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ARTICLE I.

ON THE MEANS OF PREVENTING WAR.

An Essay on some of the means by which the evil of war may be prevented, may be a not inappropriate supplement to the preceding review.* The following enumeration of means contributive to that end, may perhaps cover the whole ground :

1. A diffusion of the moral power of Christianity.
2. A direction of the special attention of society to the effects of war, and to the principles of peace.
3. Peace Societies and Conventions.
4. A Congress of nations.
5. Arbitration—both as an habitual resort, and as the subject of special treaties.
6. The disarmament of nations.
7. Unfettered commerce.

It is only to a few of these that we at present address remark ; after which the subject of *civil* war shall receive attention.

I. On the subject of Peace Societies, it is but necessary to exhibit their efficiency. Hear the plea of the American Peace Society, in the following extracts from one of its publications :†

* See the Mexican War Reviewed, in the July No.

† A tract entitled, " Shall I give to the cause of Peace ?"

ARTICLE V.

The Philosophy of Religion. By J. D. MORELL, A. M.
London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans.
1849, pp. 427.

"The design of this book"* we are told in the preface, "grew out of some of the reviews, which appeared upon a former work of the author's, entitled, *An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth century.*" These reviews evinced, at least to the mind of Mr. Morell, "such a vast fluctuation of opinion," and such deplorable obscurity and confusion of ideas upon the whole subject of the connection betwixt philosophy and religion, that, in mercy to the general ignorance, and particularly in deference to a suggestion of Tholuck, he was induced "to commence a discussion," which, he evidently hoped, might have the effect of imparting intensity to the religious life, vigour to the religious literature, and consistency to the religious sentiments of his country. He is at pains to inform us,† and we devoutly thank him for the information—the book itself furnishing abundant internal evidence, which, in the absence of such a declaration, would have been decisive to the contrary—that he has not rushed "hastily and unpreparedly into the region of *theological* inquiry." "While philosophy has been the highest recreation, theology," he declares, "has ever been the serious business of my whole life. To the study of this science I gave my earliest thoughts:—under the guidance of one‡ who is recognised by all parties as standing amongst the leading theologians of our age, I pursued it through many succeeding years; and if I have found any intense pleasure, or felt any deep interest in philosophy at large, it has been derived, *mainly*, from the consciousness of its high importance, as bearing upon the vastest moral and religious interests of mankind." Trained by this fitting discipline for the task, it is, perhaps, no presumption

* p. iii.

† Preface, p. xxxii.

‡ We learn from the North British Review, that Dr. Wardlaw is the Divine referred to.

in Morell to have published a book, which professes to be not "a popular and attractive exposition" of the questions which come within its scope, but a thorough philosophical discussion, developing "from the beginning, as far as possible, in a connected and logical form," a subject, which involves the fundamental principles of human knowledge, and demands, at every step, that any thing like justice may be done to it, the subtlest analysis, the profoundest reasoning and the intensest power of reflection. These qualities Mr. Morell may possess in an eminent degree—he may even feel that the possession of them implies a vocation of God to give a new and nobler impulse to the religion of his country, and that, like all apostles, he is entitled to use great boldness of speech; still we cannot but suggest, that as modesty becomes the great, a little less pretension would have detracted nothing from the charms of his performance. The perpetual recurrence of phrases, which seem to indicate the conviction of the author, that his book is distinguished by extraordinary depth, and that he is gifted with a superior degree of mental illumination, is, to say the least of it, extremely offensive to the taste of his readers; and he will, probably, find few who are prepared to share in the supercilious contempt which he lavishes upon the prospective opponents of his system. The philosophy with which Mr. Morell is impregnated is essentially arrogant; and it is more to it than to him, that we ascribe the pretending tone of his work. The pervading consciousness of the weakness and ignorance of man—the diffidence of themselves—the profound impression of the boundlessness of nature and of the limitless range of inquiry which lies beyond the present grasp of our faculties—the humility, modesty and caution which characterize the writings of the great English masters, will, in vain, be sought among the leading philosophers of modern Germany and France. Aspiring to penetrate to the very essence of things—to know them in themselves as well as in the laws which regulate their changes and vicissitudes—they advance to the discussion of the sublimest problems, of God, the soul and the universe, with an audacity of enterprize, in which it is hard to say, whether presumption or folly is most conspicuous. They seem to think that the human faculties are competent to all things—that whatever reaches beyond

their compass is mere vacuity and emptiness—that omniscience, by the due use of their favourite organon, may become the attainment of man, as it is the prerogative of God, and that, in the very structure of the mind, the seeds are deposited from which may be developed the true system of the universe.

Within the limits of legitimate inquiry we would lay no restrictions upon freedom of thought. All truly great men are conscious of their powers; and the confidence which they have in themselves inspires the strength, intensity and enthusiasm which enable them to conceive and to execute purposes worthy of their gifts. To the timid and distrustful, their excursions may often seem bold and presumptuous—but in the most daring adventures of their genius, they are restrained, as if by an instinct, from the visionary projects and chimerical speculations, which transcend the sphere of their capacities, as the eagle, in his loftiest flights, never soars beyond the strength of his pinion. Confidence adjusted to the measure of power never degenerates into arrogance; it is the soul of courage, perseverance and heroick achievement—it supports its possessor amid discouragements and obstacles—represses the melancholy, langour and fits of despondency to which the choicest spirits are subject—gives steadiness to effort—patience to industry and sublimity to hope. But when men forget that their capacities are finite—that there are boundaries to human investigation and research—that there are questions which, from the very nature of the mind and the necessary conditions of human knowledge, never can be solved, in this sublunary state; when they are determined to make their understandings the sole and adequate standard of all truth, and presumptuously assume that the end of their line is the bottom of the ocean—this is intolerable arrogance, the very spirit of Moloch,

“Whose trust was with the Eternal to be deemed
Equal in strength; and rather than be less
Cared not to be at all.”

We can have no sympathy with the pretensions of any method, whether inductive, or reflective, which aims at a science of being in itself, and professes to unfold the nature of the Deity, the constitution of the universe and the mysteries of creation and providence. To say, as Mr.

Morell does,* that "our knowledge of *mind*, in the act of reflective consciousness, is perfectly adequate; that it reaches to the whole extent of its essence—that it comprehends the intuition of its existence as a *power* or *activity*, and likewise, the observation of all its determinations," is sheer extravagance and rant, which can be matched by nothing, but the astounding declaration of the same author, that "to talk of knowing mind beyond the direct consciousness of its spontaneous being, and all the affections it can undergo, is absurd; *there is nothing more to know.*" We are not to be surprised that such a philosophy should find nothing to rebuke it in the awful and impenetrable depths of the Divine nature, that it should aspire to gaze directly upon the throne of God, and profess to give a "direct apperception" of Him,† whom no man hath seen or can see, and whose glory would be intolerable to mortal eyes. Titanick audacity is the native spirit of the system, and it is in the imperceptible influence of this spirit upon a mind otherwise generous and manly, that we find the explanation of the fact, that Mr. Morell, in the tone and temper of his performance, has departed so widely from the modesty of true science.

There is one feature of the book before us which is particularly painful, and we confess our embarrassment in finding terms to express it. Hypocrisy would precisely indicate the thing, but as that word cannot be employed without casting a serious, and we believe, an undeserved imputation upon the personal integrity of the author, we shall forbear to use it. We have no doubt that he is cordial and sincere in the zeal which he manifests for an earnest and vital religion—but what we object to is, that he should so often employ a phraseology, and employ it in such connections, as to convey the idea to indiscriminating readers, which the whole tenor of his argument proves to be false—that the earnest and vital religion, which enlists his zeal, embraces the distinctive features of the system of grace. When he speaks of christianity, in its essence, as a deep inward life in

* *History of Modern Philosophy*, p. 53, vol. 2. second London edition.

† *Ibid*, p. 52. It is refreshing to contrast with such pretensions the statements of Locke in the introduction of his celebrated *Essay on the Human Understanding*.

the soul, and pours contempt upon the barren forms and frigid deductions of logick, as a substitute for piety; when he contends for divine intuitions—heavenly impulses, and a lofty sympathy and communion with God—there is something in all this, so much like the language of converted men, that untutored minds are apt to be caught with the guile; and under the impression that they are still clinging to the doctrines of a living, in opposition to a formal and dead christianity, may imbibe, without suspicion, a system which saps the foundations of the whole economy of the Gospel. Mr. Morell is no friend to what is commonly denominated Evangelical religion. His divine life is not that which results from mysterious union with the Son of God, as the Head of a glorious covenant, and the Father of a heavern-born progeny. His divine intuitions are not the illuminations of that Spirit which irradiates the written word, and reveals to our hearts the light of the knowledge of the glory of God, in the face of Jesus Christ—his communion with the Father is not the fellowship of a child, who rejoices in the assurance of its gracious adoption, and renders unceasing thanks for its marvellous deliverance, through the blood of a great Mediator, from sin, condemnation and ruin.—His religion embraces no such elements; and he ought not, in candour, to have disguised sentiments utterly at war with the common conceptions of piety, in the very dress in which these conceptions are uniformly presented. If he has introduced a new religion, he should not have decked it in the habits of the old. It is the same species of dishonesty, the same paltering in a double sense, as that to which we object in Cousin, who, in seeming to defend the inspiration of Prophets and Apostles, and to rebut the assaults of a rationalistick infidelity, really denies the possibility of any distinctive and peculiar inspiration at all, and places divine revelation upon the same platform with human discoveries. We acquit Mr. Morell of any intention to deceive. We rather suspect that he has partially imposed upon himself. We can understand his declaration,* that he “does not know that he has asserted a single result, the germs and principles of which

* Preface, p. xxxiii.

are not patent in the writings of various of the most eminent theologians of the Church of England, or of other orthodox communities," in no other way, than by supposing, that he has been so long accustomed to associate his own philosophical opinions with the characteristic phraseology of spiritual religion, that the terms have ceased to suggest any other ideas to his mind, so that he is unconscious of the change of meaning, which they have imperceptibly undergone from his habits of thought. His honesty, however, does not diminish the danger which results from the ambiguity of his language. A corrupt system, disguised in the costume of the true, is like Satan transformed into an angel of light. We should have rejoiced if Mr. Morell's religion could have been more nakedly presented. It is not the ingenuity of his arguments, nor the subtlety of his analysis—it is not the logical statement, or the logical development of any of his principles, from which the most serious mischief is to be apprehended—it is from his fervour—his earnestness and zeal; which, in seeming to aim at a higher standard of Christian life, will enlist the sympathies of many, who feel that there is something more in the Gospel, than a meagre skeleton of doctrines. They will be apt to think that the words which he speaks to them—resembling so often the tone of Christ and His Apostles—are, like them, spirit and life. They will take the draught as a healthful and vivifying portion; and find, too late, that it is a deadly mixture of hemlock and nightshade. Here is the danger—in this covert insinuation of false principles—this gilding of a nauseous pill. If there were less in the book which counterfeits the emotions that spring from religion, the operation of its poison would be comparatively circumscribed.

The danger, in the present instance, is incalculably increased by the surpassing enchantment of the style,—which, though not distinguished by the precision of Stewart, the energy of Burke, or the exquisite elegance of Hall, has a charm about it which holds the reader spell-bound from the beginning to the end of the volume. We will venture to assert that no man ever took up the book who was willing to lay it down, until he had finished it; and very few, we apprehend, have finished it, who were

willing to dismiss it without another, and, perhaps, still another perusal. Mr. Morell is never dull; in his abstrusest speculations, in his most refined and subtle efforts of analysis, there is an unction which fascinates the reader; he has the art, the rare and happy art, of extracting from the dry bones of metaphysics, a delightful entertainment. The sorcery of his genius, and the magic of his eloquence, conceal the naked deformity of his principles, and beguile attention from the hideousness of the object, by the finished beauty of the painting.

The transparency of his diction, the felicity of his illustrations, the admirable concatenation of his thoughts, his freedom from the extremes of prolixity and brevity, and his skill in evolving and presenting in beautiful coherence and consistency, the most complicated processes of thought, justly entitle him to rank among the finest philosophical writers of his country. Imbued, as he is, with the spirit of German philosophy, and thoroughly conversant with the productions of its best masters, it is no small praise, that in his own compositions, he has avoided all affectation of foreign idioms, and that, at a time when our language seems likely to be flooded with the influx of a "pedantick and un-English phraseology." He has found his mother-tongue amply adequate to the expression of his thoughts; and even the misty ideas of Germany, which its own authors have seldom been able to render intelligible in a dialect of amazing flexibility and compass, are seized with so firm and masculine a grasp—are so clearly defined, and so luminously conveyed—that we hardly recognize their identity, and cannot but think, that if Kant could rise from the dead, and read his speculations in the pages of Morell, he would understand them better than in his own uncouth and barbarous jargon. We could wish that all importers of German Metaphysics and German Theology, would imitate the example of Mr. Morell in his use of the vernacular tongue. We want no kitchen-Latin—and we strongly suspect that any ideas which refuse to be marshalled in English sentences, or to be obedient to English words, are unsuited to our soil, and had better be left to vegetate or perish on the banks of the Rhine.

As Mr. Morell nowhere tells us precisely what he means

by the philosophy of religion, we are left to collect its import from his occasional statements of the scope and design of philosophy in general, his definition of religion, and the nature of the whole discussion. Religion he carefully distinguishes from theology: they are, as he insists in his former work,* "two widely different things. Theology implies a body of truth, founded upon indisputable principles, and having a connection capable of carrying our reason with it, running through all its parts.—Religion, on the other hand, is the spontaneous homage of our nature, poured forth with all the fragrance of holy feeling into the bosom of the Infinite. Religion may exist without a theology at all, properly so called." Or as the same sentiments are expressed in the work before us.

"Let it be distinctly understood in the outset, that we are speaking of religion now as a fact or phenomenon in human nature. There is a very common, but a very loose employment of the term religion, in which it is made to designate the outward and formal principles of a community, quite independently of the region of human experience, as when we speak of the Protestant religion, the religion of Mohammed, the religions of India, and the like. The mixing up of these two significations, in a philosophical treatise, cannot fail to give rise to unnumbered misunderstandings; and we emphatically repeat, therefore, that in our present use of the term, we are not intending to express any system of truth or form of doctrine whatever; but simply an inward fact of the human consciousness—a fact, too, the essential nature of which it is of the utmost importance for us to discover."—*pp.* 62, 63.

By religion, then, we are to understand, not a system of doctrine or a creed, but those states of the mind, and those inward experiences of the heart, which spring from a sense of the Infinite and Eternal. But religion, in general, occupies a very subordinate place in the book—it is only introduced at all, in order to prepare the way for what Mr. Morell denominates "the Christian consciousness." It is Christian experience, particularly, which he proposes to investigate. But what is the *philosophy* of religion? We have a clue to what the author means by it, in the following passage of the preface:

* Vol. 2nd, Appendix, 2nd Edition, p. 650.

“All great systems of philosophy are simply methods; they do not give us the material of truth, they only teach us how to realize it, to make it reflective, to construct it into a system.”—*p.* xxiv.

The inquiries which, in conformity with this definition, a definition, we would add, rather of logick than philosophy, we should expect to find him conducting, as obviously falling under the import of his title, are such as have reference to the department of the soul, in which religion is pre-eminently seated, the nature and origin of our religious affections, the laws of their developement and growth, the process by which a theology may be formed, and the grounds of certainty in regard to religious truth. In this expectation we are not disappointed; these are the high themes that he discusses; the pith and staple of his argument. But we must take the liberty to say that, in our humble judgment, the analysis of these points, whatever appearances of candour and impartiality may be impressed upon it, was instituted and shaped with special reference to a foregone conclusion. The author was in quest of what Archimedes wanted to move the world, a *nov στω*, by means of which he could overturn the foundations of the Christian faith. There was a darling hypothesis in relation to the authority of the Bible, which he was determined to establish; and with an eye to this result, his philosophy, though digested into the form of a regular and orderly developement of principles, was invented and framed. It is a species of special pleading, ingeniously disguised in the mask of philosophical research, against the great distinctive feature of Protestant Christianity. When we contemplate the havock and desolation of his theory—the Bible, as an authoritative standard of faith, and creeds and confessions, as bonds of Christian communion and fellowship, involved in a common ruin, with nothing to supply their place but the dim intimations of sentiment and feeling, chastened and regulated by the natural sympathy of earnest and awakened minds—we might be appalled at the prospect, if it were not for the consolatory reflection which the author himself has suggested, that his “philosophy does not give us the material of truth.”

But to be a little more minute—the book is divided into twelve chapters—the first of which presents us

with a general survey of the human mind. And as two of its powers are found to be of fundamental importance to the subsequent discussion, the second is devoted to a somewhat extended elucidation of the distinction betwixt them. In these two chapters the "philosophical groundwork" is laid of the author's whole system. If he is at fault in any essential point of his analysis, or has misapprehended the nature and relations of the "two great forms of our intellectual being," which play so conspicuous a part in his theory, his speculations labour at the threshold, the foundations are destroyed, and the superstructure must fall to the ground. Since a human religion must be adjusted to the faculties of the human mind, an important step is taken towards the determination of its real nature, when these faculties are explored and understood. Mr. Morell is, accordingly, conducted by his mental analysis, to an inquiry into "the peculiar essence of religion in general," which he prosecutes in the third; and to a similar inquiry into the essence of christianity in particular, which he prosecutes in the fourth chapter of the book. He is now prepared to enter into the core of the subject; and as it is in the application of his psychology, to the affiliated questions of Revelation and Inspiration, and to the construction of a valid system of theology, that the poison of his principles most freely works, we must invite particular attention to his opinions upon these points—the developement of which occupies the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters of the work.

Revelation he regards as "a mode of intelligence"—a process by which a new field of ideas, or a new range of experience, is opened to the mind. It is precisely analogous to external perception, or that more refined sensibility to beauty and goodness, upon which we are dependent for the emotions of taste and the operations of conscience. It consists in the direction of an original faculty, to a class of objects which it is capable of apprehending. It is wholly a subjective state, and should never be confounded with the things revealed—a spiritual clairvoyance, which brings the soul into contact with spiritual realities, and enables it to gaze upon invisible glories. Hence an external revelation, or a revelation

which does not exist in the mind, is a contradiction in terms. We might just as reasonably suppose that the Bible, or any other book, could supply the place of the senses, in giving us a knowledge of the material world, as to suppose that it can supply the place of revelation, in giving us a knowledge of religion. It can no more see for us in the one case, than in the other—this is a personal operation—a thing which every man must do for himself. And as each individual must have his own power of perception, that he may know the existence of the objects around him, so each individual must have a personal and distinct revelation in himself, that he may come into the possession of the “Christian consciousness;” he must be brought immediately into contact with the object, and contemplate it “face to face.” Inspiration is not essentially different from revelation; they are rather different aspects of the same process. As in all immediate knowledge, there is an intelligent subject and an intelligible object brought into union, revelation, for the convenience of distinction, may be regarded as having primary reference to the act of God, in presenting spiritual realities to the mind; and inspiration to whatever influence may be exerted upon the soul, in order that it may be able to grasp and comprehend the realities presented. Revelation, in other words, gives the object—inspiration, the eye to behold it. The concurrence of both is essential to the production of knowledge. As inspiration, therefore, indicates, exclusively, a state of the mind, and that, a state in which we are conscious of immediate knowledge, it cannot be affirmed of any class of writings, nor of any processes of reasoning. An inspired book, or an inspired argument, is as senseless a form of expression as an intelligent book, or an intelligent argument. Hence the whole question of an authoritative standard of religious truth, commended to our faith by the testimony of God, is summarily dismissed as involving an absurdity; a discovery which relieves us from all those perplexing speculations in relation to the proofs of a divine commission, and the criteria which distinguish the word of God from the delusions of man, or the impostures of the devil, upon which theologians, from the earliest age, have been accustomed, in their ignorance and folly, to waste their

ingenuity. The doctrine is avowed, openly and broadly avowed, that God *cannot*, without destroying the very nature of the human understanding, put us in possession of an infallible system of truth. A book, or an argument, can be inspired in no other sense than as it proceeds from a man under the influence of holy and devout sensibilities, and contains the results of his reflection, in the development of which the Almighty cannot protect him from error, upon the facts of his own experience. The Pilgrim's Progress is, accordingly, divine, or the word of God, in precisely the same sense in which the Scriptures are divine; and the productions of Prophets and Apostles are entitled to no different kind of respect, however different in degree, from that which attaches to the writings of Owen and Baxter and Howe. Theology, in every case, results from the application of logick and philosophy to Christian experience—it is necessarily a deduction from subjective processes, and not the offspring of the comparison and arrangement of doctrines derived from an external source. Being the creature of the human understanding, and the understanding being above or below, we do not know exactly where the author places it—the immediate guidance and control of God, every theology must be fallible and human, whether it be that of Paul, or Peter, or James, or John, or—for such is the fearful sweep of the argument, that of Jesus Christ himself.

Having settled the principles upon which theology must be constructed, he proceeds to apply them in the eighth chapter, with remorseless havoc, to the popular faith of his age and country. His next step is to investigate the grounds of religious fellowship, an investigation which turns out to be a spirited and earnest assault upon creeds and confessions. When the Bible is gone, these beggarly children of the understanding can, of course, show no cause why sentence of death should not be pronounced upon them. The tenth chapter, which is a sort of summary of all his previous speculations, discusses the grounds of certainty in reference to spiritual truth, which are resolved partly into our own consciousness, or immediate knowledge of its reality, and partly into the consciousness of other similarly inspired people. The eleventh chapter, on the significancy of the past, seems to us to be a logical

appendage of the seventh or eighth, mercifully intended to relieve our minds from the despondency and gloom which were likely to overwhelm them on account of the loss of the Bible and the feebleness and imperfection of the instrument which we must use in its place in "realizing" a system of faith. After all, he tells us, among earnest and awakened minds, there is no danger of miscarriage. Error is the fiction of bigotry rather than a stern and sober reality. All contradictions and discordancies of opinion are only the divergencies, or polar extremities, of some higher unity of truth, in which they are blended and reconciled; as the numberless antagonisms of nature contribute to the order and harmony of the universe. The progress of theology depends upon the success of the effort to discover those higher realities in which heresy and orthodoxy sweetly unite, and hence all opposition to error and zeal for the truth—overlooking the important fact that they are different phases of the same thing—that error, in other words, is only a modification of truth, are very wicked and indecent.

The relation between Philosophy and Theology is the subject of the last chapter, in which he undertakes to vindicate himself from the anticipated charge of rationalism. How successful he has been we shall see hereafter, but one thing is certain, his rationalism has but little tendency to exalt the understanding. In the pictures which he occasionally draws of a perfect Christian state, this perverse and unruly faculty, it seems, is to be held in abeyance—the soul is to be all eye—all vision—everlastingly employed in the business of looking—so completely absorbed in the rapture of its scenes, that it cannot descend to the cold and barren formalities of thought. But while the understanding is degraded, another element of our being is unduly promoted. Throughout the volume we find attributed to sympathy the effect, in producing and developing the divine life, which the scriptures uniformly ascribe to the Holy Spirit. Society and fellowship are, indeed, the Holy Ghost of Mr. Morell's gospel. They beget us again to a lively hope—they refine and correct our experiences—they protect us from dangerous error, they establish our minds in the truth, and through them we are enabled to attain the stature of perfect men in Christ Jesus.

