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THE TERMINOLOGY OF LOVE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

I

Considered as a monument of the Greek language at a particular stage of its development, the New Testament is a very interesting document; and not least so in the terminology which it employs to express the emotion of love. The end-terms of this development, so far as it is open to our observation, are found—we are speaking in broad categories—in the literature which we know as “classical” on the one side, and in the speech of the modern Greek world on the other. In passing from one of these end-terms to the other, a complete revolution has been wrought in the terminology of love; a revolution so radical that the ordinary verb for “to love” in classical Greek has lost that sense altogether in modern Greek, its place being taken by a verb in comparatively infrequent use in the classics; while the ordinary substantive for “love” in modern Greek, formed from this latter verb, does not occur even once in the whole range of classical Greek literature. Coming in somewhere between these two end-terms, the New Testament, flanked on the one side by the Septuagint version of the Old Testament and its accompanying Apocrypha, and on the other by the Apostolic Fathers, forms a compact body of literature in which alone we can observe the revolution in progress; or, we should better say, in which this revolution suddenly appears to sight already nearly completed. Without any heralding in the secular literature, all at once in this religious literature the change presents itself to our view as in principle already an accomplished fact.

GENERAL THEOLOGY

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, with the assistance of JOHN A. SELBIE, M.A., D.D., Professor of Old Testament Language and Literature in the United Free Church College, Aberdeen, and LOUIS H. GRAY, M.A., Ph.D., Sometime Fellow in Indo-Iranian Languages in Columbia University, New York. Volume IX, *Mundas-Phrygians*. Royal 8o, pp. xx. 911. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribners' Sons. 1917.

The ninth volume of the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* presents, of course, the same external appearance as its predecessors. Despite the dislocations of the great war, it is still a marvel of good mechanical workmanship. We have fancied, it is true, that we could trace here and there the effects of the war in a slightly diminished perfection, say, of the proof-reading. They are rather bad slips, for example, by which on p. 294 "negro" is printed for "white"; on p. 319 "world" for "Word"; on p. 558, "predicted" for "predicated." The standard maintained, however, is remarkably high even in the manufacture of the volume. In its contents there is no falling off whatever. The volume contains nearly three-hundred articles, the product of nearly two-hundred writers. The most of these writers are, of course, British. About thirty of them however, are Americans; and about thirty more from the continent—including three Japanese. The most of the continentals naturally are French-speaking scholars, fourteen or so from France and three or four from Belgium. We are rather surprised to find six or seven Germans in the list: Drs. Dorner of Königsberg, Garbe of Tübingen, Graf of Quedlinburg, Hahn of India, Jolly of Würzburg, Mogk of Leipzig, and Grass of Dorpat—if we can include his name in the list. Doubtless their contributions were already in hand before the war interrupted communications between the countries: but it is pleasant to think of them still coöperating with their British colleagues in such a scholarly enterprise. Of the American contributors less than half can be classified, with the utmost stretch of the category, as theological writers: G. A. Barton, A. S. Carrier, W. O. Carver, A. T. Clay, H. DeW. Griswold, R. M. Jones, H. Malter, E. E. Nourse, L. B. Paton, J. B. Peters, J. D. Prince, E. F. Scott, E. D. Starbuck. We may perceive from this the wide scope of the *Encyclopaedia*.

Very few distinctively dogmatic subjects are dealt with in this volume. There are articles on Original Sin, Parousia, Passibility and Impassibility, Penance, Penitence, Perseverance, Perfection. The article on Original Sin has been committed to Dr. F. R. Tennant, no doubt just because he does not believe that there is any such thing. It gives a very clear summary of what he has elsewhere urged at length against the very notion. It is partly offset by a carefully prepared and interestingly written article by Mr. R. G. Parsons, on Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism from the standpoint of a moderate Augustinianism.

