sin much every day and deserve nothing but punishment."[8] In the instructions for the confessional coming from the hand of Luther which were soon incorporated into this Short Catechism, the believing penitent accordingly is told to say "I, miserable sinner (*armer Sünder*), confess myself before God guilty of all manner of sins . . ."[9] The hold which this teaching has taken of the devotional expressions of the Lutheran churches may be illustrated by the

and especially H. Windisch, *Taufe und Sünde,* etc., 1908, p. 534: "Miserable-sinnerism even finds support in the Bible also. Jesus, for example, by the side of the Methodist notion of conversion which He employs; by the side of the strict requirement of cleansing; recognizes the continuance of sinning and quite like all Lutheran Christians assures His disciples of the divine clemency." So also P. Wernle, *Der Christ und die Sünde bei Paulus,* 1897, p. 12f., where we are told that Paul has gone far beyond Jesus, has nothing to say of no one being good, or of prayer for forgiveness, and brings the pneumatic closer to God. "It may be said that Paul thought worse of men and better of Christians than Jesus. Both the theory of original sin and the theory of the 'flesh' are alien to Jesus, but so is the doctrine that the Christian no longer sins."

[7] See Th. Hardeland, *Der Kleine Katechismus D. Martini Lutheri,* 1889, p. 186; cf. H. Scholz, *ZThK.* 1896, p. 471.

[8] Hardeland, as cited, p. 137 (155 f), and 185; P. Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom,* 1878, pp. 80, 82.

[9] Schaff, as cited, p. 88.

presence in the new Agenda of the National Prussian Church of a Confession of Sin for the whole congregation which runs thus: "We confess that we were conceived and born in sin; and, full of ignorance and heedlessness of Thy divine word and will, always prone to all wickedness and slack to all good, we transgress Thy divine commandments unceasingly in thoughts, words and deeds."[10] Naturally it retains its place in the forms of service adopted for "the three bodies" of American Lutherans. In the German form[11] the Confession of Sin takes this shape: "I, poor sinful man, confess to God, the Almighty, my Creator and Redeemer, that I not only have sinned in thoughts, words and deeds, but also was conceived and born in sin, and so all my nature and being is deserving of punishment and condemnation before His righteousness. Therefore I flee to His gratuitous mercy and seek and beseech His grace. Lord, be merciful to me, miserable sinner (*armer Sünder*)." The English form is to the same effect.[12]

It is the same in the Reformed churches as in the Lutheran: catechisms and liturgies alike embody the confession of the continued sinfulness of the Christian, and his continued dependence on the forgiving grace of Christ. In Calvin's Catechism the catechumen is made to declare that there is no man living so righteous that he does not need to make request for the forgiveness of his sins, that Christ has therefore prescribed a prayer for forgiveness of sins for the whole church, and that he who would exempt himself from it "refuseth to bee of the companie of Christes flocke; and in very deed the Scriptures doe plainlie testifie, that the most perfect man that is, if he would alleadge one point

[10] H. Scholz, as cited, p. 472.

[11] *Gemeinen Versammlung der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirchen im Nord Amerika*, 1908, p. 4.

[12] *The Common Service for the Use of Evangelical Congregations*, 1907, p. 1: "Almighty God, our Maker and Redeemer, we poor sinners confess unto Thee that we are by nature sinful and unclean, and that we have sinned against Thee by thought, word and deed. Wherefore we flee for refuge to Thine infinite mercy, seeking and imploring Thy grace, for the sake of our Lord Jesus Christ."

to justify him selfe thereby before God, should bee found faultie in a thousand." "It is meete therefore," it concludes, "that everie man have a recourse continuously unto God's mercie."[13] When expounding at an earlier point[14] the clause in the Creed, "I believe in the forgiveness of sins," it is said that God "doeth freely forgive all the sinnes of them that believe on him," the comprehensiveness of the language is intended to include in the declaration sins committed after as well as before the inception of faith. And therefore, when good works come to be treated of,[15] it is said that they are "not worthy of themselves to be accepted," "because there is mixed some filth through the infirmity of the flesh, whereby they are defiled." They are accepted by God therefore "only because it pleaseth God of his goodness to love us freely, and so to cover and forget our faultes."

The teaching of the Heidelberg Catechism is to the same effect. We increase our guilt daily, we are told;[16] our whole Christian life is occupied with a conflict against sin and the devil;[17] and our best works in this life are imperfect and defiled with sin.[18] To the question whether those that have been converted can keep God's law perfectly, it is answered explicitly, "No, but even the holiest men, while in this life, have only a small beginning of this obedience, yet so that with earnest purpose they begin to live, not only according to some but according to all the commandments of God."[19] As in Calvin's Catechism, the most comprehensive language is employed however, in expounding the clause of the Creed on the forgiveness of sins. "I believe that God for the satisfaction of Christ," we read, "hath quite put out of His

[13] We quote from the old English translation first printed at Geneva, 1556, as reprinted by Horatius Bonar, *Catechisms of the Scottish Reformation*, 1866, p. 66.

[14] P. 26.

[15] Pp. 31f.

[16] Q. 13.

[17] Q. 52.

[18] Q. 62.

[19] Q. 114.

remembrance all my sins, and even that corruption also wherewith I must strive all my life long."[20] And naturally the exposition of "the Fifth Petition" of the Lord's Prayer[21] is the occasion for repeating that we are "miserable sinners" (*arme Sünder*) burdened not merely with the evil which always still clings to us, but also with numerous transgressions.

Perhaps this series of truths never received crisper statement, however, than at the hands of John Craig in his larger Catechism (1581), on the basis whether of the article of the creed or of the petition of the prayer.[22] "Why is remission of sinnes put here? Because it is proper to the Church and members of the same. Wherefore is it proper to the Church only? Because in the Church only is the spirit of faith and repentance . . . How oft are sinnes forgiven us? Continually even unto our live's end. What need is there of this? Because sinne is never thoroughly abolished here." "What seeke we in this fifth petition? Remission of our sinnes or spirituall debts . . . Shall every man pray thus continually? Yes, for all flesh is subject to sinne. But sometimes men doe good things? Yet they sin in the best things they doe."

The Calvinistic liturgies naturally also reflect this universal Reformed doctrine. The Confession of sins contained in the liturgy which was published by Calvin in 1542 and which passed into the use of all the French-speaking Reformed Churches, has been universally admired. Its beauty, says E. Lacheret, has been proclaimed with one voice: Christian sentiment finds in it one of its purest and strongest expressions: "brief, sober, solemn, it expresses in a grave style and penetrating tone, the grief of the penitent soul, its appeal to the divine mercy, its desire for a new and holy life."[23] Its opening prayer in the form in

[20] Q. 56. We use the old Scotch translation, Edinburgh, 1615, (Bonar, as cited, p. 132).

[21] Q. 126. (Bonar, as cited, p. 132).

[22] Bonar, as cited, pp. 210, 232.

[23] *La Liturgie Wallonne*, 1890, p. 17.

which it has been long used in the English-speaking French Protestant Church of Charleston, S. C., runs thus:[24] "O Lord God, eternal and almighty Father, we confess before Thy Divine Majesty that we are miserable sinners,[25] born in corruption and iniquity,[26] prone to evil, and of ourselves incapable of any good.[28] We acknowledge that we transgress in various ways[29] thy holy commandments, so that we draw down on ourselves, through thy righteous judgment, condemnation and death."

The brief Catechism of the Church of England, although very plainly presuming the continuous sinning of Christians, naturally contains nothing explicit on the subject. Whatever may be lacking in it is abundantly made up, however, in the Articles and Prayers. The Articles not only affirm that "the infection of nature" derived by every man from Adam "doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated" and has in them "the nature of sin" (IX); but also that he can do no good works which can endure the severity of God's judgment (XII), and very explicitly that all men, except Christ alone, "although baptized and born again in Christ, yet offend in many things; and if we say we have no sin we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us" (XV). They are therefore to be condemned, we are told, "which say they can no more sin as long as they live here" (XVI). With respect to the Prayers we have only to bear in mind the Exhortation, General Confession and Absolution with which both the Morning and Evening Services begin; or indeed only the Litany, in which specifically God's people abase themselves before Him as "miserable sinners" and beseech His

[24] *The Liturgy, or Forms of Divine Service, of the French Protestant Church of Charleston, S. C.* Translated from the Liturgy of the Churches of Neuchatel and Vallangin, Editions of 1737 and 1772.... 1853, pp. 7, 8.

[25] *Paovres pecheurs* in Calvin's form: the form *misérables pécheurs* appears to have come in during the eighteenth century.

[26] "Conceived and born in iniquity and corruption,"—Calvin.

[28] "Prone to evil, incapable of all good,"—Calvin.

[29] "Without end and without cessation,"—Calvin.

forgiveness and holy keeping. The enumeration in the General Confession of the modes of sinning of which the petitioners are guilty is exceedingly comprehensive, and yet is keyed wholly to the experience of believers. In the exhortation in response to which their confession is made, they are addressed as "dearly beloved brethren," and God is designated as their "heavenly Father," from whose "infinite goodness and mercy" they are receiving and are further to look for all things requisite for the welfare of both body and soul. Yet they are represented as guilty of "manifold sins and wickedness," and are led by the minister in this Confession: "Almighty and most merciful Father: We have erred, and strayed from thy ways like lost sheep. We have followed too much the devices and desires of our own hearts. We have offended against thy holy laws. We have left undone those things which we ought to have done; And we have done those things which we ought not to have done; And there is no health in us." Their only refuge is in the Lord; and the cry is therefore at once appended:—"But thou, O Lord, have mercy upon us, miserable offenders. Spare thou them, O God, which confess their faults, Restore thou them that are penitent; According to thy promises declared unto mankind in Christ Jesu our Lord." That is the very spirit of the "miserable sinner," as is also the closing petition of the prayer: "And grant, O most merciful Father, for His sake; That we may hereafter lead a godly, righteous, and sober life, To the glory of Thy holy Name. Amen." The note which sounds here is precisely the same as that which rings out in the Easter Litany of the Moravian Church: "We miserable sinners (*arme Sünder*) pray that Thou wouldest hear us, dear Lord and God!"[30]

It has not always been easy through the Protestant ages to maintain in its purity this high attitude of combined shame of self and confidence in the mercy of God in Christ. But even in the worst of times it has not been left without

[30] Schaff, as cited, p. 805.

witnesses. There is Zinzendorf, for example.[31] It was in an evil day of abounding Rationalism that he rediscovered for himself and for his followers a "miserable-sinner Christianity." He gave the term as recovered by him for daily use in his brotherhood a particular coloring of his own; sentimentalized it, if we may so say; and especially made it vivid by means of a very specialized analogy. The terms "sin," "sinner," are used in German, with a less prevailing religious reference than in English, in the general sense of "offence," "culprit"; and it happens to have come about that in the popular German speech the customary designation of the condemned criminal awaiting the gallows is precisely "the miserable sinner."[32] The implication is that all the resources of such an one have been exhausted: he stands stripped, destitute, desperate before his doom. Seizing upon this accident of usage, Zinzendorf bids the Christian see in the condemned criminal the image of himself: in this thoroughly specialized sense also the Christian is a "miserable sinner." Not indeed the merely condemned criminal. He is in Christ, and what he is in Christ is this condemned criminal snatched from the gallows by the mere clemency of one on whom he has no claim. He is therefore distinctively the pardoned criminal; and therefore his immediate preoccupation is less with the guilt from which he has escaped than with the deliverance which he has received. "The most solid distinction between an honest disciple of the no doubt still lingering old teachers who were known as Pietists, Spenerites, Halleites and a 'Brother' is this: the former commonly has his misery always before his eyes and glances only for his necessary comforting to the wounds

[31] Zinzendorf's doctrine of the "miserable sinner" is admirably stated by Bernard Becker, *Zinzendorf und seine Christentum*, etc. 2 ed., 1900, pp. 296-298. See also H. Scholz, *ZThK*. VI., 1896, pp. 463-468.

[32] J. and W. Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, I. 1854, p. 355: "The imprisoned and condemned criminal was called der arme gefangene, der arme sünder." Heath's *German and English Dictionary*, 1906, p. 582: "armer Sünder, condemned criminal awaiting execution."

of Christ,—the latter has always before his eyes the finished reconciliation and Jesus' blood and only for his necessary humbling casts an occasional glance on his misery."

Zinzendorf pushes his simile into details and insists on the application of them all. Having J. K. Dippel's rationalizing doctrine of the Atonement in mind, he declares that the deliverance of the believer from the punishment due to his sin is accomplished in no other way than that of the thief from the gallows,—not through future good behavior, but out of pure mercy. And like the thief, he owes not only his escape from the immediately impending gallows but whatever further existence is accorded to him, continuously to the mere favor of his deliverer. Thus through every moment of his life the believer is absolutely dependent on the grace of Christ, and when life is over he still has nothing to plead but Christ's blood and righteousness. Very complete expression is given to this conception in the noble hymn, "Christ's blood and righteousness," some of the pungency of which is lost in John Wesley's translation of it, excellent as that translation is in transmitting the general sense. The blood of Christ, says Zinzendorf here, is his sole comfort and hope, on which alone he builds in life or in death: yea, even though by God's grace he should attain to a life of unbroken faithfulness in His service, and should keep himself clean from all sin whatever up to the grave itself—he should still, when he came to stand before the Lord, have no thought of "goodness" and "godliness," but would say only, "Here comes a sinner who depends on the great Ransom alone." The poignancy of that declaration is inadequately expressed by Wesley's

> "When from the dust of death I rise,
> To claim my mansion in the skies,
> Even then this shall be all my plea,
> Jesus hath lived and died for me."

It must not be imagined because of its hypothetical supposition in this hymn, that Zinzendorf allowed the possibility of the believer's actually living free from sin "up to

the grave." Sanctification with him was most decisively held to be a process which reaches its end only when we are freed from the limitations of sense; and his rejection of all perfectionist notions is so decisive as almost to seem harsh. "Should any one say," he says, "he was in *sensu perfectissimo* done with sin, and had *hoc respectu* no longer to strive, he would be a fanatic or arrogant fool."[33] He is particularly decisive in his rejection of the Quietistic view of sanctification. That, says he, carries with it an ideal of the Christian life, with its passivity, apathy, freedom from trepidation, which can find no example in Christ. No, the believer strives against sin all his life, and is never without failings; and from his well-grounded fear of sinning arises a powerful, ever present motive to watchfulness and effort. He has nothing to depend on but Christ, and Christ is enough; but that does not relieve him from the duty of cleansing his life from sin, but rather girds his loins for the struggle. The necessity for the continuance of the struggle means, of course, the continuance of sin to struggle against. As one of Zinzendorf's critics puts it:[34] "To feel himself a 'miserable sinner' never has the meaning with him of desisting from the moral task or of attributing less value to it than to religious experience. On the other side it is equally excluded that this doctrine amounts to a new form of self-torturing after a pietistic fashion. For it is precisely against the self-torturing of that narrow-hearted, unfruitful practice of penitence,[35] rich in illusions and disillusions, of the dominant pietism, that Zinzendorf's system is emphatically directed. It is not his meaning that a Christian man should be of a sour countenance, and hang

[33] Becker, as cited, p. 300, where Zinzendorf's judgment on Perfectionism is briefly but clearly stated.

[34] Scholz, *ZThK.* VI., 1896, p. 465.

[35] *Busskampfspraxis.* What is meant is the tendency to treat the self in accordance with the divine judgment which is recognized as impending over it. There is a really informing article on the *Busskampf,* in C. Meusel's *Kirchliches Handlexikon* I, 1887, pp. 618f. See also Schiele and Zscharnack I, col. 1486.

his head; he hates the dejected and grumbling piety which comes to nothing except the repetition of its dirges. He requires and exemplifies a joyous Christianity." "Miserable-sinner Christianity" is equally removed from self-asserting and self-tormenting Christianity, which is as much as to say from Rationalism and Pietism. It is Christ-trusting Christianity, and casts its orbit around that centre. And when we say Christ-trusting Christianity, it must be intended not merely negatively but positively. The "miserable-sinner Christian" not merely finds absolutely nothing but Christ in which to repose any trust, but he actually trusts—*trusts,* with all that that means—in Christ.

In those same bad days of the eighteenth century, "miserable-sinner Christianity" was rediscovered also for themselves by the English Evangelicals. We may take Thomas Adam as an example. His like-minded biographer, James Stillingfleet, tells us[36] how, having been awakened to the fact that he was preaching essentially a work-religion, he was at last led to the truth, not without some reading of Luther, it is true, but particularly by the prayerful study of the Epistle to the Romans. "He was," writes his biographer, "rejoiced exceedingly; found peace and comfort spring up in his mind; his conscience was purged from guilt through the atoning blood of Christ, and his heart set at liberty to run the way of God's commandments without fear, in a spirit of filial love and holy delight; and from that hour began to preach salvation, *through faith in Jesus Christ alone,* to man by nature and practice lost, and condemned under the law, and, as his own expression is, *Always a sinner.*" In this italicized phrase, Adam had in mind of course our sinful nature, a very profound sense of the evil of which coloured all his thought. In one of those piercing declarations which his biographers gathered out of his diaries and published under the title of *Private Thoughts*

[36] *Private Thoughts on Religion.* By the Rev. Thomas Adam. Ed. Poughkeepsie, 1814, pp. 22f. There are many other editions.

on Religion,[37] Adam tells us how he thought of indwelling sin. "Sin," says he, "is still here, deep in the center of my heart, and twisted about every fibre of it."[38] But he knew very well that sin could not be in the heart and not in the life. "When have I not sinned?" he asks;[39] and answers, "The reason is evident, I carry myself about with me." Accordingly he says:[40] "When we have done all we ever shall do, the very best state we ever shall arrive at will be so far from meriting a reward that it will need a pardon." Again, "If I was to live to the world's end, and do all the good that man can do, I must still cry 'Mercy!' "[41]—which is very much what Zinzendorf said in his hymn. So far from balking at the confession of daily sins, he adds to that the confession of universal sinning. "I know with infallible certainty," he says,[42] "that I have sinned ever since I could discern between good and evil; in thought, word and deed; in every period, condition, and relation of life; every day against every commandment." "God may say to every self-righteous man," he says again,[43] "as he did in the case of

[37] "These entries from his private diary, which were meant for no eyes but his own, bring before us a man of no common power of analytical and speculative thought. With an intrepidity and integrity of self-scrutiny perhaps unexampled, he writes down problems started and questionings raised, and conflicts gone through; while his ordinarily placid style grows pungent and strong. Ever since their publication these 'private thoughts' have exercised a strange fascination over intellects at opposite poles. Coleridge's copy of the little volume (1795) remains to attest by its abounding markings, the spell it laid upon him, while such men as Bishop Heber, Dr. Thomas Chalmers, and John Stuart Mill, and others, have paid tribute to the searching power of the 'Thoughts.' " A. B. Grosart, in Leslie Stephen's *Dictionary of National Biography,* Vol. I., 1885, pp. 89, 90.

[38] *Private Thoughts on Religion, etc.,* as cited, p. 72.

[39] P. 74.

[40] P. 218.

[41] P. 212.

[42] P. 71.

[43] P. 129. In the same spirit with these quotations, but with perhaps even greater poignancy of rhetorical expression is this declaration of Alexander Whyte's (*Bunyan's Characters,* III,. p. 136): "Our guilt is so great that we dare not think of it. It crushes our minds with a perfect stupor of horror, when for a moment we try to imagine a day of judgment when we shall be judged for all

Sodom, 'Show me ten, even one, perfect good action, and for the sake of it I will not destroy.' "

There is no morbidity here and no easy acquiescence in this inevitable sinning. "Lord, forgive my sins, and suffer me to keep them—is this the meaning of my prayers?" he asks.[44] And his answer is:[45] "I had rather be cast into the burning fiery furnace, or the lions' den, than suffer sin to lie quietly in my heart." He knows that justification and sanctification belong together. "Christ never comes into the soul unattended," he says:[46] "He brings the Holy Spirit with Him; and the Spirit his train of gifts and graces." "Christ comes with a blessing in each hand," he says again;[47] "forgiveness in one and holiness in the other, and never gives either to any one who will not take both." But he adds at once: "Christ's forgiveness of all sins is complete at once, because less would not do us good; his holiness is dispensed by degrees, and to none wholly in this life, lest we should slight his forgiveness." "Whenever I die," he says therefore,[48] "I die a sinner, but by the grace of God, penitent, and, I trust, accepted in the Beloved." "It is the joy of my heart that I am freed from guilt," he says again,[49] "and the desire of my heart to be free from sin." For both alike are from God. "Justification by sanctification," he says,[50] "is man's way to heaven, and it is odds but he will make a little serve the turn. Sanctification by justification is God's, and he fills the soul with His own fulness." "The Spirit does not only confer and increase ability and so leave us to ourselves in the use of it," he ex-

the deeds done in the body. Heart-beat after heart-beat, breath after breath, hour after hour, day after day, year after year, and all full of sin; all nothing but sin from our mother's womb to our grave."

[44] P. 103.
[45] P. 99.
[46] P. 180.
[47] P. 179.
[48] P. 209.
[49] P. 216.
[50] P. 219.

plains,[51] "but every single act of spiritual life is the Spirit's own act in us." And again, even more plainly:[52] "Sanctification is a gift; and the business of man is to desire, receive and use it. But he can by no act or effort of his own produce it in himself. Grace can do everything, nature nothing." "I am resolved," he therefore declares,[53] "to receive my virtue from God as a gift; instead of presenting Him with a spurious kind of my own." He accordingly is "the greatest saint upon earth who feels his poverty most in the want of perfect holiness, and longs with the greatest earnestness for the time when he shall be put in full possession of it."[54]

Thus in complete dependence on grace, and in never ceasing need of grace (take "grace" in its full sense of goodness to the undeserving) the saint goes onward in his earthly work, neither imagining that he does not need to be without sin because he has Christ nor that because he has Christ he is already without sin. The repudiation of both the perfectionist and the antinomian inference is made by Adam most pungently. The former in these crisp words:[55] "The moment we think that we have no sin, we shall desert Christ." That, because Christ came to save just sinners. The latter more at length:[56] "It would be a great abuse of the doctrine of salvation by faith and a state of dangerous security to say, If it pleases God to advance me to a higher or the highest degree of holiness, I shall have great cause of thankfulness, and it will be the very joy of my life; but nevertheless I can do without it, as being safe in Christ." We cannot set safety in Christ and holiness of life over against one another as contradictions, of which the one may be taken and the other left. They go together.

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[51] P. 242.
[52] P. 234.
[53] P. 247.
[54] P. 225.
[55] P. 251.
[56] P. 223.

"Every other faith," we read,[57] "but that which apprehends Christ as a purifier, as well as our atonement and righteousness, is false and hypocritical." We are not left in our sins by Him; we are in process of being cleansed from our sins by Him; and our part is to work out with fear and trembling the salvation which He is working in us, always keeping our eyes on both our sin from which we need deliverance and the Lord who is delivering us. To keep our eyes fixed on both at once is no doubt difficult. "On earth it is the great exercise of faith," says Adam, "and one of the hardest things in the world, to see sin and Christ at the same time, or to be penetrated with a lively sense of our deserts, and absolute freedom from condemnation; but the more we know of both, the nearer approach we shall make to the state of heaven." Sin and Christ; ill desert and no condemnation; we are sinners and saints all at once! That is the paradox of evangelicalism. The Antinomian and the Perfectionist would abolish the paradox—the one drowning the saint in the sinner, the other concealing the sinner in the saint. We must, says Adam, out of his evangelical consciousness, ever see both members of the paradox clearly and see them whole. And—*solvitur ambulando*. "It is a great paradox, but glorious truth of Christianity," says he,[59] "that a good conscience may consist with a consciousness of evil." Though we can have no satisfaction in ourselves, we may have perfect satisfaction in Christ.

It is clear that "miserable-sinner Christianity" is a Christianity which thinks of pardon as holding the primary place in salvation. To it, sin is in the first instance offence against God, and salvation from sin is therefore in the first instance pardon, first not merely in time but in importance. In this Christianity, accordingly, the sinner turns to God first of all as the pardoning God; and that not as the God who pardons him once and then leaves him to himself, but as the

[57] P. 220.
[58] P. 225.
[59] P. 253.

God who steadily preserves the attitude toward him of a pardoning God. It is in this aspect that he thinks primarily of God and it is on the preservation on God's part of this attitude towards him that all his hopes of salvation depend. This is because he looks to God and to God alone for his salvation; and that in every several step of salvation,—since otherwise whatever else it might be, it would not be salvation. It is, of course, only from a God whose attitude to the sinner is that of a pardoning God, that saving operations can be hoped. No doubt, if those transactions which we class together as the processes of salvation are our own work, we may not have so extreme a need of a constantly pardoning God. But that is not the point of view of the "miserable-sinner Christian." He understands that God alone can save, and he depends on God alone for salvation; for all of salvation in every step and stage of it. He is not merely the man then, who emphasizes justification as the fundamental saving operation; but also the man who emphasizes the supernaturalness of the whole saving process. It is all of God; and it is continuously from God throughout the whole process. The "miserable-sinner Christian" insists thus that salvation is accomplished not all at once, but in all the processes of a growth through an ever-advancing forward movement. It occupies time; it has a beginning and middle and end. And just because it is thus progressive in its accomplishment, it is always incomplete,—until the end. As Luther put it, Christians, here below, are not "made," but "in the making." Things in the making are in the hands of the Maker, are absolutely dependent on Him, and in their remanent imperfection require His continued pardon as well as need His continued forming. We cannot outgrow dependence on the pardoning grace of God, then, so long as the whole process of our forming is not completed; and we cannot feel satisfaction with ourselves of course until that process is fully accomplished. To speak of satisfaction in an incomplete work is a contradiction in terms. The "miserable-sinner Christian" accordingly, just as

strongly emphasizes the progressiveness of the saving process and the consequent survival of sin and sinning throughout the whole of its as yet unfinished course, as he does justification as its foundation stone and its true supernaturalness throughout. These four articles go together and form the pillars on which the whole structure rests. It is a structure which is adapted to the needs of none but sinners, and which, perhaps, can have no very clear meaning to any but sinners. And this is in reality the sum of the whole matter: "miserable-sinner" Christianity is a Christianity distinctively for sinners. It is fitted to their apprehension as sinners, addressed to their acceptance as sinners, and meets their clamant needs as sinners. The very name which has been given it bears witness to it as such.

Naturally, therefore, to those who are not preoccupied with a sense of their sinfulness, "miserable-sinner Christianity" makes very little appeal. It would indeed be truer to say that it excites in them a positive distaste. It does not seem to them to have any particular fitness for their case, which they very naturally identify with the case of men in general. It appears to them to foster a morbid preoccupation with faults which are in part at least only fancied. It does scant justice, as they think, to the dignity of human nature, with its ethical endowments and capacities for self-improvement. It presents, as they view it, insufficient and ineffective motives for moral effort, and tends therefore to produce weak and dependent characters prone to acquiesce in an imperfect development, merely because they lack the vigor to go forward. Men turn away from it in proportion as they are inclined to put a high estimate on human nature as it manifests itself in the world, and especially upon its moral condition, its moral powers, its present and possible moral achievements. It is a gospel for sinners, and those who do not think of themselves as sinners find no attraction in it. It has accordingly been in every age the shining mark of attack for men of what we commonly speak of as the Rationalistic temper. It should

not surprise us, therefore, that in our own age also it should have been made an object of assault by representatives of this general tendency of thought. And it is very natural that it was that arch-Rationalist, Albrecht Ritschl, who, a half century ago, drew it afresh into burning controversy.

On the basis of his Rationalistic construction of Christianity, Ritschl developed a doctrine of "Christian Perfection," in which Christians are represented as working out religious and moral perfection for themselves, by the sheer strength of their own right arm, without any help whatever from God. He developed this doctrine in express antagonism to the Reformation conception of "the miserable sinner," and he did not fail to stud his exposition of it with scornful references to that conception. It was, however, when writing-in a biblical basis for his doctrine, in the closing pages of the exegetical volume of his great work on *Justification and Reconciliation,*[60] that his polemic reached its climax. His leading purpose here is to deprive the Reformation doctrine of the support of Paul, to which it makes its chief appeal. In the teaching of the Reformers, he says, Christians are led to keep alive a sense of dissatisfaction with themselves, in order that they may the more constantly and earnestly look to Christ, and the more utterly rest on His righteousness. Paul, on the contrary, does nothing of the kind. He presents Paul's teaching both in its negative and in its positive aspect. Negatively, says he, Paul knows nothing of any provision for the forgiveness of Christians' sins; positively, he not only exhibits a very healthful satisfaction with his own moral condition, but betrays no tendency to think less well of other Christians than of himself. He did not keep his own sins constantly in mind—if he had any; and he does not teach his converts to keep their sins in mind—though his letters show us that he knew perfectly well that they had a good many. And he never connects the sins of Christians with their

[60] *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung.* Vol. II., Ed. 1, p. 187; Ed. 3, 1889, § 39ff. pp. 365ff.

justification, after the manner of the Reformers; indeed he had never reflected on the relation of the justification they had received to their subsequent sins. The justification was there; the sins were there—whenever they were there: Paul never in his thought brought the two into connection. Still less was he of a sad countenance because of these sins—whether his own or others'; on the contrary, possessed of a consciousness of well-doing in his work, not unbroken sorrow for his sins—of which he betrays not a trace—but satisfaction with his condition as a Christian and with his work as an apostle, is his mood. And Ritschl does not fail to generalize from Paul's case, declaring that every man may and ought to have like Paul the consciousness of good work done,—not precisely of a multiplicity of good works, but of a connected life-work that is good; and having that, he may account himself, in the Pauline sense, perfect. This work must of course be proved to be approved; but it may be proved and approved, and form a valid ground of complete satisfaction with ourselves. Satisfaction with our Christian attainments, not constant penitence for our sins—that is the Pauline conception of the Christian life.

As an account of Paul's attitude toward the sins of Christians, this leaves much to be desired. It makes the impression that he is represented as being indifferent to them, although that accords very ill with the contents of his letters. It scarcely adequately represents the preoccupation of these letters with the sins of his converts and their strenuous dealing with them, to say simply that Paul "was of course acquainted with the fact" of the imperfection of his converts.[61] He certainly does not treat the sins of his converts as negligible things. But if we ask, how it is possible that with these sins abounding about him and engaging his unceasing care, he should never have reflected on the relation of his great message of justification by faith to them, and indeed never suggests any relief for them whatever, we

[61] As cited, pp. 365.

obtain no answer from Ritschl. There is, to be sure, a remark dropped[62]—in accordance with one of Ritschl's own doctrinal notions—to the effect that Paul kept "the two points of view, of justification by faith and the bestowment of the divine Spirit on believers, unconfused." But even if this could be pressed into a suggestion that Paul expected the sins of Christians to be eradicated by the Holy Spirit, their guilt would still be left unprovided for: and Paul would not be expected to, and does not, speak of them as if he were indifferent to their guilt. Perhaps there is a veiled hint that Christians are to expiate these sins in their own persons at the judgment day. But if so it is not worked out. We are left to the unresolved contradiction that Paul whose message revolved around the deliverance of believers from their sins, yet looked upon the sins still committed by them as negligible.

And what shall we say of Paul's alleged satisfaction with himself? Of course passages like Rom. VII. 14ff, Gal. V: 17 in which he probes the human heart, and even uncovers his own soul for us, are set aside. Even when that is done, however, we are far from a Paul who is satisfied with his attainments and indifferent to his short-comings; though we do have a Paul who rejoices in his salvation. It is the indifference to sin, considered as guilt, inherent in Ritschl's system of teaching, not Paul's, which is really made the basis of judgment. Ritschl wishes to make Paul say in effect that Christians may neglect their sins: it is not their sins but their salvation with which they should be concerned. But Paul will not say that. The most that Ritschl can venture to maintain, with the utmost wrenching of the text, is that Paul does not direct his converts to any remedy for their continued sinning; and that from this we may infer that he did not think it required any remedy—despite his multiplied rebukes of their sins and agonizing warnings against them! And even this he cannot assert of John. John, he allows, does provide a remedy

[62] P. 370.

for the sins of Christians, a remedy that directs us to the faithfulness and righteousness of God, the cleansing effect of the sacrificing Christ, the intercession of Christ.[63] John alone, therefore, says Ritschl, occupies the standpoint of the Reformers on this matter.[64] Not quite even John; for though the hard facts of experience had compelled John to modify the optimistic judgment which Paul held concerning Christians, he remained, we are told, essentially of the optimistic party, and could by no means descend to the depths of the Reformers. "John also is far removed from the pessimism with which Luther emphasized the perpetual imperfection and worthlessness (*Werthlosigkeit*) of the moral activity of Christians. Sinning is for him still always the exception in the Christian life, not the rule and an inevitable fate."[65]

Ritschl's book was published in 1874. But the seed sown in it did not come to its fruitage for a quarter of a century. His representation of the attitude of the New Testament writers to the sins of Christians, did not fail of an immediate echo, of course, here and there. And it was no doubt silently moulding opinion in like-minded circles. It was not until the later half of the last decade of the century, however, that wide interest was manifested in it. An essay or two appeared on the subject in 1896, and then, in 1897, attention was sharply attracted by an extended discussion of it in a book of unusual vigor both of thought and language written by a young man of twenty-five, just out of the University, Paul Wernle. Wernle came forward as an enthusiastic but independent pupil of Ritschl's. "So far as I see," he says:[66] "Ritschl is the sole theologian who as yet has seriously interested himself in the question of how sin in the life of Christians was thought of and dealt with by the Apostles." The time had come,

[63] P. 273.
[64] P. 372.
[66] P. 378.
[66] *Der Christ und die Sünde bei Paulus*, 1897, Preface.

he thought, to go into the matter more thoroughly than Ritschl had been able to do. He devotes to it, therefore, this, his maiden book, in which he endeavors not merely to ground Ritschl's conclusions, but also to give them sharper and more complete expression. The view that he asserts (no other term will meet the case) is that with Paul—it is with Paul alone that the book concerns itself—the Christian is as such altogether done with sins, and is a sinless man, who will appear as such in the rapidly approaching judgment day;[67] and that the Reformation has so far departed from Pauline Christianity that it has transformed it from a religion of sinlessness into a religion of sinning.[68]

In attaching himself thus closely to Ritschl, and carrying out the suggestions made by Ritschl to their logical conclusions, Wernle perhaps somewhat neglects his chronologically closer predecessors. E. Grafe mildly rebukes him for this.[69] "The ideas brought forward here and acutely grounded," he says, "are, in great part, not altogether new, not so unheard of as the author appears to suppose. He himself recognizes with lively gratitude that A. Ritschl was the first to point energetically to the question under consideration. But other theologians also have already raised it, such as, for example, Schmiedel, Scholz, Karl, Holtzmann." Wernle was not, however, unaware of the exist-

[67] As cited, p. 126. A certain ambiguity attaches to the word "sinless." Even Wernle does not quite venture to assert that Paul supposes himself to be free from a sinful nature; but only from sinful acts. Commenting on Gal. II. 20, he says he does not fully understand it (p. 19), and then proceeds to say that we cannot on its ground attribute to Paul "a consciousness of sinlessness." He is speaking here of the inner nature, not of external acts, and therefore at once explains his meaning to be that "the feeling of perfection which filled Paul in so high a manner has yet its limitations in the reality of the 'flesh,' and the delay of the 'consummation,' that is, of 'the world to come.'" Jacobi (as subsequently cited, p. 324) appears to have misunderstood him here, to be speaking of the perfection of act,—which Wernle does attribute to Paul.

[68] As cited, p. 124.

[69] *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1897, 19, col. 517.

ence of these closer predecessors. He even mentions them.[70] He writes, however, clearly, in independence of them, and those of them of any large significance in the development of the controversy antedated the publication of his book by so short an interval, that it is quite possible that it was well advanced to its completion before they became accessible to him. Two of them are of sufficient importance, nevertheless, to require that we shall give some account of them before proceeding to look into Wernle's own book. We refer to W. A. Karl and H. Scholz.

W. A. Karl[71] stands so far outside of the most direct line of development of the controversy that he does not derive immediately from Ritschl, and does not make it his primary object to validate Ritschl's condemnatory judgment upon the Reformation doctrine of "the miserable sinner," although he will permit as little standing-ground in the New Testament for this doctrine as Ritschl himself. Though he has thus climbed up some other way, however, he nevertheless takes his position at the head of the subsequent development, in so far as he was the first to proclaim Paul "the great idealist," who, in his incurable doctrinairism, asserted the completed sinlessness of Christians in the face of all experience.[72] His first object in his chief work—which he describes in the very military language of "obtaining the mastery of the Pauline soteriology from a new point of attack"—he tells us is to reach a unitary conception of Paul; and he seeks this, according to

[70] Scholz, at pp. 11, 19, 3; Karl, at p. 86; Holtzmann at pp. 2, 21, 61, 87. Schmiedel's "Glaube und Dogma beim Apostel Paulus" (*Theolog. Zeitschrift aus der Schweitz,* 1893, pp. 211-230), which seems likely to be the work referred to by Grafe, does not appear to be cited by Wernle; but he cites Schmiedel's commentary on the Epistles to the Corinthians (pp. 48, 71). He cannot be reproached with lack of attention to "the most recent literature."

[71] *Beiträge zum Verständnis der soteriologischen Erfahrungen und Spekulationen des Apostel Paulus,* 1896; also, *Johanneische Studien*: I. *Der Erste Johannisbrief,* 1898.

[72] Cf. H. J. Holtzmann, *Lehrbuch der Neutestamentlichen Theologie.* ed. 2. 1911, II. p. 166, note 3.

Wernle,[73] who does not believe that Paul can be unified, "by identifying a series of heterogeneous ideas with one another." "We can learn from this," adds Wernle, "how Paul must probably have begun had he sought after a unitary system—nothing more." This is far higher praise than we ourselves could give to Karl, who seems to us busied with imposing a system of teaching on Paul of which Paul could never have dreamed. In his work on John he proceeds to impose the system which he had already imposed on Paul, on I John also, with the object of showing that the same body of religious conceptions are present in a wider circle than that into which we enter in Paul's letters.

The chief elements of this early Christian conception-world are the idea of a real indwelling of Christ, that is, of the Pneuma (in John also of God)[74]—for the expression of which the preposition "in" forms a short formula—along with the fixed conviction that this indwelling produces in us ethical perfection as well as recognition of the Messiahship of Jesus and also "parrhesistic ecstacy"; and not only guarantees but is identical with eternal life.[75] What in this view New Testament Christianity consists in is just a mystical transformation, referred as its cause to the indwelling of the Pneuma-Christos, and manifesting itself in a new faith, belief in the messiahship of Jesus; a new conduct. ethical perfection; and ecstatic phenomena. On all three of these characteristic manifestitations of Christianity, Karl lays the greatest stress. Our concernment is, however, only with the central one. The ethical perfection affirmed in it is asserted in its fulness. What John teaches, we are told, is that "all Christians are entirely sinless and therefore pure and righteous as Christ Himself, that is, perfect in love."[76] This perfection is expounded both in its rela-

[73] *Der Christ and die Sünde bei Paulus,* etc., p. 86.