From this general survey of the scope and contents of the book, it must be obvious to the reader, that we are called to contend with a new and most subtle form of infidelity. The whole ground of controversy is shifted. The end aimed at is the same, the destruction of the Bible as a divine revelation, in the sense in which the Christian world has, heretofore, been accustomed to use the term, but the mode of attack is entirely changed. The infidels of former times impugned Christianity either in its doctrines or evidences, but never dreamed of asserting that an external standard of faith was inconceivable and impossible. Some denied that it was necessary, the light of nature being sufficient for all the purposes of religion—but the ground generally taken was, that the scriptures were wanting in the proofs, by which a divine revelation ought to be authenticated, or that they were self-condemned in consequence of the absurdity and contradiction of their contents, or that no proofs could ascertain to others the reality of a revelation to ourselves; but whatever was the point of assault, whether miracles, prophecy or doctrines, the genuineness and authenticity of the records, the origin and propagation of Christianity in the world and its moral influence on society, it was always assumed that *there was sense* in the proposition, which affirmed the Bible to be a divine and authoritative standard of faith. Elaborate apologies for it, under this extraordinary character, were deemed worthy of the powers and learning of the most gifted members of the race. But Mr. Morell takes a widely different position. He undertakes to demonstrate, by a strictly *a priori* argument, drawn from the nature of the mind and of religion, that a revealed theology is a psychological absurdity. His design is, from the philosophy of Christian experience, to demolish the foundations of Christianity itself. His method requires him to attack neither miracles, prophecy, nor doctrines—you may believe them all—provided you do not regard them as proving the Bible to be a rule of faith, nor receive them on the ground that they are attested by the seal of Heaven. In the application of his boasted reflective method, he has plunged into the depths of consciousness and fetched from its secret recesses the materials for proving that, in the very nature of the case, every system of doctrine not only *is* but *must* be human in

its form and texture. It is on this ground that we charge him with infidelity. He takes away the Bible, and when that is gone, we deliberately assert that all is lost. He talks indeed, of his intuitions and fellowship and sympathy and his all powerful organon of reflection, but when he proposes these as a substitute for the lively oracles of God, our minds labour for a greater ability of despising, than they have ever had occasion to exert before. Let the authority of the Bible be destroyed, and Christianity must soon perish from the earth. Put its doctrines upon any other ground than a "thus saith the Lord," and every one of them will soon be denied, and we shall soon cease to hear from the dim territory of feeling, in which Mr. Morell has placed religion, any definite reports of God. What has been the effect upon himself, since he has declined to receive his theology from the Bible? How many of the doctrines which he was, no doubt, taught in his infancy and childhood, has he been able to "realize" by his own method of construction! The plan of his work has not required him to treat of particular articles of faith, but from occasional glimpses which we catch, it is easy to collect, that his creed is any thing but evangelical. The doctrine of the incarnation, for example, is reduced to nothing but "the realization of divine perfection in humanity." "We need," says the author,* "to have the highest conceptions of divine justice and mercy, and the highest type of human resignation and duty, realized in an historical fact, such as we can ever gaze upon with wonder and delight; not till *then* do they become mighty to touch the deepest springs of our moral being." Jesus is, accordingly, represented as a finished model of ideal excellence, combining in his own person all that is pure and lovely and sublime, a living embodiment of the moral abstractions which, it seems, are powerless to affect the heart until they are reduced to "an historical and concrete reality," and which *then*, as if by an electric shock, or a wizard's spell, can stir the depths of our nature, rouse our dormant energies and inspire us with zeal to imitate what we are obliged to admire. Hence the whole mystery of godliness—of the word made flesh—is a very simple affair; it is just God's giving us a pattern to copy. This is what reflection makes of it from the intui-

* p. 241.

tions of religion without the Bible. Justification by faith, the *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae*—"the very life-spring," as Mr. Morell admits*—"of the Reformation," fares no better in his hands, as it passes, through his constructive method, from the region of experience to that of doctrine. It is not a little remarkable, too, and sets this method in a very unfavourable light, that while our author professes to have the same "*moral idea*" with Luther and the reformers, his statement of it as a *doctrine* is precisely *opposite* to theirs. Total depravity and the consequent necessity of regeneration, he must, to be consistent, deny, as his theory requires that religious sensibility, even in our fallen state, should be viewed as an original faculty of the soul, and from the beginning to the end of the volume there is not a single passage which even remotely squints at the doctrine of atonement, in the sense of a satisfaction to the justice of God for the guilt of men. What then of *real* Christianity does he believe? Echo answers, what.

These specimens are sufficient to show what success crowns the efforts of our author in constructing a theology without the Bible. We want no better illustration of what is likely to become of our religion when we give up an external standard for the dim intuitions of inspired philosophers. We are not, however, without other lessons of experience, which Mr. Morell must admit to be applicable. Upon his principles, the construction of the universe is a process exactly analogous to the construction of a creed. The ontological systems of the German masters may, accordingly, be taken as a fair sample of what reflection is able to achieve in the science of world-making—and judging from them, we can form something more than a conjecture, of the extravagance and folly which will be palmed upon us, for the pure and wholesome doctrines of the cross, should the same method be admitted into the department of Christian theology—it would be sheer insanity to suppose that it will make less havock of our creeds, than it has made of nature, of the soul and God. Upon one thing we might count with certainty—the being speedily overwhelmed with a species of Pantheism, in which all sense of duty and religion would perish. The fatalism of Mahomet has the merit of being consistent, but the

* p. 253.

transcendental philosophy, as if impelled by an irresistible instinct to contradictions and absurdity, makes its boast, in one breath, of the demonstration of the essential and indestructible freedom of man as its greatest triumph, and, in the next, does not scruple to deduce the contingent, finite and variable, from their *necessary relations* to the absolute, infinite and eternal. No man can turn from these speculations and laugh at the Geeta, or the Ramayuna of Valmeeki. They teach us—what it would be madness to disregard; that, in relation to theology, the real issue is between the Bible, or a wild imagination “in endless mazes lost;” between the Bible, in other words, and Atheism. We do not hesitate, therefore, to rank Mr. Morell’s book in the class of infidel publications. He has assailed the very foundations of the faith, and in resisting his philosophy, we are defending the citadel of Christianity from the artful machinations of a traitor, who, with honeyed words of friendship and allegiance upon his tongue, is in actual treaty to deliver it into the hands of the enemy of God and man.

Entertaining these opinions of the character and tendency of the work, we shall make no apology for entering, with great freedom, into a critical estimate of its merits. It is, perhaps, only the first fruits of what we may yet expect from larger importations of the same philosophy into Britain and America, and, as is generally the case with first fruits, it is probably the best of its kind. We apprehend that no man, who shall undertake a similar work, will be able to bring to it a larger variety of resources, a more profound acquaintance with ancient and modern speculations—a nicer critical sagacity or an intenser power of reflection than have fallen to the lot of Mr. Morell, and we are glad that it is a man, thus eminently gifted, the great hierophant of German mysteries, and not the humble and contemptible retailer of oracles, which are hawked about as divine only because they defy all effort to understand them, who has brought on the first serious collision in the field of English literature, betwixt evangelical religion and the new discoveries in metaphysics. The vigour of *his* assault may be taken as a fair specimen of the power and resources of the enemy, and we rejoice in being able to say, that whatever vague and undefined fears may have

floated through our minds, for the security of our faith, while the conflict was yet at a distance, and the proportions of the foe unduly magnified by the fogs and mists through which he was contemplated, have turned out to be, upon the first demonstration of his real dimensions and his skill in battle, like the shudder and dismay conjured up by a moonlight ghost.

The book may be considered in the double light of a philosophy and an argument—the philosophy supplying the premises of the argument. We intend to examine it in both aspects, and as, in every instance of ratiocination, the first and most obvious inquiry is in regard to the validity of the reasoning, does it hold?—do the premises contain the conclusion?—we shall pursue, in the present case, the natural order of thought, and inquire into the merits of the argument before we investigate the claims of the philosophy. We hope to show that there is a double escape from the infidelity and mysticism into which the author would conduct us—one through the inconclusiveness of his reasoning, the other through the falsehood or unsoundness of his premises—he is signally at fault both in his logic and philosophy.

The fundamental proposition of the treatise, in which its preliminary speculations were designed to terminate, and upon which its subsequent deductions are dependent for all the value they possess, is that a valid theology is *never* the gift of Heaven, but is *always* the creature of the human understanding. This is assumed as a settled point in the last six chapters of the book. The seventh, which develops the process by which, in conformity with the laws of mind, we are able to construct a theology for ourselves, evidently takes it for granted that it is a matter which we have to do for ourselves, unless the author intended these discussions as a mere exhibition of his skill, an amusing play of ingenuity and fancy, like Ferguson's *Natural History of Society* or Smith's theory of the origin of language. If God has given us a body of divinity it is of very little consequence to speculate on what might have taken place, had we been left to ourselves. Theology, in this aspect of the case, being reduced to the condition of any other science, perhaps the method described by our author is, as he asserts it to be, the *only* method by

which we could successfully proceed. But the very stress of the controversy turns upon the question—whether we have been left to ourselves—whether theology is, in fact, like all other sciences, the production of man, or whether God has framed it for us, ready to our hands. The same assumption, in regard to the human origin of theology, pervades all the speculations of the eighth chapter, professedly on Fellowship, but really on creeds and confessions. If there be a faith once delivered to the saints, it may be our duty to contend for it, and to withdraw from those who consent not to wholesome words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ and to the *doctrine* which is according to godliness, and to reject those, after the first and second admonition, who bring in damnable heresies. If there be such a thing as a form of sound words, there may be an obligation to teach it, and hence an analogy betwixt the church and the school, in consequence of which believers may be termed disciples, ministers, teachers, and Christ the great Prophet of all. These things cannot be gainsaid until we have something more than assertion that there is no authoritative type of doctrine into which we ought to be cast. As to the chapter on Certitude, that never could have been written by a man in whose philosophy it was even dreamed of, that there might be a ground of assurance in a divine testimony fully equal to dim and misty intuitions which require to be corrected by the generic consciousness of the race. Let it be admitted that God has given us a theology, and evinced it to be His, by signs and wonders, or any species of infallible proofs, we certainly need no firmer basis for our faith than that the mouth of the Lord has spoken. All such speculations as those of our author are darkening counsel by words without knowledge. The relation, too, in which philosophy stands to theology, the subject of the last chapter of the book, is materially changed, when it is denied that philosophy is the organon to form it, or when the whole question concerning the truth or falsehood of any doctrinal system is made a question of *authority* and not a question of abstract speculation.

It is hence obvious, that the human origin of theology is the soul of the system, it pervades all his speculations. Without it one-half of his book falls to the ground, and

the conclusions, which palpably contravene the popular faith, are stripped of all plausibility and consistency. As a logical production, his entire treatise is a failure unless this principle can be established.

Now, has it been proved? Has the author any where demonstrated, that theology, as contra-distinguished from religion, must *necessarily* be human, and *can* possess no other authority but that which attaches to it from the laws of thought? or has he even succeeded in showing that, as a historical fact, it *is* human, though it *might* have been otherwise, and, therefore, subject to the same criticisms to which every human production is amenable? Let it be remembered, that the real issue, betwixt himself and the popular faith, is, whether or not God *has* communicated, in the language of men, a perfect logical exposition of all the truths which, in every stage of its religious developement, the human mind is capable of experiencing. Mr. Morell denies, the popular faith affirms: if he can make good his negative, then man must create his theology for himself—his speculations, upon that point, become natural and proper, and all the conclusions which are subsequently drawn from them in relation to fellowship, certitude and the precise office of philosophy, with respect to systems of Christian doctrine, become consistent and legitimate. If, on the contrary, he fails to do so, then all these speculations are premature—they have no solid foundation in truth; and though they may still be interesting, as a new and curious department of fiction, they should drop the name of philosophy, or couple it with that of romance, and assume a title which would indicate the fact, that their logick is purely hypothetical.—Has he succeeded, or has he failed? This question we shall be able to answer, by considering what the exigencies of his argument demand, and the manner in which he has addressed himself to the task of meeting them—by comparing, in other words, what he *had* to do with what he *has* done. What, then, is necessary in order to prove that no such divine communication, as the popular faith maintains, has ever been made to men? There are, obviously, only two lines of reasoning that can be pursued in an argument upon this subject. It must either be shown, *a priori*, that such a divine communication is

impossible, involving a contradiction to the very nature of theology—or *a posteriori*, that such a divine communication, as a matter of fact, *never has been made*, or what, upon the maxim—*de non apparentibus, &c.* is equivalent to it—*never has been proved*. This last proposition may be established, in turn, either by showing that no testimony or no evidence can authenticate such a communication; or that the evidence, in the given case, falls short of what ought to be afforded; or that it is set aside by countervailing evidence; or that there is positive proof, that some other method has been adopted. This seems to us to be a true statement of the logical condition of the question. Mr. Morell was bound to prove either that a divine revelation, in the ordinary sense of the terms, is impossible, a psychological absurdity; or that no book, professing to be a revelation, is worthy of credit—there *can* be, or there *has* been none. This being the state of the controversy, let us proceed to examine how he has acquitted himself in disposing of these points—the last of which, alone, has given rise to a larger body of literature than any other subject in the world.

The premises of the argument, in both aspects, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*, are contained in the chapters on Revelation and Inspiration. It was evidently the design of these chapters to developé a theory which should explode the vulgar notions in relation to the Bible, as at once absurd, in a philosophical point of view, and destitute of evidence, as a matter of fact. His whole view of inspiration he represents as “a protest and an argument”* against “the formal use of the letter of Scripture,” which is made by “those who ground their theology, professedly, at least, upon an induction of individual passages, as though each passage, *independently of the spirit of the whole*, were of divine authority.” “To suppose that we should gain the slightest advantage,” by accuracy of definitions, and consistency of reasoning, on the part of the sacred writers, “implies,” he informs us,† “an entire misapprehension of what a revelation really is, and of what is the *sole method* by which it is possible to construct a valid theology. An actual revelation can only be made

* p. 205. † p. 175.

to the intuitional faculty, and a valid theology can *only be constructed* by giving a formal expression to the intuitions thus granted." We understand these passages, especially when taken in connection with the spirit of the whole discussion, as distinctly asserting the proposition that theology, as a formal statement of doctrine, can *never* be divinely communicated, and that upon the ground, that it involves elements which are incompatible with the very nature of revelation—a *revealed* theology being a contradiction in terms. Clearly, if "the giving of a formal expression to the intuitions" of religion, be the *sole* method by which it is *possible* to construct it—there is no place for an authoritative standard of faith.

Now does the author's theory of revelation, admitting it to be true, preclude the *possibility* of a *divine* theology? We shall not deny—for we have no disposition to dispute about a word—that it is inconsistent with a *revealed* theology, in the *author's sense* of the term. We may here take occasion to say that much of the impression which his reasoning makes upon the mind of his readers, is due to the ambiguity of language. *They*, from old associations and familiar usage, mean *one* thing by revelation; and he, *another*; and it is hard to keep distinctly in view that conclusions, which may be legitimate in *his* sense, may not be legitimate in *theirs*. If Mr. Morell chooses to restrict the application of the term to the subjective processes by which the mind is brought into contact with spiritual realities, and then infers that an external standard of faith cannot be a revelation—the inference may be just—but it no more concludes against the reality or possibility of such a standard, than to restrict the term animal, exclusively, to quadrupeds, and then infer that neither men nor birds were animals, concludes against the truth of their existence, or their possession of life. What Mr. Morell undertakes to settle, is not a question of words and names: not whether the Bible shall receive this title or that, (no one dreams that it is a spiritual vision, or any special mode of intelligence,) but whether God *can* communicate in writing or in any other form, a perfect logical exposition of those very intuitions, which he makes it the office of revelation to impart. That such a divine communication is, in the

nature of the case, *impossible*—not that it cannot be *called* by a given name—is what he represents his theory of revelation as necessarily involving, and what, if it does not involve, it is not pertinent to the argument.

This theory is designed to give an answer to the question—*in what manner* does a man become a Christian? The essential elements, included in that form of man's religious life which he denominates the Christian consciousness, having been previously enumerated, he proceeds, in his account of revelation, to describe the "process by which such phenomena of man's interior being are produced—the secret link which unites them with an outward causality, and the laws by which they are brought into existence, regulated, and finally developed to their full maturity." It is only "in relation to the *method*, by which it is communicated to the human mind," that Christianity can be properly designated "as A REVELATION from God."* That is, if we understand the author, it is the office of revelation to excite the emotions which are characteristic and distinctive of the religion of Jesus. It has reference, therefore, exclusively to what, in common language, would be styled experimental religion, and includes nothing but the means by which the state of heart is engendered, which entitles a man to be considered as a real, in contradistinction from a formal believer.

But as religion consists, essentially, in emotions; and emotions are dependent upon that form of intelligence which supplies the objects adapted to awaken them—a direct correspondency always subsisting between the intellectual and emotional activity—the question arises, to which faculty are we indebted for the objects that awaken religious emotions? We must *know* them—they must be *present* to the mind, or no affections can be excited; through what form of intelligence, then, do we become cognizant of spiritual realities? The answer is, intuition.

"In considering, then, under which of the two great generic modes of intelligence, we have to class the particular case involved in the idea of a revelation, we can have but little hesitation in referring it, at once, to the category of intuition. The idea of a revelation is universally considered to imply a case of

* p. 122.

intelligence in which something is presented *directly* to the mind of the subject; in which it is conveyed by the immediate agency of God himself; in which our own efforts would have been unavailing to attain the same conceptions; in which the truth communicated could not have been drawn by inference from any data previously known; and, finally, in which the whole result is one lying beyond the reach of the logical understanding."—*p.* 126.

The author, then, proceeds to run the parallel betwixt this account of revelation and intuition in its lowest form, that of external perception, and finding a perfect correspondence, he does not hesitate to rank them as kindred species of the same mode of intellectual activity. But to make assurance doubly sure, he undertakes to show that revelation *cannot* be addressed to the understanding—"that the whole of the *logical* processes of the human mind are such, that the idea of a revelation is altogether incompatible with them; that they are in no sense open to its influence, and that they can neither be improved nor assisted by it."* His meaning is that no new original elements of knowledge, or as Locke would call them, no new simple ideas, can be imparted to the mind by definition, analysis or reasoning. He regards revelation as a source of original and peculiar ideas—like the eye or the ear, or what Hutcheson felicitously styles the internal senses of the mind. "The object of a revelation, is to bring us altogether into another and higher region of actual experience, to increase our mental vision, to give us new data from which we may draw new inferences, and all this lies quite apart from the activity of the logical faculty."†

The author still further, though not more plainly, develops his views in the answer he returns to the question, "could not a revelation from God consist in an exposition of truth, made to us by the lips or from the pen of an inspired messenger, that exposition coming distinctly under the idea of a *logical explication of doctrines*, which it is for mankind to receive, as sent to us on divine authority." Let us hear him upon this point:

"Now this is a case of considerable complexity, and one which

* *p.* 131.† *p.* 133.

we must essay as clearly as possible to unravel. First of all, then, we have no doubt whatever but that there have been agents commissioned by God to bring mankind to a proper conception of divine truth, and comprehension of the divine will. But now let us look a little more closely into their real mission, and consider the means by which alone it was possible for them to fulfil it.

“These divine messengers, we will suppose, address their fellow-men in the words and phrases they are accustomed to hear, and seek in this way to expound to them the truth of God. If we imagine ourselves, then, to be the listeners, it is needless to say, that so long as they treat of ideas which lie *within* the range of our present experience, we should be well able at once to comprehend them, and to judge of the grounds on which they urge them upon our attention. But it is manifest that such a discourse as I describe could in no proper sense be termed a *revelation*. So long as the divine teacher keeps within the range of our present intellectual experience, he might indeed throw things into a new light, he might point out more accurately their connexion, he might show us at once their importance and their logical consistency; but all this would not amount to a *revelation*, it would give us no *immediate* manifestation of truth from God, it would offer no conceptions lying beyond the range of our present data, it would quite fail in bringing us into contact with new realities, nor would it at all extend the sweep of our mental vision. Mere exposition always *presupposes* some familiarity with the subject in hand; one idea has always, in such a case, to be explained by another; but supposing there to be an entire blindness of mind upon the whole question, then it is manifest that all mere logical definition and explication is for the time entirely thrown away.

“Illustrations of this are as numerous as are the sciences, or the subjects of human research. Let a man, for example, totally unacquainted with the matter, hear another converse with the greatest clearness about differential quantities in physics or mathematics—how much of the explanation would he be able to comprehend? He has not yet the experiences of space, number, or motion, on which the intelligibility of the whole depends; and in want of these, the whole of the explanations offered are involved in the darkest obscurity. Take up any other subject, such as biology, ethics, or metaphysics, in their higher and more recondite branches. Explication here is of no avail, unless the mind first realize for itself, and reproduce in its own thinking, the fundamental conceptions of the teacher. What is

true of perceptive teaching, in the case of the infant, is true, in a modified sense, of all human education, to the most advanced stage of intelligence. You must, in every instance alike take proper means to awaken the power of vision within, to furnish direct experiences to the mind, in brief, to give clear intuitions of the *elements* of truth, before you can produce any effect by the most complete process of defining or explanation.

Let us return, then, to the supposed case of the inspired teacher, and proceed with our analysis of the conditions that are necessary to his becoming the medium of a revelation, properly so called. We have seen that, if he always kept within the region of our present experience, there would be no fresh revelation made to us at all: but now, let us imagine him to *transcend* the present sphere of our mental vision;—it is evident from what I have first said, that in such a case we should be by no means in a condition to comprehend his meaning; on the supposition, of course, that he was to confine himself to *mere exposition*. The only way in which he could give us a revelation of truth hitherto unrealized, would be by becoming the agent of elevating our inward religious consciousness up to the same or a similar standard as his own; which is the same thing as if we had said that all revelation, properly so called, can be made to us primarily only in the form of religious *intuition*.”—pp. 134—137.

We have now said enough to put our readers completely in possession of the author's views of revelation. It implies a direct perception of spiritual realities—a gazing upon eternal verities, which, upon the principle that the eye affects the heart, produces those peculiar emotions in which the essence of religion consists. It communicates to us the elemental ideas of all religious knowledge—the primary data, without which the science of theology would be as unmeaning as the science of optics to a man born blind. As perception gives us all our original and simple ideas of matter—the moral sense, our notions of the good—taste, our notions of the beautiful and sublime—so revelation imparts to us the ideas of God, of Christ, of redemption and of sin. The subjective processes in all these cases are the same. Nature, the beautiful, the good, are just as truly and properly revelations, as the verities embraced in Christian experience. There was, however, in the case of Christianity, a series of “divine arrangements, through the medium of which the loftiest and purest conceptions

of truth were brought before the immediate consciousness of the apostles, and through them, of the whole age; at a time, too, when, in other respects, the most universal demoralization abounded on every side.* These arrangements the author admits to be supernatural—the result of a “divine plan, altogether distinct from the general scheme of providence as regards human developement.” But the revelation consequent upon them is purely natural—man was elevated to a mountain which commanded prospects beyond the ordinary range of his eyes—but the vision which ensued was in strict obedience to the laws of sight.

