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I.

CHRISTIAN UNITY AND THE HISTORIC EPISCOPATE; OR, THE FOURTH ESSENTIAL IN THE DECLARATION OF THE HOUSE OF BISHOPS.

EACH official response to the Declaration of the House of Bishops has expressed the desire for Christian unity and a readiness to promote it. The first response came from the Conference of Congregational Churches in Connecticut (1886). Receiving the Declaration in the most kindly spirit, the Conference affirmed its substantial agreement in regard to the first, second, and third essentials, so that the *Churchman*, in an early reference to it (November, 1886), spoke thus approvingly: The Congregational response "is remarkable for the beauty of its language and for its Christian spirit."

But the Congregational Conference, in the frankness of Christian honesty and in the boldness of Christian equality, referred to the fourth and last essential in the Declaration—the Historic Episcopate—as divisive rather than irenic, as a note of division rather than of unity, and questioned its scriptural warrant. Upon this the *Living Church*, of Chicago, proceeded to rebuke the Congregational response as "foretokening insuperable obstacles to organic union with Christians who have discarded Episcopacy," and proceeded to say: "If this is the way, . . . there is little use for our bishops to trouble themselves about a basis of Church unity." And so lately as December, 1887, a Church journal speaks thus reprovingly: "The Congregational red tape which has so nearly strangled our bishops must be unknotted or cut altogether away. The prevailing Congre-

This argument from cause is supplemented by the argument from conscience supplied by the former treatise. It is the traditional moral argument put in interesting lights. It clothes the almighty Cause of all things with moral attributes and identifies it with the God of our spiritual intuition. Three attributes of God as perfection are thus derived: "*Benevolence* toward sentient beings," "*Justice* toward moral beings," "and *Amity* toward like (congenial) minds." An appeal is here made to the government of the world, as in the doctrine of God as free cause an appeal is made to final cause in nature. The difficult problems of sin and suffering are treated, perhaps as satisfactorily as they can be, though this portion of the work would not convince Miss Cobbe. It is very hard in discussing such questions not to sympathize with Dr. Hedge, who would reverse the terms of the problem, and instead of proving the fact of God from the benevolence of nature, prove the benevolence of nature from the fact of God. But in either case Dr. Martineau's theodicy removes many of the difficulties to an optimistic view of our earthly relations.

J. MARK BALDWIN.

FIVE DISCOURSES ON FUTURE PUNISHMENT. Preached in Grace Church, Kansas City, Mo., by the Rector, the Rev. CAMERON MANN. New York: Thomas Whittaker [1888]. 12mo, pp. 138.

The theory of future punishment which Mr. Mann endeavors to commend in his five vigorously written sermons, is that which is most strongly argued, perhaps, by Mr. Edward White in his "*Life in Christ*," and which is commonly known as "*Conditional Immortality*," but which Mr. Mann calls "the theory of final destruction." He makes no claim to originality, but only endeavors to set forth his theory in a simpler way than it has heretofore been presented, and to bring forward the chief objections to the other theories, which he enumerates as those of final restoration, of eternal probation, and of everlasting misery. He is especially vigorous in his opposition to the last of these, speaking of it as "a dreadful doctrine" (p. 94), which "contradicts the very idea of God" (p. 108), and is so "incredible" as to be "utterly absurd and unchristian," and to involve a "contradiction in terms" (p. 109). There is an appearance of some heat here, and there are other subjects in speaking of which Mr. Mann seems to have allowed passion somewhat to color his phraseology. For example, although he knows how to boast of the fine tolerance of "the Church" as over against "the sects" (not a very tolerant mode of expression, by the way), there is one form of faith for which he cannot feel any toleration. To him Calvinism is simply "horrible beyond credence," "irrational and cruel;" "some good men" "at a certain period" may have adhered to it, indeed, but it is none the less a "gospel of the devil" (p. 68). He even permits himself to say—with what balance of judgment, candor, or even historical knowledge the least instructed reader of Froude or Bancroft is likely to know—"Wherever Calvinism has flourished it has sown broadcast the seeds of a fierce and contemptuous infidelity. . . . The teachings of election and reprobation . . . have made bigots and hypocrites, cowards and infidels, but never brought one soul to the love of Christ, and never entered into an honest, humble heart except to dim its sunshine and freeze the streams of its joy" (p. 68). The odd thing is, that this tolerant and unbogoted railer against the faith of Christendom from Augustine down, professes to be bound by the creeds of the Church. He speaks of his preaching as unfettered, indeed, by the opinions of her children, but as swervelessly loyal to her authoritative creeds (p. 19). He admits that he is bound by the XXXIX Articles (p. 77). But that these articles are purely Calvinistic no historian will doubt; though it is undoubtedly true that predestination may be read out of the seventeenth article by the same process by which Mr. Mann rids his conscience of the "everlasting damnation" of the liturgy (p. 114) or of the condemnation of the "Rom-

