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I.

THE FATHERHOOD OF GOD VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF CHRIST'S PERSONAL TEACHINGS ON THE SUBJECT.

IT is unnecessary to say that the Fatherhood of God, as everywhere taught and in so many ways emphasized by Christ, is a truth of the first moment—Fatherhood, that is, not so much in relation to Himself as the Son, though this also, as in relation to those who in and through Him are likewise sons. This so significant aspect of the divine character was not unknown in Old Testament times (Isa. lxiii. 16, lxiv. 8), but it stands out with a clearness and receives a prominence on Christ's lips formerly unknown. It is set by Him in such new and definite relations to men, to their needs and sorrows, as almost to amount to a new revelation, if indeed His words, "No man knoweth the Father but the Son and he to whom the Son willeth to reveal him" (R. V.), do not assert this claim for it. So far as the term may be regarded as charged with ethical import, its general significance, as applied by Christ to God, seems obvious enough. It presents Him to us, as not remote and inaccessible, no distant and cold divinity, but as at once near and gracious. In the father-heart, love is in the ascendant. The name thus gives a like ascendancy to love in that aspect of the divine character which faces those, whether few, or many, or all, who are sons. It carries with it the assurance that notwithstanding the oft stern and remorseless aspects of physical nature, notwithstanding the prevalence in the world of suffering and of wrong, it is, so far at least as the sphere of sonship extends, love which is on the throne.

the Lutherans that it distinguishes between the original state of man in which he was placed by creation and the ideal destiny he was yet to obtain through obedience. From the Reformed standpoint this is expressed in the conception of the *fœdus operum*. Dr. Bavinck ably vindicates the federal character of all true religion.

The last question with which the present volume deals is that of Creatianism *versus* Traducianism. The author thinks that neither the Scriptural nor the philosophical grounds used on either side are sufficient to lead to a decision. If nevertheless the Greek, the Roman and the Reformed theologians have unanimously declared in favor of Creatianism, and the Lutherans stand alone in their advocacy of the other view, there must be a deeper reason for this. This deeper reason, he thinks, is to be found in the one-sidedness of the Lutheran conception of the image of God and the destiny of man. By restricting the *imago Dei* to the religious-ethical qualities, the Lutherans naturally incline toward considering the question, how man *as such*, destitute of the divine image, originates, an unimportant question. On the other hand, because, according to the Reformed, man is, even apart from his ethical-religious nature, specifically distinct from angels and animals, he must have a distinct origin also, such as can be maintained on the basis of Creatianism only. It will be observed that this line of thought implies the adoption of Traducianism in reference to animals. Dr. Bavinck further thinks that the principle of moral solidarity of the human race, as most clearly expressed in the federal theory, predisposed both Romanists and Reformed in favor of Creationism. All that can be said here, it seems to us, is that the anti-federalist needs Traducianism to maintain his position. But the federalist is by no means thus dependent on Creatianism. While Traducianism has been frequently exploited to controvert the federalistic view, this has always been done at the expense of logic. Federalism *as such* can with equal ease be combined with the Traducianistic and the Creatianistic theory. Still it remains possible that the immanent tendency of every doctrinal development to advance its position beyond the range of possible attack, has influenced the Reformed in this point. For, although Traducianism can be held consistently with federalism, Creatianism may in so far have appeared preferable as it positively requires the federalistic principle in order to explain the connection between Adam's fall and the sinfulness of his descendants.

Princeton. GEERHARDUS VOS.

THE CONDITIONS OF OUR LORD'S LIFE ON EARTH. Being Five Lectures Delivered on the Bishop Paddock Foundation, in the General Seminary at New York, 1896, to which is prefixed part of a First Professional Lecture at Cambridge. By ARTHUR JAMES MASON, D.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity and Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge; Canon of St. Saviour's, Canterbury. New York, London and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1896. 12mo, pp. xxii, 194.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION. By ROBERT L. OTTLEY, M.A., Fellow of S. M. Magdalen College, and Principal of the Pusey House, Oxford. London: Methuen & Co.: New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896. 2 vols., 8vo, pp. xii, 324 + x, 366.

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INCARNATION. With Especial Reference to the Relation Between our Lord's Divine Omniscience and His Human Consciousness. By H. C. POWELL, M.A., of Oriel College, Oxford; Rector of Wylye, Wilts., Formerly Provost of Inverness Cathedral. London, New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1896. 8vo, pp. xxxi. 483.

THE INCARNATION. A Study of Philippians ii. 5-11. By E. H. GIFFORD, D.D., Formerly Archdeacon of London and Canon of St. Paul's. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1897. 12mo, p. x, 161.

STUDIES IN THE MIND OF CHRIST. By Rev. THOMAS ADAMSON, B.D., Glasgow, Formerly Examiner for Divinity Degrees in Edinburgh University. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1898; New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 8vo, pp. xii, 300.

THE KENOTIC THEORY. Considered with Particular Reference to Its Anglican Forms and Arguments. By the Rev. FRANCIS J. HALL, D.D., Instructor of Dogmatic Theology in the Western Theological Seminary, Chicago, Ill. New York, London and Bombay, 1898. 12mo, pp. xviii, 247.

The nineteenth century, it would seem, may plume itself, if not exactly on giving birth to, at least on giving form and substance to, a brand new theory of the Incarnation. All that prevents it from putting in a successful claim of having actually originated this new theory is the circumstance that at two previous widely separated points of time its elements appear to have occurred to individuals, though, when announced by them, it fell on absolutely deaf ears. In the sixth or seventh century something at all events very like it was broached by a certain "Beron" (or Vero), of whom we know nothing except what may be gathered from some eight fragments of a refutation of him—*κατὰ Βήρωνος καὶ Ἥλικος* [?]—preserved for us by Anastasius the Apocrisiarius, or Papal Nuncio at Constantinople (A.D. 665). Something very like it again was suggested in the middle of the eighteenth century by the great Moravian leader, Count Zinzendorf, who in his devout aspirations after full communion with Christ was misled into bringing the divine Christ quite down to the level of man. It was thus reserved for the German Church of the middle of the nineteenth century practically to plant the seeds as well as to rear the stock of this new doctrine of the Incarnation, which is now so widely known under the name of "the Kenotic theory," and the principle of which is that in "becoming man" the Logos "emptied Himself" (more or less) of His deity.

The teaching of Origen that some such emptying had taken place at the Incarnation in the case of Christ's (preëxistent) human soul, and the early development in the Lutheran churches of a similar doctrine of "kenosis" relatively to the human soul of Christ, divinitized (as was thought) by the act of Incarnation, had dug out, we may well believe, no unwelcome channels in which the new kenotizing thought might run. The startling step of transferring the idea of such an "emptying" from the human nature to the divine nature itself, was one which could not have been taken, however, until the idea of God current among theological thinkers had been debased by the long prevalence of the pantheizing conceptions inculcated by the post-Kantian schools of German philosophy culminating in Hegel, and the idea of the Person of Christ had been correspondingly degraded by the pantheizing humanitarianism given immense vogue by the teaching of Schleiermacher, reinforced by the somewhat similar views of Rothe. The strong reaction against the one-sided emphasis on the Deity of Christ predominant through the Middle Ages, which had shown itself in the Reformation age in the radical theories of Socinius and his fellow-Unitarians and had ever since been operative, naturally added the force of its current to commend the new conception of a humanized Logos. While, further, the advocates of the union between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, which was then being agitated, found in the new Christology something different

from either of the opposing Christologies of the two Churches, over which they had been so long divided—against which neither therefore would be prejudiced; and yet capable of being commended to each as preserving the essence of what it had striven for—to the Lutherans as maiutaining the principle of the *communicatio idiomatum*, though certainly applied in a new way, and to the Reformed as guarding the integrity of the human developmeut and activities of the "Man Christ Jesus" as pictured in the Gospels. Thus all the most powerful influences operative in the thought of contemporary Germany—philosophical, theological and ecclesiastical—united to recommend the new coustructiou of the Person of Christ; and we cannot be surprised that it at once took deep root and rapidly grew to be the dominant Christology of the German teachers. First set forth with clearness and fulness by Joh. L. König (1844), it was rapidly developed, in its divergent forms, by a series of really great writers, such as Thomasius, Liebner, Ebrard, Gess, von Hofmann, Delitzsch, Schöberlein, Kübel, and in adjoining countries, participating in German culture-conditions, by such worthy coadjutors as Martensen, van Oosterzee, Godet, Pressensé, Bonifas, Grétillat.

In lands where the intellectual conditions were less similar to those reigning in Germany and over whose theological thinking German teaching had, as yet at least, acquired a less complete sway, the new Christology exerted naturally a much more languid influence. Even in them, however, echoes of so great a commotion could uot fail to be heard—often (as is usually true in such cases) with so little apparent connection with the parent movement as to seem more or less independent of it. In Britain, for example, we hear of Dr. Lewis Edwards about the middle of the century teaching "the doctrine of the *kenosis*" to his classes at Bala (T. C. Edwards: *The God Man*, p. 116), and Bishop O'Brien expounding it to his Irish clergy in 1863 (*A Charge Delivered to the Clergy of the United Diocese of Ossory, Ferns, and Leighlin, at his Ordinary Visitation in October, 1863*, cited by Mason, *op. cit.*, xxi). In America it was independently inculcated, each in his own way, by Henry Ward Beecher (*The Life of Jesus the Christ*, 1871), Henry M. Goodwin (*Christ and Humanity*, 1874), and Howard Crosby (*The True Humanity of Christ*, 1881). Its impress on the theological thought of these countries remained however very slight, despite the admirable presentation of it in America by the translation of Gess' *Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ* (1870) by Mr. Reubelt, and in England by the attractive exposition of its several forms in Dr. A. B. Bruce's *The Humiliation of Christ* (1876). It was and remained for years manifestly merely an exotic curiosity.