Now we ask our readers to ponder carefully this account of revelation, and to lay their fingers on the principle which either directly or indirectly proves, that a perfect standard of theology cannot be imparted to us by God, or that any and every theology *must* be the offspring of the human understanding. This account, we are told, is at once a protest and an argument against the popular notions on the subject. The protest we can find—it is patent on every page—but the *argument* we are utterly unable to discover. Does it follow that because religion, as a matter of experience, is divine, therefore theology, as a matter of science, *must* be human? Does it follow that because God gives us all the direct and immediate cognitions out of which the science can be *framed*, therefore, He is unable to construct the science Himself? Does it follow that because He makes us feel and see, therefore, He is incompetent to describe either our visions or emotions? We confess that our sincerest efforts cannot render palpable to our thinking faculty the least incongruity betwixt the notions of a divine theology, and a revealed religion in the sense of Mr. Morell. For aught that we can see to the contrary, his whole psychology might be granted—all that he says of the understanding and intuition—their differences and relations—with his whole scheme of revelation—all might be granted—and yet nothing be conceded at all destructive of the doctrine, that we have a faith, ready developed to our hands, which we are bound to receive upon the authority of God. We might no longer call it a *revealed* faith, but it would be none the less infallible and divine on that account.

* p. 145.

Mr. Morell admits that man can construct a theology for himself, that he is able to give a definite form and scientific basis to his religious life, and to the spiritual truth involved in it." The intuitions of religion, like all other intuitions, can be submitted to the operations of the understanding; they can be compared, classified and arranged; they are as really the materials of a science as the facts of perception, or the phenomena of conscience. Now what is there in the process of constructing a science from religion, which limits it exclusively to man? Is there any absurdity in supposing that God can communicate, in writing or in some other form, a perfect logical exposition of all the intuitions which, in every stage of its religious history, the human mind is capable of experiencing? any absurdity in supposing that God can do perfectly and infallibly for His weak and ignorant creatures what it is conceded they can do imperfectly and fallibly for themselves? What is there inconceivable in God's giving a logical and formal expression to the religious mind of man? We do not deny that a divine theology, though it might be strictly scientific in its form, and capable of the same proofs to which all human sciences appeal, must yet challenge our assent upon a higher ground. It is to be received—not because it accords with our experience, but because it is the testimony of God. It comes to us and *must* come to us with authority. It is truth because it proceeds from the fountain of truth. If Mr. Morell contends that this peculiarity removes it from the category of science, we shall not dispute about a word; all that we contend for is, that it is and must be a more full and complete representation of all the phenomena of religion than reflection itself could give with the aid of the best conceivable organon, applied to intuitions as strong, distinct and clear as the most definite perceptions of sense.

It is clear that Mr. Morell, in representing his scheme of revelation as an *a priori* argument against the possibility of a divine theology, has quietly assumed that the agency there described is the *sole* agency of the Deity in relation to the religion of His creatures. He seems to think that the Almighty exhausted Himself in the production of spiritual perceptions, and therefore, *could* not reduce them to the forms of the understanding; that in the process of engen-

dering religion he lost the ability to describe it. But where is the proof that revelation, in our author's sense, includes the *whole* agency of God? Not a particle is adduced—and hence as a divine theology is not inconsistent with a revealed religion—as there is no shadow of contradiction betwixt them—and not the slightest proof that the revelation of religion is the only form in which God condescends to His ignorant and sinful creatures, Mr. Morell has signally failed to establish, on philosophical grounds, the human origin of theology. His premises do not contain his conclusion. For aught that he has alleged to the contrary, we may be as truly indebted to the divine benignity for a perfect and infallible standard of faith as for those other operations in consequence of which we feel the pulsations of the Christian life.

The only thing, indeed; in the whole chapter on revelation, which seems remotely to bear upon the subject, is the passage already quoted, in which he states the question only to evade it. He shows, indeed, that a logical explication of doctrines could not awaken ideas in a mind destitute of the capacity to apprehend them. We may cheerfully concede that no painting can make a blind man see, that no musick can ravish a deaf man with the rapture of its sounds; but still the painting and the musick may both exist and be perfect in their kind. No one claims for a divine theology the power of making men Christians; it is universally conceded that the letter killeth; but the controversy betwixt Mr. Morell and the popular faith is whether that letter can exist. It is a poor evasion to say that because it cannot perform an office which no one has ever thought of ascribing to it, that, therefore, it is essentially and necessarily inconceivable as a real and substantive entity. All that our author proves is that it cannot enlighten; that it can impart no new simple idea; that it presupposes all the elemental germs of thought which enter into theology, as natural philosophy presupposes the informations of sense, and psychology those of consciousness. It supposes, in other words, that men are capable of religion, but it by no means follows that because a divine theology can neither create the religious faculty nor immediately produce its appropriate intuitions, therefore it cannot express them with logical exactness, nor describe

the objects on which they are dependent. Moral philosophy cannot originate a conscience, but it may still be a scientific exhibition of all the operations of the moral nature. What Mr. Morell's argument requires him to prove is that a divine theology is impossible—that a science of religion being admitted, that science *cannot* be imparted to us by God; it *must*, from the nature of the case, be *human* in its origin; and this proposition is not affected by the inadequacy of such a science to accomplish a certain subjective effect, unless it can be shown that its ability to do this is the condition of its existence.

But, perhaps, the proof we are seeking may be found in the chapter on Inspiration. It is the object of that chapter to show that

“Inspiration does not imply any thing generically new in the actual processes of the human mind; it does not involve any form of intelligence essentially different from what we already possess; it indicates rather the elevation of the religious consciousness, and with it, of course, the power of spiritual vision, to a degree of intensity, peculiar to the individuals thus highly favoured. We must regard the whole process of inspiration, accordingly, as being in no sense *mechanical*, but purely dynamical; involving, not a novel and supernatural faculty, but a faculty already enjoyed, elevated *supernaturally* to an extraordinary power and susceptibility; indicating, in fact, an inward nature so perfectly harmonized to the divine, so freed from the distorting influences of prejudice, passion and sin, so simply recipient of the divine ideas circumambient around it, so responsive in all its strings to the breath of heaven, that truth leaves an impress upon it which answers perfectly to the objective reality.”—*p.* 151.

All which, being interpreted, is that inspiration and holiness, or sanctification, are synonymous terms. The author apprehends, in its literal sense, the benediction of our Saviour on the pure in heart, and makes them seem not only of God, but of those things of God, which the apostle assures us, none can understand but the Spirit of God Himself. It will certainly strike our readers as a novelty, that there should be any inconsistency betwixt the grace of holiness and the gift of knowledge. They will be slow to comprehend how sanctification and instruction *can* be contradictory processes—so much so, that He who *sanctifies* cannot *teach*. Sanctify them through thy truth—

thy word is truth—through sanctification of the spirit and belief of the truth. For aught that we can see it may be granted to the author, that the measure of piety is the exact measure of ability to appreciate, to understand, to know divine truth, that holiness is essential to a living faith, and yet it will not follow that God cannot communicate the truth, with which, as holy beings, we are brought into harmony. If our holiness were perfect, it would enable us, according to the author, to apprehend the objects of religion in their concrete reality, but not in their scientific form; and there is nothing absurd in the idea, that the things which have aroused our moral sensibilities should be presented, in their full and perfect proportions, to the contemplation of the understanding.

It may be objected, however, that although Mr. Morell's philosophy does not prove a divine theology to be impossible or absurd, in the strict acceptance of the terms, yet it demonstrates, what, in reference to any dispensation of God, amounts to the same thing, that it is unnecessary or useless. This is no doubt the *real* scope of his argument, though he has been bold enough to assert that the *only way*, the *sole method* by which a valid theology can be constructed, is by human reflection on the phenomena of religion. But widely different as the issues of possibility and expediency evidently are, we shall concede, in the present instance, that the proof of uselessness is tantamount to the proof of absurdity, and proceed to inquire how Mr. Morell has succeeded in even this aspect of the case. "To a man utterly ignorant," says he,* "of all spiritual conceptions, and altogether insensible to divine things, the mere exposition of the truths and doctrines of Christianity is *useless*. He does not grasp them at all in their proper meaning and intensity; ranging as they do beyond the sphere of his present experience, the very terms of the propositions employed awaken no corresponding idea within his mind." That is—theology, under a certain contingency, is *powerless* to produce a given effect. But a specific incompetency and a general uselessness are very different things. Because, in a "man utterly ignorant of all spiritual conceptions and altogether insensible to divine

* p. 137.

things," the mere exposition of the truths and doctrines of Christianity cannot supply the place of faculties to apprehend them, it by no means follows, that to the man who has spiritual conceptions and is "sensible to divine things," that theology may not be of incalculable service. To a man destitute of senses, natural philosophy would, no doubt, be a very unintelligible jargon—but does it follow that it must be correspondingly useless to one who has all the simple ideas of which it is composed? But Mr. Morell has himself settled the question. He represents theology, in our present condition, as a *necessity** of our nature, and ascribes to it offices of immense importance in the development of the religious life. It is true that he has his eye only on *human* theology, but the uses which he admits are not at all dependent upon its *origin*, but upon its *truth*. It answers these valuable ends, not because it has been reached by reflection, but because it has a real existence and is capable of a real application. It is the thing itself which is useful, and not the mode of its discovery. It would seem, too, that the more perfect it was, the better; and that the circumstance of its being divine, so far from detracting from its value, would immensely enhance it. Let us now attend to the author's admissions:

"Theology, having once been created, can be presented didactically to the understanding before there is any awakening of the religious nature, and can even lead the mind to whom it is presented to such an interest in the subject as may issue in his spiritual enlightenment.—*p.* 207.

Here it is obvious that the use of the theology is not at all dependent upon its origin—it is useful to a mind which has not been in a situation to construct a system reflectively for itself. This is just what we attribute to a divine theology; it is the means under God of awakening the religious nature, the incorruptible seed by which we are begotten to newness of life, and the standard to which all our experiences must be brought, and by which their soundness must be tried. This single consideration, that the science of religion may be the means of awakening the religious nature, that theology may be the parent of piety, is enough to set aside all that the author has said against

* *p.* 196.

the value of a logical exposition of the truths and doctrines of Christianity.

The following remarks, professedly intended to elucidate the subject, are applicable with tenfold power to such a system as the Bible claims to be. We ask nothing more than what the author has himself suggested to remove all cavils against the letter because it killeth, while the spirit only is competent to quicken into life :

“The uses of Christian Theology are :—

1. To show the internal consistency of religious truth. Little as we need to see this consistency whilst our inmost souls are burning with a deep and holy enthusiasm, yet in the ordinary state of human life, beset as we are with a thousand repressive influences, it is highly important to strengthen ourselves with every kind of armour against scepticism and indifference. In proportion as our zeal and excitement become cooler, do we need so much the more the concurring testimony of reason to support us in the pursuit of the Christian life. It is upon this we fall back, when the fire of life burns dim, until we can kindle it again from the altar of God. Hence the importance of having Christian truth presented to us in such a form, that we may see its harmony with all the laws of our intellectual being, and have *their* witness to seal its truth on our hearts.

“2. Another use of Christian Theology is to repel philosophical objections. The unbeliever has not the witness within himself; and what is more, he would fain destroy the validity of the truths of Christianity to others, by affirming their inconsistency with reason or with one another. The moral influences of the religious life do not *answer* these objections, although they may disarm them greatly of their force. To answer them, the truth conveyed in the religious life must be made reflective and scientific;—then, indeed, and not till then, can itself be maintained, and its consistency be defended upon the grounds of the philosophical objector himself.

3. A third use of Christian Theology is to preserve mankind from vague enthusiasm. A strong religious excitement is not inconsistent with a weak judgment, a feeble conscience, and active tendencies to folly, and even sin. Under such circumstances, the power of the emotions will sometimes overbalance the better dictates of Christian faith, love, and obedience, so as to impel the subject of them into something bordering upon fanaticism. Against this evil, religion alone is often unable to struggle; it needs the stronger element of calm reason to curb these wandering impulses, and bring them into due subjection to duty and

to truth. Here, then, the influence of *theology* bears upon the whole case; and to its power is it mainly owing that the intense incentives offered by Christianity to the emotive nature of man have been so ordered and directed as to keep him from vague enthusiasm in his belief, and an unsafe fanaticism in his actions.

"4. The last use we mention to which theology may be applied, is, to embody our religious ideas in a complete and connected system. In this form they appeal to every element in the nature of man. The moral influence they exert upon the whole spirit is coupled with the power of their appeal to the reason, and the intellect of mankind becomes *satisfied* as his heart becomes softened and renewed.

"Such in brief are some of the principal uses of theology formally considered."—*pp.* 225—227.

Having shown that our author has signally failed in his *a priori* argument against the existence of a divine standard of theology, that is, that his philosophy even upon the supposition of its truth, is not inconsistent with the popular faith in regard to the *authority* of the Bible, we shall next notice the several considerations by which he attempts to prove that, as a matter of fact, no such divine standard has ever been vouchsafed to our race. His first argument is drawn from the proofs by which Christianity has been revealed to man.

"The aim of revelation," he informs us, "has not been formally to expound a system of doctrine to the understanding, but to educate the mind of man gradually to an inward appreciation of the truth concerning his own relation to God. Judaism was a propædeutic to Christianity; but there was no formal definition of any one spiritual truth in the whole of that economy. The purpose of it was to school the mind to spiritual contemplation; to awaken the religious consciousness by types and symbols, and other perceptive means, to the realization of certain great spiritual ideas; and to furnish words and analogies in which the truths of Christianity could be embodied and proclaimed to the world. If we pass on to the Christian revelation itself, the mode of procedure, we find, was generically the same. There was no *formal* exposition of Christian doctrine in the whole of the discourses of the Saviour. His life and teaching, his character and suffering, his death and resurrection, all appealed to the deeper religious nature of man; they were adapted to awaken it to a newer and higher activity; instead of offering a mere explication to the understanding, they were intended to fur-

nish altogether new experiences, to widen the sphere of our spiritual insight, to embody a *revelation from God*. The apostles followed in the same course. They did not start from Jerusalem with a system of doctrine to propound intellectually to the world. It would have been no revelation to the world if they had; for with his moral and spiritual nature sunk down into insensibility and sin, man would have had no real spiritual perception associated with the very terms in which their arguments and propositions must have been couched. The apostles went forth to awaken man's power of spiritual intuition; to impress upon the world the great conceptions of sin, of righteousness, of judgment to come, of salvation, of purity, and of heavenly love. This they did by their lives, their teaching, their spiritual *intensity* in action and suffering, their whole testimony to the word, the person, the death and the resurrection of the Saviour."—pp. 139—40.

We do not remember ever to have seen a more signal exemplification of a theory breaking down under its own weight, than that which is presented in the preceding extract. The end of all revelation is to furnish, we are told, intuitional perceptions of religious truth; it cannot, therefore, be addressed to the understanding, neither can it contain logical and definite statements of doctrine. But still this revelation is to be imparted through the instrumentality of commissioned agents, and these agents fulfil their vocation by *teaching*. Now if the reader will turn to the second chapter of our author's book, in which the distinctions are drawn out at length betwixt the intuitional and logical consciousness, he will find that the very first point insisted on, is that the "knowledge we obtain by the logical consciousness is *representative and indirect*; while that which we obtain by the intuitional consciousness is *presentative and immediate*." To produce an intuition, consequently, the mind and the object must be brought together in actual contact. It must not be some description or representation, but the reality of truth itself which must stand face to face with the knowing subject. Where essential existence, or original elements of knowledge are concerned, the power of language is utterly inadequate to convey any ideas to the mind; the intuitions themselves must exist, or all efforts to awaken the conceptions are utterly hopeless. If, in conformity with these principles, Christ and His Apostles were commissioned to

make a revelation to men whose moral and spiritual nature was sunk down into insensibility and sin, all that they could have done was to present the spiritual realities which they themselves apprehended, and then impart a corresponding power to perceive them. They went, according to the theory, among the blind, to make known glorious objects of sight. Their first business must have been to place the objects within the reach of the eye, and then purge the eyes to behold them. This is the only way in which we can conceive that they could have succeeded in effecting vision. But what has *teaching* to do with this process? All the knowledge acquired from another, through the medium of signs, is indirect and representative; and, therefore, addressed not to intuition, but to the understanding. How will our author explain this inconsistency? He, in the first place, represents Christ and His Apostles as spiritual mesmerizers, whose whole business it is to bring their fellow-men face to face with a class of transcendental realities, and then, at the very time that he is disproving the possibility of an appeal to the understanding, he converts them into teachers, dealing not with the realities themselves, but with their signs and logical exponents. They awaken intuitions by *teaching*! Hence upon his own admission, the process by which Christianity has been revealed to man, is *not* in accordance with the fundamental principles of his system. The inconsistency of his statements is still more glaring in reference to the Mosaic institute. That, it seems, was a propædeutic to Christianity; but it had nothing logical, nothing in the way of representative instruction; and *yet awakened the religious consciousness by types and symbols*. Now we would humbly ask what are types and symbols, but a *language* through which, in the one case, instruction is communicated by means of analogy, and in the other by means of visible and significant signs?—In what way could these figured representations of truth suggest the spiritual realities to the mind, but through the operations of the understanding, comparing the type with the anti-type—the sign with the thing signified? From the author's own account, then, it is evident that both Judaism and Christianity were propagated by appeals to the understanding; that the agents of the revelation, in

both cases, were, in the strict and proper sense of the term, teachers, and that it was a part of their commission to embody, in language of some sort, the high conceptions to which they were anxious to elevate their race. These conceptions, when embodied in language, became doctrines; so that there must have been, to the same extent to which Christ and His Apostles were teachers, "a formal exposition of Christian doctrine."

But we would ask our author how, apart from didactic appeals—which, we have already seen, he confesses may be the means of spiritual awakening—spiritual intuitions could be engendered by any merely human agency? In what way is it possible for one man to present a spiritual reality to another, except through its verbal sign, or by a description of the occasions on which the intuitions are experienced? His whole office *must* be logical. He can neither give eyes to see, nor can he bring the objects themselves in their essential and substantive existence into contact with the mind. He can, in other words, *do nothing*, according to Mr. Morell's own psychology, but make a logical statement of his own experiences. How could the Apostles, for example, impress upon the world the great conceptions of sin, of righteousness, of judgment to come, of salvation, of purity, of heavenly love, but by some definite, that is to say, logical expression of these very conceptions as they existed in their own minds; or if they were simple and elementary ideas, by referring to the occasions or circumstances connected with their first suggestion to themselves. The *intuitions* they could no more produce, than they could create a soul. Through a strong ideal presence of the scenes amid which their own experiences had been awakened, they might rouse the latent susceptibilities of their hearers—but their office terminated with the descriptions suited to produce this presence, which is purely a logical process. "Their testimony to the word, the person, the death and the resurrection of the Saviour," must, in the same way, have been conveyed in words—they could only hope to reach the sensibilities through the understanding—they could set Christ and his life in vivid distinctness before the minds of men, but it could only be by signs which represented the realities—and therefore their appeals must

have been exclusively logical. Their intensity in action and suffering, as a mere phenomenon, suggested no definite idea—it might have been madness, fanaticism or any other extravagance—it could have no moral import to spectators, until it was explained—and we see no way of explaining it but by signs which should represent the moral enthusiasm from which it sprung. Hence, according to the author's own showing, the labours of Apostles and Evangelists were confined exclusively to the faculty which deals with signs. They testified to facts, and embodied in words the great moral conceptions which these facts involved ; and hence Christianity, then, *was diffused*, so far as the agency of men was employed, by addresses to the logical faculty. The Apostles taught, testified, acted—their teaching and testimony were obviously to the understanding, and action has no meaning except as its principles and motives are understood. Direct appeals to the intuitional consciousness would evidently have been preposterous. That faculty deals immediately with things themselves—and unless the Apostles were gifted with power to command the presence of spiritual realities at pleasure—to bring God and Heaven and Hell into direct contact with the minds of men—and possessed a similar power over the hardened hearts, the slumbering consciences, and the stupid sensibility of their age—unless they could give eyes to the blind, and ears to the deaf—to have sent them into the world to awaken religious intuitions, would have been about as sensible an errand as to have sent them into a cemetery, to quicken corpses and make the dead entranced admirers of the beauty of nature. If they were to be debarred from addressing the understanding, we are utterly at a loss to conceive in what manner they would proceed. Mr. Morell has involved himself in perplexity and contradiction by confounding the real mission of the Apostles, which was purely logical, and from the nature of the case could not have been otherwise, with the results which God intended to effect, and which, if he likes the expression, were purely intuitional. The whole process, as it is described in the New Testament, is plain, simple, intelligible. It consisted, in the first place, in that very logical explication or statement of doctrines which Mr. Morell so much abhors ;

and then in a process of supernatural illumination, which it was the prerogative of God alone to communicate.—The Apostles described the realities of religion, and the Holy Ghost enabled the hearers to understand. They made the sounds, the Spirit imparted the hearing ear; they presented the scenes, the Spirit gave the seeing eye; they announced the truth, the Spirit vouchsafed the understanding heart. They, in other words, upon the authority of God, proclaimed an infallible theology; and the Spirit of all Grace produced the religion of which that theology was the logical expression. He used their truth to renew, to sanctify, to purify, to save. Their business was to *teach*; it was the office of an agent more august and glorious than themselves to awaken the conceptions which that teaching embodied.

It is particularly in the chapter on Inspiration, that the author points out the difficulties with which the vulgar theory of the divine authority of the Scriptures is encumbered. We have seen that he regards inspiration as equivalent to holiness; and most of the chapter is occupied in refuting what he has chosen to designate the mechanical view of the question. It is, of course, indispensable to the authority of the Scriptures, as the word of God, that the men who wrote them should have written as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. Any hypothesis which sets aside a divine testimony to every statement and doctrine of the Bible, is inconsistent with the exercise of that faith which the Scriptures exact, and which is the only adequate foundation of infallible assurance. So far as responsible authorship is concerned, a divine rule of faith must be the production of God. The object of such a rule is not simply to give us truth, but truth which we know to be truth, specifically on the ground that the Lord has declared it. Hence the theory of "verbal dictation," which our author declares,* "has been so generally abandoned by the thoughtful in the present day," is the only theory which we have ever regarded as consistent with the exigencies of the case—the only theory which makes the Bible what it professes to be, the WORD OF GOD, and an adequate and perfect measure of

* p. 154.

our faith. If its contents, in any instances, however insignificant, rest only upon the testimony of the human agents employed in writing it; in those instances we can only believe in man; the statements may be true, but they cease to be divine and infallible; and the assent which we yield to them becomes opinion and not faith.— If, therefore, the author has succeeded in demolishing the theory of verbal dictation, or of a distinct commission, which he treats separately, though they are only different expressions of the same thing, it must be confessed that, however he has failed in his philosophy, he has completely triumphed in the *a posteriori* aspect of his argument.

His first consideration is, that “there is no *positive* evidence of such a verbal dictation having been granted.”— This is summary enough. But the reason assigned is still more remarkable.

“The supposition of its existence would demand a two-fold kind of inspiration; each kind entirely distinct from the other. The Apostles, it is admitted, were inspired to preach and to teach *orally*, but we have the most positive evidence that this commission did not extend to their very words. Often they were involved in minor misconceptions; and sometimes they taught specific notions inconsistent with a pure spiritual Christianity, as Peter did when he was chided by Paul. The *verbal* scheme, therefore, demands the admission of *one* kind of inspiration having been given to the Apostles as men, thinkers, moral agents and preachers, and another kind having been granted to them *as writers*.”—*p* 155.

