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ARTICLE I.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS.

The question which we considered in our last article in this REVIEW (April, 1880), was, whether our position that the first sin was not necessitated by an efficacious decree of God is uncalvinistic and untrue. We showed that the Supralapsarians themselves maintain the distinction between efficacious and permissive decree in relation to the first sin, and hold that God did not effect that sin, considered as sin, but permitted it. We next showed that Calvin was a Sublapsarian, so far as the order of the divine decrees and the object of predestination are concerned. But the question occurred, whether he held the view that God necessitated the first sin by an efficacious decree, and, more particularly, whether he decreed to effect, and therefore actually effected, the first sin, regarded as an act or an historical event, while he permitted man to infuse the evil quality into the act, or, to fail in producing the good quality which ought to have existed. That was the particular question under discussion when we were compelled to bring the article to a close, and we now proceed with its consideration. Having remarked that we proposed to adduce and examine the most prominent passages in the writings of the Reformer which seem to place him on the affirmative of

sponsibility by failing to acknowledge his claims. We cannot escape the strict and impartial account to which we will be held for the use we have made of the talents committed to our keeping.

With these three parables the Lord concludes his words concerning his "middle advent." Of the third, his final advent, his coming to judge the quick and the dead, it is not our purpose to speak. This is referred to in the concluding words of the 25th chapter from the 31st verse to the end. It is the middle advent for which the Church is now looking and waiting, and which, for aught we know, may be near, even at the doors. It is this for which the Church is to be ready, knowing not at what time her Lord may come. It is this event that is to inaugurate the kingdom of Christ in our world with such power and glory as has never yet been witnessed. It is this event for which we are to pray as John prayed: "Even so, come, Lord Jesus, come quickly."

H. F. HOYT.

ARTICLE IV.

RE-EXAMINATION OF DR. GIRARDEAU'S VIEWS OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

In two numbers of this REVIEW, during the past year, our esteemed brother, Rev. Dr. Girardeau, published certain views in reference to the fall of Adam, which the present writer ventured to criticise in these pages. In the January and April numbers of this year (1880), Dr. Girardeau responded, in an excellent spirit of moderation, but with a sensitive anxiety to vindicate his orthodoxy before the Church. He intimates, moreover, that his articles may be continued. It does not become an obscure individual to occupy much space in controverting the opinions of one so eminent for his character and talents, and so deservedly enjoying the confidence of his brethren. A brief rejoinder will suffice to justify our position as a fraternal critic, and to place clearly before the reader the issues between us.

In the first place, Dr. Girardeau has endeavored to adopt the strategy of Scipio, by carrying the war into Africa. He sets the writer down as a Supralapsarian, and appears disposed to avail himself of a common prejudice against this class of theologians. Unfortunately for his success, the evidence for this classification can be derived from no other source than the single article in which his opinions were examined, and which was not designed to expose the views of the writer, but his own. It is a matter of indifference to the Church whether *we* are Supralapsarian or not. But it does not follow from the fact that we differ from him on the points in question, that we *are* Supralapsarian. A large number of our most distinguished theologians differ from him in unmistakable terms, and are, nevertheless, pronounced Sublapsarians.

There are two principal points of issue between us, and they will be considered separately. First, as to the agreement of Dr. Girardeau with Calvin and our standards. And, here, let full justice be done this distinguished brother. He declares, in his last article, that he does not limit a permissive decree of the fall to "a bare permission." Our inference from his argument was to the effect that, in this very point, he had departed from the language of Calvin and the Confession of Faith. It is now clear that, so far from rejecting this doctrine, he is in accord with it, in his theological views. He believes that the decree of God, permitting the fall, was *more* than a mere permission. That he is here in exact agreement with Calvin, is evident from the words of the latter, distinctly and repeatedly used in the Institutes. For example: "For the first man fell *because* the Lord had *determined* it was so expedient." (Bk. III., ch. xxiii., sec. viii.) Again: "Nor should it be thought absurd to affirm that God not only *foresaw* the fall of the first man, and the ruin of his posterity in him, but also *arranged* all by the *determination* of his own will" (Sec. 7). Again: "Here they recur to the distinction between *will* and *permission*, and insist that God permits the destruction of the impious, but does not will it. But what reason shall we assign for his permitting it, but because it is his will? It is not probable, however, that man procured his own destruc-

tion by the *mere permission*, and without any *appointment* of God, as though God had not *determined* what he would *choose* to be the condition of the principal of his creatures. I shall not hesitate, therefore, to confess plainly, with Augustin, that the will of God is the *necessity* of things, and that what he has willed will *necessarily* come to pass; as those things are really about to happen which he has foreseen" (Sec. 8).

No reader of this chapter of the Institutes can fail to see that Calvin utterly rejects the idea of a *bare permission* of the fall; but, on the contrary, teaches throughout, that it was the result of *volition, choice, purpose*, on the part of the Almighty. It is pleasant to know that Dr. Girardeau substantially adopts the same view. The standards of our Church are equally explicit on this point: "The almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God, so far manifest themselves in his providence, that it extendeth itself even to the first fall, and all other sins of angels and men; and that not by a *bare permission*, but such as has joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding, and otherwise ordering and governing them, in a manifold dispensation, to his own glory" (Conf. of Faith, Ch. V., Sec. 4); "God's decrees are the wise, free, and holy acts of the counsel of his will, whereby, from all eternity, he hath, for his own glory, *unchangeably foreordained* whatsoever comes to pass in time, especially concerning angels and men" (Q. 12); "God *executeth* his decrees in the *works* of creation and providence; according to his infallible foreknowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of his *own will*" (Q. 14, L. C.)

It is taken for granted that Dr. Girardeau also adopts this language from the Confession and Catechism, and when he avows his belief that the decree of God concerning the fall was more than a bare permission, he means to admit that it was, in a complete sense, *unchangeably foreordained*. Under these circumstances, it would be highly unjust to question his orthodoxy on the subject. So much for his statement of his belief. We have no wish, whatever, to impeach his theological standing. Let us rather deal with the consistency of his logic, the coherence of his argumentation. This it was that arrested our attention at first,

and excited our painful apprehension. We thought, and still think, after all he has written, that he has put a dangerous argument in the mouth of the Arminian, to assail the faith which he himself reveres.