ish doctrine concerning purgatory" (p. 77). But do such dealings with plain written documents commend their author to men as a safe guide for the interpretation of the Scriptures in the most serious matters of life and destiny?

One general line of thought which books of this class always rouse within us is, perhaps, worth mentioning here. What is the effect on our doctrine of future punishment of our theories of the nature of punishment in general? Mr. Mann adopts the theory that there is no punishment except what comes through the natural consequences of sin, in its boldest form: "the penalty of wilful sin is inevitable, being its natural outgrowth and fruitage" (p. 85). He thinks that God never inflicts pain otherwise than through "the nature of things," and that it would imply an unworthy conception of God to conceive of Him as punishing "by blows applied from the outside, with no object except to inflict pain" (p. 92). We do not pause now to inquire after the atrophied sense of justice which can speak of blows given in punishment for sin, as "applied with no object except to inflict pain," and which thinks that they would "bring in an element of personal vindictiveness" and "arbitrary vengeance" (p. 91). Nor do we now raise the difficulties involved in the consequent position which our author very frankly takes (p. 23), that we must, then, think of the future as simply a prolongation of the present life; by which we are scarcely left room to speak of it as a state of rewards and punishments. What we now ask is, What is the effect of this theory of punishment on our conception of the nature of hell? According to this view, hell becomes a place of self-torment rather than of divinely inflicted punishment; a place of continuously increasing sinfulness and festering corruption rather than of divinely limited evil; a place where every man is tormented more and more as eternity runs on, with the accumulating miseries due to his ever-accumulating sins, where the punishment of each one is necessarily with "many stripes," rather than a place where God justly assigns his stripes to each, according to the deeds done through the body, to some many, to some few; a place, in fine, where God has left men to torture themselves, through the natural working of the natural laws appointed by Himself to govern the nature which He made, throughout ages of ever-increasing sin and woe, rather than where He Himself punishes men, as a father punishes his child, with "blows inflicted from without" and graduated to their guilt. We are not now asking which view of the nature of punishment, or even of the nature of hell, is the correct one. But we do ask what superior advantages toward relieving our horror, when we think of the condition of the lost, are possessed by the theory which makes it a place of "eternal sin," in the sense of "sinning," over that which makes it a place of "eternal sin" in the sense of "guilt"—which conceives it as a place of eternally increasing corruption rather than a place of eternal but justly regulated infliction of punishment—especially should this "eternal" turn out to mean "everlasting"? It is at least possible that the restlessness of many minds before the doctrine of everlasting punishment has its roots in the conception of hell as a corrupting sore in the universe rather than God's prison-house for justly punished men. And it is at least worth while to try the effect on current thought of laying more stress on the guilt of sin and on the infliction of penalty in the future, rather than on the self-propagating power of evil and on the effects of an eternal freedom of restraint upon evil men, when removed from all good influences and allowed to interact upon one another for all evil.

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We notice also the following works in this department:

The Religious Aspect of Evolution (the Bedell Lectures for 1887). By James McCosh, D.D., LL.D., Litt. D. (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1888.) Pp. xii. 109, 8vo. Dr. McCosh has deserved well of our generation, for