So matters stood until near the opening of the last decade of the century. Then a change begau to set in: every second book of a certain type one took up began now, with more or less assurance, to assume the Kenotic doctrine as true or at least probable. There had meanwhile no thorough going discussion of the Christological problem taken place. There was little evidence that it had beeu earnestly grappled with by those who were thus recommending it. There had been no assimilation of the conditions of thought to those which had given it birth and vogue in Germany. The fact is simply that a condition of opinion had arisen in auother department of iuvestigation, which made it eminently conveuient for some writers to appeal to "the doctrine of *kenosis*." Certain students of the Old Testament literature had been led to adopt opinions as to its origin and development which brought them into discord with the witness of Jesus to the Scriptures of the Old Covenant. It was a very facile expedient to point lightly to "the doctrine of *kenosis*" as if it were established or generally acknowledged, or needed only to be looked into in order to be adopted—in justification of a refusal to be bound by the teaching of Christ, who might rather (it was suggested) be supposed, in matters

of scientific criticism at least, to have spoken out of the limited horizon of his own day. Mr. Alban Richey is therefore thoroughly justified in saying that on English ground "the kenotic doctrine" has thus far "been chiefly advocated in the interest of certain aspects of Biblical criticism" (*The Incarnation and the Kenosis*, New York, James Pott & Co., 1898, p. 19). Bishop Colenso himself, at an earlier date, had set the example for this mode of procedure. "It is perfectly consistent with the most entire and sincere belief in our Lord's Divinity," he says, in the Preface to his first volume on the Pentateuch and Joshua (Vol. i, p. 82),

"to hold, as many do, that when He vouchsafed to become a 'Son of Man' He took our nature fully, and voluntarily entered into all the conditions of humanity, and, among others, into that which makes our growth into all ordinary knowledge gradual and limited. . . . . It is not supposed that, in His human nature, He was acquainted more than any educated Jew of His age, with the mysteries of all modern sciences, nor . . . . can it be seriously maintained that, as an infant or young child, He possessed a knowledge surpassing that of the most pious and learned adults of His nation, upon the subject of the authorship and age of the differing portions of the Pentateuch."

A more typical instance of the somewhat suggestive mode in which this appeal is ordinarily made may be found, however, in the Preface to Dr. Driver's *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament* (sixth ed., p. xii, note*):

"It does not seem requisite for the present purpose, as indeed within the limits of a Preface it would not be possible, to consider whether our Lord, as man, possessed all knowledge, or whether a limitation in this, as in other respects—though not, of course, of such a kind as to render Him fallible as a teacher—was involved in that gracious act of condescension, in virtue of which He was willing in 'all things to be made like unto His brethren' (Heb. ii. 17)."

It was a somewhat similar though more decided use made of the "doctrine of *kenosis*" in Mr. Gore's essay on "The Holy Spirit and Inspiration," published in *Lux Mundi* (1889), however, that drew public attention strongly to the revolution which "in the interest of certain aspects of Biblical criticism" was being wrought in the current conceptions of the Person of Christ, with all its related doctrines.

"The Incarnation," wrote Mr. Gore "was a self-emptying of God to reveal Himself under conditions of human nature and from the human point of view. . . . . He willed so to restrain the beams of Deity as to observe the limits of the science of His age, and He puts Himself in the same relation to its historical knowledge. . . . . He never exhibits the omniscience of bare Godhead in the realm of natural knowledge, such as would be required to anticipate the results of modern science or criticism." In a word, He "shows no signs at all of transcending the history of His age."

The agitation thus aroused naturally had the wholesome result of drawing attention to the Christological problem involved, and bringing to an end the silent progress of the revolution in the Church's faith in a Divine Christ. The origin of the discussion in such considerations naturally focussed interest, however, in the first instance too exclusively on the subordinate problem of the knowledge of the Incarnate Christ. This accounts not only for the fact that one of the earliest treatises called out by the discussion—Mr. Swayne's *Our Lord's Knowledge as Man* (1891; see notice in this REVIEW, iii, 179, 180), along with which should be mentioned also Dr. Plummer's article on "The Advance of Christ in Σοφία," published in *The Expositor* for 1891—confined itself to this subject, but also for the further result that it is around this topic that the larger part of the discussion still gathers, though there are happily signs arising about us that it is slowly advancing into a broader region. Mr. Gore himself has contributed to the controversy two treatises of importance—his Bampton lectures on *The Incarnation of the Son of God* (1891; see the notice of it in this REVIEW, v, 342), followed by his *Dissertations on Subjects Connected with the Incarnation* (1895; see the notice of it in this REVIEW, vii, 175). His colleagues in the furtherance of the general

principles for which he stands in the Church of England, have gathered loyally around him and have given us at least two notable works: Mr. Ottley's *The Doctrine of the Incarnation* (1896) and Dr. Mason's *The Conditions of Our Lord's Life on Earth* (1896). The same line of thought has been also more or less independently advanced by Dr. Kedney in his *Mens Christi* (1890), Bishop Moorhouse in his *The Teaching of Christ* (1891), Dr. Du Bose in his *The Soteriology of the New Testament* (1892), Bishop Hall in his *Christ's Temptation and Ours* (1896) and Mr. Hawkesworth in his *De Incarnatione* (1897; see the notice of it in this REVIEW, viii, 82); and with full independence by Principal Fairbairn in his *Christ and Modern Thought* (1893, pp. 354, 476; see the notice of it in this REVIEW, v, 532), Principal T. C. Edwards in his *The God-Man* (1895, pp. 108, 123, 153; see the notice of it in this REVIEW, vii, 357), and Principal Simon in his *Reconciliation by Incarnation* (1898); while in Mr. Adamson's book on *The Mind in Christ* (1898) the teaching of Dr. Gore and Dr. Mason has been whetted to an edge which cuts very deeply indeed. Meanwhile there has not lacked a strong and telling protest against the new views. On the exegetical side we have especially Dr. Gifford's beautiful study on Philippians ii. 5–11; on the historical side remarks in Dr. Bright's *Waymarks in Church History* (1894; see the notice of it in this REVIEW, vi, 166), supplemented by his sermons on the *Incarnation as a Motive Power* (1889); and on the side of general theological discussion the two notable volumes of Mr. Powell (1896) and Prof. Hall (1898), to which may be added a weighty charge by Bishop Stubbs (1893), and some careful articles in *The Church Quarterly Review* (especially "Our Lord's Knowledge as Man," October, 1891; "Canon Gore on the Incarnation and the Eucharist," January, 1896; "Ottley's Doctrine of the Incarnation," October, 1896; "Our Lord's Divine and Human Knowledge," July, 1897; "The Sacred Manhood of the Son of God," October, 1897).

Some slight sketch of its historical origin and progress seemed to be necessary as preliminary to understanding the discussion of the Person of Christ now going on in the English-speaking world and especially in the Church of England, which is represented by the volumes whose titles are set at the head of this article. It is important for us in estimating the literature it has produced to remember that it is not a native growth of the soil, nor indeed of the subject that is fundamentally under discussion. The doctrine of *kenosis* was borrowed in the first instance from the German speculative theologians, and was invoked in the first instance to relieve difficulties arising in another branch of theological inquiry; and initially at least by men but little wonted to the sphere of investigation in which this question is agitated. It is of little importance, to be sure, to inquire after the particular sources whence such a doctrine has been derived by its British advocates. Mr. Powell ascribes its entrance into British thought more specifically to the influence of the writings of Prof. Godet: and no doubt the fine, clear spirit and high expository talent of that eminent commentator will go far to account for the popularity of any tenet to which he gives his distinguished advocacy. If we were ourselves, however, to single out one writer whose presentation of the doctrine has most deeply influenced the Anglican writers who have adopted it, we should fix rather on Bishop Martensen, who has exerted a singularly strong influence on the modern High Church party in the Church of England, due chiefly, no doubt, to his high gifts and his winning formulation of the system of Divine Truth, but also in part, no doubt, to a not unnatural preference among the adherents of that party to lend ear to the teachers of the one Church of Continental Protestantism organized in an Episcopal form. Little stress need be laid, however, on the

indications in this or that writer of direct borrowing from this or that teacher: the discussions of the *kenosis* in the German theology of the middle of this century were not held in a corner nor with bated breath; they were heard at the ends of the earth, and there are many channels through which they have made their way to the knowledge of English-speaking students of theology. What does seem to be of real importance is to keep in mind what the course of the discussion has been on English ground. As Dr. Sanday puts it, in a note included in his thorough and thoroughly good article on "Jesus Christ" in the second volume of Dr. Hastings' new *Dictionary of the Bible:*

"It was started in the first instance by the argument from our Lord's use of the Old Testament in its bearing upon the question of Old Testament criticism. This led to a closer examination of the text Mark xiii. 32 and parallels, *var. lec.* That again expanded into a discussion of the technical doctrine of the *Kenosis*, an episode in which was renewed study of the exegesis of Phil. ii. 5–11. And that in turn in its later phase (H. C. Powell's *Principles of the Incarnation*, 1896), has opened up the whole question of the Two Natures, which in Germany for some time past has been far more freely handled than in Great Britain."

Through this line of advance a new Christological literature has come rapidly into being.

A glance over the list of titles set at the head of this notice will show that they include the cream of the literature called out by the publications of Dr. Gore. Along with the other works already noticed in this REVIEW, whose titles have been incidentally mentioned in the foregoing survey, they constitute indeed well-nigh the whole of it. After what has been said, some cursory account of the contents of each of the works now before us will doubtless suffice to indicate its place in the history of the discussion and its value as a contribution to the understanding of the subject.

1. Let us begin with Principal Ottley's comprehensive presentation of the history of *The Doctrine of the Incarnation;* for a history rather than a discussion of the doctrine is what his treatise really offers us. At the beginning, to be sure, we have a short, introductory section (i, 3–35), in which the nature, purpose and evidence of the Incarnation are somewhat perfunctorily (and somewhat inexactly) summarized, followed by a section (i, 39–151) on "the Scriptural presentation;" and at the end we have a section (ii, 245–334) on the "systematic form of the doctrine of the Incarnation," followed by a few concluding pages (335–351) in admirable exposition of the great text, John iii. 16. But "the Scriptural presentation" is conceived and treated as the first section of the history of the doctrine: "the writer believes that this division of the subject strictly belongs to the history of dogma," we read in the Preface (p. v), and, though these words are primarily intended to vindicate to the Scriptural presentation a place at the root of the development of the dogma, as against Harnack's and Hatch's proclamation of it as "merely a product of Greek metaphysics," they yet fairly express the spirit in which the Scriptural evidence is approached. The concluding section similarly enters into the structure of the book as a history, and presents not so much a systematic treatment of the Incarnation on Mr. Ottley's own part as his conception of "the final systematic form of the doctrine of the Incarnation"—that is, of the issue of the historical process.

What Mr. Ottley has given us, then, is a comprehensive history of the doctrine of the Incarnation, as understood from that somewhat odd point of view characteristic of the party of liberalized High Churchmen to which he belongs, in which an inherited traditionalism has been modified by deference to the

teachings of the rationalizing "modern" school of investigators into the *origines* of Christianity. He has given us, indeed, something more than this, for he spreads his net very widely and gathers into the history of "the doctrine of the Incarnation" a very large part of the whole history of "Christian doctrine"—of the doctrine of God and of the Trinity on the one side as leading up to the doctrine of the Incarnation, and of the whole complex of soteriological doctrine on the other as its issue. The treatment of the patristic age is especially full, and sometimes one almost loses the thread of the "doctrine of the Incarnation" on which it is strung. The account of later ages is more strictly confined to the topic more especially in hand, but here the whole treatment grows meagre, the notes on the post-Reformation Church (ii. 217–241 only) being indeed jotty in the extreme.