[74] What is new in I John (over against Paul) is the indwelling of God as well as of Christ or the Pneuma (*Johanneische Studien,* p. IV). But this indwelling of God is not an independent indwelling but is through that of Christ. (p. 99).

[75] *Johanneische Studien,* p. 111.

[76] *Johanneische Studien,* p. 103.

tion to forgiveness of which it proves to be the condition, and in its relation to the indwelling of the Pneuma-Christ of which it is represented as the immediate and necessary effect. The whole matter is summed up in a single sentence thus:[77] "If the Pneuma-Christ dwells in me, I am ethically renewed and thus 'righteous' in God's eyes." This "ethical renewal" which is conceived as instantaneous and complete, is the ground of our acceptance as righteous. " We can say briefly," says Karl,[78] "that the word 'righteousness' designates the ethical renewal according to its religious value, according to the value which it has before God." Or more crisply still,[79] "The 'righteousness of God' is ethical perfection."

He deals with the matter both from the objective and the subjective point of sight. "The forgiveness of sins is accomplished," says he,[80] "with renewal of the whole man. How would God forgive me and leave me still in my sinful misery? How can I pardon my enemy and hold him incarcerated in his prison? Herein I perceive forgiveness, herein it manifests itself, completes itself, consists—that God sends me the Spirit, renews me ethically. Our life of salvation forms a unity like all that makes claim to the word life. It consists not first in forgiveness, then in a subsequent renewal; but in the renewal, I experience also the forgiveness, and the result is full reconciliation with God." Elsewhere,[81] having declared roundly that "we feel that our previously committed sins are forgiven only as we are renewed," he illustrates the deliverance by urging that no thief will believe his thefts are forgiven so long as he continues to steal: he must stop stealing before he can have a sense of forgiveness. No doubt men, both Protestants and Catholics, pretend that it is otherwise, and imagine themselves to enjoy forgiveness while they go on sinning. But this imagi-

[77] *Beiträge*, p. 48.
[78] *Beiträge*, p. 30.
[79] P. 59.
[80] P. 71.
[81] P. 51.

nary forgiveness,—forgiveness to-day, to-morrow new sins —is frankly imaginary, and we all know it. "Therefore,[82] it will not do to say, First pardon, then ethical renewal; first the feeling of the forgiveness of sins, then the purpose of renewal." That is not what Paul says, and it is fundamentally wrong, as is very easily seen. For we cannot have forgiveness without repentance; and we cannot repent without experiencing sin as sin; and we cannot experience sin as sin without having in ourselves its contradictory with which to contrast it,—the ethical ideal. This is apparently supposed to be equivalent to saying that we must be good before we can be forgiven. On the next page[83] the sorites is thrown into this form: "This, then, is our meaning: Only he can receive forgiveness of sins, who is in a condition to be sensible of their forgiveness. Only he is sensible of it who knows his sin. Only he knows it who is in grace. Therefore it is not right to say, First forgiveness of sins, then renewal; for there is no forgiveness without renewal." These statements will not be apprehended in their full meaning unless it is understood that the "renewal" spoken of is complete renewal, "ethical perfection," and that the "forgiveness" spoken of is not supposed to accompany but to follow on it; forgiveness is received only after we are perfect. The process is accurately outlined as follows:[84] "Through the indwelling of Christ we are ethically renewed, and we become an ethical new creation. We fulfill the commandments of God. Naturally we enter then into a new relation with Him. First, His judgment on us, then naturally His treatment of us, is changed. He esteemed and treated us before as sinners, because that is what we were; He judges and treats us now as 'righteous' because we are now become righteous before Him, that is, we are what He wants us to be."

The central Reformation doctrine is here replaced by

[82] P. 52.
[83] P. 53.
[84] P. 30.

its contradictory, and according to this teaching we should not receive forgiveness until we become glorified saints. Paul escapes this result in Karl's exposition of him by representing Christians as becoming ethically perfect immediately on their baptism, and therefore recipients of forgiveness from the inception of their Christian life. "The Apostle," says he,[85] "presupposes and does not doubt that through baptism Christ dwells in Christians. All who are baptized are 'in Christ.' *Thence* comes their sinlessness . . . A Christian can therefore never sin again." "This indwelling of the Pneuma-Christos, however," he says again,[86] "means for us a complete ethical new-creation. 'If any one is in Christ, he is a new creature; old things have passed away, behold all has become new' (2 Cor. 5.17). It cannot be otherwise than that this renewal is a complete one. For Christ, as a unitary (*geschlossen*) personality, cannot dwell in us as something only partial. A personality, a unity, suffers no division. Either we have Him wholly or not at all. If we have Him dwelling in us completely, however, there dwells in us also His moral personality. He shares with us a kind of moral infallibility. A Christian can no longer sin."

On this view all progress in Christian living is excluded; the Christian on baptism is all that he will ever be, at once. "The ethical gifts," says Karl,[87] "are not given in part, or in advancing development, but completely." Taking the matter more broadly, he undertakes to show,[88] that no passages exist in Paul which suggest a development. "If Christ dwells in us at all," he says,[89] pressing his *a priori* argument, since He is an indivisible person, "he must be present in us without remainder." The charismata, being wrought by the spirits, may indeed show themselves in different degrees, and if the moralization of Christians had

[85] P. 96f.
[86] P. 14f.
[87] P. 24.
[88] P. 17.
[89] P. 17ff.

similarly been committed to the spirits, it too might be progressive. But Paul denies the possibility of ethical development, precisely because it is the product of the indwelling Christ Himself—that it is "once for all settled by the once for all indwelling of the Pneuma-Christos—to which then the idea runs parallel that the ethical renewal, because necessary to salvation, must be always present in perfection."[90] For the Parousia hangs always trembling on the horizon, and the Christian must be always ready.

It is a sufficiently bizarre body of teaching which Karl attributes thus to Paul. And it stands in open contradiction to facts with which, as we all know, Paul was in the most observant contact. This does not deter Karl from attributing it to him. "We must of course ask," he says,[91] "whether these declarations"—the declarations concerning the sinlessness of Christians—"accord with the facts. We should think that, among the Christians of whom he could not deny that they had the Spirit, Paul would have made the experience that not all is gold that glitters, that even in Christians a notable remainder of actual sinning continued. The Corinthians, for example, might have opened his eyes in this matter. How did he adjust himself to the facts of open wickedness which he encountered? Paul never comprehended these facts. They were to him the riddle of all riddles. He stood before them with the toneless, 'Know ye not?' . . . These are desperate passages, these numerous 'Or are ye ignorant?' or 'Know ye not?' sections. In them the complete perplexity of this great idealist comes to expression . . . It is precisely when he jolts against sins, that he argues that such sins are impossible to Christians. He reasons away theoretically what stands before his eyes as facts." That is to say, that is what must be attributed to Paul on Karl's theory of his teaching. Let us hear him, however, again:[92] "We have seen that Paul's

[90] Pp. 26f.
[91] P. 16.
[92] P. 50.

theory does not agree with the facts. It exists merely as a particular notion of the metaphysical nature and mode of existence of the Risen One, and the nature of His indwelling. This idea cannot, however, be harmonized with the facts. That the indwelling of Christ on the ethical side does not coincide with ecstacy, that one can in other words be a good ecstatic and a very bad Christian,—this fact Paul did not banish out of the world by denying it theoretically. Paul may possibly have been religiously, ethically, psychologically and physically of such a predisposition that the glory of the Lord expanded in him all at once like the flaring up of a great light (he himself uses this figure in 2 Cor. IV. 6); it was not so with other men and it will not be so. In his splendid enthusiasm, unselfishness and devotion to the saving of souls, the Apostle makes on us, to be sure, the impression that the full moral greatness of Jesus had taken up its dwelling in him, so that Paul might have justly declared to his opponents that he *could* no longer do an unworthy act, because it was Christ who moved him; just as a great musical genius may assert of himself with our approval that is impossible for him to write a single false harmony. But it was a mistake in Paul to assume the same ethical completeness in every Christian ecstatic. We are not bound by the mistake, because we no longer accept his metaphysical principles. Paul could not reason otherwise, because according to his assumption Christ dwells in us either altogether or not at all. We think more spiritually now of the Risen One than Paul did, and of His indwelling more as psychologically mediated. And so it is possible for us to speak of a progress in Christ's indwelling."

The circle of conceptions attributed by Karl to Paul stand in no more staring contradiction with the facts of life not merely open to Paul's observation and thrust violently on his attention, but copiously remarked upon in every one of his letters, than they do with his most explicit and most elaborated teaching. It would serve no good purpose to ex-

hibit this in detail. It is obvious to every reader of Paul's letters. And it is enough here simply to point to the two formative conceptions from which this whole system of teaching attributed to Paul derives, and each of which stands in diametrical contradiction to his most fundamental convictions. It is a desperate undertaking to attempt to interpret Paul as basing forgiveness on acquired character, that is, on works. It is precisely to the destruction of that notion in all of its forms that a large part of his life-work was devoted. It is equally unwarranted to attribute to him the idea that renewal is instantaneously complete. That too he explicitly negatives too often for citation. It is not Paul's but Karl's reasoning that to have Christ at all we must have the whole Christ—which is true enough—and that having the whole Christ is already for Him so fully to have assimilated our nature to Himself that there remains no further development possible—which is so far from true that it is absurd. On these two principles hang the entire system of teaching ascribed to Paul. There is no need to say anything further.

The main purpose of Hermann Scholz, in his winningly written essay *On the Doctrine of the "Miserable Sinner,"*[92a] is to justify Ritschl's representation of the essential difference between the attitudes of Paul and the Reformers towards the actual Christian life. The Reformers, says Ritschl in effect, and Scholz after him, concentrate all their attention on the necessary sinning of Christians, and thus give to the Christian life the aspect of defeat and consequent endless penitence, and to Christians themselves the character of merely perpetual petitioners for pardon. Paul, on the other hand, say they, looks out rather on the constant conquest of sin by Christians, and sees the Christian life as an arena of high ethical exertions and ever increasing ethical advance; while Christians are to him therefore distinctively the morally strong. If the antithesis were as here stated, *cadit quaestio*: the Reformers have

[92a] *ZThK.* 1896, VI. pp. 463-491.

no case. But they have been deprived of their case by the removal from the statement of their position and of that of Paul alike, of all that each has in common with what is ascribed to the other. Thus an artificial antagonism has been produced, and, if you restore to each what has been omitted, the two melt into one another. The most that can be even plausibly contended is that the emphasis may be thrown by each of them on different elements in the general conception of the Christian life insisted on by both: the Reformers emphasizing rather the constant penitence which belongs to Christians, Paul the constant ethical advance which is achieved by them. Scholz knows this perfectly well; and accordingly, when he comes to contrast the two, with actual appeal to the records, finds some difficulty in making out clearly the contrast between them to which he is committed.

The essay opens with an account of the doctrine of "the miserable sinner" drawn largely from Zinzendorf.[93] The definition put in the forefront [93a] very fairly describes it. "The idea of 'the miserable sinner' has from of old been in ecclesiastical use in order to declare the abiding imperfection of the Christian life and the impossibility of our delivering ourselves." There is nothing apparent in that, of slackness in moral effort or depression of spirits; only, what one would think a natural and necessary recognition of constant dependence on God and his grace. And Scholz is compelled to admit that in the case at least of Zinzendorf, who is used by him as its chief exemplar, the doctrine did not either inhibit ethical activity or cloud the natural joy of the Christian heart.[94] Nevertheless he deprecates the mood which it fosters. It takes all the pleasure out of our work, he says. It destroys the spur to effort. It substitutes a habit of looking for forgiveness for our actions—and ex-

[93] Scholz had himself come out of Moravian circles and it was no doubt natural to him to turn first to Zinzendorf.

[93a] P. 463.

[94] P. 465.

pecting it as a matter of course—for the better habit of anticipating ethical results from them. Who will keep the ideal before his eyes if he knows it to be unattainable and that meanwhile it is enough that he confesses himself a "miserable sinner"?[95] Obviously Scholz has passed here beyond both his definition and his example; he is blackening the conception of "the miserable sinner" by ascribing to it traits not derivable from either.

This is even more clear, when, a little later, repudiating the doctrine in the name of Paul, he brings against it his most summarily expressed arraignment.[96] "Accordingly the doctrine of 'the miserable-sinner' applied to the active moral life, whether as object of daily forgiveness, or as occasion for mistrust or indifference towards advance in sanctification, has no support in Paul. Of course Paul derives his Christian state exclusively from the good-pleasure of God—He is never weary of emphasizing that in all the relations of our lives we are dependent on God's grace. . . . He thus represents evangelical Christianity in the whole range of its practical religious motive, as the Reforers have summed it up in the doctrine of justification; and we need not say more on that. But the special reference to daily, active sinning is lacking. In this matter he is interpreted not out of himself, but by means of alien inferences. The preponderant attention given to the doctrine of justification has dulled men's sense for the independent ethics of the Apostle; the necessary emphasizing of the natural inability of man has led to the assertion of an imperfection without measure and without end." Of course again a "miserable-sinner" doctrine such as is here described should be repelled as Scholz repels it: a doctrine which throws such stress on justification that it has lost all sense for moral action; and which has turned our continued imperfections into a "precious doctrine," to be cherished, instead of a state of sin to be striven against. We are *not* to continue in sin;

[95] P. 472.
[96] P. 482.

moral effort is *always* demanded; and the recognition of our continued imperfection must operate as the *spur* that at every moment drives us onward. In justice to Scholz it is to be borne in mind, however, that in his own environment there are some who do appear to submerge the moral demand in continued or repeated justification, thus finding the whole meaning of Christianity, formally at least, in justification; and who fancy themselves to be maintaining the Lutheran tradition in so doing.[97] It is less in them, however, than in Scholz's transcript of Paul's teaching that the real "miserable-sinner" doctrine is to be found.

And when Scholz goes on to describe[98] the state of mind which ruled in Paul's day, "the miserable-sinner" finds his own very much reflected in it. "To the generation of that day, nothing was more alien than the passive knowledge of self and of sins, which makes a painful privilege or distressful business of the mournful contemplation of our perpetual imperfection, falls back therewith on the grace of God, and is just as sluggish in forming resolutions as in actual conduct. A high feeling of responsibility teaches us not to permit ourselves to be overcome by evil but to overcome evil with good (Rom. XII. 21). With this earnestness in our sense of duty, the joyful character of Christian morality thoroughly accords. Everything is thrilling with stimulation—the range of the morally attainable expands—the final success is assured." . . . That is just how the "miserable sinner" feels. Does not Scholz himself tell us so of Zinzendorf, his typical example? "That no abatement is suffered in the earnestness of sanctification and moral renewal, or in the comprehensive circle of duties included in them," he says,[99] "may be recognized all the more readily that Zinzendorf's Christocentric ethics, elsewhere made known, is characterized by richness of conception, purity of ideas, and salutary emphasis on the effort

[97] Cf. *The Princeton Theological Review*, January, 1920, pp. 95ff.
[98] P. 483.
[99] P. 465.

after sanctification. To feel ourselves a 'miserable sinner' has never with him the meaning of renunciation of the ethical task, or even assignment to it of a lower value in comparison with religious experience. It is equally excluded on the other hand that this doctrine issues in a new form of self-torturing after the Pietistic fashion. It is precisely against the self-torturing of that narrow-hearted, unfruitful penitential practice of the dominant Pietism, rich in deceptions and self-deceptions, that Zinzendorf's system is directed with emphasis. He does not wish that a Christian man should be of a sad countenance, with hanging head; he hates a dejected and discontented piety, which comes to nothing but the repetition of its lamentations. He demands and exhibits a joyful Christianity."

Scholz's zeal, it cannot fail to have been perceived, is burning for the ethical character of Christianity, which he wrongly conceives to be brought into jeopardy by the point of view of "the miserable sinner." Following Ritschl he even places justification and sanctification in contrast with one another as contradictories, of which if one be taken the other must be left. Paul, says he, [100] never refers sinning Christians to Christ for forgiveness but always on the contrary to the Holy Spirit that they may be girded for the fight. The Christian life is thus to Scholz, in its very essence, a conflict; and as it is not a hopeless but an auspicious conflict, it is also a constant advance towards the good. He stands here on ground diametrically opposite to that occupied by Karl, who, we will remember, supposes the Christian from the very beginning perfect, just because recreated by the Holy Spirit. Scholz on the contrary, teaches an ethically progressive Christianity, and indeed it is precisely for this that he is primarily solicitous, as it well became him to be on the ground of his Ritschlian moralism. "It presupposes a high estimate of the moral powers of the gospel," says he,[101] praising Paul, "when in

[100] P. 476.
[101] P. 476f.

general, he does not doubt a favorable issue of the process depicted, and in particular shuns employing the divine forgiveness as a means of soothing, to say nothing of as a motive for corruption." Paul, he says, only incidentally and in particular instances warns against over-confidence, but on the other hand "puts, fundamentally, in the first rank growth, advance, progress." "Who will see in these heroic lines," he cries,[102] "the portrait of 'the miserable sinner'"? No one, of course; but only because, in painting the figure of the strenuously advancing Christian, common to both "the miserable-sinner Christianity" and his own fervent moralism, he has sedulously obliterated the background upon which it is thrown up in the one, and worked in that which is appropriate only to the other. The divine forgiveness is not allowed to serve either for consolation for shortcomings still remaining or for encouragement for going onward. It is under the incitement of the gospel proclamation alone, which can act only "ethically" that is to say in the way of bringing inducements to bear on a free spirit, that the Christian hews his way onward in the strength of his own right arm. It is not difficult to see which of these two points of view is Paul's.

It is also easy to see that, although there is no room in Scholz's system for such a perfectionism as Karl teaches, he cherishes nevertheless a very high estimate of human prowess and human achievements, and is eager (with the help of Paul) to set it over against what he conceives to be the depreciatory view of "the miserable sinner." "Paul," say he,[103] after having drawn a picture of the shortcomings of Paul's converts, "has no scruples in designating as saints or sanctified, as the beloved of God, as the body of Christ, the temple of the Holy Ghost, the building of God, a host of men who display these obvious deficiencies in their active moral life." And then he adds: "To such an extent does reflection on God's grace, which enters into

[102] P. 477.
[103] P. 476.

the life of believers on the one side as justifying, on the other as sanctifying, and forms something new in the core of their nature, preponderate with him, that the empirical failings of moral sinfulness do not come into comparison with it." On the face of it, this statement is a recognition of the continued presence and activity of sin in Christians, and the exaltation of the power of grace—justifying, sanctifying, recreating—over it. The scope of it is merely to show by the titles which he gives them, the honor which Paul put on Christians as subjects of this grace, with a view, naturally, to withdrawing them from the depreciatory judgment supposed to be visited on them (but surely not as subjects of grace) by "miserable-sinner Christianity."

This motive is more clearly manifested, however, in the description of Paul's estimate of his own person. "It may be boldly maintained," we read,[104] "that Paul makes no express use of the predicate 'miserable sinner' for his own person and in view of his daily life of sanctification. He would neither say with Luther, 'for we daily sin much and deserve nothing but punishment;' nor would he with Zinzendorf rest his hope before God's judgment 'on the Ransom alone.' What is to be read in 2 Tim. iv. 7 is spoken entirely in this sense: 'I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith: henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness which the Lord, the righteous Judge will give me at that day.' His good conscience is raised above all doubt, although with the proviso of humble deference to the final judgment of God (I Cor. iv. 4, 2 Cor. i. 12, iv. 2, vi. 6ff); he exhorts the brethren to walk in imitation of him, (Phil. iii. 17), and when he brings into consideration the effect of his vocational activity in his life, and the development of the inner man, he can only triumphantly declare: We all, with unveiled face, reflecting as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as from the Lord of

[104] P. 379.

the Spirit (2 Cor. III. 18)." Shall we say that on this showing Paul, despite his constant protest, was saved by works, at least in part,—not by "the Ransom alone"? Shall we say that, according to it, again, despite his protest, he had already attained and was already perfect; and, different in this from his converts, whom he addresses in his letters, had already fought his fight through to a finish and no longer was ethically advancing? We can hardly say less than that according to it Paul felt no lack in himself, no dissatisfaction with his attainments, and saw nothing before him but ever rising stages of glory. And even that, although overdrawn and, as here put, misleading, might be allowed to pass without much remark, except for one thing—the omission of Christ.[105] If we could look through it and see Christ behind it all; and look into it and see trustful dependence on Christ transfused through it all; we might perhaps recognize Paul in it. Otherwise not: for to him Christ was all in all and only in Christ did he have any ground, any goal, any hope, any strength. The ground of Paul's satisfaction was not in himself but in Christ. And that is precisely what "miserable-sinner Christianity" means. It does not mean that our attainments in Christian living may not be great, or that we may not find a legitimate satisfaction in their greatness. It means, however, that it is only as we penetrate behind these at-

[105] It may be worth while to remind ourselves that almost as good a case could be made for Paul's "perfection" before as after his conversion. He never was a "sinful" man in the coarse sense. "He had been a highly moral Pharisee, and lived the strictest of lives," as we are reminded by P. Gardner (*The Religious Experience of St. Paul*, 1911, p. 22). He tells us himself that "as regards the righteousness which was in the law he was blameless." He does not accuse himself of the vices which he names as having stained the lives of some of his Gentile converts. If he seems in a passage like Tit. III. 3, to include himself in the description, may we not say (reasons Gardner) that the "we" is ambiguous and must we not in any case deny Titus to Paul? And is not Eph. II. 3 open to the same doubt? The bearing of the fundamental fact that Paul was in any case a "good" man ought not to be neglected in interpreting his words. The alternatives are not either "good" or "wicked," but, either "good" or "perfect."

tainments, no matter how great they may be, to their source in the Redeemer, that we find any solid ground for satisfaction. And if our attainments meanwhile fall in any degree short of perfection, the necessity of recourse to their guarantor in the Redeemer becomes in that degree more and more poignant. To Paul as to his followers there is no satisfaction to be had in the contemplation of ourselves, since our best attainments are imperfect, and since, because they are experienced as imperfect, they beget in us a divine dissatisfaction which spurs us onward. Here is the paradox of "the miserable-sinner Christianity," — dissatisfaction with self conjoined with satisfaction with Christ, in whom alone is the promise and potency of all our possible advance.

It was immediately on the heels of Karl's and Scholz's essays that Paul Wernle's book[106] appeared, written with such flare and fury as to compel the attention which they had not received. Wernle comes forward like Scholz as a follower of Ritschl,[107] though he was too young to have been his personal pupil; and he makes it his real task to justify by a detailed study of Paul's Epistles, or rather of as many of them as he will allow to Paul,[108] Ritschl's representation that the Reformation doctrine of "the miserable sinner" finds no support for itself whatever in Paul.[109] The

[106] *Der Christ und die Sünde bei Paulus,* 1897. The preface is dated February, 1897. Scholz's essay was printed in the last *Heft* of the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* for 1896 and appeared probably in November. Karl's dedication is dated January, 1896.

[107] Pp. v. 13f.

[108] He uses Thessalonians, Galatians, Corinthians, Romans, Philippians and Colossians (omitting Ephesians and the Pastorals.) Karl uses only the four great Epistles and Philippians.

[109] This is the way he states his problem in a general and positive form (p. 3): "The problem of the Christian life, as the Reformation raised it, and as Ritschl has posited it afresh, is this: how the Christian can be a joyful child of God, in spite of sin." The Reformation answer, By trusting our sins to Christ, he says is wrong. Paul's answer (as he reads Paul), By the immediate perfecting of the soul in baptism, is also wrong. Ritschl's answer is, By treating sinning as negligible and going on and doing your duty in your station in life. That seems in general Wernle's answer.

method he pursues is that bad one very common among Teutonic investigators, of coming to the subject of study with a hypothesis already in hand, and "verifying" that hypothesis by seeing how far it can be carried through. This method leads inevitably to much twisting and turning in the effort to make the unwilling texts fit into the assumed hypothesis: and no one surely could have given us more twisting and turning than Wernle does. The Paul with which he emerges is far more Karl's Paul than Scholz's: he is indeed substantially the same Paul with Karl's. It is not easy, it is true, to obtain a perfectly unitary picture of him. He is not only presented as with the most brazen impudence asserting as fact what not only he but everybody concerned could not fail to know was not fact—as when he is said to have proclaimed all Christians—the Christians of Corinth and Galatia, for example—free from sin. He is represented also as contradicting himself flatly with the utmost ease and indifference—as when he is said to have taught that Christians are not liable to the judgment and yet to have threatened Christians sharply precisely with this judgment. He is even drawn as so developing from epistle to epistle as, in effect, to be a series of Pauls. He does not get to be really Paul in fact until the sixth chapter of Romans, and then by the third chapter of Colossians he has passed onward into still another Paul. These Pauls are all bound together, it is true, by two common traits which may be supposed to form the fundamental, as well as the abiding, elements of his character. He is always a missionary and always an enthusiast.[110] But he only slowly becomes a moralist. Up to the sixth chapter of Romans he teaches no morality; there he teaches an immediately perfect morality; when we arrive at the third chapter of Colossians he is found teaching a progressive morality.

[110] Cf. e. g. p. 79. "For the right understanding of the Epistle to the Galatians, two factors are of decisive importance: his theory of the Christian life is the theory of a *missionary;* and its root is *enthusiasm.*"

Before the sixth chapter of Romans we have merely the missionary proclaiming justification by faith and leaving it at that; the quickly coming parousia precludes all question of his converts' sinning—there is not time for sinning; and so they are left to the warmth of their purely religious enthusiasm in view of the rapidly approaching end. In the sixth chapter of Romans the morals of the converts have been taken up among the miraculous gifts of the Spirit; they have been recreated in their baptism into newness of life; henceforth they cannot sin; they are perfect. Yet by the third chapter of Colossians this perfection has been found sufficiently imperfect to admit of further perfecting; the converts must go on if they are to attain perfection.

It is needless to say that Wernle feels little admiration for this Paul, who seems to be ever learning and never coming to the knowledge of the truth. If the main motive of his book is to deprive the Reformers of the support of Paul, this is not because in his own view the support of Paul is of large value. The argument against the Reformers is purely *ad hominem*. If orthodox Protestantism derives comfort from the supposition that it reproduces the teaching of Paul, it must forego that comfort. For himself, however, it would be difficult to determine which Wernle thinks less well of—orthodox Protestantism or Paul. He stands apart from both, and from his superior position of critic speaks biting words of each. Nothing startled his first readers more than the contemptuous tone which he uses towards Paul. The venerable Adolf Hilgenfeld sharply rebukes his "overbearing manner"—with perhaps some increase of the sharpness because of the manifestation of this overbearing manner also toward the Tübingen school.[111] Otto Lorenz is full

[111] *Zeitschrift fur wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1898. 41. pp. 161ff. article: "Paulus vor dem Richterstuhle eines Ritschlianer." "The 'hard doctrinairism,'" says Hilgenfeld in closing—referring to Wernle's characterization of Paul's teaching—"is clearly to be recognized not in Paul of Tarsus but in Paul Wernle of Basel, who missed Ritschl's doctrine

of indignation over what he calls Wernle's "swaggering attitude" toward the Apostle.[112] These are not men whom it was easy to shock with criticisms of Paul; both say things about him themselves which shock us. But they could not brook his reduction to a man of whom it could be said that he had no eye for the real, that he dealt in commonplace, high-sounding phrases of whose truth to fact he was indifferent, that when he did not wish to see a thing he did not see it, that he learned nothing from experience, did not in the least bother about the contradictions of fact, but acted steadily on the theory, "It ought to be, therefore it is."

Wernle's primary impulse was derived from what he conceived to be the unwholesome acquiescence of Protestant Christianity in sinning. What he sought in the first instance to do was to show that no warrant for this attitude was supplied by Paul from whom Protestantism felicitated itself that it derived its whole religious character. For Luther and his followers, he asserts,[113] "the riches of God's grace and of the merit of Christ are manifested precisely in the forgiveness of the ever new sins of the Christian." "It is emphasized over and over again," he says, "that the whole glory of the condition of Christians consists in this—that sin no longer condemns, that we can live in grace in spite of sin." The implication is that on the Protestant view, what we receive in Christianity is really license to sin; continuous forgiveness of sins supersedes the necessity of cessation of sinning; and the question that is raised is "whether the moral state of the Chris-

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that we know nothing of sin outside the Christian community in Paul, and cannot find his way in the higher ideas of the Paul who reasons of sin and grace." (p. 171).

[112] *Protestantische Monatshefte*, 1897, pp. 376-378, review of Wernle's book. "Is there no other explanation of these contrasting declarations, that the Christian is free from sin and that he is not so, except the crassest self-contradiction?" "Wernle himself knows very well 'that his ideas are carefully ordered and stand in a close inner connection.'" It is in truth not Paul who is self-contradictory, but Wernle himself.

[113] P. 101.

tian possesses any importance." It was not Paul who made Christianity into this kind of a "sin-religion." It was Augustine who did this; he it was who first put sin and grace over against one another at the heart of Christianity, preoccupied man with the idea of sin, and presented the Christian religion as above everything else a source of consolation for men self-conscious in their sin. With Paul it was a very different story. To speak perfectly frankly Paul shows very little engagement with the subject of sin.[114] In Romans alone among his Epistles does he handle the topic theoretically at all. In the other letters even the terms "sin" or "to sin" are near to lacking. In I Corinthians, for instance, the noun "sin" occurs only in three passages in the fifteenth chapter and the verb "to sin" in seven passages scattered through the letter. And yet the congregation at Corinth certainly gave sufficient occasion for speaking of sin, if Paul was specially inclined to speak of it. In Romans sin is, no doubt, made the subject of discussion in chs. I-III, V b and VII b. But all these discussions concern the pre-Christian situation, while in Rom. VI, sin is just dismissed altogether from the Christian life, and that in the plainest of words. When Paul thinks of sin, in other words, he is not thinking of Christians; he is thinking of something which Christians put behind them on becoming Christians. Precisely what Christians are is the men who have ceased from sinning; the relation of the condition of sin and the condition of grace is a chronologically successive one. And so, Wernle formally announces as the result of his investigations just this:[115] "That the Christian state has nothing further to do with sin; that the Christian is a sin-free man and shall appear as such before God at the rapidly approaching day of judgment."

The religion of Christians, according to Paul, says Wernle, feeds purely on God and the future. "Forgive-

[114] P. 124.
[115] P. 126.

ness of sins, comfort for sin—that belongs to the past; the Pneumatic must be done with that."[116] He has secured his forgiveness once for all in the great experience of justification, by which his life has been cut in half. We have already seen Wernle declaring that "the condition of grace follows the condition of sin in chronological succession."[117] It is precisely here, he says, that Protestantism has deserted Paul; and he expounds the matter at length. "In Protestant orthodoxy," says he,[118] "the relation of the state of grace to the state of sin is no longer conceived as one of succession. The proof of universal sinfulness has for the Lutheran dogmatician the purposes of showing the indispensableness of righteousness by faith for every moment of the life (as is very clearly set forth by Troeltsch, *Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Johann Gerhard und Melanchthon,* pp. 133ff, 137). We should be conscious of ourselves as sinners in every moment of our Christian life, that we may ever anew feel the need of forgiveness and the imputation of Christ's righteousness. From this point of view the contrast of the 'now time' [in Rom. III. 26] to the time of the 'sins that are past' is explained by the contrast of the Christian and pre-Christian eras, and the theme treated is why God, and how He, was gracious to the Jews already before Christ's death. For the Christian on the other hand the time of sin altogether coincides with the time of forgiveness; for Christ's death has made it possible for us to receive justification ever afresh, despite our perpetual sin." Having thus described the Protestant view, he now contrasts with it Paul's own. "It is impossible," he says,[119] "to exaggerate the divergence of this Protestant theory from Paul's meaning. Where is there in the whole body of Paul's letters a single passage in which Paul appeals to Christ's death for the continuing

[116] P. 127.
[117] P. 126.
[118] Pp. 94f.
[119] P. 94.

sins of Christians? And which letter even in the smallest degree shows the Lutheran mood as to sin and grace? In all—in absolutely all—of them the fundamental idea is this—that sins are gone, that the Christian has them no longer, since he has become a Christian. The 'now time' is precisely the Messianic age; over against it the 'sins that are past' of Rom. III. 26 are the sins of Christians before their entrance into the community of the Kingdom of God (cf. 2 Pet. 1.9 and everywhere in the later literature). God has borne with them patiently and passed them by up to the forgiveness through Christ's death; now, since those burdened with them have become believers in Christ, He has obliterated them. When we were still sinners, Christ died for us; now, since we have been justified by His blood, we are no longer sinners (Rom. v. 8). The 'now time' begins historically, it is true, with Christ's death and resurrection, but for every Christian it begins with his entrance into the community, with his justification. Then the sins that are past are washed away; up to then the man was a 'sinner,' now he is that no longer. Precisely from this it is clear that Paul, in Romans too, occupied the standpoint of the missionary, divided the world from the missionary's experience of conversion, and distributed sin and grace respectively to the two halves of life. He did not reflect upon how the Christian receives forgiveness in the state of grace, since he made no such supposition as that the Christian needs forgiveness in the state of grace. In Protestant orthodoxy, on the other hand, the missionary problem has fallen away, and a problem derived from the congregational life has taken its place."

It is not worth while to remark here on the violence done in this passage to Rom. III. 25, 26. There can be no real question that Paul is distinguishing there between the two dispensations, and makes no reference whatever to the pre- and post-justification experiences of the individual Christian. It is more important at the moment

to point out the emphasis with which Wernle confines the effects of justification in Paul's view to the sins committed before it has been received. If sins are committed afterwards, there is no remedy for them in justification. But he is emphatic in declaring that according to Paul, no sins are committed afterwards. The saving effect of justification continues only because Christians, having been completely saved by it once for all, need no further saving. This is how Wernle puts it:[120] "The natural man, whether Jew or Gentile, so long as he operates with works, can only bring down God's wrath on himself, and never finds of himself by his own activity the way to the divine salvation. In the sight of the infallible Judge, as the Scriptures reveal Him, who can stand before God? When it is a matter of salvation, man can only lift his eyes and grasp the hand that is held out to him,—that is, believe. Here the missionary question has only become the occasion for the most profound apprehension of the religious problem. Had Paul carried this way of thinking through, his theology would have approached that of the Reformation, and especially Calvin's (cf. the kindred idea in *Inst.* III.12) infinitely more closely; for how can a man who so judges himself before God ever cease to feel himself a sinner, who is in need of grace? But strange as it may appear to us, Paul confined this way of thinking to the state of the natural man, and banished it from the state of Christians. The Christian may boast (Rom. v. 6); he is the bond-servant of God and of the righteousness (vi. 18, 22); is filled with the fruit of righteousness (Phil. i. 11). Thus Paul has remained to the end, the missionary, who summons to the Kingdom of God. The Christian congregations are for him withdrawn from the world, the children of God who do righteousness. Man sins; the Christian is free from sin after his justification."

According to this representation the entirety of salvation not only hangs with Paul on justification, but is ac-

[120] P. 96.

complished in justification. But Wernle does not maintain this representation. The insistence that justification affects only the sins "that are past" in each individual case, made even in this very passage, renders its maintenance impossible. The life of the Christian may be consequent on his justification, but it is also subsequent to it; it may be lived out under the influence of justification, it is not, and it is one of Wernle's most peremptory assertions that with Paul it is not, lived out under the continuous application of justification. Paul, according to him, looks upon justification as cutting the life into two unrelated halves. What it does is to give the Christian a new start. Its only effect is wholly with the past life. The future life—what of it? There must be something to be said of it. We find Wernle accordingly, on an earlier page, [121] representing Protestantism as differing from Paul, precisely in its tendency to look upon justification as the entirety of salvation. Paul, it seems, had something to add to justification. "The missionary preaching of the prevenient grace of God which grants to every believer forgiveness for his previous sins, is what distinguishes Paul from the other apostles, is the peculiarly Pauline element of his theology. But this always remained with him missionary preaching; he did not revert to this side of his gospel with Christians. That great proclamaton of faith and forgiveness stands with him at the beginning, and is far from being as in Protestantism, the sum of his whole religion. Protestantism has thus—by applying this missionary preaching to the community and declaring it the whole of the gospel—passed far beyond Paul." There could not be a more distinct assertion that justification constitutes only a part, perhaps only a small part, of Paul's gospel, and concerns only the initial stage of the Christian life; it was supplemented for those who had experienced justification by an apparently copious and certainly weighty further teaching.

It is not at first apparent, however, what this further

[121] P. 54.

gospel for believers as distinguished from unbelievers is. It appears as if in Paul's practice, or at least in his earlier practice, it amounted to nothing more than the preaching of the duty of a moral life and exhortations to those who sinned to repent and put away sin from them. By such a representation the effect of justification is made in the sharpest way possible to be merely the giving to men of a fresh start; and Paul is made, despite the protest of his whole life, to base salvation in the most express manner on faith and works combined, or rather on works alone wrought on the basis of a clean slate attained through faith. Wernle, [122] while declaring that in point of fact Paul did proceed practically on precisely this ground,—"separating justification and salvation in such a way that he bases them respectively on different conditions, the one on faith and the other on works,"—yet finds himself in difficulties in attributing this dualism to him in theory, because of his "promising salvation to every believer without any supplement or any condition." After all, then, Paul understood himself to promise a complete salvation to that faith by which justification is received; and this is sufficiently close to saying that all salvation was, in one way or another, implied in justification. His gospel was a unit, and it is to misunderstand him to divide it into unrelated or loosely related parts. "Therefore," says Wernle himself,[123] "Paul's theory of justification and salvation, what he called his gospel, is unitary and clear. It is pure proclamation of faith; faith receives salvation as well as justification. It introduces into the community of salvation and guarantees salvation to those that are in it. It needs no supplementing by works; the simple invocation of the name of Jesus at the judgment is enough." But then he adds: "But this theory, this gospel, is not the whole of what Paul taught. We meet with almost nothing of it in the letters to the Corinthians; the fear of God, sanctifi-

[122] P. 97.
[123] P. 99.

cation, love are demanded by Paul from his readers. In I Cor. x he directly forbids them to imagine themselves sure of salvation. That the judgment proceeds according to works is also in Rom. xiii. 14 the simple assumption. This contradiction of theory and practice is insoluble."

A considerable portion of Wernle's inability to accredit to Paul a unitary conception of salvation, is due really to his own ingrained dualism, inherited from Ritschl, with regard to justification and ethical renewal. "It is Ritschl's merit," he says,[124] "to have shown that justification has no causal relation to the moral life, that, rather, its consequences are peace with God and firm hope of acceptance at the last judgment, confidence in prayer and trust in God's providence,"[125]—in other words religious, as distinguished from ethical. "The Christian, through justification, receives a right to all the benefits of the Messianic community, without any moral transformation being derived from it." Clearly this is a profoundly immoral doctrine to attribute to Paul, without anything so far as we have yet seen, to balance it. The Apostle, we have been told, preaches justification by faith alone, and promises to all who exercise this faith salvation in its completeness; and this is defined to include all the benefits of the Messianic community; and yet no moral transformation is included, although moral transformation is prominent among the Messianic promises. Fortunately, the Apostle is not in the least guilty of the immorality charged against him. He not only preaches morality as we have already seen with the utmost vigor, and threatens with the terrors of the judgment all doers of iniquity. He provides for the moral life of his converts as an essential part of his gospel, and that with such fulness that Wernle represents him as providing for their necessary and complete sinlessness.