We still maintain that Dr. Girardeau's *course of reasoning* on the point now under consideration, involves a retreat to a *bare permission* in God's decree concerning the fall. *He* thinks differently; but we are not dealing with his consciousness. That may be ever so right, and his processes ever so wrong. The question is, Does he attribute to God anything *more* than a determination to let Adam yield to the tempter? We appeal to his own language. His argument is directed to this very end, to show the volition of the divine mind as merely concerned in securing the free exercise of the will of man. All efficiency in the will of God is expressly excluded. Yet, some sort of efficiency is obviously implied, or, rather, clearly expressed in the citations we have made from Calvin and the standards. "The most wise and powerful bounding," that is joined with the permissive decree, cannot be a limitation of the permission. This would make it *less* than a bare permission, instead of *more*. It is obviously a limitation of the power of the creature. This, at least, is the interpretation of Calvin. He leaves not a shadow of doubt upon the subject. He declares that "God arranged all (pertaining to the fall) by the *determination* of his *own* will." "It is not probable that man procured his own destruction by the *mere* permission, and without any *appointment* of God." "The will of God is the *necessity* of things, and what he has willed will *necessarily* come to pass." Nor is there any obscurity in the language of the Confession. It declares that "the *power* of God extendeth to the first fall, and that, *not* by a bare permission." Foreordination is predetermination. The fall was *predetermined*, and we are surely warranted in repeating that, in a theological sense, Calvin and our standards sustain Determinism as rigorously as Edwards himself.

There are but three possible gradations involved in the question. 1. A bare permission. 2. A divine efficiency consistent with free-agency. 3. A divine efficiency incompatible with free-agency. We challenge the reader to conceive of anything inter-

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mediate between the first and second. Dr. Girardeau repudiates a bare permission—a "*nuda permissio*" (April Number, p. 331). Where, then, can he stand? With us, he rejects the third position. If he recoils from the second, we see no possible place for the sole of his foot. But it is evident, from his repeated language, that he *does* refuse to admit any efficiency in the permissive decree. Here is his own statement: "We maintained that God neither decreed efficiently to produce the sin of Adam, nor efficaciously to procure its commission, nor to render it unavoidable by a concreated necessity of nature; but that he decreed to permit it; so that, while he did not determine to prevent it, he, *in that sense*, willed its occurrence rather than its non-occurrence; yet so, moreover, that it was committed by a free, that is, by an unnecessitated and avoidable, decision of man's will."

It will be observed that the only sense in which he admits that God *willed* the fall of Adam, is, that he determined not to prevent it. In other words, he represents God as a *passive* spectator of a transaction independently occurring before him. Now we challenge the reader to discover in his statement anything but a bare permission. It plainly represents the Deity as foreseeing the event certainly occurring in the future, and simply determining not to prevent it. And, of course, such a determination would have been vain, seeing the occurrence was so certain as to baffle any attempt to reverse it. How could even omnipotence prevent an act already foreseen as certainly transpiring? But our chief inquiry is whether Dr. Girardeau agrees with Calvin and our standards. Does Calvin teach anything of the kind? Surely not, unless he has been guilty of the grossest contradictions in language. He says, with Augustine, "The will of God is the *necessity* of things, and what he has willed will *necessarily* come to pass." Now if God willed the fall, it occurred *necessarily*. Did Calvin hold that God willed the fall only in Dr. Girardeau's sense of not willing to prevent it? It is impossible so to interpret him. He declares that "God had determined what he would choose to be the condition of the principal of his creatures." A determined choice is not a negative thing. It implies a contemplation of two alternatives, both possible to the eternal

mind, and the sovereign selection of one. Calvin everywhere uses language on the subject that is irreconcilable with a merely passive state of the divine mind. He speaks of *will, choice, purpose, appointment, determination*, over and over again, in connexion with the fall. If he does not mean that the fall was due, in some true sense, to the active will of God, his words are full of Jesuitical deceit.

The pivotal point here, is the *order* of the operations of the divine mind. According to Calvin, the decree preceded the foreknowledge. Hear him: "I say, with Augustine, that the Lord created those who, he certainly foreknew, would fall into destruction, and that this was actually so *because* he willed it" (Institutes, Bk. III., Ch. xxiii., Sec. 5). Here, undoubtedly, the foreknowledge of the event is represented as logically *following* an act of the divine will. And more than this, the foreknowledge is based upon the decree, not as an inference from it, but as necessarily consequent. How is it possible for the most liberal critic in the world to reconcile Dr. Girardeau's statement with Calvin? In direct opposition to Calvin, he bases the decree upon a foreknowledge of the event. His own words are before the reader. According to him, the decree was "to permit it." What is meant by "*it*?" Why the fall, an event already before the mind as a *certain* occurrence. Thus the decree of God concerning the fall is reduced to a mere resolve, that what is certainly to be may be. Is Dr. Girardeau in accord with Calvin or not?

Let it be noticed that Calvin and Augustine affirm that the event occurred, and was foreknown as certain, "*because* the Lord willed it." If the question were asked why Adam fell, we have their answer in these words. And the former expresses himself thus: "If God simply *foresaw* the fates of men, and did not also *dispose* and *fix* them, by his determination, there would be room to agitate the question, whether his providence or foresight rendered them at all necessary. But since he foresees future events, *only in consequence of his decree that they shall happen*, it is useless to contend about foreknowledge, while it is evident that all things come to pass rather by ordination and decree" (Sec. 6). Who can doubt, after reading this passage, that Calvin makes

the decree logically precede the foreknowledge? And who can fail to discover that, between him and Augustine, on one side, and Dr. Girardeau, on the other, there is a difference of statement on this great doctrine of the decrees, as vast as the diameter of the spheres? The former do *not* teach, like the latter, that the fall was "fixed" and made certain by the self-determination of *Adam's* will.

Our esteemed brother is right in imputing to us a denial of *his* distinction between efficacious and permissive decrees. We maintain that the permissive decree of our Confession, being *more* than a *bare* permission, involves an efficacious determination of the will of God. We, however, took especial pains to say, that a distinction might be made between the decrees of God, as they affect brute matter, or rational accountable beings. We understand the permissive decree of the Confession to pertain to the latter class. And we press our point with Dr. Girardeau. If there is no efficiency in it, it is nothing more than permissive; and this is in the teeth of Calvin, Augustine, and the Confession. The brother owes it to himself to define his position, categorically, between a bare permission and an efficacious decree.