In the first place, this two-fold inspiration is the result of Mr. Morell's own arbitrary use of language. If he chooses to describe the influences under which men are converted and sanctified as *one* kind of inspiration, the theory of verbal dictation, of course, implies another; but another, by no means inconsistent with the former. The process by which a man is transferred from sin to holiness, is very different from the process by which he receives a message to be announced in the terms of its conveyance. There is nothing in personal integrity incompatible with the office of a secretary or amanuensis.

In the next place, Mr. Morell begs the question in assuming that the commission of the Apostles as teachers

and preachers, involved no other inspiration but that which changed their hearts. The very stress of the controversy turns upon the question—what was the Apostolick commission? Whatsoever it was, it is universally conceded, that it extended to their writings in exactly the same sense in which it extended to their preaching. If their preaching, in the discharge of their functions as Apostles, were not verbally dictated, no more were their letters. If they *spoke* not by the Holy Ghost, neither did they *write* under His suggestions. “But,” says our author, “we have the most positive evidence that this commission did not extend to their very words.” This, if it could be proved, would settle the question. But there is something in the first commission which our Saviour gave to the twelve, when He sent them out to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, which seems to be in such palpable contradiction to this confident assumption, that we must be permitted to hesitate whether the evidence can be regarded as superlatively positive. “Behold,” says the Master, “I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves—be ye, therefore, wise as serpents, and harmless as doves. But beware of men; for they will deliver you up to the councils; and they will scourge you in their synagogues; and ye shall be brought before Governors and Kings for my sake, for a testimony against them and the Gentiles. But when they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak; for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak. FOR IT IS NOT YE THAT SPEAK, BUT THE SPIRIT OF YOUR FATHER WHICH SPEAKETH IN YOU.” Or, as it is more pointedly in Mark, “IT IS NOT YE THAT SPEAK, BUT THE HOLY GHOST.” Paul, too, for whom, by the way, the author has no great partiality, professed to speak the things which had been freely revealed to him of God, “not in the words which man’s wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth;” and had the arrogance to treat his communications “as the commandments of the Lord.” But what is the *most positive evidence* to which Mr. Morell refers? Why, that the Apostles “were often involved in minor misconceptions, and sometimes they taught specific notions, inconsistent with a pure spiritual Christianity, as Peter did when he was chided by Paul.” Peter *taught* no such thing. He was

guilty of dissimulation *in conduct*. He knew the truth and acted in consistency with it before that certain came from James, but when they were come, he was tempted to humour their prejudices. Paul reprov'd him distinctly upon the ground that he was acting in contradiction to what he knew to be the truth of the Gospel. This case, therefore, only proves that Peter, as a man, was partially sanctified; it does not prove that, as an Apostle, he was permitted to fall into doctrinal error. As to the other minor misconceptions, to which our author refers, it will be time to explain them when we know what they are.—Mean while, we may be permitted to remark that, in this case of Peter, the author has confounded holiness of character with the Apostolick commission. The only inspiration which he seems able to conceive, is that of personal purity; and if a man has any remnants of sin cleaving to his flesh or his spirit, he is, accordingly to Mr. Morell, imperfectly inspired. This, we repeat, is a begging of the question. No one maintains that the Apostles, as men, were perfect; they were sinners, under the dominion of grace; but as Apostles, in their official relations, it is the doctrine of the popular faith, that they were the organs of the Holy Spirit in communicating to the Church an infallible rule of faith and practice. It is no presumption against this hypothesis, that they were subject to the weaknesses of fallen humanity; the treasure was put in earthen vessels, that the excellency of the power might be confessed as springing from God. It is surely miserable sophistry—when the very question in debate is, what was the Apostolick commission—quietly to assume a theory, and then make that theory the pretext for rejecting another account. And yet this is what our author has done; he assumes that the Apostolick commission consisted exclusively in the elevation of the religious sensibilities, and then upon the ground of this assumption, rejects the hypothesis of verbal dictation, as requiring a commission, for the writers, distinct from that of the Apostolick office. We suspect that it would be no hard matter to prove any proposition, in heaven or earth, if we can only be indulged in the liberty of taking our premises for granted.

The author's second argument,* upon which, very prudently, he does not insist, is drawn "from the fact, that we find a distinctive style, maintained by each separate author." He regards it "as a highly improbable and even extravagant supposition, without the most positive proof of it being offered, that each writer should manifest his own modes of thought, his own temperament of mind, his own educational influence, his own peculiar phraseology; and yet, notwithstanding this, every word should have been dictated to him by the Holy Spirit." If Mr. Morell had investigated, a little more fully than he seems to have done, the grounds of the popular faith, he might have found in this very circumstance, which he considers so extremely improbable and extravagant, a fresh illustration of the wisdom of God. The external proofs of inspiration, which consist in the signs of an apostle or prophet, found either in the writer himself, or some one commissioned to vouch for his production, require, in most cases, a knowledge of the author. And in conducting an inquiry upon this point, the internal evidence, arising from style, structure and habits of thought, materially contributes to a satisfactory result. In the first stage of the investigation we consider the productions simply as human compositions, and God has wisely distributed the gift of inspiration so that while He is responsible for all that is said, the individual peculiarities of the agent shall designate the person whose instrumentality He employed. He has facilitated our inquiry into the human organ of the Holy Spirit. Having ascertained ourselves as to the human authors or their works, the next question is—as to the claims which they themselves put forward to divine direction. What are these claims and how are they substantiated? If they pretend to a verbal dictation and then adduce the credentials sufficient to authenticate it, we have all, which, in the way of external evidence, could be reasonably exacted. The epistle to the Romans, for example, is put into our hands as a part of the word of God. The first question is—who wrote it? If it can be traced to Paul, we know that he was an apostle of the Saviour and enjoyed whatever inspiration was attached to the apostolick office. He possessed in an eminent degree the signs of an apostle, and if it were one of

* p. 156.

the privileges of the office, that those who were called to it should, in their publick instructions and testimonies for Jesus, speak the language of the Holy Ghost, as soon as we are convinced that Paul was the writer of the document, its ultimate emanation from God is settled. Now it obviously facilitates this inquiry to have the mind of Paul stamped upon the letter—to have it distinctly impressed with his image, while it contains nothing but the true and faithful sayings of God. It is consequently no presumption against the divine dictation of a book, that it should exhibit traces of the hand that was employed.

The third argument* mistakes altogether the very end of inspiration. The object was to furnish a statement of facts and an exhibition of doctrines, which should be received with a faith infallible and divine, upon the sole consideration that God was the author of both. Its design was to give us a *rule of faith* and *not a standard of opinion*. It was to be a divine testimony—and therefore whatever might be the moral and religious qualifications of the writers—however competent they might have been upon their own authority to have told us the same things, their words could, in no sense, be received as the real oracles of God. The Lord Himself must speak; and this being the purpose of inspiration, verbal dictation detracts in no way from the character or worth of the apostles. What they were inspired to teach others, was received by themselves upon the same ultimate ground on which it is received by us. They were channels of communication—not because they were *fit* to be nothing else—but because the end intended to be answered necessarily precluded any other relation on their part, to the message conveyed.

The fourth argument, which is a repetition, almost for the hundredth time, of the incompetency of the Bible to change the heart and enlighten the understanding, though the author presents it here as a "*moral demonstration*" against the theory of verbal dictation, has already been sufficiently answered in what we have said of the uses of theology. Will Mr. Morell never learn to distinguish between an inadequacy to produce a given effect and universal worthlessness? Is the eye useless, because it can-

* p. 156.

not hear, or the ear useless, because it cannot see? And must a divine standard of theology be utterly good for nothing, because it cannot perform the office of the Holy Spirit? Is there nothing else that it can do? Has not he himself repeatedly admitted that a *human* theology subserves many valuable purposes in the economy of religion? and in the name of truth and righteousness what is there in the mere circumstance that it *is human*, to give it such an immense advantage over one that is divine?

The theory of a distinct commission, which the author treats separately from that of verbal dictation, though they are only different expressions of the same thing, he summarily dismisses, as destitute of any satisfactory evidence, and indebted for "its growth and progress in the Church to the influence of a low and mechanical view of the whole question of inspiration itself."* The compositions of the prophets and apostles, whether in the Old or New Testaments, he considers as the spontaneous effusions of their own minds, prompted by the motives which usually regulate good men, in their efforts to promote the welfare of their race. The purpose to write and the things they should write were equally the suggestions of their own benevolence and wisdom. The theory of a distinct commission, on the other hand, asserts that they were commanded to write by the special authority of God, and that the things which they wrote were dictated to them by the agency of the Holy Spirit. The settlement of this controversy evidently turns upon two points—the light in which the writers themselves regarded it—or in the absence of any specific information upon this head, the light in which it was regarded by those who were competent to judge. If they claimed a distinct commission, or those whose testimony ought to be decisive, awarded it to them, there is an end of the dispute. With relation to the books of the Old Testament, we receive their verbal inspiration upon two grounds. The first is the testimony of the Jewish Church, which in the successive generations contemporary with the successive writers in its canon, known to them, however unknown to us, possessed the means of determining with accuracy, whether the several authors exhibited

* p. 160.

themselves the external proofs of a divine commission, or in the absence of such proofs, whether their productions were vouched by the seal of those who were competent, from the same proofs, to give an infallible decision. The second is the testimony of Christ and His Apostles. These witnesses are competent to judge; now the question is, what judgment did they give? in what sense did they receive these books as coming from God? We shall not here enter into the question concerning the notions of the Jews, although they are patent upon almost every page of the New Testament; but we confidently assert, that Christ and His Apostles distinctly and unequivocally awarded to the prophets of the ancient dispensation precisely the verbal inspiration in their writings, which Mr. Morell labours to subvert. Paul declares that all scripture is given by inspiration of God.* Peter, a little more definitely—that holy men of God *spake* as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.† Our Saviour rebuts a malignant accusation of the Jews, by an argument which turns upon the divine authority of the *words* of the Old Testament;‡ and passages are again and again quoted by His apostles as the *ipsissima verba* of the Holy Spirit. Well *spake* the Holy Ghost, says Paul, by Esaias the prophet unto our fathers.§ Wherefore as the Holy Ghost saith—to-day if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts.|| The Old Testament is compendiously described as the oracles of God,¶ and the apostle informs us that it was *God* who, at sundry times and in divers manners, *spake* in time past unto the fathers by the prophets.** Paul goes so far as to identify the scripture with God himself—attributing to it what was absolutely true only of Him. The scripture saith unto Pharaoh—the scripture foreseeing that God would justify the heathen—the scripture hath concluded all under sin. It is absolutely certain from these references that Christ and His Apostles regarded the Old Testament as *verbally* inspired—and the prophets being nothing but the agents through whom the Holy Ghost communicated His will. It is of no consequence, therefore, whether we know the human authors of the different books or not—or the times

* 2 Tim. iii. 16. † 2 Pet. i. 21. ‡ John, x. 33—36. § Acts, xxviii. 25.

|| Heb. iii. 7. ¶ Rom. iii. 2. ** Heb. i. 1.

at which they were written, or even the country in which they were composed; it is enough that what constituted the canon of the Jews in the days of our Saviour, was endorsed by Him and His own chosen apostles as the word of God. He and they referred to that canon as *a whole*, under the well known titles of the Scriptures, the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms, treated it generally as authoritative, called it specifically the oracles of God, and quoted particular passages in a way which they could not have done if there had been no distinct commission to write them. But these considerations, it appears, are nothing to Mr. Morell. Because we are not in possession of the evidence which justified the reception of each particular book into the Jewish canon, he triumphantly asks, upon the hypothesis of verbal dictation, "what chance have we of being successful in proving the inspiration of the Old Testament against the aggressions of the sceptick.?"* "The fact," he adds, "upon which many lay such remarkable stress, that Christ and His Apostles honoured the Old Testament, is nothing to the purpose, as far as the *nature* of their (its) inspiration is concerned." But is it nothing to the purpose that Christ and His Apostles distinctly declare to us that it was *God* who *spake* by the prophets, that the scriptures are called by our Saviour the *Word of God*, and particular passages are repeatedly cited as the *ipsis-sima verba* of the Holy Ghost? Is this *kind* of honour nothing? But he continues:

"They honoured the *Divine* and *Eternal* in the old dispensation. They honoured the men who had been servants and prophets of the most High. They honoured the writings from which their spirit of piety and of power breathed forth. But never did they affirm the *literal* and special divinity of all the national records of the Jewish people, as preserved and read in the Synagogues of that day.—pp. 178.

No doubt Christ and His Apostles honoured the *Divine* and *Eternal* in the old dispensation, but if the scriptures are to be credited they also honoured the divine and *temporary*. They honoured *every thing* that *was* divine, whether it was to remain or be done away. The Master fulfilled *all* righteousness. As to the *men*, who had been

* p. 178.

servants and prophets of the most high, they said very little about them—at least very little is recorded. But it is certain that they *never* honoured the writings of the prophets because they were the offspring of pious and devotional feeling. It was not because the spirit of the men was in them, but because the spirit of God was there, that they attached the importance which they did to the books of the Old Testament; and the passages which we have already quoted, put it beyond any reasonable doubt that they *did* regard God as the real and responsible author of these books. Their testimony is, or ought to be decisive of the question.

The author's opinion of the inspiration of the New Testament may be collected from the following passage, which, though long, cannot be conveniently abridged:

“Passing from the Old Testament to the New, the same entire absence of any distinct commission given to the writers of the several books (with the exception, perhaps, of the Apocalypse of John) presents itself. Mark and Luke were not apostles, and the latter of them distinctly professes to write from the testimony of eye witnesses, and to claim the confidence of Theophilus, for whom his two treatises were composed, *on this particular ground*. Matthew and John wrote their accounts somewhat far in the first century, when the increase of the Christian converts naturally suggested the necessity of some such statements, at once for their information and for their spiritual requirements generally. Finally, Paul, as we know, wrote his letters, as the state of particular Churches seemed to call for them; but in no case do we find *a special commission* attached to any of these, or of the other epistles of the New Testament.

“Added to this, the light which history sheds upon the early period of the Christian Church shows us that the writings which now compose the New Testament Canon, were not at all regarded as express messages to them from God, independently of the conviction they had of the high integrity and spiritual developement of the minds of the writers. They received them just as they received the oral teachings of the apostles and evangelists; they read them in the Churches to supply the place of *their* personal instructions; and there is abundant evidence that *many other writings* which now form the New Testament were read with a similar reverence, and for a similar edification.

It was only gradually, as the pressure of heresy compelled it, that a certain number of writings were agreed upon by general

consent as being *purely apostolic*, and designated by the term *homologoumena*, or agreed upon. But that much contention existed as to which should be acknowledged canonical, and which not, is seen from the fact that a number of the writings now received were long termed "antilegomena," or contested; and that the third century had well nigh completed its course before the *present canon* was fixed by universal consent. All this shows it was not any distinct commission attached to the composition of certain books or documents, which imparted a divine authority to the apostles's writings, but that they were selected and approved by the Church itself as being veritable productions of men "who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost"—men who were not inspired *in order* to write any precise documents, but who wrote such documents, amongst other labours, by virtue of their being inspired.

"The conclusion which we necessarily draw from these considerations is, that the canonicity of the New Testament scriptures was decided upon, solely on the ground of their presenting to the whole Church clear statements of *apostolical Christianity*. The idea of their being written by any special command of God or verbal dictation of the Spirit, was an idea altogether foreign to the primitive Churches. They knew that Christ was in himself a divine revelation; they knew that the apostles had been with him in his ministry; they knew that their hearts had been warmed with his truth, that their whole religious nature had been elevated to intense spirituality of thinking and feeling by the possession of his Spirit, and that this same Spirit was poured out without measure upon the Church. Here it was they took their stand; in these facts they saw the reality of the apostolic inspiration; upon these realities they reposed their faith, ere ever the sacred books were penned; and when they *were* penned they regarded them as valid representations of the living truth which had already enlightened the Church, and as such alone pronounced upon their canonical and truly apostolic character."—*pp.* 163—165.

The substance of these observations may be reduced to three points.—1. That the writers of the New Testament made no pretensions to the sort of inspiration implied in the idea of a divine commission to write. 2. That the primitive Church did not look upon their productions as the words of the Holy Ghost; and, 3. That the collection of books which constitute the canon of the New Testament was made—not that it might be an authoritative rule of

faith, but that precious mementos of the apostles and of apostolick preaching might be embodied and preserved.

Every one of these propositions is grossly and notoriously false. There are three considerations which to any candid mind put it beyond all reasonable controversy, that the apostles and evangelists *must* have claimed the plenary inspiration for which we contend. The first is that the Saviour, on no less than four different occasions, promised to the twelve the verbal dictation of the Spirit, when they should be called to testify for Him. The last promise has no limitation as to time and place, and the language in which it is couched deserves to be seriously pondered. "Howbeit, when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will guide you into all truth; for He shall not *speak* of Himself, but whatsoever He shall hear, that shall He *speak*, and He will show you things to come."* These promises explain the nature of the apostolick commission—at least so far as oral teaching was concerned. When the apostles *speak*, it was not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth. The second consideration is that the apostles placed their *writings* upon the same footing exactly with their oral instructions. *Est enim scripturæ et prædicationis par ratio.*† The third is that they attributed the same authority to their own compositions which they awarded to the scriptures of the Old Testament. Peter refers to the epistles of Paul with the same reverence with which he refers to the canon of the Jews.‡ and Paul quotes the law of Moses and the gospel of Luke as entitled to equal consideration.§ If now our Saviour promised the verbal dictation of the Spirit in the oral teaching of the apostles—and they ascribed the same authority to their writings which belonged to their preaching—if they reckoned their own compositions in the same category with the Law, the Prophets,

* John, xvi. 13. The other instances are—Matt. x. 19, 20. Mark, xiii. 11. Luke, xii. 11, 12.

† 2 Thess. ii. 15. 1 Cor. xv. 1. John, xx. 31. 1 John, i. 1—4.

‡ 2 Pet. iii. 16.

§ 1 Tim. v. 18. *The labourer is worthy of his hire* is a passage found nowhere else as quoted by Paul but in Luke x. 7, and there it occurs exactly in the words of the apostle.

and the Psalms, and distinctly traced these to the immediate suggestions of God, what more can be required to establish the unqualified falsehood of Mr. Morell's first position upon the subject? But Luke, it seems—whom, be it remembered, Paul quotes as of equal authority with Moses—virtually disclaimed this species of inspiration, since “he professes to write from the testimony of eye-witnesses and to claim the confidence of Theophilus, for whom his two treatises were composed, *on this particular ground.*”^{*} Mr. Morell is particularly unfortunate whenever he deals with scripture. The memorable words of our Saviour to Nicodemus, God so loved the world, &c., he very amusingly expoundst as a discovery of one of the apostles—a bright ray of intuition, beaming from a mind intensely heated by the marvellous scenes connected with the history of Jesus. And here he blunders sadly in reference to the beloved physician. Luke does not say that *he* wrote from the testimony of eye-witnesses, but that *others* had done so. He simply ascribes to himself, according to our English version, an accurate knowledge of the facts, or according to another version, a thorough investigation of them; and he claims the confidence of Theophilus, because he himself was perfectly ascertained of the truth of what he wrote. His own mind had reached certainty—by what particular steps is not made known to us, and he was anxious to impart the same certainty to the friend to whom his treatises are addressed. Nothing hinders but that this very investigation may have been prompted by an impulse which terminated in that very dictation of the Spirit, without which his book is entitled to no special authority. Mr. Morell is not surely to learn that the theory of verbal inspiration contemplates something more than organic influence—that it represents the sentiments and language as the sentiments and language of the writers as well as of the Holy Ghost. God employed the *minds* of the apostles, with all their faculties and powers, distinctively as *minds*, and not as machines, to communicate His own will in His own words to mankind. Through their thoughts, memories, reasonings, studies and inquiries, He infused *His* truth into their hearts, put His words into their lips, and impressed His own declarations on the written page.

* p. 163. † pp. 247, 8.

How these things can be, we profess not to determine. *Our* philosophy cannot penetrate the mysteries of God. But we have the faculty of believing where we cannot explain. The *incarnate* word was man and God in one person and two distinct natures—and His divinity stamped ineffable value upon the deeds and sufferings of his humanity. The *written* word is divine and human in mysterious concurrence, and the divine invests it with all its value and authority as a conclusive standard of faith. "We grant," says Dr. Owen,* "that the sacred writers used their own abilities of mind and understanding in the choice of words and expressions. So the preacher sought to find out acceptable words—Eccles. xii. 10. But the Holy Spirit who is more intimate into the minds and skill of men than they are themselves, did so guide and operate in them, as that the words they fixed upon were as directly and certainly from Him, as if they had been spoken to them by an audible voice." "God," says Haldane,† "did not leave them to the operation of their own mind, but has employed the operations of their mind in His word. The Holy Spirit could dictate to them His own words in such a way that they would also be their own words, uttered with the understanding. He could express the same thought by the mouth of a thousand persons, each in his own style." It is upon this obvious principle that God employed them as intelligent agents, that they were required to give attendance to all the ordinary means of improving their faculties—to reading, study, meditation and prayer—to mutual consultation and advice—and to all the ordinances of the Christian Church. They were, by no means, like Balaam's ass, the passive vehicles of articulate sounds—God spoke through their *voice*, and communicated ideas through *their minds*.

The second proposition—that the primitive Church did not look upon the writings of the Apostles and Evangelists as verbally inspired, is so ludicrously false, and betrays such disgraceful ignorance of the history of opinions upon the subject, that very few words will be sufficient to despatch it. It is well known to every scholar, that the

* Works, vol. ii. p. 159. Holy Spirit, book 2nd, chap. 1.

† Haldane on Inspiration, p. 117.

theory of verbal dictation, stated often in such forms as to make the sacred writers merely passive instruments of divine communications, is the *oldest* theory in the Christian Church. Justin, Athenagoras, Macarius, and Chrysostom very frequently compare them to musical instruments, which obey the breath of the performer in the sounds they emit. Macarius tells us that the Holy Scriptures are *epistles*, which God, the King, has sent to men.* Chrysostom affirms that "all the Scriptures have been written and sent to us, not by servants, but by God, the master of all"—that "the words which they utter are the words of God himself." He tells us farther that even their very syllables contain some hidden treasure; that nothing is vain or superfluous about them, every thing being the appointment of the wise and omniscient God. The same opinions are found also in Origen, Cyrill of Alexandria, Irenæus, and Gregory Thaumaturgus. And yet the primitive Church attributed no verbal inspiration to the authors of the Gospels and Epistles! It is notorious, too, that the same terms of respect, which the Jews were accustomed to appropriate to their canon, were promiscuously applied by the Christian fathers to the whole canon of the Christian Church, and to the books particularly of the New Testament.† They were called by Irenæus, *Divine Scriptures, Divine Oracles, Scriptures of the Lord*; by Clement of Alexandria, *Sacred Books, Divine Scriptures, Divinely inspired Scriptures, Scriptures of the Lord, the true Evangelical Canon*; by Origen, the whole canon was called the *Ancient and New Oracles*; by Cyprian, the books of the New Testament were distinguished as *Books of the Spirit, Divine Fountains, Fountain of the Divine Fulness*. We hope Mr. Morell will look a little into history before he ventures to assert again, that "in the early period of the Christian Church, the writings which now compose the New Testament Canon, were not all regarded as express messages to them from God."