It is of course the sixth chapter of Romans which comes

[124] P. 100.

[125] Ritschl, *Recht. und Versöhn.*, II. pp. 343-353.

most pointedly into consideration here; but equally of course not the sixth chapter of Romans alone, or even first. Wernle is himself compelled to admit that in Gal. v. 24 what is taught in Rom. vi is suggested, and that in 1 Cor. vi. 11 it is something more than suggested. The latter passage he represents as [126] the first in which Paul gives utterance to this line of thought. "He does not yet attempt," he adds, "to make clear to himself how the sinlessness of Christians follows from the experience of baptism; he has as yet no theory of regeneration. He is merely sure that, through God's grace in baptism, past and present stand in the sharpest contrast, and sin is already broken off." "The Corinthians are to take note that the Christian life is no life at once in sin and grace, that after the once for all and unrepeatable experience of sanctification and justification, sin has simply come to an end." We are astonished, says Wernle, to read such words addressed to the sinful Corinthians. The actual situation, however, could not affect Paul's conviction "of the total separation of the Christian life and the world, and the radical significance of conversion, as he had experienced it in himself." "There is already exhibited here that audacious but abstract idealism, which, in the framing of theories, looks on the contradiction of experience with indifference."

As the sixth chapter of Romans itself is approached we are warned to remember the enthusiastic background and to interpret therefore from the eschatological standpoint. And then we have this remarkable passage.[127] "From the other epistles we learned that the problem of the sin of Christians had no existence for Paul whatever because of the hoped-for nearness of the parousia. This result is not invalidated but sustained by Rom. vi. The problem does no doubt emerge, but only to be simply repelled: 'God forbid.' And the reason is the same as before; we are already living in 'the age to come,' are snatched away from

[126] Pp. 57f.
[127] P. 103.

the old world. We are just as certainly risen as Christ is risen; bodily death will surely pass us by. Sin is no longer anything to us, since in the next instant we receive the new sinless body. We can no longer sin, because we are men of the future." We have called this passage remarkable because it is a mass of open contradictions. The problem of sin among Christians is said to have no existence with Paul and to be raised here and argued. It is said that it is raised only to be repelled, and that it is argued to one solution out of a possible many. In point of fact, the passage is not concerned with our bodily death and resurrection and says nothing of the parousia, whether near or distant; it is "*as if* alive from the dead" that we are to walk (verse 13). So far from sin being no concern of Christians, the passage is written because it is very much their concern. So far from its being impossible for Christians to sin because they are men of the future, the Apostle earnestly exhorts them not to sin, proves that it is grossly inconsistent in them to sin, and in the end promises them freedom from sin as an attainment of the future. From the very first verse of the sixth chapter of Romans two things subversive of Wernle's whole point of view are perfectly plain. First, that Paul is speaking to a constituency among whom sinning has not automatically ceased on their believing. "Are we to *continue* in sin?" he asks of them; and that would not have been a serious question if it had been a matter of course that they had ceased from sinning and could no longer sin. Secondly, that the grace received by them at believing did not have exclusive reference to the sins that were past. Had that been the case it would have been meaningless to ask whether they were to continue in sin that this grace *might abound*. This question involves the understanding that sins committed in the Christian life share in the same grace by which the sins of the pre-Christian life have been cancelled. Paul is contemplating a situation in which not only is it conceived that sins may occur in the life of Christians, but it is understood that, occurring in it, they receive the same treat-

ment as the sins that are past—make drafts on the same grace, and thus "cause that grace to abound."

Wernle approaches the sixth chapter of Romans, then, with a bad case already in hand. We are afraid that we must say that he makes it worse by the way in which he deals with it. It is a typical and also a crucial instance of his mode of expounding Paul, and we shall therefore permit ourselves a considerable quotation from it.

"So far as this theory," says he,[128] speaking of the theory that the Christian on becoming a Christian becomes also automatically sinless, "is simply the expression of the personal enthusiasm of the apostle, it still has for us something inspiring. He had experienced the radical change; for him conversion was a new creation and ressurection. And the feeling of being wholly free from the past, and of looking solely to the future,—yes even of already living in the future as a new man,—was the living impetus of his great work. But the sixth chapter of Romans goes far beyond a mere confession-like expression of pure experience. It flatly asserts for every Christian what he, the Apostle, had himself experienced. After having had so many experiences of sin in the congregations, and in the midst of the very city in which the impossibility of a sin-free Christian life stared him daily in the face, he draws up, on the ground of a series of logical conclusions, the propositions which infer and maintain the sinlessness of Christians. After having as missionary steadily required nothing but faith, he here without more ado assumes that becoming a believer is also a break with sin, a moral renewal. What he had only suggested in Gal. v. 24,—that Christians have crucified their flesh with its passions and lusts—he expands here with manifold repetitions. He even dilates into the hyperbole, that the body of sin of baptized people is done away (VI. 6), that they are no longer in the flesh (VII. 5). No doubt he has not failed to accompany his descriptions of the Christian life always with requirements that Christians

[128] Pp. 103ff.

are to be what they have become. 'Reckon ye yourselves, therefore, to be dead to sin, but living for God in Christ Jesus. Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body. Present not your members as weapons of unrighteousness in the service of sin, but present yourselves to God' (VI. 11-13, 19). What was first an experience receives the significance of an eternal obligation. It comes in the end to this,—that the Christian *ought* not to give the dominion to sin, that he *ought* to refuse obedience to its lusts; but that is a subsequent supplement to the theory, which was required by observation of the congregations. The theory itself is framed like a law of nature, antecedently to all inquiry. Whether the Christian actually sins no longer—in Thessalonica, Corinth, Galatia, Rome—that gave Paul not a bit of concern. These conclusions which he draws are valid, because the presuppositions—the death of Christ, and so forth—are correct, not because experience is in their favour. As soon as this is overlooked, the whole passage loses its cogency. Paul raises the question whether the Christian still sins.[129] To say merely that it is his duty to serve God, that sin ought not to reign any longer in him, would be no answer at all. Everything here points to the impossibility of sinning; this is declared in the propositions in the indicative. The answer that the Christian is free from sin is *first* given. *Afterwards* his duty is laid on him in the premises. This may no doubt seem to us very salutary but certainly it ought not to be necessary—if what is maintained first is true.

"In point of fact, however, the sixth chapter of Romans yields us nothing but proof that all his experiences in his congregations taught the Apostle nothing when he had it in hand to repel an objection that suggested itself against his theory. Here is pure hard doctrinairism, quite intelligible

[129] It is doubtless unnecessary to point out that this is not the fact. The question Paul raised was not, whether the Christian still sins, but whether the Christian ought still to sin. What follows in Wernle's argument is therefore from the start without force.

from the Apostle's eschatological enthusiasm, but none the less doctrinairism. Paul does not wish to see the problem of sin in the life of Christians; therefore it has no existence. At bottom, despite this theory, he holds the ethical and the religious together only by an assertion. For that (moral) conversion always and everywhere coincides with becoming a believer, the Apostle has not shown and experience had already in his time refuted it. He could not do anything else, however, than tread this dangerous path of postulations, because he had left the proclamation of judgment out of his theory. If mere faith saves and all believers are exempt from the judgment, then the moral character of religion can be preserved only through the postulate that justification and regeneration coincide. It remains a postulate which experience seldom verifies; but the moral earnestness of faith is saved by it. Only by this theory could Paul meet effectively the valid objections against his gospel. If the believer is at the same time the regenerated, then all reproach of moral laxity falls away. Paul is not to blame for the difficulties and ambiguities which have thus been imposed on Christian dogmatics. For it was his fixed belief that the new world would come quickly and these questions be altogether abrogated. And this would also be the sole decisive reply to the objection of VI. 1—the destruction of the world.

"The doctrine of the sin-free life of the Christian is the most striking difference of the Pauline theology from that of the Reformation. The Reformers derived from Rom. VI the obligation to strive after sanctification, the explanation of the perpetual *mortificatio carnis* and *resurrectio spiritus*. But the possibility that the Christian can attain to moral perfection in this life, they denied outright; it has since been characteristic of sects of fanatics. There lay in this simply a historical necessity. It was out of fanaticism, that is to say, out of fixed belief in the nearness of the parousia, that this doctrine was generated in Paul's case too: apart from this it cannot maintain itself. The break

with this postulate of sinlessness was an act of veracity. Since, however, the Reformers retained the Pauline formulas, they increased the confusion and called into existence that, in spite of all idealism, false theory of regeneration in which the question dare not be asked who is regenerate or when and where the regeneration has taken place. And since, following in the track of Paul, they have even more completely set aside the proclamation of the judgment, without having, in conversion, such a counterweight as Paul had, they have crippled the moral power of the gospel and robbed themselves of the simplest of the practical motives. Thus they have at one and the same time advanced beyond Paul to the gospel of Jesus, and yet remained behind him. It is not to the sixth chapter of Romans alone that this applies, but it is very clearly in evidence there."

It is after this absurd fashion that Wernle establishes his central contention—that Paul teaches that Christians as such are sinless, and thus stands at the opposite pole from the Reformation doctrine that Christians "sin much every day." It is very clear from Wernle's own presentation that Paul does not teach anything of the kind. To attribute it to him is to bring him into open conflict, not only, as Wernle allows, with all the facts of his observation—facts, be it noted, known to us only from his letters—but with all the facts of his letters as well. The Christians of Paul's letters are not sinless but "sin much every day." The individual instances of sins actually committed brought before us here and there in the letters, although a significant fact, do not constitute the main fact. The main fact is the pervasive concernment of the letters with the moral correction and advancement of Christians. The letters are compact of imperatives. We have had occasion to observe how Wernle attempts to meet the challenge of these imperatives in the sixth chapter of Romans. It is scarcely worth while, however, to endeavor to explain away one here and there. They crowd every epistle; and this general fact cannot be met by declaring[130] that Paul

[130] Pp.59f.

did not know the difference between *Sein* and *Sollen,* so that to this man who understood how to use the imperative better than anybody else who ever lived, "the difference between the natural and the ethical, what we are and what we ought to be, was hidden." After all is said, it remains true that exhortations like these imply imperfection, effort, growth; and these things accordingly appear as the characteristic of the Christian life as it is brought before us in Paul's epistles. F. Winkler observes quite to the point:[131] "We have no New Testament letter to which there are not adjoined ethical exhortations, which set santification before us in its progressive nature with the fundamental tendency of 'Not that I have already attained or am already made perfect, but I press on after it' (Phil. III. 12ff)." It is meaningless to attempt to explain away Phil. III. 12. The whole New Testament is an extended Phil III. 12, and is based fundamentally on the presupposition that a holy life is an achievement and is attained by continuous effort, the goal of which lies ever in the future. Wernle is compelled by his thesis to contend that nevertheless Paul does not contemplate any growth in the Christian life. The parousia was immediately impending, says he: there was no time for growth. The Christian must at all times be already grown, or the parousia would catch him unready.

The parousia thus appears as "in the higher sense the regulator of the Christian life." "It is clear from this," Wernle explains, "how wholly perverse it is to talk of a *process,* or a *development,* of the Christian life with Paul. He prescribes an incessant separation from the world, and renewal of the mind; he does not rest satisfied with conversion; nevertheless the conception of development can only by a misunderstanding be introduced into the Pauline ethics. The nearness of the parousia leaves no place for it whatever; what it demands is precisely that we be ready when the Lord comes; it makes it difficult so much as to set before ourselves a high goal in the distance. Therefore the

[131] *Robert Pearsall Smith und der Perfectionismus,* 2, 1915, p. 12.

ethics of Rom. XII-XIII passes no other judgment on sin than the rest of the letter. Because the idea of development is wholly absent, there is no place for it here; there is nothing here but the either—or. He who does evil incurs the wrath of God, and of His agent the earthly magistracy. The Christian who does evil has nothing else to expect than the heathen; there is no forgiveness which makes his position more endurable. The conclusion of chapter XIII falls in with this. He who still walks in darkness must perish when the 'day' appears. The Christian life is a life in the clear light of the coming day; it has nothing to hide, it needs no twilight. It is absolutely impossible to have part in Christ and still to do the pleasure of the flesh; that is, the Christian in sin has secured no place whatever in the Pauline ethics. By such a notion it would have lost its very core." No sooner, however, has Wernle made this strong assertion that the Christian according to Paul is always "finished," always all that he is to be, so that he may be ready for the parousia, than he is compelled by passages like Col. II. 3f. Phil. III. 20, Rom. VIII. 11ff to allow that the parousia does not find him finished, but contributes something to his "glory." So long as he lives here below he has "to contend with the remains of the old world in his body."[133] This seems to him to be in contradiction with Paul's general teaching, and he takes refuge as always in the manifest inconsistency between Paul's teaching as he expounds it and the matter of fact which is always seeking recognition at his hands: "it remains always a mere assertion that the Christian has broken once for all with sin; experience is always compelling corrections, exhortations and threats."

It is not however merely by exhortations and threats that Paul deals with the sinning Christians into contact with whom his experience brought him. He tells us of individual cases of sinning Christians with whom he dealt by discipline. They occur from the earliest epistles (2 Thess. III.

[132] P. 114.
[133] P. 117.

12ff) on, and in no case is the sin dealt with, even when of the grossest nature, (1 Cor. v. 5), treated, as Wernle would have us believe Paul must needs look upon it even at its lightest, as destroying the Christian character. In Gal. vi. 1ff this practice of discipline is generalized and made a standing Christian duty toward erring brethren, a manifest proof that it was supposed that Christian brethren might err and need to be corrected, as indeed is directly asserted. Wernle's dealing with this passage is very instructive.[134] He begins by declaring that only the lighter sins are contemplated here: an assertion borne out neither by the term employed, nor by the context: surely the nature of the faults intended is intimated in v. 19ff. He then goes on to say that it is presupposed that at the moment of sinning, even in the case of light faults, the Christian loses the Spirit—an assertion again wholly without warrant from either the text or the context, or rather in complete disaccord with both. The term rendered "restore him" in our English version means just "correct him," "set him right." And the presupposition of the context is that, in the perpetual conflict between the flesh and the Spirit (v. 17), any Christian may, at any time, be overtaken by a fault. Wernle is merely, in the interests of his theory that a Christian cannot sin, representing every Christian that sins as no longer a Christian; and that involves, of course, a repeated passage back and forth from Christianity to the world and back again to Christianity, in the case of one who sins from time to time and is "corrected." Accordingly Wernle writes: "Thus the Christian life falls into a perpetual uncertainty, an eternal falling and rising again; it falls apart into separate pieces which are divided by periods of sin. And this cannot possibly be otherwise in an ethical theory based on the Spirit. This sharp division between sinner and pneumatic draws constantly after it a pulverization of the conception of life, and leaves it dependent on each moment whether the Christion is a sinner or a pneumatic." The bald assumption which

[134] P. 75.

lies at the bottom of such a deliverance—responsible for much of Wernle's false construction of Paul's teaching—is that queer doctrine argued by Karl, merely assumed by Wernle, that one must be all a sinner or else all a pneumatic; that there can be no intermediation between them: in other words that the Spirit works His effects always instantaneously complete and never through progressive stages. There is not only no warrant for this, but it is contradicted on every page of Paul's letters. Then Wernle remarks that Paul speaks in this passage no single word of "grace," or "forgiveness"—any more than in the letters to the Corinthians: "setting right"—that is what is suitable for the sinner. The remark is true enough. The sinning Christian needs only to be set right—because the forgiveness is presupposed; the Christian is living under a dispensation of forgiveness.

That Paul teaches that Christians are living under a dispensation of forgiveness is, to be sure, precisely what Wernle is most strenuously denying. Justification, according to his most insistent contention, has to do in Paul only with past sins, not future ones; there are no "future sins" —for Christians do not, cannot sin. What Paul says, however, is quite unamenable to such an interpretation. He does not say, "There is therefore now no sinning for those in Christ Jesus." He says, "There is therefore no condemnation to those in Christ Jesus"; and on the face of it this means not that those in Christ Jesus have received forgiveness for their past sins and must look out for themselves hereafter; but that those in Christ Jesus live in an atmosphere of perpetual forgiveness. Wernle of course, cannot allow that. "The Reformers repeated this sentence often," says he:[135] "but always understood it wrongly. They interpreted it as teaching that the Christian is freed from the condemnation of the law even though he should sin, because forgiveness becomes his daily portion through his faith in the vicarious suffering of Christ: in all their sorrow for sin this

[135] P. 109.

clause gave them their surest consolation. Paul however grounds freedom from condemnation on this—that the Christian is freed from the law of sin and death by the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus; that therefore the demand of the law is fulfilled in the pneumatic man. The Christian is no longer condemned because he no longer sins up to the parousia, because he is a pneumatic man. Nowhere perhaps does the difference between the two theories come so clearly to expression as in this verse. For the Reformers, everything turns on this—that the Christian in spite of his sin, can be a joyful child of God; for Paul, that he is delivered from his sin and makes his entrance into his future life. It is always the intensified eschatological expectation which separates Paul from the Reformers." It ought to be enough to point out that there is no apparent eschatological reference in Rom. VIII. 1, beyond that which is involved in the very notion of salvation. And it certainly ought to be enough to point out that in this passage least of all can Paul be supposed to be teaching the perfection of Christians. What, at bottom, Wernle makes Paul do here is to suspend the salvation of Christians on themselves—there is to be no condemnation only if they cease from sinning and maintain their sinlessnes up to the parousia. And certainly it is a desperate expedient to make Paul a patron of a work-salvation, whether apart from or in conjunction with faith.

As the passage is treated by Wernle, however, as a kind of crucial one, it may not be amiss to scrutinize its language a little more closely. Paul says, "There is *therefore* now no condemnation to those in Christ Jesus," and is therefore drawing an inference from the immediately preceding statement. That preceding statement is, "Accordingly then the same I with the mind serve the law of God, with the flesh, however, the law of sin." That is to say, when Paul says, "There is therefore now no condemnation," he is inferring that there is no condemnation from his divided mind, —not from his wholly sinless state. This clause, also, however, opens with an illative particle, which carries us back

to the "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? Thanks be to God, (it is) through Jesus Christ our Lord." And that is the cry wrung from Paul by his analysis of his divided mind. Paul then certainly means to represent the "no condemnation" as his in spite of remaining sin and sinning. When now in the second verse of the eighth chapter he supports his assertion that there is no condemnation to those in Christ Jesus by declaring that "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has freed us from the law of sin and death," he is repeating in substance what he had said in the last clause of VII. 25, with a clearer indication of the reason of the effect produced. The reason why his divided mind results in an assurance that there is no condemnation is that its division is not between equal claimants, but one is wholly preponderant—and the preponderant one is "the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus." His mind is divided only because the Spirit of Christ Jesus has invaded it, and by invading it has freed it from the control of sin. The term employed for "freed" is not the term for "cleansed," but the term for "emancipated": it has slavery, not impurity for its background. It is bondage to sin which is affirmed to be broken; not cleansing from sin which is affirmed to be effected. This Spirit of Christ, breaking our bondage to sin, we are told, has come to us as the result of a substitutive atonement wrought by Christ in our behalf (VIII. 3); and it is explicitly declared that this atonement, condemning sin in the flesh, was "in order to the fulfilling in us of the righteousness of the law"—of "what the law laid down as its rightful demand: the singular comprehending the collective (moral) claims of right as a unity"—as H. A. W. Meyer puts it. Thus Paul teaches that our "no condemnation" in spite of our continuing sins is no ministering to evil, but has our fulfillment of the law as its necessary sequence: in other words that our justification not only covers our future as well as our past sins, but has a causal relation to our sanctification. Clearly it is the Reformers, not Wernle who have understood Paul.

The publication of Wernle's book made something like a sensation. The subject of "the sins of Christians" was brought by it, as Hans Windisch puts it,[136] into "the foreground of theological discussion." The opinions expressed upon the subject were very varied. Many of the same general way of thinking,—adherents, as Windisch would put it, of "the critical-scientific theology," or, as Fr. Winkler more distinguishingly decribes them,[137] of the "history of religion wing of the modern theology,"—rallied to Wernle and indeed formed a party among whom it rapidly became something like a tradition that Paul teaches in one way or another the sinlessness of Christians. Naturally, however, adverse critics were much the more numerous. Paul Feine puts it strongly when he says:[138] "This hypothesis called out almost universal contradiction, which did not remain without influence upon Wernle himself." Whether under the influence of this adverse criticism or not, Wernle did find himself ultimately unable to maintain the positions he had so violently asserted.

Already on the appearance of his *Beginnings of our Religion,*[139] the old contentions by which he had startled the world had dropped out of sight. He has a chapter here on "the piety of the community and the piety of Paul himself"; and while the general portrait of Paul which he draws in it is not wholly dissimilar to his former mode of conceiving him, yet there is no repetition of the earlier book's fanatastic description of him as a man sinless in his own eyes and attributing a like sinlessness to his converts —asserting it of them, rather, with the fanaticism of a doctrinaire theorist although the actual facts staring him in the face shrieked against his creed. Perhaps the nearest that he comes here to repeating those old assertions is when, in discussing the contrast between sin and grace (on which he

[136] *Taufe und Sünde im ältesten Christentum bis auf Origines,* 1908, p. 2.

[137] *Robert Pearsall Smith und der Perfectionismus,* 2, 1915, p. 2.

[138] *Theologie des neuen Testaments,* 1910, p. 420 note.

[139] *Die Anfänge unserer Religion,* 1901; ed. 2, 1903, pp. 250, 252f.

says Paul was the first to ground piety), he declares that with Paul "sin and grace" were thought of as successive, not contemporaneous. That is one of his old contentions and may be intended here in the old meaning; but it is not developed here. Elsewhere he tells us in the old spirit, that, Paul throwing the emphasis on grace and being fundamentally a man of feeling, the danger of his point of view was ethical sloth. This, however, says Wernle now, the Apostle struggled against with all his might, and then instances the sixth chapter of Romans in proof. The sixth chapter of Romans appears here, then, as an effort on Paul's part to ethicize his congregation, and not, as in the former book, primarily as evidence that, being in his view by necessity of their new birth holy, they needed no ethicizing. In other words, the imperative reading of this chapter has taken the place of the indicative reading of it insisted on in the former book.

The changes thus indicated are not small, and they were to go further. In a few years it came about that Hans Windisch[140] did for Wernle what Wernle had done for Ritschl—took his rapid sketch, and extended, elaborated, deepened it. If Wernle's book is to Ritschl's paragraph or two, what, say, our good right arm is to our little finger, Windisch's treatise is to Wernle's book what the whole body is to the arm. Wernle undertook to show that to Paul (the Paul of his special selection of Epistles), the Christian is a sin-free man, and he paints his Paul with a very broad brush. Windisch undertakes to demonstrate the same proposition for the whole New Testament, and not content with the New Testament pushes his inquiry back to Ezekiel and forward to Origen, and examines the whole ground through a microscope. Wernle, looking apparently on Windisch's at once brilliant and labored treatise, not as the triumphant demonstration but as the *reductio ad absurdum* of his own thesis, out of which it grew, took occasion from its publication to sing his *mea culpa*. Paul to him is still fundamen-

[140] As cited.

tally the missionary, but he is no longer supposed to have thought Christians sinless. "Missionaries who imagine that Christians no longer sin, are sinless men in their actual nature," he now writes,[141] "are not known to history, have never been known to history. Accordingly, the apparently contradictory theory must be corrected by the practice out of which it came, and from which it is framed. A purer man of practice than Paul, there never was; everything with him is an 'ought' and finds its place under a life-purpose. And thus the whole theory of sinlessness so far as it is found in him expresses nothing more than the energy of his requirements, and the radicalness of his faith that his God will fashion something stable out of the weak, wavering, sinking, hundred-times falling Christians. There is optimism here, of course, not only an optimism of the backward, but of the forward view, not isolated from experience, but deeply apprehending the sad experience and pushing forward to the goal." He still thinks that Paul believes it *possible* for Christians to become sinless, because he took such expressions as "new creature," "newborn children," "second birth," seriously. Possible, but by no manner of means necessary; all of Paul's apparent indicatives are nothing at bottom but strengthened imperatives; when he speaks in the sixth of Romans of an inability to sin—that is but the strongest possible way of saying that it is very improper to sin. He still thinks Paul was no teacher of "miserable-sinner Christianity"; his object was not to comfort men in their sins but to deliver them from them, and "he believed in the final purification of his communities for the day of judgment and in the salvation of all who had been called and elected even though many would need to pass through hard judgments." Paul's belief in election, he says, had its roots in his radical experience of God and possession of God, which allowed no place for a God who does His work only half way. Lapses into sin, light or serious, are not excluded by this mighty

[141] *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1909, 21, col. 569.

faith in election and grace; but grace abounds above sin and will ultimately have its way. Those that sin Paul does not comfort by pointing them to grace; that was forbidden by his whole tendency as a missionary. He warns them of the divine judgment and calls them to repentance. They will be punished according to their sins and saved as by fire.

As we read this retractation we are almost tempted to think that Wernle has joined the company of the prophets. The ball which he had set to rolling had to roll very far however before it came to rest at this point.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

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THOMAS GUTHRIE

Wandering one day down Princes Street in Edinburgh, somewhere between the Scott monument and the National Gallery, and not far from the memorial to Scottish soldiers who fell in the Boer War, I came upon a bronze group of three figures. In the center stood a tall man, massive head and benign countenance. On either side of him, as if taking refuge from a pursuer who would do them harm, crouches a ragged street urchin. In striking contrast with the many memorials on that famous street to Scotland's heroes on the crimson field of war, her philosophers, scientists and poets, this fine statue commemorates the life and ministry of a preacher of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, Thomas Guthrie. In the burying ground at the other end of the street there is a statue of Abraham Lincoln erected by Scottish Americans who fought in the Civil War. At the feet of Lincoln cowers a slave; but his fetters have been struck from him, and Lincoln reaches down his great hand to lift the negro to his feet. Both monuments, that to Thomas Guthrie, with the ragged boys about him, and that to Lincoln with the negro at his feet, suggest the greatness that is also goodness. Perhaps the monument to Guthrie makes the deeper appeal; there is less of the formal and grandiose in art about it, and, although it does not always use him well, all the world loves a boy. A fitting memorial, one would say—and not far from the model of the Gospels, where we see little children gathered about the feet of Jesus—for this minister of Christ to have the street Arabs associated with him in the sculptor's creation.

I commence with this account of the Princes Street memorial to Guthrie for the reason that that monument to

"MISERABLE-SINNER CHRISTIANITY" IN THE HANDS OF THE RATIONALISTS

II. From Clemen to Pfleiderer

Twelve years intervened between Wernle's assault on "Miserable-Sinner Christianity" and his retractation, and it is necessary to give some account of the course of the debate through these years. We have already intimated that one of the effects of the publication of Wernle's book was to uncover a tendency and to create a party. A tendency was uncovered among adherents of the history-of-religion school to represent Paul as claiming for himself or asserting of all Christians either express sinlessness or something very like it, and this tendency rapidly hardened into a party-contention. Men like E. Grafe, H. J. Holtzmann, Paul Schmiedel, E. Teichmann, A. Jülicher, in reviewing Wernle's book, were quick to express complete or partial agreement with its general position.[1] Carl Clemen was perhaps the first, however, to associate himself with it in an independent discussion.

Before the end of the year Clemen had published the Biblical part of his *Christian Doctrine of Sin*—the only part ever published,—and he naturally included in it a section on "the dissemination of sin."[2] It had been the Biblical doctrine from the prophets down, he says, that sin is universal among men. But the possibility of overcoming it was always recognized for the future, and indeed was assumed for the past by the Priest Code and the Chronicler, and asserted for the present by Paul—and he might have added also by the other writers of the New Testament since he interprets most

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[1] H. J. Holtzmann, in the *Theologischer Jahresbericht* XVII, 1898, p. 170 and XVIII, 1899, p. 187, gives references to the several reviews mentioned.

[2] *Die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde* I: *Die biblische Lehre*, 1897, pp. 100-122.

of the post-Pauline writers in this sense (Eph. i. 4; iv. 24, v. 1; I Pet. i. 15; Jas. i. 4; I John iii. 6, 9).[3] Paul, he asserts,[4] not only sets himself up as a model and boasts of his work, but "expressly ascribes perfection to himself"—for which assertion Clemen has, however, no better proof than is afforded by the merely general, and perfectly natural, assertions of I Thess. ii. 10; I Cor iv. 3f; II Cor vi. 3f. Paul, morever, "nowhere speaks of sins committed by him after his conversion, and nowhere refers to them the sufferings which he so often recalls, as he must have done on his presuppositions, had he been conscious of any guilt whatever." Apparent confessions of imperfections are only apparent—I Cor. xv. 9, II Cor. v. 2, Rom. viii. 22f, Gal. ii. 20.

As for Rom. vii.—of course the presents are presents; we must not make the Apostle a comedian dramatizing a distant past: but it was written in a bad hour, when the Apostle was in a gloomy mood,—and therefore when he came to write the eighth chapter afterwards, he wrote in on the margin, "Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord," words which have crept since into the text. "Looked at as a whole," therefore, Rom vii. means—what the moderns make it mean; and "in any case it has nothing to say against the freedom of Paul as a Christian in general from any consciousness of sin."[6] As to Phil. iii. 12ff it is not to be denied that the efforts to empty it of its confession of imperfection have been imperfectly successful, but "neither is it to be forgotten that we have to do here precisely with the last of Paul's letters to congregations, and that we find in it elsewhere also a different estimate of the Christian life from Paul's earlier one; from it therefore we can draw no conclusions for the earlier period."[7] This comment seems to convey an admission that Paul does not always teach his

[3] P. 122.
[4] P. 110.
[5] P. 111.
[6] P. 112.
[7] P. 113.

own sinlessness or that of his converts. In his later epistles, at any rate, he has lost the assurance which is attributed to him on the basis of his earlier ones.[8]

With reference to his converts, it is argued that in presenting himself—and indeed Christ—as their model, Paul recognizes their ability to become like him—and Christ. There are passages, also, it is asserted, in which it is "expressly declared that the Christian no longer sins."[9] Here the stress is laid on I Cor. vi. 11, Rom. v. 6, 8, and especially of course, on Rom. vi. 1ff, but also on Gal. iii. 2, v. 24, and finally Col. ii. 11. "In any case," the conclusion runs,[10] "the transformation which has taken place in Christians through baptism is designated here again by so strong an expression, that it appears impossible to reduce it to a reversal merely of the relative strength of good and evil, to a removal of sin from the center to the periphery, to a certain inner separation from sin,—as Lütgert[11] has again of late sought to do." "I admit," Clemen adds, "that this explanation" —that is, Lütgert's—" is valid in the case of some passages; in the most of them, however, Paul speaks so clearly of the overcoming of sin through conversion, that all limitation appears to be excluded." Of course he should have added, "except the limitation of time"—but it is characteristic of this whole school of writers simply to assume that what is done in the matter of cleansing of Christians is done without any expenditure of time whatever, all at once, completely.

Clemen then does not press Paul's doctrine of the sinlessness of Christians quite to such extremities as Wernle, and he draws back altogether when it comes to Wernle's estimate of the Apostle himself. So far from an "abstract idealist," "doctrinaire fanatic," who flagrantly contradicts in his teaching both the facts and himself, Paul was, says

[8] P. 119.

[9] P. 114.

[10] P. 116-117.

[11] The reference is to Lütgert, *Sündlosigkeit und Volkommenheit*, 1897, pp. 38ff.

Clemen, a "sober realist," who kept his eye and hand precisely on the facts.[12] There is one thing, however, he says, which Wernle has missed in estimating Paul's dealing with sin in the churches: when Paul charges his converts with sinning, it was only certain special sins which he ascribes to them, and otherwise he praises them (I Thess. iv. 9f; I Cor. xi. 2, 17). There is no explanation of this, says Clemen,[13] except that they had really conquered sin in general, but had not yet learned to look upon certain particular vices as sins. And here he draws an arrow from Scholz's quiver. Scholz very strikingly pictures the difficulties which the newly converted heathen must have had in comprehending the Christian standard of morality. "When we wonder at the open transgressions of the ten commandments of which we hear so often in the Pauline epistles," he says, "it should not be forgotten how new and unaccustomed many of the ethical requirements were for Christians of heathen origin; how many hindrances to the purer moral understanding must have arisen out of the instincts of the past. A just critic should allow that from such a start a good advance could be recognized in spite of all wavering, falling, holding back. This is precisely what Paul did." Certainly nothing truer could be said. But to say this, as Clemen does through Scholz's lips, is certainly not to say that Paul looked upon his converts as having already attained the goal. And Clemen himself has to admit[14] that in his later epistles at least Paul—perhaps disheartened by the delay of the parousia—thought of his converts as only beginners. Their new moral life was not yet manifest, but still "hidden" with Christ in God (Col. ii. 3); the good work was only begun in them (Phil. i. 6); Paul himself was only beginning to know the power—it was a moral power—of Christ's resurrection (Phil. iii. 10). The goal of blamelessness still stood before them.

What Clemen teaches here, he repeats in the main in his

[12] P. 117.
[13] P. 118.
[14] P. 119.

Paul, His Life and Works,[15] though not without modifications, the most notable of which is the apparent abandonment of the distinction between Paul's earlier and later teaching. Justification, he teaches here, has reference it is true only to *past* sins, but does not on that account fail of some effect upon the future. Sins committed after we believe, we must ourselves bear the punishment of: therefore believers are sick and die—sometimes suddenly and untimely. But since they are justified, they need not commit these sins; justification brings with it the *possibility* of sanctification. Now, being justified, we can satisfy the claims of God on us, however high they may be "We can walk in a high, holy life, because we know that our old man is crucified, therefore has paid its penalty; we can fulfil the law, after sin has been judged in the flesh."[16] The consciousness of this was very strong in Paul and he expected it to be present in others in the measure in which "he saw in the Christian in principle the new man, who actually did not sin any more at all.[17] "There was a time when we were weak and sinful, but now we are washed and sanctified, or figuratively expressed, are unleavened, so that there is no longer anything condemnable in us." This is the reason why Paul could speak of the forgiveness of sins as something past; believers have no present sins to be forgiven. Christ's intercession, however, no doubt remains, and will according to Paul's expectation be operative at the last judgment.

There is another side of the matter, however, which must not be overlooked. Although we have become new creatures in Christ, yet this life is still hidden in God. Paul considered himself not yet perfect, and did not need to be taught by experience that others were even less so. We cannot even pray as we ought and need the grace of God always. If in spite of this Paul still looked upon himself and others as without sin, the explanation is doubtless to

[15] *Paulus, sein Leben und Wirken,* 1904, Vol. II, pp. 98ff.

[16] P. 100.

[17] P. 101.

be found in part in this—"that he did not consider every departure from the highest ideal as sin."[18] It is found further in his expectation of an early end for all things. But what chiefly comes into consideration is that "Paul and the others had with their conversion really broken with sin, so that they feel now bound to the service of righteousness rather than of sin." If they were overtaken by a fault there was the hope that they would be recovered from it, and therefore could still stand unblamable at the parousia and receive God's praise.

All this is once more said over again with the added clearness suitable to its more popular destination, in Clemen's little handbook which he calls *The Development of the Christian Religion within the New Testament,* published in 1908.[19] Here too he begins by pointing out that, according to Paul, "the death of Christ blots out only our *former* sins (Rom. iii. 25), and the judgment at the end of the day proceeds on the ground of *works.*" No doubt even then grace will rule, but consider II Cor. v. 10. When Paul says in Rom. viii. 3 that God has judged sin in the flesh *in order that* the righteousness demanded by the law may be fulfilled in us, that proves that reconciliation so little supplants sanctification that it for the first time renders it *possible.* What it meant in Rom. vi. 7 is primarily that each one's own death has an expiatory value; as it is spoken, however, of us who have not died, it means that we are absolved from sin by the death of Jesus and that carries with it the further idea that we are no longer to serve sin—provided that we carry with us the mediating thought, that we are brought by the forgiveness of sins into a condition in which we need not serve sin. "So long as we still had to bear our guilt, we had always to say in our battle against sin that it was of no avail how much we attained, since the old guilt always remained; now that it is done away,

[18] P. 102. He supports himself in this on Gottschick, Jacoby and Titius, as cited elsewhere, and repels Max Meyer's criticism.

[19] *Die Entwickelung der christlichen Religion innerhalb des Neuen Testaments* 1908, pp. 88ff.

however, now that we have been assured of the grace and love of God, we can for the first time take up the battle against sin, and actually begin a new life."[20]

It is important to pause here to note that the only effect of forgiveness looking to sanctification which Clemen here supposes Paul to intimate, is our enheartening for the conflict with sin. There is nothing intimated as to any interior effect of the death of Christ in the way of purifying our hearts. We are to sanctify ourselves under the inspiration of our liberation from guilt. The importance of making this clear arises from its connection with what immediately succeeds. For Clemen proceeds at once thus: "Yes, Paul assumes of his congregations that this has already happened with them, that they *have* died to sin (verse 2). Christ died for us, he says (Rom. v. 6), when we *were* still weak or sinners—now therefore we are no longer that: ye *were* slaves of sin, now however we have become obedient from the heart to the form of teaching which ye received (vi. 17); ye have washed and sanctified yourselves (I Cor. vi. 11) or, figuratively expressed, ye are unleavened (I Cor. v. 7). And now we understand why Paul, as already said, always relates reconciliation to the past sins, and speaks of forgiveness as something past (Col. iii. 13); the Christian ought actually not to sin any more at all." In this connection the deliverance from sin spoken of in this passage as already received by Christians can scarcely refer to anything more than deliverance from the guilt of sin. Their deliverance from sinning remains their own affair, wrought by their own efforts as a matter of duty under the inspiration of their forgiveness.

The sinlessness of Christians as such has become then only their duty to be sinless. And yet, just after thus explaining that all of a Christian's freedom from sin is the result of a battle against it, in obedience to the exhortations of the gospel, Clemen proceeds, just as if it was otherwise, to ask: But did not Paul have to fight against sin? Is

[20] P. 89.

not I Cor. ix. 27 there? And Rom. vii.? Or if Rom. vii. was written in a gloomy hour, is not Phil. iii. 12 there? And is not Paul always exhorting his readers to lay aside their sin? One thing is notable, he says: Paul has nowhere brought the death of Jesus into connection with their later sins, although he does speak once (Rom. viii. 34) of Jesus appearing before God for us. Which merely reminds us again that a Christian, having once been relieved of the burden of his guilt, is then left to take care of his own subsequent sins for himself. Then Clemen closes the discussion by telling us that we must observe three things, if we would understand Paul's position. The first of them is that "conversion was at that time actually the beginning of a new life; he who attached himself to the Christian community had actually (at least in principle) broken with his past." The second of them is that under the influence of his vivid expectation of the rapidly approaching end, "Paul could think that the change which had taken place in these newly converted men would protect them altogether from new sins." And the third of them, which he says is the main one, is that Paul was filled with "youthful faith in the divine power of the gospel, and knew nothing of the senile conception of Christianity as 'comforted sorrow for sin' (*getröster Sündenelend*)." He hoped that his congregations would stand unblamable at the coming of Christ. That is to say, Paul in his youthful fervor of faith was optimistic.

