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THE SURVEY OF THOUGHT.

THE PRINCIPLES OF TEXTUAL CRITICISM AS APPLIED TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. By Rev. J. G. HEISCH, M.A. (Hunt & Co., London).—In a brief pamphlet with the above title Mr. Heisch analyses and compares the two leading methods which have been made use of for obtaining an accurate text of the New Testament. The one is to select some MS. or MSS. presumed to be more accurate than the rest, and to take it (or them) for our guide to the exclusion, entirely or partially, of all others. This may be called, for convenience, the *eclectic* method. The other is to examine the whole of the MSS., and to adopt such readings as are supported by the greater number. This may be called the *diplomatic* method. He points out that these two methods rest on opposite assumptions, which cannot therefore both be true. The first assumes a degree of accuracy in the selected MS. or MSS. which renders their joint testimony practically infallible. The second assumes the equal fallibility of *all* individual MSS., and depends, not on their accuracy, but on their *concert*. It being the fact that even in the five great MSS.—A, B, C, D—there are divergences which mark the presence of errors of transcription, he considers that it is a mistake to rely solely or principally upon them for a discovery of the original text, while there are hundreds of later codices, which, though more modern in their actual production, may be derived from originals as ancient as any which are extant. The unlikelihood that any reading not in the original autograph should find its way into a large number of MSS. depends, he holds, not on their accuracy, but on their mutual independence. An example will best illustrate the position he takes up. The disputed reading, Luke ii. 14, depends upon the omission or insertion of the final ς at the end of the word $\epsilonὐδοκία$. The traditional reading ($\epsilonὐδοκία$) is vouched for by every known copy of the Gospels but four, not to mention fifty-six fathers from every part of Christendom. Now, supposing that of these numerous authorities only twenty-five were strictly independent witnesses to the point in question, what will follow? Why this: That whereas the accidental insertion of the letter in a single copy would be a matter of every-day experience, and its presence in four might be easily accounted for, its *omission* in the five-and-twenty, which are, by the supposition, independent of each other, could not, without a miracle, have taken place if it had existed in the sacred autograph. "In preferring, then," he says, "the method which grounds itself on consent to that which relies on transcriptional accuracy, we are following the guid-

LITERARY DEPARTMENT.

BOOK REVIEWS.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. By JOHN MILEY, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N. J. Vol. I. New York: Hunt & Eaton; Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe, 1892, 8vo, pp. xvi., 533, \$3.

The high quality of the "Biblical and Theological Library," now publishing by the Methodist Publication House, does honor to the great denomination which it represents. Dr. Miley's "Systematic Theology" is the latest issue in the series, and it is highly but not unduly praised when it is recognized as worthy to stand in company with Dr. Bennett's "Christian Archæology" and Dr. Terry's "Biblical Hermeneutics." It is clearly, directly, and strongly written; it is characterized by candor, restraint, and modesty; it is orderly in arrangement and lucid in discussion. It is altogether a good book, which the Arminian should find rarely satisfying, and with which the Calvinist should count it a privilege to join issue.

It is somewhat embarrassing to undertake an estimate of a half-finished book. When a treatise is occupied, as this is, with a well-known system of thought, the end is no doubt seen from the beginning; but something depends on individuality in the modes of statement and defence. In the present instance the embarrassment is increased by the fact that a number of detailed discussions, belonging to matters treated in this volume, have been postponed to an appendix, to be printed at the end of the second volume. We can scarcely fail, however, to catch from Dr. Miley's clear pages the elements of the doctrines which he would commend.

An introduction of some fifty pages is occupied with the nature, sources, scope, and method of systematic theology. We miss here a satisfactory discrimination of the theological disciplines; and this has affected somewhat the contents of the volume. The great subject of "Theism," which Dr. Miley makes the first division of systematic theology, we should include in the preliminary discipline of apologetics. On the other hand, this introduction contains very illuminating discussions of such topics as these: the nature of scientific treatment; the scientific basis of Christianity; the right of systematization and the value of dogma; and the method of systematizing—under which occurs a very sensible criticism of the so-called "Christocentric" method. Dr. Miley despairs of attaining a single "unifying principle" in theology, and holds that systematizing must proceed "in a synthetic mode." He

therefore follows the customary order of topics.

The sources of theology are distributed broadly into nature and revelation; and these sources are fruitfully discriminated on the basis of "modes of knowledge" (p. 9). Knowledge acquired "in the use of human faculties" is natural; that immediately communicated by Divine agency is revealed. In the one case "the mode of acquisition is purely human;" "the discovery of truth is mediated by the use of our own faculties." In the other, "it is immediately given by the supernatural agency of God." "It is important," he adds justly, "thus sharply to discriminate these two modes of truth." For, if we lay the stress on source or agency alone, without taking into account also mode of knowledge, we may find ourselves embarrassed before the current pantheizing conception, which, by postulating immanent deity in all human thought, confounds the categories of reason and revelation, and thus does away with the category of revelation altogether, as readers of Dr. Whiton's recent little book, called "Gloria Patri," have occasion to observe anew. We regret to note Dr. Miley, at a later point (p. 11), apparently deserting this ground. He there seems to posit a reception by heathen men of a Divine revelation, which comes to them through their human faculties, and is not verified to the recipient as from God. Here he seems to step beyond the wall of his own definition, with the effect of throwing himself into the hands of the mystic rationalists. We must hasten to add, however, that when he comes to treat formally of mysticism (p. 16), he rejects the mystical path for attaining religious truth altogether, and deals very stringently with the modern doctrine of the Christian consciousness. We must confess that we know not how the views expressed at p. 11, as to a not uncommon revelation to heathen seekers, can be accorded with the criticism here; unless we are to suppose that God is nearer to heathen than to Christians, and deals more intimately with them than with Christians. We may take note, by the way, of the skill and success with which Dr. Miley treats the whole matter of the relation of reason and feeling.