It is the needs of theological students that the author has kept specially in mind in writing his history, with a view, he tells us, to providing "a compendious and plain introduction to the doctrine of the Incarnation, giving a connected outline of the theology and doctrinal history" (i, p. v). The spirit in which the work has been presented is adumbrated in the later declaration: "It is the general aim of this book to recall students to the temper of sobriety and holy fear that marks the greatest among the ancient theologians" (ii, 306). The tone of the book is reverent, its scholarship is adequate and exact, and the power of historical exposition evinced is very considerable. The reader's interest is engaged from beginning to end, and he feels himself in the hands of a careful and safe guide through the intricacies of the Christological discussions of the early Church, especially on the side of its shifting terminology.

The fault of the book, beyond its lack of proportion already adverted to, is its too entire dependence on Dorner's exposition and too great deference to Harnack's constructions. It is evident to be sure that Mr. Ottley has explored the sources as diligently as opportunity afforded, but it is equally evident that he has done this with Dorner in his hand and with the fear of Harnack before his eyes. He ventures to differ from these "authorities" now and then, no doubt—as, for example, when he vindicates a "pneumatic" Christology to the apostolic fathers, inclusive of Hermas (ii, 158)—but their dominating influence over his presentation is only too apparent. A reiterant contrast between the "metaphysical" and "ethical" elements of faith and the "metaphysical" and "ethical" points of view in the study of doctrine, to the disadvantage of the former, is a marked part of this "modernity" of the book's standpoint.

Out of this contrast, indeed, the author seeks the defense of his "kenotism"—quite in the manner, say, of Thomasius. The Christian conception of God is, in his eyes, one in which "metaphysical conceptions have been displaced by ethical ideas." God must be conceived of as Love: and what is there in the way of self-emptying of which Love is not capable?

> "We have no right to set arbitrary limits to the possibilities of self-sacrifice and self-humiliation for a Being whose essence is Love. It is ethically conceivable, though on metaphysical grounds insuperably difficult, that a Divine Being should accept even the limitations of human knowledge" (ii, 303).

Accordingly:

> "The entire process of condescension is a display not of weakness, but of infinite moral strength. What we should venerate in the *kenosis* of the Son of God is the triumphant power of an unswerving will, persisting under the utmost pressure of distress and trial in a morally glorious action. . . . . If Love is the supreme attribute of the Divine nature, the metaphysical difficulties raised as to the 'unchangeableness' of God seem to give way to moral considerations; the abstract attributes of Deity must in the last resort be compatible with a real power of condescension, a real display of pity" (ii, 287, 288).

Any such attempt, however, to set the "ethical" attributes of God over against His "metaphysical" attributes is, of course, indefensible. God is *ens simplicissimum*, and, of course, is as loving in His immutability as He is immutable in His love; and it is just as impossible for Him to be conceived as ceasing to be lovingly immutable as to be immutably loving. We cannot, on the plea that He is Love, demand that He shall cease to be God; the value of the Love that He is rests rather on the fact that it is God (involving all that God is) that is this Love; and in proportion as we evacuate the Deity, with all that is involved in Deity, in the interests of the Love on which we lay our one-sided emphasis, in that proportion we evacuate this Love itself of all that gives it worth to us. To attempt to escape from the impossibilities of this assumed *kenosis* by demanding that we shall think of God, "ethically," as Love, and not, "metaphysically," as immutable, is thus to cut off the limb on which we are sitting.

For the rest, it is to be observed that Mr. Ottley's *kenotism*, though real and constantly coloring his thinking (cf. ii, 64, 122, etc.), is nevertheless of the mildest type, approaching the form represented in German thought by such writers as Kahnis and Lange. We have already quoted his remark that

"What we should venerate in the *kenosis* of the Son of God is the triumphant power of an unswerving will, persisting under the utmost pressure of distress and trial in a morally glorious action" (ii, 287).

The idea of a "*persistent will*" is so far antagonistic to that of "emptying" that it necessarily implies the continued possession of the attributes which require this constant repression of their use. Yet this idea Mr. Ottley strongly emphasizes.

"The humiliation of Christ is to be regarded therefore—nay, it is surely revealed in Scripture—as being a voluntary act of love: a state maintained by a continuous act of unwearied will; a 'voluntary perseverance in the mind not to assert equality [with God] on the part of one who could do otherwise.' It was the great merit of some early fathers, notably Hilary, that they gave prominence to this truth. They represented our Lord's self-abasement as the effect of continuous loving acts of will. They insisted that the Son of God remained at every moment in absolute possession of power over Himself, and accordingly they reverenced in the incarnate Christ the tenacity and persistence of a holy will" (ii, 289). "Such lines of thought seem in fact to suggest the conclusion that the *kenosis* consisted in a deliberate abstention on the part of the Logos from the exercise of Divine powers that might at any moment have been resumed. From the first to the final stage the *status exinanitionis* was maintained by a persistent and invincible will. Thus, as Gregory pointed out, the submission to mortal infirmity was throughout an act of Divine power" (ii, 292).

It is the besetting sin of the "Kenoticists" that they are not able effectively to bear in mind that our Lord possessed two complete natures in the unity of His person. Here is Principal Ottley, for example, cherishing the most entire and the most intelligent faith in the Two Natures of our Lord, and fresh, moreover, from a sympathetic and penetrating study of the fathers in their struggles to preserve the integrity of the Two Natures, and of the phraseology and maxims which they invented for its preservation—and yet, so soon as he begins to speak of the mysteries of the action of our blessed Lord in his own person, forthwith forgetting all about the Two Natures, practically denying the one in the exclusiveness of his reference to the other, and misinterpreting the language of the fathers, which was based on a complete realization of them! Hilary, Gregory and the rest could speak with propriety and force of the persistent restraint which the Incarnated Logos placed upon the exercise of His Divine attributes; for they remembered the Two Natures, and were speaking of the manifestation of these attributes through the Human Nature and in its acts. It was therefore with them a natural and altogether consistent view, that these Divine attributes, being in the full possession and use of the Incarnated Logos, were

prevented from exhibiting themselves constantly in the daily activities of the God-Man only by the equally constant restraint of the loving will which determiued that the God-Man's actions should be governed rather by the determinations of His human will and the guidance of the conteuts of His human mind. To transfer this language, based on a thorough realization of the interaction of the Two Natures, to the Divine uature of the God-Man itself, and to speak of the Logos Himself "deliberately abstaiuiug," by an act of powerful will, from Himself and in the sphere of His own life, "exercising the Divine powers"—say omniscience, for example—which nevertheless remained in His absolute possession and the exercise of which might have at any moment been resumed, is (to speak fraukly) to talk nonsense. However powerful Love may be, it cannot avail to eliminate the exercise of omniscience from a mind that remains all the time omuiscient; it might avail to lead it to act in this, that or the other relation as if it were not omniscieut, but to say that it "empties" itself of its omniscience while it yet remains omuiscieut is just a contradiction in terms. No will, however powerful, though swayed by Almighty Love itself, can possibly avail to close the eyes of an omniscience which yet remains iu possession. The life of the Son of God on earth was certainly a life of deliberate, persistent and constant self-restraint in the use of the Divine powers that abided in Him; and therefore the Incarnation was not, as Mr. Ottley represents it, in itself and its very principle a self-emptying act of the Logos, by which He initially laid aside His Divine powers, but a life of constant self-abnegation on the part of a God-Man who retaiued the powers proper to Him as Deity, and persistently refused to use them in the work the Father had given Him to do.

2. We pass from Mr. Ottley's volumes to Cauon Mason's delightful *Paddock Lectures*, without noting auy change in tone, attitude or essential doctrinal teaching. Perhaps we are conscious of an eveu more cultured English style; certainly we are conscious of comiug under the guidance of a somewhat surer doctrinal grasp and of a finer exegetical tact. Dr. Mason's theological studies, first made known to us in his excellent little treatise entitled *The Faith of the Gospel* (1888—see the notice of it in this REVIEW, i, 149), have prepared him for a firm handling of doctrinal subjects and throw a background of well-digested doctrinal kuowledge behind his treatment of the problems that emerge in the course of this discussion. And the exegetical skill revealed in the progress of these lectures is of a very high order indeed—clear, delicate aud precise: the translations of the Scriptures referred to, for example, are models of what renderings of the Bible text should be aud will supply many hints to the uuderstanding of the passages. Dr. Mason's general standpoint is the same with Mr. Ottley's, however, and the Kenotic doctrine he teaches is indistinguishable from his colleague's.

"The view which is suggested in my lecture," he tells us (p. xv),

> "is that the Eternal Son Himself, from whom the Holy Ghost proceeds, vouchsafed to take the position of a recipient of the Holy Ghost, and, although He might at any moment have worked His wonderful works by His own intrinsic Divine power, chose to work them rather by the power of another—though the power of that other was throughout, in Cyril's sense, His own. There is no derogation from the perfection of Christ's Godhead if, accordiug to what appears to be the natural meaning of the New Testament words, we suppose our Lord to have voluntarily assumed, and consistently maintained upon earth, a position which was not that to which His Divine nature entitled Him, and which He might at any instant have abandoned, had He so willed."

This is more precisely explained as regards the particular point on which, as we have seen, these English discussions of the *kenosis* more especially hinge, as involving the supposition that "one who knows can voluutarily exclude

his knowledge from consciousness, and only gradually win it back for himself by a process of learning;" that our Lord, in fact, "shut out from His life on earth that knowledge of all things, temporal as well as eternal, which necessarily belonged to Him as God" (p. 116). This is, as will be at once observed, a precise repetition of all the essential elements of Mr. Ottley's conception: the continued voluntariness of the *kenosis*, its literal reality as an "emptying" within the sphere of the life of the Logos Himself, and the practical neglect, in the whole construction, of the Two Natures.

It is certainly not meant to suggest that Canon Mason, any more than Mr. Ottley, formally rejects the doctrine of the Two Natures. He not only emphatically but most intelligently professes his not merely traditional but reasoned and vital faith in the Two Natures.

"The definitions of Nicæa and Chalcedon are binding upon us, not only because we have consented to be bound by them under peril of ejection from the Church, but also because the more we work upon the materials at our command, the more abundantly clear it becomes that no theory of the Person of our Redeemer answers to the facts except the theory of the Fathers—two whole and perfect natures coexisting and united in the single and indivisible person of the Son of God made flesh" (p. 31).