But what right has *he* to insist that an efficacious decree in relation to Adam would make God the author of sin? This is the gist of his dissent from Calvin's doctrine presented in our brief citations. Of all writers with whom we are familiar, he (Dr. Girardeau) is the most emphatic in his opinion concerning the decree of God in the affairs of *fallen* man. He not only holds that this decree efficaciously disposes of their eternal interests, but goes so far as to introduce *external force* into the execution of it. And yet he can see no objection to his doctrine, on the ground that it makes God the author of sin. He teaches that an efficacious decree, in Adam's case, would have destroyed his free agency; and yet a *forcible* execution of such a decree, in the case of his posterity, is perfectly consistent with free agency. We cite his own words: "We are even prepared to go further than some advocates of Determinism, and to assert that, besides the inherent inability of the sinner, without regenerating grace, to perform spiritual acts, there is an *external force*, that is, an ex-

ternally originated force, operating upon him, which disables him spiritually." (Apr. No., p. 5.)

Whether he is correct or not, in this opinion, we cannot stop to consider. The language is intensely strong. He has nothing of Dr. Taylor or Mr. Barnes in his composition. But we press our point nevertheless. If free agency is unimpaired, even by the exercise of external force upon the sinner, disabling him from obedience, why should it be insisted that Adam's free agency would have been destroyed by an efficacious decree of God concerning the fall? What principle is involved that creates so vast a difference? Dr. Girardeau says the sinner's case is judicial. He is punished with inability and constraint for crime. But if the destruction of free agency is essentially unjust, how can it be consistently employed as an instrument of justice? His objection in reference to Adam is, that equity forbids that an innocent creature shall be subjected to death by an efficacious decree. But does not the same principle forbid a sovereign to restrain a *guilty* subject from doing right, and to punish him for doing what he is forcibly impelled to do? Our complaint is, that our author, in opposition to rationalism, accepts the latter doctrine on scriptural grounds; but objects to a mysteriously efficacious decree in Adam's case, on grounds outside of Scripture and purely rationalistic. For the scriptural narrative does not contain a syllable on the subject.

His argument is, that it makes God the author of sin. To be valid, it must be founded in some great law of thought—some fundamental principle of truth. But if this were granted, the rationalist might promptly retort, that such a principle must be comprehensive and universal, and cannot be set aside by our interpretation of Scripture. No interpretation can be accepted that contravenes the primary dictates of the reason. We insist that there is no such dictum of the reason, that an efficacious decree of God makes him the author of sin. If there were, it would be equally tenable that the *creation* of a holy being, knowing he would perish, would also involve the Creator in the responsibility. Can Dr. Girardeau rationally defend the character of God from such an imputation, on *his* premises? Does he not

make God the author of the sin of Judas, and, instead of denying it, actually vindicate the fact, by teaching that God was *just* in the matter? The whole difficulty arises, in our judgment, from applying a human standard to the acts of a Being, who, from the nature of the case, is incomprehensible and irresponsible. Calvin warns us against this very error. We must add a little more of his testimony :

"They" (his opponents) "say it is nowhere declared, in express terms, that God decreed Adam should perish by his defection; as though the same God, whom the Scripture represents as doing whatever he pleases, created the noblest of his creatures without any *determinate end*. They maintain that he was possessed of *free choice*, that he might be the author of his own fate, but that God decreed nothing more than to treat him according to his desert. *If so weak a scheme as this be received, what will become of God's omnipotence*, by which he governs all things according to his secret counsel, independently of every person or thing besides? But, whether they wish it or dread it, predestination exhibits itself in Adam's posterity. For the loss of salvation by the whole race, through the guilt of our parent, was an event that did not happen by nature. *What prevents their acknowledging concerning one man*, what they reluctantly grant concerning the whole species?" Bk. III., Ch. VII., Sec. VII.)

Does this leave any doubt of Calvin's views? Does he not denounce Dr. Girardeau's scheme as "a weak one" in advance? What prevents *him* from acknowledging concerning one man what he distinctly grants concerning the whole species? This question of Calvin shows, beyond a doubt, that *he* did that which he censures his opponents for not doing. He includes Adam in the species, and represents him as subject to the same predestination. And yet our brother, in all candor, we know, insists that he and Calvin are at one on this point. Again :

"I inquire again, how it came to pass that the fall of Adam, independent of any remedy, should involve so many nations . . . in eternal death, but because such was the will of God. . . . It is an awful decree, I confess; but no one can deny that God foreknew the future final fate of man before he created him, and that he did foreknow it, because it was appointed by his own decree." (Sec. VII.)

Does not our author deny, in most positive terms, the doctrine of Calvin which this passage so clearly expresses? A brief cita-

tion, from a long discussion, will suffice to prove that he and Calvin are at direct issue :

"And here we must call attention to a distinction which is too often overlooked, but which it is necessary to signalise : namely, that between the foreknowledge of an *active* being, as grounded in the divine decree to produce it, and the foreknowledge of the *acts* of that being. It must be acknowledged that God could not have foreknown the existence of Adam, as an actual being, unless he had decreed to create him, and the certainty that he would exist as depending upon the execution of that decree. Otherwise Adam must have remained an object of knowledge only as in the category of the possible. But God having decreed to create him, and therefore having foreknown his existence, the question is how he foreknew the sin of Adam. Now we have proved, if argument can prove anything, that God neither decreed to produce his sin, nor efficaciously to procure its commission. But he must have foreknown it, else his knowledge is limited and imperfect. *That* it could not have been, nor can be, for it is infinite. The foreknowledge of the sin of Adam *was not grounded in a decree which necessitated its commission*" (Jan., 1879, pp. 75, 76).

We have taken the liberty to italicise some of his expressions. Let the reader remember that by "*necessitated*" Dr. Girardeau means rendered certain, and insists that the fall was not made certain by a decree. The main point for which the passage is quoted is to show that he is in irreconcilable antagonism with Calvin. He says God did not foreknow the fall because he decreed it. Calvin says he did. Is this agreement, or disagreement?