It seems apparent that in the ten years of his development covered by these three books, the doctrine of the sinless Christian lost its point in Clemen's thinking. He has abated nothing, however, of his hatred of "miserable-sinner Christianity." "The senile conception of Christianity, as 'comforted sorrow for sin,'" is a tolerably biting characterization to make of the type of Christianity which presumably he identified with the doctrine of the Reformers. The excuse may justly be offered, no doubt, that if he does identify a Christianity which could be so described with the doctrine of the Reformers he has fallen into a mistake very

prevalent in the circles in which he moved. And it is to be remembered in his favor that the intemperance of his language is apparently the result of a zeal which reflects a robust sense of the duty of moral effort. If "miserable-sinner Christianity" represents a tendency to acquiesce in sin and to substitute constantly repeated forgiveness of sins passively accepted as inevitable, for a manly battle against all sin and a steady advance upward toward conquest,—why, then, it fairly deserves Clemen's characterization. Clemen has, however, tripped here over that facile "either—or" which catches the feet of so many of his fellows. We do not have to choose between the alternatives of a Christianity of mere ethical effort and a Christianity of passive submission to unopposed sinning. There is something much better than either, between.

The defence of the Reformers against Wernle's strictures was undertaken by a fellow Ritschlian, Johannes Gottschick in an effective article printed in one of the later numbers of the *Journal for Theology and Church* for 1897.[21] The thesis of the article is that the difference, amounting to contrariety, which Wernle has attempted to establish between the Reformers and Paul, in their attitudes to the Christian life, is purely imaginary; the Reformers must be recognized as the continuators of Paulinism. The main contention of Wernle, says Gottschick, is to the effect that "by maintaining the continuation of sinning in Christians, the Reformation has obliterated Paul's sharp separation between the state of sin and the state of grace, and—a thing of which Paul knew nothing—has led the Christian who has to judge himself to be a sinner to maintain his confidence in God by means of reflection on forgiveness in Christ; and thus justification becomes to it no longer a single but an ever-repeated act."[22] Behind this representa-

[21] *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1897, Vol. VII. pp. 398-460, article on "Paulinismus und Reformation." Compare with it another article by Gottschick in the immediately preceding number of the same magazine (pp. 352-384) entitled "Propter Christum. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der Versöhnungslehre Luthers."

[22] P. 403.

tion, however, lie two questions of fact with reference to Paul's teaching, simple enough to make it easy to obtain answers to them: (1) Does the sinner remain a sinner after justification? (2) Is the Christian's confidence in God based on his assurance of the forgiveness of his sins in Christ?

To the first of these questions Gottschick's aswer is given in the following passage:[23] "The question is how far the change which is given for Paul with faith and the reception of the Spirit reaches. According to Wernle, it produces complete freedom from sin, and this is to the Apostle characteristic for the nature of the Christian; Paul, it is said, knows no process, no development of the Christian life, but assumes that the ideal, that which Christians ought to be, they already are, and that the Spirit and the Christian state are lost with every sin, even the lighter ones. The assertion that Paul takes the ideal for the real and knows no development of the Christian life is, however, the manifest reverse of the actual state of the case. In all his letters the advancement, the growth, the strengthening of the Christian life is an object of the Apostle's exhortation and prayers." Citing then I Thess. iii. 12, iv. 10, Phil. i. 11, I Cor. xv. 58, I Thess. iii. 13, II Thess. ii. 17, iii. 3, I Cor. iv. 16, I Thess. i. 10, II Thess. i. 3, II Cor. x. 10, Col. i. 10, 11, I Cor xv. 58, Gottschick adds: "These passages already show that for Paul, the Christian life is more than the actualization or even merely authentication of a condition; it is advance and development in both the extensive and intensive reference." Wernle, then, he continues, "has not shown that the Christian is a *sinless* pneumatic. He admits himself that the apostle, in his practice, expects the recurrence of sin in the Christian life; but he contends that in theory he ignores or even denies it. For this he appeals to I Cor. iii. 4 and Gal. vi. 1, passages which are to prove that to the Apostle the Christian loses the Spirit with every sin. But I Cor. iii. 1-4 does not say that the

[23] Pp. 414ff.

Corinthians have *lost* what they *possessed* or have *ceased* to be what they *were;* but that they have *not yet* attained that stage in life in Christ, in which they should long have stood. Although, according to iii. 16, the Temple of the Spirit, they are nevertheless not yet 'pneumatics.' To say that Paul at iii. 16 has already 'forgotten' what he said in iii. 4 is nothing but a bad evasion. In Gal. vi. 1, too, the pneumatics who are to restore those that stumble—who are regarded as Christian brothers, just as the dissembling Peter and Barnabas are in iii. 12ff.,—can be only a particular class of Christians, and in that case were perhaps distinguished by charismata and on that account called to such service. The Christian life *cannot* be any longer a life of bold service of sin, and *need not* be any longer a life of weak slavery to sin of a will wishing the good. The possibility of individual transgressions lies nevertheless according to Gal. vi. 1 near to everyone. What has changed is the *habitus,* the total disposition (*Gesamtcharacter*)." "And now the denial of sin in the Christian life in Rom. vi. 1ff.! As if what is discussed there were whether in the course of the Christian life, which for Paul is self-evidently directed to a moral end, sin can *occur,*—and not rather whether faith in grace and emancipation from the law are a *license* or even an *incitement* to sin. And what Paul deduces here is not the impossibility of individual sins, but impulse and power for a life for God and righteousess in contrast with a former service of sin." On Wernle's representation that Paul's passage from the indicative to the imperative in dealing with the relations of Christians to sin—leaping, without any mediation and without noticing it, from the ethics of miracle to the ethics of will,—Gottschick remarks:[24] "What appears contradictory to Wernle, is, so far as I see, only that a break with sin in principle can coëxist with the necessity of admonition to contend against it, and farther, that a consciousness of a nature-like propulsion can coëxist with spontaneous effort to obligated ends."

[24] P. 418.

The question raised by Wernle, Why does not the Apostle, in dealing with the sin of Christians, comfort them with reminders of the forgiveness which lies for them in Christ as the Reformers do? would be most directly answered, no doubt, by challenging the fact which is assumed in it. It would be enough to point to a declaration like Rom. viii. 1 which, especially in its context, before and after, cannot possibly be made to refer only to the past sins of Christians, and which very eminently is of the nature of a comforting declaration. Gottschick is not prepared, however, to make just this rejoinder.[25] He prefers therefore to urge an argument *e concessis,* to the effect,—that the forgiving grace of God is certainly everywhere presupposed in Paul.[26] Unrepentant sinners are of course dealt with by efforts to awaken their obtuse consciences and to bring them to repentance. "Even the strictest Protestant would have ventured on no other course." But, in any event, even according to Wernle himself, "faith, baptism, justification, in Paul's sense, ground a religious relation to God with the reversion of salvation." And if justification renders salvation certain, it is absurd to speak of it as absolution only from the sins that are past; it must exercise dominion over

[25] P. 420: "In one matter, to be sure, Wernle is right, although his theory of the sinlessness of the Christian is not discernable in Paul: Paul did not reflect on sin as a thing which adheres to the Christian life permanently and normally and destroys its joyousness, and therefore needs a neutralizer through a continuously renewed forgiveness. And neither did he, when sin encountered him in the community, point the sinners to the grace of God and comfort them with forgiveness. The difference between him and the Reformers appears particularly characteristically in Rom. viii. 1. There is given to him—the connection compels this view—by the experience of emancipation from the law of sin and death by the Spirit of life in Christ, the consciousness of no longer being subject to any sort of 'condemnation,'—whereas the Reformers explain the passage in such a manner that this consciousness is rather to spring from God's objective gracious judgment." Gottschick is confusing here the *proof* of "no condemnation to those in Christ Jesus," with its *ground*; or to speak broadly, assurance with salvation itself. He accordingly shows some hesitation in an attached note.

[26] Pp. 428 ff.

the whole life, and, if sins be committed in that life, absolve from them also. "The formula that the preaching of faith, that is, the doctrine of justification, has merely missionary significance, is conversion-theology, is therefore simply untrue, so far as it has the meaning that justification brings something only for entrance into the Christian state and the community, but not for the continuation of the Christian life in the community."[27] Wernle has himself contradicted this representation when he points out that justification guarantees salvation at the judgment-day, and assures the enjoyment of future benefits, that it transfers us into the state of the "righteous," and looks therefore not merely backward to the sins that are past but forward to the heritage of the just. And Paul contradicts it no less, in passages like Rom. v. 1-11, viii. 31-39, in which he expounds the significance which being justified has for the believer, bringing to him triumphant confidence in God, which raises him above the trials and perils of life and assures him of salvation. According to this representation, the faith that justifies must of course remain as the motive-power of the whole life. "Faith, in Paul's sense, which supports itself on the love of God in Christ and longs for and confidently awaits life in the Kingdom of holiness and love, includes inalienably the earnest direction of the will to the moral goal."[28] Justification, however, as Paul conceives it, does not act merely as a powerful incitement to right living; it is also necessarily a constant absolvement for the sins of life. On Wernle's own representation which allows that the faith that justifies grounds in Paul's view a religious relation with God which involves in it the reversion of salvation, it must have been included in Paul's view that the relation with God was destroyed by every sin, great or small. "Were,[29] however, that the case, all analogy suggests that simple amendment would not be thought enough, but special transactions would be required for atonement. It is only the moralism of the

[27] P. 405.
[28] P. 413-414.
[29] P. 429.

Enlightenment which has allayed the uneasy conscience with mere amendment. There is no trace of anything like this in Paul. Wernle himself, indeed, declares that 'Paul never, it seems, raised the question how the Christian obtains forgiveness when he sins' (p. 69). The presupposition for such an attitude can only be that he and his congregations did not feel such sins as abrogating childship to God. And that finds an excellent explanation precisely from the significance which justification (or its synonyms) has to him for the Christian life—that it does not mean only non-reckoning of past sins, but transference into the positive and perpetual condition of the children of God and heirs of His kingdom, yes, into the already present enjoyment of its benefits. The objectivity of the electing and calling grace of God, in connection with the assurance of already enjoying a foretaste of a future benefit, accompanying to him the expression of the relatively great transformation, imparted such strength and confidence in God and hope in the coming salvation, that it did not waver because of individual defeats in the struggle. And the Apostle's own judgment was not different: he only over and over again inculcated the condition which must be fulfilled, if this hope was not to deceive and this security was to be no fleshly one,—aspiration after what is above, and—the special form which this condition took over against intruding sin,—sincere and earnest repentance. Paul then does not speak of forgiveness as a continuously repeated necessary factor of the Christian life only because justification includes it once for all."

The direct contradiction in which Wernle places Paul and the Reformers in their judgments upon the Christian life—representing the one as looking upon Christians, as such, as sinless and the other as thinking of them, to put it at its height, as "all sin"—has no foundation in fact. The "optimism," ascribed to Paul by Wernle, Gottschick declares, transforms him into a "psychological monstrosity," at once "the incomparable spiritual adviser and the doc-

trinaire incapable of learning from experience."[30] His letters teach us that he saw things as they were and realized fully all the shortcomings of his Christians. Of course he estimated also at its true value the radical break with sin which they had made, the power they had acquired in their conversion to turn away from the old evil life, and to fight their way toward the goal of Christian perfection. And this new life which had come to Christians was as little neglected by Luther as by Paul. Nothing would have shocked Luther more than any suggestion that Christians have obtained nothing by believing, except an ultimate salvation. Sinners they are, who sin daily and need daily forgiveness. But they are not as the sinners of the Gentiles; with them "sin is not as it was before, because its head has been bruised by remission of sin."[31] "They are not made but in the making,"[32] but they are in the making; and that means that they are partly made. By both Paul and Luther Christians were well understood to be in the process of salvation; but this very fact that they were and were seen to be in the process of salvation opened the way to the possibility of a difference in emphasis. How shall the Christian, by nature a sinner, but now regenerated by the Spirit and justified by faith and becoming more and more conformed to the image of God's Son, be characterized? From the remaining sinfulness of his nature? Or from his new creation and his now waxing holiness? Insistence on his character as "miserable sinner," may be exaggerated into denial or neglect of the transformation which has taken place in him. Insistence on his character as new creature may be exaggerated into assertion of a perfection already attained. It would not do Wernle serious injustice to say that in his view something like these opposite exaggerations was precisely what took place respectively in Paul and Luther. Gottschick denies that any such exaggeration took place in the case of either. But he is prepared to admit that a real

[30] P. 427.

[31] *Werke* (Erl. ed) XIX. 41, cited by Gottschick, p. 438.

[32] XVIII. 188, cited p. 440.

difference exists between Paul and Luther, arising from their throwing their emphasis respectively in the direction of these two opposite exaggerations.[32a] He is prepared to go indeed further than this, and to attribute to them a far-reaching difference in their definitions of sin. They both have the same state of things before their eyes, he says,[33] a will energetically directed to the good, which, however, is still only advancing to perfection, and still has to contend with the temptations and antagonisms of sin continuing to work in the periphery of the personal life, and thus is often betrayed into manifest transgressions. "But they pass very different judgments upon it." "This is explained," he now goes on to say, "by their applying a different standard of judgment. Paul characterized as sin in the complex of the Christian life only notorious lapses into sins of sensuality and selfishness; but on the other hand he did not so regard lagging in the attainment of extensive and intensive perfection, in trust in God, in love, in the sanctification of the whole life, which stood for him as the goal of his Christians, nor yet the struggle with the enticements and oppositions of the flesh which made themselves felt. Luther on the other hand, with inflexible sternness pled, in opposition to the scholastic theology, for the standpoint that every falling-short precisely of this Pauline ideal of perfection—to cover which he extended the Decalogue—is condemnable sin. Precisely the fact that the Christian life is a striving towards a goal is to him a proof of the continuance of sinfulness in the regenerate."

If this be true, then the Reformation has greatly refined and deepened the Pauline conception of sin. The purpose which Gottschick has in view in affirming its truth is to account for what he conceives (with Wernle) to be the greater preoccupation of the Reformation theology with sin. It has enlarged the conception of sin, he says, and, having enlarged the conception of sin, it has felt the condemnation

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[32a] Pp. 438, 448.

[33] P. 438 f.

of sin and the need of forgiveness, if not more strongly, yet more extensively than Paul. Here we have no doubt a difference with Paul, he intimates, but not a contradiction. This is the way he puts it:[34]—"That Luther perpetually felt disquieted religiously by the continued conflict with the flesh and by the delay in attaining the ideal of perfection, or let us say of the Christian character, and had need of a counterpoise against this disquiet, is therefore the new thing, as compared with Paul, which remains. That, however, he found the counterpoise in justification for Christ's sake, is not an extension of the meaning given to it by Paul, beyond the beginning of the Christian life to its whole course. In Paul, too, it extends over the whole course of the Christian life; objectively as the basis of the relation of childship to God or of the right to the inheritance of eternal life; and subjectively in the humility with which the moral deliverance leads back to God and in the confidence with which protection from all inimical powers, the fatherly guidance of God, and perfecting from God are expected. It is much rather a logical application (*folgerichtige Anwendung*) of the fundamental religious conception which Paul has formulated in his doctrine of justification, to the changed judgment (required by the changed circumstances) on the state of things, that is to say, on the Christian life, fundamentally renewed, it is true, but still striving and growing. It is not in this as if Luther in the forgiveness of the sins of the Christian thought of a continuously repeated forgiveness of individual sins; he was just as conscious as Paul of the unity and completeness of the state of grace, given objectively with justification, or the individual promise of grace, subjectively with faith. Forgiveness, or justification, and also the absolution given in the sacrament of penance, is not with him a dispensation for a *quantum* of sins, but the reception of the *whole person* into the divine favor, the transference of it into the unitary and permanent state of grace. And it is the task of faith to raise itself.

[34] P. 448.

in the assurance of this, above the disquiet produced by the painful sense of continued sinfulness and by serious sins, recognized and repented of. It is on the one side included in this that it is not necessary, in the accompanying mood of humble trust in God's grace, to reflect scrupulously on daily sins; and on the other side it is not excluded that the application to particular cases of the justification which governs the whole life—since it is not a logical but an emotional one—will often enough be brought about as the restoration of a shaken or renewed consciousness of God's grace."

Among the writers on the ethics of the New Testament during this period, Hermann Jacoby[35] claims our attention at this point because of the completeness with which he associates himself with Gottschick, and that especially in the dubious views of Paul's conception of sin which we have just seen Gottschick enunciating. He was preceded by G. Mühlau,[36] whose revulsion from Wernle's whole representation was much stronger, and followed after a few years by A. Juncker,[37] writing from a modern point of view but protesting against the representation of Paul which sets his "theory" and "practice" in contradictory antagonism, and (following A. Seeberg here) maintaining on somewhat doubtful grounds the use of the Lord's Prayer by Paul and his consequent regular praying for forgiveness of sins. Jacoby, without expressly intimating any exceptions, represents himself as coinciding in Gottschick's results, and having in view for himself only to "supplement" them.[38] His presentation of their common views, however, is so clear and pointed that it will repay us to give them independent attention.

He begins his exposition of Paul's conception of the

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[35] *Neutestamenthiche Ethik.* 1899, pp. 320 ff, 396 ff.

[36] *Zur Paulinischen Ethik,* in the *Abhandlungen Alex. von Oettingen gewidmet,* 1898, pp. 220-244.

[37] *Die Ethik des Apostels Paulus,* 1 Halfte 1904. Also *Das Gebet bei Paulus,* 1905.

[38] P. 325.

Christian's relation to sin with two affirmations.[39] The first of them is that "Paul characterizes the path of the Christian's life as a path of victory." "For a true Christian," he affirms, "there can be no such thing as a life in the service of sin; a dominion of sin, a 'reign,' 'rule' of it, is excluded (Rom. v. 6, 8)." In Paul's view it is the other side of the Christian's "double life" that is to be emphasized; the Christian belongs to what he is to become, not to what he is leaving behind him. This is Jacoby's protest against what he conceives to be the "miserable-sinner" conception of the Christian life. It is the seamy side of the Christian life which is the subject of his own second affirmation. There is such a thing as sinful concupiscence, and it has its allurements: and we are not without a painful sense that there is something in us in sympathy with it. But, and this is the second affirmation, Paul did not range this "under the category of sin," "no consciousness of guilt grew out of the conflict for him." "He did not regard even this condition, bound up with a victorious conflict, though it contradicts the moral ideal, as sin. Falling short of the moral ideal and sinning are by no means the same thing to him. The idea of sin has for him a narrower compass." This is Jacoby's act of adherence to Gottschick's representation as to Paul's undeveloped conception of sin, and he proceeds at once to transcribe approvingly a page of Gottschick's discussion, and then to repeat and enforce its essential elements in his own language.

"No one," he says,[40] "has appreciated like Paul the conflict against the flesh in its entire greatness, in its complete difficulty. He sees the old man in his dreadful form, all the sinful lusts which move in him; he demands with uncompromising decision the putting off of this old man (Col. iii. 5-9); but the experience of these allurements is not to him sin, but suffering, an almost unendurable suffering. Out of this feeling of suffering he exclaims, O

[39] P. 325.
[40] P. 326.

wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me out of the body of this death (Rom. vii. 24). A cry of pain out of a past continuing into the present. For though he is removed from the service of sin under the dominion of the law, the condition of suffering, which is connected with the conflict against sin, abides with him. And how far Paul knows himself to be from the goal! He has not yet reached it, he has not yet attained perfection, but with straining strength he hastens toward it. He judges the life of salvation which has been built up in the community, as only a beginning (Phil. i. 6). And it is not without anxiety that Paul looks on the path of conflict, which he must still traverse—on the temptations that he must endure (Phil. iii. 10-14). He has no doubt moreover that on this path transgressions can occur. No Christian is certain that a temptation may not overcome him; that he may not permit himself to be betrayed by the flesh into a fault (Gal. vi. 1). That declaration of the Apostle's is very important for the understanding of his view of the continuing of sin in Christians. Faults which may be thought of as sins of inadvertance can occur even in a normal Christian life, and in this sense Paul will have adopted the Publican's prayer and the fifth petition of the Lord's Prayer. In this consciousness of the danger of temptation, of entanglement with lusts of the flesh, he requires from everyone who will partake of the Lord's Supper that he prove himself (I Cor. xi. 28, 31), and therefore assumes that a Christian will always find himself at his best. Paul was certainly not an enthusiast; the traits of an enthusiast are wrongly attributed to him by Wernle. But in spite of all that, it is true that Paul looked on the course of life of the Christian as a course of victory, sin as a slain foe, and the fundamental tone of his confession forms not the *Kyrie eleison* but the *Hallelujah*. Thus it ought to be in the case of every true Christian. But Paul also knows that reversions to the stage of the old man take place in the Christian life; not mere 'transgressions,' but 'sins' in the full sense of the word. To him

however, this is neither a necessary thing, nor a thing to be universally presupposed of Christians. It nevertheless does actually happen. In that case, however, the Christian state is imperiled, shaken, and must be reëstablished in the same way in which it was first begun,—in the way of 'repentance,' of the 'godly sorrow' which saves (II Cor. vii. 9-11)."

According to this representation the Christian is conceived rather as capable of sinning, liable to sin, than as actually a sinner by nature and through the manifestations of that nature also an inevitable sinner in fact. Original sin is reduced to an incitement of sin, a temptation to sinning which may be successfully resisted. Even sins of inadvertence, although liable to occur in all lives, apparently need not occur in any. Sins "in the full sense of the word," we gather, are rare in truly Christian circles; and when they occur are looked upon almost as having destroyed the Christian life itself. No Christian has as yet attained his goal: he is in the making and not made. But an impression is conveyed that the goal set before Christians is in the technical sense of the words very much a "counsel of perfection." Certainly the ideal which Paul held before himself and his converts stretched far above anything he could, on Jacoby's representation, call mere cessation of sinning; and he is almost given the appearance of busying himself not with delivering himself and them from sin but with elevating himself and them into something like supermen,—into a region stretching beyond what can be easily spoken of as human. The element of truth in this representation should not blind us to the serious error of it. It is the result of minimizing the amount of sinfulness still clinging to and manifesting itself in the Christian life—original sin, actual sinning—until little room seems to be left for that continued ethical development on which nevertheless Jacoby vigorously insists.

Paul, says Jacoby,[41] when expounding Paul's teaching on the developing life of the Christian, looks on the path over

[41] Pp. 396 ff.

which the Christian advances from a two-fold point of view. "It is on the one hand to him the path of effort, of personal exertion, of his own achievement. The Apostle considers himself a combatant, who strains every nerve to win the imperishable crown, who practices self-denial to reach the goal (I Cor. x. 24-27). He knows that he has not yet scaled the height of perfection (*Vollendung*), that he does not yet stand at the goal; but he expends his whole energy upon the effort to win it; dissatisfied (*nicht befriedigt*) with the moral stage to which he has attained, he aspires to a higher (Phil. iii. 12-14). Thus the moral life appears to him a perpetual struggle, which reaches no end within the limits of earthly existence." There was another point of view, however, from which he looked on it. "But he looks at the same moral life," continues Jacoby, "as a development which takes place with inner necessity, like an organic process, which, once begun, if it is not arrested by some accident, reaches the ends by which it is determined by means of the action of the forces operative in it. The Christian who sows to the Spirit, that is, lets the Holy Spirit work on him, follows His incitement, reaps of the Spirit eternal life (Gal. vi. 8)." Because he places himself in the service of God, a moral quality "forms in him which fashions itself into holiness, and has as its ultimate result eternal life, without this quality ceasing to be a gift of God's grace; for it is the grace of God which introduces this ethical power, carries it on, and brings it to its conclusion (Rom. vi. 22, 23)." The main point here is clearly and firmly stated: the Christian life is from the ethical point of view a process, advancing continually to the as yet unattained goal; and this process has a two-fold aspect, according as it is viewed from the human side, as effort, or from the divine side, as re-creation; that is, according as we think of the exhortation, "Work out your own salvation," or of the encouragement "For it is God that worketh in you."

Jacoby now proceeds[42] by adducing the great passages

[42] P. 397.

II Cor. iii. 18, iv. 16, and warning us at the same time that, in Paul's view, "this constantly advancing procession of glory, which is grounded in childship to God, does not prevent Christians longing for a condition in which the full enjoyment of childship to God shall be possessed by them." "At present," he explains, "their childship to God is attested to them in the purely spiritual sphere, but their sensuous being is a mode of existence which in the burden of the afflictions which fall on them, in the temptations which are connected with it, contradicts the mode of existence which, according to their spiritual nature, they possess as children of God. They therefore long after the redemption of the body, after the resolution of the disharmony between the spiritual and bodily phases of their life, after the harmony in which they shall experience the complete realization of childhood to God (Rom. viii. 23, 30)." In comparison with this future condition, Paul, says Jacoby, speaks of our present blessedness as a "hidden" possession: we are pressing on towards things as yet unseen and only in the beyond shall we attain our end. "Thus the consciousness of Christians is filled with contrasting feelings and exertions. On the one side they are placed in the visible world in which they are to maintain themselves in faithfulness in their calling, in obedience to the ordinances approved by God, in sanctification of life—in a world, over against which they are nevertheless inwardly alien. On the other side they belong to a heavenly world, the powers of which are communicated only to believers, of which we can become aware, on which we lay hold, only by faith." Only when Christ appears out of that "hiddenness" in which he now works, will the inner life of Christians find an outer manifestation corresponding to Him. "To this crisis of their condition they are ripening by inner development, by constant growth, which is conditioned by the knowledge of God (Cor. i. 10)."

This essentially true account of Paul's doctrine of the Christian life in the world, presents the Christian life as in its very essence a preparation for the life to come, and as

therefore in every respect now incomplete. Paul teaches not a this-world but a next-world Christianity. Everything is begun here; nothing completed. It is of the very essence of his teaching, therefore, that we are not here perfect, that, in our ethical development as well as in every other, we are only in the making. Additional point is given to this by the striking paragraph of Jacoby's discussion in which he raises our eyes from the individual to the Christian community and from the Christian community to the world —which is, after all said, God's world. The consummation of the ethical life, he tells us,[43] is not related by Paul to the individual Christian alone but to the whole Christian community. It too is in a process of God-wrought growth; it too is to be the body of Christ, the temple of the Holy Ghost. But the gaze of the Apostle is not directed to Christ's community, he now adds, as to a holy island in an unbelieving world; but to the entirety of humanity, which is to be taken up into the Kingdom of Christ. Thus, at the end of the road, every enemy shall be seen to be conquered (I Cor. xv. 26, 28), and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord (Phil. ii. 11).

Something like what Jacoby does for Paul is done for John by A. Titius from his more vigorously Ritschlian standpoint.[44] If, according to John, eternal life is already had here and now, it is nevertheless not here and now enjoyed in its completeness. Christianity is with John too a next-world religion: the Christian is in this life in the Way, not at the Goal (cf, the designation of Christianity as the Way in Acts xiv. 2, xix. 9. 23). And the difference concerns every relation of life, not least the relation of Christians to sin. The world they live in is an evil world, and they are liable to temptation. "They are moreover in need of perennial (*dauernd*) cleansing (Jno. xv. 2, I Jno. iii. 3) and emancipation from the power of sin (Jno. viii. 32); they must ever confess that they have sinned (I Jno. i. 8-10)

[43] P. 398.

[44] *Die Neutestamentliche Lehre von der Seligkeit*, III. 1900, pp. 17ff.

and are therefore condemned by their hearts (I Jno. iii. 19, 20) and need forgiveness (I Jno. 1, 9, 11, 1, 2)." Paul no doubt presupposes "the perpetual necessity of forgiveness of sin." But John does more than that. He emphasizes it. "It is emphatically asserted that forgiveness of sins belongs to the permanent life-conditions of the community, because the notion that we do not have sin and therefore do not need forgiveness rests in self-deception and is excluded by God's word (I Jno. 1. 8, 10, ii. 1f. 12). With this it accords that the Risen One imparts to His own the right to dispose of the forgiveness of sins; this presupposes the state of forgiveness of sins as a personal possession of the community (Jno. xx. 23). But also the particular conditions, under which the individual appropriation of forgiveness of sins stands, are discussed . . . "[45] Nevertheless, says Titius, with all this, there is a difference between John—and Paul too, who, had he dealt with these matters as fully as John does, could scarcely have treated them differently—and Luther. It is a difference only of degree, it is true,—of the degree in which the consciousness of sin gives its character to the Christian consciousness; but there is none the less a difference. With John—"perpetual incompleteness and sin are undoubtedly recognized, but it does not make a relative Christian perfection impossible; this appears rather as normal. Thus at I Jno. ii. 1 the sin of the Christian is thought of as exceptional; and in I Jno. iv. 22, Jno. xv. 8, 16, the joy of prayer is conditioned by the consciousness of fulfilling God's commandment and of doing what is pleasing to Him." We do not see, however, how Luther can be interpreted as greatly differing from this: he too supposed the Christian to be a Christian—one who had broken with sin in principle, and though in perpetual need of forgiveness, yet also in the perpetual joy of salvation.

In dealing with the portions of the New Testament not connected by him with the names of Paul and John, Titius

[45] P. 44.

speaks of the emergence in them of a new problem—the problem of the relation of the justification or the forgiveness of sins obtained in baptism to the sins of Christians.[46] Paul, says he, had scarcely related his doctrine of justification to the continuing sin of Christians. The Apocalypse, Acts, Pastoral Epistles—for he denies these to Paul—give no certain guidance. But, fortunately, there is the Epistle to the Hebrews. It speaks here plainly, and speaks strongly, "relating the forgiveness of sins obtained by Christ to the whole life of Christians." "On the ground of the divine will, the sanctification of Christians follows from the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all; they are and remain holy (perfect tense, x. 10). By a single act He has sanctified the people of God (xiii. 12, x. 29 cf. x, ix). So that now all of them are holy (iii. i. vi. 10, xiii. 24). The application to individuals is accomplished by the sprinkling of their hearts with the blood of Christ, and the washing of their bodies with pure water, that is, in baptism (x. 22). The fundamental ideas of the author place beyond doubt that he considered, not that the forgiveness at baptism required supplementing, but that the forgiveness then once for all given conveyed a permanent (compare the perfect, 'having been sprinkled') relation to God not capable of destruction by sin (within certain limits). This follows already from Christ's offering taking the place of the entire Old Testament expiatory system. What distinguishes the New from the Old Covenant is that God will no longer remember sins and transgressions (viii. 12, x. 17). From that, Hebrews draws the conclusion that where such forgiveness is present, the sin-offering no longer is made (x. 18). Therefore the single sin-offering of Christ expresses God's permanent readiness to forgive, not a once for all forgiveness, but a permanent relation of forgiveness, arranged once for all in baptism . . . " "It is manifest," Titius concludes after presenting much further evidence,[47]

[46] Vol. IV, p. 180 f.
[47] P. 182.

"that here for the first time, the fundamental Pauline idea of justification has received a form, in which it is capable of satisfying the changed need, the need of assurance of permanent forgiveness for sin." We gather that on this view the Reformation might derive its specific quality if not from Paul, yet at least from the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

It is when treating Paul's teaching, however, that Titius formally enters into the controversy as to the sins of Christians.[48] His mode of dealing with it has close affinities with that of Jacoby. He draws back a little, indeed, from Gottschick's and Jacoby's representation that Paul's idea of sinning was a somewhat narrow one. He is willing to allow, it is true, that Paul did not think of every failure of the Christian to correspond with the highest ideal, as sin. But he is quick to warn against attributing to the Apostle the low moral standard which does not look upon the inner contradition of the flesh as sin, and to insist upon the comprehensive breadth of his recognition of the sinful. It cannot reasonably be denied, he says,[49] that Paul considered every movement of the sensuous desire which runs athwart the divine requirements—and the divine requirements coalesce with him with the "ideal"—to be sinful. The love of our neighbor is not a mere ideal of perfection with him, but a binding requirement of the law, breach of which falls under the curse. Every action which is not accompanied with the religious assurance that it is permissible, or rather is pleasing to God, is branded by him as sin,—which certainly shows an exceptional delicacy of moral judgment. Add the sharp contrasts which he draws between Spirit and flesh, light and darkness, righteousness and sin; and observe that, according to him, it is not given to men to stand neutral between these forces, but each one must take one side or the other:—surely that has not the appearance of looking only on the

[48] Vol. II, pp. 76 ff.
[49] P. 81.

grosser failings and faults as sin. In a word, while we need not attribute to Paul "a scrupulous and nervous anxiety of sin-consciousness," we cannot deny to him a clear and accurate and comprehensive sense of sin, as sin. We are not to suppose that he thought highly of the moral life of Christians because he thought lightly of the evil of sin. That way of answering the question raised by Wernle of whether Paul considered Christians sinners is barred.

The question no doubt would already be answered if we could follow Mühlau in considering Rom. vii. 14-25 a transcript of the Christian consciousness. Rejecting that interpretation of this passage does not leave us, however, in doubt as to Paul's attitude towards the Christian life. The Apostle does not look upon the salvation which has become the possession of Christians, although it is in its innermost nature really divine salvation, as, as yet the final salvation, but as incomplete, so that the position of Christians in the world is one not yet worthy of the children of God.[50] Sin and the Spirit can dwell together in the human soul—not the dominion of sin and the dominion of the Spirit, but sin and the Spirit. Neither in the seventh chapter of Romans nor anywhere else does Paul know the notion that the dominion of the Spirit is empirically compatible with the dominion of sin; nowhere does he recognize the alternation of the victorious advance of the Spirit and a retrograde moral movement, as the permanent rule of the Christian life. "But it is not less wrong, it seems to me," continues Titius,[51] "when the theory is ascribed to the Apostle—a thing which A. Ritschl did not do—that the Christian does not sin." Von Soden, Mühlau, Gottschick have brought forward much material to the contrary, but something more may be said. In saying it there is to be emphasized first of all that "not only particular observations, but precisely the whole theory of the Apostle, prove that he considered the life of Christians as sinful. That is already clear from the fact

[50] P. 77.
[51] P. 80.

that the present state of Christians has as its characteristic the presence in them of the two opposing factors, the flesh and the Spirit. "It is, however, self-evident that the morality of conflict and strife is not the highest, but that the measure of effort required marks at the same time the measure of power which sin still possesses even in the believer. To attribute to the Apostle the notion that the Christian does not sin, means therefore, to attribute to him that he considers the inner opposition of the flesh as not sin, that is, that he operates with too low a moral standard. If, however, his norm of righteousness consists in perfect love of God and men, then every impulse repugnant to it, even though it be overcome, is sin (Rom. vii. 7); there is, however, no lack in the Christian life also of such impulses proceeding from the flesh (Gal. v. 17, Col. iii. 5); and there can be no lack of them because these lusts are the movements of our flesh (Eph. ii. 3) inseparable from our mortal body (Rom. vi. 12). If then the moral norm is not externalized after a fashion wholly incompatible with Rom. vii. 7 and with the whole inner conception of the Apostle, then the fundamental fact of the existence of flesh and Spirit in the Christian life already brings with it the sinfulness of the life."[52] This is far from the only evidence of the fact which Titius produces, but it may serve as a sample of his reasoning. As to Paul himself, it is true that it is not easy to turn up passages in which he ascribes present sins to himself; and he speaks too of Christians, from the point of view of the Spirit which dwells in them, as sinning rather through inadvertence and through weakness than by determinate purpose. They are Christians; and sin is represented by him as an ever more and more disappearing element in the Christian life, and he presupposes a really progressive approach to the ideal of perfection (e.g. Phil. iii. 12ff.). "But sin always forms a limitation to the complete blessedness of the Christian. And it is only in the resurrection, as the context of Phil.

[52] P. 81.

iii. 10 and 14 shows, that the goal of sinless perfection beckons."[53]

The discussion aroused by Wernle's book was thus obviously moving, from the first, even within the limits of the Ritschlian school, towards the decisive refutation of his central contention—that, according to Paul, Christians do not sin,—and the consequent isolation of it as the peculiar property of those extremists who had come now to be known as the history-of-religion school. The impression is even received that, had it not been for their feeling of loyalty to their master, "the regular Ritschlians," if we may so speak of them, might have reached in the process of the discussion an unexceptionable understanding of Paul's view of the Christian life, as the as yet uncompleted product of the combined operation of the forgiving and renewing grace of God; and along with that a recognition of the substantial faithfulness of the reproduction of Paul's view in the teaching of the Reformation. Their approximation to such an understanding is at times so close that their assertions of divergences from it strike the reader almost as mere eccentricities. But the main elements of what Ritschl had taught, they continue to repeat up to the end, in one form or another, although, to speak the whole truth, often with more or less complete evacuation of Ritschl's meaning, while yet always making a show of deference to his authority. We have reference here especially to the assertion that Paul does not relate justification to the sins of Christians, and indeed does not regard these sins as very serious, certainly not as serious enough to qualify their sense of their own ethical worth; and that on the other hand, the Reformers so focused attention on the perpetual sinning of Christians as to submerge all sense of or indeed effort after ethical growth in a constant search for forgiveness, so that the entirety of Christian experience was summed up for them in the sense of repeated forgiveness. The debate, of course, did not lie wholly in the hands of the Ritschlians, although

[53] P. 84.

they were perhaps the most active parties to it: and it must be confessed that too many of those who entered it with a view to defending the Reformation doctrine, taught, instead, a doctrine which seems to have become traditional in the Lutheran churches as the Reformation doctrine, but which, if conceived as such, would go far towards justifying the Ritschlian strictures upon the teaching of the Reformers.

An example is supplied even by the very carefully guarded discussion of Ernst Cremer.[54] It is Cremer's fundamental postulate that "forgiveness of sins" is "the whole of Christianity, full salvation."[55] And "because the forgiveness of sins is God's whole salvation, perfect salvation, the faith which apprehends it in Christ is perfection."[56] "It becomes intelligible now why faith in Christ is perfection; it is because God's forgiveness of sins is God's whole salvation, in which God's saving will comes to its goal; believers are perfect because Christ's saving work is perfect."[57] "By the designation of the believer as perfect, it is emphasized that we have in Christ in the forgiveness of sins all that we need from God." The terms perfection, perfect, are, of course, used in these declarations in a non-moral sense. We read:[58] "The idea that under Christian perfection the final result of the so-called process of sanctification is to be understood has no point of attachment in the New Testament." Again:[59] "The perfection of the Christian is nowhere represented as the goal that is to be attained by him"; "it is not a particular stage of the Christian life."

If this be so, naturally the question becomes very pressing, In what relation does the moral life stand to this experience of forgiveness through faith? Cremer raises the

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[54] *Ueber die Christliche Vollkomenheit,* 1899. Compare also L. Clasen, *Z TH K,* X. 1900, pp. 439ff. and Beyreis, *NKZ,* XII. 1901, pp. 507 ff. 621 ff.

