

The Princeton Theological Review

OCTOBER, 1916

DOES MY NEIGHBOR EXIST?¹

Kant has said that there are some questions which should never be asked, and there is apostolic authority for the injunction to "avoid foolish questions". Only the fool has said in his heart that he is alone in the universe; but since philosophy has seriously raised the question of the existence of my neighbor and of the way in which I may come to know him, it may be not without interest to notice (i) how the problem has emerged, (ii) the importance of the problem for modern philosophy, and (iii) some leading solutions that have been offered.

I. Our social environment is no doubt the most important factor in our every-day life. The belief in the existence of other men's consciousness, as Clifford has said, "dominates every thought and every action of our lives." On the other hand there is a sense in which we not only die alone, as Pascal says we do, but live alone as well. One man's thought and feeling is not directly accessible to the consciousness of another, and each man has an unsharable feeling, to use James' language, "of the pinch of his own individual destiny as he privately feels it rolling out on fortune's wheel."

Yes! in the sea of life enisled,
With echoing straits between us thrown,
Dotting the shoreless watery wild,
We mortal millions live alone.

How for the philosopher this "unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea" is to be crossed or bridged is the question before us in this paper.

Some of the problems of philosophy are perennial and

¹ This paper was read at a conference of former students in the division of Philosophy, Psychology and Anthropology at Columbia University, April 18th, 1916.

certain philosophical theories. He argues "that all our knowledge of what we term outer as well as inner things and events is for each of us individually comprised in the moving stream of thought on the firmament of the soul and is to be found nowhere else." He seeks to show that the outer is only a very small part of the "real world" and enters into an argument from the development of the consciousness of a little child. How very dangerous such a method of arguing is must be immediately recognized by the knowledge that our "firmament of the soul" in early childhood is almost entirely made up of the most rudimentary sensations due to our animal nature and that it certainly *does not* reveal to us a world of which the known physical world is but a small part. There follows a long, involved, and confused discussion in which it is shown to the satisfaction of the writer that the two worlds—the inner and the outer exist side by side—the inner being the more real and the larger. The writer's inability to define and his distrust of the scientific method of research lead to endless vagueness. Whether any result is finally attained the reader of the essay must judge for himself. There are certain parts of this little work that are worthy of consideration, but as a whole it would have been far better had it been edited, revised and clarified by less philosophical speculation and surer reasoning.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

GENERAL THEOLOGY

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, with the assistance of JOHN A. SELBIE, M.A., D.D., Professor of the Old Testament Language and Literature in the United Free Church College, Aberdeen, and LOUIS H. GRAY, M.A., Ph.D., Sometime Fellow in Indo-Iranian Languages in Columbia University: New York. Volume VIII, *Life and Death—Mulla*. Royal 8vo. pp. xx, 910. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1916.

The eighth volume of the great *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* makes the same appeal to the scholarly world as its predecessors. Some hundred and eighty-five writers have taken part in its preparation. Of these about twenty-two are Americans; and the scope of the work is illustrated by the circumstance that only some half dozen of these can be, with the utmost stretch of the term, called theological writers—G. A. Barton, G. A. Coe, T. C. Hall, H. E. Jacobs, L. B. Paton, W. A. Shedd. The volume is, however, peculiarly rich in articles of distinctively theological interest. It opens with one of those extensive composite articles of which this *Encyclopaedia* makes a speciality—on Life and Death. Thirteen authors here cooperate to tell us how life and death have been conceived in various ethnic groups and they occupy forty-four double-columned pages in doing so. The closing article of the volume is a brief account of what a Mullah is.

When we open it at its exact centre we find ourselves in the midst of a very comprehensive composite article on Marriage, in twelve parts, covering nearly fifty pages.

