

Dictionary
of the
Apostolic Church

EDITED BY

JAMES HASTINGS, D.D.
///

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF

JOHN A. SELBIE, D.D.

AND

JOHN C. LAMBERT, D.D.

VOLUME I

AARON—LYSTRA

138997
—
3/7/16

EDINBURGH: T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET

NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, FIFTH AVENUE, AT 48TH STREET

1915

BS
440
H55
v.1

Printed by MORRISON & GIBB LIMITED

FOR

T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH

LONDON: SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, HAMILTON, KENT, AND CO. LIMITED

NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

leased from all outward restraints, and to be left only to inward constraint; and St. Paul's counsels and commands even in his letters show that this end of the Law was ideal rather than actual. It is certain that the Christian Church in the course of its history generally has been legal rather than spiritual in its morality, and so this part of the Christian good has been unrealized.

(7) In the apostolic view of the Christian good there are two features which may be regarded as of temporary and local rather than of permanent and universal significance for Christian faith: (a) the expectation of the speedy Second Advent of Christ in power and glory to usher in the Last Things, which faded out of the Christian consciousness, with from time to time futile attempts to revive it, as the course of human history contradicted it; and (b) the belief which became more prominent in subsequent centuries than it was in the Apostolic Age, that the evil to be overcome and destroyed was embodied in personal evil principles and powers, over whom Christ gained the victory, and from whom He effected deliverance for the believer (Ro 8³⁸⁻⁴⁰, 1 Co 15²⁴, Eph 1²¹, Col 2¹⁵). For the details on both these subjects the relevant articles must be consulted, as all that is here necessary is merely the mention of them for the completeness of the treatment of the present topic.

Such is the Christian good; is it regarded as destined to be universal? Does the NT offer us a theodicy? It has been already indicated that the Christian hope does include the victory of Christ over all His foes, and the subjection of all things to Him, and at last of Himself to God (1 Co 15²⁴⁻²⁸); but these confident predictions do not clearly or fully answer the question whether all men will at last be saved—that is, become sharers of the good. While there are a few passages pointing towards *universal restoration*, there are others indicating *eternal punishment*, and some even on which has been based a theory of *conditional immortality*. This problem seems insoluble even with the data not only of the Scriptures, but also of human experience; and accordingly, whatever Christian wishes and hopes may be, we cannot affirm that the Christian good presents the final destiny of the race in cloudless sunshine without any shadow; and thus the believer must walk not by sight, but by faith, in the belief that whatever the Heavenly Father does is wisest, kindest, best. As has been shown in the art. *EVIL*, the Christian attitude is neither *optimism* nor *pessimism*, but *meliorism*—the belief that the world not only needs redemption, but is being redeemed in Christ.

LITERATURE.—W. Beyschlag, *NT Theology*, Eng. tr., 1895, bk. i. ch. viii., bk. ii. ch. v., bk. iv. chs. vi. ix., bk. v. ch. v.; G. B. Stevens, *The Theology of the NT*, 1899, pt. i. chs. iii. xii., pt. ii. chs. vi. vii., pt. iv. chs. v. viii. xii., pt. vi. ch. v., pt. vii. ch. iv.; T. von Haering, *The Christian Faith*, Eng. tr., 1913, ii. 800-926; A. M. Fairbairn, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, 1902, pp. 94-168; O. Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion*², Eng. tr., 1886-88, vol. iv. ch. iv.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

GOODNESS (HUMAN). *—Two applications go side by side in the general usage of the word 'goodness' and are also found in the NT. On the one hand, it denotes an inherent quality without regard to its effect; on the other hand, the 'goodness' is predicated in view of the effect. In the latter case, however, the thought of the inherent quality as producing the effect is never quite absent from the field of consciousness. It is not possible to call either of these two uses the older and more original one and to stamp the other as secondary and developed. Already in Homer (*Od.* xv. 324, *Il.* xiii. 284) *ἀγαθός* occurs of inherent quality as a designation of the well-born class, as