[55] P. 40.

[56] P. 22.

[57] P. 21.

[58] P. 22.

[59] P. 37.

question in the first instance in this form:[60] "If the Christian has his perfection in faith in Christ, and that, just because he has in Him forgiveness of sins,—if forgiveness of sins is the whole of salvation—in what interest can then the moral requirement be made seriously effective?" In reply he tells us that "the moral relation cannot be so separated from the religious, from faith, that a faith would be conceivable which does not at the same time postulate and bring with it a moral relation:" "faith in Christ is not possible without our attitude to the world being decisively influenced." It is absurd to talk of going to Christ for forgiveness of sin without a realization of the evil that sin is, and a renunciation of it. The one is involved in the other. That is all true enough, but it leaves us only greatly desiring to be free from sin, without telling how our deliverance from it may be accomplished. We are carried a step further, however, when we are told that[61] "the salvation present in Christ is of such a nature that it cannot be accepted in faith except with such a transformation." But we will let Cremer himself expound why and how this is so:—"Even the minimum of religious understanding is lacking when forgiveness of sins becomes suspected of being a dispensation from the moral requirement. It is a favorite notion—especially where moral perfection, or at least completeness, 'sanctification,' is demanded with emphasis—that on deliverance from the guilt of sin, deliverance from its power *follows* as a *second* divine gift and human task. The power of sin cannot be more strongly experienced than when sin is experienced as guilt. Precisely in the sense of guilt does sin exercise its enslaving dominion, and when the sense of guilt is lacking sin is not felt as an enslaving power and therefore the power of sin is broken when guilt is removed. Forgiveness of sins and the gift of the Holy Spirit are therefore one act; God forgives sins when (*indem*) He gives the Spirit: the forgiveness of sins is in

[60] P. 22.
[61] Pp. 22-23.

itself the establishment of communion with God; a forgiveness which was not the establishment of communion with God, gift of the Spirit, would be no forgiveness. Because, however, forgiveness is the gift of the Spirit, essentially the entirety of salvation is to be recognized in it. In one divine act the power of sin is, therefore, broken along with the removal of its guilt; in faith and in the forgiveness of sins morality is inseparably bound to religion and morality proceeds inseparately out of religion. The establishment of the relation to God is the removal of the relation to sin; in the instant in which the man is bound to God, he is no longer bound to sin; the forgiveness of sins means that the one power replaces the other; if sin has power over men, so also has God, who takes man into fellowship with Himself, power which becomes active in the same instant in which man yields himself to Him. In turning to God, the relation to sin is immediately broken; compare the exposition of Paul in Rom. VI" . . . and so forth.

The scope of this exposition is to the effect that forgiveness of sins and the gift of the Holy Spirit as a sanctifying power, are received by the same act of faith. And that is the burden of Cremer's doctrine of the Christian life. "No doubt when faith is preached," he says again,[62] "sanctification is preached; for faith which delivers from sin is extinguished if it does not avouch its possession. The preaching of forgiveness and it alone is itself the preaching of sanctification." All this is true, and is important, and as far as it goes is well put. What is lacking in it is any real explanation of how the moral life proceeds out of forgiveness, how justification necessarily carries with it sanctification. We are told that the two go together and must go together: we are told that the same faith receives both: we are told that the new relation to God involved in faith brings renewal with it, with inevitable certainty. But we are not shown how the two are immediately connected inwardly. They find their union apparently in their common relation to

[62] P. 40.

faith, or in their common source in a reconciled God, but not at all in an immediate relation to one another. And therefore Cremer's insistance that the "forgiveness of sins is the whole of Christianity, full salvation" remains unjustified, and provokes contradiction, as, despite his asseverations of the inseparable connection—involution, if you will—of moral renewal with it, leaving the ethical side of the Christian life inadequately recognized.

The tendency which seems to be guardedly suggested by Cremer comes to its full expression in an interesting article by Karl Schmidt published in the *New Church Journal* in 1905.[63] If we read him aright, sanctification with Schmidt consists really in a constantly repeated, or renewed justification; so that it might be said with the fullest meaning that in justification the entirety of sanctification is included. His apparent meaning is not merely that justifying faith brings sanctification also with it, which would be true; but that it brings complete sanctification—perfection—with it all at once. Thus every justified man is perfect; and, the extremes meeting, Schmidt and Wernle might seem to clasp hands. But Schmidt explains that he means this only "in principle"—a phrase very *caviare* to the whole Ritschlian circle. The justified man is sanctified only in beginnings, which will however certainly complete themselves in the end —provided of course that he stays justified. For he may sin; but if he sins that is because his faith has failed; and, faith failing, so does his justification. The only remedy in this condition is to refresh, renew, regain faith. Faith may, no doubt, fail not only measurably but entirely; and then we have fallen wholly out of grace. In every man without exception, however, it fails measurably over and over again. The life of the Christian is conceived thus as a continuous series of failures and renewals of faith—that is to say, of justification, and also of sanctification. This gives to it the aspect of alternations of complete sinfulness and complete sanctification; and in these alternations the

[63] *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift,* XVI. pp. 719-771.

Christian life is lived out. In this construction certainly the necessity of moral effort has dropped out of sight, and no place seems to be left for moral growth. Whatever morality the Christian has, comes to him without effort; and his life-history is marked, not by increasing firmness of moral purpose and strength of moral energy, to say nothing of compass of moral attainments, but only by the aimless and endless systole and diastole of his ethical vicissitudes.

If the discussions of Cremer and Schmidt take a somewhat wide range, and touch on the specific controversy about "miserable-sinner Christianity" only somewhat incidentally, the two dissertations of the Pomeranian pastor, Max Meyer, have no other reason for their existence than that controversy affords them, and make it their sole aim to test the exegetical basis and to review the conclusions of Wernle and his coadjutors. The first of these dissertations, which bears the title of *The Christian's Sin according to Paul's Letters to the Corinthians and Romans,*[64] confines itself strictly to the testimony of these Epistles to Paul's attitude to the sins of Christians in general. The special question of what role sin plays in the life of the Apostle himself is reserved for the second dissertation, which is entitled, *The Apostle Paul as Miserable Sinner.*[65] The two together thus cover the ground, and seek by an independent examination of the sources to reach a well-founded judgment on Paul's attitude towards sin in the life of Christians. The three things in the Christian life, as reflected to us from the pages of the Epistles to the Corinthians and Romans, on which Meyer lays stress, are its principial break with sin, its continued involvement with sin, and its progressive conquest of sin. "The Christian life," says he, therefore, is "at once both a being and a becoming, a possessing and an acquiring, an enjoying and a longing, a jubilation and a

[64] *Die Sünde der Christen, nach Pauli Briefen an die Korinther und Römer,* 1902.

[65] *Der Apostel Paulus als armer Sünder. Ein Beitrag zur paulinischen Hamartialogie,* 1903.

groaning."[66] The principial break with sin which has taken place is not undervalued. It is even said that "if sinning once belonged to the nature of man, it has become for the Christian henceforth unnatural."[67] But neither is it obscured that the break with sin is as yet only principial. "The new creature is nevertheless only one in principle, because one in the making."[68] "The new life is an inner, a central life, that does not yet dominate in its birth the periphery of the old life. . . . The Christian life needs therefore development in the periphery and is accordingly thought of by Paul as a process of completing and unfolding."[69] In expounding the Sixth chapter of Romans, Meyer insists that it deals not with an instantaneous transaction merely but with a continuous activity. The question to which it is an answer is, Shall we continue in sin? The thing deprecated is that we may live in sin. The thing approved is that we should walk in newness of life. The passage of the discussion from the indicative to the imperative presents therefore no difficulty. "The new life is thus laid upon the baptized person as his continuous task. And herein it is plainly declared that Paul looked upon the new life of the Christian as an uninterrupted process, proceeding on the ground of a single inner fact."[70]

The Christian life is therefore not merely a gift but also a task, not merely *Gabe,* but *Aufgabe.* "What has come into existence as a once for all determinate experience at the entrance into the Christian state, is to pervade the whole Christian life as a perpetual task."[71] The whole Christian life: there is even a hint that the parousia itself will not find the task completed. At least, when in commenting on I Cor. i. 8 Meyer declares: "That, then, the moral develop-

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[66] *Die Sünde der Christen,* p. 77.

[67] P. 78, appealing for support to Lütgert, *Sündlosigkeit und Vollkommenheit,* 1897, pp. 38f and Beck, *Vorlesungen über christliche Ethik,* 1892, I. pp. 244-252.

[69] P. 64.

[70] P. 79.

[71] P. 79.

ment of the Christian has its crown in sinlessness at the day of the parousia, the Apostle has not taught,"[72] he does not make it clear that he has that passage only in mind. On the contrary, there is some appearance that he intends the declaration, though occasioned by the exposition of this particular passage, to have general validity. The remark is directed against Gottschick's assertion[73] that the only difference between Paul and Luther in the matter of the Christian's growth reduces to this: "that Paul hopes for the presence of perfection at the judgment day, while Luther, who understands perfection in the absolute sense, holds it to be unattainable." There underlies this assertion Gottschick's notion that Paul does not treat anything as sin among Christians except gross vices, while Luther has attained to a deeper and more refined sense of what is sinful. This notion is undoubtedly wrong. But Meyer is as certainly wrong when he seeks to remove the difference asserted to exist between Luther and Paul with reference to the state of Christians at the parousia, by denying that Paul expected Christians to be perfect "in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ." Such an expectation, he says, "is already excluded by I Cor. vi., where Paul has recognized sin as an inevitable evil, under which the Christian community suffers." The reference here appears to be wrong, but it is the general assertion founded on it which interests us. According to it, it is Paul's doctrine that sin is an unfailing evil from which Christians suffer: it is a thing that stays by them always, from which they will never be free. If, when they stand before the Judge at the last day they are "unreprovable," that is only, now Meyer continues, because they stand there in Christ Jesus and God is faithful and will fulfil the promise of their call. This remark is just, and it is no doubt a just exposition of I Cor. i. 8. But it does not follow that Paul does not teach that the conformation of Christians to their Lord, however slowly it may

[72] P. 47.
[73] *Z TH K.* VII. 446.

have proceeded, will be completed at the last day. This he teaches elsewhere with great clearness (e.g. I Thess. iii. 13, v. 23), and it is a part of his general system, the absence of which would throw it into confusion.[74]

We have laid some stress on Meyer's representation that in Paul's teaching sin is "an inevitable evil" (*unausbleibliches Uebel*) in the Christian life, because he also represents that, according to Paul, sinlessness is possible to Christians. Possible, not actual; but though not actual, yet possible. Before that great experience which we call conversion, a man was under the necessity of sinning: after it, "the Christian need sin no more."[75] "The possibility of not permitting sin to occur, is, of course, present for the pneumatic."[76] Expounding Rom. vi. 12, Meyer says: "The 'obeying the lusts' need no longer occur in the Christian life. The Apostle does not mean by this, however, 'that the Christian leads a life no longer accessible to any sin (Holtzmann). The *non posse non peccare* has no doubt ceased for the Christian, but it has not therefore already come with him to the *non posse peccare,* but at most to the *posse non peccare.*" We would gladly lay hold of the qualification "at most" as exhibiting at least a certain hesitation in Meyer's mind: but we fear he will not permit us to do so. He means to assert sinlessness to be possible to Christians, although illustrated by no single example. Or rather, as we shall soon find that we have to say, by only a single example. For Meyer finds a single example in Paul himself. Were it not for this one exception we should have to say that a possibility which is never actualized is no possibility—there must be something to render it impossible if in such a multitude of instances it is never actualized. In

[74] Cf. the good note by T. C. Edwards on I Cor. i. 8: "It by no means implies that a Christian can be, as Meyer says, morally defective at the day of judgment (cf I Thess. v. 23). Rather it implies that the end of this aeon will be determined by moral reasons. The course of history is a moral judgment and the cosmic development depends on that of the individual Christians."

[75] P. 78.

[76] P. 79.

the presence of this one exception we can only say that the possibility must be a very slight one which in so many instances has been actualized only once. Meyer's zeal in the matter is an ethical one, and is grounded in his doctrine of the will and its function in the Christian life. What has happened to the Christian at conversion is, in his view, that his will has been freed from bondage to sin, and his destiny placed in his own hands. He may sin, if he chooses; and he need not sin unless he chooses. He may sin fatally if he chooses; or he may refrain from all sinning whatever if he chooses. He stands before the two ways and can walk as he will. If he has the *posse non peccare,* he has equally the *posse peccare*—the *non posse peccare* and the *non posse non peccare* would be equally derogatory to his manhood; for has not the Spirit made him *free?* Accordingly we are told that "it is not unthinkable for Paul that even the Christian should live after the flesh,"[77] and that "the eventual turning of the Christian *in malam partem* is not at all excluded."[78] Of course it is not unthinkable either that the Christian should live after the Spirit; that is his quality. And of course he may conceivably live wholly after the Spirit. But here we are called up again, for in the very act of drawing the parallel out in detail Meyer interposes:[79] "Therefore this conflict cannot possibly find its conclusion within the sphere of this life. And the Apostle has not taught that Christians stand at the end of their Christian development sinless. 'Grace' remains for them always the last word. The sinlessness of the Christian lies therefore on the other side of the earthly existence."[80] And yet Paul was sinless! The one thing, meanwhile, of which Meyer is most sure, is that what the Spirit does is just to make us formally free; and that He is therefore not to be thought of as an "overmastering power" which acts like a "natural force of a higher order," so that "life in the Spirit is to

[77] P. 70.
[78] P. 71.
[79] P. 80.
[80] P. 80.

proceed infallibly with the necessity of nature." The language here is, of course, exaggerated. It is chosen with a view to repelling the representations of Karl and Wernle. But, the exaggeration having been eliminated, there is an element of Paul's teaching of the first importance, recognized at this point by Karl and Wernle, which Meyer has not allowed for.

When Meyer comes to deal formally with the question, why Paul had nothing explicit to say to the Corinthians of the forgiveness of their sins, committed since conversion, he is more successful on the destructive than on the constructive side. He has no difficulty in showing that there is no exegetical ground for the assertion than Paul connects the forgiveness of sins so closely with baptism as to treat the merits of Christ as available only for pre-baptismal sins.[81] And he has as little difficulty in showing that the attempts to interpret Paul as reckoning as sins only the gross vices into which he could count on his Christians not falling, does not bear the test of either the exegesis of Paul's words or of the recorded facts. He is quite within the warrant of his evidence when he declares that so far from not requiring his Christians to realize his high ideal in their lives, Paul strenuously demanded its realization by them as their obligatory task, and reckoned it sin in them when their life in the smallest respect failed to correspond with it.[82] When it comes, however, to adducing definite texts in which the forgiveness of the current sins of Christians is declared, Meyer does not appear to have made his selection with particular success. He is led therefore to suggest that Paul made only a sparing use of express references to the consolation of forgiveness, no doubt for a pedagogic reason—these raw young Christians were less in need of consolation for sins grieved over than of correction for sins indulged in. In the end he falls back, very wisely, on the general consideration that "the forgiveness of sins" that is to say

[81] P. 33.
[82] P. 35.

that forgiveness of sins which is justification, "has with Paul the value of a permanent possession," so that the question, which it is asserted Paul never raised, how the Christian when he sins, receives forgiveness, obtains this as its proper answer: In the same way that he received forgiveness on becoming a Christian.[83] He has no difficulty, of course, in showing,[84] that justification in the Epistle to the Romans is treated as introducing once for all into grace, and, as H. Cremer puts it, looks both forward and backward in the great context of salvation, binding together past, present and future into one. "God's justifying judgment (explains Cremer more fully),[85] "is a continuous, permanent one, to which, therefore, even the pardoned sinner can only daily appeal afresh, for daily new and yet abiding forgiveness of his sin and guilt." It admits of no doubt that according to Paul, justification is salvation and therefore dominates with the effects of salvation all the subsequent life of the Christian. And now, having reached this point, Meyer turns the argument around[86] and urges that this alone proves that Paul looked upon Christians as still sinning. For why should he lay such weight on the continuous importance for the Christian life of precisely justification, unless there were continuous sinning for which this justification is needed?

This argument from justification to the universal sinfulness of Christians admits of greater elaboration than is given it in this place, and receives it in the second of Meyer's dissertations. The very essence of this doctrine is that men have no righteousness of their own, but only that which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is of God on faith (Phil. iii. 9). That this means not only that our sole dependence is on the righteousness of God received when we believed, but also that we continue through life so far in the same condition as when we believed, that we never

[83] P. 37.
[84] P. 54.
[85] *Paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre*, 1899, p. 366.
[86] P. 56.

have any righteousness of our own on which we can depend, is clear from the eschatological reference in Phil. iii. 9-11. It was not once only that Paul and his Christians had "no confidence in the flesh"; they never had or could have confidence in the flesh, and least of all when it was a matter of entering into participation of Christ's resurrection. It has its significance that precisely in this passage Paul proceeds to declare himself not a consummator but only a viator. He has not attained, but is pressing on. The life that is lived here below is lived not by sight but by faith. Accordingly he characterizes it in Gal. ii. 20 as a life in the flesh, lived in faith, faith in his Redeemer. The question, no doubt, arises whether the phrase "in the flesh" in this passage implies sin. H. A. W. Meyer says it does not: "The context does not convey any reference to the ethical character of the 'flesh' (as sedes peccati)." Max Meyer says it does; and on the whole we think him right.[87] "Already," he writes,[88] "that 'flesh' and 'Spirit' are associated in the passage as two inimical powers, which stand in diametrical contradiction with one another, proves that the Apostle did not consider himself sinless. . . . The 'flesh' with him too is still *sedes et fomes peccati,* and is active in the 'lusts,' . . . And that Paul has even here thought of the sin inhering in his 'flesh' in which he knows himself involved, in spite of his most intimate *unio mystica* with Christ, we learn from this—that he, so long as he lives 'in the flesh,' knows himself permanently united by faith to Him who loved him and gave Himself for him. It is Jesus' love for sinners on which he stays himself in his life of faith. . . . According to this passage Paul not only felt the need of comfort and new forgiveness but actually always afresh appropriated in faith the forgiveness of sins in Christ." Meyer, then, adduces Col. i. 14, Eph. i. 7, "we *have* forgiveness of sins," and calling attention to the present tense, declares that these passages show that Paul knew, for his own person also, "a

[87] See also Mühlau, as cited p. 231. On the other hand Windisch, as cited, 156, holds with H. A. W. Meyer.

[88] *Theolog. Litersturzeitung,* 1904, 7, col. 203.

remissio quotidiana." G. Hollmann simply scouts this use of these passages, and certainly it does bear some appearance of overstraining them. But at least the passages show that the forgiveness of sins was a blessing enjoyed, alike by Paul and his Christians, as a continuous possession, and that this forgiveness must be taken sufficiently inclusively to embrace all the sins that existed for him and them. If we cannot quite say that the passages prove that they were continuously sinning, we must at least say that they do prove that the grace of forgiveness was looked upon by them as the fundamental blessing on which they rested their whole lives long.

Meyer himself, it is to be observed, does not look upon these passages as proving that Paul and his Christians thought of themselves as continually sinning. They prove only, in his view, that Paul and his Christians thought of themselves as continually sinful. He argues strongly, as we have seen, that all others than Paul were continually sinning. But he singles Paul out as the one man who has ever lived who has realized the possibility that belongs to all Christians, of not actually sinning,—a judgment which seems rather ungenerous to John and Peter and James and the rest. Paul, says he,[89] "is the greatest, next to Him who can be compared to none other." "He not only preached to his Christians, but he lived out before them, how far the Christian can advance in the battle for sanctification." If this is to be taken as meaning what it says, Paul is presented to us as illustrating the utmost moral possibility of humanity; we may just as well look upon his person as read his precepts, if we wish to learn the full duty of the Christian in the sanctification of his life. He is more completely our example than Christ Himself, because Christ went beyond,—Paul only to the extreme limits of—our possibilities. There are attainments in Christ's life in which we cannot follow him; there are no attainments possible to us whose model we do not find in Paul. It is needless to say that

[89] *Der Apostel Paulus als arme Sünder,* p. 585.

Paul does not present himself to us as such a universal example, when he calls on his readers to be imitators of him as he was of Christ Jesus; and it is equally needless to say that he is not brought before us in his epistles as such a universal example. Such overstraining of Paul's language is not necessary that we may do justice to his greatness, or to the really divine element in his life and in his work. Meyer is quite right when he insists on the unity of his consciousness and refuses to separate Paul the man from Paul the Apostle,[90] and to pass differing moral judgments on the two. Paul was as a man what he was as Apostle: the apostleship was the sphere in which this man functioned. And after all said, Paul's apostleship was not self-sought, and was not prosecuted in his own strength. He was called by God to it, and sustained by God in it, in a definitely supernatural manner. It is not surprising that he was conscious of having done the work of the apostleship faithfully. He praises his work as well done: the praise he gives it is of course less praise of himself than of the God who strengthened him: but even so, his self-praise does not involve a claim of personal perfection even in his work. In I Cor. xv. 9 he puts himself in point of fitness for his office below all the other Apostles—though he was under no illusions as to the shortcomings of some of them; and if he asserts that he has labored more abundantly than all, he ascribes that to the pure grace of God. In Eph. iii. 8 he describes himself as less than the least of all the saints, without any obvious reference to his pre-Christian life,—and he knew the saints. When he calls himself in I Tim. i.15 (if the adduction be allowed) the chief of sinners, it is not so certain that the reference is solely to his pre-Christian sins. It is not a boastful sense of his own strength, but a humble dependence on God's grace, which after all forms the basis of Paul's self-consciousness, and, as Meyer very properly remarks,[91] "if it is the triumph of the divine power in him which rules the Apostle's whole self-consciousness,

[90] P. 41.
[91] P. 20.

then, his boasting, in which his self-consciousness finds its strongest expression, becomes intelligible; and the appearance of Paul's making himself guilty of the sin of proud exaltation, vanishes."

Meyer is no more insistent that Paul was free from actual sinning—that is his concession to his opponents in the "miserable-sinner" controversy—than he is that he remained always sinful in his 'flesh,' which is his concession to Paul's own teaching. He argues elaborately[92] that although Paul always felt the impulse to sin and longed to be free from it, yet he never fell into sins of act. He bore therefore in the battle with sin the physiognomy of conquerer, and step by step drove it ever from the field. But Meyer is very strenuous in asserting the unbroken presence in Paul of this sinful "flesh." As he puts his conclusion formally:[93] "So far as the material at our disposal tells us, it must pass as an axiom that Paul in his Christian life knew sin very well, but had no acquaintance with sin in our ordinary sense. We can speak then, with reference to Paul only of a *peccatum habituale,* not here ever of a *peccatum actuale.* Apart from the possibilities of sins of inadvertence, weakness and ignorance, it was 'concupiscence' which with Paul was the constitutive characteristic of what was especially signified to him by 'sin.' On its account the Apostle has to prosecute with reference to himself continually, that 'discerning' of I Cor. xi. 31, 'cleansing' of II Cor. vii. 1. This 'concupiscence' was the constant occasion why Paul over and over again cried out with yearning for his deliverence from his sinful flesh." A position like this is scarcely more intelligible in itself than it is defensible from the records. So sharp a separation as is made between the underlying sinful nature and the body of sinful acts seems untenable. There is no sinful nature which is not active; and the activities within and the activities without are scarcely capable of such sharp division. So certainly as the *operari* follows the *esse,* so certain is it that as long as the *peccatum habituale*

[92] Pp. 43, 44.
[93] P. 51.

exists the *peccatum actuale* occurs. So far from saying that the *peccatum habituale* may lie in the background and show itself in no act, we must rather say that so long as it lies in the background it must of necessity show itself in every act. Its existence in Paul makes him in the fullest sense of the word a "miserable sinner," incapable of not sinning, because incapable of being in his acts anything but himself. Of course, if all that is meant is that Paul did not commit murder or adultery, did not steal and rob, then that is true. But we should not forget the probing touch of the Sermon on the Mount, which is Paul's touch too, as Meyer fully understands—witness his decisive repulsion of the attempts of Gottschick and Jacoby to attribute to Paul a coarser standard. And Meyer should not forget either, by the way, that according to him, Paul prayed, "Forgive us our trespasses." And it might even be worth while to remember the sharp saying of Samuel Rutherford about "the world's negative holiness—no adulterer, no murderer, no thief, no cozener,"—which, he says, "maketh men believe they are already glorified saints." It is not necessary to do those things in order to be a "miserable sinner;" nor does the absence of such things from the life constitute us sinless.

We have just seen Meyer attributing to Paul knowledge and use of the Lord's Prayer and we have seen formerly the same thing done by Juncker. It was inevitable that sooner or later some one would enter the controversy about the sins of Christians from this angle. This was at length done by G. Bindemann in a book entitled *The Prayer for Daily Forgiveness of Sins in Jesus' Proclamation of Salvation and in the Epistles of the Apostle Paul,*[94] published in 1902. It cannot be said that this new mode of approach brought much gain for the particular debate in progress. It was already generally allowed that Jesus did not contemplate sinless followers, so that in the first part of his discussion Bindemann can give us only a systematic arrangement of generally accepted facts. In the second part, he manages

[94] *Das Gebet um tägliche Vergebung der Sünden in der Heilswerkungung Jesu und in der Briefen des Apostels Paulus* 1902.

to review all the main topics which the debate had thrown into prominence but he does this outside of his specific subject. He is compelled to allow that there is the slenderest direct ground for attributing to Paul knowledge and use of the Lord's Prayer, and indeed he bases his own conclusion that it was known to Paul ultimately on general considerations, rather than on specific references to it. He can even write:[95] "No express references to the several petitions of the Lord's Prayer are found, and it may seem that the whole spirit of that prayer is alien to the Apostle: not petition, but thanksgiving becomes the Christian. It has even been possible to maintain that the Lord's directions as to prayer as they are presented in the Lord's Prayer are altogether unknown to the Apostle.[96] And in fact, for one to whom it is not from the outset on other grounds a historical impossibility that Paul should have had no knowledge of this important piece of tradition of Jesus, such knowledge is not to be indisputably proved from the Epistles of Paul."

Already from this passage we perceive that the question with reference to Paul's prayers takes a wider range than merely his knowledge and use of the Lord's Prayer. In his references to prayer, we are told in this same context, the prayer of petition in general falls notably into the background in comparison with the prayer of thanksgiving, and petitions for forgiveness remain unmentioned even when the prayer of petition is spoken of. "Here Paul nowhere mentions, no matter how much occasion there was for it, the prayer for forgiveness; he neither bears witness to it for himself, nor does he recommend it to others with unmistakable clearness. This could be expected; since he is writing to congregations in which open sins, serious faults, lay publicly in sight. Even his intercessions for his congregations, the contents of which he incidentally communicates, do not enable us to determine that he prays for the forgiveness of their guilt. He prays for the growth of faith, the

[95] P. 10.

[96] The reference is to Wernle, as cited, p. 50, to which is added Gunkel, *Wirkungen des heilingen Geistes*[2], 1899, p. 61.

increase of knowledge, that they may receive in greater fulness the gifts which they already have." At a later point in the discussion this same line of remark is resumed. We read:[97] "Petition also, then, does not fail in Paul's own prayer-life. But in all the intimations concerning the content of his prayers all reference to prayers for the forgiveness of sins is lacking. We might repeatedly expect an exhortation to the congregation not to forget the prayer for forgiveness; most naturally, say, at the end of Galatians or Corinthians; but precisely here there is lacking even that general requirement of prayer, such as is found in I Thessalonians, Romans, Philippians, Ephesians, Colossians. Other passages seem to show directly that the daily prayer for forgiveness, such as is recommended in the Lord's Prayer, does not at least take a prominent place in the Apostle's circle of ideas. In Col. iii. 12 cf. Eph. iv. 32, the readers are required to forgive one another when they have suffered injury the one from the other. But as the motive for such a willingness to forgive, there is no indication that only under this condition will their prayer for forgiveness of their own sins be heard of God—though that would be sufficiently naturally suggested by Mat. vi. 12, 14 f., Mark xi. 25, 26, Luke xi. 4. Only the fact in their own past is recalled, that their sins *have been* forgiven to his readers, the fact of washing away their sins which occurred in baptism."

Having thus sharpened the problem to the utmost Bindemann makes it his task to show in detail that despite the fact that mention of the prayer for forgiveness falls into the background in Paul's letters, Paul's whole system of teaching supposes and demands it. In that system the guilt of sin takes the most prominent place and on every page of his writings it is pre-eminently the guilt of sinning which is presupposed. He will not even permit it to be said that, justification being presupposed, it is, with reference to the Christian life, the power of sin which takes the place in the

[97] P. 62.

foreground. Having pointed out that, according to Paul, wherever the "flesh" is, there is sin, that therefore all Christians still sin, and, still sinning, are still in need of forgiveness, he continues:[98] "according to all this, it should be admitted that the prayer for the forgiveness of sins takes a place in the piety of Paul of similar inportance to that which it takes in Jesus' proclamation of salvation."

Nevertheless (he proceeds to reason) precisely the significance which the contrast of "flesh" and "Spirit" with Christians possesses in the theology of Paul seems to many to lead to something different. There is an appearance as if, for the Apostle, in the estimate of sin in the Christian life, the idea of its *power* may stand in the foreground, while the idea of the *guilt* produced by it in God's sight retires into the background. Attention has accordingly been called to the fact that Paul never speaks of the importance for Christians of the forgiveness of sins obtained by Christ. Justification, forgiveness of sins, appear rather, it is said, as a possession, which believers have from the beginning on. On the other hand, it is said, the demand that Christians shall withstand the power of sin in the power of the Spirit is constantly repeated. In the description of the Christian life, interest in emancipation from the power of sin predominates with the Apostle. Here, therefore, the Apostle's teaching concerning the Spirit, which contains the really new and fruitful ideas of the Apostle, obtains the upper hand, while the juridical circle of ideas, which embraces the doctrine of justification, of faith, and so forth, seems confined wholly to the fact, lying in the past, of entrance into the Christian life. The Epistle to the Romans is, it is said, the proof of this; whereas the first five chapters are wholly dominated by the doctrine of justification, in the succeeding three which describe the life of the Christian, it is only the walk in the Spirit that is discussed. Thus the recession of prayers for forgiveness is explained, so it is said, by the concentration of the Apostle's interest on emancipation from

[98] P. 89.

the power of sin, whereas emancipation from its guilt, by the fundamental forgiveness of sins, which occurs once for all, is guaranteed once for all.

To this plausible representation Bindemann replies that not only does it fail to apprehend the close relations in which Paul's doctrines of justification and of the gift of the Spirit stand to one another; but it attributes to the Apostle a separation between the power and the guilt of sin, which would have been impossible to him. It would have been impossible to the Apostle to think of the power of sin, without at the same time thinking of its guilt. "It was far too serious an estimation of sin, which came to the Apostle out of his faith in God's forgiveness of sin on the ground of Christ's death, for the consciousness of guilt not necessarily to awaken with new sharpness along with the thought of Christ's act, on the occurrence of every sin that was committed in the Christian life." "Therefore," Bindemann says in conclusion,[99] "it is for Paul, too, wholly self-evident, that the Christian, considering his sin, necessarily needs the forgiveness of its guilt, and the assurance that this new sin also is forgiven and his communion with God is no longer disturbed." By such lines of thought as this, Bindemann supposes that he has shown that the preaching of Paul contains all the presuppositions which require of Christians prayer for forgiveness and manifests the sameness of the faith of Paul with that of Jesus. On this ground he thinks he may assert that Paul knew the Lord's Prayer and used it in the same sense in which Jesus gave it. "It can no longer seem strange that Paul never elsewhere"—than in the one passage in which he supposes it referred to—"mentions it, and does not oftener require it. We may hold it to be accident, if the few occasional writings which have come down to us from Paul, do not give us clearer information in the matter."

Ludwig Ihmels' excellent conference address on *The*

[99] P. 90.

Daily Forgiveness of Sins[100] occupies much the same standpoint with Bindemann's book. It itself sums up the result of its discussion in these words:[101] "We live by daily forgiveness and we praise God's mercy that we may live by it." But it adds at once: "To be sure, that we are sinners is no part of the Gospel and what we praise God's mercy for is not that we never have as yet overcome sin." That the address is preoccupied with this apologetical aspect of the question is due in part to the gibing tone of the assailants of the doctrine presented in it, and in part, no doubt, also to the circumstances that it was spoken to a company of pastors, and has as its object to advise them in their dealings with somewhat formal penitents. It is more concerned therefore to avoid appearing to give license to sinning among the indifferent, as something natural to the Christian life, which it would be useless to strive against, than it is to encourage the despairing with the assurance that their sins, though many, may and will be forgiven them.

The address opens by representing opponents as saying, "Must we sin, then, in order to be orthodox?"[102] Why preach the persistence of sinning among Christians and the permanent continuance of their imperfection? The answer is, in the first instance, says Ihmels, because it is true. It is also true, of course, that it is only half the truth, and the other half must be insisted on, too. And the other half is that "wherever personal Christianity exists there necessarily is also a radical break with sin."[103] The Christian is not to be expected simply to accept his lot and adjust himself to his continued sinning as to something that has to be endured.[104] And certainly he is not to be exhorted, as some sectaries exhort him, to look on all our sinning as in such

[100] *Die tägliche Vergebung der Sünden: Vortrag gehalten auf der X. Allgemeinen lutherischen Konferenz, zu Lund.* 1901.

[101] P. 34.

[102] P. 8. Ihmels says he takes these words from the lips of one of the leaders of the Sanctification Movement, meaning R. Pearsall Smith (*Reden*, p. 99).

[103] P. 9.

[104] P. 16.

a sense already forgiven as that we need have no concern about it. That is not the attitude of the New Testament writers to the sins of Christians. Nor is it the attitude of the Reformers. The Reformation doctrine of "miserable sinners" is a doctrine of penitent sinners. It has no application to the indifferent or the secure. It offers itself only to those who, broken-hearted in repentance, look to Jesus alone as their compassionate Saviour, and it tells them that for them too Jesus alone is enough. It does not tell them that they are not sinners; that would not be true, and they know it is not true; no one knows himself a sinner like a penitent sinner. It tells them that they are saved sinners,—and that is the most glorious thing it could tell them.

Advising his company of pastors directly as to how the public proclamation of the perpetual forgiveness of sins is to be made, Ihmels speaks as follows:[105] "This is the gospel —that God for the sake of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who gave Himself for our sins and rose again for our justification, will still have communion with sinners. As proclamation of the daily forgiveness of sins, this Gospel takes the form that God will not be prevented from fostering this communion by the continuing imperfection of the Christian state. The gospel, now, belongs, however, only to the sincere. Hence it follows that consolatory preaching of the possibility and actuality of continuous forgiveness, must be accompanied—of course not in the pastoral care of the anxious, but in the general public preaching—with a plain warning against all consciously cherished sin. Consciously cherished sin makes communion with God objectively and subjectively impossible—there can be no doubt of that. Then, however, the proclamation must carefully avoid all appearance of intending to treat the Christian's continuing sin itself as a part of the gospel. It cannot, in other words, seek to quiet the Christian, lamenting over his sin, with the consolation that it cannot be otherwise, and also that it makes little difference."

[105] P. 49.

It will have already been observed that the specialty of Ihmels' treatment of the general subject lies in the emphasis he throws on the duty of overcoming our sins. The forgiveness of our sins is in the interests of our overcoming them, not of our acquiescing in them. In this the whole essence of the gospel lies for him. "The whole Christian life," he says,[106] "in the sense of the Reformation is nothing but an unfolding of the communion with God and the blessedness grounded in forgiveness of sin. Therefore a forgiveness of sins, no matter how truly, as the warranty of communion with God, it may mean the whole salvation, would nevertheless be but a self-contradiction if it did not also deliver the Christian actually from sin." And what is true of the great central act of forgiveness, is true for him also of all the repeated acts of our daily forgiveness. They are in order to our constant advance in overcoming our sins. We are still imperfect; but it is perfection to which we are destined and it is through God's grace, manifested, among other things, in the forgiveness of the sins into which we fall on our way thither, that we are advanced toward it. This is the way Ihmels expresses himself on these matters:[107] "It may be said that among all assertions which are made about sanctification, there is none which is more lacking in Scriptural basis than that view according to which the divine act of justification needs to be supplemented by a later divine act of sanctification. On the other hand the Holy Scriptures certainly know of a growth in faith, which means at the same time a growth in the whole Christian life, and they know also of such Christians as they call in a special sense perfect. But let the Biblical notion of perfection be defined as exactly as it may, there are at any rate three things about which there can be no doubt. First, nothing is meant by it beyond the homely Christian state itself, accessible to all: it is rather a matter simply of perfection in this state. Secondly, the application of this conception to the individual Christian is always intended

[106] Pp. 12, 13.
[107] P. 20.

only in a relative sense. Lastly, this judgment has, moreover, nothing to do with absolute sinlessness."

Perhaps there underlies Ihmels' treatment of the Christian's advance in ethical attainment a somewhat inadequate conception of the mode of the supernatural re-creation of which it is the human manifestation. Like many of his fellows he is very much afraid of ascribing an operation to God analogous, as he would say, to the action of a natural force;[108] and is jealous above all things for "purely voluntary" action on man's part—as if the voluntariness of the human action was in any way curtailed by the underlying recreating or even "leading" action of God. When he comes to describe in detail, however, the process of the Christian's advance, the words in which he does so are at least capable of a thoroughly unexceptionable meaning. The main points in his description are that the Christian's life is a battle against remanent sin, but a battle fought under the initiation of God and with the promise of victory. "According to experience," he adds,[109] "this victory is not in this life a definitive one; the expectation of the complete overcoming of the flesh we connect with the complete deliverance from the obduracy of the world of sin and of death, and our immediate transference under the influence of God 'from face to face'."

Much the same note as is struck by Ihmels is struck by Johannes Hausleiter in another conference address—on *The Christian's Consciousness of Sins,*—delivered in 1904. This address is indeed more intimate in tone than Ihmels', because it deals not with pastoral duty but with personal religion. Having spoken of our vivid memory of past sins, Hausleiter asks whether the change that took place in us "when we believed" has broken off all relation to the "lusts of the flesh" which formerly brought us into sin. "Were that true," he says, "the memory of the past would

[108] E. g. pp. 16-36.

[109] Pp. 22.

[110] Published in the *Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung,* 1904, 26 (Jan. 24), coll. 610 ff.

not be so living, so present,—we might say so timeless—as it actually is. The Apostle Paul says, 'the flesh lusts against the Spirit, the Spirit, however, lusts against the flesh' (Gal. v. 17). The assertion applies to us, to Christians. We may be preserved now from many actual sins, if we let ourselves be led by the Spirit of God. But so long as we are involved in this body of death the old man does not cease to stir or to move. We have every reason to take heed to these movements and to combat them. When the Apostle gives the exhortation, 'Walk in the Spirit,' he does not add the conclusion, 'And then you will have nothing more to do with the lusts of the flesh,' but 'And then you will not *fulfill* the lusts of the flesh.' There is no longer need to fall into the gross works of the flesh and there should be no falling into them. But the impulse and the provocation to do so remains in our sinful nature, and therefore the necessity of conflict and of watchfulness abides. And therefore there abides the petition: 'Forgive us our trespasses.'"