The topics which fall under the head of theology proper are treated with logical power and self-restraint. The term "attribute" seems unduly limited in sense; but the distinction drawn between the "personal attributes" and all others is sound and fruitful. The Divine intellect is discussed under the caption of omniscience; and the perplexities which emerge from it for Arminian thought are not disguised (p. 189 *sq.*). Dr. Miley refuses, however, to be led by these perplexities

into a denial of the Divine foreknowledge of free actions, which he defends unanswerably against the arguments of Dr. McCabe (p. 181). We cannot think, however, that he has followed out his own arguments to their legitimate conclusions. They not only involve the admission of the certainty (as distinguished from the necessity) of free actions (p. 183), which is all any Calvinist believes; but they distinctly imply the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. For example, he acutely reduces the difficulties which are asserted to stand in the way of God's foreknowledge of the free acts of men to absurdity, by pointing out that the same difficulties would press equally against God's foreknowledge of His own free acts. This is unanswerable. But it will require an immeasurably more acute logic still to distinguish God's foreknowledge of His future choices, from a fore-intention to make those choices; and this is just the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. And as it will be impossible to disentangle the future choices of God from those of His creatures, with which they are interwoven in the actual web of life, it will be exceedingly difficult to deny to these creature choices also a place in the comprehensive plan already foreknown in all its parts in eternity, and therefore pre-intended or predestinated. Again, the objection that it would be inconsistent with the Divine goodness to create souls whose rejection of salvation is certainly foreknown, is justly set aside with the remark that nescience will not obviate the objection; inasmuch as it presses almost equally against the creation of souls with the known possibility of their loss, and quite equally against the continuance of the race after the fact of such numerous losses has emerged in experience. But surely the bottom of the matter is not yet reached; for if God creates souls which He certainly foreknows will be lost, He must create them with the intention, in this sense, of their being lost; and this is the whole content of the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination in this case—of that *decretum horribile* to which men seem so unceasingly to object, but which is as surely a truth of reason as it is of Scripture.

The real difficulty here Dr. Miley finds in the very existence of moral evil under the government of God. He considers that a complete theodicy is unattainable to human knowledge (p. 429 *sq.*); but we cannot consent to stop at the point at which he elects to stay his efforts to discover one. In this matter, as elsewhere, he appears to go upon a principle which is naturally very attractive to minds of the analytical power of his—the principle of *divide et impera*. The danger is that in the analysis the essence of the question may slip out between the joints. This is

what happens here. Dr. Miley shows in turn that (1) the creation of moral beings is permissible; (2) that a probationary economy is permissible; and (3) that therefore the fall, which is necessarily contemplated as a possibility in a probationary economy, is permissible. Most excellent. But the question still remains for one who accepts, with the frankness of Dr. Miley, the doctrine of God's complete foreknowledge, how could it be permissible to create these moral beings and put them in this probationary economy, with the knowledge, not that they *might possibly* fall, but that they *certainly would* fall? The only tenable ground here is the Calvinistic ground that such action on God's part involves the Divine intention, in this sense, of the fall—i.e., its predestination. And the only conceivable direction in which to look for a theodicy is in that of an end great and glorious enough to justify the incidental evil arising from this course. Dr. Miley rejects out of hand all such theodicies, on the ground that "the fall itself," in that case, "must have been completely within the disposition of Divine providence" (p. 439). But certainly we cannot exclude it from God's providence, as a single question will show. What required God to create just those free agents whom He foreknew would fall? Or shall we say that while He foreknew that some angels would stand and others fall, it was impossible for Him to create a *human* free agent whose standing He could foreknow? In that case we must say either that *human* free actions cannot be foreknown (which Dr. Miley denies), or else that all possible *human* free agents would certainly fall, which would make human sin a necessity of nature without developing any theodicy for God's creation of such a nature.

In these remarks on the origin of evil we have, of course, passed out of the domain of theology proper into that of anthropology, leaving much behind of which we should like to speak. It is in the anthropology of the volume, of course, that the Calvinistic reader will find most which will seem to him open to question; and this the more that Dr. Miley occupies in this sphere the extremest Arminian ground. We find much, here too, in the way of care in statement and candor in treatment to admire; and we willingly bear witness to the fairness with which the Augustinian positions are stated. Dr. Miley divides the great question of original sin into three: whether there is such a thing as native depravity; whether it is penal; whether it is guilty. Only the first does he answer affirmatively. He teaches that all men are naturally depraved, and out of that depravity will certainly commit sin; but that this depravity does not come to them in any true sense by way of penalty,

but only through the law of nature that "like begets like;" and that, because they are born with it and do not produce it, they cannot be held responsible for it, and it therefore is (as our New England brethren used to call it) "uncondemnable vitiosity." Of course we shall not commit the folly of attempting to refute this, as it seems to us, very refutable position, in the course of this brief notice. Let us only remark in passing that it passes the comprehension of our Calvinistically warped mind to understand how so close a thinker can, on the one hand, hang the whole weight of depravity on a "law of nature," or, on the other, deny the condemnability of a state of depravity which inevitably produces sin in every action into which it issues. What is a "law of nature"? and who made it a "law of nature"? and on what ground of right? To say that all that was threatened to Adam for sin—physical death and its precedent weaknesses and pains and spiritual death or depravity, with its inevitable issue into actual sinning—has been brought upon mankind simply on the basis of a "law of nature," so that the whole race is brought through the mediation of depravity into actual sin and guilt without possibility of escape, on the sole basis of a "law of nature"—is just no explanation at all: it is the deification of a phrase. And to say that a depravity which originally arose in personal action, and which is apparently the same in us as in Adam, and which is the inevitable spring of sin and the actual source of all sinning, is non-condemnable because it is only "a subjective quality"—is to antagonize the most intimate and ineradicable convictions of the human mind. If God looks upon Adam before the fall, and finds him with a "subjective quality" which is "excellent" and "pleasing to the Divine mind," how should He not be pleased and show His pleasure? And if God looks upon us, after the fall, and finds us with a "subjective quality" which is not excellent, but depraved and displeasing to His holiness, how should He not be displeased and show His displeasure? Such teaching confounds all our ideas of God as a moral agent.

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ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY, NATURAL AND REVEALED. By JAMES H. FAIRCHILD, Professor of Theology in Oberlin College. Oberlin, O.: Edward J. Goodrich, 1892, 8vo, pp. xv., 858.

The publication of this system of divinity by the Nestor of Oberlin, who has ruled for over a generation in its theological thought, is modestly ascribed, in the Preface, to the importunity of pupils.

It is of value to many others also in indicating the doctrinal position of Oberlin to-day, and its close adherence to the teachings of Finney and the New Haven theology. This relation to Finney is to be found more in the general positions of the system than in the specific teaching on the doctrine of Perfectionism. Indeed, here the author dissents from Finney's doctrine, holding that Finney did not logically carry out the "doctrine of simplicity" in considering Perfection a secondary stage after Conversion. Dr. Fairchild deprecates the search after "Sanctification as a special experience," and indicates that there may be "false and fanatical views in this direction."

Perhaps the fullest and most catholic discussion is on the Person of Christ. The inductive method is used in the collation of passages of Scripture which throw light on the different sides of the character of Christ. The glow of personal faith and loyalty shines through the chapter. With the dogmatic aspects the author is largely indifferent. The doctrine of the Eternal Sonship is not accepted, and the term "person" in the Trinity is considered an unfortunate expression. The statement that Kenosis is essentially Monophysitism is hardly exact: Kenosis is the emptying of the Divine nature; Monophysitism was the absorption of the human nature in the Divine.

