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I.

THOMAS AQUINAS AND LEO XIII.

AS an ecclesiastical diplomat, Leo XIII will no doubt take high rank among the popes of modern times. He had no power to marshal armies and to set in motion crusades against refractory dissenters, as did Innocent III, nor did he exercise the function of fulmination against princes. And yet his moral influence throughout the bounds of all western Christendom has been notably great. He has elevated the papacy to a position of world-wide influence such as it has not had since the Reformation. Not before in their history have the different portions of Protestantism had so kindly a feeling toward a pope. For the moment room has been made even for a feeling of toleration for the papacy itself. Both feelings are due to the impression made by the virtues of Leo's private character. This impression was enhanced by the exceptional mental vigor Leo displayed into a high age and the youthful interest he manifested to the very end in current events, and which has seldom, if ever, been equaled in recent times. This personal sympathy of Protestants, strange to say, has been accorded to Leo in spite of his sweeping condemnations of Protestantism. His encyclicals* have denounced the Reformation, with its novel doctrines, as having produced "sudden tumults and most audacious revolts, especially in Germany." Its so-called philosophy is made the mother of unnumbered pests, such as communism, socialism and nihilism. The ultimate fruit of the Lutheran revolt is the ruin of morals.† In one of his very first encyclicals the evan-

* June 29, 1881; August 1, 1897, etc.

† *Ruinam morum ultimam maturavit*, *Encyclical*, August 1, 1897.

THE RELIGIOUS SENSE IN ITS SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS. By GREVILLE MACDONALD, M.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1903; New York: A. C. Armstrong and Son. Crown 8vo, pp. xvi, 243. [Three Lectures given before students of the several departments at King's College, London, June, 1902.]

We hardly know whether it is fairest to look upon these attractive lectures as a serious argument or as an exalted rhapsody. As a rhapsody, they are certainly beautiful, conceived in a noble key and crowded with exquisite passages. As a formal argument they leave, it must be confessed, much to be desired. We have scarcely ever met with a finer tangle of "undistributed middles." So prone are they, indeed, to play on words in their reasoning, that the philologist might almost look on them as an interesting study in homonyms. Nevertheless there runs through the whole a perfectly sound and a truly valuable philosophy of being, which constitutes a profound theodicy. This we may perhaps be permitted to state in our own way, as follows.

All things stand in express relation to God who has made them for Himself, and unvaryingly work out the end for which they were made. Hence all things work together toward that far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves, each fulfilling steadily its function in the great movement onward. All things are thus absolutely obedient to Law, and in their obedience manifest Law—the Law of service to an end outside themselves, and therefore a Law of subordination of self to service. Man differs from other things only in that he is conscious of the Law which he is to serve and for the service of which he should renounce himself. But to be conscious of the Law is to open the way to diverse attitudes toward the Law. There may be an attitude of glad obedience; there may be an attitude of rebellious opposition. Freedom is thus the offspring of consciousness; and it may be the parent of either virtue or sin. The prime question is, Whether the gain in elevating service from mechanical instinct into freedom justifies the incidental evil of the—possibility shall we say?—or shall we say the certainty?—of sin, less or more. For, as for God—the only limitation that can be put upon His eternal power is 'inability to do what is second best.'

"The Law's aim," says our author, "is that man should serve in a manner more excellent than can be accomplished by the relative automatism of lesser created things." "The Law's design in the great structure which man, like the sponge-sarcodite, is unconsciously building, needs for its accomplishment an active understanding of the particular work demanded of each handicraftsman." "The only form of society in which sin and evil could be impossible would be one like the insect communities." "Would omnipotence be better exemplified, I ask you, if men were no more than bees, obeying because they must instead of because they may?" "It is because of this very freedom to do or to err that sin has come into existence." And then the whole is illustrated by a beautiful apologue of two chess players who were to make their own men—and one made them automata and the other free agents: and the results thereof. There may be some overstraining here, as *e.g.*, in the suggestion that the possibility of sin is inherent in freedom (and yet God is free!) and that a society in which sin were impossible is necessarily inferior to one in which the possibility of evil lies ever open (and yet we look forward to the glory of the consummated Church!). But in the main, we say, this essential reasoning of the lectures is both sound and valuable.