In contrast with the dealing with Original Sin the article on Christian Perfection has been placed in the hands of a convinced believer in the doctrine—Professor Frederic Platt of the Wesleyan College at Handsworth, Birmingham. He has treated the subject without acrimony, but without much illumination; and with notable dependence on Dr. W. B. Pope—than whom, of course, he could have found no better Wesleyan guide. It is borne in on the reader afresh, as he reads, that the great question raised by the perfectionists is just the perfection of perfection. Anybody can be perfect, if it be agreed that in order to be perfect you do not have really to be perfect; and no advocate of perfectionism succeeds in continuing permanently to maintain that men are ever really perfect in this life. We gain an impression from the closing section of his article that Professor Platt is inclined to fall in more or less with the view much pressed of late which articulates the perfection of the individual with the consummation of the kingdom of God. That is to fall in with Paul's teaching; Paul constantly refers our perfection to "that day." But it is also fatal to "perfectionism"; which is not willing that men shall wait until "that day" for their perfecting. The doctrine of Perfection is the Arminian substitute for the doctrine of Perseverance. It is the way in which the supernaturalness of salvation—the sense of which is ineradicably fixed in the Christian heart—finds expression among Arminians. It is a very inadequate expression of Christian supernaturalism, because, among other things, it is amissible. It therefore still leaves the salvation of the sinner in his own hands, and keeps him in fear of his life all his days. Thus, fear, not faith, becomes the psychological mark of the Christian. The contrasting doctrine of Perseverance is treated here by Professor D. S. Adam of Ormond College, Melbourne. It is not a very satisfactory article. There is some lack of clarity with respect to the doctrine of the will and its function in salvation, which mars the treatment at more than one point. The mistake here is twofold. The divine initiative in salvation is not dealt with seriously enough: there is even some talk of a free yielding to "the Spirit's influence in regeneration." And the place of human effort in sanctification is not firmly enough apprehended: there is even a tendency to parcel off separate regions in the process to the divine and human wills. Full justice is done thus neither to the divine will nor to the human will in that process which Paul with beautiful adequacy speaks of as a "leading" of the Spirit. Nevertheless Professor Adam both means right, and brings out fairly in the end the essential truth about the Christian life. This is that in it we work under the Spirit's leading and not the Spirit by our permission; and therefore, since it is the Spirit that leads,—not merely directs or guides but *leads*—there can be no doubt of the issue.

We can scarcely look upon the short article on Passibility and Impassibility by Principal R. S. Franks of Bristol as wholly competent. It combines the treatment of impassibility and immutability and of the impassibility of God and of Christ in a very confusing manner, and as a consequence gives no clear exposition of any of these topics. Princi-

pal Franks ascribes the origin of the impassibility of God to Greek philosophy, entering corruptingly into the thought of the early church, whose native view was that of God is a person, and because a person the subject of passions like those of other persons. As bearers of the notion of the divine passibility in the early church he can point, however, only to its chief heretical parties—the antagonistic parties of the Patripassians and the Arians, both cited, however, we must recognize, misleadingly. “Patripassians” was a nick-name given to the Monarchians with the intention that it should rankle; and it did rankle. The Arians thought of nothing so little as to humanize the unapproachable Godhead. The whole history of theology in the Patristic age is instinct with horror of any such idea as a passible God. It is to Aquinas that Mr. Franks attributes “the classical treatment of the divine impassibility,” founding, as he says, on Aristotle: and in illustration he quotes a passage from Aquinas which deals, not with the divine impassibility, but with the divine immutability. At the close of the article the modern movement towards the assertion of divine passibility is adverted to, with allusions to Weisse’s and Lotze’s philosophical constructions and the theological dicta of A. M. Fairbairn, Richard Rothe and Albrecht Ritschl. If one wishes to see, however, this movement at its best, he would do well to turn over to the closing paragraph of Dean W. R. Inge’s admirable article on Neo-Platonism and read his eloquent call for “an incarnational philosophy of religion.” Mr. Franks says nothing of the Pessimists to whom suffering is the very essence of deity.

