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of lives and society, are valid proofs of His claims and power. No one would neglect them. But there is no need—or propriety—in setting them in opposition to the “historical evidence” of His claims and power, as the sole proof of their truth. In point of fact they are themselves just historical evidences, along with the other forms of historical evidence, and lead us not merely to a conviction of faith, but to a historical judgment. That is no true “historical science” which in forming its historical judgments fails to take account of the effects of historical events or personalities. And if these effects are of a supernatural order it belongs to historical science to assume for them a supernatural cause emerging in history, on pain of ceasing to be historical *science*. For science means causal thinking, and causal thinking means the discovery and validation of *adequate* causes. The Divine Christ is not merely a fact of faith, but a fact of history; and it is not history but a *a priori* reconstruction of history in the interest of an erroneous world-view which would eliminate Him from history and relegate Him to the realm of faith alone. That Loofs reacts from this extreme view is to his credit: that he reacts only partially is only a part of that fatal “*halbheit*” which vitiates all the reasonings of the whole school to which he belongs and of which he is one of the chief ornaments. The “assertions of faith” are not to be set over against the findings of “historical science” to correct them; they are to be made part of the evidence on which “historical science” depends for its findings and are to coöperate with whatever other evidence “historical science” has at its disposal in rendering beyond all question the historical fact of the Divine Christ, who is given to us on the ground of a great variety of historical evidence, only one item of which is found in our own experiences of His reality and power.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Rule of Faith, being the Baird Lecture for 1905. By the Rev. W. P. PATERSON, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh. London and New York: Hodder and Stoughton. 1912. Crown 8vo; pp. x, 439.

The range of Dr. Paterson's discussion in his Baird lectures, now published in this attractive volume, will scarcely be suggested to the average reader by the title he has given them,—*The Rule of Faith*. He considers himself entitled to subsume the whole under this title, however, because of a certain ambiguity attaching to it, due to its divergent use in Patristic and in Protestant Theology. In the early ages of the church “the Rule of Faith” (or “the Rule of Truth”) was the designation given to the common fundamental faith of the Church, as drawn out from Scripture and expressed in a succinct formula, say for example, the Baptismal Creed. By their harmony with this standard of teaching the orthodoxy of all theological constructions was estimated. In the Post-Reformation controversies, on the other hand, “the Rule of Faith” is the designation given to the proximate authoritative source of Christian knowledge, from the

teaching of which alone what is genuinely Christian doctrine is to be ascertained. In the former usage the substance of Christian doctrine, in the latter the seat of Christian doctrine is called "the Rule of Faith"; and by this circumstance Dr. Paterson considers he is given a certain justification in employing the term as the general title of a series of lectures in which both the seat and the substance of doctrine are discussed. There is, however, a deeper justification of Dr. Paterson's procedure here than can be provided by the mere ambiguity of a term. As a result of his discussion of the seat of Christian doctrine, Dr. Paterson arrives at the conclusion that the seat of Christian doctrine lies really in the substance of Christian doctrine; so that the discussion of the seat of doctrine necessarily involves in it the discussion of the substance of doctrine, and any discussion of the Rule of Faith in the former sense must include both topics. The bald announcement of this conclusion has undoubtedly a paradoxical sound. That is, however, Dr. Paterson's concern, not ours; and it must be conceded to him that if he does actually find the seat of Christian doctrine in the substance of Christian doctrine, then he must discuss under the head of "the Rule of Faith" not merely the seat but the substance of Christian doctrine, and he is from his own point of view justified in dividing his lectures on "the Rule of Faith" into these two main topics, and, indeed, in giving the larger share of the discussion to the topic of the substance of Christian doctrine. This is in point of fact what he does. So that what we find in the volume before us is a parallel discussion of first, the seat of doctrine (pp. 31-173), and secondly, the substance of doctrine (pp. 177-396); to which there is added a series of illustrative appendices (pp. 397-428), and an Index (pp. 429-439).