Having next deepened our sense of the sinfulness of our misdeeds by showing how they are all specifically sins against God, Hausleiter proceeds: "There stands a declaration in the First Epistle to Timothy which has seemed to many strange. Paul writes here (I Tim. i. 15), that Christ has come into the world to save sinners, and adds: 'Among whom I *am* a chief one.' Has he not miswritten? Ought he not to have written, 'Among whom I *was* a chief one?' He is certainly already, washed, sanctified, justified; he is a servant of Jesus Christ, and His ambassador to the Gentiles. He has labored more than the others. But that is not his merit, but the merit of grace. Through God's grace he is what he is. But just because he lives continuously by grace, the knowledge of his sin is ever before him. They condition one another. Because Paul cannot live without the Savior of sinners, he reckons himself permanently among sinners, not among sinners who wish to remain sinners and are far from God, but among those who have experienced overpowering grace but who also know that they need grace

daily. Paul knows himself and his Savior. The Holy Spirit has opened his eyes." "The Christian knows," we read again, "that he is burdened with much more guilt than he himself perceives,—guilt of unrecognized results of earlier sins, still greater guilt of sins of omission in the region of charity. The Christian joins in the prayer of the Psalmist, 'Who can mark how often he fails? Cleanse me from secret faults' (Ps. xix. 13). Should he be willing consciously to increase the burden of guilt lightly? The Christian stands in daily conflict with sins of temperament, with sins of weakness and sins of habit. The grace of God has enough here to bear, to cleanse, to wash away. It were a sacrilege to draw on it deliberately by conscious transgression. God keep us, us Christians, from security! The consciousness of sin, in the earnest sense in which we have described it, is a means of protection."

We have moved into a totally new atmosphere when we turn to Otto Pfleiderer. A lingering relic of the old Tübingen school, an eager forerunner of the new history-of-religion school, he had no more in common with the Ritschlians by whom and with whom the controversy had in the main been carried on, than with their "miserable-sinner" opponents. We shall have to go back to W. A. Karl at the very beginning of the controversy to find anything with which we can compare him, and it goes without saying that Pfleiderer owes nothing to Karl, and that the parallel between the two has its very narrow limits. He takes his start as is his wont from general ethnic conceptions and endeavors to interpret Paul from them, placing in this interest at the foundation of Paul's thought the universal animism of heathen mythology. The book in which Pfleiderer's views on the matter which concern us are given expression, is the second edition of his *Primitive Christianity in its Writings and Teachings.*[111] The first edition of this work was published late in 1887. The second edition, "thoroughly re-

[111] *Das Urchristenthum, seine Schriften und Lehren* (1887) 1902.

vised and much enlarged" appeared in 1902;[112] and among the changes introduced into it were included the whole animistic background which Pfleiderer now wrote into Paul's doctrine of the Spirit, and especially the completed elaboration of that mystical conception which he had always attributed to Paul's notion of the relation of the Christian to Christ,[113] and on the basis of which he now represents Paul as inconsistent with his fundamental thought in recognizing sin as possible and actual in the Christian life.[114]

It will be observed that Pfleiderer is entirely willing to allow that Paul holds a supernaturalistic view of the Christian life. He assigns his supernaturalism, however, to an animistic inheritance. This animistic inheritance, nevertheless, has been modified by Paul in two directions. With him all the spirits had coalesced into one Spirit, the Spirit of Christ. And this Spirit operated in the Christian not occasionally only but continuously, and in particular became the productive cause of his whole ethical life. There is a recognition here of Paul's doctrine of the "leading of the Spirit," disparaged no doubt by its connection with animism, but nevertheless admitted in its fundamental elements. Now, Pfleiderer remarks that such a doctrine brings with it certain practical difficulties. "When the Christian life is referred back to a spiritual being of supernatural power, coming into man from without," he argues,[115] "the ethical self-determination of the human ego threatens to be suppressed, and the transformation seems to be effected in the

[112] An English translation was published in 1906, and the following references are to it.

[113] From the beginning of his occupation with the teaching of Paul (*Paulinismus,* 1873, E T 1877) Pfleiderer had attributed to him a mystical doctrine (which he calls a Mysticism of Faith), discovering the chief of its expressions in the "in Christ" which was afterwards to be exploited by A. Deissmann (see *Paulinismus* pp. 197ff.) On the early form of his doctrine of the Spirit the same reference will suffice, to which may nevertheless be added *The Influence of the Apostle Paul,* 1881, pp. 69 ff. In these early expositions of the "in Christ" and the "Spirit" is to be found the germ of all that Pfleiderer teaches in 1902.

[114] Pp. 404 f.

[115] P. 390.

inevitable fashion of a process of nature, in which, along with human freedom, guilt and sin would be excluded." That is to say, if we are in the hands of a supernatural power all our own activities must be supposed to be superceded and there must be attributed to the Spirit alone our entire, not merely recreation, but life-manifestation.

Pfleiderer says that Paul, "in his ideal picture of the spiritual life under grace (Rom. vi. and viii.)," does seem to make an approach to "these inferences." "But," he adds, Paul "is practical enough to recognize fully the continuance of sin even in Christians and attributes this to a principle of sin in the flesh which brings the ego into captivity. Over against the abstract ideal of the spiritual man who cannot sin, he sets directly the equally abstract caricature of the carnal man who can do nothing but sin (Rom. vii. 14ff.)." Here we have, he says, "two abstractions which are doubtless meant as the opposite sides of the same condition." They are nevertheless, in Pfleiderer's opinion "in fact mutually exclusive, and in their opposition split the unity of the personal life in a dualistic fashion." He thinks the "difficulty is solved," however, if, following "modern psychology," we interpret Paul in terms of "psychic conditions, motives, determinants of the will, which, as they are developed out of the unity of human nature, are always held together by the unity of personal consciousness in such a way that they form its proper content, the manifold factors of its life activity."

As this is precisely what Paul means and says, without prejudice to his supernaturalism, we can but wonder why a self-contradiction should be thrust upon him only that it may be immediately resolved. The contradiction is resolved, however, in Pfleiderer's view only for himself, not for Paul, and in his further exposition of Paul's teaching as to the Christian life it is pressed to its extremity. "A lofty idealism," we are told,[116] "appears in this description of the Christian life. The Christian is no longer in the

[116] Pp. 404 ff.

flesh but in the Spirit; he has crucified the flesh with its lusts; the world is crucified to him and he to the world; he is risen with Christ, lives in the Spirit, possesses the Spirit of Christ. Christ himself lives in him instead of his former ego; he is a new creation; his life is hidden with Christ in God; he has become a spiritual man; he is like Christ. That over such a being sin no longer holds sway is self-evident; that is what makes it so difficult to grasp the fact that nevertheless in the actual Christian life sin is still present. The Christian, as Paul describes his character, ought properly no longer to be able to sin, since the divine Spirit is the ruling ego in him, and the sinful flesh is conquered, abolished. Yet Paul is far from drawing this obvious inference from his doctrine of the Spirit. On the contrary, all his epistles testify with what prudence and care he estimates the actual ethical condition of his churches, censures their weakness and sins, and exhorts them to lay aside all evil and contend unremittingly against sin. Spirit and flesh stood in constant strife with one another; and the victory of the Spirit does not come to pass by itself with the unfailing certainty of the laws of nature, but depends on whether the Christian endeavors to walk according to the standard set up by the Spirit, and mortify the deeds of the body, or allows sin again to have dominion over him."

Pfleiderer supposes here that according to Paul the flesh may defeat the Spirit,—that neither justification nor the spirit of sonship secure "unconditionally" the ultimate salvation of the Christian, but that he stands or falls at the last judgment according to his works—which is certainly not Paul's teaching. But he closes the paragraph with a direct declaration that Paul did not, in any case, ignore the sins of Christians, but deals with them at large and in detail. He then proceeds to declare that there is a contradiction, in Paul's presentation of the Christian life, between his doctrine of it as Spirit-led and his doctrine of it as the scene of ethical effort. We are accustomed, he says to correct or to soften this contradiction, by calling in the notion of develop-

ment, process, progressive advance. This is, however, declares Pfleiderer, inconsistent with the supernaturalism of the one aspect of it. "How," he asks, "in relation to the overmastering divine being, is there room for the free self-determination of the human will?"[117] But the distinction which Pfleiderer draws here—between divine control and human function—is not Paul's. Paul's preoccupation is with "the flesh" and "the Spirit"—the old instinct to evil, and the new power (certainly divine) to good. What Pfleiderer is asking is, how the creature can resist the creator. His whole preoccupation is with freedom. "Is not the new man on this assumption," he asks," at bottom a will-less slave of the holy spiritual being in his heart, as the old man was a slave of the demonic sinful being in his flesh (Rom. vi. 16 ff.)? Is he the active and responsible subject of sanctification, or is he only the passive object for the possession of which two hostile powers, the holy spiritual and the fleshly sinful, contend (Gal. v. 17)?" Why take either horn of this dilemma, with its exclusive either—or? Neither represents Paul, who instead of Pfleiderer's Either God or man, says with great clearness, Both (Phil. ii. 12, 13).

It is not without its interest to observe Pfleiderer applying Rom. vii, 14 ff. to the Christian as a description by Paul of one side of the Christian's condition.[118] On an earlier page,[119] to which he here refers us, he declares of Rom. vii. 25 that it is a "confession which is by no means to be referred to the past of the Apostle before his conversion, but pictures a present and continuous condition." He adds, however, "But of course only as regards the 'natural man,' which continues to exist even in Christians alongside of the supernatural 'pneuma,' and is here portrayed by Paul with the same one-sided abstraction with which he elsewhere

[117] P. 407.

[118] P. 390.

[119] Pp. 734 f. This whole passage is in the second edition added bodily to the statement in the first edition (1887), which closes on a different note.

portrays the new spiritual life of Christians." "Only," says he, "from a combination of the two one-sided pictures, —the dark picture in chapter vii, and the bright picture in chapter viii,—can we gather Paul's complete view of the actual concrete Christian life (Gal. v. 17)." With this background of the dualism of Paul's representation behind him, Pfleiderer can now go on to declare that in Rom. viii., Paul represents believers as set free by the Spirit from all sin, meaning "not merely the removal of the guilt of sin, but also the overcoming of the power of sin." Only—it all depends on our coöperation and after all it is only an abstract picture of one side of the matter, the other side of which we have already read in Ch. vii.

This is not untying the knot; it is not even cutting it; it is leaving it as tightly tied as it was before. The debate could not end in such ambiguities. We find it accordingly returning at once, for better, for worse, to the round assertions of Wernle. Only so was there hope of rescuing these assertions from their impending disintegration. Whether this rescue could in any case be accomplished we may learn by observing Windisch's valiant attempt to accomplish it.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

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"MISERABLE-SINNER CHRISTIANITY" IN THE HANDS OF THE RATIONALISTS

III. Windisch and the End

The assault on the Reformation conception of the Christian life could not end on so ambiguous a note as that struck by Pfleiderer. On the contrary, what may very properly be spoken of as the last word said in furtherance of it, was the most direct that had been said since Wernle's own, and in many respects the most forceful and telling of all. We are referring, of course, to Hans Windisch's at once brilliant and ponderous volume on *Baptism and Sin in the Oldest Christianity up to Origen*,[1] which was published in 1908. We have already pointed out the relation of the book to Wernle's published twelve years before. It came into the controversy which Wernle had provoked, very distinctly at the end, when the debate was languishing, and indeed, from the point of view of Wernle's contentions, when the battle was lost. It had much the appearance accordingly of a last vigorous attack, seeking to wring a victory out of defeat. And assuredly little was left unsaid by Windisch that could be said to rescue and save a lost cause.

What Windisch undertakes to do, to speak now of the formal contents of his volume, is to take up Wernle's proposition that to Paul Christians are in their actual nature sinless men, to justify it by a really thorough exegetical survey of the Pauline material, and then to place it in its histor-

[1] *Taufe und Sünde im ältesten Christentum bis auf Origines. Ein Beitrag zur altchristlichen Dogmengeschichte,* 1908. The book, published when he was twenty-seven years old, was Windisch's first book; at least it was preceded only by his Doctor's dissertation on *The Theodicy of Justin,* 1906.

ical connections both narrow and broad. For this purpose he traces the related conceptions with the same thoroughness through the rest of the New Testament books, and then extends the view backwards to Ezekiel and forward to Origen. He discovers preparations for the theory of the sinlessness of Christians, attributed to Paul, in the Prophets' demand for repentance, in the Jewish dogma of the sinless man of the end-time, and in the sacramental rite of cleansing baptism. He follows what he thinks of as survivals of the Pauline conception through the early Patristic writings, pausing at Origen only because he discovers in him the complete dissolution of the theory of Baptismal cleansing and the recognition of the natural necessity of sin, even for Christians. It is naturally, however, upon the New Testament text itself that he expends his chief effort, and he discusses this with a minuteness of detail, a fulness of exegetical comment, and a richness of illustrative remark which make the volume in effect a commentary on the entire New Testament from the point of view of its witness to the relation of the Christian life to sin. This detailed discussion of the New Testament text is of course the strength of the book; but, since its task is approached from a point of view really alien to the New Testament, it is also its weakness. Many concessions require to be made, many acts of exegetical violence are committed, much special pleading is indulged in, and it still remains necessary to declare the New Testament writers constantly inconsistent with themselves. Under whatever form it may be put forward, it is very clear that this is not really exposition. It rapidly becomes obvious to the reader that the New Testament passages which are discussed cannot be strung on the thread with which they are approached, and the most thorough of all attempts to show that to the New Testament writings the Christian is a sinless man becomes, by the very attempt to be thorough, its most thorough refutation. It becomes ever more and more plain that the text is intractable to this theory of its meaning.

We are not surprised, therefore, to observe that Wernle, reviewing the book under the spur of a wholesome sense of his own partial responsibility for its vagaries, throws into primary emphasis the notable lack of plain, human common sense which, despite all its diligence and acuteness, deforms its exegesis; and the general deficiency in it of a feeling for reality. "During the reading of great parts of the book," he says, "we live in the labyrinth of a bewitched world, while the simple reality of life lies without." In other words, Windisch has not shown us the plain three-dimensioned world which the New Testament reflects; he has attempted to work out a new two-dimensioned or four-dimensioned world, and to impose that on the New Testament writers as their own. Naturally everything in their world, under this treatment, takes on an artificial aspect. "What kind of a Paul is this that is depicted," cries Wernle,[3]—"a Paul for whom in the Epistles to the Corinthians the occurrence of sin in Christianity 'obviously' and 'again' 'makes theoretical difficulties,' who over against the same Corinthians 'artifically creates the problem of the sinful Christian,' who at I Cor. x. 1ff 'deals plainly with the problem of sin after baptism,' who gives to his Galatians as sinful Christians an injunction to the sinless life, and sets before them the essence of the Christian as sinlessness, whose whole point of view was dominated by an ideal portrait of the Christian according to which the disappearance of sin characteristically accompanies becoming a Christian? I find this Paul, despite all the pre-Christian elucidations which Windisch adduces, a total psychological enigma; and not only he but all the primitive Christians in the mass must have been visionaries and dreamers if the author's closing result be right,—that Christians are in their real nature sinless men. No day perhaps passed for them in which intelligence of faults, failings, aberrations, did not smite their eyes or ears from near and far, and yet, for example, it was so difficult for the

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[2] *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1909, 21, col. 589.

[3] Coll. 587-8.

preacher of Second Clement, because of his rigoristic theory of baptism, to make a demand for repentance, that he must writhe about sadly before he can give to Christians the exhortation to penitence demanded by the actual state of things. And why so? Because first of all for all those Christians a theory of sinfulness was firmly established, and it was only with the presupposition of this theory that they could approach empirical reality."

In summing up at the end of his volume, the results of his investigations, Windisch formulates them crisply in the words which we have just seen Wernle quoting from him. They all are comprehended, he says,[4] "in this, that he has established it as the doctrine of the primitive Church, that Christians are in their real nature sinless men." He then proceeds to develop a rationale of this doctrine, founded on the circumstance that Christianity is a historically grounded redemptive religion, in which the two matters of the first interest are the nature of the Redeemer and the nature of the redeemed. As the Redeemer is by nature without sin, so must His redeemed become sinless men. It is the burden of prophecy that all sin must be put away in order that the salvation of the Lord may come. It is the expectation which informs all apocalypses, that God will make His people sinless. Christianity comes as the fulfilment of prophecy and the realization of all the hopes founded on it, whether given expression in apocalypses or elsewhere. In it the longed for Messiah actually comes, and He brings with Him all that God's people had been taught to look for in Him; and that very especially in the special form of those expectations which sees just in sin the enemy He is to overcome. As the Messiah must be Himself without sin, so must He, in every sense of the word, save His people from their sins.

Of course all this is in substance true. But it does not follow that from this point of view Christians must be sinless; that, as Windisch expresses it, "sinless men have been

[4] P. 507.

on the earth ever since the sinless Messiah was sent by God"—because "the fulfilment of the hope and the realization of the requirement in the circles of the Christians have their historical starting point in the person of the Messiah Jesus."[5] The essence of the matter is contained in the simple remark that all that is here adduced leaves it still an open question how and when Christ's salvation of His people from their sins is to be supposed to reach its completion. He came into the world, let us say, to save sinners; to save them from their sins; from the guilt of their sins, from the pollution of them, from their power, from the commission of them,—from all that they are, and from all that they bring with them in the way of effects or consequences. But it does not follow that this whole body of results must be supposed—or will naturally be supposed—to be brought about at once—"on faith." There is death, for instance; that it is a consequence of sin (Rom. v. 12). There may have been some in Paul's churches who fancied that they were to be relieved from the necessity of dying (I Thess. iv. 13 ff). Paul does not encourage the notion. He points rather to the resurrection, and to the coming of Christ, events which were to take place in the future,—how far in the future he says he does not know, but quite obviously well in the future. It is impossible to imagine that this Paul, nevertheless, supposed that the whole process of salvation was instantaneously completed when the act of faith was exercised. Rather, he constantly refers its completion, and that very especially in its ethical aspects, to this same coming of the Lord (I Thess. ii. 19, iii. 13, v. 23). It is that future event—perhaps far future event—then, which forms the term of the salvation of Christians; and as their salvation is precisely salvation from sin it is only at the arrival of that event that they realize to the full the "salvation from sin" which they receive from Christ Jesus.

This fundamental historical fact enables us to place our finger on Windisch's central error in his interpretation of

[5] P. 509.

the New Testament writers with reference to the nature of the Christian life. He misses the significance of the inter-adventual period. Paul calls it "the day of salvation," which means not merely the day in which salvation is freely offered to men, but also, in the light of a passage like I Cor. xv. 25 f., the day during which the saving work is perfected in men and in the world. Windisch necessarily misses this constitutive fact in Paul's teaching because he ascribes to the New Testament writers, Paul included, an expectation of the coming of the Lord as immediately impending. That is not, however, their view. Paul, for example, teaches with great fervor and consistency a doctrine of a prolonged period of development under the government of the exalted Jesus, through which the world advances to a glorious consummation. It is in this period of world-development that he sees his Christians living. They form its core and leaven, and he of course attributes to them individually a similar development, reaching its completion in the same great consummation. Not when He was on earth merely, but now also while He is in heaven, according to Paul's view, Jesus is actively our Saviour. He is still while in heaven "saving His people from their sins;" and that not in the mass merely, but also with reference to the individual. His work of saving the individual therefore as truly as that of saving the world is given the character of a process; and the end of this process for the one as for the other is to be reached only at the parousia. That the sanctification of the Christian is a process, belongs thus to the very substance of Paul's doctrine of salvation, and his repeated allusions to it in his writings cannot be explained away.

It is not, however, on the progressive character of the Christian's salvation from sin, itself, that this new interpretation of Paul impinges with most deadly effect, but on —what is implicated in it— the continuous dependence of the progressively saved sinner on the living activities of the saving Christ. We are made to feel this very sharply when

Windisch comes to tell us how the teaching of the Reformation differs from that of his new Paul.[6] The difference, as stated, turns, of course, on a difference in their views of the application of justification. According to Paul, we are told, we receive in justification forgiveness of our past sins only, while with Luther the forgiveness received in it is extended to all the sins we may commit through life. This mode of statement, however, only touches the surface of the matter. Underneath it lies a conception which throws the Christian back on his own resources and withdraws from him all recourse to, as it denies of him all need of, the continued saving activities of Christ our Mediator. The real dividing question comes, therefore, to be seen to be whether the Christian is always dependent on Christ and always looks to Him as His one complete Saviour. According to the new interpretation of Paul, Christ earns for us only the first grace; after that we must earn eternal life for ourselves by our own work and merit. This means of course that his own works are a Christian's sole dependence. It is only, we are told, those out of Christ who have no works on which to depend, and who therefore are exhorted not to depend on their own works. Paul, "in his rejection of our own works is thinking apparently only of the works of our earlier life;" while the Reformation expressly excludes present and future works also. All that we receive in Christ is thus for Paul exhausted in that "first grace"; after that we are left to our own resources. This is as much as to say that all that Christ has done for us is to start us on our way; we have to walk in the way for ourselves. We must not forget that, according to this new reading of Paul, he represents Christ as giving us a magnificent start. He not only in that "first grace" gives us forgiveness of sins but takes them away; so that all we have to do is to keep ourselves as He leaves us. It is not, to be sure, overly clear precisely what is meant by His taking away our sins; in the passage at present be-

[6] Pp. 524 ff.

fore us, Windisch apparently assumes that it means the cleansing of our corrupt nature—which is also what from the logical point of view it should mean. At all events it is here that the difference between this new reading of Paul and the Reformation teaching comes to its head. Windisch fixes on a phrase in the *Formula Concordiae* to give it pointed expression. We are told there that "we are and remain sinners" because of our corrupted nature, and therefore depend entirely on Christ. "This 'and remain sinners,' " says Windisch, "admirably indicates the application of the doctrine of justification which goes beyond Paul." According to Paul, we do not "remain" sinners, and accordingly do not any longer need Christ. We have got all that Christ can give us; henceforth it is our own concern. Clearly we have two different religions contrasted here. We gain by the new interpretation of Paul a more immediate perfection in our lives. We lose by it Christ out of our lives.

It would be wrong not to pause to observe that this new interpretation of Paul is really a modernization of Paul, in the theological sense of that word. One may suspect that it has its real source largely in the imputation to Paul by its authors, in more or less fullness, of their own conceptions of what the Christian life actually is. It is at all events a great step towards the modernization of Paul to relieve him of all implication in the ascription of a present saving activity to Christ. Really "modern" men do not think, of course, of allowing to even the acts of the historical Jesus any expiatory character, any "forgiveness-procuring" value. But it is a wide step toward their mode of thinking to eliminate all activities of Christ except those of the historical Jesus. When it is said that Paul knows nothing of continued saving activities by Christ after His death—that what he did while on earth, serves, according to Paul, to bring about that repentance and faith which secures forgiveness and delivers from sin, and after that, it is our own concern —the exalted Christ is made as much "hidden" to Paul as it

is to Ritschl, and all communion with Him is as completely eliminated from Paul's thought as it is from Herrmann's. The resultant conception of the Christian life itself, therefore, attributed to Paul is also thoroughly "modern." Man is thrown back on his own ethical activities, which are made the decisive thing in his standing or falling. All that he really obtains from Christ is a new start; the slate is washed clean for him. No doubt it is in the inspiration of this new start that he goes forward. But in the end all depends on what he has himself written on the cleansed slate. Paul is in other words thought of as teaching a "moralistic" doctrine of salvation of quite modern aspect. He is made a very respectable follower of Ritschl—or something worse.

It is this understanding of the teaching of Paul, and with him of John,[7] and indeed *mutatis mutandis,* of the whole New Testament, and of early Christianity in general, that Windisch sets before us at the end of his volume as the result of his investigations. It is questionable, however, whether the detailed report of these investigations, very richly set out in the volume itself, sustains this result. Windisch is himself very prompt to admit that we cannot speak with any propriety of it as the only Biblical doctrine. Indeed, from his point of view there is no such thing as "a Biblical doctrine"; many different notions concerning the Christian life may be found in the Bible. To give point to this assertion, he adds illustratively:[8] "Yes, even 'miserable-sinnerism' is represented in the Bible. Jesus, for example, along with the Methodistic notion of repentance which he employs, along with His strict requirement of cleansing, recognises the continuance of sinning, and assures His disciples like any Lutheran Christian of the abiding favor of God." It may tend to console "miserable-sinner Christians" to know that it is admitted that Jesus is on their side. And this is not all. For Windisch is com-

[7] Cf. p. 509: "Paul and John are the typical and irrefutable witnesses for the dogma that the Christian is freed from sin (*entsündigt*)."

[8] P. 634.

pelled to admit also that Paul himself is not able to preserve unbrokenly an attitude towards Christians which sees in them those sinless men whom he is said to proclaim them. In point of fact, it is explained,[9] the relations of Christians to sin are spoken of by Paul from three different points of view. "The *Messiah-man, cleansed by God,* is delivered from all sin and temptation. *The normal and ideal Christian* has separated himself from sin, is conscious of no new sin, and yet must, under the faithful guidance of God, be on his guard against sinful temptation. Finally the *unestablished, imperfect Christian* still occasionally commits sin, and even is still entangled in serious faults; he is still unconverted, has not yet yielded himself to the control of the Spirit, has lost the feeling of being with Christ and with His Spirit; if he is not to be destroyed he must at length repent and let the Spirit come into action, he must repent afresh and yield to Christ and to the Spirit." Needless to say the Apostle gives no hint of the existence of any such three classes of Christians. These are only three different ways in which, according to Windisch, Paul is found actually dealing from time to time with Christians. If so we can only say that he dealt with them very inconsistently,—implying sometimes that Christians are glorified saints, sinless and sin-proof; sometimes that they are indeed without sin but only through their own strenuous efforts and always liable to sin; and sometimes that they are sin-stained creatures who must bestir themselves lest they perish. Windisch, however, very remarkably as it seems to us, draws the conclusion from the situation thus depicted that Christians are, according to Paul sinless beings. "In every case," he says, "all—what has happened and what ought to happen—tends to this—that the Christian is a sinless man." "By this ideal," he now continues, "all the Apostle's expectations are permeated. Only in two passages (I Cor. iv. and v.) does Paul give expression to the view that God will pardon also the Christian who has remained a sinner; these, however

[9] P. 219.

deal with disgraceful exceptions." He says two passages, apparently, only by a slip of the pen. There is nothing in the fourth chapter of First Corinthians to satisfy the allusion, and it is clear that his mind is on merely the opening verses of the fifth chapter. Therefore he continues: "In this single passage Paul gives expression to a conception which presents an individual Christian as a 'miserable sinner' who is not able to fulfil his life-task. We may add to this, no doubt, certain oft-recurring exhortations, which at least indirectly 'reckon with the sin of the Christian,'—exhortations to return no more evil for evil (I Thess. v. 15, Rom. xii. 17), to forgive one another as God has forgiven us (Col. iii. 13, Eph. iv. 32)." This is a most inadequate adduction of the relevant material; but even so, it is enough to show that Paul does not prevailingly deal with Christians as if they were sinless, but assumes on the contrary that sin ever lies at their door. Windisch, however, comments as follows: "Our expositions have shown that in none of these declarations can the proposition find support for itself that Paul sees in sin the constant attendant of the Christian." It is doubtless true that exhortations not to sin imply immediately only a constant liability to sin, not a constant sinning. The distinction is, however, a rather narrow one; and one wonders whether a constant liability to sin which was never illustrated by actual sinning would naturally call out such constant exhortations against sinning.

And one wonders also whether Windisch wishes to convey the impression that in his exhortations to growth in the Christian life Paul invariably confines himself to the positive side of this growth, or the putting on of graces, and never exhorts Christians to the negative aspect of it, or the putting off of vices—always in other words, urges the putting on of the new man, never the putting off of the old man. Obviously the implication of exhortations to put away vices may be not merely that we are liable to these vices, but that we are afflicted with them. Paul's Epistles fairly

swarm with such exhortations. The fact is too patent to require illustration, and it is not denied by Windisch. He founds on it indeed his representation that Paul has two inconsistent theories of cleansing from sin, the mystic and the paranetic; and in expounding this representation he actually allows that the paranetic theory implies the continuance of sinfulness in Christians.[10] "The paranesis of conversion," he says, "goes back to the phrases, 'that ye may walk in newness of life,' and 'that ye may no longer serve sin'; only, according to its intrinsic peculiarity, it presupposes subsistent sinfulness or temptability"; it is only this second theory, he says again, "which reckons with the temptability of the Christian, and in it there is even to be assumed as we have seen, an actual sin of the Christian." This admission falls short, no doubt, of allowing that Paul presupposes "continual sinning" in Christians, although that too is the real implication of Paul's continual paranesis. It must be allowed also that in dealing with the several paranetic passages Windisch does his best to transform the imperatives into indicatives. It is in its failure to enter into what may be called the prevailing paranetic tone of Paul's epistles, indeed, that Wernle finds the fundamental fault of Windisch's book. It would be truer to the real state of the case, he intimates,[11] if instead of turning the imperatives into indicatives, the indicatives were read as nothing but strengthened imperatives. "The inability to sin in Rom. vi.," he adds illustratively, "is the strongest imperative which Paul has at his disposal, and very properly passes therefore in the end into the *impropriety* of sinning. . . . In I Cor. vi. 11, Gal. v. 25, this imperative in the form of retrospect is very evident." The idea meant to be conveyed is that Paul always writes with moral impression in view and has as his end the ethical advancement of his readers. Even his indicative statements have this as their end, and to that extent have an imperative concealed in their affirmations.

[10] Pp. 180-182.

[11] *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1909, 21, col. 588.

The fundamental paranesis which Windisch has to face in his endeavor to turn the exhortations rather into declarations, is of course that of the sixth chapter of Romans. He opens his exposition of this passage[12] with the remark that Paul repels the suggestion that Christians are to continue in sin—and that is the same as asserting that they are no longer to sin—and supports it by declaring that sin has become an impossibility to the pardoned man. This representation can be allowed only provided that the "impossibility" asserted be understood as a logical one. That is to say, what Paul asserts is that it is grossly inconsistent for the converted man to sin; he ought not to sin with an oughtness which should be compulsory for his whole conduct. If, however, it were a sheer impossibility in the strict sense of that word for Christians to sin Paul should have spared himself his useless argument. That he has not thus spared himself proves that sinning was not only not impossible for the converted man, but was not unexampled among converted men, or even unusual. Paul is laboring here to deter his readers from sinning: and that is the way we deal with men who still sin, not with those who have ceased sinning altogether. Windisch allows that the life, the new life, is presented in some sense as a task; but he insists with reference to the newness of life itself, that it is a sheer gift, and that the power that it brings is not an "ought" but a "can." This is of course so far true: but the point at issue is not the newness of life itself but the walk in this newness of life; and that is, as he is himself ready to allow, a task. He dismisses the idea, it is true, that this task includes the overcoming of hindrances; there is no conflict, no effort, no advance in the walk to which Christians are exhorted. "As little as in the case of Christ is the new walk conceived as a conflict or advance." "It is a walk on an open and level road." What is true in such statements is only that these things are not expressly notified in the words themselves, but are left to the general implica-

[12] Pp. 167ff.

tion. But they are very expressly included in the general implication. The future tenses, as it is natural they should, greatly disturb Windisch. But his troubles come to their climax only when he reaches the "believe" of verse 8 and the "reckon" of verse 11. "The determination of the sense of the 'reckon,'" he says,[13] "is not easy and not certain." "I might say," he adds, "that it is the subjective conception of an objective fact, arising from the 'apprehension' of Christ and of mystical connection with Him. To gather from it an element of pure subjectivity and of uncertainty of the objective, seems to me illegitimate. Paul would no doubt have applied 'reckon' to the possibility of mysteriously worked circumstances." Very possibly. But he could not easily apply it to objective conditions directly known in an experience already in full enjoyment. The thing that cannot be balked is that Paul's readers had to *consider* themselves dead to sin and living to God. It was *not* to them a matter of complete present enjoyment but of faith. And then, at this point of the discussion, Windisch has to brace himself to meet as best he may the full force of the paranesis.

The memory of his struggle with the sixth chapter of Romans, Windisch carries over with him to Col. iii. 5, another paranesis which gives him some trouble. Paul is dealing in the opening verses of this chapter, he tells us, with the positive side of the Christians' transformation. They have been raised with Christ; and, having been raised, says Paul, their life is now hidden with Christ in God. "The glorified nature," Windisch explains, "is already present but invisible, hidden still in God's protection. It is only the revelation, not the new-creation of the 'life' that still holds back." The influence of the Jewish hopes of cleansing and glorification on Paul's thought, Windisch suggests, is visible here. "Like the apocalyptist Baruch, Paul sees cleansing and glorification together as one process." He certainly sees them together,—and one result

[13] P. 174.

of that is that he postpones the accomplishment of the one as of the other to the manifestation of Christ our life; in the meantime it is true of both these things that they are "not yet manifest." This means naturally that as we are not free from weakness in this transition period, so we are not free from sin. Windisch, however, says: "A reference to the sinful *habitus* of the Christian is altogether lacking;" it is only asceticism that is in question, and that is spoken of with contempt. Why, however, we need to ask, does Paul throw such contempt on this asceticism? Precisely because it is useless for the purposes of moral cleansing! These practices, says he (ii. 23) "are not of any value against the indulgence of the flesh." That is the reason why he pronounces them useless to his Christians. What he conceives Christians to be in need of, therefore, is something that will aid them in their battle against "the indulgence of the flesh." Is not that to relate the matter to "the sinful *habitus*"? And is it not to say that the Christian life on earth is a process of conquering sin in its manifestations in that life—"the *indulgence* of the flesh"? Positively, no doubt, this process may find expression in seeking the things that are above, in contrast with the things of earth (iii. 1, 2). But it has a negative side too. Precisely because we have died with Christ and our life is hidden with Him in God, to be manifested in all its fulness in due season, we must bestir ourselves in the meanwhile to be prepared for its revelation. "Mortify therefore your members which are on the earth," says the Apostle (iii. 5 ff.). "Therefore!" That is a very significant "therefore," and one very unaccountable to Windisch. "The very first word 'mortify,'" he says, "shows clearly that a completely new train of thought is begun." But Paul says "therefore." "What we have to inquire," Windisch says, "is whether possibly there is not attempted here a connection between heterogeneous conceptions." But Paul says "therefore"; and "therefore" does not connect "heterogeneous conceptions." Well, says Windisch,[14] it is at

[14] P. 200.

least not a *process* of cleansing which is intimated here: look at the aorists—"mortify," "put away," verses 5, 8. It is an abrupt passage from sin to holiness which the apostle has in mind. But neither will this plea serve him. The "aorist of the strong imperative" is too familiar a usage to be overlooked.[15] Of course Paul wished decisive acts of moral amendment from his Christians, and that is the reason he uses these strong aorists. But there is no implication that the end in view could be accomplished at once. And the main point is that such an exhortation was not superfluous for Christians. Windisch seeks to meet this, desperately we should suppose, by suggesting that Paul was so accustomed to the use of a catechism for neophytes that he writes down mechanically from it these exhortations, though, of course, he had no knowledge of his readers being guilty of any such sins. In other words, his exhortations here are purely conventional. If so, we need to ask why it was that he was led to transcribe just such and such sections of the catechism for neophytes when writing to Christians. Must we not suppose that he used the sections of the catechism which in general were suitable to the case in hand? We do not seem by this road to escape the implication that precisely these exhortations were appropriate for Christians as Christians.

A similar means of escape to that which he makes use of here Windisch essays again, when commenting on Rom. xiii. 1 where Paul requires Christians to be good citizens and warns them that rulers are of divine appointment and we must subject ourselves to them for conscience's sake and not merely from fear of punishment. It certainly seems to be implied here that it was conceivable that Christians, if

[15] Cf. Winer's *Grammar of New Testament Greek,* Thayer's translation, p. 314. In John xiv. 15, *Keep* my commandments does not mean keep them once for all; neither does, John xv. 4, *Abide* in me, refer to a single act; nor, I John v. 21, *Keep* yourselves from idols, refer to a single separation of ourselves from idols; nor, Mark xvi. 15, Go and *preach,* refer to the delivery of a single sermon. The verb in every petition of the Lord's Prayer is an aorist, the suitable tense, as Gildersleeve says, for "instant prayer."

they did not take heed to themselves, might transgress the law of the state and in doing so sin against God. This appearance Windisch does not deny. "Here," says he,[16] "the Apostle seems clearly to say that now and again sin may bring even Christians into conflict with the state." "But," he adds, "this is not so. It is not Paul the counselor of the community of believers in the Messiah who is speaking here, but the Hellenistic instructor of mankind. The Thou is man not the Christian. The possibility that a 'Christian' should need to be punished by the state for an offence, he did not seriously entertain; he did not intend to apply the civil law to the sin of the 'Christian.' What he wishes to make obvious to the Roman Christians is the humanitarian conception of the state, in and of itself. They are to observe in the ordinances of the state the same divine discipline to which they have subjected themselves." As Paul here forgot he was a Christian leader addressing Christians and spoke as a heathen philosopher preaching good citizenship, so, only a few verses further on he forgets himself again and speaks to his Christian readers in the forms in which he was accustomed to address his heathen audiences in his missionary preaching. The passage is Rom. xiii. 11-14, and Windisch finds it impossible to deny that Paul speaks in it to his readers as if they were still living in sin.[17] He speaks to them, he says, as if they were still unconverted people. He exhorts them in terms—"make not provision for the flesh, to fulfill the lusts thereof"—which imply that they were still capable of sinning, or, rather we should say, were still constantly sinning: *"continue not* to make provision for the flesh to fulfill the lusts thereof." The Christians are simply required to put away their vices, and the vices that are enumerated are real vices. This, precisely on the ground that they are Christians, that they had long been Christians, and that it was high time for them "to show up better" as Christians. This certainly does not look as if

[16] P. 190.
[17] Pp. 191-2.

Christians were to Paul as such sinless men. No, as Windisch complains, he treats them as if they had always up to the moment of his addressing them, lived like heathen. But Windisch grasps at the straw, that he requires of them an immediate and final break with their old sin: "Not a realizing now to be begun and gradually to be accomplished is required, but an immediate passage from sin to sinlessness." Even that straw, however, does not sustain him. He is at his wits' end. "The words," says he, "strike on us as very surprising. That a totally changed conception of the Christian state lies here, is felt by everybody. We have found the ideal carriage of the community strongly emphasized, never actual sin, but only the possibility of sin, brought into consideration, a process of renewal already brought in substantiated. Now the Christians are suddenly required to discontinue their vicious life, and yet such vices are alluded to as could confidently be supposed to have been overcome. How is this change in conception to be explained?" Windisch sees but one way. Paul was a missionary, and had acquired certain modes of speech in his missionary addresses. And here, as he was writing to the Roman Christians—"the spirit of the missionary came over him, and instead of the Christians who needed only further helpful instruction, he sees a body of lost sinners before him whom he now has to snatch with one grasp out of their sinfulness."

