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HERMAN BAVINCK.

The Free Churches of Holland possess at the present moment in Dr. Abraham Kuyper and Dr. Herman Bavinck theologians of genius and of erudition worthy of the best traditions of the Reformed theology. In the autumn of 1898 Dr. Kuyper delivered at Princeton Seminary the L. P. Stone Lectures, and thus for the first time made his voice heard by an English-speaking audience. During the present month Dr. Bavinck is to deliver these Lectures. The circumstance seems worthy of notice; and the occasion seems to call for some introduction of Professor Bavinck to his American audience. The following account of the position he occupies and the work he has done in the churches and for the people of the Netherlands has been derived from an authentic source.—EDITORS.

The Reformed Church in the Netherlands underwent a great change in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Rationalism had already penetrated into the church and caused a tremendous upheaval; but it now made itself master of almost the whole of the church in the form of a moderate supranaturalism. Everywhere the old truths of atonement and regeneration were set aside in favor of new dogmas of the example of Jesus and of moral improvement. The hope was cherished that an end could be put to the old faith by means of official preaching, elementary education

allusions. What the book undertakes to do is to "present simply and concisely the present-day standing of Darwinism in biological science", and to outline the various auxiliary and alternative theories of species-forming which have been proposed to aid or to replace the selection theories". And this it does well, with thorough knowledge, with sufficient fulness, and with adequate exactness. Professor Kellogg exhibits here great skill in expounding and much penetration in criticizing the several views which have been advanced, and commends his own views to us by their moderation and balance. He impresses us as a safe guide to the history both of evolutionary speculation and of biological research. Readers desiring to know the present state, whether of knowledge or of opinion, in this sphere of research, cannot do better than to resort to his comprehensive and readable volume.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

NO STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE: NO NATURAL SELECTION. A Critical Examination of the Fundamental Principles of the Darwinian Theory. By GEORGE PAULIN. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1908. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 8vo.; pp. xx, 261. Price, \$1.75 net.

We have not had the fortune to meet with other writings by Mr. George Paulin and are entirely ignorant of his personality. He speaks of himself as of one advanced in years; and his manner of writing seems to accord with this description, characterized as it is at once by a certain ripeness of tone and by a certain diffuseness of expression. The matter of his book is highly speculative in character and divides itself into two extended arguments—the one in refutation of the Darwinian theory of Natural Selection, the other in rebuttal of the central contention of Malthus' Essay on Population. Unity is secured by the identity of the governing principle in the two theories which are examined.

Mr. Paulin appears to ascribe a venturesome novelty to his assault on the core of the Darwinian hypothesis which somewhat astonishes us. He seems almost to imagine that he is the first, or among the first, to arraign the conceptions of the "struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest". Readers who are unaware of the widespread revolt from these conceptions among recent scientific investigators should at least read the three chapters on "Darwinism Attacked" in Professor Vernon L. Kellogg's *Darwinism To-day*. Meanwhile, Mr. Paulin's apparent lack of acquaintance with these labors of his fellow-workers gives to his strictures on the Darwinian hypothesis the value of an independent criticism. The hundred and twelve pages which he devotes to this criticism, diffuse and speculative as they are, and now and then somewhat heated, are nevertheless quite effective,—chiefly because they lay stress on certain broad considerations, which, apart from all details, appear to be fatal to the Darwinian construction.

Neither the palaeontological record nor the present state of the

animate universe is such as it must have been were the Darwinian hypothesis true. If the Darwinian hypothesis were correct, there would necessarily have existed, in the slow formation of types through infinitesimal changes, innumerable intermediate stages and the several types would inevitably melt insensibly into one another. Vastly more of the unfit would have died than of the fit. How is it that the record is free from these intermediate types? How have the rocks selected out only the few fit for preservation in their remains for our inspection, and destroyed all trace of the immensely more numerous unfit? If the Darwinian hypothesis were correct, again, all nature, in the terrible struggle for existence which is its nerve, would hang ever at the starving point. It does not. The average animal is a well-to-do animal. Why do not the starving multitudes who are unfit swarm around the surviving few who are fit? They do not. On the Darwinian theory, nature should be one vast charnel house. It is not. It is a happy hunting ground. "We behold only the survivors,—vigorous, healthy and happy survivors. But where is the struggle for existence? Where are the dying and the dead?" (p. 17). Starvation is not the normal plane of animal existence. On the contrary, in a district stocked from immemorial time, the numbers of animals inhabiting it will be constant at just the point at which they can be comfortably supplied with their proper food (p. 53). This is what we call the balance of nature, and it seems to maintain itself indefinitely without visible struggle. An internecine struggle such as Darwin pictured as the inevitable state of animal nature—and on the inevitableness of which he built his whole theory—simply never exists, as is open to the observation of everybody. And what survives from generation to generation is obviously not a few hard-pressed "fittest", but the normal somewhat pampered "average".