But we add a few subordinate remarks on the logic of this passage. He admits that a portion of God's foreknowledge is grounded in an efficacious decree. We see no necessity for the distinction. If he would certainly foresee an undetermined act of Adam's will, he could equally foresee an act of his own without a decree. But we give his language above as an example of faulty reasoning. He says God could not have foreknown the existence of Adam if he had not decreed it. What, then, becomes of his laborious argument to show that *all* God's foreknowledge is independent of his decree? He says (p. 75): "But, admitting that the crucifixion was rendered necessary by an efficacious decree, it would not follow that God's knowledge of its certainty was grounded in—depended upon—the relation between it and the decree." Here he insists that the sin of the crucifixion, con-

fessedly predestined, was not foreknown because it was decreed ; and his objection is based upon the intuitive character of all the divine knowledge; and yet he admits that foreknowledge of creation was dependent upon a decree. All God's knowledge, then, is not independent. But the predestined *acts* of sinful men are objects of independent foreknowledge. Why may not the foreknown acts of Adam have been also predestined? We respectfully suggest that this is not sound logic. "He knows the operation of causes, and he knows their effects, but he does not know the effects because they can only be produced by the causes." But the creation of Adam was an effect. Therefore, God's certain foreknowledge of it may have been independent of the predestined cause. And yet he makes it depend upon God's own decree. Now, if God's decree gave certainty to the crucifixion, how could his foreknowledge of it be any more independent than his foreknowledge of the existence of Adam?

Dr. Girardeau does not notice the reasoning from the freedom of God. Surely that argument was valid. The decree of God was, by his own admission, efficacious over his own creative act. Our author's logic is, that an efficacious decree ensuring the fall would have been destructive of the freedom of Adam. A free will cannot have its choice in time determined by a decree in eternity. But if this reasoning were correct, it would destroy the freedom of the divine act at the time of its occurrence. We contend that the Creator enjoyed as much freedom of choice when he performed that act as when he decreed it, and fully as much as Adam did when he fell. Yet it is undeniable that the eternal decree made the creation of man a certainty. God's own acts are unchangeably determined, and are yet the most perfect examples of freedom.

But the brother maintains that the free action of Adam, being that of another will, must have been exempt from predestination. We answer that if Adam's will had been, like God's, unchangeable, he would have been no less free. This would have ensured his safety without impairing the liberty of choice. We reject the doctrine, that confirmation in holiness puts an end to moral free-

dom. It amounts to a denial of such freedom to God, to elect angels, and to glorified saints.

What was CALVIN's view of the freedom of Adam's will in his state of innocence? On this subject, Dr. Girardeau has crowded his articles with quotations which it is impossible for us, in a moderate space, to notice. It brings us, however, to a consideration of the *second* issue between us—the psychological aspect of the question.

Dr. Girardeau complains of our intimation, that he has broached a new kind of psychology. We simply meant that, according to him, the mental laws that prevail in fallen men, in spiritual matters, are inapplicable to the primitive state of man. We understand him to hold that the will of fallen man is *bound* by his depraved affections and his darkened mind, whilst that of unfallen man was *not* bound by his existing affections and mental states. If so, we argued that the will, in the two cases, was differently related to the other faculties, and a system of mental and moral philosophy adapted to our present state could not be suited to the former condition of man. Moreover, he has introduced an element of *force*, to show that the will of wicked men is doubly bound. He distinctly admits *necessity* in the nature of man, governing his voluntary actions in his present state; that is, he admits Determinism in all its efficiency. Now, a constitution of mind in which the will was free from such necessity, must have been radically changed by the fall, to bring about a necessitated condition of the will. This is what we termed a novelty in psychology—an altered relation of the will to the subjective motives. The one involves free agency; the other seems to us, with its element of external force, altogether destructive of it.

But what was Calvin's opinion? He treats it, as we have done, as a distinct question from predestination. No matter whether the will is self-determined, or determined by the subjective motives, predestination is a fixed fact in his system, "extending even to the first fall." In treating of that event, he recognises a concreated condition in Adam, that rendered him inferior to what he might have been, if God had seen fit to create him differently. This inferiority consisted in what he calls a

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mutable will; and he attributes the fall (under God) to this peculiarity. We give his own words:

"In this integrity man was endued with free will, by which, *if he had chosen*, he might have obtained eternal life. For here it would be unreasonable to introduce the question concerning the secret predestination of God, because we are not discussing what might possibly have happened, or not, but what was the real nature of man. Adam, therefore, could have stood, *if he would*, since he fell merely by his own will; but because his will was flexible to either side, and he was not endued with constancy to persevere, therefore he so easily fell. . . . If any object that he was placed in a dangerous situation, on account of the imbecility of this faculty, I reply that the station in which he was placed was sufficient to deprive him of all excuse. . . . But why he (God) did not sustain him with the power of perseverance, remains concealed in his mind, but it is our duty to restrain our investigations within the limit of sobriety. He had the power, indeed, *if he chose to exert it*; but he had not the *will* to use that power; for the consequence of this will would have been perseverance." (Bk. I., C. XV., Sec. VII.)

Let the reader first notice, that Calvin declares that this inquiry is not affected by predestination, or predestination by it—a truth which he maintains in all its integrity. He sets that truth aside, as belonging to one sphere, the divine, and confines himself to another sphere, the limited, the human, the contingent. And whatever may have been his psychological notions, in an age when that science was so immature, it is obvious that he attributes the fall, within the sphere of second causes, to something wanting in the nature of man. We protest that it is not fair to infer from the varying phraseology of Calvin, that he held doctrines in philosophy inconsistent with his theological views. He says in this paragraph that Adam's nature would have been more excellent if he had been created with a will confirmed in holiness. The gift of constancy was denied him for secret reasons in the mind of the Almighty. Dr. Girardeau insists that the fall was not necessitated by Adam's nature. This is true in one sense, but not in another. No principle implanted in his nature was, according to Calvin, a cause of his fall; but a principle *not* implanted was, by its absence, a cause of the result. What can a mutable will mean, but one that would certainly change in the course of time with changing circumstances? If Adam's will

had continued steadfast under a long succession of changes and temptations, this fact would have indicated the presence of that very constancy which was wanting in his nature. Let the reader also observe that Calvin introduces an *if*, which can have no place in the divine sphere. Adam could, indeed, have stood, *if* he would, in the language of contingency; but he says expressly that Adam had not the *will* to do so. It seems to us indisputable that he uses the term *will* to include the desires and affections of the soul, and that he means to impute the fall to the changes that took place in its moral dispositions.