There is another characteristic of the passage which gives Windisch some trouble. That is the interchange of the first and second persons in it. Windisch is unwilling to allow any significance to this interchange. "Because it is the missionary that is speaking," he says,[17a] "I do not think that the 'we' is to be referred to his self-consciousness. It is a pure style-form. It gives place at once to 'you.' Since he abandons the first person precisely with 'put ye on,' it is clear that he cannot have included himself in the 'we'." For support in this somewhat remarkable opinion

[17a] P. 192.

he apparently appeals to A. Jülicher's comment on the passage. At least, to the sentence which expresses his opinion that the "we" is not to be referred to Paul's self-consciousness, he appends a note which says, "compare Jülicher," with a reference to Jülicher's comment. We do not find anything in that comment, however, which can lend support to Windisch's representation.[18] What we find, on the contrary, is a remark to the effect that Paul does include himself in the exhortations of verses 12b and 13, and that that fact precludes our using verses 11, 14 to prove that there was no trace of spiritual life in the Roman church at all. This would be in any case an overstrained use of these verses; but the fact that Paul includes himself in verses 12b and 13 and does not in 11, 14, does at least show that he did not feel it possible to associate himself with the Roman Christians in what he has to say of them in verses 11 and 14, or at least in verse 14—for the "you" in verse 11 may be only the direct address appropriate to the opening of the exhortation. The strength of the language employed is, no doubt, throughout, as Jülicher suggests, due to a desire to move the consciences of the Roman Christians strongly. The particular items in the enumeration of vices in verse 13 are chosen accordingly to meet their case, actual or possible. In

[18] Jülicher's Commentary on Romans is published in J. Weiss' *Schriften des Neuen Testaments*. The section on Rom. xiii. 11-14 is identically the same in the first and second editions (1907, 1908.) The failure of Jülicher to support Windisch at this point is the more significant because they occupy common ground in the contention that Paul holds that Christians are sinless. Commenting on Rom. iv. 15, for example, Jülicher represents Paul as meaning that "where the law is not—in the blessed present (iii. 21, 26)—there is also no transgression and accordingly no excitation of the divine wrath." And then he adds: "An extremely characteristic declaration of the ideal glory in which Paul saw the condition of humanity—no more punishment because no sin." E. Kühl (*in loco*) very sharply, from his own point of view, corrects Jülicher for this certainly very unjustified exposition and inference. It is probably enough to say that the meaning of the declaration that "where law is not there is no transgression either"—which is no doubt a general proposition—is *here* that the promised inheritance was in no sense conditioned on law; it was a promise of pure grace and rested on the righteousness of faith.

associating himself with his readers in these middle clauses of the passage the Apostle—the more forcibly that it is purely without calculation—intimates that it is not true of bad Christians alone, but it is a universal Christian characteristic, that they must be constantly turning away from sin and reaching upwards. As Jülicher puts it: "that the awakening from sleep and the putting on of Christ must be daily repeated, with ever greater result, was to him no mystery." It is impossible therefore to escape from the implications of the passage that Christians are not sinless but sinful men, in process of making their way through the night to that day which is presented as the goal of their endeavor.

A similar instance of Paul's associating himself with his readers in an exhortation to moral improvement is found in 2 Cor. 1. 7: "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God." Windisch deals with this passage very much as he deals with Rom. xiii. 11 ff.[19] It is clearly a piece of missionary preaching which Paul more or less inadvertently delivers to his Christians. He is not thinking of any "gradual amendment," but is calling on sinful Christians to lay aside once for all, in one comprehensive act, all sin, and "to let the ideal of a truly holy walk become reality in their empirical life." It is only misplaced exegetical ingenuity which would "infer from the use of the first person that the Apostle includes himself in the exhortation." "The 'we' is a friendly style form." Meanwhile, it remains inexplicable that if Christians are as such sinless men Paul could address these Christians in this fashion. The Christians whom he addresses he distinguishes at length and in the most pungent way, in the immediately preceding context, from the heathen; and exhorts them to hold themselves aloof from heathen modes of thinking and standards of conduct. He cannot possibly be reverting here to a "missionary" mode of speech more suitable to heathen than to

[19] P. 150.

Christians. There is no reason whatever for representing the cleansing to which Paul exhorts here as a thing which is expected to be, or that can be, accomplished suddenly, in a single stroke. The employment of "the strong aorist"—"let us cleanse ourselves"—only shows that the Apostle is exhorting his readers to undertake the task he is urging them to at once, vigorously and with decisive effect; while the present participle which follows it—"while we are bringing holiness to perfection"—shows that the task is accomplished only through a process,—is, as H. A. W. Meyer expresses it, "the continual moral endeavour and work of the Christian, purifying himself." And finally it is beyond question that the Apostle includes himself in what thus is marked out as the common task of all Christians. No one forms an exception, at any stage of his Christian life, to the need of purifying himself from defilement of one sort or another, affecting the flesh or the spirit, and so continuing the perfecting of his holiness in the fear of God. And therefore, when exhorting the Corinthians to this activity of, not keeping ourselves pure, but of making ourselves pure, the Apostle, as Meyer puts it, with true moral feeling of the universality of this need, places himself, the mature Christian, on an equality with them, the immature. The Christian life is conceived here as a continuous process of active advancement in, negatively, purification and, positively, sanctification.

A very striking passage of the same general order meets us in I Cor. xi. 17 ff. In the midst of Paul's rebuke of the Corinthians for irreverent conduct in connection with the Lord's Supper, two verses (vs. 31, 32) suddenly occur in which the second person gives way to the first: "But if we discerned ourselves we should not be judged. But when we are judged, we are chastened of the Lord, that we may not be condemned with the world." The effect of this change of persons is, of course, to give the assertion contained in these verses a greater generality. "You," "you," "you," the Apostle had been saying, and after these verses

returns to saying: here he says "we"—not setting the two pronouns in contrast with one another (which would require that they be expressed) but broadening the one into the other. But why should he broaden his statement in just these two verses? H. A. W. Meyer (and Heinrici after him) says: "The use of the first person gives to the sentence the gentler form of a general statement, not referring merely to the state of things at Corinth, but of universal application." That is true of course; but it does not fully answer the question. There is no obvious reason why just this remark should be singled out for gentler statement. It is not intrinsically the severest remark in the context, which therefore called particularly for softening. The plain fact is that, in his rebuke to the Corinthians, the Apostle introduces this general mode of speech here because what he has to say here no longer applies to the Corinthians only, but is true of all Christians, himself included. Only the Corinthians had been guilty of the specific faults mentioned in the surrounding context. But all Christians are sinners; they all require to "discern themselves"; they all fail, more or less, in that wholesome duty; thus failing, they are all chastened by the Lord, in order that they may escape condemnation for their sins. This is the picture which Paul draws for us here of the Christian life. A. Titius is quite right, then, when he says,[19a] that Paul "in I Cor. xi. 31 f. expressly reckons himself in the number of those who are judged and disciplined by the Lord, because they have foreborne their own proving—" although he is at once contradicted by C. Clemen[20] and subsequently by Windisch.[21] Windisch does not say here, however, as in former cases which we have noted, that Paul's "we" is simply a trick of style and means nothing. He endeavors to discover how Paul may be supposed to associate himself with the Corinthians, without the implication that he too needed to be brought to give proper attention to his sinning by

[19a] As cited, II. p. 83.
[20] As cited, *Paulus,* II. p. 102.
[21] P. 139.

chastening from the Lord. The theory which he broaches is in brief this—sufferings were sent to others to bring them to a recognition of their sins and to separation of themselves from them; they were sent to Paul, to suppress temptation to sin in him. In associating himself with the Corinthians by his "we," "Paul therefore did not intend to recognize that he too was punished by God because of his sins; he has nevertheless used a 'we,' because he too in another sense reckoned himself among the 'disciplined.'" This is rather a weird theory—which has no ground in the text, and indeed has nothing to recommend it except that it avoids recognizing that Paul confesses himself a sinner, who is dealt with by God as a sinner. It labors meanwhile under the disadvantage that in its effort to relieve Paul from the sins which he confesses, it involves him in a sin which he does not confess; and indeed scarcely avoids involving God Himself in sin. For it is not a sin to profess to be at one with others in a matter in which you are really radically different from them? And is it not a sin to inflict punishment where punishment is in no way deserved?

It is quite clear that Paul conceives of Christians as not yet freed from sinning. Windisch struggles hard not to admit it, although of course he struggles in vain. How hard he struggles may be revealed to us by his comment on I Cor. xii. 21.[22] There is probably no passage in the New Testament which throws into a more lurid light the sins of which Christians may possibly be guilty. Paul, speaking to his readers with affection and addressing them as "beloved," expresses a fear lest, when he comes to them, he may find the evils which he has rebuked among them still existing, and many of the sinners whom he has reproved still unrepentant. He describes those whom he has in mind as "those who have formerly sinned," meaning those whose sinning had fallen under his rebuke on a previous occasion, —as it seems without effect. Windisch[23] adopts the notion, however, that by "those who have formerly sinned" Paul

[22] P. 151.

[23] P. 151.

means those who have sinned before their conversion (as if Paul could have imagined that there were any who had *not* sinned before their conversion) and seizes upon the words to ground a representation that Paul means to say that these sinning Christians were not Christians at all. "I may paraphrase the words," he says, "thus—they continue their heathenish sins steadily, and have not even yet repented." Paul, it seems, "looked upon such Christians as have still after baptism committed whether serious or lighter sins, as if they had not yet been converted at all: sinning Christians are to him unconverted people." The fact that they sin proves that they have not yet been converted—because Christians do not sin. It is part of Windisch's theory, however, to emphasize the "not yet." They are not quite the same as heathen after all: they have been baptized, and by their baptism they have both been made capable of repentance and been obligated to repent. But they have not done so; and until they have done so, they are not Christians; and that is the reason they can still sin. That is the theory, he says, that Paul went upon. But experience compelled Paul to modify it. It was only too plain that Christians did sin. He could not think otherwise, however, than that if a real Christian sinned he would be hopelessly lost: there remained no place of repentance for him. And so Paul, out of the gentleness of his heart, represents the Christians who sin as not yet having completed the process of becoming Christians by repentance, and so as still capable of salvation. This reasoning is so incredible that we transcribe the very words in which it is presented:—"The 'not yet' however is to be emphasized. It is precisely because of it that baptized people also are *able* to repent. When Paul describes sin as a Christian's sin, it sounds as if he gave the sinner up for lost: the fornicator severs himself from Christ. If he intends to maintain the salvation of the sinning Christian, he changes his point of view; then the Christian has not yet entered into relation with Christ. Radically framed conceptions

dominate his thought; but because within the limits of these radically framed forms a change of point of view is possible, he is able to do justice to reality. There is nothing problematical to him about the repentance of one long baptized." This certainly is beautifully simple. Paul describes Christians as sinning and repenting. Windisch says that in Paul's view Christians do not sin, or if they manage to sin, cannot repent. Hence, says he, when Paul speaks of a Christian sinning, and calls on him to repent, he really means he is no Christian. And thus, he says, Paul keeps in touch with reality. We observe meanwhile simply in passing that it is precisely the "spiritual" Christians whom in Gal. vi. 1 Paul speaks of as liable to fall into sin; and perhaps we may be allowed to add that in I Tim. v. 30 not only Christians as such but even the elders among Christians are contemplated as able to sin.

It is only Paul, not Windisch, who is deceived by this mental legerdemain. And thus, as we have already seen, Windisch is compelled, after all is said, to pronounce Paul self-contradictory in his modes of thinking of Christians in their relation to sin. He does not pretend to think this contradiction a merely surface one. "Paul," he tells us,[24] "following different influences arising from experience and observation, brings together really incompatible things. From the mysteriously wrought cleansing, from the mystical life with Christ, which has made men insusceptible and apathetic to the allurements of sin, there exists no passable road for logical and psychological thinking to the obligation to refuse obedience to sinful lusts. No doubt even the theory of cleansing and renewal permits an outlook on the further life of man. But the way in which the walk of the cleansed person is described shows that no subsequent conversion can be added. The new walk is not given the task to overcome old oppositions; the new man has only to tread the road which God has opened for him and in which God leads him. Thus Paul, in Romans, sets the theory of bap-

[24] P. 217.

tism and the requirements of conversion immediately together, and when he, in the later letters, unites them, an insoluble contradiction arises, because he is trying to think incongruities together." And yet he suggests that Paul's entertainment of two such contradictory conceptions together is psychologically explicable from the circumstance that in the rite of baptism a place was found for exhortation to the neophyte to carry out in life his character as a baptized person. "This element of human activity suggested by the theory of baptism may offer a certain mediation between the two disparate modes of conception. It means that the instruction and exhortation may be tendered also to the cleansed man. Presenting himself to empirical man, Paul falls involuntarily into the tone of the preacher of repentance." Windisch does not remark on the equal inconsistency of the conjunction of the two conceptions in question in the baptismal ritual or even on the extreme inadvertence of Paul in forming his fundamental teachings.

In another passage[25] he discusses somewhat more seriously the possibility of conciliating the two theories—the mystic and the paranetic, as he calls them. The prevailing exegesis, he points out, maintains their organic unity. The God-wrought change is spoken of as a transference of the life-center, or, more frequently and more weakeningly, as a change in principle. And there is attached to it the task which is set for man. This is actually to realize in the empirical being, gradually pushing on to the outermost periphery, what God has effected in principle and in the center; or actually and really to become what we already are in principle. This conception, now, Windisch pronounces not un-Pauline if only the notion that the empirical cleansing proceeds gradually be eliminated. It becomes in this form in fact, he says, one of the theories of cleansing which he has himself brought to view as Paul's, consisting in an organic combination of the doctrine of justification and

[25] Pp. 180-182.

the requirement of conversion: "faith signifies an inner transformation of the spirit of man, which capacitates and impels him to put away sin by a radical break in his empirical life too." On the other hand, he continues, the mystical theory of cleansing can find no place in this mode of conceiving things. In it, deliverance from sin and the establishment of life appear as embraced in one particular definitive total process—that is to say, as effected in their completeness all at once. "The notions of dying and death are characteristic of this conception: they designate for the Christian experiences of the past and declare the impossibility of sinning in his new nature." The rejection here of the current understanding of the entire body of Paul's teaching as to the application of salvation, as forming an organic unity, declaring a salvation with the creative activity of God at its basis and human activities working out into manifestation what God works at the center, is, it will be observed, solely in the interest of the theory that what Windisch calls the mystical conception involves the complete transformation of human nature instantaneously. That is, however, by no means the case. Paul's insistence on the radicalness of the change wrought by God's saving power in sinners, by no means carries with it the implication that the whole change is completed in the twinkling of an eye. On the contrary the implication is always that it consumes time in its completion and engages in its processes the activities of men. It turns out that Windisch is not altogether unwilling to allow this. At the end of the paragraph he says that after all a certain conjunction between the two theories is possible, a line of connection may be laid down. And this line of connection proves to be precisely this: that "the mystical theory of cleansing too can speak of an activity of the man, of the man awakened to new life" "Only," he adds, reaching now the center of his contention, "this activity is exempted from the task of overcoming sin." Apparently then the concession amounts only to this: that in recreating man God does not destroy

him; he is still living and acting; but living and acting now as a sinless man, whereas before he lived and acted as a sinful man. He has no battle to fight, no struggle to undergo; as we are elsewhere told, the path opened up before him is a straight and smooth one.

That Paul does not so represent the Christian life, Windisch knows just as well as anybody. That is precisely the inconsistency of Paul which he is at the moment engaged in asserting. For side by side with the mystical theory of cleansing stands Paul's paranetic theory, and this presupposes "the continuous sinfulness or temptability" of Christians. "Thus there are two mutually exclusive theories which Paul opposes to the misuse of his gospel of grace; the one explains that the Christian by God's power has obtained a sinless nature,—the other that through the reception of grace he is obligated and capacitated to a sinless walk. Paul sums up what he has to say as to the relations of the Christians to sin thus—they are broken off through God's power or through the energy of the man's conversion. The first mode of conception describes the Christian throughout as a man suffused with heavenly powers, detached from the natural conditions of life. Only the second theory reckons with the temptability of the Christian; in it, as we have seen, even actual sin is assumed in the Christian."[26] In this contradiction he is forced to leave Paul. He does indeed add, most unexpectedly: "Our statements would require a decisive correction, if the exposition of the seventh chapter of Romans—no longer it is true the prevailing one—which finds set forth in the conflicts portrayed in it experiences of the renewed Paul, of the renewed ego, had to be recognized as right. Then it would be convincingly proved that the apostle 'is even inherently sinful,' yes, that he recognizes himself as a 'poor, miserable sinner.'" It is not in the seventh chapter of Romans alone, however, as we have already had occasion abundantly to observe, that Paul recognizes himself as well

[26] P. 181.

as all other Christians as sinful. Windisch has been telling us indeed that one of the two thories of cleansing which Paul employs in his teaching on the subject implies not only the temptability but the continued sinning of Christians. If however the matter is to be hung on the seventh chapter of Romans we are content: it seems to us quite certain that we have in these pungent verses a revelation of the inner life of the Christian striving against sin.[27]

We certainly are conscious of no revulsion when Windisch lays stress on the greatness of the change which Paul felt himself to have experienced when he became a Christian. Neither is the language in which he describes it in itself altogether intolerable.[28] We can put a benevolent sense on such phrases as that Paul was "filled with Messianic enthusiasm," or even that he conceived himself "already a man of the Messianic era, transformed by the Messiah by means of a personal revelation, a new creature, with his selfish body dead, his sinful-lusting flesh suppressed, his sin removed." "Christ is here, the new age has come, the man of the new age is here"—that not unfairly expresses Paul's conviction. He did suppose that a supernaturally wrought transformation had taken place in him, and in all Christians. And this transformation was expressed in his life by (among other things) a sense of cleansing, purification. He, his Christians, were no longer of the earth earthy; their citizenship was in heaven; and they were sharers in the heavenly character,—which is without sin. We cannot emphasize too strongly this experience. It is the strength of Windisch's presentation that he emphasizes it—although he emphasizes it as an "experience" rather than a fact. He tells us what Paul thought of himself in his "enthusiasm," rather than what

[27] Windisch cites for this interpretation M. R. Engel, *Der Kampf um Römer 7*, 1902, to which he adds F. Mülau and L. Ihmels. This does not, however, exhaust the important names even in the "miserable-sinner" controversy. Add Max Meyer, E. Cremer, J. Hausleiter, Paul Feine, and even C. Clemen, O. Pfleiderer, A. Deissmann. Junker leaves the matter undecided.

[28] Pp. 220ff.

Christ had done for Paul in His almighty grace. That is the weakness of his presentation, and beyond that this further weakness—which perhaps is, in part at least, a result of the former—that he allows no time for the accomplishment of the great change, no process for its perfecting, no beginning and middle and end to it; but insists that because it means a radical breach with sin, therefore from its very inception no trace of sin can be admitted to exist. As a result he is compelled to admit that this high conception could not be sustained by Paul; that contact with life brought him disillusionment, or we must rather say, failure —for it was a matter which concerned not abstract opinion with him but a self-judgment which in the face of experience he could not maintain. Immediately after describing in glowing language how Paul in his enthusiasm felt himself without sin, Windisch is forced to add:[29] "It is true that, cast into the old course of things, he was not able to maintain literally his enthusiastic conception. He had to say of himself, that sin in him was not slain but put to flight. He could represent his life to his enemies and to those whom he wished to win for Christ as a blameless walk according to God's working. But to his friends he revealed the secret that the maintenance of it on its high plane cost him uninterrupted struggle." Is not this a little seventh chapter of Romans of Windisch's own? Surely this is not the Paul who knows himself a man of the new age with his selfish body dead, his sin-tempting flesh suppressed, his sin taken away. But Windisch still has some fragments to save. The sin in him is not dead as he fondly thought; he needs steadily to fight it to keep it down—(that is the seventh chapter of Romans): but he keeps it down. "But that he has failed, that he fails and sins, incidentally and daily, he has never conceded." He had, says Windisch, plenty of occasions to confess his sins if he had any to confess; and other teachers,—Philo, James, Clement, Clement of Alexandria, Origen—confess that

[29] P. 222.

they are "miserable sinners." Why not Paul? It might be enough to answer that Paul was not writing a confession but letters,—letters dealing not with his own conduct but that of his readers; and that he constantly includes himself with them when speaking of their liability to sin. It may be better to say simply, There is the seventh chapter of Romans—and Windisch's own little seventh chapter of Romans which we have just had occasion to observe. It seems to be very much a matter of standard. Probably no one thinks Paul was a "common sinner," or supposes that he means to represent all Christians as "common sinners." But if "sin is not dead in him," then he was still a sinner; and sin, being alive in him, affected all his activities, none of which was what it would have been had there been no sin in him,—and so he was not only "an incidental and daily sinner" but a perpetual sinner; and we are not surprised to hear on his lips the "miserable sinner's" cry—O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?

According to Paul, says Windisch,[29a] Christianity rests on two foundation-stones: "justified by faith, and led by the Spirit; or without guilt because believing, and without sin because pneumatic." His purpose is to emphasize the latter of the two, because, in his view, the Reformation has thrust it aside and elevated justification into a position of such dominance that it may be thought of as the whole of Christianity.[30] And in emphasizing the latter of the two he wishes it to be taken strictly as he has expressed it, and justice to be done to its coordination with justification. Christianity consists in these two things, not in one without the other. At an earlier point[31] he had, therefore, very properly repelled an idea advanced by Wernle and Munzinger to the effect that Paul's missionary preaching was of a purely religious character and took no account of ethics. We may learn the contrary, he says, even from his use of

[29a] P. 158.

[30] Pp. 524, 529, 531.

[31] P. 101.

the single word "sanctification." For "'sanctification' is the process by which the sinful man becomes a pure personal being, perfect according to the divine model,"—citing I Thess. iv. 7, 2 Thess. ii. 13 in illustration. Men, he continues, having received in faith the salvation to which God called them, were "by a divine act at the same time separated from the impurity which had formed their nature hitherto; there was given to them in the Holy Spirit the power to pursue a holy life removed from all immorality." "This moral transformation," he now goes on to say, "is accordingly conceived as an act of God and as a task which is appointed to the believer, as the total task of his life." This statement, which is not far from Paul's actual teaching as to the Christian's sanctification, and which seems quite simple in itself, Windisch finds to contain a whole nest of antinomies. These he undertakes to "explain," not in the sense of resolving them, but of seeking an origin for each separately in Paul's inheritance—as if Paul's mind was a mere receptable into which things were dropped to remain related to one another only by mechanical contiguity. The main matter on which we wish to lay stress now, however, is the strength of the assertion that Christianity consists no less in sanctification than in justification —a statement quite true in itself—and the use to which it is put in order to discredit the Reformation doctrine of justification.

In the section in which the teaching of Paul as a whole is summed up, his doctrine of justification is presented in the first instance in its relation to the sins of Christians.[32] "The doctrine of the gracious justification of the sinful man,"—the discussion begins in purely general terms, but with Paul in view—"seems to push aside the question of the sin of the Christian as a matter of course, as raising no problem. The sinful man stands here on earth exposed on account of his sin to condemnation in the rapidly approaching judgment, but over against him stands the

[32] Pp. 213 f.

gracious God who does not impute to him his enormous guilt. This judgment is assured and sealed to him. Past and present are taken together; the view goes into the future which will bring salvation and glory because God forgives sin. In principle there lies at the bottom of this doctrinal conception the idea that the sin of the Christian will be forgiven as a matter of course." Then the discussion turns pointedly to Paul: "Paul also has so formulated it that the sinning Christian could draw from it daily comfort and assurance; we have forgiveness in Christ and stand under grace; Christ appears for us against every accusation." "But," it goes on to say, adducing the contrary part—"but only once has Paul made the general assertion that Christ's intercession and God's justifying judgment cover every sin." We interrupt the quotation to note in passing that it is admitted, then, that Paul has made the assertion once. And now Windisch continues:—"Never does he in an individual instance point the sinning Christian to the forgiveness that will never be denied him. For the most part he presents the doctrine of justification in the form in which it describes the condition of entrance into the Christian community, in which it grounds the forgiveness of the enormous guilt that has accumulated in the past." "Accordingly," he continues, "Paul attaches directly to it the two other theories which have for their object the passing away of sin out of the empirical life of the Christian, the real sinlessness of the normal Christian." "Paul never says, Be of good comfort despite your sins, because they will be forgiven you. Because they are forgiven he demands now conversion too. And now there arises a schism of thought from the necessary orienting of the requirement of conversion to the expectation of judgment. Alongside the proclamation of grace, that believers will be saved from the judgment, there enters this requirement to leave off sinning because they will be judged. It is, now, the motiveing of this requirement of cleansing which makes the sin of Christians a problem. Paul plainly declares that

sin compromises salvation—the individual sin which is committed after conversion, after baptism." There are four ways, Windisch now tells us, in which Paul knows how to adjust to one another the two ideas that all a Christian's sins are forgiven and that sin is something abnormal, unsuitable in his life, which must disappear. What he looked upon as normal was that the Christian should commit no sins; then he would have nothing to answer for at the judgment. If he did commit sins he might renew his repentance and so wipe them off his slate; or he might expiate them in suffering. In either case he could still stand in the judgment. "Only one mode of conception reckons with the idea that a Christian remains a 'sinner,' or that his act of repentance has failed: the condemning judgment is not spared the sinful Christian. It is grace that nevertheless saves him."[33] "Thus," Windisch now adds, "the theory of conversion adjoined to the doctrine of grace is able to maintain the sinless character of the normal Christian, and nevertheless at the same time to reckon with the sin of the Christian."

Surely the two propositions that Christians are as such sinless men and that only that one of four classes of Christians which manages to maintain sinlessness may be called normal Christians—are not identical. So soon as we allow, as must be allowed, that the Christian proclamation includes provision for sins committed after justification, whatever that provision is, we allow that the Christian man is not as such sinless. To say that at least the "normal" Christian is sinless, is a distinct misuse of the word "normal." Not only are Christians not presented in the Pauline Epistles as, as a rule, sinless, but they are presented as never sinless. The sinless Christian does not meet us on Paul's pages: there, all Christians live not by works, but by grace. What is true is that Paul presents Christians as in principle sinless: that is their fundamental character as Christians—although it is not yet realized by them in

[33] P. 215.

fact; they are all "in the making, not made." They are not seeking to obtain salvation by being good, but striving to work their salvation received by faith out into the goodness which constitutes its substance. It will scarcely have escaped notice that, after all has been said, Windisch is not able to avoid admitting that according to Paul, justification covers the sins of Christians also. When he attemps to set over against one another the justifying decree on the one hand and Christians' liability for their sins at the judgment day on the other, he is not able to keep them from fitting into one another as parts of one unitary conception. It is very striking to observe him, on coming to describe his fourth class of Christians—those who come up to the judgment day still burdened with their sins—compelled to say that they bear their punishment, it is true, but still are "saved by grace." When commenting on Rom. viii. 33,—"who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect?" and the rest—Windisch admits that it is implied that occasion for laying a charge against God's elect could be found and that in, not their pre-Christian but, their Christian life. Their safety depends, not on the falseness of the charge supposed to be made against them, but on God's decree of justification and the saving work of Christ, which was not confined to a single past act but embraced in it also a continued intercession. "Here then," he says,[34] "for once the relation to the whole life of the Christian which is intrinsic in the doctrine of justification is brought to expression." Why he should say "for once," is not easily discerned. It is just as clearly implied in Rom. viii. 1: "There is therefore now no condemnation to those in Christ Jesus," as we have had occasion to point out at an earlier point. It is just as clearly implied also in Rom. v. 9 ff. and Phil. iii. 9, although Windisch labors to escape the implication in both instances. Undoubtedly in Rom. v. 9 ff. Paul grounds the future "salvation" of Christians as exclusively on Christ as their past justification; and argues from the

[34] P. 188.

one to the other *a fortiori*,—their justification carries with it their "salvation" by necessary implication. Similarly in Phil. iii. 9 Paul represents himself as trusting utterly at the last day in the righteousness of God received by faith, in sharp contrast with any righteousness of his own whatever. Passages like these leave no room for attributing to Paul a conception of justification which confined its effect to sins committed before it had taken place; and as little a conception of the final judgment which supposed it to proceed solely on the basis of works done after justification.[35] After all said, it is the fact of justification which according to Paul is the ruling fact in the Christian life and the Christian destiny.

It will scarcely have escaped observation that Windisch is apt to give expression to the difference between Paul's doctrine of justification and that of the Reformers in sharp negative propositions. In a passage which we have only recently had before us,[36] he says for instance: "*Only once* has Paul made the general assertion that Christ's intercession and God's forgiving judgment cover every sin." And again: "*Never* does he in an individual instance point the sinning Christian to the forgiveness which will never be denied him." Similarly we read elsewhere:[37] "Paul himself *never* unambiguously *declared* that the forgiveness which the Christians experience passes over also to their new sins; he only acted on this principle." And again:[38] The attempt "to comfort the aroused *conscience* of the sinning Christians meets us *only once* in Paul." It will no

[35] On the rather vexed question of the relation of "judgment according to works" to "justification" see the excellent lecture by E. Kühl, *Rechtfertigung auf Grund Glaubens und Gericht nach den Werken bei Paulus*, 1904, and also the page or two (including a quotation from Chalmers) in J. Buchanan, *The Doctrine of Justification*, 1867, p. 237f. Compare further Paul Feine's discussion, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, 1910, pp. 308, where the literature is given, to which add James Moffat, in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*, II, 1918, p. 391 f. and G. P. Wetter, *Der Vergeltungedanke bei Paulus*, 1912.

[36] P. 213.

[37] P. 518.

[38] P. 526.

doubt have been noticed that each of these statements is carefully qualified, and that nevertheless they are scarcely perfectly consistent with one another. The two pairs in which we have arranged them are so related indeed that the universal statement in each is provided with an exception in the other. The net result of the four declarations is thus that it is allowed that Paul does all the things which seem to be denied of him—even though he has done them each but once. We have here, then, not even an argument from silence, but only an argument from relative silence: which at the most might suggest that Paul and Luther threw the emphasis somewhat differently in applying their common doctrine of justification. The real import of the matter is that Windisch is aiming all the time at the one thing he most dislikes in Luther's teaching—that Christians sin daily and daily need and receive forgiveness. At this, accordingly, he directly launches his most sharply framed negative assertions. "The daily forgiving of his sins to the daily sinner," he says,[39] "is a gracious benefit which is never mentioned in Paul, and which, when it is mentioned is never related to the fundamental religions position of the Christian"—a sentence which is so prudently guarded that it seems not to wait for a companion sentence to contradict it. Again:[40] "Confessions of sins," like Luther's when he says "we sin much every day"—"do not meet us in Paul and John (in this generality)." Should however, all that is said in these and similar assertions be granted, what do they amount to? Nothing beyond the very natural fact that in the few and brief occasional letters which have come down to us from Paul, much is left unsaid, or is only briefly and perhaps only allusively said, that nevertheless belongs to the essence of his doctrine, and in other circumstances and on the call of other needs among his readers would have been said with the same fulness and vigor that he has used in developing the aspects of his

[39] P. 525, 6.
[40] P. 525.

doctrine which he was called to emphasize. Paul has given us no systematic treatise; what he wrote he wrote in reference to the needs of the situations he required to face. It is enough that he has given us the doctrine of justification. We should not demand that he shall have developed systematically every element in it and given a place in his Epistles to each of its possible applications in precise proportion to its systematic importance.

The difference between Paul's position as apostle to the Gentiles and Luther's as reformer of the Western Church, carried with it necessarily a difference in the particular application of their common doctrine on which each necessarily dwells. In the very nature of the case it was the "former sins" of his readers which most concerned Paul —as they most concerned them; equally in the very nature of the case it was the present sins of their constituents that most concerned the Reformers—as they did their constituents. To erect this inevitable difference of interest in the varied aspects of the application of the doctrine, into a fundamental doctrinal difference is preposterous. It is as absurd to suppose that because Paul was absorbed in the forgiveness of past sins, he was ignorant of the forgiveness of present sins in God's justifying grace—or even ready to deny it—as it would be to suppose that because Luther was eager to comfort Christians, agonizing over their sins, by assuring them that they were forgiven them in Christ, he was careless as to the forgiveness of sins which say, a converted Jew might have committed before conversion, or ready even to deny that they were capable of forgiveness. It is Wernle, however, who in a few remarkable—and very extreme—sentences, written for another purpose, teaches us how Luther's situation in the midst of the long established Christian community, of necessity affected the particular direction which his interest took as he dealt with the great topics of sin and salvation. "We have never been sinners, entering only now by a conversion into the condition of regeneration," says he:[41] "we know absolutely nothing of

[41] *Der Christ und die Sünde bei Paulus.* 1897. P. 3.

sin outside the Church. The problem of the Christian life, as the Reformation framed it, and as Ritschl has stated it afresh, is this: how can the Christian be in spite of his sin, a joyful child of God?" Something like this was, we say, necessarily the form in which the problem of the Christian life presented itself most pointedly to the Reformers. As necessarily it presented itself to Paul most pointedly in the form of how the Christian could be a joyful child of God in spite of his past. In meeting the needs of their differing situations Paul and Luther inevitably dwelt most constantly on different aspects of their common doctrine. That is the whole story.

Along with Paul it is John to whom Windisch makes his principal appeal to prove that to the New Testament writers Christians are men who do not sin. "Paul and John," says he,[42] "are the typical and irrefutable witnesses for the dogma that the Christian is cleansed." And he is eager to have it understood that they are independent witnesses. That they are united in testifying "that the Christian and sin are forever separated from one another,"[43] shows how firmly the idea was grounded in reality; and also, no doubt, how completely the pre-Christian conceptions on the subject were taken over into Christianity and made a part of its teaching and its life. We have seen how he has fared in his attempts to interpret Paul in this sense. His success is no greater with John, by which is meant in this connection mainly the first epistle of John. He already finds himself in great trouble with I John i. 5 to ii. 3. Contradictory statements seem to him to be set here side by side. John represents Christians as enjoying, as such, complete actual sinlessness. And he represents them as still sinning. Windisch deals with this embarrassing situation in the following fashion. Even those declarations which assert that Christians still sin, he says,[44] "do not presuppose that we sin on and on, and consider ourselves only to be in a

[42] P. 508.
[43] P. 276.
[44] P. 258.

gradual process of suppression of our sinful nature (*Art*). They rather have in view a chief act, in which we confess the sins which *we have* committed (perfect tense) and receive now the forgiveness of sins and at the same time cleansing from every wickedness." This, however, is not at all what John says. He has not a "chief act" of confession in mind, but continuous acts of confession as sin after sin emerges;[45] and this confession is not brought into immediate connection with the perfect "we *have* sinned," as Windisch's representation seems to imply, so much as with the continuous present, "if we say we have no sin," where "sin" must mean "act of sin," standing as it does between two connected plurals. Nor can the perfect "we have sinned" in this context bear the sense which Windisch seeks to put upon it. When he continues: " 'Cleanses us from all iniquity' must, like the preceding analogous phrase, be expounded as an *actual cleansing* of the man, which gives his life a new character," he is assuming the least likely sense of the word "cleansing."[45a] Even on this view of its meaning, however, John is speaking not of a cleansing wrought all at once, but of an energy of cleansing resident in the blood of Christ and applied progressively up to the completion of the process. John in this passage is assuring his readers that their sinning cannot separate them from Christ—provided that their sinning be dealt with as it should be dealt with, fought against and brought to Christ, and not covered up with lying denials. He says his whole mind in the first verse of the second chapter: "I am writing these things to you that ye sin not, and if any man sin"—not "has sinned," as Windisch tendentially renders[46]—"we have an advocate with the Father." John obviously understood himself therefore to be writing paranetically, and to have it as his end to deter his readers from sinning, and to give them comfort when nevertheless they fell into sin. He is, in other words, just

[45] See Hüther here. [45a] See R. Law here.

[46] Consult Winer-Thayer, p. 293 and H. A. W. Meyer on I Cor. vii. 11.

a "miserable-sinner Christian." And this Windisch himself is constrained by the next clause—"for our sins, but not for ours only"—to admit. "The declaration that Christ makes propitiation for our sins," he says,[47] "generally formulated as in Col. i. 14 and Eph. i. 7, is now here for the first time expressly applied to the sins of the Christian. The general formula might include this application; that it was not unknown to Paul might be inferred from the eighth chapter of Romans. But he never spoke it clearly out and it cannot have been current with him. It is John the Pastor who first makes use of it." Having formulated this comprehensive admission, however, Windisch endeavors to save some fragments. "But even he," that is, John, he adds,[48] "does not entertain the idea of a continuous operation of the propitiatory death of Jesus, which has for its presupposition consciousness of many daily sins. He is thinking only of the occasional sinning of one and another. The fundamental characteristic of the empirical Christian life lies in the 'that ye sin not.' Sin is an exceptional occurrence in the Christian life." This is certainly to make an illegitimate use of the aorist, "that ye sin not." Of course it means that John's purpose is to deter his readers from committing acts of sin. To infer that he means at the same time that there were long intervals between these acts of sin is desperate reasoning. John says, "If we say we have no sin"—and we have seen this means acts of sin—"we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us." Are we to suppose that he spoke these words with the reservation—"except of course during those very long intervals between sins which make our life itself a sinless one?" Or when he said: "If we say we have not sinned we make Him a liar and His word is not in us," are we to suppose that it was with the reservation,—"this of course has no reference to the general tenor of our lives and refers only to the very rare slips of which we may

[47] P. 259.
[48] P. 200.

have been guilty"? The tone of the passage as a whole is not that Christians are sinless men who may possibly, however, be overtaken in a rare fault; but that Christians are sinful men, seeking and obtaining in Christ purification from their sins and striving day by day to be more and more delivered from them. This, of course, does not mean that sinning is according to John the characteristic mark of the Christian. Not sinning is his characteristic mark. It was as not sinning that the Christian stood out in contrast with other men. It means only that "not sinning," when understood in its height and depth, is a great achievement and—we shall quote Luther's words again—"Christians are not made but in the making."

That Christians can sin and do sin, as John understood the matter, is made abundantly clear again from I John v. 16-18, where intercessory prayer in his behalf is made the duty of every Christian who "sees his brother sinning. . ." The passage closes, it is true, with the declaration that "everyone who has been begotten of God sins not," and the easiest thing to say of the two statements is that they contradict one another. This is what Windisch does say. The ideal and the ideal-contradicting reality stand here side by side. John believed Christians could not sin; John saw Christians sinning. So, at the end of his letter we find him "giving an injunction for the treatment of sinning Christians which passes into a conspicuous confession of the sinlessness of the God-begotten."[49] That John is misunderstood when he is made thus flatly to contradict himself, not only within the limits of three verses, but in the general drift of his whole letter, is certain. And the present tense in the declaration, "No one that is begotten of God sins," appears to open the way to understanding it of the general life-manifestation rather than of a particular act. What John means in that case is not that he who has been begotten of God never commits a sin, but that not sinning is the characteristic of his life.

[49] P. 220.