The genealogy of the main doctrines may perhaps be defined as follows: Finneyism, in the confounding of Regeneration, Conversion, and Repentance; Taylorism, in the general Governmental view and in adherence to the doctrines of Power to the Contrary, Sin consists in Sinning, and Ability limits Obligation; Emmonsism, in making Justification equal Pardon; Bishop Butler's Analogy, in the discussion of Immortality; the Platform of the Remonstrants, in denying Irresistible Grace; Semi-pelagianism, in making Depravity a sickness, not a sin; and Pelagianism, in making all morality in the free acts of the individual.

The discussion of the Doctrine of God is a brief presentation, on the grounds of Natural Theology alone, of the New Haven Benevolence view of the Divine character. The *a priori* arguments are dismissed as unsatisfactory, the cosmological argument is well stated, and a chapter is given to Pantheistic views. Possibly Hegel would object to the label "defender of Schelling." In his conception of the absolute and method of development he opposed and attacked Schelling.

Of the moral attributes of God, Benevolence "expresses the entirety of His moral character." Holiness, Justice, Mercy are but different aspects of Benevolence. The Decrees of God do not touch man's will.

THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

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I. NATURAL RELIGION AND THE GOSPEL.

ASSUMING that theology is a science, and that it pursues the method of definition adopted by all sciences, that is to say, one derived from the object-matter about which they are concerned, we define it, with others, to be the science of religion. But religion, comprehensively taken, is easily distributable into two kinds: natural religion and evangelical religion, or, briefly, redemption. The latter member of this division is the gospel. These are the only two schemes of religion that God has given to man. The first was communicated to Adam in innocence, the latter to Adam and his race in sin. The gospel, specifically considered, has been developed in great dispensational forms contradistinguished to each other, not as to their essential, but as to their peculiar and distinctive, features; but, generically considered, it is as a scheme of religion contradistinguished to natural religion. It is, therefore, interesting and important to ascertain the relations which subsist between natural religion and the gospel; and we propose to indicate their points of similarity and difference. What are the elements of natural religion? How do they come to be incorporated into the gospel? And what are the peculiar and differentiating elements of the latter scheme?

I. Their points of similarity.

1. Some of their contents are alike. Taking it for granted that the articles which will be enumerated are, in some sense, embodied in the gospel, the question will be whether they were component parts of natural religion.

(1.) The doctrine of God's existence. It cannot be supposed

VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

MILEY'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. *By John Miley, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Systematic Theology in Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New Jersey.* Vol. I. 8vo., pp. xvi., 533. New York: Hunt & Eaton; Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe. 1892. \$3.00.

The high quality of the "Biblical and Theological Library," now publishing by the Methodist Publication House, does honor to the great denomination which it represents. The latest issue in the series, Dr. Miley's *Systematic Theology*, is highly praised when it is recognized, as it must be, as worthy to stand in company with Dr. Bennett's *Christian Archaeology*, and Dr. Terry's *Biblical Hermeneutics*. It is written with a direct lucidity which is the natural expression of adequate knowledge and clear thinking. It presents its subject in orderly arrangement, in clear definition and with argumentative force. And it is characterized throughout by candor, restraint, and modesty, while a quiet humor occasionally subtly colors a phrase. It is altogether a good book; and the reader of it is sure to rise up and gratefully praise it. If he be an Arminian, he ought to find it a rarely judicious and well-reasoned exposition of his form of faith. If he be a Calvinist, he ought to count it a privilege to be enabled to consider the points in which the two great systems differ, under the leading of so competent a guide, and with such an entire absence of theological rancor.

It is somewhat embarrassing to undertake the criticism of a half-finished book. In a case like the present, when the work is occupied with a well-known and well-compacted system, the end is indeed seen from the beginning. And yet there are individual ways of stating and defending, and indeed of conceiving, even the formative doctrines of a school of thought, which render it improper to anticipate their actual statement and exposition. In the present instance the embarrassment is increased by the further fact that a number of detailed discussions, underlying or expanding the treatment of matters embraced in the scheme of this first volume, have been postponed to appendices to appear at the close of the second volume. There we are to look for full expositions of the doctrines of inspiration and of angels; a study of Romans v. 12, *seq.*, seeking to justify the rejection of the doctrine of the federal headship of Adam which is thought by many of us to be taught in that text; and a historical review of the treatment of original sin by Arminian writers, which promises to be very interesting. The volume before us not only closes with anthropology, therefore, but does not give us the whole of the relevant material. Nevertheless, though with it alone before us we may not catch the proportion of doctrine as it lies in Dr. Miley's mind, we can scarcely fail to apprehend from his clear writing the elements of the doctrines which he presents.

In an introduction of some fifty pages, Dr. Miley gives us his view of the

nature, sources, scope, and method of Systematic Theology. We miss in this a satisfactory indication of the distribution of the disciplines in the theological encyclopædia, and this has affected somewhat the contents of the volume. To our thinking, the great subject of "Theism," which Dr. Miley makes the first division of Systematic Theology, belongs to the preliminary discipline of Apologetics; and its treatment should either have been excluded from this treatise altogether or made very summary and included in the prologomena. This we say by way of mere formal criticism; for the actual treatment given to Theism commands our admiration, especially the defence of God as an intuition, which in its last analysis amounts to a defence of a religious nature as a fundamental element of the human constitution. On the other hand, we find in this introduction a luminous discussion of such topics as these: The nature of scientific treatment, which is especially good with reference to the scientific treatment of separate doctrines; the nature of the scientific basis of Christianity, including an admirable statement of the place of reason in theology; the right of systemization and the value of doctrine; and the method of systematizing, in the course of which there is a very severe criticism of the so-called "Christocentric" method, and a possibly too extreme statement of the difficulty, Dr. Miley would say the impossibility, of finding one unifying principle in theology. Under this view, he holds that the work of systematizing is constructive and must "proceed in a synthetic mode," *i. e.*, must seek only a logical order. He therefore follows the customary order of topics, beginning with theology and proceeding through anthropology, christology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology.

We have no criticism to offer upon the adoption of this general scheme; most schemes, under whatever name they are put forth, practically follow its order. But a criticism or two may be proper as to the distribution of the matter under these rubrics. We have already pointed out that "Theism" is out of place under the first section, and finds its true position in the previous discipline of Apologetics. We miss also under the first rubric (as is usual, indeed, in Arminian systems, but certainly unfortunate) any treatment of the plans or purposes of God. Dr. Miley perceives, no doubt, that God has not entered upon his works of creation and providence without a plan. He remarks incidentally (on p. 297): "Creation has a purpose and a plan. All things were created in the divine pleasure, and for the manifestation of the divine glory, to the end that men might know God and live to him as their supreme God." But he passes at once from the topic of the Trinity to that of Creation; and this is apt to leave the impression that God is simple activity, and that he is not even rational in his works. For a synthetic order we must have a discussion here of God's decree. We do not like, either, the line of division which is run between christology and Soteriology. Certainly if these rubrics are to be distinguished, the work of Christ must be subsumed along with his incarnation and person under the former, just as the work of God appears as creation and providence under the rubric of theology; otherwise the work of Christ and of the Spirit are confused under the rubric of Soteriology.