We have quoted from Calvin to the verge of weariness, to prove that he attributed the fall to the efficacious will of God, as its first cause. We add one more passage. Explaining what Augustine means by *permission*, he says: "He certainly does not suppose God to remain an idle spectator, determining to permit anything; there is an intervention of actual *volition*, if I may be allowed the expression, which otherwise could never be considered as a *cause*." He also asserts that Augustine "excludes any contingency dependent on the human will." Now, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that Calvin, adopting Augustine's views, attributes the event, permissively decreed, to an actual volition of God, as the primary cause, and to the will of man as a second cause; and that he makes the first cause independent of the second: in other words, he held a *determinist* view of the transaction. The same is unquestionably asserted in our standards. "Unchangeably foreordained whatsoever comes to pass," is an all-comprehending expression, that admits of no distinction between *existences* and *acts*. "The contingency of second causes is established," but they are true second causes still, and are due to the first.

But, at least, it must be conceded that the language of Calvin represents the fall as predetermined by the will of God, either through second causes in a succession, or directly, as the result of the divine volition. Dr. Girardeau must take his choice. Calvin was either a determinist of the type of Edwards, or a determinist of a still higher order. We believe that he, as well as the Confession, recognised second causes as the *media* through which

God *executes* his decrees. And if he *executes* his decrees, how can we understand him as barely permitting them?

What, then, are the second causes to which these authorities refer? Dr. Girardeau admits the universal validity of the law of causality. Volitions, then, are not exceptions, and were not so even in Adam. What, then, are the causes of specific volitions? What makes one *right* and another *wrong*? Surely not the will itself. This is the doctrine of the author. Adam's will was the cause of his sin—a doctrine that makes God its original author as inexorably as any other theory. For God's power was the cause of the will, and if the will of Adam was the cause of his sin, God must have been its author by Dr. Girardeau's own logic. But the term *will* is only a convenient name for a *power to will*. A power to act is not a cause of acting. When a man walks, we assign no cause for the act by saying he is able to walk. All men, in such cases, point to a motive as the cause. If the law of causation is granted, a *bad* volition must have a *bad* cause, and a *good* volition a *good* cause. The will cannot be good and bad at the same time. There must be successive changes in the causes to account for the changes of the result. But this is nothing but what we affirm of the soul itself—the indivisible unit of personality. It is this that passes from one state to another. Our brother, in the ardor of his pursuit, speaks of the will as if it were locally or anatomically distinct from the soul. He knows that it is a function of the *ego*, not an essence or an organ, and that the changes upon which specific volitions depend, are really changes of the soul. When, therefore, he admits a valid causation in volition, is it philosophical to contend that the will is its cause? Ought he not, in accurate language, to consent to our proposition, that the causes are to be found in the soul? The *ego* is the true seat of these causes. And as volitions are specific, the causes must be specific. When, in Adam's case, a wrong volition occurred, it was clearly due to a different cause from that which might have led to the opposite alternative. And this points directly to a change in the spiritual state of the soul itself—in other words, to an inevitable determinism. But this our author cannot tolerate. We complain that he *virtually* denies that

volitions are effects. His position is distinctly taken. He denies that the certainty of Adam's first sinful volition was due to God's decree, as its first cause, and that it was due to the state of the soul, as its second cause. God, in apprehending that certainty, perceived it as occurring without either kind of cause. He expresses himself thus: "*This causal efficiency in man has its seat precisely in the will.*" This locates it in a mere power of the soul, rather than the soul itself. "*Motives, therefore, are the final, the will is the efficient cause of voluntary acts.*" Here, the local seat, or, as he elsewhere denominates the will, the "organ" of volition, is represented as the efficient cause of its own exercises. His representation is, that the will is a sort of existing object, endowed with contrary choice, as the eye is the organ of vision. Of course, we do not understand him as speaking literally. But we do object to the suggestion, even the most remote, that a power of the soul may be the only efficient cause of its appropriate action. We insist that the will has no such existence, but is merely one of the soul's endowments. How can an object that has no substantive existence, but is, itself, an endowment of a substance, be gifted with a power distinct from itself? Only in the imagination. It is the soul that exercises volition, and it must be the soul that, according to his own theory soberly stated, is the only efficient cause of these specific acts. But this amounts to saying that an existing substance is the only efficient cause of the acts that spring from it. We recur, then, to the point, Can the soul be the only efficient cause of specific volitions? Causes answer the question, *Why?* Why, then, does a right volition manifest itself? Our author's reply should be, *The soul.* Why does a wrong volition occur? He should still answer, *The soul.* Is this logical, or not? He is too sagacious and profound to be directly guilty of such reasoning; and yet he has been unconsciously betrayed into it by his very ardor. It is evident that if the will or the soul was the cause of Adam's first sin, and God the cause of the soul, he was the cause of the cause, and, according to him, the author of the sin.

If we reason at all, we are compelled to seek specific causes in the changed condition of the soul—in other words, in the active

states of the subject. This is Determinism, and we see no escape from it. Dr. Girardeau positively denies that states of the soul are efficient second causes. The will, and the will alone, is the efficient cause. And thus the question, Why? gets no significant reply. When we ask why Adam chose to disobey, the only consistent answer is, *He willed it*. But this is another form for, *He chose it*. The answer thus becomes this, "He chose it, because he chose it." Choice is the sole function of the restricted will, or rather the will is simply the power of choice. The only answer possible is in its nature absurd. Dr. Girardeau admits the existence of motives in Adam's case, but they were *final*, not efficient causes. Are we not right, therefore, in maintaining that, *virtually*, he denies all efficient specific causation in the fall?