Whatever we may think of the cardinal decision by which the question of the seat of Christian doctrine is transferred to the question of the substance of Christian doctrine (and we have no wish to conceal the fact that we do not think well of it), the reader of the volume profits by the inclusion in it of the rich discussions upon the substance of Christian doctrine which Dr. Paterson gives us. Decidedly it is here that Dr. Paterson is at his best. His method is historico-critical. He passes in review, in turn, the Orthodox—that is to say, the Patristic—Interpretation of Christianity, the Genius of Roman Catholicism, the Gospel of Protestantism, the Distinctive Testimony of the Reformed Churches, the Rationalistic Theology, the Theology of Schleiermacher, and the Ritschlian Revision, endeavoring on each occasion to fix the conception of Christianity presented and to estimate it as an attempt to set forth Christianity in its substance. The order pursued is in each case to begin with a careful exposition of the view under scrutiny, then in a few sentences to point out in general its excellences, and antithetically its shortcomings, and only after this to enter into detailed criticisms. It is doubtless an old-fashioned method of conducting a discussion, and a certain air of formality hangs around it; but it contributes a singular tone of judicial balance to the discussion, which combines with Dr. Paterson's scrupulous care

as an expositor and the very unusual insight which he displays in his criticisms to render the whole a very attractive piece of exposition. The effect is heightened by the plain, clear, penetrating style in which the whole is written, and the independence and sturdy common-sense of the point of view which suggests that rather of the experienced man of affairs than of the pedantic scholar poring over his texts.

No doubt part differs from part both in lucidity and in satisfactoriness, and curiously enough the power of the discussion appears to increase steadily as it progresses. On the whole the least satisfactory section is that on the Patristic Theology where the great doctrines of the Trinity and the Person of Christ come under consideration. On both doctrines Dr. Paterson seems to waver somewhat and to be not altogether free from confusion of mind: he even goes so far as to suggest in the one case whether the question of tritheism might not be hopefully reopened, while in the other he seems to be almost inclined, though without full satisfaction, to seek refuge in the Kenotic theory, pronouncing it (in its moderate form) "the only possible interpretation of the Person of Christ", *provided*,—provided, that is, that we believe both in the preëxistence of the Son of God and the true humanity of Jesus. In sharp contrast with this fumbling touch on matters of the highest concernment, the sections on the Rationalistic Theology, the Theology of Schleiermacher, and the Ritschlian Revision leave little to be desired. The exposition here is sympathetic and adequate and the criticism fundamental and full of weight. A passage like the following (p. 363), goes indeed to the root of matters; and the reader may be pardoned if he wonders before he finishes the work, whether Dr. Paterson has kept these wise words in mind for his own guidance. "But a religious theory which, by whatever path, brings us back to the imperfect self as the ground of our confidence violates what may well be felt to be an axiom of the Christian religion. Our deepest spiritual need is to look away from what has been divinely and graciously wrought in ourselves to a ground of confidence which is wholly of God, and perfectly worthy of God; and it is a mark of theological decadence to disturb religious assurance by transferring the gaze to the humiliated and imprisoned Christ that is discernible in the experiences even of the most Christ-like of those who have entered on the new life." In general one gets the impression that Dr. Paterson's touch is steadiest and his modeling firmest when he is dealing with recent thought, especially if it is of German origin, and particularly if it lies in the region of soteriology rather than in that of theology proper.

It perhaps ought not to be a matter of surprise therefore that we find the section on the "Testimony of the Reformed Churches" unwontedly good. It breaks down, indeed, only when it faces the doctrine of preterition (pp. 311 ff.), and it breaks down there apparently only because it fails to realize with sufficient poignancy what sin is and its deserts, and reasons as if the salvation of all were a question of merely the power of God: God has power enough to

save all; if, then, He does not, there must be some flaw in His love. The obstacle of justice is not realized. Dr. Paterson can see but two ways out: either, on the one hand, in an Arminian or semi-Arminian modification (which obviously he shrinks from as fundamentally wrong), or else in a doctrine of universal salvation (which, apparently, with the late Dr. Hastie, he inclines to). The difficulty is, however, purely artificial, and is wholly due to the practical elimination of the element of justice from the conception of the Divine character. It is not difficult to understand why a just God does not save all sinners; the difficulty is to understand how a just God saves any sinners. It is precisely this difficulty which Christianity meets, and if neither the difficulty is felt nor the manner in which Christianity meets it appreciated,—then Christianity is not understood, and we have substituted for it in our thought of it something which is essentially different.