Nothing could be more frankly or more truly said. What we are affirming is that in framing his actual conception of the "our Lord's life on earth" Canon Mason practically forgets this his good profession, and works on the unrecognized assumption that He was a unit in nature as well as person. Thus, in the passage already quoted from him, he not only attributes to Christ as a person, but pointedly to His Divine nature itself, the dependence on the Holy Ghost, the ignorance of things temporal and eternal and the gradual growth of knowledge, which are true of His human nature alone.

The fault here obviously is an insufficient firmness of intellectual grasp on the doctrine of the Two Natures: and this fault is characteristic of the whole school of thought to which Dr. Mason belongs, and is fostered by a habit of using ambiguous phraseology relative to our Lord's earthly life—speaking, for example, of our Lord's knowledge "as man," of His "life on earth" and the like, and using the simple pronoun "He" in an undifferentiated sense and with little practical realization of the results on language of the *communio idiomatum*. Thus on p. 189 we read of what "He" knew in infancy, in sleep, in crises like the agony in the garden, etc., with what seems like a studied neglect to bear in mind that analysis of the "He" into its two organs of knowing in which the key to the whole puzzle lies. On p. 129 we have indeed what looks very much like a formal refusal to make the analysis—and this would amount to nothing less, of course, than a formal rejection of the Catholic doctrine of the Two Natures in one of its most direct and important applications. The passage is so striking that we quote it in some fullness, emphasizing what seems to us the most significant phraseology. Canon Mason had just been discussing the passages (Luke ii. 40, 52) in which the growth of the infant Jesus in wisdom is recorded, and proceeds:

"We may add, the language of the Bible, in the passages now before us, *does not suggest the notion of some other all-embracing form of knowledge held simultaneously* in reserve. The eternal life of the Godhead is not measured out in parallel succession to our days and years; and in studying the life which the Son of God has vouchsafed to live in time, *we need not, perhaps, encumber ourselves with the notion of such a higher form of knowledge accompanying the development of the lower*, side by side, day by day. The relation of the eternal to the temporal must remain for us unknown at present; and while we watch the progress of the earthly life of the Son of God, we are *constrained to think of Him as* WHOLLY *engaged in it*. There, at Bethlehem now, and now at Nazareth, is His centre of personality. Although it is in virtue of His human nature, not of His Divine nature, that the Lord is the subject of growth and progress, yet *it is* HE *that advances* and that is conscious of the advance—not some outlying group of faculties remotely connected with His real self. 'Jesus advanced.' *It is the very personal Word of God Incarnate who thus passes from such a state* of sensation, perception, knowledge, as belongs to the embryo, the babe, the

child, relatively perfect in each stage, to that of the full-grown man, of the complete head of the race, 'to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ'" (pp. 129, 130).

With the best wish in the world—with even an eager desire—to read such passages as merely strong assertions of the reality and perfection of Christ's humanity and the reality of its human development, it seems impossible so to understand them: they appear rather to be intended to attribute with great decision the development that took place specifically to the Divine Nature incarnated, and thus to evince an effective forgetfulness if not formal denial of the Catholic doctrine of the Two Natures.

We have done no injustice to Dr. Mason's book in approaching it thus from the point of view of its Kenotic doctrine. Its argument for its doctrine of *kenosis* is gracefully cast in the form of an induction from the Scriptural portrait of the life of our Lord on earth: and we even read (pp. 38, 39):

"It is not my purpose in these lectures to maintain a theory, though very likely something of a theory may naturally result from the study before us. Rather I wish to make a comprehensive survey of the phenomena of the case, in order that we may judge how far these phenomena are in agreement with any of the particular theories that have held the field in ancient times or in modern."

We may well believe that Canon Mason looks on Scripture as the test of theories—the finely conceived exposition of our entire dependence on Scripture as a guide to theological truth, given in the lecture he has prefixed to the course to which the volume is more particularly devoted, will assure us of that. We have no doubt that his personal study of the Scriptural data underlies his doctrinal conclusions on this matter itself. But it cannot be wrong to suppose that he had reached his own conclusions before he actually wrote these lectures, that he has cast them in a form designed to commend his conclusions to his hearers, and that the inductive shape in which he has moulded them is relative to his hearers rather than to himself. Certainly, on reading them over, we cannot resist the impression that the form of presentation has been adopted and carried through with the design of commending in the most powerful manner the Kenotic conclusion already attained by the author; and, indeed, to speak frankly, that the presentation, so far from being "inductive," in the broad and just sense of that word, is fatally one-sided, neglectful of whole areas of modifying and even contradictory facts, and calculated for advocacy of a preconceived opinion rather than for the balanced formulation of the well-rounded truth.

Take as an example the final chapter—that which essays to investigate the hints of a transcendent knowledge possessed by our Lord on earth. The impression made on the reader is very strong that its ordering is the result of a *schema* previously conceived and carefully arranged for conveying the suggestion that our Lord's transcendental knowledge concerned chiefly, perhaps solely, spiritual things. Even with so slight a change as a reversal of the order in which the chief items are presented—so that, for example, it would have been shown in turn that the Scriptures teach, (1) that our Lord knew all spiritual truths, (2) had a perfect discernment of the whole moral world, the characters of all men, etc., and (3) even also numerous purely external facts—the effect on the mind of the reader might have been very different. The same may perhaps be said (in a lesser degree) of the general arrangement of the topics, in the course of lectures. The five lectures treat in turn of "The Historical Method of Studying our Lord's Life on Earth," "The Development of our Lord's Character as Man," "Our Lord's Power upon Earth," "Our Lord's Knowledge upon Earth—Appearances of Limitation," "Our Lord's Knowledge upon Earth—Its Transcendence." Certainly the whole detailed treatment—in its emphases and omissions alike—seems carefully calculated to keep the attention focused on the human nature of Christ and

to suggest that what is true of it is all that is true of Him. In a word, the question wholly before the lecturer's mind from the beginning seems to be: "How much of Christ's life on earth can be accounted for on the Kenotic assumption?" and the lectures appear to offer a sustained attempt to answer this question with the words, "All of it." It is all so skillfully and graciously and reverently done that the reader is very apt to be carried along with the flow of the argument. When he is through, however, he will realize that it is the plea of an advocate he has been reading—that difficulties have been unduly smoothed over, that whole classes of facts have been minimized or neglected, that the balance has been held far from true. If he is wise he will then ask for himself two other questions: How much of Christ's life on earth can be accounted for without the Kenotic assumption? How much of the phenomena of Christ's life on earth as recorded in the Gospels cannot be accounted for on the Kenotic assumption? To which he may profitably add yet a third one, How far does the Kenotic assumption accord with the conceptions of Christ's person held by Himself and His accredited apostles? When he has collected the Biblical facts, which resolutely range themselves under these captions, he will find himself making a rather moderate estimate of Dr. Mason's success in accounting for the facts of Christ's life on earth on the Kenotic assumption.

3. What estimate will he make then of Mr. Adamson's success in his *Studies in the Mind of Christ*? For the relation in which Mr. Adamson's book stands to that of Dr. Mason is very close—only heightening its positions all along the line. We do not remember that Mr. Adamson anywhere mentions the names of the Anglican writers who had preceded him in the pathway which he seeks to break out through the Gospel narrative of the activities of the Son of Man. His book may be very well looked upon, however, as little more than an attempt to work out in fuller detail and to give a sharper point to the positions laid down by these earlier authors. Even in the limitation which he places upon the *kenosis* his text might well be taken from certain words found in Dr. Gore's *Bampton Lectures*—such as, for example, these:

> "It is not possible to doubt that He knew His eternal preëxistence and Sonship" (pp. 145, 146); "Thus in fact, in becoming incarnate, the Son of God retained and expressed His essential relation to the Father; He received therefore as eternally, so in the days of His flesh, the consciousness of His own and of His Father's being, and the power to reveal that which He knew" (p. 156).

The general conception of the nature of the *kenosis* suffered by the Logos on becoming man and of the consequent character of the life of our Lord on earth, moreover, follows very closely the lines drawn by Dr. Gore and Dr. Mason. Only, as we have hinted, Mr. Adamson does not possess a full share of their discretion, and pushes forward the conceptions which he shares with them to an extremity which they would be the last to sanction. Nor is the language in which he presents his disturbing portrait of the mental life of our Lord at all calculated to soothe the sensibilities of his astonished readers. The object he sets before himself is practically the same as that Canon Mason had in view and his treatment of the material runs very much parallel with that of Canon Mason. But what a difference in tone and manner—and in consequent effect—between the two books! The one woos us to what it considers a better view of our Lord's earthly life; the other demands of us, in the raucous voice of the north, an immediate surrender of our cherished conceptions. There is no lack of strength in Mr. Adamson's presentation. But there is some lack of graciousness, perhaps also of reverence, in his manner.

Like Canon Mason, Mr. Adamson would fain give us a pure induction from

the Scriptural phenomena, and so—from the pure facts as the Gospels give them to us—determine what kind of mind there was in Christ. But like Canon Mason, only still more flagrantly, he begins with the conclusion to which he would conduct us, and orders the whole material so as to commend it as strongly as possible to our acceptance. The Two Natures seem even less firmly fixed in his thought than in Canon Mason's, and from the beginning he speaks quite *naïvely* of "His mind," "His knowledge when He was on earth," etc., as if He had but one "mind" and but one "knowledge," and that was necessarily (because He was true man) purely human. Nay, he begins with the assumption that all the knowledge that Jesus had was limited: the subject which he posits for investigation reads (p. 2), "What the limits of His knowledge were wheu He was on earth"—and he speaks from the commencement (p. 3) of the extremest Kenotic assumption as "the principle contended for." When we begin by begging the whole question and proceed in the use of such a pervasive undistributed middle as is supplied by the phrases, "His knowledge as man" (which may mean either "in His human nature" or "during the period of His earthly life"), we can scarcely avoid arriving at the predestined goal. So *naïve* is Mr. Adamson's assumption of what he undertakes to prove that he is contiuually advancing this conclusion itself as the proof of his preliminary contentions. "The actual vision of the thing"—Satan's falling as lightning from heaven—he tells us (p. 64), "was impossible if for no other reason than that *the faculties of the Saviour were truly human and therefore really limited.*" Here we have presupposed the principle of the whole conclusion as to Christ's "mind" which the book is written to prove: "it was human aud therefore limited." If it were to be thus assumed, surely there needed not so much to be said about it.