Now, we regret to say, our author has chosen to submerge this piece of very interesting theodicy in a mass of the most amazing paradoxes. He

strangely elects to call the relation to Law in which each organism stands "the religious sense"; and to set himself to discover thus—by way of perverse definition—the "religious sense" in even the lowest organisms. "The sense of obligation to obey" by an abuse of language is thus attributed to even the sponge-sarcode: and such phrases as "unconscious recognition of obligation to the unknown" are sown thickly over the pages. The impulse to this absurd procedure is derived from an extreme evolutionism. The author quite properly recognizes that nothing can appear in the perfected development which was not contained at least in a germinal form in the primitive starting point: and he feels himself, therefore, bound to discern the "religious sense" in the amœba lest he should be forced to deny it in man. He does not seem to recognize that in order to do this he has to reduce the "religious sense" so far beneath itself that, from a religious point of view, it isn't worth anything when he finds it—whether in the sarcode or in man.

Nor does he seem to realize that the position he has assumed has a double edge. He quite clearly perceives the alternative, to be sure. It is strict evolution or else special creation. He is never tired of adducing this alternative, as if the mere adduction of it would frighten every reasonable man back into strict evolution. You *must* believe that the difference between the amœba and man in the matter of the religious sense, he says, is one not of kind but of degree, or else "you sanction the heresy of *special creation*" (pp. 29, 86), you imply that "we are created on a different plan from the great brotherhood with which we share the essence of life's law" (p. 73), you "fall back upon" the first chapter of Genesis as a relation of scientific facts" (p. 70). But—there obviously is no "religious sense" in the amœba in any intelligible sense of the words: and therefore something absolutely new *has* entered into the brotherhood of life as the stages have advanced upward: and therefore Evolution is *not* a sufficient formula to account for all life and all its functionings on our globe: and therefore the alternative of *special creation* must be assumed! It will not do to *assume the necessary existence* of the "religious sense" in the lowest forms of life, merely in the interests of the evolutionary presumption; and then to *exhibit the actual existence* of it by absurdly dubbing by that name whatever we find in those lowest forms of existence. This is our author's method. Obviously it is a method which has two edges to it.

The degree in which, in order to fit it in with his evolutionary theories, our author degrades the "religious sense" may be estimated by attending to the definition of it he offers. This is given formally on p. 35. "The religious sense," we read, "whether passive or active, is that acknowledgment of the Law which compels all creatures possessing the sense to work or live for objects or attainments, be they immediate or prospective, in which the individual has no personal concern, save perhaps," it is added to escape an obvious criticism, "in exalted specimens of the species Man." This definition is subsequently modified by further descriptions, as *e.g.*, on p. 88: "The sense I speak of is religious because it implies a union between life in all its forms and the Unknown. And it is more: it is *ethical* because it implies obligation, whether active or passive, conscious or unconscious, to the unknown origin of life's being." But it is never essentially altered and indeed we are warned to hold fast to it if we would follow the author's meaning at all. By the phrase "whether passive or active" is meant much the same as "whether involuntary or voluntary"—a passive emotion being one operating "under a law that is not perceived or understood." Perhaps there is no open contradiction in describing a "sense" as "passive" where it is supposed all the time to be in action, though this action is conceived as

rooted in no volition and accompanied by no consciousness. But there is certainly ambiguity in this, and the open contradiction seems to enter fairly in when this involuntary and unconscious action of a "sense" is identified with an "acknowledgment" or, as it is elsewhere phrased, "a recognition" (p. 46). One would suppose that some such term as "subjection to," instead of "acknowledgment of," Law were required here: but then, if such a phraseology were adopted, the "undistributed middle" would be lost which enables our author to identify as equally instances of the action of the "religious sense," the mechanical obedience to Law of the sponge-sarcodæ, nay also of the blooming daisy, and the voluntary obedience to Law of the responsible Man.

The chief criticism to be passed on this definition, however, is that it manages to leave out of the religious sense entirely all that makes it religious. Religion, according to this definition, is just "altruism": whatever is unselfish is religious. There is no reference to higher Personalities and no suggestion even of upward strivings. For all that appears, a man who cherishes an inordinate affection for a dog by which he is led to renounce his own comfort and profit for the dog's satisfactions, would be just as religious as one whose heart was fixed on God. All that is essential is that he should acknowledge a Law which leads him to work or live for an object or attainment in which he has no personal concern. This is assuredly Hamlet with Hamlet left out, with a vengeance. One of the funny results of pressing this false definition with the design of discerning the "religious sense" in all lower creatures is the final discovery that it is not only present in them all, but is better developed in them all than it is in man. Man is less religious it seems than any other animal: "When man is considered as a species, that is from the point of view of such characteristics as are common to every individual, we must admit that the religious sense seems to have degenerated" (p. 190). Even this paradox, however, does not open the author's eyes to the real nature of his procedure.