Dr. Paterson, it must be borne in mind, has introduced this discussion of the substance of Christianity as part of a discussion of the seat of Christianity. He has reached the conclusion that the seat of Christianity is found in the substance of Christianity, and so passes into the discussion of the latter topic. We seem to be entitled to obtain from him in these circumstances, a clear exposition of that substance of Christianity which is to stand as its norm. We do not feel that we receive it. A very illuminating discussion of the several main views of the nature of Christianity which have ruled in the Church is given us, and from that discussion we may infer what Dr. Paterson thinks Christianity to be. The impression we gain thus of his own conception of Christianity is in general reassuring: but we should hardly be justified in drawing out from this criticism of others a positive statement of what should be held to be so of the essence of Christianity that it should stand as its substantial norm, to which in all its details Christianity must conform on pain of being no longer Christianity. The short opening chapter of this section of the book, entitled, "The Nature of the Christian Religion", deals only in certain wide notions, which Dr. Paterson no doubt gathers up into a formal definition of Christianity (p. 199 note), but which he certainly would not himself, if we are to judge by the drift of the whole discussion, consider to embody the substance of Christianity in sufficient detail to enable it to stand as the norm of what Christianity is. On his own showing Christianity necessarily contains much more than is here set down to its credit. Neither do we get any clear light from the short concluding chapter. There no doubt we are told in general what Christianity is like, and some of the things which have been attached to it without being of it, and are assured again that there is "a groundwork of the Christian religion" which is present in all its divergent forms. But there again no serious attempt is made to extract this "groundwork" and set it plainly before us, that we may see precisely what Christianity in its essence is, persistent in all its genuine forms, the presence of which is Christianity,

and the absence of which is the absence of Christianity. On the face of it, Dr. Paterson seems to have left his task incomplete. His main undertaking was to present us with the Christian rule of faith. He intimates that this rule of faith lies ultimately in the substance of the Christian faith. And then he leaves this substance of the Christian faith only vaguely indicated, with shadowy boundaries on this side and that.

It seems to be time that we should revert, therefore, to the main question. The main question which Dr. Paterson invites us to consider is the question of the Christian "Rule of Faith". This he himself explains (p. 4) to mean, "in brief", the question of "what is the proximate source from which we collect the special Christian knowledge which is held to be derived from God as its primary source, and how is this source known to be trustworthy". Primarily, therefore, the question before us is, what is the source of our knowledge of Christian truth. Now, Dr. Paterson tells us, many answers have been given to this question in the Christian Church. The Roman Catholics have their answer. It runs in brief: the Word of God, as contained in Scripture plus tradition, as interpreted by the Church, speaking through its infallible organ, the Pope. The Protestants have their answer. In direct opposition to the Roman Catholic (and on the other hand to the Mystical) view, it runs: the Word of God as contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. The Mystics have their answer. They appeal to the Word of God, spoken directly to the soul of each man. The Rationalists have their answers. They appeal to the primal endowment of man with reason as the adequate source of knowledge of divine things. Professor Patterson passes all these answers in review, and then for the sake of completeness adds two additional chapters, in the one of which he investigates the attempt to find in spontaneous religious feeling the norm of all religious truth, and in the other, the attempt to find the norm of Christian truth not in the Scriptures as a whole, but in some particular portion of the Scriptural content. With this last view in general, which Professor Paterson calls "Biblical Eclecticism", he expresses his own sympathy. The Rule of Faith is therefore to be found, according to Professor Paterson, not in the Church nor in the Reason, not in the Inner Word, nor in the Feelings, but in the Scriptures: but not in the Scriptures as a whole but in a certain portion of the Scriptural contents isolated by him as "the substance of Christianity". Thus he draws us away from the Scriptures as such and invites us to attend, as "the Seat of Christianity", rather to the "substance of Christianity" as transmitted to us in the Scriptures.

The justification which Dr. Paterson offers for deserting the Protestant doctrine of the Rule of Faith is, brusquely put, that the Scriptures, in their full extent, are not a trustworthy source of Christian truth. They contain a human element of ignorance and error; and they teach differently in different portions so that no single system of either doctrine or morals can be extracted from

them. It is then simply impossible to make them in their entirety the authoritative rule of faith: no man can possibly believe all they teach. The way for rejecting the authority of Scripture in its entirety as the source of truth is prepared by the contention that in point of fact Scripture never was in its entirety the rule of faith to anyone. The Reformers themselves practically used as the rule of faith not the whole Bible but a selected portion of the Bible, a Bible within the Bible: and we are entitled to do no less. We shall not stay to refute either of these very refutable propositions. It is enough for us to note that on their support what Dr. Paterson proposes for us to do is to find the source of our knowledge of what Christianity is, not in the Scriptures as such but rather in a certain body of contents which has been transmitted to us by Scripture. He seems to be under the impression that he does not thus desert the Protestant doctrine of the rule of faith, but only modifies it: not all Scripture but some Scripture is, he intimates, his formula. This is, however, plainly an illusion. He no longer appeals to Scripture at all as authority. What he appeals to is a certain sum of truths selected out of Scripture on the authority of something extraneous to Scripture. The most that can be said for Scripture is that it is the vehicle in which—along with much else—the items of Christian knowledge which in their sum constitute Christianity are conveyed to us. What assures us that these are genuine items of Christian knowledge is not that they are found in Scripture, but that they are gathered out of the heap of things found in Scripture by quite another magnet.