Dr. Miley distributes the sources of theology broadly into nature and revelation, and discriminates these sources at page 9 most fruitfully on the basis of "modes of knowledge." Knowledge acquired "in the use of human faculties" is natural; that immediately communicated by divine agency is revealed. In the one case "the *mode of acquisition* is purely human"; "the discovery of truth is

mediated by the use of our own faculties." In the other, "it is immediately given by the supernatural agency of God." He remarks justly that "our intuitions of truth are no exceptions," since intuition is a purely human mode of knowledge. The author remarks with justice: "It is important thus sharply to discriminate these two modes of truth, for only thus can we properly distinguish nature and revelation as sources of theology." For if we lay the stress on source or agency only without taking into account also the mode of knowledge, in our definitions, we may find ourselves helpless before the presently common pantheising conception of the world, which, by postulating immanent deity in all human thought, confounds the categories of reason and revelation. Readers of Dr. Whiton's recent little book, called *Gloria Patri*, will perceive how easy it is through such a conception to do practically away with the category of revelation altogether, by formally subsuming all the deliverances of reason under the category of revelation. We regret, therefore, to find Dr. Miley at a somewhat later point apparently deserting this ground. On page 11 we read that "the defining fact" of revelation lies no longer in mode of knowledge, but apparently solely in *agency*: "Religious truth communicated *through a supernatural agency of God* is a revelation." And, the way thus prepared, we read further that heathen men, feeling after God if haply they may find him, may receive a divine revelation through their human faculties: "According to the defining fact of revelation as above stated, any religious truth divinely given in such answer, *though not verified to the recipient as from God*, is yet a revelation." "And to this source," he continues, "we would trace the higher religious truths reached by heathen minds, rather than to unaided reason and the light of nature, or to tradition." But, according to the definition on page 9, the question whether they belong to the category of reason or revelation is not one of *source* merely, but of *mode of knowledge* as well, and specifically turns upon "whether the acquisition of truth is *in the use of human faculties*." Dr. Miley appears to us to have stepped over the wall of his own just definition here into the preserve of the Quakers, with the effect of throwing himself helpless into the hands of the mystic rationalists. His doctrine of unrecognizable, but real, revelation to inquiring heathen, is indistinguishable from the logos-doctrine which Dr. Briggs recently announced in his defence before his presbytery; and would logically lead to the broad conception of religion, in which G. Ph. Chr. Kaizer so rejoiced when he commended his *Biblical Theology* to readers "who are observant students of mankind, and who, refusing to believe that any one church is in sole possession of salvation, are learning to find out and appreciate the honest worshippers of the divine in every age and clime, whose religion is neither Judaism, Christianity, Mohammedanism, nor Paganism, but religious Universalism, Catholicism in the true sense of the word, what our theologians call perfectible Christianity." On such a conception, in a word, there seems no imperative need for distinctive Christianity in the world.

We must hasten to add that when Dr. Miley comes to treat formally of "Mysticism" (page 16) he rejects the mystical path as a source of knowledge of religious truth altogether, thus, as it appears to us, reverting to his first and just position. He looks upon mysticism as "the doctrine of an immediate insight into truth"—this "immediate insight into truth being through some form of divine illumination," "the mind being divinely illuminated and lifted above its natural powers, and truth and God being immediately seen." Is not this just what he had

postulated for seeking heathen? Yet he criticises as follows: "There is a divine illumination which lifts the soul into a higher capacity for knowing God and truth; but there is no new revelation." "There are promises of divine inspiration, as the mode of higher revelations of truth, but definitely and exclusively to the chosen mediums of such inspiration and revelation," *i. e.*, to the prophets and apostles. We know not how these statements can be accorded with the former teaching of a not uncommon revelation to heathen seekers, unless we are to suppose that God is nearer to heathens than to Christians, and deals more intimately with them than with Christians. It is worth noting further in this same connection that in the section which deals with the modern doctrine of "Christian Consciousness," Dr. Miley not only rejects it altogether as a source of Christian doctrine, but even goes to the unwarrantable extreme, as we think it, of refusing to allow "that certain facts of Christian experience witness to the truth of certain correlate tenets of doctrine" (page 18). He says (page 19): "No soul ever reached it," *i. e.*, Christian consciousness, "or ever can reach it, through reason or the light of nature. Its essential precondition is knowledge of Christian truth." And we may note, by the way, the skill and success with which Dr. Miley treats in general the whole matter of the relation of reason and feeling. We should particularly like to quote a fine passage on page 40 as to the value of feeling in religion and its relation to reason (*cf.* also pages 48, 49).

The topics which fall under the head of Theology proper are treated with sufficient fulness and great logical power along with considerable self-restraint. The term "attribute" is confined to too narrow a sense, being limited to those constitutive of personality; but the distinction between these "personal attributes" and all others is sound and fruitful. The first of these "personal attributes"—the divine intellect—is discussed under the caption of Omniscience, the perplexities presented by which under the constitutive Arminian principle of "Freedom" are not disguised (page 189 *et seq.*). Among these perplexities Dr. Miley does not include, however, the divine foreknowledge of free actions. This he explains under the category of *scientia media* (page 189), and defends not only powerfully, but quite unanswerably against the arguments of Dr. McCabe (page 181, *et seq.*). We cannot think, however, that he has followed his own arguments to their legitimate end. These arguments not only involve the Calvinistic doctrine of the certainty of free actions (as distinguished from necessity (page 183)), but also distinctly imply predestination. For example, it is argued by way of a *reductio ad absurdum*, that the difficulties asserted to stand in the way of God's foreknowing the free acts of men, press equally upon his foreknowledge of his own free acts. "If future free volitions are unknowable because free, or unknowable for any other reason, then such volitions of God are as completely beyond the reach of his prescience as the future volitions of men." This is acute and will prove very difficult to answer. It will require an even more acute logic, however, to distinguish between God's foreknowledge of his future choices and his fore-intention to make those choices, which is just Calvinistic predestination; and as it will be difficult to disentangle the future choices of God from those of his creatures with which they are woven in the actual web of life, it will be exceedingly difficult to deny these creature choices also a place in the one comprehensive plan, already foreknown in all its parts in eternity, and therefore fore-intended or predestinated. Again, the objection that it would be inconsistent with the divine goodness to create souls whose rejection of salvation is certainly foreknown, is justly set aside with the re-

mark that nescience will not obviate the objection, inasmuch as it presses almost equally against the creation of souls with the known possibility of their loss, and quite equally against the continuance of the race after the experienced fact of such numerous losses. But surely the bottom is not reached thus. For, if God creates souls which he foreknows will certainly be lost, he must, in this sense, create them with the intention that they will be lost, and this is the whole content of the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination in the case, of that *decretum horribile* to which men seem so ineradicably to object, but which is as surely a truth of reason as it is of Scripture.