All this, however, Mr. Adamson shares with the writers already reviewed. It is particularly in the extremity of his contentions, as we have said, that he parts company with them. This extremity is visible from the very beginning of his treatise, and, indeed, iu the very ordering of his book. What he is essaying is au investigation of "the mind in Christ," and what he begins with is a chapter boldly entitled (and that with the fullest meaning) "Christ's Ignorance"—only proceeding thence to recognize the various fragments of knowledge (supernatural, ouly apparently supernatural, Divine, natural), which gradually worked their way into His mind to illumiuate its vast stretches of ignorance, or, as he himself phrases it, were "let in on Christ's ignorance" (p. 27). We are not speaking without warrant. In Mr. Adamson's view the characteristic of Christ's mind was ignorance; it was knowledge which constituted the adventitious element: and we must remember that he is not speaking in this of His specially human mind, as distinguished from the Divine Mind also in Him, but of all the mind He had, the mind which was the Logos, or which the Logos had become. And as of knowledge, so of all other Diviue attributes. He was as little omnipotent, for example, as omniscient, and depended on strength from without as truly as on illumination from without. In a word, He was phenomenally man and nothing more. He differed in knowledge from the rest of us only in "the consciousness He had of His own Divinity" (p. 163) —that is, He was conscious of the fact that He was God without being conscious of the actual existence in Him of any of the powers which belong to God as God—a form of consciousness, oue would think, quite as marvelous as anything the volume is written to explain away. And He differed in power from the rest of us, only iu that His native human strength was not sapped by sin.

Nor is Mr. Adamson content with the attribution to our Lord of mere ignorance—deep and pervasive as, in his construction, His ignorance was—

he presses on unshrinkingly to attribute positive error to Him. This, it is to be noted, our Anglican "Kenoticists" are forward to repudiate. Dr. Mason, for example, justly complains (p. 29) of that unguarded pressure of the limitations of Christ's knowledge that he is himself prepared to admit, which would "imperil our confidence in Christ as a teacher of Divine truth." "If it is suggested," he says,

"that our Lord occasionally, because He knew no better, used arguments which were convincing to those who heard Him, but which might fail to convince us, it becomes hard to know why we should be invited to place absolute trust in the accuracy of His revelation as a whole. Supposing that in His condescension to our human conditions He made Himself liable to mistakes, can we be sure He was never mistaken?"

Mr. Adamson is superior to all such timid fears. He is not even among those whom Dr. Mason specially has in mind in this passage—who draw back from saying such things openly and can only be charged with leaving their teaching in so unguarded a form that it may seem to imply them. He speaks them frankly out. In his view, "the working of Christ's human powers"—and He had no other powers, for "though God-Man" He "was yet truly man in *all* His faculties" (p. 160), and therefore He had *no* Divine faculties, and if He had no Divine *faculties*, then, one would think, no Divine *nature*, for do not faculties and nature go together? or is there a nature without faculties, *i. e.*, that is no *kind* of nature at all?—"the working of Christ's human powers were fallible, just like ours, and thus mistakes were possible" (p. 19). When He said that a "prophet hath no honor in His own country" He referred to Galilee—where, however, He was not rejected. "Here, then, He was mistaken. He was not rejected as He had expected: He was received with open arms" (p. 67). It is graciously added, however, "Still He was not deceived, though He was mistaken. He knew what the men at heart were, and that His principle was still true." It is at least obvious, however, that "whatever combination of powers Christ had," "it was not a preventative against error," though this may not imply "any mistake on His part as to spiritual things or their issues" (p. 75). We need not hesitate to admit, then, that He was simply mistaken when He expected to find fruit on the fig-tree (p. 219); or when He spoke in a general way as to the authorship of a Biblical book (p. 130).

"We are not concerned to deny in our Saviour a mere lapse of memory. Weakness of mind is dependent often on physical infirmity; that was as real in Him as limitation of mental faculty was when demanded by the conditions of His life. Forgetfulness of even a Bible fact, or mistake as to one, specially when it implied no consequence of spiritual import, is not more than ignorance of it to begin with, or the necessity of time in which to learn" (p. 138).

The *kenosis* which thus rendered the "mind in Christ" liable not only to ignorance, but to error as well, naturally rendered the "power in Him" liable not only to quiescence, but to failure. "If we believe that the second person of the Trinity submitted to be enlightened, and strengthened, and guided by the Holy Spirit" (p. 164)—why, there seems little reason to believe that this "enlightening and strengthening and guiding" were more complete in His case than in that of others living under the same conditions. As His predictions of the future were not drawn from His own knowledge, but were precisely like those of other prophets—and Mr. Adamson holds a very low idea indeed of the nature of prophecy in general (pp. 119, 120)—so His miracles were wrought, precisely like those of other servants of God, in the power of the Holy Ghost. Nay, they even required for their success coöperation on the part of those on whom they were wrought (pp. 20, 110, 179, 213, 225, 282).

We think it will scarcely be felt to be a very engaging picture of the

inner life of our Lord which Mr. Adamson has thus limned for us. A man of His times, with the conviction within Him of the fact indeed that He was God and that a great mission was entrusted to Him, but possessing no consciousness of corresponding Divine powers and deriving no aid from His higher nature in the conduct of His life, but dependent on what was without Him for all knowledge, direction, guidance—surely this is not the figure that meets us in the Gospel narrative. Mr. Adamson indeed tells us:

"If we read the Gospels carefully we find that the great mass of Christ's life was not determined or shaped by Himself, any more than a child's birth is by the child, but in the providence of God by the action of others" (p. 211): "in His active ministry His life was moulded largely by those who came to Him" (p. 213).

One would certainly have to read the Gospels very carefully indeed to escape noting the universal negative they give to this whole assertion. It is not the Gospel narrative which has determined Mr. Adamson's construction of our Lord's inner life, but his own preconceived theory: and he has given us, not the mind that was in the Christ of the Gospels, but rather that that may be supposed to have been in the Christ of, say, Dr. Edwin A. Abbott's *Philochristus*. It is to that unpleasant book that we must go, indeed, to see how such a Jesus as Mr. Adamson gives us must have appeared as He walked His weak and hesitant and tottering way through this world of sin.

The possibility of drawing such a picture of the inner life of Christ as Mr. Adamson has given us arises from the power of the human mind to focus its attention on one series of facts to the neglect and exclusion of all others. There is a series of facts as to Christ's knowledge and acts in the Gospel narrative which are in character purely human. If we bear them alone in mind it will be possible for us to derive from them the picture of a purely human Christ; and if we choose to go on and draw exclusive inferences from them we may succeed in excluding all marks of divinity from our conception of His life. But this will involve a resolute closing of our eyes to another series of facts as to Christ's knowledge and acts, lying by the side of the other in the Gospel narrative, which are just as numerous, striking and characteristic as they, and which are manifest revelations of an ever-active Deity in the composition of His Person. He who would picture to Himself a purely human Christ must elaborately explain away this series of facts, just as he who would picture to himself a purely Divine Christ must explain away the others. It is just this that Mr. Adamson has attempted. The whole art of his presentation consists in magnifying and exaggerating the one series of facts and minifying and obscuring the other, until the mind of the reader is so filled with the one that it gives no proper attention to the other. It is no doubt very easy to take a one-sided view of the Person of Christ and to drive through an interpretation of His life on its lines. Perhaps He has been too exclusively conceived as God in some quarters; and books like Dr. Mason's and Mr. Adamson's may do good service in awaking our generation—even though rudely—to a deeper appreciation of the truth of His humanity. But a one-sided view cannot be justly corrected by a far grosser one-sidedness from the opposite point of sight.

No one can possibly arise from a fresh reading of the Gospels and acquiesce in the picture of Jesus which Mr. Adamson draws. It is too little to say, as we have just said, that in their narrative the two series of opposite facts lie side by side: they are rather interlaced with one another, and the reader is bidden to contemplate not merely now the marks of Deity, and now the signs of humanity, but both conjointly in the same moment. Observe the story in the eleventh chapter of John for example: how "Jesus learns from

others that Lazarus is sick, but knows without further message that Lazarus is dead," "weeps and groans at the sight of the scene which surrounds Him, yet calmly gives thanks for the accomplishment of the miracle before it has been accomplished" (Mason, p. 145). This is really typical of the character of the whole Gospel narrative. As pictured in it, our Lord's entire life is distinctly duplex—now we see Him depending on God's working through the Spirit, now announcing His mighty "I will:" now expressing ignorance of a definite fact, now exercising the Divine prerogative of reading the hearts of men, claiming to know even as the Father knows, and acquiescing in the attribution to Him of omniscience itself. There is but one principle of interpretation which will do justice to both series of facts. It was not discovered without much groping. It may easily escape our grasp, as it involves certain conceptions difficult to apprehend aud even more difficult justly to apply to details. But it is well worth our careful guarding, for it alone will introduce harmony into what else is full of perplexity. It is the Church conception of the constitution of the Person of Christ as embracing in its unity two complete natures, united without conversion, without confusion, eternally and inseparably. In proportion as we lose our clear grasp on this doctrine, we not only mar our conception of the God-Man, but confound the whole record of His life in the Gospels and throw it into inextricable confusion. The temptation in that case becomes very strong to simplify the narrative by doing violence to one or the other side of its complex presentation. Writing under the influences of the present day—and with the anxiety which he exhibits to garner all of value to be found in the writings of Paulus and Strauss and Baur and Keim (the reading of which series of writers, after all, is scarcely a sufficient preparation for the understanding of Jesus)—it could not be doubtful to which side of the complex presentation of Scripture Mr. Adamson would do violence. The result is naturally that he reduces "the whole Christ" to a human level. That he should not at first recognize fully the drastic character of his procedure or the destructive nature of his results is altogether natural. But on every page the reader will observe tell-tale phrases indicatory of the humanitarian conception of Christ's person dominating his fundamental thought. Take for example this phrase which occurs (not for the first time) on p. 210: "His first duty was to preserve intact the nature which had been entrusted to Him." That is to say, then, Jesus is primarily and fuudamentally a Man, even as "He" is always throughout the volume the Man: to this Man a Divine nature has been entrusted: and He is in some danger of not preserving the deposit. Needless to say this is no Divine Being incarnated in man, but a Human Being inhabited by God: in other words the Scriptural idea of the iucarnation is not only evacuated but turned on its head.