It seems to us that the difficulty that leads so decided a Calvinist to this strange position, is owing to his rejection of all distinction in the nature of efficient causes and necessities. Calvin himself makes such a distinction. He says: "What God decrees must *necessarily* come to pass, but not by an *absolute or natural necessity*." He illustrates it thus: there was no absolute or natural necessity that the bones of Christ should not be broken; yet, owing to the decree of God, the breaking of them was impossible. The Roman soldier had the natural ability to do it, but the decree prevented its exercise.

Whatever form we may give it, there is surely a difference between a predestined volition and a predestined physical occurrence. A physical effect implies entire passivity in the subject, but a volition implies a concurrent activity. The necessity that secures certainty in the one case must be different from that of the other. Let Dr. Girardeau come down to Calvin's position, that this involves an inscrutable mystery which human reason cannot solve. We have two facts: the certainty of the fall from eternity, the effect of God's decree, and the voluntary character of the transaction, implying a second cause in the soul of man. Shall we endeavor to reconcile these facts, rationally, by denying causal efficiency in both? Is it not wiser to let them stand in apparent conflict till the light of eternity shall remove the difficulty? These efforts are at the expense of both reason and

Scripture. To eliminate causal efficiency from the decree is to destroy the decree; and to eliminate it from the states of the soul is to destroy second causes.

This theory of a power of contrary choice in the will, is fatal to the law of causality. No necessity analogous to that of physical nature is supposed to govern voluntary acts. But we insist that the certainty of such events is the necessary consequence of a divine decree, and that the voluntary nature necessarily, yet freely, concurs with that decree. We have no right to limit the power of God by denying that he is able to constitute a creature whose free nature shall certainly work out a career which his own sovereign will has ordained. There is a difficulty in it which we have no ambition to explain. In reference to the efficient second cause, we differ from Dr. Girardeau *toto cælo*, when he locates it in the will alone. There is a secondary and subordinate causation in the person, but not in the single faculty of the will. This power in the personal unit—the *ego*—implies independence of every other person but God. There can be no independence of him. He cannot delegate his sovereignty to a creature. But in relation to other creatures, Adam was the author of his own destiny. Neither Satan nor Eve was the cause of his defection. But this by no means implies that his will was independent of himself, or of his associated faculties. The doctrine of a power of contrary choice in the will makes our faculty independent of all the rest. But a faculty is not the *residence* of power. It *is* power. It is unphilosophical to locate power anywhere but in the substance or unity of the soul. If the will were the seat of this alleged power, to the exclusion of other faculties, it might dispose of a man's destiny in spite of the dictates of thought and feeling. This we have shown to be a fatal *schism* in the indivisible soul. According to our author, the will of Adam had the power to concur or not with these dictates. He calls motives "final causes," and says: "*Without the final, the efficient would not produce; but it is the efficient, not the final, that produces.*" The reader knows that by the efficient he means the will. His language, therefore, signifies that without motives the will would not exercise volition; but it is the will, not the motive, that

causes the volition. We have shown that this is no cause at all. He here admits that no case of volition occurs without the presence of motives. The question is, *Can* volition occur without an adequate cause? And as the will is no cause, must not something else be the cause? If so, what other cause shall we assign but the motives themselves? Now, he claims for the will a power to do what it never actually does—that is, act against all motive. He says of Adam: “He had the power of *contrary choice*, as an attribute characteristic of his will, and by an exercise of that power, which might have been avoided, willed to sin.” Again: “His will, traversing the path of his holy dispositions and tendencies, so far as they were moved, was precisely the *organ* through which he determined himself in the commission of this first sin.” Here he recognises no sinful dispositions and tendencies as present, but represents the will of Adam as acting in opposition to the holy state of his mind and heart. The external motives which were present had produced no change in his spiritual frame. There were no internal or subjective motives inciting him to disobedience. His will acted in opposition to his holy dispositions, and overcame them. Where, then, was the cause? We cannot say a volition was the cause of the volition. But no other cause than will is even suggested.

Is Dr. Girardeau sure that there were no *unholy* dispositions at the moment in Adam's spiritual nature? If there were, the case is not one of a choice contrary to them. We argue that, unless the volition “traversed his holy dispositions,” *without a cause*, there were unholy thoughts and tendencies, present in the mind at the time, that were not traversed by it. This conclusion is unavoidable; and unless it can be shown that the influence of the latter was weaker than that of the former, it follows that the sinful volition was produced, if caused at all, by the sinful dispositions and tendencies. The dilemma is obvious. There is no escape. Either the subjective motives were the cause, or there was none.

If the holy dispositions were at the time stronger than the unholy, as some might suggest, the case is not changed. The will, without adequate cause, submitted to the minor influence,

and its volition was efficiently produced by nothing. The only conceivable efficient is a preponderating influence in the motives.

The question would not be a serious one, whether the missing link were in the will or in the soul, but for its theological consequences, which we have no space to discuss. If the highest reason teaches us that the first sin had its origin in the will, the argument from analogy must be applicable to the present state of man. The same reason will insist that all sin now has the same origin, and it follows, rationally, that we are not responsible for our sinful frames of mind, until they assume an overt form as volitions and actions.

Dr. Girardeau triumphantly appeals to Adam's case, as a demonstration of his theory on its face. But this is a presumption, and what he assumes is not susceptible of proof. The presumption is altogether against him, unless his appeal to *consciousness* is well taken. This appeal is peculiarly unfortunate. Sir Wm. Hamilton, with all his aversion to Dr. Girardeau's Calvinistic views, gives the matter up. He says a free volition is inconceivable. Dr. Girardeau, on the contrary, holds that, in non-spiritual actions, the will is always undetermined, even in fallen man, and that each of us is conscious of the fact. Hamilton appeals to our moral consciousness of *responsibility*, to show that our spiritual volitions must be free. But our author denies this, and insists that the will of man, now, is bound by his depraved nature. Yet he teaches that, in non-spiritual acts, men are conscious of this power of contrary choice in the will. Now we contend that this cannot be so. We insist that our conscious freedom extends to *all* our actions. A man is no more conscious of freedom in eating than in blasphemy. We are conscious, all the time, of acting in accordance with an apparent preponderance of motive, and the appeal to experience is directly against the theory under review. Dr. Girardeau admits that a choice contrary to apparent inducements is very unusual. But was an exception ever known among men? Did any one, except from a blind impulse, and irrationally, ever do freely what his head and heart opposed? Did any one ever, in the main, desire to do what his prevalent disposition at the time urged him not to do?