The third proposition is, that these books were not col-

* All the quotations which follow may be found with many others in Suicerus, Article *γραφή*, and Conybeare's Bampton Lectures; Lecture 1, at the end. The reader is also referred to Taylor's Doctor Dub. Book 2d, Chap. 3d, Rule 14.

† Paley's Evidences, Part 1, Chap. 9, § 4.

lected because they were the canon or authoritative rule of faith, but because they contained interesting memorials of Apostolick teaching and labours. If Mr. Morell has not sufficient leisure to peruse the documents of Ecclesiastical antiquity, he will find in the treatise, appended to the *Corpus et Syntagma confessionum*, or the consent of the ancient Fathers to the doctrines of the Reformation, a very satisfactory account of the precise light in which the primitive Church looked upon the Holy Scriptures. In the mean time we may inform our readers that it had exactly the same notions of their divine authority, as the arbiter of faith and the judge of controversies, which all Evangelical Christians now attribute to them. "It behoveth," says Basil of Cæsarea, "that every word and every work should be accredited by the testimony of the inspired Scripture." "Let the inspired Scriptures," he says again, "ever be our umpire, and on whichever side the doctrines are found accordant to the divine word, to that side the award of truth may, with entire certainty, be given." And still again, "it is the duty of hearers, when they have been instructed in the Scriptures, to try and examine, by them, the things spoken by their teachers, to receive whatever is consonant to those Scriptures, and to reject whatever is alien; for thus they will comply with the injunction of St. Paul, to prove all things, and hold fast that which is good." "We have known the economy of our salvation," says Irenæus, "by no other but by those by whom the Gospel came to us; which truly they then preached, but afterward, by the will of God, delivered to us in the Scriptures, which were to be the pillar and ground of our faith."

The facts upon which Mr. Morell relies to give countenance to his notions, in reference to the early estimate of the Scriptures, prove to our minds exactly the reverse. Why, when the primitive Christians were pressed by heresy, were they so anxious to be ascertained of the Apostolick writings, if these writings were not a standard of truth? Why so cautious in their inquiries; so watchful against impostures and frauds; so thorough in their investigations, if when they had agreed upon the genuine productions of the Apostles, they were no nearer settling their controversies than they were before? Can

any satisfactory reason be assigned, but that of the eloquent and fervid Chrysostom:

“The Apostolical writings are the very walls of the Church. Some one, perhaps, may ask, what then shall I do, who cannot have a Paul to refer to? Why, if thou wilt, thou mayest still have him more entire than many, even with whom he was personally present, for it was not the sight of Paul that made them what they were, but his words. If thou wilt, thou mayest have Paul and Peter and John, yea, and the whole choir of Prophets and Apostles, to converse with thee frequently. Only take the works of these blessed men and read their writings assiduously. But why do I say to thee, thou mayest have Paul; if thou wilt, thou mayest have Paul’s master; for it is He himself that speaketh to thee in Paul’s words.”

The Apostles themselves were to the first churches which they collected the oracles of God. They were inspired to teach and publish the whole counsel of God, in reference to the Church. The words which they spake were not theirs, but Christ’s who sent them. To all future generations, their *writings* were designed to occupy the position which they themselves occupied to the first converts. In these writings *we* now have what God originally spake through them. The care and anxiety of the primitive churches, to guard against delusion and deceit, were owing to the belief that all Apostolick compositions, that is, all compositions written either directly by themselves, or commended as inspired by their approbation, were, in the proper acceptation of the term, canonical; they were a rule of faith—they were the word of God. This being the state of the case, no book was received as of Apostolical authority, but after full and complete investigation. The evidences of its origin were thoroughly canvassed. The question was, what books has God sent to us; or in the language of Chrysostom, what epistles has God sent to us as the standard of truth? The answer was, those which the Apostles, in the discharge of their Apostolick commission, either wrote themselves or sanctioned as written by others. What books were these?—The primitive Church finally settled this question when it agreed upon the canon of the New Testament. The whole history of the matter shows that these documents were honoured—not as memorials of Peter, James and

John, but as the words of the *Master* communicated through them. Mark and Luke were not Apostles themselves, and yet they are included in the canon, and entitled to the same authority with Paul or any other Apostle. The reason was that the early Church had satisfactory evidence that they wrote under the same guidance which was promised to the twelve. Mr. Morell is therefore grossly at fault in maintaining that the Apostles themselves made no pretensions to verbal or plenary inspiration—that the Primitive Church did not accord it to them, and that their writings were not regarded as a divine and infallible canon of truth. The testimony of history is clearly—strongly—decidedly against him; and any conclusions against the theory of a divine commission, which he has drawn from the monstrous propositions which, as we have seen, have no existence but in the fictions of his own fancy, are nothing worth.

There remain two other arguments by which he attempts to set aside the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures—the first is the defective morality of the Old Testament, and the second is the inconsistencies and discrepancies of the sacred writers. As to the first it is obvious, from the whole tenor of the New Testament, that it professes to make no new revelations in morality—it is only a commentary on the Law and the Prophets. The great principle which is supposed by many to be characteristic of the Gospel, that we should love the Lord our God with all our hearts, and our neighbours as ourselves, is distinctly inculcated by Moses; while patience under injuries, alms to the indigent, and kindness to the poor, afflicted and oppressed, are the reigning spirit of the ancient Institute. The Israelites were indeed commissioned to wage exterminating wars against the devoted objects of divine wrath—but in these instances they were the scourge of God. It was not to gratify their private resentments or national ambition, but to execute the vengeance of Heaven, that they were commanded to destroy the tribes of Canaan. They were as the plague, pestilence and famine in the hands of the Almighty—God was the real destroyer—they were but the instruments of His will—and they departed from every principle of their Institute, if they suffered themselves to be influenced by

private malice. There are other instances in which deeds of treachery and deceit are *recorded*, but there is a huge difference betwixt recording and approving them. The drunkenness of Noah—if indeed he were drunk, which we very much doubt—the lies of Abraham, the cruelty of Sarah, the incest of Lot, the frauds of Jacob, and the adultery of David, were written not for our example, but our warning. There are other instances in which the moral import of the same material action was very different then from what it is now. There can be no doubt, that in the progress of society, relations may be developed and causes unfolded which shall make an act criminal in one age that was perfectly blameless in another. Incest was lawful in the family of Adam—under a certain contingency a Jew might marry his brother's widow—and it remains to be proved that in the early condition of eastern civilization, the habits and customs which now provoke our censure were possessed of the same moral import which attaches to them now. With these distinctions and limitations we have no hesitation in asserting that the morality of the Old Testament is precisely what we might expect it to be upon the theory of verbal inspiration. The great duties of piety and religion—of truth, justice and benevolence—the charities of life—the virtues of the citizen, the master and the man, the husband, the father and the son, are all impressed under the ancient economy with the sanctions peculiar to that Dispensation. There is nothing impure, immoral, unworthy of God.

As to inconsistencies and discrepancies in the sacred writers, which cannot be fairly explained, we simply deny them. Mr. Morell charges them with inconclusiveness of reasoning—defects of memory—and contradictions to science and themselves in their statements of fact. When he condescends to specify the instances, and to *prove* that his allegations are true, it will be time to answer yet again these exploded cavils of infidelity, which have a thousand times been refuted, and which he ought to know to be worthless. In regard to defects of memory, we beg him to recollect that any effort to substantiate this charge may involve an effort to cast a serious imputation upon the moral character of Jesus Christ himself. If there was any thing which he distinctly and unequiv-

orally promised to His Apostles, it was that the Holy Ghost should teach them all things and *bring all things to their remembrance*, which He himself had said unto them.

There is indeed one specification which he has made; the inconsistency of geological speculations with the Mosaick cosmogony. Mr. Morell, however, is not ignorant that the Mosaick narrative contradicts not a single fact of descriptive geology—all that it reports of the shape of the earth—its minerals and fossils—its marks of convulsion and violence—all these *facts* may be fully admitted, and yet not a line of Moses be impugned. It is only when the geologist proceeds to the causes of his facts, and invents hypotheses to explain them, that any inconsistency takes place—and this inconsistency is evidently not betwixt geology and religion, but geologists and Moses. It is a war of theories—of speculation and conjecture against the historical fidelity of a record, supported by evidence in comparison with which they dwindle into the merest figments of the brain.

There is one other consideration which demands our notice—and which we have reserved to this place, because it is evidently not an argument against the abstract possibility of a divine theology—being not at all inconsistent with the patristic notion of organic inspiration—but against that view of the manner in which it has been communicated that we have felt it our duty to defend. Mr. Morell asserts :

“ That the whole of the *logical processes* of the human mind are such, that the idea of a revelation is altogether incompatible with them—that they are in no sense open to its influence, and that they can neither be improved nor assisted by it. All our logical processes of mind—all the operations of the understanding take place in accordance with the most fixed and determinate laws, those which are usually termed *the laws of thought*. Whatever can be inferred by these laws, whatever can be derived in any way from them, must be strictly within the natural capacity of the human mind to attain. If, on the contrary, there be any thing which these laws of thought are naturally unable to reach, no extraneous influence whatever could give them the power of reaching it. The laws of thought are immoveable—to alter them would be to subvert the whole consti-

tution of the human intellect. Whatever is once within their reach is always so. Correct reasoning could never be subverted by revelation itself; bad reasoning could never be improved by it."—*pp.* 131, 2.

We are not sure that we understand this passage. If the author means that our logical processes do not originate the materials upon which they are employed, what he says may be true, but it is nothing to the purpose—but if he means that to a mind, already in possession of all the simple ideas upon which it is to operate, God, in consistency with its own laws, cannot secure the understanding from error, what he says is contradictory to the revelation of a theology, through the agency of men, upon any other hypothesis but that of organic inspiration. The question is not whether any divine influence can make bad reasoning good, or good reasoning bad—but whether God can exempt men from the bad, and infallibly conduct them to the good, without subverting their intellectual constitution.

Mr. Morell will hardly deny that if all the conditions and laws which ought to be observed in the processes of the understanding were faithfully regarded, there would be no danger of fallacy or mistake. Error is the result of disobedience or inattention to the laws of our own nature—the punishment of intellectual guilt. The naked question then is, whether God, by any subjective influence on the soul, can preserve it from eccentricity and disorder, and keep it in harmony with the essential conditions of its healthful operation. Surely it is no *subversion* of the *constitution* of the mind, to have that constitution protected from violence and encroachment. The soul is more truly itself when it moves in the orbit prescribed for it, than when it deserts its proper path, and wanders into forbidden regions. If God cannot exert a controlling influence upon the understanding, it must be because there is something in the nature of its faculties or exercises incompatible with the direct interference of the Deity. Now the faculties which belong to it are, according to our author's own statement,* memory, conception, imagination, abstraction and generalization, to which

* p. 15.

may be added, the association of ideas—the processes which belong to it are definition, division, judgment and reasoning, whether inductive or deductive. Not to enter at this stage of the discussion into any metaphysical analysis, it is obvious that these faculties exist, among different men, in very different degrees of perfection—and these processes are conducted with very different degrees of correctness—and yet their essential nature is the same in all. If, then, by the act of God, there can be different degrees of memory in different persons without any infringement of the laws of memory, why may there not be different degrees in the same person? If God can make one man reason better than another, without disturbing the laws of ratiocination, why cannot He make the same man reason at one time better than he reasoned at another? Can He not impart additional clearness to conception—vigour to imagination—nicety to analysis, and accuracy to the perception of those resemblances and relations upon which generalization and reasoning proceeds? The truth is, one of the most mysterious features connected with the human mind, is its susceptibility of growth and improvement—without receiving additions to its substance. Perfectly simple and indiscerptible, in its own nature, incapable of enlargement by accretion, it yet begins, in the simplest operations of sense, to exert an activity, which waxes stronger and better in every successive period of its existence, and to the developement of which there seem to be no natural limits. All the expressions by which we represent this change, are borrowed from material analogies, and are evidently liable to the abuse which, from such applications, has made the history of philosophy too much a history of confusion. In relation to our minds, much more than in relation to our bodies, we are fearfully and wonderfully made.* And if the *natural* order of improvement is a mystery, profound and impenetrable; if we are unable to comprehend, much less to explain, how a single substance—remaining unchanged in its essence—shall exhibit those wonderful phenomena which we can liken to nothing but growth, expansion and enlargement in material objects, surely it is too much to say that, in this world of mystery, another mystery still, cannot be found—that of *supernatural* im-

provement, in which every faculty shall faithfully obey the laws of its structure. To us the idea, that any creature, in any of its operations, can be independent of God, involves a gross contradiction. Absolute dependence is the law of its being. As without the concursus of the Deity, it must cease to exist, so His sustentation and support are essential to every form of action—every degree of developement—every step in improvement. It is only in God that it can live and move, as it is only in God that it has its subsistence. We see no more difficulty in supposing that God can superintend and direct the various processes of the understanding, than in admitting that he created its powers in the first instance, and impressed upon them the laws which they ought to observe. Providence is no more wonderful than creation.

Mr. Morell admits that the Deity can exert a subjective influence upon the intuitional faculties—that *they* can be elevated to a supernatural degree of intensity, and that this is actually done in the phenomenon of inspiration. Why, then, should the understanding not be accessible to God? If He can touch the soul in one point, why not in another? If He can improve its vision, what hinders but that He may regulate and assist its reflection? That He can turn the hearts of men as the rivers of water are turned—that the spirits of all flesh, in the full integrity of their faculties, are as completely in His hands as clay in the hands of the potter—that He can bring every proud thought and lofty imagination into humble obedience to his will—that the whole man is absolutely and unresistingly in His power, so that He can direct its steps without a contravention of the laws of its being—is the only hypothesis upon which the great evangelical doctrine of regeneration is consistent or possible. The work of the Spirit is represented as extending to the whole soul—it gives eyes to the blind—ears to the deaf—knowledge to the ignorant—wisdom to the foolish. It enlightens the mind—purifies the heart—cleanses the imagination—purges the conscience—stimulates the memory—quickens the judgment and imparts an unwonted aptitude in the perception of spiritual relations. As there is not a faculty which has not suffered from the ruins of the fall—so there is not a faculty which does not share in the restoration of grace. The testimony of scrip-

ture may be nothing to Mr. Morell—but as his presumptuous assertion is unsupported by any thing in his own mental analysis—as it is inconsistent with the analogy which the case of intuition, confessed by him to be susceptible of supernatural influence, obviously suggests—as there is nothing in the nature of the understanding, in any of its faculties or exercises, which places it beyond the reach of divine regulation—as there is no more absurdity in God's governing than in God's creating its powers—we may safely receive the declarations of the Bible, as well as the dictates of common sense, until we have some better reason for calling them into question, than the *ipse dixit* of a transcendental philosopher. And that theory is certainly reduced to a desperate extremity, which allows its author no refuge but a bold and impudent denial of the essential attributes of God. Whatever does not involve a contradiction and so prove itself to be nothing, lies within the boundless range of possibilities, which Almighty power can achieve. It is the folly and blasphemy of the wicked to reduce their Creator to their level—to make Him altogether such an one as they themselves, and to measure His resources by their own insignificant capacities. It is His prerogative to lift his hand and swear that as He lives forever, so He shall accomplish all His will—and rule alike the minds and bodies He has framed. Our God is in the Heavens. He has done whatsoever He hath pleased—and if among the things which have pleased Him were the purpose to communicate a divine theology through the minds and understandings of men, there could have been no impediment which his power could not easily surmount.

We shall here finish our examination of the book before us, with reference to the soundness of its logick. The single point to which our remarks have been directed is, whether the conclusions are legitimately drawn from the premises. We have admitted, for the sake of argument, the principles of the author's philosophy. We have called in question, neither his psychology, his analysis of religion, nor his accounts of revelation and inspiration. Our object has been to discover whether, granting all these, the popular faith in regard to the authority of the scriptures is necessarily subverted. We have attempted to

show that, though his philosophy pretends to be an *a priori* argument against the possibility of this notion being true, it demonstrates nothing to the purpose—that revelation, in *his* sense, is not *exclusive* of revelation in its common and ordinary acceptation—and that *his* inspiration is, by no means, inconsistent with the inspiration of the vulgar faith. Divest his argument of the ambiguity of language, and of the gratuitous assumption that the agency which he admits is the *sole* agency of God, and it is divested of all pertinency and force. We have gone still farther and convicted of weakness and confusion all his efforts to render useless and unnecessary the existence of a canon, such as the Bible professes to be. Out of his own mouth have we condemned him. As a *philosophical* argument, therefore, we are compelled to say, that his book is utterly wanting. That so far from demonstrating that a revealed theology is a psychological absurdity, he has beaten his drums and flourished his trumpets, when the enemy had not been even in sight. We have also followed him in his arguments addressed to the question as a matter of fact. We have seen that he is at fault in charging the popular faith with a total destitution of positive proof, and that all his objections to the plenary inspiration of the scriptures, whether founded on varieties of style, the necessity of divine illumination, the diminution of our respect for the sacred writers, the history of the canon, the immoralities, absurdities and contradictions of the Bible, or the alleged impossibility of a divine revelation through the understandings of men, are capable of an easy and obvious refutation. The conclusion of the whole matter is, that as an infidel assault, his book is a signal failure. For any thing that he has proved to the contrary, by either *a priori* or *a posteriori* reasoning, the Bible may be what the Christian world has always been accustomed to regard it. But a harder task remains yet to be performed. His philosophy must be brought to the touchstone of truth—and we hope, at no distant day to be able to convince our readers that no better success has attended his speculations, than has rewarded his efforts to apply them.

SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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ARTICLE I.

1. *Address of the Southern members of Congress to their constituents, Washington City, Jan. 1849.*
2. *Lecture on the North and the South, delivered before the Young Men's Mercantile Library Association of Cincinnati, Ohio, January 16th, 1849: by ELWOOD FISHER. 8vo. pp. 24.*
3. *Mussey's review of Fisher, on the North and the South. Cincinnati: 1849. 8vo. pp. 98.*
4. *Practical Hints on the comparative cost and productiveness of the culture of Cotton, and the cost and productiveness of its manufacture. Addressed to the Cotton planters and capitalists of the South. By CHAS. T. JAMES. Providence: 1849. 12mo. pp. 68.*

We cannot repress a sigh from our very heart, as we take up the pen to discuss the subject of these publications. Its magnitude and difficulties are enough to make any mind serious and even sad. We are almost ready to despair, too, of a satisfactory and peaceful settlement of the questions it involves. The conviction that the season for discussion has passed, and the time for action come, is also growing upon us. We have scarcely a hope that aught we shall say, will influence the result so much as a

ARTICLE VI.

The Philosophy of Religion, By J. D. MORELL, A. M. London. Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans. 1849. pp. 427.

Having, in our former article, considered the work of Mr. Morell as an argument against an authoritative theology, we proceed, according to our promise, to examine the philosophy on which the argument is founded. This task we undertake with unfeigned reluctance. The questions which it involves demand a power of analysis, a patience of reflection, an intensity of thought, a depth of investigation and an amplitude of learning, to which, we are conscious, we can make no pretensions. We always return from the study of the great problems of human knowledge with a conviction of littleness, incapacity and ignorance which, though the process by which it has been produced has disclosed enough to prevent us from despairing of the ultimate possibility of philosophy, teaches us to commiserate rather than denounce the errors of others, and makes us feel that *our* position must always be that of humble and teachable inquirers. Far from dreaming of the attempt to originate an independent system of our own, or even to combine into a consistent and harmonious whole the various elements of truth, which may be elicited from existing systems, we are content, in regard to these high problems, to discharge the negative office of refuting error without presuming to establish its contrary, of saying what is *not*, without undertaking to declare what *is* truth. The work of simple destruction, though often invidious, is sometimes necessary. In the case before us, we shall feel ourselves to be the authors of an incalculable good, if we can convict Mr. Morell's philosophy of inconsistency and falsehood, though we should fail, in the progress of the argument, to make a single direct contribution to a sounder system.

This philosophy may be embraced under the three heads of Psychology, Religion and Revelation, together with the connection subsisting between them. The first inquiry of the author is in regard to the subject in which

religion inheres,—what is it that is religious? then in regard to the essence of religion itself—what is it to be religious? and finally in relation to the mode in which religion is produced—how is the given subject put in possession of the given essence? The answer to the first inquiry constitutes his Psychology—to the second, his analysis of religion in general and of Christianity in particular—to the last, his theories of Revelation and Inspiration. As to the connection subsisting between them—the nature of the subject determines, to some extent, the nature of religion—and the nature of religion, in its relations to the subject, determines the mode and laws of its production. Mind being given, the essential element of religion is given—mind and religion being both given, the characteristics of Revelation are settled. This is a general outline of the discussions of the book. We begin with the psychology—and that our readers may fully understand the strictures which we shall make upon some of the doctrines of our author, it may be well to give a preliminary statement of the essential differences which distinguish existing schools of philosophy.

I. Sir William Hamilton has very justly observed that* “philosophy proper is principally and primarily the *science of knowledge*; its first and most important problem being to determine—*what can we know?* that is, what are the conditions of our knowing, whether these lie in the nature of the object, or in the nature of the subject, of knowledge.” The origin, nature and extent of human knowledge, are, accordingly, the questions which have divided the schools, and the answers which have been returned to them, have determined the place which their authors have taken in the history of speculation.

It is now universally conceded that all knowledge begins in experience—but there is not the same agreement as to the conditions which are essential to experience, and under which alone it becomes available. In one class of opinions, the mind, at its first existence, is represented as a *tabula rasa* or a *sheet of blank paper*, upon which, from without, are written the characters which, contemplated by itself, constitute the sole materials of cognition. It

* Hamilton's Reid. p. 808. *Note.*

comes into the world unfurnished—an empty room—and the world furnishes it. There is, on the one hand, a capacity to receive, and on the other, a power to communicate—and the relation of the two constitutes experience. Upon the materials thus given, the mind can operate—it can combine, compare, decompose, and arrange, but it can add absolutely nothing to the stock, which has been imparted to it as a passive recipient. Experience is restricted exclusively to sensation—the mind is a machine and its various faculties the tools with which it works up the materials afforded in sensible phenomena. This low and contracted hypothesis, which sprang from a corruption of Locke's principles, at best partial and incomplete, was pushed to its legitimate consequences of atheistic materialism and the blindest chance, by the celebrated authors of the French Encyclopedia. And it is to this scheme that we would confine the distinctive title of sensationalism.