The real difficulty here, Dr. Miley finds in the very existence of moral evil under the government of God; and when he comes to speak of the origin of evil, he allows that a complete theodicy is unattainable to human knowledge (p. 429 *et seq.*). We cannot consent to stop, however, at the point at which he elects to stay his efforts to discover one. In this matter, as elsewhere, he appears to act upon a principle which is naturally very attractive to minds of analytical power, the principle of *divide et impera*. The danger is that in the analysis, the essence of the question may slip out between the joints. This is what happens here. Dr. Miley shows in turn: (1), that the creation of moral beings is permissible; (2), that a probationary economy is permissible; and (3), that therefore the fall which was contemplated as a possibility in the probationary economy is permissible. Excellent, we say. But we still ask, for Dr. Miley fully accepts the doctrine of the divine fore-knowledge as we have seen, how was it consistent with God's holiness and goodness that he should create these moral beings, and put them in a probationary economy, knowing beforehand, not that they might *possibly* fall, but that *they certainly would fall*? The only tenable ground here is the Calvinistic ground that such action on God's part, of course, involves his creation of man with the intention in this sense that he would fall; and the only possible direction in which to look for a theodicy is in that of an end great and glorious enough to justify the incidental evil arising from this cause. John Wesley saw this; but Dr. Miley rejects Wesley's suggestion out of hand, and with it all similar and better ones (for there are better ones), with the remark that it involves the implication that sin could have been prevented consistently with human freedom, which cannot be true, he adds, since in that case "the fall itself must have been completely within the disposition of Divine Providence" (page 439). But certainly this implication is true—even on the basis of natural religion; and a single question would seem to uncover the fallacy of Dr. Miley's opposite assertion. What required God to create just those free-agents whom he foreknew would fall? Why could he not confine himself to creating such as he foreknew would stand, in their probation? Or shall we say that while he foreknew that some angels would stand and others fall, it was impossible for him to create a *human* free-agent whom he could foreknow would stand? In that case, we must say, either that *human* free action cannot be foreknown, which is contrary to Dr. Miley's doctrine; or else that all possible human beings would certainly fall, which would seem to carry back their fall to necessity of nature. Thus, even on Dr. Miley's own ground it would seem that we must recognize the fall as "completely within the disposition of Divine Providence," and must allow that God made man thus and not otherwise, and placed him in these conditions and not others, knowing that he would fall, and, in that sense, intending him to fall; and that is but to say that the permission of the fall entered into God's

eternal plan, and must be justified by the ultimate end in view. We may be able to assign this end or we may not; but we must believe that it exists, and that it will be sufficiently glorious to justify the incidental evil arising in the course of its prosecution.

In these remarks on the origin of evil, we have, of course, passed out of the domain of Theology into that of Anthropology, leaving much behind which we should have liked to speak of. It is in the Anthropology of the volume, of course, that the Calvinistic reader will find most which seems to him open to question; and this all the more that Dr. Miley occupies here the extremest Arminian ground. We find much here in the way of careful statement and candid treatment to admire, and we willingly bear our witness to the fairness with which the Augustinian positions are stated. Dr. Miley divides the great question of original sin into the three of whether there is such a thing as native depravity, whether it is penal and whether it is guilty. Only the first of these does he answer affirmatively. His doctrine is that all men are natively depraved, and out of that depravity will certainly commit actual sin; but that this depravity comes to them only through the law of nature that "like begets like," and is in no sense penalty; and that, because they are born with it and do not themselves produce it, they cannot be held responsible for it, and it is, therefore, as our New England brethren have learned to call it, an "uncondemnable vitiosity." Of course we shall not commit the folly of attempting to refute this, as it seems to us, very refutable position, in the course of a brief notice. Let us only remark briefly that it passes the comprehension of our Calvinistically warped mind to understand how so careful a thinker can, on the one hand, hang the whole weight of depravity on a "law of nature," and on the other, deny the condemnability of a state of depravity which inevitably produces sin in every action into which it issues.

As to the former matter, what is a "law of nature" but a generalized *fact*? and what *explanation* of a fact can be found in simply generalizing it? Even the foolish king was not satisfied when asking how the apple got into the dumpling, to be told that all dumplings have apples in them. To point to the law of nature that "like begets like" as the explanation of universal depravity can mean nothing more than to subsume this fact as a specific case under the general law of heredity. The mind immediately wants to know, then, why it is Adam's depravity, and not that perhaps greatly increased (or, perhaps, it may be the greatly lessened) depravity of his nearer ancestry, that one inherits—a matter by no means explained by Dr. Miley's brief remarks on it. And the mind further wants to know who made this a law of nature, and what right it has to be a law of nature; it wants to know whether this law of nature is not a cruel injustice, under the grinding working of which man has nothing to do but to curse God and die. As long as it is true that "no theory could consent to a purely arbitrary implication of the race in the Adamic sin," so long will it be true that we must have an explanation of how it is just and right for man to inherit Adam's depravity, if we would justify the ways of God with man. To say that all that was threatened to Adam for sin—physical death and its precedent weaknesses and pains, and spiritual death or depravity, with its tendency to sin inevitably issuing in actual sinning—has been brought upon mankind simply on the basis of a "law of nature," so that all the race is brought through the mediation of depravity into actual sin and guilt without possibility of escape, on the sole basis of a "law of nature," is just no explanation at all. It is simply to deify a phrase.

As to the demerit of native depravity, we recognize indeed the truth of Dr. Miley's contention that Arminianism cannot stand with its admission; but this seems to us as Calvinists only a refutation of Arminianism. Its denial involves, of course, a denial of ethical character to all merely subjective states. We had thought early in the volume that Dr. Miley could escape this extreme, when we read: "So much have our subjective states to do with our judgments. But we are responsible for these states, and therefore for the judgments which they so much influence" (page 42). But when Adam's primitive holiness fell to be discussed (page 409), our illusion was dissipated. It seems that Adam's holiness was "simply a quality of Adam's nature," and as such possessed no proper ethical element. It "was simply a subjective state and tendency in harmony with his moral relations and duties"; "but such a state, however real and excellent, and however pleasing to the divine mind, could not have any true ethical quality, or in any proper sense be accounted meritorious or rewardable." In like manner, our native depravity is only a subjective quality, and though non-excellent and displeasing to God, has no ethical quality. This seems to us most remarkable. Here is a depravity which originally arose in personal action and which is apparently the same in us as in Adam, which is the spring of all our actual sins, and yet which is itself, however hideous, non-condemnable. The theory which requires such a view is in antagonism with the deepest convictions of the human mind. If God looks upon Adam and finds him with a subjective quality "excellent" and "pleasing to the divine mind," how should he not show him his pleasure? And if God looks upon us and finds us with a subjective quality non-excellent, and displeasing to his holiness, how should he not show us his displeasure? Must we look upon God as the most *unnatural* being in the universe? as a being whose action is entirely divorced from his immanent choice? No wonder our Arminian brethren are continually telling us Calvinists that their God is not our God.