* For Divine goodness, see art. God.

distinguished from the common people (cf. our 'better class,' aristocracy'). When these are at the same time called *ἀγαθός* in the sense of 'brave,' this but shows the close connexion between the inherent and the transient reference of the word. Bravery is the goodness of the aristocracy in action. Hence in the frequent sense of 'efficient,' 'adequate,' the adjective does not describe a momentary or spasmodic efficiency, but the habitual one of quality. Good objects, good circumstances, 'goods,' in the sense of wealth or of delicacies, are all so designated because of their inherent adaptation to benefit the owner or receiver. The force of the word in such connexions can perhaps be felt best from the opposite *πονηρός*. Both meanings are transferred to the moral sphere. The ethical use of the word is, however, in profane Greek a comparatively late development, not being frequent until the philosophical writers (e.g. Plato).

In the NT both the sub-ethical and the ethical use are represented. For the former see Mt 7¹⁷, Lk 1⁵³ 8⁹ 12¹⁸, 19 16²⁵, Ro 8²⁸ 10¹⁵ 13⁴, Gal 6⁶, He 9¹¹, Ja 1¹⁷, 1 P 3¹⁰. For the latter, used of persons, see Mt 5⁴⁵ 12³⁴ 19¹⁶, 17 20¹⁵, Mk 10¹⁸, Lk 18¹⁹ 23⁵⁰, Jn 7¹², Ac 11²⁴, Ro 5⁷, Tit 2⁵; of things, Mt 12³⁴, 35 19¹⁶, Lk 8¹⁵ 10¹², Jn 5²⁹, Ac 23¹, Ro 2¹⁰ 7¹³, 18, 19 9¹¹ 12⁹, 21 13³ 14¹⁰ 16¹⁹, 2 Co 5¹⁰, Eph 4²⁹ 6⁸, 1 Th 3⁶ 5¹⁵, 2 Th 2¹⁷, 1 Ti 1¹⁵, 19, Tit 2¹⁰, 1 P 3¹¹, 12, 16, and frequently in the formula 'good works.'

It will be observed that the ascription of goodness to persons is rare in the NT. The reason for this is not to be sought in the biblical doctrine of sin as excluding human goodness, for on that view the affirmation of goodness with reference to works ought to be equally rare, which is not the case. The true explanation seems to lie in the God-centred estimate which Scripture places upon man's moral character. Man is measured with strict reference to the nature and will of God as his norm. The conception of 'goodness,' while not excluding, and even presupposing, an objective standard of this kind, does not in itself express it. It describes the quality either as inherent or as affecting others, but does not explicitly relate it to God. This the word *δικαίος* does, for *δικαιοσύνη* means goodness as conformity to the Law of God and as approved by the Divine judgment. The full and positive conception of *δικαιοσύνη* therefore covers all that is *ἀγαθός* and adds to this the God-related element just named. It is not at variance with this that *δικαίος* occasionally occurs in a negative sense, more closely adhering to the profane and popular usage—a sense which places it below *ἀγαθός* in the ethical scale. Thus in Ro 5⁷ the *δικαίος* ('righteous') is one who merely is free from fault, who does what in the ordinary relations of life can be required of him, but does not go beyond this to the spontaneous exercise of virtue as the *ἀγαθός* does. The term 'good' is reserved for the latter. But as a rule *δικαίος* is not less comprehensive than *ἀγαθός*, covering the Divine demand in all its reach (Ro 3¹⁰).