We need not say that the sensationalist stumbles at the threshold. He gives no account of *knowledge*—to receive ideas, as the canvass receives the impressions of the brush, is not to *know*. Intelligence involves judgment, belief, conviction of certainty—not merely that the thing is there, but to use a sensible analogy, *seen* to be there. No mechanical activity, however delicate and refined, is competent to explain the peculiar phenomenon involved in the feeling *I know*. Experience, therefore, must include conditions in the subject which make it *capable of intelligence*. There must be a *constitution* of mind, adapted to that specific activity by which it *believes* and judges; as it is only by value of such a constitution that knowledge can be extracted from experience. This preparation of the mind to know, or its adaptation to intelligence, consists in subjecting it to laws of belief under which it must necessarily act. Its energies can be exercised only under the condition that it *shall* know or believe. As it is the *necessity* of belief which distinguishes *intelligent* action from every other species of operation, and as there can be no belief without the belief of *something*, there must be certain primary truths involved in the very structure of the mind, which are admitted from the simple necessity of admitting them. As undeveloped in experience, they exist not in the form of propositions or general conceptions, but of irresistible *ten-*

dencies to certain manners of belief when the proper occasions shall be afforded. They are certain "necessities of thinking." - But developed in experience and generalized into abstract statements—they are original and elementary cognitions—the foundation and criterion of all knowledge. They are the standard of evidence—the light of the mind, and without them the mind could no more be conceived to know than a blind man to see. Being in the mind—a part of its very structure—they are not the products of experience. Essential conditions of mental activity, they are not the results of it. As experience furnishes the occasions on which they are developed or become manifest in consciousness—it is obviously from experience that we know them as mere mental phenomena, in the same way that we know every other faculty of mind—but as primitive beliefs, as vouchers and guarantees for the truth of facts beyond "their own phenomenal reality,"* they are involved in the very conception of experience. "Catholic principles of all philosophy," they have been more or less distinctly recognized, in every school and by every sect, from the dawn of speculation until the present day. According to the different aspects in which they have been contemplated, they have received different titles†—innate truths—first principles—maxims—principles of common sense—general notions—categories of the understanding and ideas of pure reason—fundamental laws of belief and constituent elements of reason—but whatever names they have borne, their character remains unchanged, of original, authoritative, incomprehensible faiths.

Though the distinct recognition and articulate enunciation of these principles have played a conspicuous part in the speculations of modern philosophers, yet the admission of them can hardly be regarded as characteristic of a school. It forms a *class*, in contradistinction to the ultra sensationalists, in which two schools‡ are em-

* For a masterly dissertation on the Philosophy of Common Sense, the reader is referred to Hamilton's Reid—Appendix, Note A. We deem it just to ourselves (and we hope we shall not be suspected of vanity,) to say that the distinction indicated in the text and the corresponding distinction in regard to the possibility of doubt, illustrated by Hamilton, p. 744, had occurred to us, in our own speculations, before we had ever seen his book.

† See §5, Note A, Hamilton's Reid.

‡ "What is a school? It is a certain number of systems, more or less,

braced, discriminated from each other by the application which they make of what both equally admit. They are divided on the question of the relation which our primary cognitions sustain to the whole fabric of human knowledge.

One party represents them as wholly barren and unproductive in themselves—the forms of knowledge and indispensable to its acquisition, but not the sources from which it is derived. It is only when acting in obedience to them it comes in contact with objective realities that it truly knows. All knowledge implies the relation of subject and object—the laws of belief qualify the subject to know, but cannot give the thing to be known. Hence we are dependent on experience for all the *objects* of knowledge. The mind, however richly furnished with all the capacities of cognition and belief, however intelligent in its own nature, cannot create, by the laws of its constitution, a single material of thought. The description of our intelligent constitution is an answer to the question *how* we know, but not to the equally important question *what* we know. There must be something distinct from a faculty—something to which it is applied, or applies itself, in conformity with its nature, before the relation of knowledge can obtain. Or in one word, the laws of belief are the *conditions* of knowing, but in themselves considered, are not knowledge. They are not the matter of an argument, but the criterion of the truth of any and of every premise. According to this class of philosophers, experience not only furnishes the occasions on which our primitive cognitions are developed, but furnishes the *objects* about which our faculties are conversant. It gives us the *what* we are to know. From the importance which this school attaches to induction, it may be preeminently styled the school of experience.*

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knowledge, but as the data, the *αρχαί*, in which are implicitly contained all that is worthy of the name of science. We are dependent upon experience only to awaken them; but when once awakened and roused into action, they can conduct us to the fountain of existence, and solve all the mysteries of the universe. As reason is held to be the complement of these universal and all comprehensive principles, this class of philosophers is commonly denominated *rationalists*.

Differing as widely as they do, in regard to the matter of our knowledge, it is not to be wondered at that these two great schools of Rationalism and Experience, should differ as widely in relation to its nature and extent, or the precise province of a sound philosophy. Rationalism, in all its forms, aims at a complete science of Ontology—it pretends to be, in the language of Cousin, “the absolute intelligence, the absolute explanation of every thing,”* or in the language of Sir William Hamilton, “it boldly places itself at the very centre of absolute being, with which it is, in fact, identified; and thence surveying existence in itself, and in its relations, unveils to us the nature of the Deity, and explains, from first to last, the derivation of all created things.”†

The philosophy of experience is guilty of no such extravagances. Professing to build on observation, its first and fundamental principle is, that all knowledge must be relative in its nature, and phenomenal in its objects. As speculations about abstract being transcend the province of legitimate induction, it dismisses them at once, as frivolous and absurd, and aspires to know only those qualities and attributes of things, through which they become related to our minds. What they are in themselves, or what they are to the omniscience of God, it would regard as a no less preposterous inquiry than to undertake to determine the size, number, and employments of the inhabitants of the moon. Still, phenomena, in its vocabulary, are not synonymous, as rationalists constantly assume, with phantoms or delusions. They are

* *Introduct. Histor. Philos. Sect. i. p. 24, Linberg's Trans.*

† *Edinburgh Review. Cross's Selections, vol. 3d, p. 176.* A masterly article on Cousin's Philosophy.

realities—the conditions of the objects corresponding to the conditions of the subjects of human knowledge, and consequently as truly real as those necessary principles of reason for the sake of which they are despised. “What *appears* to all,” says Aristotle, “that we affirm *to be*; and he who would subvert this belief will himself assuredly advance nothing more deserving of credit.”*

Claiming, therefore, only a relative knowledge of existence, the philosophy of experience, instead of futile and abortive attempts to construct the universe, takes its stand, in conformity with the sublime maxim of Bacon,† as the minister, not the master; the interpreter, not the legislator of nature. Professing its incompetence to pronounce beforehand what kinds of creatures the Almighty should have made, and what kinds of laws the Almighty should have established, it is content to look out upon the world, and to look in upon itself, in order to discover what God has wrought. Without presuming to determine what *must* be, it humbly and patiently inquires what *is*. From the very nature of the case, it pretends to no science of the Deity. To bring Him within the circle of science, would be to degrade Him—to make Him a general law, or a constituent element of other existences instead, of the eternal and self-existent God.

The two schools of Rationalism and Experience are, accordingly, at war in regard to the scope and province of philosophy. Agreeing in their general views as to the indispensable conditions of intelligence, they differ fundamentally in the answers which they return to the question—*what* can man know? This single consideration is enough to show the futility, or, at least, the delusiveness, of a classification like that adopted by Mr. Morell, in his former work, which brings Stewart, Reid, and Brown under the same general category with Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The problems which the former undertook to solve, were the poles apart from those dis-

* Eth. Nic. Lib. x. Cap. 2; a passage repeatedly quoted by Sir William Hamilton.

† Nov. Organ. Aphor. i. In this age of transcendental speculation, the words deserve to be repeated: Homo naturae minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit quantum de naturae ordine re, vel mente observaverit, nec amplius scit aut potest.

cussed by the latter. The former were inductive psychologists, applying the same method to the phenomena of mind, which Newton had applied with such splendid results to the phenomena of matter—the latter were bold and rampant ontologists, unfolding the grounds of universal Being from the principles of pure reason. The former restricted their inquiries to the phenomenal and relative; the latter pushed into the region of the absolute and infinite; the former stopped at properties and attributes; the latter plunged into the essence of all things. From Locke to Hamilton, English and Scotch philosophy has been, for the most part, a confession of human ignorance; from Leibnitz to Hegel, German philosophy has been, for the most part, an aspiration to omniscience.*

After these preliminary remarks, we can have no difficulty as to the general position to which we must assign Mr. Morell. He is a rationalist, coming nearer, so far as we can collect his opinions, to the Eclecticism of France than to any other school. His method, the psychological,† is evidently that of Cousin; and there is the same unsuccessful attempt to combine the philosophy of experience with that of rationalism.

1. The treatise before us opens with an inquiry into that which constitutes the essence of the mind.

“Now, first,” says our author,‡ “whenever we speak of the mind, or use the expression, ‘*myself*,’ what is it, we would ask, that we really intend to designate? What is it in which the mind of man *essentially* consists?”

The terms in which the question is propounded would seem to indicate that Mr. Morell regarded *personality* and *mind* as synonymous expressions—that the Ego embraced the *whole subject* of all the phenomena of consciousness. And yet, in another passage, he obviously divorces intelligence from “*self*,” and restricts the *person* to individual peculiarities.

* Kant deserves to be specially excepted from this censure. The ontology of pure reason he has remorselessly demolished in his celebrated critique. See also Morell's *History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, pp. 81-2.

† *Fragmens Philosophique*, Pref. A translation of this Preface may be found in the first volume of Ripley's *Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature*. Boston, 1838. See also Morell's *Hist. Mod. Philos.* vol. ii. p. 484, 2d London Edit.

“Neither, lastly,” says he,* “can the real man be the complex of our thoughts, ideas, or conceptions. These indicate simply the existence of logical forms, intellectual laws, or perceptive faculties, which are essentially the same in all minds; they do not express the real, concrete individual man; they do not involve the element which makes each human being entirely distinct from the whole mass of humanity around him; in a word, they do not constitute our *personality*.”

To us, we frankly confess, it is amazing that the essence of mind *as* mind should consist in something that is not common to all minds. But the difficulty does not stop here. The will, in which Mr. Morell fixes the essence of the man, as *a mere power* of spontaneous action, is just as universal and just as uniform as the operations of intelligence. *It*, therefore, “as the *capacity* of acting independently, and for ourselves,” cannot be the essential principle of mind, and we are absolutely shut up by this species of logic to the idiosyncracies and oddities of individuals. It is strange that Mr. Morell, in adopting the analysis of Maine de Biran, has not admitted the limitations, of Cousin, who, it seems to us, has unanswerably proved that, upon this hypothesis, we must deny the personality of reason, at least in its spontaneous manifestations, and make “*self*” and mind expressions of different but related realities. If the Ego is the will, then intelligence is no more of it than the organs of sense. “Reason,” says Cousin,† adhering rigidly to his conception of personality as involving only the individual, and voluntary, to the entire exclusion of the universal and absolute—“reason is not a property of individuals; therefore it is not our own—it does not belong to us—it is not human—for, once more, that which constitutes man, his intrinsic personality, is his voluntary and free activity; all which is not voluntary and free, is added to man, but is not an integrant part of man.” This is consistent. But what shall we say, upon this hypothesis, of the veracity of consciousness, the fundamental postulate of all philosophy, which just as clearly testifies that the operations of reason are subjective—that they are, in other words, affections of what

* p. 2.

† *Introduct. Hist. Phil. Lect. v. Linberg's Trans. p. 127. Lecture vi. passim.*

we call ourselves—as that the decisions of the will are our own? The distinction betwixt reason, in its spontaneous and reflective manifestations, does not touch the point.—The “spontaneous apperception of truth,”* which Cousin boasts to have discovered “within the penetralia of consciousness, at a depth to which Kant never penetrated,” is either a subjective act—and then it is personal; or it is only another name for the intellectual intuition of Schelling, in which the distinction of subject and object disappears, and we have the miracle of knowledge without any thing known, or any one to know. If M. Cousin admits that his spontaneous apperception of truth involves a percipient, relativity and subjectivity are not only apparent, but as real as they are in reflection—if it does not involve a percipient, then we humbly submit that it is self-contradictory, and therefore, equivalent to zero. A theory which defends the impersonality of reason, by an assumption which denies the very possibility of thought, may be safely remanded to the depths from which its author extracted it, and into which it is not at all astonishing that such a thinker as Kant never penetrated. We cannot but add that as Cousin’s ontology is founded on the authority of reason, and the authority of reason founded on its impersonality, and its impersonality founded on the annihilation of thought, his speculations upon this subject end exactly where those of Hegel begin—AT NOTHING.

Mr. Morell, however, rigidly cleaves to M. de Biran, and saves the *personal* character of reason by the extraordinary hypothesis, the most extraordinary which, we venture to say, has ever been proposed in the history of philosophy—that will, spontaneity or personality—for they are all, in his vocabulary, synonymous expressions—is the SUBSTANCE of mind,—that our various faculties of intelligence sustain the same relations to the will, which, according to popular apprehension, an attribute sustains to that of which it is a property. That unknown substratum, which, under the appellations of mind, soul or spirit,

* *Fragmens Philosophiques*, Pref. Morell *His. Philos.* vol. ii. p. 495.—We take occasion to say that this account of Cousin’s Psychology is one of the clearest statements of his system that we have ever seen—apart from his own writings.

other philosophers had been accustomed to represent as the subject in which all our mental capacities and energies inhere—Mr. Morell professes to have drawn from its concealment, and to have identified with spontaneous activity, or the power of acting independently, and for ourselves. Reason or intelligence, accordingly, is a property of the will, in the same sense in which extension is a property of matter. All the operations of the mind are only so many modifications of the will—so many manifestations of activity, not as an element which they include, but as the *support* upon which they depend. “If, therefore,” says he,* in a passage which shows that we have not misrepresented him—“if, therefore, in our subsequent classification of the faculties of the mind, little appears to be said about the will, it must be remembered that we assume the activity it denotes, as the essential basis of our whole mental being, and suppose it consequently to *underlie* (the italicks are his own, and show that he means—*it is the substance of*) all our mental operations.” And again: † “Remembering then that the power of the will runs through the whole, we may regard these two classes (the intellectual and emotional) as exhausting the entire sum of our mental phenomena.” And again:

“We would also again remind them, that the activity of the *will* must be regarded as running through all these different phenomena; and that as there is involved in the spontaneous operations of the human mind, all the elements which the consciousness at all contains, it must not be imagined that these elements have to be reflectively realized before they can contribute their aid to our mental developement. It is, in fact, one of the most delicate and yet important of all psychological analyses, to show how the power of the will operates through all the region of man’s spontaneous life, and to prove that our activity is equally voluntary and equally moral, in its whole aspect, although the understanding may not have brought the principles on which we act into the clear light of reflective truth.”—*p.* 25–6.

“To talk of knowing *mind*,” he affirms in his former work, † “beyond the direct consciousness of its *spontaneous being*, and all the affections it can undergo, is absurd; there is nothing more to *know*.” By *spontaneous being*,

*pp. 3, 4.

† p. 4.

‡ Vol. ii. p. 53, 2d London Edition.

he evidently means the existence of mind as a spontaneity. Beyond this and the various properties it exhibits there is nothing to be known—in spontaneity we have the substance—in the “affections it can undergo” the attributes; and these, in their connection, exhaust the subject.

If, now, spontaneous activity is the substance of the soul, and intelligence and reason, with all our various capacities and powers, are only properties or modifications of this spontaneous activity, it necessarily follows that all thought and belief—all knowledge and emotion, are purely voluntary. When we cognize an external object, immediately present in consciousness, or assent to any universal or necessary truth, such as that the whole is greater than a part, we do it by an act of the will. The cognition is spontaneous—which means, if it mean any thing, that the mind is not irresistibly determined to it: and that, consequently, it might *refuse* to know, when the object is actually present before it, and refuse to believe, when the terms of the proposition were distinctly and adequately apprehended; which being interpreted, is that a man may refuse to see when he sees, and refuse to believe when he knows. This very circumstance of the independence of truth, especially of necessary and absolute truth, of the human will, is one of the principal arguments of Cousin to establish the impersonality of reason. We *cannot help* believing when the evidence of truth is clearly before us, says Cousin; we believe in every case, only because we *will* to believe, says Morell. Doctors differ.

But passing over this difficulty, and admitting the doctrine, hard as it is to reconcile with the obvious testimony of consciousness, that all knowledge and belief are the creatures of the will, the products of spontaneous activity, we find ourselves unable to detect in this activity the only criterion by which our faculties are capable of distinguishing substance from attributes. “That which is in itself, and conceived by itself,” is the compendious definition of substance given by Spinoza*—and though it expresses what every human intellect must pronounce to be impossible, and contains the elements of proof, that our only

* Spinoza, in Howe's Living Temple, Pt. ii. Chap. i.

notion of substance is a certain relation to attributes—in other words, a postulation of the mind which we are forced to make, by the very constitution of our nature, in order to explain the existence of what is felt to be dependent; yet, as Mr. Morell admits it,* we will apply its canon to the case before us. Every thing, then, is an attribute which cannot be recognized as self-subsistent and independent, and every thing is a substance which can be construed to the mind as self-subsistent—self-subsistent in the sense that it inheres in nothing as an attribute in it. Hence, whatever is conceived by the mind as having only a dependent and relative existence, or is not conceivable as having a separate and independent existence, must be an attribute—it cannot be a substance. Apply this principle to the case before us. Is activity dependent or independent? In other words, can we conceive of it abstracted from every agent, and every form of operation? Does it not just as much require a *subject* as intelligence or thought, and some definite mode of manifestation?—Can it not just as properly be asked *what* acts as *what* thinks or believes? We confess that we are no more capable of representing to the mind absolute activity, than of representing absolute intelligence or absolute motion? We can understand the proposition that the mind is active—that it performs such and such operations, but we can attach no glimmer of meaning to that other proposition that it is activity itself. Action without something to act, and some manner of action, is to us as preposterously absurd as knowledge without some one to know; and we are unable to enter into that peculiar mode of cogitation which can be content to settle down on activity as the substratum, the self-subsisting subject of all intellectual phenomena. That the mind is active in thought, and that activity thinks, are propositions the poles apart—that activity is a characteristic and all pervading quality of every species of mental affection, and accordingly the highest generalization of mental phenomena, is a very different statement from that which makes it *the mind itself*. Hence, according to the canon, activity is

* This is evident from what he says of substance, p. 37, also Hamilton's Reid, p. 895, note, 1st. col.

only an attribute. Mr. Morell, in fact, admits as much :

"We do not say, indeed," says he, "that we can comprehend the very essence of the soul itself *apart* from all its determinations ; but that by deep reflection upon our inmost consciousness, we can comprehend the essence of the soul in connection with its operations—that we can trace it through all its changes as a *power* or pure activity ; and that in this spontaneous activity alone, our real personality consists."—*p.* 3.

But it is essential to any positive idea of substance, that it should be conceived apart from attributes. It is that "which exists in itself, and is conceived by itself—or whose conception needs the conception of nothing else, whereby it ought to be formed." In saying, therefore, that activity cannot in thought be abstracted from its manifestations, Mr. Morell has conceded the impossibility of his thesis, and instead of making it the *substance*, he has only made it the universal characteristic of mental operations.

But be it substance, or accident, we venture to suggest a doubt, whether such a thing as *spontaneous* activity, in the sense of Mr. Morell, does not involve a contradiction. According to this hypothesis, man is an undetermined cause, or a cause determined by nothing but his own proper energy. How shall we account for the first act ? It either produced itself, or it came into being by chance—for all foreign influences are, *ex hypothesi*, excluded—to have produced itself it must have existed as a cause before it existed as an effect—i. e.—it must have existed before it existed, which is self-contradictory. To say that it was produced by chance, is to say that the negation of all cause is the affirmation of some cause—or that a thing can be and not be a cause in the same relation and at the same time—which is also self-contradictory. We crave from Mr. Morell and his admirers a solution of these difficulties. We are utterly unable to absolve the doctrine of *spontaneous* activity from the charge of implying the doctrine of an absolute commencement, and an absolute commencement we are as incapable of conceiving as a triangle of four sides. If Mr. Morell takes man "out of the mighty chain of cause and effect, by which all the operations of nature are carried on from the commencement to the end of time," and makes him a separate and indepen-

dent cause, receiving no causal influence from without, we should like to know how he makes a beginning? For to us it is as plain that all commencement must be relative, as that there is any such thing as a commencement at all. If an absolute commencement were possible—Atheism could not be convicted of absurdity—and we see not how they can consistently apply the principle of causation to the proof theism—how they can deny that all things might have spontaneously sprung from nothing—when they distinctly affirm that our mental acts generate themselves. Upon this subject there are obviously only three suppositions that can be made—that of the casualist who asserts an absolute commencement—that of the fatalist who asserts an infinite series of relative commencements—that of the theist who asserts a finite series of relative commencements, carried up in the ascending scale, to a necessary Being—at once Creator and Preserver—the seat of all causation, who is without beginning of days or end of life. The extremes of fatalism and casualism are not only inconceivable—for we readily grant that the power of thought is not the measure of existence—but they are palpably and grossly self-contradictory—and therefore must be false. The hypothesis of the theist is also inconceivable. We cannot represent in thought a necessary and eternal being—but, then, it is not self-contradictory, and upon the doctrine of excluded middle it must be true; a man must take his place in the “mighty chain of cause and effect, by which all the operations of nature are carried on from the commencement to the end of time.” In the calumniated doctrine of an universal providence, extending to all events and to all things—the only depository of real efficiency and power—we find the true explanation of an activity which is neither casual in its origin, nor a dependent link in an endless chain.* In God we live and move and have our being. Nature and our own minds present us with multifarious phenomena—linked together as antecedent and consequent—but all are equally effects. Neither nature nor ourselves present us with an instance of a real cause. To Him that sitteth on the throne, and

* Hence we dissent totally from the doctrine laid down by Sir Wm. Hamilton, that there is no medium between fatalism and chance. Hamilton's Reid, p. 602, Note.

to Him alone, in its just and proper sense, belongs the prerogative of POWER. He speaks and it is done. He commands and it stands fast.

The proof by which Mr. Morell establishes his proposition that spontaneous activity is the substance of the soul, is as remarkable as the proposition itself. His argument is what logicians call a destructive conditional, to the validity of which it is as requisite, that all the suppositions which can possibly be made in the case, should be given in the major, as that all but the one contained in the conclusion, should be destroyed in the minor—the very species of argument which we ourselves have employed in regard to the existence of a necessary being. Now, says Mr. Morell, the essence of mind *must* consist either in sensation, intelligence or will. It does *not* consist in sensation, or intelligence—therefore it *must* consist in the will. Very plausible, no doubt. But how, we ask, does it appear, that it *must* consist in one of the enumerated elements? Why may it not consist in something else—in that unknown substance denominated spirit—unknown, but yet believed by virtue of the very constitution of our nature? This supposition is, at least, one which *may* be made in the case—which *has been* made by philosophers of the highest repute—and which, we venture to predict, will *continue* to be made by the great mass of mankind as long as the world shall stand. Then, again, in his process of destruction, he removes a great deal more than he intends. He removes whatever “is essentially the same in all minds,” and of course the will considered as a mere “spontaneity or capacity of acting independently and for ourselves,” for in this sense it is unquestionably common to all mankind. Its modes of manifestation are various in different individuals, and in the same individual at different times—but as a faculty or power abstracted from its effects, “it is essentially the same in all minds.”

We have insisted, at what may seem a disproportionate length, upon this preliminary feature of Mr. Morell's psychology, because we believe that it contains the seeds of incalculable mischief. The serious proposal of the question, concerning the substance of the soul, as one that our faculties can answer, involves a complete apostacy from the fundamental principle of the experimental school.

The great masters of that philosophy would as soon have thought of gravely discussing the relations of angels to space, how they can be here and not there—or there and not here—and yet be incorporeal and unextended beings. Des Cartes, indeed, speaks of the essence of the soul—and places it in thought—as he had placed the essence of matter in extension. But he uses essence—not as synonymous with substance—for he expressly distinguishes them—but for the characteristic and discriminating quality.