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CAMPBELL'S THE PURITAN IN HOLLAND, ETC.

THE PURITAN IN HOLLAND, ENGLAND, AND AMERICA. An Introduction to American History. *By Douglas Campbell, A. M., LL. B., Member of the American Historical Association.* Third Edition. Revised and Corrected. In two Volumes. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1893.

Whether we agree with all the conclusions of the author or not, it is impossible not to recognize in this work a most delightful and valuable contribution to the history of modern civilization. It is truly a magnificent work, worthy of the handsome dress in which it is presented to us by the publishers; the fruit of wide and varied reading and thinking, admirably arranged, and elegantly expressed.

By the Puritans is meant that class which was the product of the Calvinistic Reformation in the sixteenth century, which played so grand and determining a part in the histories of the Netherlands, England, and America, and consequently in the history of the whole modern world. If they have been and have done what this writer claims for them, and as we believe justly, it is impossible to exaggerate their importance. We hope that one effect of this book will be to correct some of the unjust prejudices too commonly entertained against this noble class of people, and to conciliate towards them that respect which is their due, but which has been too long withheld from them, except by those who are in sympathy with their reli-

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HOW THE REV. DR. STONE BETTERED HIS SITUATION.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE ASSURANCE OF SALVATION, AND THE CERTAINTY OF BELIEF,
TO WHICH WE ARE AFFECTIONATELY INVITED BY HIS HOLINESS THE POPE.

By LEONARD WOOLSEY BACON.

I.

THE following argument, not less timely now than when it was first called forth by the publication of Dr. Stone's book, treats of the claims of the Roman Catholic Church from a neglected point of view, but a point which commands a much wider and juster view of the Roman system than the point commonly occupied by Protestant controversialists.

For many generations it has been a standing accusation against the Roman Catholic Church that it has a tendency to demoralize society and the individual by issuing certificates, written or oral, of the forgiveness of sins, and of the remission of the penalties of them, both in this world and the world to come, on the performance of rites, or the payment of money, or on other conditions different from those required in the gospel—repentance and faith.

In answer to this accusation, the apologists of the Roman Church have constantly averred, sometimes with a great show of indignation, that these certificates of forgiveness of sin and remission of penalty and assurance of salvation do not mean, and are well understood not to mean, what their terms import; that the understanding is distinct and explicit between the Church and its devotees, that when the priest says, "I absolve thee," he does not in fact absolve at all, and that the forgiveness of the "penitent," to whom these words have been pronounced in the confessional, is just as entirely contingent on his true repentance as the forgiveness of any sinner outside of the Church can be; that the promise given in an "indulgence" of the remission of purgatorial torment, notwithstanding it may be absolute in form, is really subject to similar conditions; and that the grace to be

conferred, *ex opere operato*, by the sacraments generally, is in like manner dependent on such and so many contingencies, as to preclude the danger that any person will be tempted into sin by assurance of safety; that, if at any time, impenitent persons have been induced by the agents of the Church to purchase indulgences promising to remit the penalties of their sins, these promises, given by her agents in her name, are indignantly disavowed and repudiated by the Church—although there is no recorded instance of the money being refunded.

On the other hand, however, an opposite style of address is sometimes taken up by this Church and its advocates—a style of address calculated to assure those who have thought themselves shut up to the gospel promises of forgiveness on condition of repentance and faith—that there is something a great deal more certain and assured to be had in the Church of Rome; that her clergy have a peculiar power of binding and loosing, which other clergymen do not possess; that there is a gracious virtue in her sacraments, which cannot be found in others; that her pope, especially, has control over the keys of the kingdom of heaven. There is much in the tone of her teachings, in the language of her sacraments, and in the terms of her indulgences and other documents that corresponds with these pretensions. They are summed up in the persuasive language of Pope Pius IX., in his letter of September 13, 1868, addressed to Protestant Christians, in which he implores them to "rescue themselves from a state in which they cannot be assured of their own salvation," and come into his fold, where, as he implies, they can be assured of it.

These two "Phases of Catholicity," con-

tions similar to acute infectious diseases, which they resemble in the result; and later, as convalescence from such diseases. Seclusion, rest, sleep, appropriate food, fresh air, sunshine, interests that tax neither mind nor body, these are requirements in this class of illness. The care of the condition following depressing emotion calls for the same treatment in greater or less degree.—*New York Medical Record*.

"MR. PEABODY, who was an American," said Dean Hole the other day, "was one of the greatest benefactors of London. His houses built for, and occupied by the workmen are models which every great city

would do well to copy. At a flower and plant exhibition in London which I attended, four or five years ago, I was surprised and delighted to find that a large number of the prizes for the best plants went to people who were dwellers in Mr. Peabody's houses. That shows what a better atmosphere will do for the working classes. Public gardens and parks and workingmen's clubs, I think, are always conducive to temperance; but people will never be made temperate by constraint. To secure temperance is impossible by mere human obligations and vows. Force of common sense, conscience, and spiritual influence are necessary."—*The Churchman*.

LITERARY DEPARTMENT.

BOOK REVIEWS.

CONDUCTED BY REV. CHARLES R. GILLET, LIBRARIAN OF UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. By JOHN MILEY, D.D., LL.D. Volume ii. New York: Hunt & Eaton, 1894. 8vo, pp. xix., 537. \$3.00.

The second and concluding volume of Dr. Miley's *Systematic Theology* is conceived in the same spirit and executed with the same skill which characterized the first. The first volume included the topics which fall under the heads of Theology proper and Anthropology. This second volume discusses the remaining topics, under the heads of Christology, Soteriology and Eschatology. Three appendices, on points of interest for which Dr. Miley's plan did not supply opportunity for treatment in the body of the work, conclude the volume. These discuss, respectively, the inspiration of the Scriptures, the angels, and the Arminian treatment of original sin. The material is handled in a masterly manner, and the volume as a whole sets forth the Arminian scheme of salvation in as powerful and logical a form as that scheme admits of. For Dr. Miley presents himself here as above all things an Arminian, and as above most Arminians ready to follow his Arminianism to its logical conclusions. Here, indeed, we find the highest significance of the book. It is the Arminian "Yea" to the Calvinistic declaration of what Arminianism is in its essential nature, where its centre of gravity lies, and what it means with reference to that complex of doctrines which constitute the sum of Evangelical truth.