The first section of the opening article treats of Life and Death from the Biological point of view. It is written by Professor J. Arthur Thomson of Aberdeen, and there is no writer engaged in popularizing biological speculation who writes more attractively. He combines breadth of view with detailed information, sympathy with balance, suggestiveness with pellucid clearness. This article is a model of what such an article ought to be. The position Professor Thomson occupies as to the main subject, he describes as that "of 'descriptive or 'methological' vitalism." It is really an agnostic attitude. He recognizes that the behavior of organisms cannot be adequately expressed in physico-chemical terms. There is something more: we call this something more "life." But what this "life" is remains a mystery. Once, it is true, he seems inclined to describe it as a "relation": at least he warns us not to lose sight of the fact that life is a relation. But he cannot mean that it is no more than a relation; and in another place he more adequately speaks of it as "one term in a relation," or in a whole series of relations perhaps we would better say. When he comes to speak of the question of variability, he says we must just take this power of producing distinctively new characters as "given." We have no account of it: "we can hardly do more at present than assume that the organism is essentially creative." Would it be possible to do "more" than this in any circumstances or at any time? To assume that the organism is "essentially creative" is a tremendous assumption which quite staggers the ordinary intelligence.

It is possible that Professor Thomson does not intend the word "creative" in its full sense; we are sure for our own part, at all events, that we shall never get out of any organism in the form of effect more than was already in it in the form of cause. We gladly revert, therefore, to an earlier statement which tells us that "development" is the expression of latent possibilities and brings out only "the intrinsic manifoldness of some primordium." We stand by the axiom that what is patent in the issue was latent in the conditions. But we fear Professor Thomson would not be satisfied with that. "We share in a moment," he says, "which is not the unrolling of something originally given but a creative evolution in which time counts." What he means by this is not, indeed, quite clear: but for our part, we are thoroughly assured that no time, however extended, can bring out of a primodium anything which was not previously in it. It is a suggestive remark which Professor Thomson drops by the way: "It looks as if a man is individual not only to his finger-prints, but to the elemental molecules."

We regret to say that we do not think that the excellence of Professor Thomson's article is sustained in the subsequent ones on the Hebrew and the Christian conceptions of Life and Death, the former

by Professor J. T. Marshall and the latter by Mr. W. F. Cobb. Each of these is dominated by a fad of its author's. The former is really a word-study—a word-study on the two words *Nephesh* and *Hayyim*: and the study of the former word is a sustained attempt to read the ideas of “primitive peoples” into the Hebrew record. The latter is largely occupied with an attempt to Gnosticise the idea of “aionian life.”

The most interesting section of the great component article on Marriage, to the average reader at least, will naturally be Mr. W. M. Foley's discussion of Christian Marriage. This is founded on adequate knowledge and is written in a singularly free style. On the matter of divorce, unexpectedly liberal notions are sustained: on the basis of I Cor. vii it is suggested that Paul would permit divorce on the ground of “incompatibility of temper,” and indeed it is somewhat broadly hinted that in such matters our own common sense rather than any prescribed rules must govern conduct. The passage in which this hint is dropped is sufficiently interesting from another point of view to warrant directing attention to it. Mr. Foley is writing of our Lord's teaching as to divorce and is naturally led to speak of the effect of recent Gospel criticism upon the matter. “The passages in the Synoptic Gospels,” he writes, “have been treated as they stand in the New Testament, without any reference to the results of modern criticism; it will be generally admitted that such treatment is justified in dealing with ethical or doctrinal questions.” For so remarkable a deliverance he naturally seeks support; and he finds it in some letters to *The Guardian* by W. C. Allen, who “though holding the critical view,” yet “protests against making use of critical results to decide dogmatic questions.” Is criticism then only an idle game which scholars amuse themselves with, fully understanding that its “results” are not to be depended on in the realm of truth? Or is it rather that dogmatic and ethical questions are *per se* independent of authority—even the authority of Jesus—and that therefore the ascertainment of His teaching has no significance for them? It is the latter horn of this dilemma that Mr. Foley takes. He goes the length of declaring that no settlement of the critical question is likely to affect very much the existing state of opinion on the matter involved: “the acceptance of the critical view will simply bring into greater prominence the fact that questions in this field have never really been decided on grounds either of exegesis or of authority, pure and simple, but that our interpretation of our Lord's teaching has always been guided by moral and theological considerations.” That is to say, instead of building our dogmatics and ethics upon His teaching, we frame our own dogmatics and ethics first and then bend our Lord's teaching to them as best we may. So far as this is merely a historical statement of what men calling themselves Christian teachers have been accustomed to do, it must be sorrowfully confessed that it has only too much truth in it. So far as it is a commendation of a method of procedure, however, it deserves the profoundest reprobation. That, adopting such a principle of action, we should trouble to refer to

Christ at all betrays the essential dishonesty of the procedure. Obviously, we seek the appearance of following Him while declining to do so in reality. And this means of course that we formally give in our adherence to the dogma that Christ is authority in His Church,—for all ethical and dogmatic questions as well as others. If nevertheless we refuse to follow that authority when critically ascertained, that is the proof of our duplicity. We have no other organon except criticism to determine trustworthiness of transmission; we desert Christ Himself when we refuse to follow our critical results.