Part of the strong impression made by the book—for it is powerfully though certainly not winningly written—is due to a peculiarity of presentation which perhaps is worth adverting to, if for no other reasou than its odd savor of the times in which we live—the day above all things of "evolution." We refer to what we may perhaps call the spurious geneticism of Mr. Adamson's method. It seems scarcely possible for him to set forth any matter of fact without throwing his statemeut into the form of a genetic account of it. Illustrations of this characteristic of style meet us on nearly every page. Take for example the paragraph beginning on p. 117, in which Jesus' conception of the uuity of Scripture is adverted to. The facts lying in Mr. Adamson's mind are: (1) Jesus treats the Old Testament as a unity; (2) He dwells much on the geueral principles underlying its specific portrayals; (3) He looks on its history as a record of God's providential dealings with His people; (4) He predicts facts of the future. These facts Mr. Adamson con-

nects in a spurious genetic series—a series for the order of which he has absolutely no warrant except that he fancies that so he may make the conceptions of Christ—and his very forecast of the future—appear a phenomenon altogether like what we see in other men. Thus we get an evolutionistic *schema* applied to the development of Christ's conceptions on no other ground than the individual operator's sense of naturalistic likelihood: and the result is inevitably a reconstructed Christ, created after the image of the operator's naturalistic thought. We are reminded of Renan's declaration that the trouble with biographies is that the biographer invariably imputes himself to his victim and will not permit him to think or act except within his own limits of thought. A famous Swiss naturalist considered the mental history of a dog impossible to fathom because of the immense difference existing between the workings of a dog's mind and his human biographer's—even though the biographer in this case could look down on his subject. But Mr. Adamson seems to feel no doubt as to his ability to enter into the working of the "mind in Christ," unravel all its processes and present a dogmatic statement of how every one of his conceptions arose in Him and of their total issue in His thinking and conduct. This method of presenting the facts of Christ's inner life naturally gives the cursory reader the impression that the author thoroughly understands the "mind in Christ." On maturer consideration, doubts arise.

4. The argument for *kenosis* in both Dr. Mason's and Mr. Adamson's treatises is drawn, it is to be noted, not from any didactic teaching of the New Testament, but from a construction of the phenomena of our Lord's life as set down in the Gospel narrative. The evidence which it is sought to derive from this source is obtained, as we have seen, and as has been fully shown for example by Mr. Powell in his excellent treatise hereafter to be mentioned, from a one-sided exaggeration of a single series of phenomena, perfectly natural in the case of a Person of Two Natures and duly balanced in the Gospels by a parallel series of phenomena equally demanding the postulation of a fully active divine nature in Him—which latter series, however, the "Kenoticists" partly neglect and partly attempt elaborately to explain away. The engrossment of these treatises with this one body of evidence does not arise, however, from a confessed absence from the New Testament of didactic passages teaching the doctrine of *kenosis*. There are such passages to which these theorists are accustomed also to appeal, and among them a chief place is accorded to the great Christological deliverance in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Philippians. From it, indeed, the term *kenosis* itself is derived; for does not Paul there distinctly say that Christ Jesus *emptied* (ἐκένωσεν) Himself in the act of incarnation? Dr. Gifford's little book on *The Incarnation* consecrates itself to a fresh study of this decisive passage. The quality of his exposition may be gathered from the characterization of it given by Dr. Sanday in the article previously cited: "These discussions," he says in immediate continuance of the words already quoted from him, "have produced one little work of classical value, Dr. E. H. Gifford's study of Philippians ii. 5-11, entitled *The Incarnation*, a model of careful and scientific exegesis, which appears to leave hardly anything more to be said on that head." Every reader of Dr. Gifford's volume will add his hearty amen to these words of well-deserved appreciation. With a breadth of handling and nicety of touch which will be no surprise to those who have profited by his notes on Romans published in *The Speaker's Commentary*, he has gone over the passage word by word, and clause by clause, determining the limits of its meaning, and then drawn out in luminous detail the essential teaching of the whole. At the end he has

added a few scattered but instructive notes on the history of the interpretation of the passage.

The most fruitful element in Dr. Gifford's exposition of this fundamental passage lies in the emphasis he throws on a neglected aspect of the implication of the participle ὑπάρχων as here used. As Estius and Gwynne had previously noted, though the matter seems to have been otherwise overlooked, this participle expresses not merely what Christ Jesus *originally was* —was by nature—but also what He *continued to be:* so that its force would be brought out by some such paraphrase of the clause as, "Though He was by nature and continued to subsist in the form of God." The effect of this implication on the "Kenoticist" interpretation of the passage is obvious: it is no longer possible to represent Paul as teaching that our Lord in His incarnation "emptied Himself" of "the form of God."

Perhaps Dr. Gifford does not himself fully perceive, however, the extent of the effect of his recovery of the true implication of the participle. It may be queried if it does not render it unlikely also that Paul can have meant that Christ emptied Himself of His "being on an equality with God." So soon as we fully realize the implied assertion of the *continuance* of the existence form of God in the incarnated state, it appears to be unnatural to suppose that the hinge of the passage turns on the assertion that He laid aside what may be called the result of the possession of this existence form, viz., "the being on an equality with God." And if we ask for a reason in the context for assuming that the incarnation consisted in, or necessarily involved, the laying aside of "the being on an equality with God," it is not so easy to find it. Dr. Gifford finds it, of course, as others before him have been accustomed to find it, in the implications of the succeeding clause: "He emptied Himself." When we inquire, "Emptied Himself of what?" it seems most easy to seek the needed defining genitive in the preceding clause, and to say, "Of course, τοῦ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ." But this very natural response—near at hand as it lies—seems to neglect two important considerations—the one derived from the emphatic position of the ἑαυτόν and the other from the usage of κενόω.

It may amount to very little to say that κενόω is used elsewhere in the New Testament only in a metaphorical sense: but a new meaning may possibly be given this fact by recalling a more common classical usage to which the New Testament usage may perhaps ultimately trace its origin. For κενόω is not always accompanied by a genitive of that of which the object is emptied, either expressed or suggested in the immediate context. Sometimes this is rather taken as implied in the object itself that is emptied—according to the nature of the case or the good understanding presumed to exist between the writer and reader. When physicians spoke of "emptying" the digestive tract, or the veins, or even a vial, there was no need of an expressed or contextually indicated genitive to complete the thought; neither would one need to find warrant in the immediate context for the needed supplement to the threat in Euripides' *Ion*, 447, that Zeus may "make their temples void." Bearing this usage in mind, there seems no need of seeking in the context for specific indication of that of which one is emptied when we read of his "emptying himself"—any more than there is for asking of what "faith" is emptied in Rom. iv. 14, or the "cross of Christ" in 1 Cor. i. 17, or Paul's "glorying" in 1 Cor. ix. 15, 2 Cor. ix. 3. We must, at least, recognize the fact, that the needed supplement may be contained in the object itself rather than in the immediate context, or in other words that the thought is completely conveyed by the verb and its object without need of supplement derived from without. To speak of emptying one's self is quite as complete a thought as to speak of emptying

one's boasting: and it may well be wise, instead of seeking for the defining genitive in the immediate context, to inquire rather what "self-emptying" may mean.

When now we note that the ἑαυτόν receives the emphasis here, we may possibly feel that this "may" might well be transmuted into a "must." This emphasis has, of course, not been neglected heretofore. But it has been explained merely as throwing a stress on the voluntariness of the act. It does that: but it does not seem to be exhausted by that. Were we to say, "He EMPTIED Himself," we might well scrutinize the context to discover "of what:" but when we say, "He emptied HIMSELF," we may well suspect that the "of what" is included in the emphatic "Himself." Must we not, indeed, say that the thing He emptied Himself of is obviously just the "self" involved in the term itself? In any event, the emphatic ἑαυτόν seems to erect a barrier over which it is difficult to climb in looking back for indication of that of which our Lord emptied Himself when He "took the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men."

When we observe further that it was precisely to "unselfishness" that Paul was exhorting the Philippians by the example of Christ so adduced, it would seem that the contextual indications throw their weight also into the scale for this interpretation. We may well ask whether the point of His great example was not that He looked not exclusively on His own things, but on the things of others too, and—not indeed emptied Himself of His own things but—in lowliness of mind counted others better than Himself. So—by emptying Himself of *self*—he would certainly exhibit what it was for them to "count each other better than *themselves*." And thus, surely not in an un-Pauline manner, the terms in which the example is expressed would take up and repeat those in which the conduct recommended is expressed: as the echo of τῇ ταπεινοφροσύνῃ of ver. 3 is heard in the ἐταπείνωσεν of ver. 8, so the echo of the ἀλλήλους ἡγούμενοι ὑπερέχοντας ἑαυτῶν is heard in the ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν of ver. 7.

Let this suggestion as to the construction of this clause go, however, for what it is worth. Dr. Gifford has certainly, by his careful and convincing exposition of the passage as a whole, removed the possibility of a "Kenotic" interpretation of it. He has made it perfectly plain that it proclaims an incarnation in which the Logos retained the "form of God" belonging to Him by nature.

5. What Dr. Gifford does for the fundamental "Kenotic text," that Mr. Powell essays in his comprehensive treatise on *The Principle of the Incarnation* to do for the whole Kenotic position. He undertakes to submit the entire subject to a fresh examination, from the philosophical, theological, exegetical and historical points of view, with the object of determining the actual principle which must have ruled and did rule in the act of the incarnation. The work opens with an account of the rise of Kenotic views in England and a discovery of their historical and philosophical origin (pp. 1-35). Then, taking up the matter from what he calls "the psychological point of view," the author seeks to determine, from the nature of the human constitution and its modes of knowledge and the nature of God and His modes of knowledge, the limits of the possible relations between the two in the incarnation (pp. 36-199). Proceeding thence to "the theological point of view," he examines into the purposes of the incarnation and what they made it necessary that there should be found in Christ, and subjects the Kenotic theories to the test of these findings (pp. 200-336). The "evidence of the Gospels" as to the actual state of our Lord's knowledge in His earthly life is next investigated (pp. 337-459). The book is then brought to a conclusion by some remarks

on the limits within which the principle of the incarnation must be sought for, and the practical aspects of the rival theories (pp. 460–466). The historical treatment of the subject promised is meanwhile postponed to another volume. The reader, however, will feel the lack of this the less that a great deal of historical material has been incidentally incorporated into the discussion, and the historical section is not necessary for the completion of the fundamental purpose of the book—which is to uncover and test the basal principle of "Kenoticism." This the book as it stands thoroughly does.