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If the power exists, it exists under various conditions. Suppose, then, that all the dictates of reason, and all the urgency of the disposition, combine to induce the adoption of one alternative, and yet, without motive, the man adopts the other. Under the theory, the case is possible. But we ask the reader, if that man would act as rationally as a dog in similar circumstances? It would be the act of a madman. The premises must be wrong that lead to such conclusions.

But the bare statement of the theory condemns it. It violates the law of causality almost in terms. That law requires an antecedent phenomenon for every occurrence. Now the first sinful volition of Adam, and every non-spiritual volition of our own, must be a phenomenon in time. Prof. Bowen, indeed, denies the phenomenal character of volitions, on the ground that they are not apparent to the senses. But this is a play upon words. A volition is as truly an historical event as an eclipse. If so, it must have some causative phenomenon preceding it. This must in turn, stand related to some antecedent phenomenon as its effect. Dr. Girardeau cannot controvert this, because, in attributing volition to the will as its cause, he recognises the distinction of the terms. But there is no *self* in will, and no *determination* except volition. A self-determination of the will, is simply a volition. Now here is the phenomenon of volition. Where is the antecedent phenomenon? There is none discoverable under the theory, and those writers are more consistent who confess that volitions are uncaused phenomena.

This difficulty was observed by our author, and he attempts to overcome it by teaching us that there are "regulative principles at the *root* of the will." But this axe, laid at the root of the tree, effectually cuts it down. For the regulative principles are not *in* the will, but *at* it. And regulative principles *exterior* of the will, if determinative of its volitions, land us in that very determinism against which we are warned.

If, however, we abandon these exterior regulative principles, and assign some such property to the will itself, we give that power a substantive existence. Otherwise no property can attach to it. The will has no *root*, and all that regulates it must be

found among the laws of our spiritual nature impressed upon the spiritual essence. They pertain to the substance of the soul, and cannot be distributed where there are no dimensions.

Where, then, is the causative antecedent of volition, under this theory? We have sought it in vain. Two opposite effects cannot proceed from the same antecedent. There must be changes in the subjective states of the soul, to account for changes of volition; and Adam's will did *not* traverse the path of perfectly holy dispositions and tendencies. Changes in these dispositions took place first, or else his choice was absolutely without a cause.

Our author interprets the "contingency of second causes," which the Confession declares is "established" by foreordination, as equivalent to *uncertainty*. He says "a contingent event is one which *may*, or *may not*, be produced by its appropriate cause." Now we positively deny, with Augustine and Calvin, any contingency in God's decrees dependent upon the will of man. The language of the standards clearly implies that the contingency is limited to "second causes," and does not extend to the "first cause." The operation of a second cause may be, to human apprehension, uncertain; but surely not to Omniscience. The permissive decree was not adopted with an *if* in it. This would make it depend upon the second cause, and thus reverse the order of causation. The decree did not establish the *uncertainty* of the fall to the divine intelligence. It is admitted that the event was not uncertain to God. The uncertainty, therefore, pertained to creatures alone. We understand the Confession to mean that some second causes are made to act by a natural or physical necessity, others freely, as the soul in volition, whose liberty is thus established. But all this is in the sphere of creation. It has no reference to the Creator. We cannot comprehend how anything can be contingent to *him*. The very definition of a second cause is that it is an effect of an antecedent phenomenon. The essential idea of a first cause, is, that it is independent of everything else. The will of God was not the *necessity*, or first cause, of all things, if its exercise depended upon the will of Adam. We admit the freedom of Adam in the fall, as unsolicited by any other created object, but we utterly reject the

notion that it was his will that played the sovereign part, whilst that of Deity was subordinate.

As we have shown, the phenomenon of Adam's volition was the effect of an antecedent phenomenon in the soul, and the latter also an effect. Every specific difference in the effect, was due to a specific difference in the cause. If this is denied, causation is denied. Yet it *is* denied, on the ground that it makes God the author of sin—the old Arminian argument. But specific causation is a dictum of our nature from which there is no appeal; and the objection is rationalistic in its tendency, because it rejects facts for the reason that they appear irreconcilable. How second causes may be free, and yet the effects of a first cause, may be ever so incomprehensible; but we have no right to sacrifice the law of causality in our efforts to reach a solution.

But what about Calvin's doctrine of the freedom of Adam's will? After what has been said, we might content ourselves with his consistency. Dr. Girardeau considers his numerous quotations conclusive against us. But it can be shown that he is mistaken. First, however, in reference to the language of our Confession, it may be stated that the cautionary clauses, concerning liberty and contingency, were introduced to forestall a rational inference from the principal doctrine there stated—the doctrine of foreordination. There was danger that the naked proposition might, without qualification, be abused to the extent of fatalism. We fear our brother has done that which it was the intention of the framers to prevent—only in an opposite direction. He has used the qualifying clause to overthrow the principal clause. We argue against him, that although “no violence is done to the will of the creatures, and the liberty or contingency of second causes is not taken away, but rather established,” yet God has, “from eternity, freely and *unchangeably* ordained whatsoever comes to pass.” If the fall came to pass, it was *unchangeably* ordained from eternity. Its certainty was in the decree. Nor can this phraseology, without torture, be reduced to a bare permission, which this authority explicitly condemns. The qualifying clause must, therefore, be interpreted so as not to invalidate free and unchangeable ordination.

We may assume, as historically true, that the terms here used were employed in the sense adopted by Calvin and his contemporaries. In what sense, therefore, did Calvin use *will*, *liberty*, *contingency*, and *second causes*? We confidently affirm, on the authority of our quotations, that, in his vocabulary, these terms could not mean anything inconsistent with his doctrine of the efficiency of the divine decrees. The *will*, for example, included far more than the simple faculty that produces action. As a matter of course, he could not use it with the precision of a modern metaphysician. But we have his own analysis of the mental faculties:

"Without perplexing ourselves with unnecessary questions, it should be sufficient for us to know that the understanding is, as it were, the governor and guide of the soul; that the will always respects its authority *in its desires*. . . . The primitive condition of man was ennobled with these eminent faculties; he possessed reason, understanding, prudence, and judgment. . . . To these was added choice to direct the appetites, and regulate all the organic motions; so that the will should be entirely conformed to the government of reason." Bk. I., Ch. xv., Secs. 7, 8.