We may say, if we choose, that ideally, in principle, he that has been begotten of God does not sin. It is probably best to say simply that this is what it is to be one who has been begotten of God,—not to sin; and Christians who have been begotten of God are therefore in process of becoming sinless. That they are not yet sinless does not prove that they have not been begotten of God, but that they have not yet reached their goal.

It is naturally to I John iii. 9, however, that Windisch makes his chief appeal: "No one that has been begotten of God doeth sin; because His seed abideth in him, and he cannot sin because it is of God that he has been begotten." "The most categorical assertion of the Christian conception of sinlessness in the whole New Testament," we read,[50] "is found in this passage. Like the wise man of the Stoa, like the miraculously blessed man of the Apocalypses, the Christian *cannot* sin. It is also clear that the *individual* sin is dismissed to the region of impossibility." That this is an overstatement is plain at once from the circumstances that here too as in v. 18 the verbs are in the present tense, and may not here any more than there be made to express individual acts rather than general characteristics of life. Windisch, however, appeals to the idea of "begotten of God." This must express, he rightly says, a creative act of God. "The inability to sin is therefore more than a moral, psychological, intelligible impossibility. That in the God-begotten the ethical energy could relax or occasionally intermit; that there should remain in him another nature which could come occasionally to fresh outbreak; that sinful acts could always be done by a Christian, without affecting the nature of his personality—all this is simply incapable of being harmonized with the conception of the begetting by God which is presented here. So also is the distinction between principial, ideal, incompatibility and empirical coëxistence inadmissible. What is begotten of God is the whole man;

[50] P. 266.

of him it is said that he does not commit a sin, that he cannot sin. He possesses 'actual sinlessness' not alone in his 'groundwork and basis.' It is with the God-begotten which John describes here precisely as with the Messianic man of the apocalypse of Enoch." The whole force of this very effective statement is dependent on the thoroughly unjustified assumption that it must be at once in all their fulness that all the characteristics which belong to a God-begotten man are manifested in one who is begotten of God. On this mode of reasoning we should have to contend that every man must be born an adult. The grounds on which development is denied to the child of God and the element of time is eliminated from his perfecting, are not stated. Once allow, however, that he that is begotten of God requires time for the realization of all that is included in that great designation, and that not merely in his empirical life but also in his very being,—and the overpressure of the conception of which Windisch is guilty becomes apparent. "Of principial cleansing," he writes,[51] "of a gradual execution of the task of cleansing, there is no question with John. All the ingenious distinctions which have been made in order to apply John's words to the present experience of the Christian, are without justification. John sums up the whole essence of the matter and all his several declarations when he declares that he that is begotten of God does not commit sin and cannot sin." It would seem only fair to John to remember that these phrases "does not commit sin," "cannot sin" do not perfectly convey the implications of his present tenses, and that he wrote I John i. 5-ii. 2 as well as iii. 9 and v. 18.

Windisch having himself indicated Paul and John as the two sources of his theory of the New Testament doctrine of the Christian life, we need not follow him in his discussion of the remaining books. We note only one or two points of special interest in passing. The Epistle of James has a certain importance as supplying what is in his

[51] P. 279.

view "the first Christian confession of sin,"—meaning by that the first declaration of the constant sinning of Christians. His reference is to James iii. 2, "for in many things we all stumble," or "for we all stumble much," as Windisch appears to prefer to render it.[52] The commentators seem inclined to take the "all" comprehensively, as including all Christians. That is Windisch's view also; and he comments on the statement thus:[53] "What is most important is the open, comprehensive confession of sin, in which the teacher includes himself. He had already called attention to the ease with which a man could fall into sin because of the multitude of the commandments. Now he substantiates the fact that all of us without exception are great sinners." And not only does James thus declare all Christians great sinners—just like the "miserable-sinner" teachers of the Reformation,—but he currently treats and addresses them as such. "Cleanse your hearts, ye sinners" (iv. 8), is the way he exhorts his fellow-Christians. "He declares," comments Windisch,[54] "that the Christians must cleanse themselves, because they are 'sinners.' This express designation has not been met with by us hitherto; it appears for the first time in the teacher who also is the first to give expression to his own consciousness of sin." There would seem to be little left in James's "miserable-sinnerdom" to be desired, especially when we observe that he actually did what Windisch forbade us to conceive possible in the case of John. "Of his own will begat He us," says James (i. 18), and Windisch comments thus:[55] "He knows how to extol an act of God, by which the Christian has become a new perfect creature. The perception that this begetting has not yet with those addressed penetrated into their external life, determines him to adopt the promotion of cleansing." It might be supposed that I Peter would be given a place by James as testifying to the universal sinful-

[52] P. 292: "The Christians who all sin much."
[53] P. 288.
[54] P. 290: cf. v. 20.
[55] P. 286.

ness of Christians. It appears to assume throughout that its readers constitute a body of "sinning saints" who require continual spurring on to moral effort; and at iv. 8 it seems to imply that they, one and all, commit a "multitude of sins" which it would be well to "cover" with love. Windisch[56] does not doubt that it is the Christian body who are expected to "have fervent love to one another," or who are reminded, in order to give force to this exhortation that "love covers a multitude of sins." But he has a way of escape here. He says that "the multitude of sins" were all accumulated before their conversion—which seems inadequate in the presence of the present tenses.

The novelty which Windisch finds in the Epistle to the Hebrews (vi. 4-8; x. 26-31) and with it, in the Second Epistle of Peter (ii. 20 ff.), is the denial of the possibility of a "second repentance"; or, to express it in language of later origin, of the pardonableness of post-baptismal sins. Paul, says he,[57] never put the possibility of a new repentance in doubt; James expressly exhorts sinning Christians to come to repentance. In Hebrews on the other hand, "he who after baptism commits a serious sin or falls wholly away cannot repent afresh and receive forgiveness."[58] With 2 Peter, "sinning Christians are worse than never converted sinners," and "baptism is unrepeatable."[59] There are passages in both epistles which make this interpretation of their teaching difficult, or let us rather say frankly, impossible. In Hebrews there is the all prevailing sacrifice of Christ which atones for all sins (ix. 7 ff.). In 2 Peter there is the express declaration that the parousia is postponed, in long suffering specifically towards Christians, because the Lord wishes to bring all of them to repentance (iii. 9). Windisch has his way of eluding both obstacles; but we need not pause to discuss the matter here. The point of chief interest to us at the moment is that it is only in

[56] P. 240.
[57] P. 294.
[58] P. 312.
[59] P. 254.

Hebrews and 2 Peter that he discovers such an estimate of sin in Christians that it de-Christianizes them, once and for all. In all other writers of the New Testament he himself perceives that the way is at least open for recognizing sinning Christians as still Christians. In point of fact there is no single one of them—not even the authors of Hebrews and 2 Peter—who does not on every page recognize sinning Christians as Christians; or rather who does not, in fact, so speak as to make it very clear that they know no other kind. That Christians have broken radically with sin; that they ought to cease from sinning absolutely; that they must give account of their sins; this they all teach. That Christians are without sin—there is none of them who teaches.

We have treated the publication of Windisch's book as bringing the "miserable-sinner Christianity" controversy to a close. But this, of course, does not mean that the general points of view urged by the protagonists of the assault on "miserable-sinner Christianity," and especially their reading of Paul's doctrine of the relation of the Christian to sin, ceased to be held and advocated. These things had come, however, by this time, to be recognized as merely the particular opinions of a special school of critical students and had lost their interest for the general religious public, except so far as that public was interested in the history of contemporary criticism. We need further, therefore, merely cursorily illustrate the continued expression of these opinions in the later years of the first and early years of the second decade of this century, with a view only to realizing the extent and significance of their persistence.

When Wernle in 1897 published his book on *The Christian and Sin in Paul,* he expressed in its preface his indebtedness for his understanding of the Pauline theology of two of his Göttingen teachers. The terms in which he did this seem to imply that he felt no great divergence between the views he was about to publish and theirs. In point of fact, at any rate, both of the Professors in question

—Johannes Weiss[60] and Wilhelm Bousset—have expressed in their own writings views very similar to his. This is particularly true of Bousset, who is found in the end chiding Wernle for playing the part of a deserter from the party.[61] "Really," he tells us in this connection,[62] "it is seriously Paul's opinion that the Christian can no longer sin. All the passages to the contrary which have been adduced have little weight"—referring especially to Rom. viii. 31, Gal. ii. 20, Phil. iii. 12. Salvation is a supernatural fact to Paul: the "newness of life" in which Christians walk is nothing of their own manufacture—it is like the sunshine and the spring breezes to them; and walking in it is just basking in it. In an earlier book—*Kyrios Christos*—of which that from which we have been quoting is a defence, we are told with rather more prudence that "Paul had a sense of sin in his life as an exceptional condition,"—although it must be admitted that the general description of Paul and his teaching which is given hardly prepares us for the prudence of this statement.[63] Essentially the same representations occur also in the article on "Paul" in Schiele and Zscharnack's encyclopædia. "Occasionally," we there read,[64] "Paul incidentally recalls that even in the life of the regenerated man, sin is still present; but he looks at that, at the least, as an exception, a little shadow in the strong light (Gal. ii. 19). The conception of the Christian life as an eternal conflict in which man scarcely advances at all, or as daily renewed conviction of the corruption of our nature and reception of the comfort of forgiveness of sins, was alien to him. The Christianity of Paul can be understood only as the Christianity of conversion. He knows himself to have been converted in a particular hour: his life now, the present in its contrast with the past, ap-

[60] *Dis christliche Freiheit nach der Verkundigung des Apostel Paulus,* 1902, pp. 21 f; also *Paul and Jesus,* 1909, p. 321.

[61] *Jesus der Herr,* 1916, pp. 47 ff.

[62] P. 48.

[63] *Kyrios Christos,* 1913, pp. 155 f.

[64] *Die Religion,* &c. vol. IV. 1913, pp. 1295 f.

pears to him in clear, brilliant light. And he gave himself to the new light with all the heroism of which he was capable, body and soul. He could actually say of himself that he was conscious of no fault (I Cor. iv. 4). It is more difficult to understand how he could maintain this mood also with reference to his churches, whose shadows he saw only too clearly, and strongly rebuked. This mood with him rests, however, not only on experience, but more on an audacious dogma—the destruction of the old and the new birth of the new world must accompany the death and resurrection of Christ."

Somewhat similarly to Bousset, G. P. Wetter, a Swedish author, having the sixth chapter of Romans particularly in mind, writes as follows.[65] "If we are delivered from the sphere of sin, if we are dead to it,—then we have nothing more to do with it. Instead of sin, 'grace,' 'righteousness,' 'life,' are now the life-element in which we move, whose air we breathe. The Apostle sees everything absolutely; the one contradicts the other. The Christian cannot sin. The fact that in the actual life of the Christian sin obviously occurs, cannot destroy this, his faith (Rom. vi. 14). Paul can believe so firmly in this new reality, because it is to him not man who produces the new thing, but God. So often as we direct our glance to men, nothing is as it should be. Paul, however, looks to God, and therefore he never doubts." A. Deissmann would apparently like to say much the same, but cannot quite do it. He too has the sixth chapter of Romans in mind. "As a new creature," says he,[66] "Paul the Christian is also free from sin (Rom. vi. 1-14). He has been loosed from sin, but is he also sinless, incapable of sinning? In theory certainly Paul might subscribe to the statement that the Christian does not sin (cf. Rom. vi. 2, 6, 11). But the awful experience of practice would give him cause to doubt. Paul the shepherd of souls retained a sober judgment; freedom from sin is

[65] *Charis*, 1913, p. 46.
[66] *St. Paul* (1911), E. T., 1912, pp. 155 ff.

not conceived as something mechanical and magical. Side by side with all his moral exhortations to Christians to battle against sin, there are expressions of Paul the Christian himself, especially in his letter to the Romans (particularly Rom. vii.) witnessing that even the new-created man feels at times the old deep sense of sin. But in Christ the grace of God is daily vouchsafed to him and daily he experiences the renovating, creative power of that grace." It is essentially the same note that is struck by W. Wrede. Paul, says he,[67] says we are dead, are dead to sin, and the like, and yet every one of his exhortations implies that we are not at all dead to sin. Is there a contradiction here? Or does Paul's language merely anticipate what is to come? Perhaps it is best to say that what he says is true at bottom, but the external realization of this inner truth as yet lags. This much is certainly true: "the whole Pauline conception of salvation is characterized by suspense." This too is only a half-truth. But there is this valuable half of the truth expressed in it, that is much too frequently forgotten: Paul's religion was a next-world religion, and he never dreamed that he was experiencing here and now all that had been prepared by Christ for him. He had the Holy Spirit already: but he himself says that what he had already in Him was only the first fruits.

Perhaps we may look upon the statements in Weinel's *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*[68] as representing as fairly as possible the present state of opinion in the school which he represents, on the attitude of the New Testament writers to the sins of Christians. And if so we may place by its side two other works on the theology of the New Testament[69] published at about the same time and representing other points of view. From the three together we may cherish a good hope of deriving a well-

[67] *Paul* (1905), E. T., 1907, pp. 102 ff.

[68] *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments. Die Religion Jesu und des Urchristentums.* Ed. 2, 1913.

[69] H. J. Holtzmann, *Lehrbuch der Neutestamentlichen Theologie,* 1911; Paul Feine, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments,* 1910.

rounded conception of the condition in which the question at issue has been left on the dying away of the active controversy.

It is of no significance that Weinel agrees[70] that our Lord did not expect His disciples to be without sin but taught them to pray, Forgive us our trespasses. That is allowed on all hands. It is more notable that his representations of Paul's teaching[71] also seem to yield the case, although not without reserve. "We have seen," he says,[72] "that according to our view of Paul too, a man's morality is the fruit of the Spirit. Nevertheless Paul did not hold Christians to be sinless; reality was too great a contradiction to that. He knew of the conflict of the flesh with the Holy Spirit even in Christians (Gal. v. 17 ff.), although these very words of his show that he holds precisely this conflict to be surmounted: 'Ye are not under the law.' Neither did he give repentance a place merely at the beginning of the Christian life, but thought of it as the sole and indeed the divinely appointed sorrow which should continue in it, 2 Cor. vii. 9f. It was, however, certainly his opinion that sin has no rôle to play in the Christian life; and he built on that, that the good grows in it like the fruit on the tree." This seems to be as much as to say that Paul recognized perfectly that Christians remained sinners, but that the Spirit was supreme in them and would bring all things right in the end. For Paul was of "the fixed conviction" that no Christian can be lost. Indeed he sometimes spoke as a universalist (Rom. xi. 12). For Christians he is, however, absolutely sure. When, at the end of the volume, Weinel comes to speak of the teaching of the later portions of the New Testament,[73] he strikes a different note. The high attitude of Paul was no doubt long maintained,— and here this is described as if it included a conviction that Christians "commit no sin, or if they commit sin, they are

[70] P. 187.
[71] Pp. 374 ff.
[72] P. 374.
[73] Pp. 628 ff.

punished, but still are saved, though 'as by fire.'" But by and by a change came, which brought a problem with it. Apparently this was because sins increased, and that, serious sins. Peccadilloes might be passed by; they were forgiven by God and man. But what must be said of apostasy, for instance? The Epistle to the Hebrews declares that no repentance will avail. In many writings, no doubt, the problem is not raised—as in Ephesians, Colossians, I Peter. In others the strictness is relaxed somewhat—as in the Apocalypse, where one more repentance is allowed. But the problem was now raised, and passed on into the later Church to give much trouble as the problem of post-baptismal sins.

When Holtzmann published the first edition of his *Textbook of New Testament Theology* (1897) he already knew W. A. Karl's *Contributions,* and cities approvingly its representation of Paul's theory of non-sinning Christians. It does not follow, of course, that he derived his idea from Karl. He appears to have been prepared to welcome it, when announced; and although he does not seem to have worked out the idea in detail prior to the publication of Karl's book, he is to be credited with independent invention of it. He speaks at any rate here in his own voice, and expounds[74] Paul as teaching "with heaven-storming idealism" that "with the passage out of the sphere of the law into the sphere of grace the dominion of sin has reached its end (Rom. vi. 18). The believer actually ceases to sin. But here too the bad reality does not correspond to the goodness of the theory. Sin works as a latent power so long as man lives at once in the Spirit (Rom. viii. 9) and in the flesh (Gal. ii. 20). Care is therefore always to be taken that the flesh does not rise and make itself felt (Gal. v. 16). Believers have, it is true, crucified the flesh once for all (Gal. v. 24): they must, however, always slay its members afresh (Col. iii. 5) and through the Spirit destroy the works of the flesh (Rom. 8. 13)." The scope

[74] Ed. I, Vol. II, pp. 151 ff.

of this statement, it will be seen, is that according to Paul, while Christians, being under the control of the Spirit, are infallibly saved and from the first are freed from sinning, yet, having still the flesh, they are continually impelled to sin and are forced to fight their way onward in ethical effort. In the second edition of his book, published in 1911, Holtzmann has retained this passage substantially unchanged.[75] A good many alterations in its language are made, and that for the purpose not merely of qualifying but also of strengthening the expression; many illustrations and supporting notes are added; but the statement remains in its contents the same. For Holtzmann at least therefore the state of the case in this controversy was not so different after the battle had been fought from what it was before. Paul is still thought of as defying reality—the reality about him and the reality in his own breast—and teaching that Christians are sinless; and the evidence which Holtzmann presents for his views does not differ in character from that which we have already seen in other like-minded writers. His judgments on the teaching of other New Testament writers than Paul follow also closely those prevalent in his school. For example, James knows nothing of Pauline sinlessness: Hebrews teaches that only sins of weakness and ignorance are pardonable in the baptized. It is Holtzmann's testimony therefore that the contentions of his school have suffered nothing through the controversy, but have come out of it unaffected.

Paul Feine views the matter from a very different angle, but although far removed in both method and judgment from Weinel and Holtzmann, is yet in his own way not untouched by the modern spirit. He looks upon the contentions of Wernle and Windisch with their congeners as being definitely wrong.[76] He is very emphatic that, in Paul's view, the Christian, though a renewed man and animated by an active principle of righteousness and life, is yet still

[75] Ed. II, Vol. II, p. 166.
[76] P. 420, note.

a sinner. "For Paul as for Luther," he says,[77] "this righteousness of the Christian is neither a complete nor a meritorious one, but the effect of new divine powers in the man. So long as man is 'in the flesh,' he is for Paul not yet freed from sin." "Even though Paul conceived the righteousness of life in the Christian, in communion with Christ, and in the power of the Spirit, as one that is already beginning and in part also being realized," he says again,[78] yet he is "far too sober-minded to look on Christians to whom the 'flesh' remains, as freed from sin. Therefore the justified also need forgiveness of sins." There was indeed a tendency "in the old church" to hold that free and full forgiveness was provided by Christ for pre-Christian sins, but not for conscious and serious sins after our reception into the Christian community. We may possibly see a trace of this in James (v. 20); it appears clearly in Hebrews (vi. 4 ff., x. 26 f.); and something analogous to it in I John v. 16. There is no trace of such a notion in Paul. He does not formally treat the question, it is true, but there is no difficulty in perceiving how he thought. To him justification is not merely an initiatory act, exhausting its effects on the sins that are past. He relates it to the eternal counsel of God and the efficiency of Christ's work of reconciliation. In it is given therefore God's definitive judgment on man. Even sin in Christians cannot compromise it; it remains in force despite all vacillations of the life, for God's faithfulness does not fail and He does not repent Him of His judgments. "Though Paul does not assert that justification includes also daily forgiveness of sins, yet at bottom that is his meaning." The passages which are adduced in proof are the Epistle to the Galatians at large (especially iii. and v. 4 f.), and Rom. viii. 33 f., Col. i. 14, Eph. i. 7 with an emphasis on the present tenses. In Rom. viii. 33 f., for example, Feine remarks that the present participles "who justifieth," "who con-

[77] P. 417.
[78] P. 420.

demneth," as is shown also by the concluding clause "who now intercedeth for us," deal with the Christian present. "The Christian feels that he is continually subject to condemnation, that he is surrounded by inimical powers, which seek to snatch him out of the hands of God and Christ. But God's decree of justification is always valid for him and Christ equally continually appears for him when he needs help." If this conception, however, is thus left only as an indispensable presupposition of Paul's it is clearly spoken out by John, who tells us plainly (I John ii. 1f.) that when the Christian sins he has Jesus Christ the righteous as his advocate with the Father. The Christian here is conceived as still sinning, and living still under the continually applied atoning power of the propitiating blood of Christ. "The walk in full Christian knowledge postulated therefore for John as truly as for Paul the confession of our sinfulness and the necessity of purification through Christ's blood."[79] Passages like iii. 6, 9, v. 18 present an ideal. "The complete ideal is shown by the apostle—the Christian as he ought to be already here, as he will be when his abiding in God experiences no longer any intermission, and we have become God's children in the full sense. But the Christians who maintain that already here they are freed from sin, are pointed by the apostle to still fuller moral knowledge than they possess, and to the redemption from continued sin also which is given us in this life. We have no new Pentecost to expect. There is only one Pentecost. But the Holy Spirit who was then given to the Christian community as the power of Christ and the power of God, will abide forever in the community of Jesus, as earnest of the power of the heavenly life. He points us to a future perfecting even in the conditions of our moral life."[80]

The very slight effect which all this long-continued and vigorously conducted discussion of the New Testament,

[78a] P. 684.
[79] Pp. 697 ff.
[80] P. 698.

and especially the Pauline, conception of the relation of Christians to sin, has had on English-speaking writers is very noticeable and perhaps significant. There have been echoes of course, but little more than echoes. Orello Cone entered the discussion at its very beginning, quite in the sense of Wernle, and with verbal allusions to Holtzmann which may indicate one of the sources of his inspiration. "For his own part," he says,[81] Paul "expresses no consciousness of sin from the time of his conversion, and no sense of the daily need of a petition for the divine forgiveness implied in the Lord's Prayer. With the 'old things' that are passed, the old sinful life, he has broken forever, and leaves them behind. . . . " What he thus held of himself, he held of others. "He regarded his fellow-believers from the point of view of his own consciousness of 'life' in the Spirit, so far at least as his theory of their religious state was concerned. . . ." "Such expressions," Cone now goes on to comment, "lend support to the supposition that Paul's missionary preaching was religious rather than ethical, that its emphasis was placed on the mystic effect of baptism, 'on sanctification' and on 'justification' (I Cor. vi. 11). His expectation of the immediate coming of Christ to receive the 'justified' believers into the Kingdom may have disturbed his perspective of the course of moral struggle which actually lay before his church. Hence the ethico-religious paradoxes." "The fact that doctrinally Paul made no provision for the sins of believers shows that he took little account of sin as a condition from which those could need to be delivered who had once been 'justified.' The atonement is not applied to them. Faith serves once only, and he who through it has become a 'new creature' is not conceived as again needing this salvation. Paul can hardly have thought that any one of his believers would be finally rejected when Christ should come." "This 'heaven-storming idealism' was not shaken by the apostle's experience of the moral delinquencies of his converts, which he did not fail

[81] *Paul*, 1898, p. 366.

to reprove with due energy." It is a defective apprehension of Paul's doctrine of the Spirit as the Spirit of holiness, and of the Christian's progressive sanctification by Him, which has led Cone into so bizarre a representation of Paul's conception of the relation of the Christian to sin.

Kirsopp Lake, entering the discussion, with his essay on *The Early Christian Treatment of Sin after Baptism,* late enough to have Windisch behind him, takes up the most extreme ground possible as if it were a mere matter of course.[82] According to him, the whole body of the first teachers of the Church were agreed that sinning after baptism—which is the same as after believing—is unpardonable, and it was only later, when hard experience had taught them that Christians did sin after baptism, that remedies for such sins came to be suggested. The essay opens with a fundamental assertion. "The most primitive form of Christian doctrine," we read, "held that Christians, as such, were free from sin. They had been born again into a state of sinlessness, and it was their duty to see that they never relapsed again into the dangerous state which they had left; if they should fail in this duty, it was questionable whether they had any further chance of salvation." According to Hebrews, we are told, wilfully sinning Christians are hopelessly lost. We are also told that "the same point of view was that of St. Paul, but in his Epistles the question is not a matter of controversy, and it is only implied or mentioned in passing." The evidence adduced, however, concerns only the sinlessness of Christians, not the hopeless state of Christians who sin,—which is the point which was raised. And the same is true of I John which is next appealed to. The latter part of the essay is concerned with the remedies proposed for sinning Christians. First rebaptism was proposed; it is polemically alluded to in Hebrews and Ephe-

[82] *The Expositor,* Seventh Series, Vol. X. (1910) pp. 63-80. The essay had previously appeared in Dutch,—"Zonde en Doop," in the *Theologisch Tijdschrift,* 1909, 43, 9. The same material is presented by H. Weinel, *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments,* ed. 2, 1913, 628, 629.

sians. Next came prayer for venial sins (I John v. 16 f.) and recourse to the advocacy of Christ (ii. 1). Then Hermas suggests penance. And possibly we may add from John xiii. 1-20, footwashing.

The most extraordinary excursion of an English-speaking writer into this circle of ideas which has met our eye, however, is contained in the remarkable Kerr Lectures for 1914-1915 by W. Morgan.[83] These lectures are written distinctly from the viewpoint of the history of religion school, and the material which concerns us is practically a transcript of the representations of the German writers. The question of Paul's attitude towards the sins of Christians is raised in the form of, What provision does he make for post-baptismal sins? The answer is to the effect that he makes no provision for them. "The message of forgiveness in Paul's gospel stands at the beginning, and has no reference to lapses in the Christian life. For post-baptismal sins no provision is made. The believer, if he would obtain salvation must cleanse himself from all defilement of flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God (2 Cor. vii. 1)."[84] Paul does not shut his eyes to the fact of sin in Christians. "What we do miss, however, is a clear recognition of forgiveness as a daily need of the Christian life."[85] It is everywhere assumed "that the standing given by the justifying verdict is something permanent," but Paul "has no thought of connecting it with post-baptismal sins." Morgan finds the account of this in two circumstances—the radicalness of the change wrought by renewal, and the small place taken in Paul's consciousness by guilt. "The sense of guilt and of pardon were not the dominant notes in his conversion," and "they can hardly be said to be heard at all in his life as a Christian." He never confesses wrong-doing; he shows no sense of need of daily forgiveness; he never prays or teaches others to pray, Forgive us our trespasses. Precisely what Paul

[83] *The Religion and Theology of Paul*, 1917, pp. 151 ff.
[84] Pp. 152, 3.
[85] P. 152.

teaches is this:[86] "From the death and resurrection with Christ the believer comes forth a new creature. So radical is the change as described by the apostle that one might infer that the very possibility of sin has been removed. But such an issue he certainly does not contemplate. What, however, he does teach is that the old compulsion to sin has passed and the way been opened for a sinless development. . . . His expectation is that in normal cases the Christian will advance day by day in the knowledge of Christ, practice keeping step with knowledge, until at last he apprehends that for which he also was apprehended and Christ is formed in him. That a Christian should deliberately sin appears to him not merely as an anomaly but as an enigma. . . . The contrast presented by the grey reality to this optimistic expectation cost the Apostle many a sad hour. That Christians could sin and sin badly was all too palpable a fact. The fact does not lead him to modify his view of regeneration, but it forces him to descend from the high plane of the supernatural to the humble region of the categorical imperative. Your flesh has been crucified with Christ, he again and again insists, therefore mortify its lusts; Ye have received the Spirit, walk in it. By the stress of facts he is compelled to supplement his ethic of miracle with an ethic of will. They stand side by side unrelated." They certainly stand side by side, but why say "unrelated"? Paul certainly relates them, as, for example, in Phil. i. 12, 13. And why, in the interest of that spurious geneticism which is the bane of much recent criticism, represent the ethic of will as rising subsequently in time to the ethic of miracle? It is *there,* as soon as we know Paul at all (Thess. ii. 12, iv. 1 ff., v. 14 ff.).[87]

It seems scarcely necessary to pursue this review of the ever-repeated emunciation of the same opinions farther. And if we glance over the whole course of the discussion

[86] Pp. 160 f.

[87] It may be reassuring to note that James Moffat in a brief review of Wernle rejects his whole point of view (Hastings' *DAC,* II, 1918, p. 380b.)

and endeavor to estimate its results, we are surprised by their meagreness. We have already suggested that they are practically summed up in providing the most radical school of criticism with an additional tenet in their historical creed. The members of that school now characteristically affirm that, in the view of Paul, Christians are sinless men —although they one and all agree that Christians, in point of fact, are nothing of the sort. The notion was only one of Paul's fanaticisms, thoroughly intelligible in him, no doubt, his antecedents and experiences being considered, but nevertheless symptomatic only of his enthusiastic temperament. On the other side no doubt the discussion has been useful in recalling adherents of the doctrine of the Reformation as to sin in the Christian life, from any tendency into which individuals may have fallen here and there to lose their sense of the greatness of the deliverance which has come to them in Christ in the profundity of their sense of the greatness of their sinfulness. The influence of Pietistic conceptions, emanating from more than one source, has been very wide-spread; and wherever they have penetrated they have tended to bring with them an inclination to give expression to the recognition of the intrinsic justice of the divine judgment on our sinfulness, by a treatment of the self in accordance with it. Hair shirts and flagellations are not popular in Protestant circles; but a mood and demeanor adapted to a deep sense of the iniquity and loathsomeness of our sins may be thought to serve much the same purpose. The jibe has not been wholly without justification that many have only enough Christianity to make them miserable. There is some evidence that the discussion of the relation of Christians to sin which we have been viewing has operated here and there to quicken in the minds of adherents of the Reformation doctrine the realization that Christianity makes men happy, not unhappy, that it brings them not sin but forgiveness of sin. In sequence to the discussion at any rate there has here and there showed itself among adherents of the Reformation

doctrine a desire to dwell rather on the blessings which Christianity brings than on the evils from which it delivers, rather on the glories into which it ushers the believer than the burdens from which it relieves him.

We adduce only a couple of examples of quite differing antecedents.

P. Gennrich, in the opening pages of his *Regeneration and Sanctification with reference to the Present Currents of Religious Life,*[88] draws a very vivid picture of the sense of new-creaturehood which filled the consciousness of the Apostles,—of "the joyful avowal of the actual experience of life by everyone who had experienced, in faith in Christ, the marvellously glorious and blessed effects that proceed from life-communion with the Lord." "How movingly," he cries, "the tone of personal experience strikes upon our ear in such confessions! What the prophets of the old covenant anticipated for the people in the time of salvation, and proclaimed in God-wrought confidence in the might and mercy of their God—that God would himself prepare for Himself a people in whom He should be well-pleased, would establish a new covenant in which sin should be forgiven and iniquity taken away, and would create in them a new spirit—that, now, might in truth and reality be experienced in themselves by all who were lifted by Christ into communion with the Father, who for Christ's sake granted them the children's right, and by Christ's Spirit created in them the sense of childship. And the experience was so transcendently great, the transformation of the whole inner and outer life-condition, which a Christian experienced who had come to faith and received baptism, was so immense, that an expression could scarcely be found which was able to compass the whole great fulness of what he had experienced and to bring himself and others quickly and impressively to the consciousness of it. This condition of new life into which the Christian knew himself to be

[88] *Wiedergeburt und Heiligung mit Begug auf die gegenwärtigen Strömungen des religiösen Lebens,* 1908, pp. 6 f.

transformed, was experienced by him as a wholly new life-state, conceivable by no human wisdom, attainable by no human art or power; as a new creative effect of the Almighty God in Christ through His Holy Spirit, who brought His almighty Becoming into the life-development of the individual even as He has brought it into the world by sending His Son; and so has worked a regeneration of humanity in Christ. In one word—it was the unanimous consciousness of the Apostolic and first Christians that they were new creatures of God, born of Him to new life, *born again*: that they were now first elevated to the stage of life on which life really deserves the name of life, because it is personal life in the full sense of the word, filled with a fully satisfying content, and supported by indestructible powers, *eternal life.*" There is much in Gennrich's personal modes of thought which is not in accord with either Paul or Luther. But speaking out of his own point of view, it is very evident that he is here straining all the resources of language in the effort to give an expression, which he can hope to be something like adequate, to the greatness of the new life brought into the world by Christianity. This is the way, he says, the apostles, who did not teach the sinlessness of Christians, thought of what Christians were. This is the way Christians, taught by the apostles what their inheritance is, feel.

The second example which we shall adduce is drawn from a very different circle, and speaks to us out of a firmly grounded and historically trained Reformed consciousness. Herman Bavinck, quoting the contention of Ritschl and his successors in this discussion, to the effect that the writers of the New Testament were accustomed to speak of their salvation in accents of glorification, proceeds:[89] "There is a truth in this contention which should not be denied. The Scriptures can scarcely find words enough to describe the glory of the people of God. In the Old Testament they call Israel a priestly kingdom, elected of

[89] *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, Ed. 2, vol. IV, 1911, pp. 281 ff (Ed. 1, Vol. III. pp. 559 ff.)

God, the object of His love, His portion and heritage, His son and servant perfected in beauty by the majesty of God; and in the New Testament believers are the salt of the earth, and the light of the world, born of God and His children, His elect nation and royal priesthood, partakers of his divine nature, anointed with the Holy Spirit, made by Christ kings and priests, incapable of sinning, and so forth. He who rejects the teaching of the Scriptures about sin and grace can see nothing but exaggeration in all this; such a radical change as takes place in regeneration and sanctification seems to him neither necessary nor conceivable. But the Scriptures are of a different mind; they give a high place to the church, call it by the most beautiful names and ascribe to it a holiness and glory which make it like to God. The glorification of the church which takes its beginning with regeneration is, however, equally with justification an object of faith." It is needless to say that this recognition of the glories brought to the individual and the church by the gospel does not in these hands in the least affect the sense of sin and ill-desert, necessary to sinners, against which as against a foil it is rather thrown up. The point which it is adduced to illustrate is merely that the fulness of this recognition of the glories of salvation—or at least the care that is taken to give it full expression—may in these instances be in part the effect of the discussion which has been in progress on the relation of Christians to sin. So far as this, advantage has been reaped from that discussion.

If now, abstracting ourselves from these individual effects of the discussion, we inquire after the real function served by this assault upon the Reformation doctrine in the great complex of the religious movements of the time, we can only say that it has operated for the support and advancement of the current perfectionist parties working in the churches. Looked at from the point of view of the general religious movements of the time it is, indeed, in effect an attempt to supply to the contentions of these per-

fectionist parties a scientific exegetical basis; and it goes without saying that it is the most elaborate attempt of the kind which has ever been made. Those engaged in this attempt, of course, care nothing whatever for the current perfectionist parties in the service of which they have nevertheless expended their learning and labor. There is probably no type of current religious thought and feeling for which they have less sympathy. And they care no more for the teaching of the New Testament than they do for the perfectionist parties. Bousset, in the very act of declaring that, among modern religious tempers, that embodied in Methodistic Christianity comes nearest to the Christianity of Paul, remarks that nevertheless to modern men it is abhorrent and the Lutheran is more acceptable—whatever he may mean here by the Lutheran.[90] These scholars have performed their service for the perfectionists while pursuing a very different purpose of their own. But in pursuing their own purpose they have been conscious all the time of possessing in the perfectionist parties allies to whose support they could appeal. There is involved in this a judgment as to the significance of the perfectionist movement in the history of Protestant thought, a judgment which is not left to the reader to divine but is openly spoken out. The purpose with which the debate has been undertaken and carried on has been to assault the Reformation doctrine of "the miserable sinner," intensely distasteful to these men of high ethical aspirations and attainments. They saw in the perfectionist movements similar revolts against the Reformation doctrine of the Christian life and the process of salvation, and they therefore claimed in their promoters fellow-workers in a common cause. They have no sense of community with them whatever in their notions of what the Christian life is, in its sources, processes, attainments, issues: but they are at one with them in their common effort to break down the Reformation doctrine and have been glad to help them in their battle, by presenting

[90] Schiele und Zscharnack *Die Religion* &c. IV. 1296.

them with Paul and the rest, as their patrons—if they attached any value to that gift. And meanwhile they have derived this benefit from them in return—that they could point to them as independent witnesses to the essential correctness of their interpretation of the New Testament.

The points of connection between the two are too significant to have been neglected by either the outside observer or the inside worker. We find them therefore cursorily intimated from the very beginning of the controversy. From the one side Fr. Luther[91] already remarks of Ritschl's mode of arguing on the matter and his exegetical procedure, that they "coincide with those of Methodistic Smithism;" and later it becomes a regular custom to mark this conjunction.[92] From the other side we find the writers of the perfectionist movements quoted by the assailants of the Reformation doctrine with a respect which is certainly notable and perhaps at times excessive. It is difficult to believe that, except as moved by a sense of party interest, Carl Clemen could have felt greatly indebted to Andrew Murray for aid in the formation of his views of Paul's attitude toward sin in his own life.[93] And it is impossible to believe that Hans Windisch felt the contributions of F. Paul to scientific religious thought very valuable.[94] The ground of the sudden interest of these ultra-"scientific" investigators in the exegetical and theological opinions of such purely "practical" writers, is that they wish to exploit the movements which these writers represent as aids in their own assault on the Reformation doctrine of sin and grace. It is for this purpose, for example, that Windisch introduces quite an elaborate account of these movements in the closing pages of his volume.[95] "There are now to be noted," says he, "some very interesting movements within the history of the Churches of the Reformation

[91] *Die Theologie Ritschl's*, 1887, pp. 38 f.

[92] Cf., for example, Bindemann, as cited, p. 12; Ihmels, as cited, pp. 76 f.; Feine, as cited, p. 420, note.

[93] *Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, I, p. 111.

[94] As cited, p. 2.

[95] Pp. 513 ff.

since the Eighteenth century, that may perhaps be considered reactions against the Lutheran Christianity which no doubt strives against sin, but above everything consoles the pious for their sins—the person of Luther is here left out of account." These movements are named as English Methodism and above all in our day the so-called Sanctification-movement. The language in which they are introduced is very carefully guarded, but what is meant is simply that in these two movements, Methodism and what we know as the Higher Life Movement, with its continuations, we have "reactions" from the Reformation doctrine of the "miserable sinner." And accordingly we are told clearly a page or two later, where the problem of sin in the Christian life is spoken of,[96] that "Methodism and the Sanctification-movement present therefore a reaction from the solution of Christian miserable-sinnerism which is fostered in Lutheran circles." This representation is true. The perfectionist teaching of these several movements, whether in its crasser or in its more guarded forms, is a revolt against the Reformation doctrine not only of the continued imperfection of the Christian in this life where he enjoys only the first fruits of salvation, but of sin and grace in general, which constitutes the pivot on which the whole system of Reformation teaching turns. And we may count it among the most beneficient results of the discussion of the Biblical teaching on the sins of Christians which we have been reviewing, if we can learn from it this fact; and with it this other fact, that the appeal of these movements to the Scripture in behalf of their teaching has, in the most elaborate effort which has yet been made to validate it, completely failed. The most striking thing about the long continued attempt which has been made to prove that to Paul the Christian is a sinless man is the clearness with which it has come out that Paul knows nothing of a sinless man in this life.

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[96] P. 533.