One of the great services which Mr. Powell renders is the clearness with which he brings out the fact that the *principium* of the Kenotic theories is not to be found in exegetical or even theological difficulties, but in a quasi-philosophical presupposition—this namely, that the possession and exercise of divine powers by the Son of God would be absolutely incompatible with a truly human experience or a truly human life on earth. Every reader of the Kenotic literature—of Dr. Gore, Mr. Ottley, Dr. Mason, and Mr. Adamson alike—will have abundant occasion to verify the dominating influence which this assumption has exercised over their whole thought. Mr. Powell does not stay, on uncovering this presupposition, to probe its implications. These are obvious enough and serious enough: for what can it mean but a precedent refusal to believe in a real Incarnation at all? If we must say, with Dean Gore, for example, that "it was necessary that Christ should be without the exercise of such divine prerogatives as would have made human experience or progress impossible" (*Bampton Lectures*, p. 157), with the understanding that this includes all that differentiates Him from man—what is that but to say that in order to be man, He must needs not be God? What is it but to say that if He is to be human at all, He must be naught but human? What is it but to say that the doctrine of the Two Natures is an unthinkable impossibility? That stress is laid meanwhile merely on "the exercise" of such prerogatives is only a sign of the transitional character of the presently affirmed *kenosis;* it is meaningless to talk of the possession of such a quality as omniscience, say, apart from its exercise, and it is the possession of these prerogatives that is the real *scandalon.* What is really said is that Christ can not be conceived as both omniscient and ignorant—as both God and man—at once; and hence, since He was obviously man, must have been only man during His sojourn on earth. Beneath the forms of Kenotic language we have thus only a veiled Socinianism. Mr. Powell, however, does not content himself with this reduction of the "Kenosis doctrine" to its proper category in the history of Christological thought, but rather addresses himself seriously to the main question brought into issue in its primal assumption, viz., whether it is true that a true human development and truly human activities cannot coëxist in the Person of Christ with a real and co-active divine nature clothed with all the characters of Deity.

Accordingly he attempts to show from the point of view of psychological science, that the divine mode of existence is so different in kind from the human, and specifically that the divine mode of knowledge is so different in kind from the human, that the presence and exercise of the one does not necessarily exclude the presence and exercise of the other—that, in a word, "the fullest habitual exercise of omniscience was quite compatible with the freest exercise simultaneously and without any modification of its true character of human consciousness" (p 256): then, from the point of view of theological science on the one hand, that this conjunction of true and complete divinity with equally true and complete humanity is demanded by the functions which the God-Man came into the world to perform—more specifically the one by His function as Revealer and the other by His function as Redeemer—and on the other hand that the "Kenotic" assumption is for-

bidden by the very elements of the idea of God, more specifically by the fact of the divine unchangeableness: and finally from the point of view of historico-exegetical science, that the "Kenotic" assumption is so far from being taught in the Scriptures or required by the phenomena of Christ's life as recorded there, that it is distinctly excluded as well by the didactic statements of Scripture, its account of Christ's wonderful works in His own power, and the prevailing attribution to Him of personal omniscience, alongside of the attribution to Him of contemporaneously active human limitations. The conclusion which he attains he would express in some such terms as these:

"It is not in any supposed change in the *Godhead* of our Lord Jesus Christ that we must look for a solution of the difficulties which we feel as we try to realize how His human consciousness could have preserved its true human character when it was conjoined in Him with omniscience. The solution must be looked for exclusively *on the human side.* If the structure of the human mind itself is of such a kind as, *ipso facto*, to make it incapable of direct intercourse on (so to say) equal terms with the omniscient God, the hypothesis of a κένωσις affecting the omniscient God becomes at once superfluous. In the present treatise an endeavor has been made to show that this is actually the true account of the matter. In connection with this it has, of course, been requisite to show that the *kenosis* theory has no real grounding in any statements of Holy Scripture and is not reconcilable with the evidence of the Gospels. This, it is hoped, has been shown . . . . and also that the theory is liable to other theological and philosophical objectious which appear to be insuperable" (p. 270).

That Mr. Powell has accomplished the task he thus sets before himself, we think is indubitable. His style is clear: his argumentation cogent: and he carries the discussion forward in an orderly advance, constantly and stringently pressing on to the complete refutation of the opposing views. Of course we do not mean by this to set our seal to every one of his opinions or even to all of his cherished convictions. The details of Mr. Powell's psychological scheme do not commend themselves to us, and we are far from according the same deference that he does to the late Dean Mansel as a metaphysician—of whose teaching indeed the whole of Mr. Powell's philosophy may be taken as a "faint Homeric echo." On this basis he presses the doctrine of the limits of human thought beyond our capacity to follow him. But he presses them also beyond the needs of his argument; and we can perceive that his whole contention here is gained while drawing back from a good many of the opinions which he incidentally expresses. On the other hand, much of what is said even in the detailed presentation of the case commands not only our assent but often our admiration. Take for instance the fine chapter on Christ as the Revealer and the Redeemer, and especially the solid exhibition of the necessity of His having been all that God is, and that not only in possession but in employment, that He might be the Revelation of God (pp. 206–220)—so that "Kenotism" must needs deny, if not in words that our Lord was "God in the flesh," yet certainly that He was "God *manifest* in the flesh." Take also the plain and convincing discussion of the minor facts of the Gospel narrative, on the exaggeration of which the "Kenotists" build so much—the expressions of surprise by our Lord, His inquiries, etc.—and his telling remark as to the relative abundance of the facts utilized and neglected by the Kenotic advocates:

"The facts on *both* sides ought at auy rate to be fully faced. And when the evidence on one side is confronted with that on the other, it will certainly be acknowledged that there is nothing less than an immense disproportion between them. . . . . If *all* that he [Dr. Gore] enumerates as evidence of limitations of knowledge would bear the test of examiuation, it would be, both as regards quantity and quality, little indeed in comparison of the multiplied statements and varied forms of proof which the Gospels contain establishing the reality of Divine knowledge as present in our Lord whilst He was ou earth. . . . . The disproportion, therefore, between what is found on the one side and on the other is very great indeed. And the point now insisted on is that this disproportion ought to be taken fully into account. If there is evi-

dence of limitation let it by all means be brought forward and sifted. But let also all that there is on the contrary side be as fully brought forward, and, if it cannot reasonably be denied, let it have its full weight. The less must not be made the standard to which the greater is to be conformed, but on the contrary the greater must rule the less. It must not set the less aside, but it must rule it. We must find a theory which will account fairly for the facts on both sides (if there are facts on both sides); we must reject any theory which ignores or which distorts the facts on either" (pp. 385, 386).

It is not necessary, however, to point further to the specific excellences of this good book: it will suffice to say that it offers a sufficient refutation of the "Kenotic" theory in principle, and exhibits to a sufficient extent the difficulties—or rather impossibilities—which it must surmount in detail before it can be made acceptable to those who will test it, whether on the philosophical, the theological or the exegetical side.

6. Dr. Hall's treatise on *The Kenotic Theory* is, at once, somewhat briefer in compass and somewhat wider in scope, somewhat more popular in form and yet no less cogent in effect than Mr. Powell's. Like Mr. Powell, Dr. Hall confines his discussion to "Kenoticism" as it has exhibited itself in the Anglican communiou, adverting to the previous German forms only in the Introduction and only at second hand. This we deem unfortunate, inasmuch as the two are historically connected and the German discussions both pushed the Kenotic conclusions to more radical extremes than has been done as yet by their Anglican imitators, thus exhibiting the essential character of the movemeut more completely, and threshed out its possibilities more thoroughly. But within the chosen limits of his treatise, Dr. Hall writes with clearness aud force, and gives us an admirable treatment of the subject in all its elements.

The specialty of his work may, perhaps, be said to lie in the skill with which he brings the general doctrine of God to bear on the Kenotic assumption and the force with which he exhibits the fact that the whole discussion of our Lord's human knowledge is after all only a debate of one section of the general doctrine of the Two Natures and that, accordingly, the objections raised against the presence in Christ, during His earthly life, of an active omniscience really impinge against the essence of the Chalcedonian Christology in general. No one can lay aside his volume without the conviction that the "Kenotic doctrine," as taught even in its mildest form, is inconsistent alike with a sound doctrine of God and a sound doctrine of the God-Man.

There exists a slight difference between Dr. Hall and Mr. Powell in their definition of what the essence of "Kenoticism" consists in: Mr. Powell being content to class with "Kenoticists" only those who affirm that our Lord put off that which was *internal* (as distinguished from what was *external*) to Himself as God (p. 15), while Dr. Hall extends the category to include all who teach that our Lord abandoned anything of what was His before He became incarnate (p. 1). The difference is probably little more than verbal. It is applied, however, by Dr. Hall to the question whether the Logos laid aside His "equality with God" on becoming incarnate—which he denies and Mr. Powell affirms. Here too probably, however, there is uo essential difference: what is meant by the "equality with God" is doubtless understood differently by the two writers. In the whole essence of the question they stand together, and the two books differ rather in mode of presentation, as addressed to different audiences, than iu anything more fundamental.

We have said nothing of the treatment accorded by our authors to the famous text (Matt. xxiv. 36, Mark xiii. 32) in which our Lord "confesses His ignorance" of the day and hour of His Secoud Advent. Such a text lay, of course, too much in the way to be avoided by any one who would

enter into the Kenotic discussion at all, and it is dealt with after his own fashion by each of the writers now in review, whose plan brought it naturally before him. By Canon Mason it is treated with his wonted fineness of exegetical tact, but under the dominance of an overstrained subordinationism, the exaggerated outgrowth perhaps of that construction of the Trinitarian relationship laid down (from Nicene sources) in his *Faith of the Gospel:* he wishes the "Son" to be taken absolutely and holds that there is expressed here an ignorance on the part of the Logos Himself, even apart from the Incarnation(p. 122). Mr. Adamson disposes of it with the ease and brusqueness characteristic of his volume (pp. 2-4): "Much better frankly to face the fact; here was real ignorance;" but the text is not of much importance, "for as Christ's ignorance was not confined to any one case, or to any class of cases, but was the rule of His condition, there are very varied illustrations and numerous proofs of it." Mr. Powell devotes a whole chapter to it (pp. 407-438), in which he certainly blunders in his exegesis, with respect both to the form of statement with "the Son" in the third person, and to the reference of the "except"—and so arrives by a wrong path at essentially the right conclusion, viz., that the ignorance affirmed is of the human mind of Christ only: he also gives, however, a valuable conspectus of the history of the interpretation of the passage from which we may learn much. Dr. Hall, on the other hand, speaks with great reserve as to the right interpretation of the text (pp. 183 *sq.*), while yet feeling sure that it will not bear the sense put on it by the "Kenoticists."