In the ethical application the inherent and the beneficent sense lie so close together that it is not always easy to determine which stands in the foreground and which is the mere concomitant of thought. In the Hebrew *צדק*, as used of God, both meanings are present, but the sense of beneficence preponderates (cf. Ps 34⁸). In regard to Mt 19¹⁷ (= Mk 10¹⁸, Lk 18¹⁹), usually understood as raising the question of absolute ethical perfection, G. Dalman (*Die Worte Jesu*, 1898, i. 277) advocates the same meaning of beneficence. Among the passages which refer to human persons Ro 5⁷ not only extends the reach of 'goodness' beyond that of 'righteousness,' but also finds this overlapping in the spontaneous, benevolent character of the former. In Lk 23⁵⁰ the same distinction may be

found, although here the sequence shows that the righteousness before God is estimated higher than the mere benevolence towards men. In 1 P 2¹³ the 'good' and 'gentle' masters are so described from the point of view of their treatment of servants rather than of inherent quality. In Jn 7¹² there is some doubt as to whether 'a good man' (in opposition to one who 'deceiveth the people') means a man of good character or one of good influence. Ac 11²⁴ and Tit 2³ seem to be the only clear instances of the use of the word to describe inherent goodness.

The same difficulty recurs where the predicate applies not to persons but to things in the ethical sphere. The 'good things' and the 'evil things' spoken of in Mt 12^{34, 35} are, of course, in themselves morally right or wrong, yet in the context the reference is to blasphemy, so that the element of the good or bad intent and effect can scarcely be excluded. When St. Paul in Ro 7¹² says that the commandment is *ἀγία καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀγαθή*, the inherent perfection of the Law is affirmed not only by the first and second but also by the third attribute; still the ensuing question, 'Was then that which is good made death unto me?' proves that 'the good' is felt as that which has naturally combined with it a good effect. The same thought must be present in Ro 12². The 'good' of the neighbour which is to be promoted according to Ro 15² is his ethical good ('unto edification'), but it is in part so called because it promotes his spiritual welfare. In Eph 6⁸ the element of profitability is plainly indicated by the context (cf. v. 7). The 'good work' which God began in the Philipians (Ph 1⁶) is good primarily because it has a beneficent, saving purpose, but probably the notion that it is productive of what is inherently good in them is also present. In Philem¹⁴ (cf. v. 6) the AV renders *τὸ ἀγαθὸν σου* correctly by 'thy benefit' (RV 'thy goodness'). The context decides in favour of 'beneficent' in 1 P 3¹³ (cf. v. 11 and 3 Jn 11). 'A good conscience' (Ac 23¹, 1 Ti 1¹⁹, 1 P 3²¹) is a conscience deriving its quality from its content, and therefore presupposes that the acts approved by it are good in themselves. The phrase 'good works' admits equally well of both interpretations. There can be no doubt that in Ac 9³⁶, Ro 13², 2 Co 9⁸, 1 Ti 2^{10, 510}, 2 Ti 2^{21, 317}, Tit 1^{16, 31} the reference is mainly to the good intent and effect of the deed. In other passages, however, like Ro 2¹⁰, Eph 2¹⁰, Col 1¹⁰, 2 Th 2¹⁷, the emphasis seems to rest not on the outward beneficent tendency, but on the inherent good character of the work, as conformable to the Divine Law.

The Jewish usage of the conception favours this, for in it not the helpfulness, but the meritoriousness, the religious significance of the observance of the Law, stand in the foreground. While St. Paul denies, of course, the meritoriousness of good works as a ground of justification, he nevertheless is at one with Judaism in emphasizing their specific religious importance. It is not in harmony with the Pauline teaching to deem of importance only the spirit and intent of the deed, and not its external performance. Such a judgment is possible only where the ethical point of view is man-centred and virtue regarded as completed in itself. St. Paul's point of view is God-centred—the virtue, the disposition exist for the sake of God; and in order that they may accrue to the full glory of God, it is necessary that they shall issue into act. For the reality of the good work the presence of the disposition behind it is indispensable, but it is no less true that, for the completion of the good as it exists in the heart, its embodiment in the good work is essential.