Our attention has been attracted to a series of related articles on Matter, Materialism, Monism, Mind. The former two are written by Dr. F. R. Tennant. The article on Matter contains a good brief account of the recent discussions on the ultimate constitution of matter. In assigning the article on Materialism to Dr. Tennant the custom often followed by this Encyclopaedia of committing subjects to sympathetic hands is broken. Not on this occasion, it must be confessed, with very good results. For, although Dr. Tennant very properly undertakes to refute Materialism, he does so on assumptions as one-sided as its own, and leaves the reader less instructed on Materialism than on Dr. Tennant's own doctrine of Spiritualism with its quite ungrounded equating of *esse* and *precipi*. The article on Monism, by R. Eucken is written with more careful objectivity. It is marred by the employment of the terms, nature, natural, naturalism, naturalistic as the opposites of spirit, spiritual, spiritualism, spiritualistic—a confusing usage which is fast growing into the accepted one. The proper opposite of spirit is, however, not nature but matter; of spiritualistic, is not naturalistic but materialistic. Dr. Tennant knows at least this. The most interesting of these articles, however, is that on Mind by Josiah Royce. It is given over almost entirely, however, to an epistemological discussion, the hinge of which is again, as in the author's *The Problem of Christianity*, derived from Charles Pierce's insistence on the recognition of a third mode of knowledge side by side with the perceptive and the conceptional, that is to say, the interpretative. So predominantly is mind kept in this discussion before the thought as object, that it falls pretty completely out of thought that it is always presupposed as subject. The reader who is not so fortunate as to forget this with the completeness of the author, is more puzzled than the author seems to be with the suggestion that the mind may be conceived "as an object whose being consists in the fact that it is to be interpreted thus and so." Nor is the reader much enlightened when it is explained to him that "this Alter, with which I have to deal, both in reflecting on my own mind, and in securing new light from my neighbor's, is never a merely single or separate, or merely detached or isolated individual, but is always a being which is of the nature of a community, a 'many in one and one in many'." Of course the whole discussion debouches into Professor Royce's particular brand of Idealism in which the idea of the self and the idea of a community of selves so interact that they coalesce. At one point, Professor

Royce makes the interesting remark that as mind "is essentially a being that manifests itself through signs, and the only being of signs consists in their demanding interpretation," there can be no such thing as an isolated mind: "the relations of mind are essentially social, so that a world without at least three minds in it,—one to be interpreted, one the interpreter, and the third the one for whom and to whom the first is interpreted—would be a world without any real mind in it at all." The force of this pluralistic reasoning is somewhat marred, it is true, by the concurrent tendency to find this requisite multiplicity within the bounds of the single mind—whether all at once or successively. We hear, for example, of "the past, present and future selves of one who is from another point of view, the same man"; and of one of these selves interpreting another of them for the benefit of the third. But there are some, no doubt, who will object as much to being betrayed into a pluralistic individuality as to being immersed in a pluralistic universe. Professor Royce writes also the article on Monotheism on the theory that the point of discussion concerns purely the matter of unity—so that, for example, pantheism is superlatively monotheistic. His contention is that any worthy idea of God must synthesize the types which may somewhat conventionally be called the Hebraic, the Hellenic and the Hindu. This is another instance of committing an important topic to a not very friendly hand.