If there be any principle which we regard as settled, it is that all human knowledge must be phenomenal and relative—and that science transcends its sphere when it seeks to penetrate into the region of substances, or into that of efficient causes—two things which we shall afterwards have occasion to observe, rationalists are perpetually confounding. We will not quote in confirmation of our own, the opinions of philosophers, imperfectly, or not at all acquainted with the modern speculations of continental Europe. We choose rather to refer to one who is master of them all—who in depth and acuteness is a rival to Aristotle—in immensity of learning, a match for Leibnitz, and in comprehensiveness of thought an equal to Bacon. We allude to Sir William Hamilton. His work on Reid has filled us with amazement at the prodigious extent and critical accuracy of his reading. The whole circle of the ancient classics—poets, philosophers and orators—the entire compass of Christian literature—Eastern and western, from Justin to Luther, including the angry controversies and the endless disputes of the Fathers and Schoolmen—the great works of the Reformation—and the prolific productions of England, Scotland, Germany and France, from the period of the Reformers until now—all seem to be as familiar to his mind as the alphabet to other men—and what is more remarkable, this ponderous mass of learning is no incumbrance—he has not only swallowed down but digested libraries, and while he carries—it is hardly extravagant to say, all the thoughts of all other men in his head, he has an immense multitude besides—precious as any he has collected—which none have ever had before him, and for which the world will always hold him in grateful remembrance. He is an honour to Scotland and an ornament to letters. Upon this subject

of the nature and extent of human knowledge and the legitimate province of philosophy, we are rejoiced to find that he treads in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessors of the same school. He fully recognizes the distinction betwixt faith and science.

"All we know," says he* "either of mind or matter is only a knowledge in each, of the particular, of the different, of the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit that the consequence of this doctrine is, that philosophy, if viewed as more than a science of the conditioned, is impossible. Departing from the particular, we can never in our highest generalizations, rise above the finite; that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, can be nothing more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of an existence, which, in itself, it is our highest wisdom to recognize as beyond the reach of philosophy."

"We know—we can know," he observes again,† "only what is relative. Our knowledge of qualities or phenomena is necessarily relative; for these exist only as they exist *in relation to our faculties*. The knowledge, or even the conception of a substance, in itself and apart from any qualities in relation to, and therefore cognizable, or conceivable by our minds, involves a contradiction. Of such we can form only a negative notion—that is—we can merely *conceive it as inconceivable*." And again,‡ "We know nothing whatever of mind and matter, considered as substances; they are only known to us as a two-fold series of phenomena, and we can only justify against the law of parcimony, the postulation of two substances, on the ground that the two series of phenomena are reciprocally so contrary and incompatible, that the one cannot be reduced to the other, nor both be supposed to combine in the same common substance." And finally,§ "We are aware of a phenomenon. That it exists only as known—only as a phenomenon—only as an absolute relative—we are unable to realize in thought; and there is necessarily suggested the notion of an unimaginable something, in which the phenomenon inheres—a subject or substance."*

These principles are so intuitively obvious to us, that we find it difficult to sympathize with men who can persuade themselves that, with our faculties, they can ever

* Edinburgh Review. Cross's Selections, p. 181. A splendid article on Cousin's Philosophy.

† Hamilton's Reid, p. 322.

‡ Hamilton's Reid. Appendix. Note A. §11. p. 751.

§ Hamilton's Reid. Appendix. Note D.**

arrive at any other conception of substance, but as the unknown and unknowable support of properties. It is not a matter of *knowledge*, but of *belief*—it is not an object which, in itself, is ever present in consciousness—it is veiled from human penetration by the multitude of attributes and qualities which intervene betwixt it and the mind. It belongs to the dominion of faith and not of science. We admit its existence, not because we know it, but because we are unable *not* to believe it. The unfounded conviction, that by some means, we can ascend from the phenomenal to the substantial—that we can apprehend existence in itself—that we can know it simply as being, without qualities, without properties, without any relative manifestations of its reality—that we can comprehend it in its naked essence, and track the progress of all its developments from its abstract *esse* to its countless forms throughout the universe, has given rise to all the abortive attempts of German and French speculation to fix the *absolute* as a positive element in knowledge. These speculations are not the visions of crack-brained enthusiasts. The reader who has judged of the German philosophers from the extravagant conclusions they have reached will find, upon opening their works, and mastering their uncouth and barbarous dialects, and what is often more difficult, their abstract and rugged formulas—that he is brought in contact with men of the highest order of mind—the severest powers of logic, and the utmost coolness of judgment. They do not *rave* but *reason*. They do not *dream*, but *think*, and that, too, with a rigour of abstraction—an intensity of attention, and a nicety of discrimination which he is obliged to respect, while he laments the perverseness of their application. The difficulty with them is that they begin wrong. Refusing to recognize the limits which the constitution of our nature and our obvious relations to existence have imposed upon the excursions of our faculties—and inattentive to the great law of our being, that in this sublunary state, we are doomed to walk by faith, much more than by sight—they undertake to bring within the circle of science, the nature and foundation of all reality. Reluctant to accept any constitutional beliefs, they seek to verify the deposition of our faculties, by gazing upon the things themselves with

the intuition of God—and grasping them in their true and essential existence. Hence their endless quest of the absolute as the unconditioned ground of *being*. They suppose that, if they can once comprehend in its inmost essence what it is TO BE, they have the data for “the absolute intelligence and absolute explanation of all things.” The consequences, too well known, which inattention, in their hands, to the necessary limits of human knowledge, has legitimately produced, show the supreme importance of accurately fixing in our minds—to use the homely language of Locke*—“how far the understanding can extend its view—how far it has faculties to attain certainty—and in what cases it can only judge and guess.” The salutary lesson of human ignorance is the last to which human pride submits—but a sound philosophy concurs with the sure word of inspiration, in pronouncing man to be a creature of yesterday, who knows comparatively nothing. It is precisely because we discover in the preliminary speculations of our author, this tendency to transcend the sphere of our faculties, which, in its last manifestation—when it has grasped the absolute—identifies man with God, that we have adverted with so much earnestness to the indispensable conditions of knowledge. In the case before us Mr. Morell has evidently made nothing of substance. After all that he has said of spontaneity, will, power, capacity of acting independently and for ourselves, the real nature of the mind is as inscrutable as it was before; and although he has confidently said that beyond what he has disclosed, there is nothing more to know, the instinctive belief of every understanding will instantaneously suggest that there is something more to know.

2. His classification of the powers of the mind comes next in order. He divides them into two classes or orders—“those relating to the acquisition of knowledge, on the one side, and those subserving impulse and activity, on the other.” The former he terms *intellectual*, the latter *emotional*. “Between the intellectual and emotional activity,” he observes,† “there always subsists a direct correspondency.” The successive stages of human consciousness in the order of its developement and in the corres-

* Essay on Hum. Understand. Introd. §4.

† p. 4.

Sir William Hamilton,* that Consciousness is not to be considered as a distinct and co-ordinate faculty of the mind, taking cognizance of its other powers and operations to the exclusion of their objects—the opinion of Reid, Stewart, and Royer-Collard—but that it is the necessary condition of intelligence—the generic and fundamental form of all intellectual activity. We cannot, in other words, know, without knowing that we know. We cannot think, will, feel or remember—without knowing, in the exercise and by the exercise of these faculties or powers, that we are the subjects of such operations. Hence, although it is strictly true, that every form of mental activity is a form of consciousness—yet there is certainly, as Sir William Hamilton himself admits—a logical distinction betwixt a faculty *as known* and a faculty *as exerted*, and this logical distinction ought to be preserved in language. It has, indeed, been preserved in the common terminology, which assigns to the separate faculties considered in themselves, appropriate appellations, while the relation of each and all to our knowledge of them is denoted by consciousness. It is a word which precisely expresses the formula, *we know that we know*, and when employed without an epithet restricting it to some specific mode of cognition, indicates the complement of all our intellectual faculties. It is, therefore, indispensable to any adequate enumeration of the sources of human knowledge. Those who regard it as a single and distinct power, of course cannot omit it, and those who regard it as the universal condition of intelligence, should include it, because it is a compendious statement of all the faculties in detail, and in that precise relation which the classification contemplates. In the table before us Mr. Morell gives us Perception *as known*, Sensation *as known*, Understanding *as known*, Reason *as known*, and various departments of emotion *as known*, but he does not give us OURSELVES, the mind in its integrity *as known*. This omission is the more remarkable, as in his history of Modern Philosophy, he has himself suggested† the convenience of the term, *self-consciousness*, “to express the mind’s cognizance of

* Cross’s Selections. Edin. Review. Vol. III. p. 197.

† Vol. II. p. 15. Note.

its own operations." We need not say that the faculties which he has enumerated, he has illustrated, according to his own views of their connection and dependence, in a very graphic and interesting sketch of the natural history of the human mind.

3. Without detaining the reader with his accounts of Sensation and External Perception, in which he has professedly followed Sir William Hamilton, and upon this subject he could not have followed a better or a safer guide, we come to that part of his psychology which bears more immediately upon the main questions of his treatise, and in which error or mistake is likely to be productive of serious consequences—we allude to his doctrine of the Understanding and Reason.

Understanding, as a synonyme for logical consciousness, is, so far as we know, utterly without authority in our philosophical literature—for we do not regard Coleridge as authority for any thing but literary theft. It is a term employed in a wider or narrower sense—in its wider sense, it embraces all the powers which relate to the acquisition of knowledge, in contradistinction from those which are subservient to impulse and activity—it answers, in other words, precisely to the division which Mr. Morell has styled *intellectual*. Hence the common distribution of our faculties into those of the understanding and those of the will. In its narrower, and, as we think, its proper sense, it denotes those higher intellectual faculties which pre-eminently distinguish man from the brute—to the exclusion of sense, imagination, memory and fancy. But we cannot recollect a single instance in which it has ever been restricted to our lower cognitive faculties, or to the processes of ratiocination. The change which Mr. Morell has introduced, or rather followed Coleridge in introducing—is a radical departure from established usage. There is much more authority for identifying *reason* with the logical consciousness, than understanding. For although that word, in its prevailing usage, is exactly synonymous with understanding, both in its narrower and wider sense, yet it has not unfrequently been employed by writers of the highest repute, to denote precisely the Discursive Faculty. This is the first meaning which Johnson assigns to it—and the meaning

in which Reid systematically employs it in his Inquiry into the Human Mind—the meaning to which Beattie restricts it in his Essay on Truth, and which Dr. Campbell evidently attached to it, when he denied it to be the source of our moral convictions. We would not be understood as objecting, however, to Mr. Morell's employment of reason as synonymous with common sense—or, as he prefers to style it, the Intuitional Consciousness—this is justified by the highest authority. Dugald Stewart long ago suggested “whether it would not, on some occasions, be the best substitute which our language affords, for intuition in the enlarged acceptation in which it had been made equivalent to the ancient *vous* or *locus principiorum*.” But what we deny is, that understanding is ever equivalent to logical consciousness as contradistinguished from Reason in its restricted application, or is ever opposed to it in any other sense than a genus is opposed to a species.* Intelligence is one, and all our faculties, when legitimately exercised, are harmonious and consistent with each other. They all conspire in the unity of knowledge. It is not one reason which knows intuitively, and another reason which knows deductively—but it is the same reason which knows in each case, though the relations of the object to it are different, but not repugnant or contradictory. To suppose that the logical consciousness, operating in conformity with the laws of thought, shall ever be exclusive of intuitive results, is to suppose that philosophy is impossible, and that skepticism is the highest wisdom of man.

The unity of reason, and the harmony of intelligence being kept steadily in view, we have no objections to *any* form of phraseology which shall exactly designate the relations in which the objects of knowledge are contemplated by the mind. There is certainly a distinction between those faculties which are simply receptive and those which operate upon the materials received—those which furnish us with our simple and elementary ideas, and those which combine them into structures of science; and if this is the distinction which Mr. Morell designed to signalize—if he means by intuition, the complement of all our faculties of presentative, and by logical

* See Stewart's Elements, vol. ii. Prelim. Cons. and Hamilton's Reid. Appendix. Note A, § v. p 768 seq. Also p. 511, Note.

consciousness, the complement of all our faculties of representative knowledge—he has aimed at the expression of an obvious truth, but we must take the liberty to say, has been extremely unfortunate in the mode of its development.

He has, in the first place, confounded presentative and intuitive knowledge. These knowledges have not the same logical extension—one is a genus of which the other is a species. All presentative is intuitive, but all intuitive is not presentative knowledge. Intuition may be, and is, constantly applied, not only to the immediate view which the mind has of an object, in an act of presentative cognition, but to the irresistible conviction of the vicarious character of the representative, in an act of representative cognition, as well as to the instantaneous perception of the agreement of subject and predicate in self-evident propositions. To make these distinctions more obvious—knowledge, in its strict acceptation, as contradistinguished from faith, is conversant only about realities, which have been given in experience; and is either mediate or immediate—it is immediate when an object is apprehended in itself without relation to others—mediate when it is known or apprehended in and through its relations. Immediate knowledge is, again, subdivided into presentative and representative—presentative when the object itself, and not an image, conception, or notion of it, is that which is present in consciousness—representative—when it is not the object, but an image, notion, or conception of it, which is present in consciousness. Hence, although all presentative knowledge is immediate, all immediate is not presentative knowledge; and although all mediate knowledge is representative, all representative is not mediate knowledge—and both presentative and representative knowledge may be intuitive. External perception is an instance of presentative and intuitive—memory, of representative and intuitive, knowledge. In the one case, the external object is known in itself, being actually present in consciousness—in the other, the past, which *ex hypothesi*, cannot be present, is apprehended through a modification of the mind representing it. But the knowledge of memory is as strictly self-evident—as strictly independent of proofs—though it may not be as perfect in degree, as the knowledge in ex-

ternal perception. If, now, the logical consciousness embraces all our faculties of presentative, and the intuition-al, all our faculties of representative knowledge--intuition certainly may be common to both. It does not follow that because an object is intuitively known, it is therefore directly and immediately given in consciousness.

His confusion of Intuition and Presentation has led him, in the next place, into a still more remarkable error--the confusion of mediate and indirect knowledge with that which is direct and immediate. When he comes, for example, to account for our conceptions of God, though, with singular inconsistency, he uses terms expressive of presentative cognition, yet in describing the process of developement by which we ascend to the lofty stage of supersensible consciousness--he gives us nothing but evolutions of reasoning--necessary deductions from our primitive and instinctive beliefs. God is not actually present as the object of consciousness--He does not stand before us as the outward object in an act of perception--it is the finite, limited, temporary and dependent, which we immediately apprehend--and in consequence of the necessary laws of mind--these suggest the infinite, eternal, independent and absolute. God, in other words, is not known in Himself--in His separate and distinct existence, as a datum of consciousness; He is apprehended in and through his works--through relations intuitively recognized and spontaneously suggesting the reality of His being. Or we know God, as we know substance, in and through its attributes. This species of knowledge is evidently indirect and mediate. Take away the limited, finite, contingent--take away the necessary belief--that these require a cause--and you take away all Mr. Morell's consciousness of God--and hence we believe in God, not because He is seen or stands face to face with any of our faculties of cognition--but because *other things* are known which are utterly inexplicable except upon the supposition of the divine existence. The heavens declare His glory and the firmament showeth His handiwork--the invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.

We agree most fully that there is a process by which the understanding can, to a limited extent, ascend from

the known to the unknown—that we are so framed as that ourselves—our bodies, our souls and nature around us become *witnesses* for God—but the knowledge we derive in this way, we should never dream of describing as immediate, presentative or direct. Mr. Morell has been betrayed into this inconsistency by making presentation co-extensive with intuition. There is no doubt that this knowledge of God is intuitive—as it results from the indestructible categories of thought—which developed into formal statements are self-evident propositions—in the application to the objects furnished in experience. Constituted as we are, we can neither cognize ourselves nor the world without a belief of God—the belief is inseparably connected with the cognition—we can give no reason for it but that such is the constitution of our nature, that when an effect is given a cause must be admitted—and hence, while we may be said to know, intuitively, we evidently do not know the cause in itself—it is mediated by the effect. The knowledge, in other words, is intuitive, but not presentative.

It is useless to adduce passages to prove what no one, perhaps, will think of disputing, that presentation and intuition are treated as synonymous—but as it may not be so readily conceded that mediate and indirect knowledge is also treated as presentative and immediate, we appeal to the following statements in justification of our assertion.

“Let us take a third instance. The mind, after it has gazed for awhile upon the phenomena of the world around, begins to ponder within itself, such thoughts as these. What is this changing scene, which men call nature? What then is nature? Of what primary elements do all things consist? What is the power and the wisdom through which their infinite forms of beauty, spring forth, live, decay, and then become instinct with a new vitality? In these questions we again discern the activity of a higher state of consciousness than the understanding alone presents. The understanding, looking at the objects presented to us, though the agency of perception, abstracts their properties and classifies them—in a word—it separates things into their genera and species, and there leaves them. But the pure reason, instead of separating the objects of nature, and classifying them into various species, seeks rather to *unite* them, to view them all together—to find the one fundamental essence by which they are

upheld ; to discover the great presiding principle by which they are maintained in unbroken harmony. The Understanding has simply to do with separate objects, viewed in their specific or generic character—the higher reason has to do with them as forming parts of one vast totality, of which it seeks the basis, the origin and the end—with the phenomena of the human mind it is the same. The understanding merely clasifies them, the pure reason inquires into the nature of the principle from which they spring, and views the human mind as a totality, expressing the will and purpose of its great Archetype.

“These two efforts of the reason to seek the nature and origin, both of the universe and the soul, lead naturally and inevitably to the conception of some common ground, from which they are both derived. The soul is not self-created, but is consciously dependent upon some higher power. There must be a type after which it was formed—a self-existent essence from which it proceeded—a supreme *mind* which planned and created my mind. So also with regard to nature. If the universe, as a whole, shows the most perfect harmony, all the parts thereof symmetrically adapted to each other, all proceeding onwards like a machine infinitely complicate, yet never clashing in its minutest wheels and movements; there must be some mind vaster than the universe, one which can take it all in at a single glance, one which has planned its harmony and keeps the whole system from perturbation. In short, if there be *dependent* existence, there must be *absolute* existence—if there be temporal and finite beings, there must be an Eternal and an Infinite *One*. Thus the power of intuition, that highest elevation of the human consciousness, leads us at length into the world of eternal realities. The period of the mind's converse with mere phenomena being past, it rises at length to grasp the mystery of existence and the problem of destiny.”—pp. 20—22.

We beg the reader to examine carefully this passage, and to lay his hand, if he can, upon any thing, but a very awkward and mystical statement—certainly a very feeble and inadequate one, of the common a posteriori argument from effect to cause. Instead of gazing directly upon the Supreme Being and standing face to face with the absolute—we gaze outwardly upon the world, and inwardly upon ourselves, and are conducted by processes of natural and spontaneous inquiry to the admission of an adequate and all-sufficient cause of the wondrous phenomena we behold. Whether our steps be from the finite to the infinite, from the dependent to the absolute—from the

fleeting to the eternal--they are the steps of intelligence mediating a knowledge of God through relations which we intuitively recognize. We see Him only in the operation of His hands. He is mirrored in His works. The knowledge in this case is precisely analogous to that of the external world which the hypothetical realists ascribe to us. We are not directly conscious of its existence, but are conscious of effects produced in ourselves which the constitution of our nature determines us to refer to outward and independent realities.

If Mr. Morell seriously believes that our knowledge of God is presentative, he is bound, of course, that he may be consistent with himself, to postulate a faculty through which the Divine Being may be given as the immediate object of involuntary consciousness. We have the senses through which the various properties of matter are directly and spontaneously cognized; we have taste and conscience which bring us into contact with the beautiful and deformed--the right and the wrong; and to preserve the analogy, we must have some power or sense which shall be directly conversant about God--a faculty of the Divine or the absolute; sustaining the same relations to the Deity which the senses sustain to the outward world--taste to the fair, and conscience to the right. This is the only way in which the theory of presentative knowledge can be consistently carried out in its application to God. But if this be admitted, it is as absurd to talk of hunting up the Deity through the realms of matter and of mind--to be feeling, inquiring, and searching after Him in the regions of the finite, limited and dependent--as it is to represent men as *seeking* the primary qualities of matter, or the elementary distinctions betwixt beauty and deformity--a virtue and a crime. All presentative knowledge comes, in the first instance, unbidden. There is no appetite or instinct for it which leads us in quest of it. We had no conception of matter until we were made conscious of its existence--beauty was an unmeaning word; and we should never have known how to set about comprehending its meaning, until the experience of it was first felt; and if there be a separate and distinct faculty of God, He must be absolutely incognizable and inconceivable by us, until He reaches us through

the medium or instrumentality of this faculty. He must come into the mind like extension, figure, solidity---like beauty, virtue, and all our simple and elementary cognitions. He is not to be a craving of our nature---something longed for and yearned after; but an immediate datum of consciousness---something which we know to be, because he is now and here present to intelligence. But the passage which we have just quoted from our author, is directly in the teeth of any such doctrine. There is no presentation there of any objective realities in themselves but the finite, dependent, and phenomenal---these are alone present in consciousness; but being cognized as *effects, they* give us, as vouchers and witnesses---other existences beyond themselves. They *testify* of God, but do not *present* God. They develop a belief which is natural, spontaneous, and irresistible---whose object is unknown except in so far as it may be collected from their qualities and attributes in their relations to it.

Mr. Morell is equally at fault in the account which he has given of the logical consciousness. This, we have seen---he employs as a compendious expression for all our faculties of representative knowledge. It embraces those processes of the mind which relate to the combination, arrangement, and structure of the sciences---which conduct us from particular phenomena to general laws---which group individual existences into classes, and perform the functions which are commonly denominated discursive. Its first office is to turn our intuitions into notions or conceptions---to give us representatives through the acts of the intellect, of the real and independent existences which are grasped by the faculty of inward or outward perception. It *idealizes*, in other words, the matter of our direct and presentative knowledge. It then decomposes its conceptions, fixes upon one or more elements contained in them---abstracts these from the rest, and makes these abstractions the grounds of classification. To it belongs memory, the mediate knowledge of the past; imagination, the mediate knowledge of the conceivable and possible, and, if Mr. Morell admits such a thing as possible, prescience or the mediate knowledge of the future. He calls this complement of faculties, *logical*; and we think the epithet well chosen to designate representative

in contradistinction from presentative knowledge, because it is in them that the mind is specially *cogitative*—it is in them that the laws and necessary forms of thought, which it is the office of logic to investigate, are conspicuously developed. In presentation the mind *knows*—in representation the mind *thinks*. In presentation there is an immediate object apart from the mind—in representation nothing is directly given but the acts of the mind itself. In presentation the mind may be regarded as comparatively passive—in representation it is wholly and essentially active. In presentation, accordingly, the prominent matter is the object of cognition—in representation, the categories of thought. There are two points, however, in Mr. Morell's doctrine of the logical consciousness, against which we must enter a solemn and decided protest. The first is that our conceptions cannot exactly represent our intuitions—that the remote and ultimate object, as given in an act of mediate and representative cognition, is not precisely the same as the immediate object in an act of direct and presentative cognition. The other is that the understanding cannot enlarge our knowledge of numerical existences—that we can only think the precise, identical realities which have been given in experience, and can infer and prove the substantive existence of nought beyond them.