Having mentioned Dean Inge’s valuable article on Neo-Platonism we are reminded that this is the volume for the Neo-s, ancient and modern. We have articles therefore on Neo-Cynicism, and Neo-Hegelianism, and Neo-Kantism, and Neo-Platonism, and Neo-Pythagoreanism—all good and informing. Neo-Realism has apparently not yet attracted the attention of the editors. Other systems of thought are also of course dealt with. There is an article on the Peripatetics and one on Pessimism and Optimism; there are articles on Pantheism and Mysticism; on Occultism and New Thought. There are also articles on heretical movements: on the Novatians, Nicolaitans, Ophites, Paulicians; on the Nestorians, and the Nihilianists. There are very few important biographical articles: but there are informing articles on Pascal, Newman and Nietzsche.

There is a long article on Paul, but none at all on Peter, not even one on the Peter-legend. This is too notable a fact to be permitted to pass unnoted. If to have dominated the whole Christian world for a millennium and a half assures no place among the religious forces which are worthy of mention in such a historico-descriptive *Encyclopaedia*,—what will? The glory of Peter has departed, though the church which has built itself on that Rock remains until today the largest and most powerful organized body in Christendom. Paul has taken Peter’s place in the minds of our modern guides as the originator of ecclesiastical Christianity. Instead of an article on Peter we have

now one on—the Papacy. This is, by the way, a very good, and a very trenchant one; although written from a Rationalistic rather than Protestant standpoint. The article on Paul bears the joint signatures of Professor Allan Menzies and the Rev. William Edie. It is written from a standpoint which allows to Paul only nine of his extant letters and finds little in Acts trustworthy beyond the “we passages” and especially the account of the journey to Rome. The construction of a life-history of Paul from this material is carried through with a good deal of unconvincing independence; and on the whole it would be difficult to write a more useless article on Paul. There is, however, no exploitation of Paul as the real founder of Christianity.

There is a very useful series of articles on Persecution. It should be noted, however, that the writers on Persecution by Christians show a regrettable tendency to confound persecution and spiritual discipline. This is especially true of Dr. W. T. Whitley who is kindled into burning zeal by sympathy with the sufferings of his Baptist forbears. But Mr. Fawkes, writing well of Roman Catholic persecution, is not free from the same tendency. It is quite possible, however, for the strictest spiritual discipline to be exercised by men of the most complete physical tolerance; and the Baptists themselves have given many very striking examples of this possibility. It is interesting to observe Mr. Fawkes expressing at the end of his article so great a suspicion and even fear of a majority church as to lead him to advocate, for the protection of others, an Erastian arrangement to keep it in check, whenever one religious body possesses a decided preponderance in numbers or influence in a State. Secular persecution of religion does not seem, however, decidedly preferable to religious persecution of rival sects; and it seems a bad plan to make all churches suffer wrong under the secular heel for fear that some may be discriminated against by others. For ourselves, we are for a free church in a free state.

There are three outstanding articles on political philosophy. These are on Nationality, Patriotism, Neutrality. It is a sign of the times that they have all been committed to women. We are not prepossessed by the way Mrs. Sophie Bryant begins her article on Nationality. It is by a definition. The definition runs thus: “Nationality is that quality or complex of qualities in a group of persons which combines them in a nation.” As one might say, beauty is that quality or complex of qualities in an object of contemplation which makes it beautiful; or redness is that quality or complex of qualities in an object by virtue of which it is red; or, perhaps, emptiness is that quality or complex of qualities in a definition, say, which makes it empty. We can get along famously at this rate, and reel off definitions of everything in heaven and earth, whether we know what they are or not. It is only fair to add that the article, although never rising above the commonplace, does rise above this inauspicious beginning: it is a pleasant enough little talk on the national consciousness. It is a pity that the same writer was set to write also on Patriotism. She had said her say under the caption of Nationalism, and can only say it over again here, transposed