The noun *ἀγαθωσύνη* (Ro 15¹⁴, Gal 5²², Eph 5⁹, 2 Th 1¹¹)—not in classical Greek, but only in the

Greek translations of the OT and in St. Paul) probably in each case describes that form of goodness which seeks the benefit of others. In Gal 5²², standing among a number of other virtues, it must have this specialized sense. This is favoured also by the connexion in Ro 15¹⁴ ('able to admonish one another'). In Eph 5⁹ there is at least nothing to contradict this meaning. In 2 Th 1¹¹, 'Our God . . . may fulfil every desire of goodness and every work of faith with power,' the desire and the work stand related as the wish and the execution, which secures for *ἀγαθωσύνη* here likewise the same sense of beneficence as is associated with the 'work of faith.' *ἀγαθωσύνη* then differs from *ἀγαθότης* (likewise a word of the later Greek) as *benevolentia* does from *bonitas*.

LITERATURE.—J. H. A. Tittmann, *De Synonymis in Novo Testamento*, 1829–32, i. 19–27; R. C. Trench, *Synonyms of the NT*, 1880, pp. 231–235; H. Cremer, *Bibl.-Theol. Lex. of NT Greek*, 1880, pp. 3–6, 183–193; T. Ziegler, *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik*, 1886, i. 56 ff.; C. E. Luthardt, *History of Christian Ethics*, Eng. tr., 1889, i. 98 ff.; J. B. Lightfoot, *Notes on Epistles of St. Paul*, 1895, p. 286 f.; W. M. Ramsay in *ExpT* x. (1898–99) 107; A. Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*, Eng. tr., 1908, i. 147 ff., 199 ff. GEERHARDUS VOS.

GOSPEL.—1. The meaning of the term.—'Gospel,' a compound of the O.E. *gōd*, 'good,' and *spel*, 'tidings,' has been employed from the beginnings of English translation of the NT to render the Greek *εὐαγγέλιον*. In the classics this term denotes (a) the reward for good tidings, and is so used in the LXX (2 S 4¹⁰), *ὃ ἔδει με δοῦναι εὐαγγέλια* (pl.), 'the reward I had to give him for his tidings'; but (b) in later Greek the word stands for the glad message itself. In the NT, however, *εὐαγγέλιον* refers not to the written record, as in the modern usage of 'gospel' = 'book,' but to the message as delivered and proclaimed. The gospel of N., e.g., is the good news as N. announced it, and St. Paul's gospel is the message brought by the Apostle in his preaching. As long as oral teaching and exhortation could be had from eye-witnesses and intimates of our Lord's ministry, 'gospel' was reserved for this testimony; accordingly, the Apostle John (1 Jn 1¹) writes, *ὃ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ὃ ἀκηκόαμεν, ὃ ἑώρακάμεν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν, ὃ ἔθεασάμεθα καὶ αἱ χεῖρες ἡμῶν ἐψηλάφησαν, περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς*, 'that which was from the beginning, that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands have handled, concerning the Word of life.' These are the credentials of his message, and the persuasion of it to the hearts of his hearers. Among the early Christians these memories—*ἀπομνημονεύματα*—were most prized, and that word rather than *εὐαγγέλιον* was the primitive term for the gospel (cf. Moffatt, *LNT*, 1911, p. 44, with foot-note).

But as the eye-witnesses and their immediate successors passed away, believers had to fall back, perforce, upon a written record. The earliest certain use of the word in the modern sense is found in Justin Martyr (c. 150 A.D.).—'The apostles in the memoirs written by themselves, which are called "Gospels"' (*Apol.* i. 66; cf. *SDB*, *DCG*, and *HDB*, s.v.).

The passage which rules the use of *εὐαγγέλιον* in the NT is Mk 1¹⁴, *ἦλθεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἰς τὴν Γαλιλαίαν κηρύσσειν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ* (the gen. is both subj. and obj.; all aspects are included), 'Jesus came into Galilee preaching the gospel of God.'

The word, probably, came into favour through the use by the LXX of the cognate *εὐαγγελίζειν* and *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι* in 2 Is. and in the Restoration-Psalms (cf. our Lord's discourse [Lk 4¹⁸] in the synagogue of Nazareth concerning the glad tidings of His Mission, based on Is 61¹). But, while the term (noun and verb) is of fairly frequent occur-