The magnet by which these items of Christian knowledge are gathered out of the dust heap of Scripture is sometimes described as spiritual tact (pp. 98, 170). This is explained to mean that the divine message that is in Scripture is "self-authenticating to those who meet it with a trustful mind and an obedient will" (pp. 76-7). When the need of a deeper ground of confidence is felt, it is found in "the testimony of the Holy Spirit" (pp. 70, 164, 165). And when something more objective is desiderated, a pragmatic test is suggested (p. 169). Perhaps no fuller statement is given than that embodied in the eloquent closing words of the volume, where we are told that Christianity has an absolute persuasion of its central doctrinal content, "which forms the soul and power of the Christian religion". The grounds of this full persuasion are suggested in the following series of sentences: "It passes down from generation to generation under the protection of experience and of God. It is accredited afresh from age to age by the fact that it is an engine for doing spiritual work of the most valuable kind, and that those who make use of it find that it makes good its promises. It is also authenticated by a conviction of its truth wrought in the hearts of those who live by it, which shows such strength, tenacity and energizing activity that they confidently interpret it as a gift of God through the testimony of the Holy Ghost" (p. 395). If we may venture to subject words which are so suffused with lofty feeling to a logical analysis, we may per-

haps be permitted to distinguish here three lines of evidence which, according to Professor Paterson, converge to give the Christian confidence in the central doctrinal content of Christianity. There is first the evidence from experience: the Christian has made trial of these truths and found in them salvation, and he perceives himself to be but one of a long series of men and women extending through the ages who have had the same blessed experience. The central truths of Christianity authenticate themselves and have always authenticated themselves by their blessed effects in human hearts. There is secondly the evidence of the observation of the effects of Christianity in the world,—the pragmatic proof: Christianity has transformed the world and continues to transform it wherever it is embraced—it obviously “works”. From a hint let drop (on p. 387), we may presume that Dr. Paterson has in mind here only the effects wrought *in the world*, in the amelioration of social conditions; and is not speaking “from an eschatological point of view”. And then, lastly, there is the “testimony of the Holy Spirit”, that is to say, as apparently expounded here (it is differently expounded elsewhere), a conviction of the truth of the central doctrinal content of Christianity arising in the soul, of such “strength, tenacity and energising activity” as suggests powerfully that it is God-given. On these three grounds, then, Christians are convinced that Christianity is true, in its central content. And in this central content they have in their hands a Rule of Faith. Whatever enters into this “central content”, that is Christianity. Whatever lies outside this “central content”, may or may not be true, may or may not be valuable; it is not of the essence of faith, and no one need be asked to believe it that he may be a Christian.

Surely no one will doubt that Christianity continuously authenticates itself by its blessed effects. And surely no one will doubt that we know that that is true Christianity which thus continuously authenticates itself by its effects. We may conceivably learn what is true Christianity therefore by analysis of that Christianity which “works”. Whatever is necessarily involved in the effects may be confidently assumed in the cause. Give me but the one assured fact, indeed, that I am saved through faith in Jesus Christ and make the content of this fact all that it really is in him who is really saved through faith in Jesus Christ, and I will draw out from this one fact by inference after inference—like the waves spreading out in ever increasing circles around a stone cast into the water—the entire body of the Calvinistic divinity. But that of course is only because unless the entire body of Calvinistic divinity were true I could not be saved through faith in Jesus Christ. Salvation by faith in Jesus Christ authenticates therefore the entire body of Calvinistic divinity. It surely will not do to tell me that my experience of salvation through faith in Jesus Christ authenticates nothing except my salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. I could not experience this salvation were not every thing true which is necessarily presupposed by it. But neither will it do to tell me that I can know the truth of these things only by inference back from this experience.