an octave higher. Patriotism, she defines, as just "the sentiment in which consciousness of nationality normally expresses itself"; or, more precisely, a "consciousness of nationality together with the will to realize such nationality further," a definition in its more precise form neither sufficiently broad, nor even within its own limits very clear. One question of more than ordinary interest is raised—the possibility of intense national consciousness, expressing itself in patriotic sentiment of great strength, without a country. The Jews and the Irish are adduced as examples. Are either really—to their own consciousness—without a country? And what would be the effect of washing thoroughly out of their minds the memories that consecrate to them Judea and Erin? Miss Campbell-Smith's article on Neutrality is of a different order. It confines itself to a brief but clear summary of the recognized law of neutrality. It is interesting to observe that such a law is a modern invention. There was a time when there was no such thing as neutrality: men with arms in their hands did precisely what seemed good in their own eyes and no one asserted rights in restraint of them. The rise of a law of neutrality is, no doubt, largely the effect of the increasing power of commerce. But it is enheartening to observe that the purely moral sentiment has entered ever more and more into consideration. To the man in the street the fundamental principle is apt to take the form of the assertion that belligerents acquire by their belligerency no rights whatever against non-belligerents; and by invading any right of a non-belligerent automatically turn it into a belligerent. If war once seemed the normal state of mankind, and peace abnormal, now that men have come to their senses and perceived the reverse to be the fact, it would seem that the first duty of neutral states is to see to it that belligerents confine their acts of war strictly to one another. This of course could be accomplished only by what would be equivalent to a defensive league of neutrals in every war. But a long step forward in conquering peace for the world would be taken if it could come to be understood that the invasion of the rights of any neutral power by a belligerent would automatically turn, not that neutral only, but all neutrals, into belligerents against the offender. Think but what would have happened, if it had been clearly understood that the invasion of Belgium's neutrality would have automatically made the whole neutral world belligerents in its defence. America is in the present world-war ultimately in defense of the rights of neutrals: but unhappily she entered it, and that only with regrettable tardiness, only in defence of her own outraged neutral rights. What is to be devoutly hoped is that the inviolability of neutral rights, as it is for us the real issue, may be also among the actual gains of the war.

The interesting article on Negroes in the United States by Professor W. O. Carver of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, is very informing, although not quite stringently scientific in its mode of treatment. Its standpoint is determined by the associations of its writer. It cheerfully contemplates the permanent residence, intermingled in Democratic America, of two races, separated from one an-

other by impassible social barriers, each possessed of an ever more intensified race-consciousness and following without regard to the other its own race-ideals. This is to look upon the negro as (according to one current theory of the nature of cancerous growth, at any rate) just a permanent cancer in the body politic. We may suspect that it is a not unaccountable feeling of race repulsion that impels Dr. Carver to repel with sharp decision the forecast that amalgamation of the races must be the ultimate issue. With continued white immigration and the large death rate of the blacks working a progressive decrease in the proportion of the black population to the white, is it not natural to look forward to its ultimate absorption? That is to say, in a half a millennium or so? That is not, however, our problem: for us and our children and children's children the two races in well-marked differentiation will form constituent but disproportionate elements in the one State. What we have to do, clearly, is to learn to live together in mutual amity and respect and helpfulness, and to work together for the achievement of our national ideals and the attainment of the goal of a truly Christian civilization. It is to this that Dr. Carver rightly exhorts us in his closing words. It is in effect an exhortation to political and social,—if not yet to racial—amalgamation. After all, we are, for better, for worse, bound up together in one bundle of life.

We shall leave in the reader's mind a very inadequate impression of the variety and value of the contents of this volume. The ethnological, anthropological, scientific, philosophical articles, on which we have not touched, constitute the major portion of its contents. We must leave it, however, at this point.

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APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

The Gospel of Buddha, Compiled from Ancient Records by PAUL CARUS. Illustrated by O. Kopetzky. 8vo; pp. xx, 311. Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1917.

This very attractive volume should serve a good purpose in making the world acquainted with the traditions and stories concerning the founder of one of the great religions of the world. It should not, however, be compared with the Christian Gospels; not even with the fourth Gospel, though it has been the aim of the compiler and editor "to treat his material in about the same way as he thinks that John utilized the accounts of the life of Jesus of Nazareth." The two belong to entirely different categories. The Christian Gospels are narratives by eye-witnesses. As to the life of Buddha, however, not a single contemporary voice has come down to us, whether of friend or enemy, which should directly assure us of a single fact. What we probably do know on the subject is only by way of inference from authorities none of whom can be proved to have lived when he lived.