The real difficulty of the verse, however, is but little sounded by any of our authors, with the partial exception of Mr. Powell. It does not lie in the *assertion of the fact of ignorance* in the case of our Lord. Every one who believes in the Two Natures already confesses the existence of a limited mind in Jesus, and, on the well-known principle of the *communio idiomatum*, the use of the term "the Son" here creates no difficulty—any more than a difficulty is created by the sayings that the Lord of Glory or the Son of God was crucified (1 Cor. ii. 8, Heb. vi. 6), or that the blood of God has purchased His Church (Acts xx. 28). The real difficulty lies in the *fact of which ignorance is asserted.* Why should even the human mind of Christ be ignorant of just this fact? There are "deep things of God" which, we might understand, might well remain inscrutable to every creaturely mind—even though brought into personal union with the Divine Logos. But here ignorance is affirmed of what seems a fact simple enough in itself, such as any human mind might readily grasp if it were presented to it. It is in this consideration that the difficulties of the Fathers are rooted; and they were led by it to seek a further explanation of the ignorance asserted than was suggested by merely attributing it to Christ's human mind—such as that it is not knowledge of this fact but *independent* knowledge of it that is here denied to the Son, or not theoretical but *practical* knowledge, or not knowledge for Himself but *for others*, or not personal but *official* knowledge, or even not knowledge in Himself but *in His people*, *i. e.*, not of the head but of the body.

Perhaps the following considerations may go a little way toward lessening the difficulty of the case: (1) We must, of course, bear in mind that a creaturely mind is limited not only qualitatively but quantitatively as well: its powers fail before an infinite multitude of easily comprehensible facts as truly as before an unfathomable mystery. It may well be, therefore, that the human mind of Jesus was incapable of receiving all the facts that the Divine mind, in union with which it existed in the Person of Christ, might otherwise have communicated to it. (2) If then it be asked why His ignorance was especially of *this particular fact*, it may perhaps be suggested: (A)

that there may have been so great a multitude of other facts of more immediate importance for Christ's human mind to grasp, in order that He might fulfill the work that was given Him to do, that His powers of attention and perception were exhausted before this particular fact could be attended to by Him; or (B) that this fact may be implicated with so great a multitude of other facts without which it cannot be intelligently grasped, that a creaturely mind must needs be unable to apprehend it, because it is incapable of grasping the whole complex of facts and relations on which its appehension depends; or (C) that there may, after all, be some inherent mystery in the times and seasons of the Second Advent, unsuspected by us (cf. Acts i. 7), which renders them incapable of knowledge beforehand, by a creaturely mind; or (D) that ignorance of the day and hour of His Second Coming may have been part of the conditions under which the Mediatorial work must needs be performed, so that knowledge of them was voluntarily withheld by the Logos from the human mind brought into contact with it in the Person of Christ, and ignorance of them voluntarily accepted by the human mind itself, and thus this ignorance, though real, may have been in a true sense also purely economical. In the light of such considerations it may at least seem that the difficulties connected with that interpretation of the passage which has reigned in the Church from the beginning, are not insuperable: and certainly that they cannot suffice to drive us into a Kenotic interpretation such as offers at best only a doubtful solution of these difficulties, and casts us at once into others, created by itself, a thousand times more insoluble.

If now we may sum up in a few words the impression which a reading of the works under review has left on our minds relatively to the acceptability of the "Kenotic doctrine," we may say at once that it is a very unfavorable one. So far as the discussion has as yet proceeded, the advantage lies wholly on the side of the opponents of the new Christology. On its side there is obvious one-sidedness and exaggeration; on theirs an equally obvious breadth of construction and depth of treatment. In particular, we may say that a strong impression has been left on our minds that the so-called "Kenotic doctrine" is not only without positive support from Scripture, either express or constructive, but stands in conflict with:

(1) The didactic teaching of Scripture, in all its great Christological passages—including the prologue of John's Gospel and the second chapter of Philippians, which have been often appealed to in the contrary sense, but in both of which the continuance in the Incarnate state of the powers of the Logos is distinctly stated.

(2) The dramatized life of Jesus in the Gospel narrative—as may be quickly perceived by simply asking ourselves the concise question, Whether the Jesus whose activities are there displayed is represented as one who has once for all put it out of His power to draw on the treasures of His Divine knowledge or perform the mighty works which should testify of Him, or rather as one who ordinarily refrains by a present voluntary act from manifesting powers which He keeps nevertheless in possession. No unsophisticated reader of the Gospels will hesitate long in his reply to this question: but on it ultimately hinges the whole dispute.

(3) The Scriptural doctrine of the Two Natures of Christ, the integrity of which is destroyed by the least obtrusive form of "Kenotism" and the very principle of which is openly denied by its more advanced forms. The theoretical admission of Two Natures, with the practical recognition of only one—and that a human nature, though baptized with the name of Deity—is only a veiled Humanitarianism and cannot possibly stand before the impact

of the humanitarian thought of the day, one of the issues of which, indeed, it itself is. To call Jesus God and see in Him nothing but man manifested is to renounce His deity in all but words.

(4) The Scriptural doctrine of the work of Christ as the Revelation of God to men, a function which He cannot possibly perform if He really had "emptied" Himself of all that is distinctive of Deity as a condition precedent to His sojourning among men. Only if we are prepared to say that God too, sitting on the throne of the Universe, is essentially man, could the kenotized Christ manifest God to us: and in that case all occasion for a *kenosis*, that He might become man, is removed.

(5) The Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity, which, as has been fully shown in the German discussions, is wrecked, in one way or another, by each of the chief forms of the Kenotic assumption. The Gessian form is frankly Arian, teaching that the communication of the Divine essence from the Father to the Son is dependent on the Father's will. The attempt of the Ebrardian form (to which the Anglican teachers assimilate) to avoid this by postulating two contemporaneous existence-spheres for the Logos—the Trinitarian and Incarnate—in one of which He retains and exercises all His divine attributes and in the other of which He has abandoned them, is only partially successful for the purpose for which it is put forward, and labors under the additional disadvantage of introducing the same dualism of powers and activities into the one mind which is the Logos, to escape which in the Two-Minded Person, Jesus, it was invented.

(6) The common Theistic doctrine of God, as the Unchangeable One, reaffirmed endlessly in the Scriptural revelation, by which we are certainly forbidden to suppose that he can be God who possesses none of the attributes characteristic of God and distinctive of Him as compared with other Beings. To pretend that God can remain God after having been "emptied" of all His so-called metaphysical attributes, that is, of all that determines His nature to be that which we distinctively call "God," is simply a contradiction in terms.

(7) The common tenets of a sound philosophy which, however much it may analyze Being to thought into substance and attributes, refuses to allow the possibility of the actual separation of substance and attributes. To say that the Logos can be stripped of all His "metaphysical attributes" and yet remain the same Logos as before, only exhibiting new and essentially human attributes, is certainly to revive the old scholastic postulate of an attributeless substance lying behind separable attributes, as the substrate of Being. There can certainly be no Being that is not some *kind* of a Being, and we cannot strip from a Being those qualities which determine the *kind* of Being it is, and leave the bare Being subsisting: much less can we now add to it other qualities, constituting it a different *kind* of a Being, and proclaim it through all these changes the same Being. The *kenosis* doctrine is, in other words, implicative of the same metaphysic as the doctrine of Transsubstantiation and falls before the same criticism.

(8) The ordinary dictates of common sense, which refuses to believe that a Being can by an act of power evacuate itself of omnipotence, by a conscious act deplete its own consciousness; and as well that a Being may be essentially ubiquitous and yet not be everywhere present, essentially omniscient and yet not know all things.

(9) The historical faith of the Church, which has been beaten out through ages of discussion of the very problems now engaging the attention of students, and has taken a form which has for ages satisfied the minds of Christian thinkers and still continues to satisfy them: from which, therefore, we will depart only with hesitancy and under the pressure of very good

reason. Nothing is more astonishing than to observe men committed to the faith of the undivided Church, like Canon Mason, striving vainly to escape from the condemnation of the Cyrillian anathemas or the Chalcedonian formularies, under which they have unwittingly brought themselves. It may as well be allowed at the outset that it is not possible to hold in common the Christology of Chalcedon and the new German Christology invented for the very purpose of correcting the Chalcedonian construction—even though it is now adopted for the different purpose of declining the authority of the Son of Man in matters of scientific criticism.

(10) The ineradicable demands of the Christian heart, which will not be satisfied with a Redeemer whose every word it cannot trust, not as words of a prophet in whom God may have spoken by divers portions and divers manner, but as the words of a Son who is the effulgence of His glory and the impress of His substance; and on whose arm it cannot rest, not as on the arm of a servant, but as on the arm of a Son, over God's house. All the religious affections gather to Jesus Christ as to One who, though He may be man as concerning the flesh, is nevertheless, at the same time, God over all, blessed forever, who even while on earth was yet in heaven, and who is yesterday and to-day the same, and forever.

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Codex Bezæ Cantabrigiensis, Quartuor Evangelia et Actus Apostolorum Complectens Græce et Latini, Sumptibus Academiæ Phototypice Repræsentatus. Tomus Prior. 4to, pp. 360. (Cantabrigiæ: MDCCCXCIX: Londini veneunt apud C. J. Clay et Filios). Nothing could be more perfect than these phototype plates, which practically place this famous MS. indeed in the hands of every scholar. They have been made by the celebrated Parisian phototyper, Paul Dujardin. The present volume contains the Gospels of Matthew and John. The brief *Monitum* confines itself to an indication of the former efforts to put the text of the MS. worthily before the public. ——*Key to the Translation of the English Exercises in the Arabic Grammar of A. Socin.* 12mo, pp. 12. (Berlin: Reuther und Reichard; London: Williams & Norgate; New York: Lemcke & Buechner, 1899.) Dr. Socin's *Arabic Grammar* is one of the very best text-books for learning a language in existence. In German it is now in its fourth edition. The second edition of the English translation appeared in 1895, and was appreciatively reviewed in this REVIEW for January, 1898 (ix, 190). The present pamphlet is designed to facilitate a teacher's use of it by supplying him with a key to the exercises designed to be translated from English into Arabic.——*The Decalogue and Criticism;* or, The Place of the Decalogue in the Development of the Hebrew Religion. Inaugural Address, Delivered by the Rev. George Livingstone Robinson, Ph.D., as Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis in the McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, Ill., May 3, 1899. With the Charge to the Professor by the Hon. David McCulloch. 8vo, pp. 33. (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1899.) Prof. Robinson fitly inaugurates his work at McCormick Seminary by a vindication of the Mosaic origin of the Decalogue. Segregating first the three opinions now current concerning it—that it is the product of the Elohistic writer and came from the late eighth or early seventh century, that its nucleus is Mosaic, and that it is in its form as known to us Mosaic—he sets aside in turn on compelling grounds the first and second hypotheses and settles upon the last, which he then supports by important considerations. His conclusion is that "the Decalogue is an original monument of Mosaism —the core of Israel's revealed religion."——*The Eschatology of Plato Compared and Contrasted with the Eschatology of the New Testament.* A Thesis.