The examination of the Malthusian theory, which occupies the second half of the volume, is somewhat more labored, but scarcely so effective as the criticism of the Darwinian theory which precedes it. Mr. Paulin's argument here, too, is that the struggle for existence, which is the nerve of Malthusianism also, is not in point of fact a characteristic of human existence, and never can become its characteristic. Population, in his view, is automatically governed by the labor-market, and follows inevitably, therefore, the fluctuations in the means of sustenance. In times of plenty, men marry early and the birth-rate is large: in times of stringency, men marry correspondingly late and the birth-rate is small. Thus the population is regulated by the means of sustenance and the struggle for existence never comes off. These views he supports by elaborate statistical tables designed to show that the birth-rate follows closely the fluctuations of the labor-market, so that the population abides steadily at the mark at which sustenance is provided according to the standard of living in vogue. A curious corollary is that large emigration, acting as a new demand for men, stimulates productivity and does not deplete a nation, and the same is true of the maintenance of a large standing army. The rule is,

according to Mr. Paulin, that every people will produce all the men it can support and use—and no more: and this automatically.

The most abiding impression which the reader receives from discussions like these is of the highly speculative character of what we commonly speak of as physical science. The whole construction which we know as Darwinism is obviously pure speculation—and speculation which, as is coming more and more fully to be realized now-a-days, has little to support it in actual nature. The warnings of men like Virchow against running so recklessly ahead of observation, have been generally, and no doubt will continue to be generally, disregarded. So zealous is the human mind for "explanations", that a plausible "explanation" is readily accepted, although the actual state of things loudly cries out against it. Mr. Paulin's own experience curiously illustrates the ineradicable habit of the human mind to proceed on mere assumptions. He wrote his book as a convinced evolutionist who had his quarrel only with the Darwinian conception of the factors of evolution. But before he got it published grave doubt attacked him as to the validity of this assumption. The immense length of time required for the evolutionary process, the entire lack in the palaeontological records of intermediate forms to bridge the gulf between the finished fish, bird and mammal types, and the sudden appearance of these finished forms among heterogeneous organisms, the general evidences of design in nature—and such like considerations—invaded his thought with new energy and threw him suddenly into doubt as to his life-long conviction. "If I be asked in what conclusion, then, do I rest", he confesses with some pathos, "I can only answer, in this, that I know nothing. The way of God in creation baffles me by its mystery. Of the mode of evolution Nature tells us nothing" (p. xix). Though the doctrine of special creation "does not recommend itself" to him, and he is "unable to accept it", he admits that the argument is logically in its favor, and that it presents no new difficulties not already found in the origin of life. Thus, as he sends out the book which he has written to show that the fundamental basis of Darwinism is pure assumption, he is compelled to pause and confess that the foundations of his own thought have revealed themselves to him as pure assumption also. *Ignoramus*, he cries; and apparently also, *ignorabimus*. This only does he feel sure of,—God; and "that the Deity did not intervene to suspend the regular operation of the forces of Nature with a view to prevent the preservation of intermediate forms, while He suffered them to preserve those finished forms which are contained in the geological record" (p. xx). That is to say, the truth of Darwinism implies a miracle. And while he is prepared to believe in miracles—or rather does not quite see how he can escape believing in them, if not in the special creation of types of animate existence, at least in the origin of life,—he is decidedly unprepared to believe in the special miracle which Darwinism implies. He does not quite know what is true, but he seems to himself to know quite conclusively that Darwinism is not true. It would seem that we must take this as Mr. Paulin's

final word to us: and it seems to us far from an unsatisfactory word.
Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INSPIRATION; An Attempt to Distinguish Religious Truth from Scientific Truth and to Harmonize Christianity with Modern Thought. By GEORGE LANSING RAYMOND. New York and London: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1908. 8vo.; pp. xix, 340.

This book promises great things, and it would be a greater book than it is if it performed them. The author, who is, we believe, connected with the George Washington University, comes to his task with what seems to be a distinct bias in his thought. He draws the line sharply, though not too accurately, between science and theology; the one "trains the mind to be candid and logical", while the other "is inclined to be neither" (p. vi). The shortcomings of theology, accordingly, are not only intellectual, they are also moral. Religious men must be prepared, "without prevaricating or hedging, to satisfy all the requirements of the rational nature". The author tells us that some time ago he attended a meeting of scientists, and, as he looked about him, he reflected that not one of those present was considered by himself or by others as being what is conventionally termed religious; yet, everybody was in a fine frame of devotion, conscientiousness, and charity. About the same time, he had his attention called to an ecclesiastical gathering (we are left to infer that he was not present); those present regarded themselves "as religious in an exceptional degree"; "yet no reported speech of any of them happened to be devoid of a certain selfish, intolerant, and unmagnanimous disregard of the feelings and thoughts of others"; neither was there any noticeable display of "distinctively Christ-like traits". We submit that the author had in this most interesting psychological observation the suggestion of a theme which in itself is worthy the consideration of many wise men without as yet widening the scope of their endeavor so greatly as to accomplish the rather ambitious task indicated in the somewhat glowing but adequately general terms in the sub-title of the comely volume which his publishers have produced. It occurs to the reader that it must have been a picked group of scientists not one of whom could be fairly regarded, even in the conventional sense, as religious. Certainly it would not be hard to select a group of scientific men of the first magnitude who are so regarded. Moreover, the ecclesiastical mien is hardly so degraded, nor is the *odium theologicum* so ferocious, in these degenerate days, as to render either absurd or superfluous a mild shock of surprise at being told that any Conference or Convocation or Synod has been in solemn session for several days without some brother, less active, less prominent, less useful forsooth than his colleagues, displaying in some incidental way or in some felicitous moment when he was off his guard, just a little degree of tolerance, unselfishness or magnanimous regard for the thoughts and feelings of others.