The Remonstrant controversy was a battle of giants. In its earnest grapple, the

movement tentatively begun by Arminius tended rapidly towards its level in a distinctively Pelagian anthropology and Socinian soteriology. But in the great Evangelical revival of the last century, the Wesleyan leaders offered to the world an evangelized Arminianism. The rationalism of the Remonstrants, they affirmed, was not due to their Arminianism but to their Humanism. The essential elements of Arminianism, they asserted, were in no wise inconsistent with the great Evangelical doctrines of sin and atonement. On the contrary, they declared, the Arminian construction alone gave their full rights to the catholic doctrines of the condemnation of all men in Adam and the vicarious satisfaction for sin in Christ. An Arminianism zealous for these doctrines might well claim to stand on a higher plane than that occupied by the Remonstrants. The question, however, was a pressing one, whether the Evangelical elements thus taken up could consist with the Arminian principle. Calvinists earnestly urged that the union was an unnatural one, and could not be stable: that either the Evangelical elements ought to rule to the exclusion of the unharmonizable Arminian principle, in which case we should have consistent Calvinism; or else the Arminian principle would inevitably rule to the exclusion of the Evangelical doctrines forced into artificial conjunction with it, and we should have consistent Arminianism. After a century of conflict, Dr. Miley's admirably reasoned vol-

umes come to tell us frankly that the Calvinists have been right in these contentions. Arminianism, he says, has no logical place in its system for a doctrine of race sin, either in the sense of the participation of the race in the guilt of Adam's first sin, or in the sense of the infection of the race with a guilty corruption. Arminianism, he says, has no logical place in its system for a doctrine of penal substitution of Christ for sinners and of an atonement by satisfaction. If the Arminian principle is to rule, he says, the doctrine of race sin must go, and the doctrine of vicarious punishment must go. And, as he thinks that the Arminian principle ought to rule, he teaches that men are not by nature under the condemning wrath of God, and that Christ did not vicariously bear the penalty of sin. Thus, in his hands, Arminianism is seeking to purify itself by cleansing itself from the Evangelical elements with which it has been so long conjoined.

The importance of Dr. Miley's attitude in this matter will not be properly estimated until we remind ourselves that he does not stand alone in it. Those who are familiar with recent Arminian theologizing will be aware that Dr. Miley in this is only a representative of a marked present-day drift in Arminian dogmatics. The nature of the impression which this drift will make upon us will doubtless depend, in part at least, upon whether our mind is upon the thinker or upon the thought. There is no one who will not feel regret to see one driven, by whatever stress of logic, from his hold upon fundamental Evangelical doctrine; it is better far to be inconsistently Evangelical than consistently Arminian. On the other hand, the line of thought by which Dr. Miley, for instance, clears away the Evangelical accretions from the Arminian core, commands our complete admiration. It is quiet logic, working its irresistible way to an irrefutable end. And as a matter of constructive reasoning it cannot be other than salutary. It is just as well that the world should come to know with the utmost clearness that these Evangelical doctrines are unconformable with Arminianism. It is just as well that the world should realize with increased clearness that Evangelicalism stands or falls with Calvinism, and that every proof of Evangelicalism is a proof of Calvinism. Dr. Miley's discussions of original sin and the atonement will help the world to perception of this salutary fact.

Under the caption of Christology, Dr. Miley includes only the doctrine of the person of Christ. The complicated questions which

arise in the determination of this doctrine, he treats with eminent lucidity and acuteness, although we should dissent from what seems to us a Monothelite element in his own construction of the doctrine (pp. 9, 36, 40, 42). The usual topics which fall under the caption of Eschatology he discusses with sober good judgment under that head. We should dissent only from his difficulty in discovering rational grounds for the terrible indeed, but, as it seems to us, rationally reasonable, as well as Scripturally certain, doctrine of eternal punishment. The larger portion of the volume is given, however, to the great doctrines of Soteriology (pp. 65-419), which form thus, in every sense, the centre of the volume. These doctrines are dealt with under the two sub-heads of "The Atonement in Christ" (pp. 65-240), and "The Salvation in Christ" (pp. 241-419). Those who are familiar with Dr. Miley's earlier volume on the Atonement (the discussions in which are here freely drawn upon) will not need to be told that, under the former of these sub-heads, the Governmental theory of the Atonement is expounded and advocated with great freshness and force. Under the latter of them, the "benefits of the atonement" are presented as "immediate" or "conditional," and the latter are developed under the influence of the Arminian principle of "freedom," a very thorough discussion of which is prefixed to the chapters on Justification, Regeneration, Assurance, Sanctification and, finally, the Church. The whole forms, as we have already said, an unusually well-compacted, logically developed and lucidly presented exposition of the Arminian system.

We have space only for a few remarks on the discussion of the atonement. The problem was to find a doctrine of atonement conformable to the Arminian *fundamentum*, which Dr. Miley does not hesitate to place in its psychology of the will. "Freedom," he says, "is fundamental in Arminianism. The system holds accordingly the universality and provisional nature of the atonement, and the conditionality of salvation" (p. 275). "The cardinal doctrines of the Wesleyan Soteriology," being thus determined—"that the atonement is only provisory in its character, rendering men salvable, but not necessarily saving them;" and that salvation is conditional in the sense of a real Synergism (p. 169)—"with these facts," Dr. Miley remarks, "the atonement of satisfaction must be excluded," and "the rectoral theory maintained as the only doctrine of a real atonement agreeing

with them" (p. 169). The former part of this conclusion, at least, seems to us perfectly solid, and we go thoroughly with Dr. Miley in his clear proof (p. 122) of the untenableness of those schemes which seek to unite an atonement of penal substitution and conditional universalism. Whether the rectoral theory, on the other hand, is the only doctrine of atonement agreeing with the cardinal principles of Arminian Soteriology, or whether the rectoral theory can be properly described as a "doctrine of a *real* atonement," are questions whose answers admit of more doubt.