The volume contains an unusually large number of articles describing great religious movements or sects. Here is a series of articles, for example, on Mohammed and Mohammedanism, dominated by D. S. Margoliouth, from which we learn, on the whole, how bad Mohammed and Mohammedanism are. Then W. Brandt tells us all that is known about the Mandaeans, and perhaps something more besides. A. A. Bevan gives a good summary of the present state of knowledge of the Manichaeans, and H. Stuart Jones deals somewhat externally with Mithraism. G. Krueger, a skeptic, has been called upon to give accounts of Monophysitism and Monothelitism, and Hugh Pope, a Romanist, of Monarchianism—with the expected results. Of Protestant sects we have articles on Luther and on Lutheranism by Henry E. Jacobs, on the Moravians by E. R. Hasse, and on Methodism by John S. Simon and George G. Findlay: even the Muggletonians (W. T. Whitley) are not forgotten. The rule has been followed in dealing with the major Protestant sects, it will be observed, of committing the subjects to sympathetic hands, and in these instances with excellent results. We have been particularly interested in Professor Findlay's brief account of the Doctrine of Methodism. He represents in effect this doctrinal system as an ellipse revolving around the two foci of "the attainability of the salvation in Christ" both in an extensive and in an intensive sense; that is to say around the two doctrines of the universal atonement and the perfectibility of the human heart. "The current orthodoxy," says he, "limited the salvation of Christ in the degree of its attainability as well as in the persons by whom it is attainable." Methodism lifted these limitations: salvation, it proclaims, is attain-

able by all, and is completely attainable. We may all, here and now, be "*freed from the last remains of sin.*" Professor Friday omits to observe that this ellipse very readily resolves itself into a circle, and that the centre around which this circle revolves is an inevitable IF. Salvation is attainable by all—if; if, that is, all will in their own freedom of action accept it. Salvation is perfectly attainable—if; if, that is, all, in their own freedom of action elect to pursue it diligently to the end. Salvation, once attained, once perfectly attained, is retainable—if; if, that is, those who have attained it elect in their own free action to retain it. How many of these all will in the circumstances in which they act, elect to attain this attainable Gospel, to attain it perfectly, to retain it, if perchance it is once attained? We must sorrowfully answer, None. For the Gospel has been sent into a world not of universal will but of universal won't. Now in a world of universal won't something more is needed than that the door of salvation should be thrown open to all, however widely. What is needed is the bringing of men into it. That it is God and God alone who can and does do this we are very pleasantly reminded by the excellent article on Molinism by Professor Aelred Whiteacre in which we have been more interested than in any other of the articles on particular theological parties. It is an admirable example of the good results which may be attained by committing a topic to an inimical hand, when that inimical hand is at the same time a just one. Writing from the Dominican standpoint, Professor Whiteacre nevertheless gives a very carefully exact account of Molinist teaching and opposes to it with eminent success the Thomist doctrine of salvation by the sovereign grace of God alone.

The commitment of Molinism to unfriendly hands has been very fairly compensated for by the commitment of Loyola to the very friendly, but at the same time, very competent hands of Herbert Thurston. The same writer gives us also the very apologetical article on Liguori. Liguori's ethical system is defended, apparently on the single ground that the Church of Rome is committed to it. The gross Mariolatry of *Le Glorie di Maria* is defended on the ground that it was written for Mariolatrous Neapolitans, and further "as a protest against what Liguori considered to be a veiled attack on the simple and childlike devotion to the Blessed Virgin which he shared, and which is a very important factor in the religion of his countrymen." This seems to amount to saying not that we ought to teach only what is true and right, but that it is right to teach whatever those whom we address consider to be true. Meanwhile, whether what Liguori teaches concerning Mary is true and right seems to be left undetermined: for the fact that Neapolitans believe it is not demonstration that it is true. Herbert Thurston also writes the articles on Loreto and Lourdes. Of course he cannot withstand the systematic refutation of the whole legend of the Holy House of Loreto which U. Chevalier published some ten or fifteen years ago. But he enters the lists for Lourdes. Even so, however, at the end he seems half inclined

to listen to a suggestion made by Alexis Correl to the late Monsignor Benson to the effect that the cures at Lourdes may be due to "a transference of vitalizing force either from the energetic faith of the sufferer, or from that of the bystanders." He does not tell us how this explanation differs from the despised "suggestion" which he rejects out of hand. Is it more than a guess as to how "suggestion" works? Nor does he tell us how it saves the miraculous character of the cures.