It might be truer to say that I will never have this experience until I know the truth of all these things at least implicitly. So long as I am not convinced of the truth of these things I shall never make experiment of salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. Shall I not ask, Who is He, Lord, that I may believe on Him? Shall I not argue, How shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in Him whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent? Must I not have the knowledge before I exercise the faith, through which I gain the experience I am to analyse? And where am I to get this knowledge? This is the problem of the Rule of Faith. It is the question of the source of the knowledge acting on which I may be saved. It is all very well to tell a man that he may know his pump is a good one if it brings the water, and that he may learn therefore what kind of a pump is a good one by the simple experiment of trying all pumps and seeing which of them bring the water. That a pump brings the water is quite evidently proof enough that it is a good pump. But where will he find pumps that will bring water to him, unless the principles of suction on which alone pumps that will bring water must be constructed, are understood beforehand? The question is, on what rules shall pumps be constructed that they may bring water? And the question is on what rule shall the "Christianity" be constructed that will save? We can derive the one no more than the other from "experience". Theory precedes practice.

Professor Paterson has, in a word, lost sight of his problem in the course of his argumentation. His task is not to prove the truth of the Christian religion. His task is to point out whence we obtain knowledge of what the Christian religion consists of. That the Christian religion "works" is a very important fact: but the Christian religion must exist before it "works". It was brought into the world before it "worked", and it has "worked" on those who have never seen it "work" before, and who could not have learned its nature first from its "working". We may indeed be told, Try it and you will find that it will "work". Try what? Must we not be told what it is we are to try? And why should we try it on the mere chance of its "working?" Obviously we need an authoritative source of information as to what Christianity is, and the problem of that source is the problem of the Rule of Faith.

What Dr. Paterson has done is to shift the source of information from an objective to a subjective basis. For the "Schriftprinzip" of Protestantism he has substituted a "Geistprinzip"; and what he tells us in effect is merely that we may be sure that true Christianity is what we find effective Christianity to be: beyond that circle of truths which we find effective we need not bother ourselves. But thus we are cast upon a wide and uncertain sea and that utterly without chart, loadstar, or rudder. We must settle for ourselves what it is we would have done. We must settle for ourselves that this is effectively done. We must settle for ourselves what it is that

has done it. We must, in a word, invent our own Christianity. Professor Paterson merely takes his place in the great company of modern subjective writers in this matter. And so far as we have been able to see, despite the superior sanity of his judgment in passing on the several doctrines and the varying constructions which come before him, he has nothing to offer us in the way of a Rule of Faith superior to what other subjective writers have previously offered us. There is much in his book that is useful and admirably said; but it leaves us wholly without an objectively valid Rule of Faith. It is a great thing to know that there is a Christianity which propagates itself down the ages and "does its work", blessing the lives of men, filling them with deathless hope, assuring them of the favor of God. But when we ask what this Christianity producing all these great effects is,—what are its precise contents, what is its extent, what enters into it giving it its full power and ensuring its stability,—Professor Paterson can help us very little. He can only say: I can point you to some things which certainly stand at its center. But where can we learn it in its whole extent? This is the problem of the Rule of Faith, and it is an important problem; and Professor Paterson has no guidance to give us as to its solution.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Glory After the Passion. A study of the events in the life of our Lord from His Descent into Hell to His Enthronement in Heaven. By the REV. JAMES S. STONE, D.D., Rector of St. James's Church, Chicago. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1913. Pp. 393.

This is the third volume of the series projected by the author. The first, *The Prayer Before The Passion*, was reviewed in these pages in October 1911. The second was entitled, *The Passion of Christ*. It is understood that the author is engaged at present on *The Preparation For The Passion*, in which he will deal with the question of the Pre-incarnate State of Our Lord, His Birth and His Earthly Ministry. The volume before us, like those preceding it, is written continuously, without the usual divisions into chapters, but, in the course of it, he covers the doctrine of Immortality, The Descent into Hell, The Resurrection, The Forty Days, The Ascension, The Session at the Right Hand of God, The Heavenly Priesthood and The Intercession. Another volume will deal with The Return of our Lord in Glory, The Resurrection of the Dead, The Judgment and the events which are to follow.

Dr. Stone is fully aware of the difficulty of his present task arising out of the tendencies of thought in our day (p. 375 ff). Modern conditions do not afford time for reflection. Churches are not without displays of energy but music and ritual are substitutes for devotion while philanthropy, building and mending civic and social conditions pass now for religion. The spirit of the age calls for action, not thought; for physical enterprise not for spiritual culture. "It is not the hardness of the doctrines that stands in the way but the trouble