It is a question of some importance, to ask ourselves seriously whether the rectoral theory, which, as Dr. Miley justly perceives, is the highest form of atonement open to a consistent Arminian, is consistent with the foundation truths of religion. Is it consistent, for example, with this foundation truth:—that sin is inherently ill-deserving, and that God, the infinitely holy and just One, must re-act upon sin with a moral indignation which is exactly proportionate to its guilt, and which burns inextinguishably until it is satisfied by adequate punishment? Dr. Miley admits that it is not. "If justice," he says, "must punish sin simply for the reason of its demerit, penal substitution is the only possible atonement" (p. 169). That the rectoral theory of the atonement may be held, and with it the Arminian system, therefore, we must deny to God that moral indignation in view of evil, which we cannot help recognizing as one of the highest endowments of moral beings, and must transmute His "justice" into the merely public justice of a wise ruler; we must revise, in a word, all our natural notions of the relations of an infinitely holy being to sin. Dr. Miley attacks this problem at an early point (p. 93ff), the result of his discussion being that he concludes that while punishment may not be inflicted where there is no sin, and may never go beyond the intrinsic demerit of sin—"and God has the exact measure of its desert"—yet sin need not be "punished according to its desert" (p. 97)—provided that the requirements of God's moral government are not endangered by the failure to punish it. In other words, while sin may not be punished beyond its desert, it may be punished below its desert, if it can be rendered "safe" to do so.

Here is certainly one of the water-sheds between Calvinism and Arminianism. Those who believe that God must, by virtue of His all-perfect nature, visit sin with a punishment fitted to the exact measure of

its desert,—no more certainly, but just as certainly, no less,—must, so far as logic can compel them, become Calvinists. But it does not seem to follow so stringently that those who take the other horn must hold to the rectoral theory of atonement. It does not seem obvious that, if it be once allowed that sin need not be punished, it is only under the provisions of the rectoral theory that it can be rendered "safe" for God to withhold His punishing hand. If it be "safe" to forgive sin on the ground of a "substitute for penalty," it would seem just as "safe" to make a sincere personal repentance that substitute as to make the suffering of an alien such substitute. In a word, Dr. Miley's argument seems to us to issue in setting aside all real necessity for atonement. He labors hard to exhibit its necessity. But its necessity for what? Not to enable God to forgive sin—that is grounded in His mere compassion, and in itself is always in His power. But to enable God to forgive sin *safely*. Forgiveness itself remains an act of pure grace. The rectoral theory does not appear to have any essential advantage here over those other theories which Dr. Miley so admirably sets aside as no theories of real atonement at all, because they lay no ground for forgiveness. Alike with them, the rectoral theory provides only a revelation of moral truths to men, and it differs from the common moral theory only in the way in which men are held to be affected by this revelation. We do not see that its advocates are in a position to cast stones at these other theories.

A book notice, however, is a narrow space in which to argue so great a question as the nature of the atonement. Let us close by simply pointing out that Dr. Miley is in error in supposing that Calvinists have an issue with him on the question of the extent of the atonement. No "limitationists," as Dr. Miley calls them, will doubt that the atonement does for all, all that a rectoral atonement is fitted to do for any. Dr. Miley has much to say of the "Sufficiency of the Atonement." Is it sufficient for all? he asks. Sufficient for all, *for what?* we ask in return. No "limitationist" will doubt that it is sufficient to provide for all "a revelation of such moral truths as give the highest ruling power to the Divine law" (p. 195). Every "limitationist" will be forward to assert that the atonement is sufficient to make known to all, God's infinite hatred of sin and His infinite love for sinners, and his infinite yearning that all should come unto Him and live. But, if the question be whether it is sufficient to *save* all,

it is Dr. Miley who speaks out at once the most emphatic No. It is not sufficient, he tells us, to save any; "it renders men salvageable, but does not necessarily save them." Every "limitationist" will affirm that it actually saves many, and that it lays the ground for a free offer of salvation to all. Dr. Miley calls on "limitationists" to answer the categorical question, "Did Christ die for the non-elect?" None will hesitate to reply, Certainly He did, in all the stretch of purpose and effect which the atoning fact, as Dr. Miley conceives it, contains. Dr. Miley himself will not contend that He died for all with the purpose and effect of all that the atoning fact, as the "limitationist" conceives it, contains. There is, in a word, no issue between the parties as to the extent of the atonement. Their issue is as to its nature. Only among satisfactionists themselves has an issue as to the extent of the atonement any meaning; and here Dr. Miley correctly sees that the necessities of the argument are with the "limitationists." He himself solidly argues that an atonement of satisfaction cannot be conditional, and must save all for whom it is wrought.

BENJ. B. WARFIELD.

Princeton.

GESCHICHTE DER ALTCHRISTLICHEN LITERATUR in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten, von GUSTAV KRÜGER, Professor zu Giessen. 1 und 2 Auflage. Freiburg i. B. und Leipzig; J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1895 (1894). 8vo, pp. xxii.-255.

The above work forms the third volume of the second series of the admirable "Grundriss der Theologischen Wissenschaften," edited by Achelis, Harnack, Kaftan and others. These series call for handbooks, brief and compact (but not beyond the point of easy readableness), with select bibliographical references such as may guide to a more thorough study of literature and sources. Following this general plan the work of Krüger gives in small compass a clear picture of the subject as a whole, and sufficient but not too exhaustive bibliographical references. It differs from the conventional patrology in being written, according to the modern tendency—from the purely literary-historical standpoint—leaving aside entirely the doctrinal matter.

The order of treatment is briefly as follows: 1. The earliest Christian literature; Epistles, Revelations, Historical Books, Didactic Books. 2. Gnostic Literature; Theological, Romantic. 3. Ecclesiastical

Literature. This third section includes the period of Apologetic (Apologetic, Antiheretical and Episcopal Literature), the period of the Rise of Theological Science (Eastern, Western, Episcopal) and chapters on the Literature of Ecclesiastical Law, on Legendary Literature and on the Martyrologies. The last page is a table of great interest, showing the chronological and geographical distribution of the literary production of the period. The chronological limit of the work is indicated by the inclusion of Lactantius and the exclusion of Eusebius. The geographical divisions indicate what writings had their origin in Syria and Palestine, Asia Minor, Greece, Egypt, Italy, North Africa, other western countries, and those whose geographical origin is in doubt.

In the Preface the author pays a special tribute to the work of Professors Harnack and Zahn in this field and acknowledges his indebtedness to them and to Dr. Preuschen while asserting the originality of his own work in method and substance. The book is in no sense a rival to the comprehensive and colossal work of Harnack and Preuschen, nor is its aim at all the popular one of Crutwell. It is for students who are studying for a general but scientific knowledge of the subject while they are not necessarily going into the special and detailed study to which Harnack's work is fundamental. At the same time it is a work which no specialist in the field can fail to find of great practical use. It is, in scope and treatment, exactly the thing needed for theological seminary work—the like of which we do not have in English. It will doubtless have a cordial welcome from the professor who has felt the need of such a work for his students, even if, *e.g.*, the dates assigned to the Epistle of Jude and to the Pastoral Epistles are not the ones commonly taught as correct by himself and his colleagues.

[It is expected that an English translation of this work will appear at as early a date as practicable, for the use of seminary students in particular.—C. R. G.]

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BOOK NOTES.

Christian Sociology.

THERE are men who object to Christianity because of what they denominate its selfishness. By this they mean a prac-