Nobody, however, believes in real miracles any longer. We say this with our eye on the article "Miracles" in this Encyclopaedia. It is written by Dr. John Arnott MacCulloch, a distinguished clergyman of the Scottish Episcopal Church, and author of a work of value on *The Religion of the Ancient Celts*. He is one of the voluminous writers in this volume of the Encyclopaedia, supplying articles, not only on Miracles, but also on the Primitive Notion of Light and Darkness, Locks and Keys, Lycanthropy, Celtic Magic, Metamorphosis, Monsters, Mountains and Mountain Gods, and Mouth. His studies, we see, have led him chiefly to the exploration of topics in natural religion. This has broadened the field which he surveys in his article on Miracles, very much to its advantage. Yet it gives him also a tendency to conceive of what we call miraculous, no matter how mysterious, as always at bottom natural,—“the reign of law is not set aside, for the ways in which miracle is brought about are still in accordance with law, even if the miracle happens but once.” We are inclined to set C. W. Emmet’s important article “Messiah,” by the side of MacCulloch’s “Miracles,” as marked on the whole by the same general tone. Mr. Emmet is fully informed on the investigations of the new History of Religion school into the development of Israelitish Eschatology; but he does not permit himself to be moved by it from the general position arrived at by the school of psychological criticism. He still minimizes the Messianic hope in the Old Testament, considers it late in origin and assigns it but a small and inconspicuous place in the religion of Israel. This leaves him in some difficulty with the developed Messianic hope not only of the post-Biblical Judaism but of New Testament presupposition. But when we are once embarked on the minimizing path we can ordinarily deal with such things very well.

We have read with pleasure the informing articles on Pseudo-Messiahs (A. M. Hyasom) and Mahdi (D. S. Margoliouth) and the great collection of articles on Magic (fifteen sections, covering nearly a hundred pages). We admire very much the excellent historical sketch—from its start to its finish,—of Modernism by A. W. Lilley. And no one surely will have this volume very long in his hands before he turns to the extended article on Missions (fifty pages). Here he will find an adequate condensed history of Christian Missions in three sections—Early and Mediaeval, Roman Catholic, and Protestant,—and good brief parallel accounts of the Missionary activities of Buddhists, Mahommedans and Zoroastrians. We cannot hope to give any impression, however, of the value of the volume by thus noting a few of its

articles, which we have by hazard been led to read. It must suffice to say that its vocabulary is well-nigh exhaustive in its special field, and its articles are uniformly written with learning and care. It has a general tone, it is true, which is not in all respects agreeable to us. This tone, for lack of a better phrase, may be spoken of, perhaps, as "Liberal." Every point of view is certainly, on occasion, admitted to its pages. But the point of view which is least in evidence in them—shall we say, is least welcome in them?—is the point of view of Evangelical Christianity.

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EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Der Märtyrer in den Anfängen der Kirche. Von D. A. Schlatter, Professor in Tübingen. Gütersloh, Druck und Verlag Von C. Bertelsmann. pp. 86. (Beiträge zur Förderung Christlicher Theologie, XIX, 3, 1915).

Dr. Schlatter tells us in the preface that the impulse for writing this treatise was received from an article published by Karl Holl in the *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Alterthum* for 1914 and entitled "The Martyr-Conception and the Acts of the Martyrs in their Historical Development." In many respects he finds himself in agreement with Holl, notably so in discovering a strong Jewish factor among the influences that shaped the martyr-conception in the early Church. Geffken's judgment that the word *μάρτυς* is of purely philosophical, and therefore of Hellenic, origin is set aside by both. On the other hand Schlatter differs from Holl in denying that the element of "enthusiasm" was to any conceivable extent concerned in the origin of the phenomenon or the formation of the idea. While both seek the beginning of the movement in the Maccabaeian crisis, Holl finds it significant that its rise coincides with the emergence of "enthusiasm," whereas Schlatter simply denies that "enthusiasm" played any part in that struggle or was a characteristic feature of the Jewish life of the period at all. It is interesting to note this, because of late Kennedy and others, in their desire to reduce the influence of the mystery-religions on Paul, have sought out and made as much as possible of whatever might seem to offer an analogy to Hellenistic "mysticism" and "enthusiasm" in Jewish religious life. According to Schlatter, to be sure, a connection between "enthusiasm" and the martyr-idea exists, but it exists only on Hellenistic-Jewish ground. Palestinian Judaism is positively conscious of the absence of the prophetic-enthusiastic element. As to the apocalyptic literature, the author rejects the explanation of this phenomenon from "enthusiasm." The summary judgment: "Apocalyptic belongs to the category of Midrash and Midrash is exegesis, not prophecy," seems to us an overstatement; it fails to explain the peculiar character of the literature in