Here "desires" are classed with the will. Understanding and will are the two leaders under whose banners all the framers are marshalled, and each is a comprehensive term.

But the use of the other terms clearly determines the meaning he attaches to will. By "liberty" he undoubtedly means freedom from all control by creatures—not exemption from the determinative will of God. This has been demonstrated already. By "contingency" he means uncertainty in the human sphere of knowledge, and not in the divine. By "second causes" he means phenomena depending upon one another in succession. These facts appear from a careful observation of passages which have been cited. Now, in the light afforded by them, we cannot mistake his use of the word *will*. It is, according to him and the Confession, that power whose acts are second causes, the freedom of which is established. In other words, they are free in one sense and necessitated in another. A concurrent, but subordinate, activity in the will, distinguishes its volitions from all physical effects. Nevertheless, they are inscrutably connected with

the will of God, which is called the first cause, by a succession of free second causes.

We are not anxious to prove that Calvin was a determinist after the type of Edwards. Our aim has rather been to show that philosophical determinism does not add any intensity to his scope of God's decrees, as our brother would have us believe. Being resolved to confine ourselves within moderate limits, and leave to our opponent all the advantage of extensive discussion, we will be very brief in our remaining remarks. No writer can connect the fall with the express purpose of God in stronger language than that used in the Institutes. That connexion with the first cause must either be mediate, through second causes, or immediate, without them. The former is the scheme of Edwards. The latter, making the first sinful volition the effect of no second cause, refers it at once to the volition of God. This moves the determinism back, and merges it in simple predestination. The avowed aim of Edwards was to introduce free spiritual activity between the decree and the result, which would exclude force, and yet account for its certain fulfilment.

But who can assert that Calvin did not hold views similar to those of Edwards? Allowing for difference of language and method, their opinions seem to us almost the same. When Calvin speaks of the sin of Adam being unnecessitated and avoidable, he evidently speaks from a human stand-point; and surely we may admit that Adam might have stood, *if he would*, which is his most common expression. Edwards would have used the same. It is probable that the same condition is generally to be understood, when unexpressed. But it must be remembered, as we have shown, that he explains *necessity* and *ability* as consistent with freedom on the part of man and sovereignty on the part of God. According to him, there is a necessity that is different from that of physical nature, and there is an ability which is subject to the sovereign will of the Almighty. If we would understand him, it is necessary to bear these explanations in mind throughout his works. But whatever may be our opinion of his philosophical views of volition, one thing remains unquestionable: *If he was not a determinist, after the method of Edwards, he was*

a necessitarian, who made the first sinful volition of Adam depend immediately upon the will of God.

Before closing, let us add a few remarks upon a matter which has been too briefly considered. We refer to Dr. Girardeau's doctrine of *certainty*. It will be remembered that he denies the *objective* certainty of the fall from eternity, although he admits that it was *subjectively* certain in the foreknowledge of God. He insists that Adam possessed the power in his will, down to the moment of its exercise, of determining the event either way. We understand, then, that he believes that, if God's foreknowledge were *mediate*, he could not have foreknown the result. But if he foresaw the event as certain, there must have been some cause giving validity to the fact. We contend that assurance of futurity must have an objective certainty to correspond with it. If the fall was absolutely uncertain before its occurrence, the only object of foreknowledge was that of its uncertainty. God intuitively foresees the future just as it comes to pass. But the fall came to pass, *ex hypothesi*, as an event up to that moment uncertain. He could not foreknow it as a certainty, if it was determined by him as uncertain. Nothing appears to us more absurd than to represent the Almighty as positively foreseeing that which he himself has made in its nature uncertain.

According to our author, and directly contrary to Calvin, God had simply determined or decreed that the fall should be a possible event, but uncertain, unappointed, unfixed, unnecessitated, and absolutely avoidable. Yet he did not *know* it in this character at all. Is it credible?

His argument is founded upon the admitted intuition and immediate nature of God's knowledge. He infers that it is always a knowledge of the present—the past and future, as such, being excluded. But shall we imagine that he has no perception of space and time? We insist that these conditions of thought are better known to him than to us. His knowledge is comprehensive of all relations. It is a present knowledge, but not a mere knowledge of the present. He *does foreknow* the event before it occurs. If so, he foreknew the fall, not as then taking place, but as destined to occur. How, then, could he foreknow it as uncertain or contingent?

Dr. Girardeau answers the question himself. "What was contingent to Adam was certain to God."

Dr. Girardeau seems to us to have utterly invalidated the foreknowledge of God, however little he intended to do so. He says: "Considered in relation to its actual occurrence (the event), God's knowledge of it must, *to human thought*, be conceived as foreknowledge; and so the Scriptures employ the term. But considered as to its intrinsic nature, as an energy of the divine being, knowledge is neither before nor after events; it is neither prescience nor memory." We have no space to discuss so vast a subject, but simply observe that he makes this term of Scriptures a mere *adaptation* to our faculties. If so, we see no room for predestination, or decrees, or causation in the universe. An eternal *now* blots out all succession, and all phenomena are really simultaneous. The doctrine points us to the gulf of Nihilism.

Our own statement would be, that there are two distinct spheres, equally real. In the divine sphere uncertainty cannot be predicated. Contingency pertains to second causes. Deity knows no *ifs*. When he foreordained the fall, by a permissive decree, he did not simply determine to permit it, *if* about to occur; for such language must imply contingency in his decree. But it is contrary to our standards to impute contingency to any but second causes.

We readily concede that a permissive decree does not admit of the exercise of any force analogous to those of the material world. The expression was, no doubt, adopted for the very purpose of excluding such a supposition. But it must be apparent that it was not intended to imply the absence of a specific purpose on the part of the Almighty. It destroys the decree altogether, to make it conditional upon a foreseen certainty. It puts into the mouth of Deity a resolve to permit what he knows will occur, and thus renders a decree absolutely useless and irrational.

Our task is done, without any expectation of resuming it. Our aim has been to expose fallacy, not to detect heresy. We take leave of the subject with great respect and regard for the eminent minister whose writings have been examined.

JAMES A. WADDELL.