We shall not enter into serious criticism of this nest of paradoxes and riot of ambiguities. Let it suffice to ask just two questions.

(1) Why should Dr. Macdonald confine his discovery of the universal presence of the "religious sense" to *living* forms? Is it not just as true of inorganic as of organic existences that they are all subject to a Law by virtue of which they subserve ends external to themselves? And if this constitutes the "religious sense," does it not as truly belong to them as to organic things? And if the theory of "special creation" is such a boggy, is it not to be denied as strenuously at the advent of life as at the advent of consciousness? Nay, if it be admitted at the origination of life may it not be at least suspected that it enters in also at the origination of consciousness? Is there any sound reason to insist strenuously *à priori* that all Life is of a piece, which is not cogent also to compel insistence equally that all Being is of a piece?

(2) Is "science" to be constructed, hereafter, by *à priori* deductions from an academic theory of "Evolution," simply assumed, in defiance of all observed fact? If a "religious sense" is to be ascribed to the amœba, the sponge-sarcodæ, the daisy and guelder-rose—nay, the star-dust itself—merely because on "Evolutionary" principles nothing can come into being that has not been germinally in being from the beginning—despite all appearance to the contrary and in wreck of all exact use of language and all consistency of conception alike—are we not given over to the "high priori" road of ascertaining facts with a completeness unexampled in the history of investigation?

On the whole we think it would be best to read Dr. Macdonald's brilliant

lectures as rhapsody rather than as science. They are good rhapsody: they are hardly good science.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE CANON OF REASON AND VIRTUE (Lao-Tze's Tao Teh King).

Translated from the Chinese by Dr. PAUL CARUS. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co.; London Agents: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Limited. 1903. 8vo.; pp. iv, 43. Price, 25 cents net.

"This booklet" (Religion of Science Library, No. 55) "is an extract from the author's larger work, *Lao-Tze's Tao Teh King*." "It has been published for the purpose of making our reading public more familiar with that grand and imposing figure Lao-Tze or the Old Philosopher." The translation of his canon is preceded by "Sze-Ma-Ich'ieu on Lao-Tze," "the most ancient and only well-attested account to be had of him." The translation itself, if as accurate as it is smooth, must be remarkably good. Dr. Carus is doing valuable service in thus introducing us to the most profound and, perhaps, the best of the Chinese classics. It is well for us to see how they fall below those of the Greeks, not even to mention those of the Hebrews. It is well, too, for us to observe how, though "the Old Philosopher" does anticipate Our Lord five hundred years by teaching that we should "requite evil with goodness," the peculiar philosophy underlying and conditioning his famous precept renders it like the corresponding words of Christ in sound only, and as much inferior to them in moral dignity as the counsel of expediency is to the utterance of unselfish love. The Word of God has nothing to fear from contrast with even the best productions of human wisdom. Comparison with them can but evince more clearly its uniqueness.

FOUNDATIONS OF FAITH. Being a Consideration of the Grounds of Religious Belief and Especially of the Evidences of Divine Revelation in the Religion of the Bible. By J. E. GODBEY, D.D. Nashville, Tenn.; Dallas, Tex.: Publishing House of the M. E. Church, South. Bigham & Smith, Agents. 1903. 8vo.; pp. viii, 262.

After discussing the relations of Reason and Faith, showing that belief in God is essential to both Philosophy and Morals, outlining the Cosmological and the Teleological Arguments for the Existence of God, and stating the Presumptive Evidence of supernatural revelation from our need of it and our tendency to expect it, the author distinguishes between inspiration and revelation, and then proves the Bible to be inspired and to contain revelations, by the evidences of Miracles, by the testimony of Prophecy and by the Incarnation, Character, Claims, Resurrection, and work in us, of Christ. The book is carefully written and its reasoning is valid and effective. Miracles and Prophecy are discussed with unusual soundness and ability. There is not, however, the same clearness in the treatment of the proofs of the divine existence. The chapter on Inspiration and Revelation is marred by needless and damaging concessions. The writer's Arminian standpoint also hinders his argument.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

III.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

OUTLINES OF AN INTRODUCTION TO THE OLD TESTAMENT. By JOHN WALTER BEARDSLEE, D.D. Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1903. Pp. 215. Price, \$1.20, net.

The author of this little handbook disclaims in his preface any intention