In relation to the first point we can only speak of what strikes us as the prevailing doctrine of the book—for the author is so vague, vacillating, and inconsistent in his account of conception, that we freely admit that he appears in two passages to teach the doctrine for which we contend. But as a general thing, he maintains that the understanding is exclusively conversant about attributes or properties. "It has to do," he informs us, "entirely with the *attributes* of things—separating, scrutinizing, classifying them, and adapting them, by the aid of judgment and reasoning, to all the purposes of human existence." "Thus every notion," (conception,) he tells us in another place, "we have of an external object—as a house, or a tree, or a flower—is compounded of two elements, a material and a formal. The matter is furnished by the direct sensational intuition of a concrete reality, and this is perception; the form is furnished by the logical faculty

which, separating the attributes of the object, as given in perception, from the essence, constructs a notion or idea (conception) which can be clearly defined and employed as a fixed term in the region of our reflective knowledge." And again :

"Of mere phenomena we can gain a very good knowledge by an intermediate or logical process. We can have the different attributes presented to us as *abstract ideas*; we can put these attributes together one by one, and thus form a conception of the whole thing as a *phenomenon*; but this cannot be done in regard to any elementary and essential existence. Of *substance*, for example, we can gain no conception by a logical definition; the attempt to do so has, in fact, always ended in the denial of substance altogether, considered as an objective reality; it becomes in this way simply the projected shadow of our own faculties. The only refuge against this logical skepticism, which has uniformly attached itself to a sensational philosophy, is in the immediacy of our higher knowledge—in the fact that we see and feel the existence of a substantial reality around us, without the aid of any logical idea or definition, by which it can be represented or conveyed."—*p.* 37.

Mr. Morell surely cannot mean that through any representative faculty, *original* ideas can be imparted of attributes and qualities which had never been *presentatively* given—that a blind man can be instructed in colours by a logical definition, or a deaf man in sounds. Every simple idea, whether of qualities or not, must, in the first instance, have been conveyed in an act of immediate cognition. What we understand Mr. Morell as teaching is, that the conceptions of the understanding do not adequately represent the cognitions of intuition—that the phenomenon does not mirror the whole reality—that there is something given in perception which cannot be mediated by an act of mind. It is true that this mysterious something is described as the essence or substance of the thing perceived; and it is equally true that essences or substances are only matters of belief—we neither see them nor feel them—they lie beyond the boundaries of knowledge, whether presentative or otherwise. But we maintain that *whatever* can be perceived or immediately known, can be also imagined or conceived. We can frame an image or notion which shall exactly correspond

to the *whole* object of an inward or outward perception. We can represent *all the essence* that we ever knew. There is no difference between the remote and ultimate object in an act of representative, and the immediate and present object in an act of immediate and presentative cognition. Unless Mr. Morell admits what we understand him to deny, that the vicarious knowledge involved in conception answers exactly to the original knowledge given in intuition, he must maintain that the knowledge of any existence, but that which is now and here present in consciousness, is impossible. All else becomes purely ideal—our conceptions cease to be *representative*; for the very notion of representation implies a reality apart from itself which, as represented, is known. To affirm that the representative does not truly mirror the original, is to invalidate the only conceivable process by which we can pass from the ideal to the actual. It is to deny the fidelity of our faculties, in the irresistible conviction which we have of the reality of the original, though mediated idea, and thus to lay the foundation of universal skepticism. To illustrate by an example, memory is the mediate knowledge of the past. The house, or man, or flower, which we saw yesterday, and remember to have seen to-day, has no longer a present existence in consciousness—what we now contemplate, and immediately cognize, is not the thing itself, but a conception which we feel to be its representative. According to our author, however, this conception is partial and inadequate—it does not embrace *all* that we saw—the most important part—the only part, indeed, which was real, has been omitted. But consciousness assures us that we distinctly and adequately recollect our perception of yesterday—the whole perception precisely as it was experienced—that, to accommodate the language of Mr. Hume, the present idea is an exact transcript of the former impression. If, now, consciousness deceives us in this case—if it lies in pronouncing that to be an adequate representative which is partial, maimed, and defective—what guarantee have we for its veracity in any case? and how, especially, shall we prove that memory and all our powers of mediate knowledge are not faculties of mere delusion? Mr. Morell, it seems to us, must deny all objective existences

apart from the mind, or he must admit that the understanding can frame conceptions exactly commensurate with original intuitions. This we conceive to be the fundamental condition of the certainty of all representative knowledge. We see no alternative between pure idealism and this theory of the understanding. When it abstracts and fixes its attention upon one or more attributes--performing what Mr. Morell regards as its characteristic functions--these attributes are not absolutely conceived, but relatively, as the attributes of real things.

The other point, that the understanding cannot enlarge the boundaries of knowledge, Mr. Morell seems uniformly to treat as well nigh self-evident.

“And yet this logical consciousness, although it is the great instrument of practical life, is entirely subjective and formal—The material with which it has to do is wholly given in sensation and perception; all that it furnishes in addition to this are forms of thought, general notions, categories, and internal processes, which have an abstract or logical value, but which, when viewed alone, are absolutely void of all “content.”—*p.* 16.

If Mr. Morell means nothing more than that the understanding can furnish no original ideas beyond the contents of intuition, the proposition, though unquestionably true, is far from being new. It is universally conceded that no powers of conception, imagination, memory, or reasoning--no processes of definition, analysis, or judgment, can supply the elementary notions of the senses to one who was destitute of the material organism. But if he means, what the tenor of his argument demands, and what we, accordingly, understand him to assert, that all our simple ideas being given, the understanding or the laws of thought cannot conduct us to the full conviction of existences, lying beyond the range of present intuition, the proposition is just as unquestionably false. What transcends the limits of momentary experience can either not be known at all, or it must be known through the medium of the logical consciousness. If it cannot be known at all, then human knowledge, in regard to external things, is limited to what is in immediate contact with the organs of sense—in regard to internal things, to the fleeting consciousness of the moment. We can know nothing of the past--we can know nothing of the distant--

we can predict nothing of the future. In other words, all science is a rank delusion. Even our knowledge of the material world, as embracing a wide range of existence, is an inference of the understanding, and not the result of a direct perception of its amplitude and variety. Upon the theory of external perception, which Mr. Morell has adopted, it is intuitively obvious that we can perceive nothing, or have a presentative cognition of nothing, but that which is in contact with our material organism. The sun, moon, and stars are not objects of perception, but of inference--they are not directly, but representatively known. We can immediately know only what is now and here present in consciousness.

"In the third place," says Sir William Hamilton, "to this head we may refer Reid's inaccuracy in regard to the precise object of perception. This object is not, as he seems frequently to assert, any distant reality; for we are percipient of nothing but what is in proximate contact, in immediate relation, with our organs of sense. Distant realities we reach, not by perception, but by a subsequent process of inference, founded thereon; and so far, as he somewhere says, from all men who look upon the sun perceiving the same object, in reality, every individual, in this instance, perceives a different object, nay, a different object in each several eye. The doctrine of Natural Realism requires no such untenable assumption for its basis. It is sufficient to establish the simple fact, that we are competent, as consciousness assures us, immediately to apprehend through sense the non-ego in certain limited relations; and it is of no consequence whatever, either to our certainty of the reality of a material world, or to our ultimate knowledge of its properties, whether, by this primary apprehension, we lay hold, in the first instance, on a larger or a lesser portion of its contents." And in another place: "A thing to be known *in itself*, must be known as *actually existing*, and it cannot be known as actually existing unless it be known as existing in its *when* and its *where*. But the when and where of an object are *immediately* cognizable by the subject, only if the when be now, (*i. e.* at the same moment with the cognitive act,) and the where be *here*, (*i. e.* within the sphere of the cognitive faculty;) therefore a presentative or intuitive knowledge is only competent of an object *present* to the mind both in *time* and *space*. E converso, whatever is known, but not as *actually existing now and here*, is known not in itself, as the presentative object of an intuitive, but only as the remote object of a representative cognition."

Upon the hypothesis of Mr. Morell, accordingly, which restricts the operations of the understanding to the specific contents which have been given in actual intuitions, the worlds which astronomy discloses to our faith are merely subjective forms and logical processes, and not realities at all. All the deductions of pure mathematics are sheer delusions, inasmuch as they are the products of the understanding operating upon the primary qualities of matter, which alone are furnished in perception. That the results which the Chemist has obtained to-day, shall, under the same circumstances, be verified to-morrow--that like antecedents shall be attended with like consequents in all the departments of philosophy, cannot, with confidence be predicted, since that would be a present knowledge of a future event, and involve a fact numerically different from any which had ever been given in experience. To say that the understanding cannot compass other realities, beside the precise identical ones which have been or are present in consciousness, is to pull down the entire fabrick of human science--to leave us nothing of nature, but the small fragment of its objects within the immediate sphere of our faculties--to make us, without a figure, the creatures of the passing moment. All that can be maintained is, that the understanding cannot conduct us to the knowledge of existences involving elements which have not been derived from some objects of actual intuition. But it may infer and prove the existence of realities involving these elements in different degrees, and different modes of combination, from any that have actually fallen within the sphere of consciousness. We can prove the existence of the Sun, and yet we have never seen him. But without a specific presentation of his substantive reality, we can frame the conception of him by a combination of attributes which have been repeatedly given in other instances of intuition. We ascribe to him nothing but what we know from experience to be properties of matter--and what we know *he* must possess in order to produce the effects which he does. We believe in the existence of animals that we never saw--of lands that we are never likely to visit--of changes and convulsions that shook our globe centuries before its present inhabitants were

born ; and though we have no experience of the future, we can frame images of coming events, all of which may and some of which, as the decay and dissolution of our bodies, most assuredly will take place. Were there not a law of our nature by which we are determined to judge of the future by the past, and a uniformity of events which exactly answers to it, the physical sciences would be impossible, and prudential rules for the regulation of conduct utterly absurd.

So far, indeed, is it from being true, that the understanding does not enlarge our knowledge of real existences, that it is precisely the faculty, or complement of faculties, which gives us the principal part of that knowledge. Intuition supplies us with very few objects—it is limited to a very narrow sphere—but in the materials which it *does* embrace, it gives us the constituents of all beings that we are capable of conceiving. The understanding, impelled to action in the first instance by the presentation of realities, goes forward in obedience to the laws of thought, and infers a multitude of beings lying beyond the range of our presentation, some like those that have been given—others possessed of the same elementary qualities in different degrees and proportions. It is impossible to say how much our knowledge is extended—our knowledge, we mean, of veritable, objective realities, by the processes involved in general reasoning. We can form some conception of the immense importance of abstraction and generalization as subservient to intellectual improvement, by imagining what our condition would be, if we were deprived of the benefits of language. How much better, apart from speech, would be our knowledge than the crude apprehension of the brute? He has, no doubt, all the intuitions of the primary qualities of matter which we possess, but he knows them only as in this or that object—he has never been able to abstract, generalize, classify and name—and, therefore, his knowledge must always be limited to the particular things now and here present in consciousness. He can have no science.

To us, it is almost intuitively obvious that the understanding, as the organ of science, is pre-eminently the faculty of knowledge. Intuition gives us the alphabet—the understanding combines and arranges the letters, in con-

formity with the necessary forms of thought, into the words which utter the great realities of nature, whether material, moral or intellectual. Intuition is the germ---the bud. Understanding, the tree, in full and majestic proportions, spreading its branches and scattering its fruits on all sides. Intuition is the insect's eye---contracted to a small portion of space and a smaller fragment of things. Understanding, the telescope, which embraces within its scope the limitless expanse of worlds---"of planets, suns and adamantine spheres, wheeling unshaken through the void immense."

Mr. Morell has been betrayed into his inadequate representations of the understanding as an instrument of knowledge, by adhering too closely to the Kantian theory of its nature as subjective and formal, without a reference to the circumstances by which the theory, though essentially just, must be limited and modified. We believe most fully that there are and must be laws or categories of thought---that there must be conditions in the subject adapting it to know, as well as conditions in the object adapting it to be known. Thinking is not an arbitrary process---our faculties of representation do not operate at random---there are forms of cogitation which cannot be separated from intelligence without destroying its nature. We care not by what names they are called---they certainly exist---and it is the special function of logic to investigate and analyze them. But one thing is set over against another. These laws of the understanding are designed to qualify it to be an instrument of knowledge. They are the conditions by which a limited and finite creature can stretch its intelligence beyond the points of space and time in which its existence is fixed. The laws of thought are so adjusted to the laws of existence, that whatever is true of our conceptions, will always be true of the *things* which our conceptions *represent*. The operations of the understanding, though primarily and immediately about its own acts, are remotely and mediately about other objects. Its acts are *representative*---and hence it deals with realities through their symbols. If Mr. Morell had kept steadily in view the *representative* character of our logical conceptions---he would have seen that they *must* have respect to something beyond them-

selves, which is not subjective and formal. He would have seen that every operation of mind *must* be cognitive—must involve a judgment. Every conception implies the belief that it is the image of something real, that has been given in experience—every fancy implies a *judgment* that it is the image of something possible, that *might* be given in experience. Attention to this circumstance of the cognitive character of all the operations of mind, would have saved him from the error of supposing that the acts of the understanding were exclusively formal. Kant knew nothing of the distinction betwixt presentative and representative knowledge. His conceptions, therefore, involved no judgment—they were not the images of a reality, as given in intuition—they were purely the products of the mind, and corresponded to nothing beyond the domain of consciousness. Had he recognized the truth, that every intellectual act is *cognitive*, and every act of the understanding *representative*, he would have “saved the main pillars of human belief”—and while he still might have taught, what we believe he has unanswerably demonstrated, that space and time are native notions of the mind and not generalizations from experience—he would have seen that, as native notions, they were the indispensable conditions of its apprehending the time and space properties of matter, and have accorded, consequently, an objective reality to extension, solidity and figure, which his theory, in its present form, denies—he would have seen that the understanding is as truly conversant about *things* as intuition—that the only difference betwixt them in this respect is, that the one deals with them and apprehends them directly—the other, through means of representatives—and that, consequently, the conclusions of the understanding, legitimately reached, must have a counterpart in objective reality as truly as the cognitions of sense. We are sorry to say that Mr. Morell, though professing to adopt the distinctions to which we have adverted, falls again and again into the peculiarities of the Kantian hypothesis, against which they are a protest. Take the following passage:

“Perception, viewed alone, indicates simply the *momentary consciousness* of an external reality, standing before us face to

face; but it gives us no *notion* which we can define and express by a term. To do this, is the office of the understanding—the logical or constructive faculty, which seizes upon the concrete material that is given immediately in perception, moulds it into an idea—expresses the idea by a word or sign, and then lays it up in the memory, as it were a hewn stone, all shaped and prepared for use, whenever it may be required, either for ordinary life, or for constructing a scientific system. Thus every notion we have of an external object—as a house, a tree, or a flower—is compounded of two elements, a material and a formal. The matter is furnished by the direct sensational intuition of a concrete reality—and this is perception: the form is furnished by the logical faculty, which separating the attributes of the object as given in perception from the essence, constructs a notion or idea, which can be clearly defined and employed as a fixed term in the region of our reflective knowledge.” p. 45.

This passage, upon any theory but that of Kant, and even upon that theory it requires modification, is absolutely unintelligible. Upon the theory which Mr. Morell professes to adopt, it is pure gibberish. “*The understanding seizes upon the concrete material that is given immediately in perception.*” Now this “concrete material” was the “*external reality standing before us face to face.*” Are we then to understand that the understanding captures the outward object *itself*? If so, it surely has matter as well as form. But then it *moulds* the concrete material into an *idea*, dubs it with a name, and lays it away in the memory. What does he mean, what can he mean, by moulding an external reality into an idea? But it seems that, in this moulding process, though the understanding had originally seized the concrete reality, yet by some means or other, the *essence* slipped between its fingers, and the notion or idea lodged away in the memory, retains nothing but the qualities. Now what is the real process of the mind which all this nonsense is designed to represent? Perception gives us the external reality in those qualities which our faculties are capable of apprehending. We know it in itself, and as now and here existing. Conception, or rather imagination, is an act of the understanding, producing an *image* or *representative* of the object---it seizes upon no *material* given from without---the *immediate* matter of its knowledge is its own act---and that act, from its very con-

stitution, vicarious of something beyond itself. "A representation," says Sir William Hamilton,* "considered as an *object*, is logically, not really, different from a representation considered as an *act*. Here, object and act are the same indivisible mode of mind viewed in two different relations. Considered by reference to a mediate object represented, it is a representative object—considered by reference to the mind representing and contemplating the representation—it is a representative act." Hence, in every operation of the logical consciousness, what we *immediately* know is not the external reality, but a modification of the mind itself, and through that modification we know the external object. The form and immediate matter, therefore, cannot be separated even in thought.

Mr. Morell indeed speaks of forms and categories of thought in such terms as to imply that the mind *creates* the qualities which it represents in its conceptions. This, of course, is to deny that its acts are properly representative, to shut us up within the prison of hopeless idealism. The laws of thought enable the mind, not *to create*, but to image, figure or represent—they enable it to *think* a thing which is not before it. But they do not enable it to invest it with a single property which it does not possess—and they are violated whenever a thing is thought otherwise than as it actually exists. The mind as intelligent, and things as intelligible, are adapted to each other.

We may now condense into a short compass what we conceive to be the truth in contradistinction from Mr. Morell's doctrine of the understanding, in the points to which we have adverted. We believe then that this faculty, or rather complement of faculties, possesses the power of representing, and of completely and adequately representing, every individual thing, whether a concrete whole, or a single attribute, which ever has been presented in intuition. "It stamps," in the language of Aristotle, "a kind of impression of the *total process* of perception, after the manner of one who applies a signet to wax." This is the fundamental condition of the certainty of its results. For, as Sir William Hamilton expresses it, "it is only deserving of the name of knowledge in so far as it is conformable to the intuitions it represents." There is no separation of the essence from the

* Hamilton's Reid, p. 809.

attributes in an act of recollective imagination—what was given in intuition, and *all* that was given, is pictured in the image. As representative, we believe in the next place, that the understanding is ultimately conversant about *things*—realities—and not fictions or empty forms. What it proves of its conceptions legitimately framed will hold good of the objects which they represent—its ideas are, if we may so speak, the *language* of reality. In the next place, it is not confined to the numerical particulars which have been actually given in intuition. It is dependent upon presentation for all the elements it employs in its representations—it can originate no new simple idea—but testimony and the evidence of facts—induction and deduction, may lead it—may compel it—to acknowledge the existence of beings—which in their concrete realities have never been matters of direct experience. It frames a conception of them from the combination of the elements given in intuition in such proportions as the evidence before it seems to warrant. Thus the geologist describes the animals which perished amid what he believes to be the ruins of a former world—thus we believe in the monsters of other climes—the facts of history and the calculations of science.

After what has already been said, it is hardly necessary to devote much space to the detailed and articulate account of the distinction betwixt the logical and intuitional consciousness, upon which Mr. Morell has evidently bestowed much labour, and to which he attaches no small degree of importance, in consequence of the part which it is destined to play in his subsequent speculations. His first observation is that “the knowledge we obtain by the logical consciousness is *representative* and *indirect*; while that which we obtain by the intuitional consciousness is *presentative* and *immediate*.” This is the fundamental difference of the two complements of faculties. Intuition, or as in consequence of the ambiguity and vagueness of that term, we should prefer to call it, Presentation, embraces all our powers of original knowledge. Through it we are furnished with whatsoever simple ideas we possess—it is the *beginning* of our intellectual strength—the logical consciousness, on the other hand—embraces all our powers of representative knowledge—it builds the fabric of science

from the materials presentatively given---it comprehends all the processes of thought which the mind is led to carry on in consequence of the impulse received in presentation. If Mr. Morell had consistently adhered to this fundamental distinction, and admitted no differences but what might naturally be referred to it, he would have been saved from much needless confusion, perplexity and self-contradiction.

His second observation is that, "the knowledge we obtain by the logical consciousness is *reflective*; that which we obtain by the intuitional consciousness is spontaneous." This distinction, we confess, has struck us with amazement. In the first place, upon Mr. Morell's theory of the soul---*spontaneity* is the indispensable condition of all intelligence---it is of the very essence---substance---substratum of mind. Reflection, therefore, is not something *distinct from*, it is only a *form*, of spontaneity. "The power of the will," he tells us, "operates through all the region of man's spontaneous life;" "our activity is equally voluntary and equally moral in its whole aspect." In the next place, upon any just view of the subject, what we are authorized to affirm is, that all reflective knowledge is representative, but not, that all representative knowledge is reflective. The two propositions are by no means convertible. Reflection is nothing but attention to the phenomena of mind. It is the observation---if you please---the study, of what passes within. "The peculiar phenomena of philosophy," says one* who has insisted most largely upon the spontaneous and reflective aspects of reason---"are those of the other world, which every man bears within himself, and which he perceives by the aid of the inward light which is called consciousness, as he perceives the former by the senses. The phenomena of the inward world appear and disappear so rapidly, that consciousness perceives them and loses sight of them almost at the same time. It is not then sufficient to observe them transiently, and while they are passing over that changing scene; *we must retain them as long as possible by attention*. We may do even still more. We may call up a phenomenon from the bosom of the night into which it has vanished, summon it again to memory, and reproduce it in our minds for the sake of contemplating it at our ease; we

* Cousin. Frag. Phil. Pref.

may recall one part of it rather than another, leave the latter in the shade, so as to bring the former into view, vary the aspects in order to go through them all and to embrace every side of the object; *this is the office of reflection.*" Reflection is to psychology what observation and experiment are to physics. Now to say that all our representative knowledge depends upon attention to the processes of our own minds--that we know only as we take cognizance of the laws and operations of our faculties, is too ridiculous for serious refutation. Even Mr. Morell starts back from the bouncing absurdity--and with what consistency we leave it to our readers to determine--reluctantly admits that, "there is evidently a sense in which all the faculties, even the logical consciousness itself, may be regarded as having a spontaneous movement, such as we have described--a sense in which we cast our knowledge spontaneously and unreflectively, into a logical mould." In order to extricate himself, however, from the contradiction in which he is involved, he invents another meaning for reflective, in which he makes it synonymous with *scientific*. But we do not see that this subterfuge relieves him. All representative knowledge is surely not scientific--nor attained upon scientific principles. The elements of science must exist and be known representatively, before science itself can be constructed, and reflection always presupposes spontaneous processes as the objects of its attention. Without spontaneity there could be no reflectively. There would be nothing to reflect upon. Reflection, therefore, is simply an instrument, or faculty of one species of representative knowledge--the organon through which science is constructed from spontaneous data--whether those data be the spontaneous facts of presentation or the spontaneous processes of representation. All the faculties and operations of mind can be made the objects of cotemplation and of study. If Mr. Morell, therefore, had said that our faculties of presentation include no power of reflection--that this belonged to the logical consciousness--he would have announced a truism--but a truism about as important in reference to the object he had in view, as if he had said that memory and imagination belong to the understanding and not to intuition.

His third observation is that, "the knowledge we ob-

tain by the intuitional consciousness is *material*, that which we gain by the logical consciousness is *formal*." Now formal, as opposed to material, amounts in our judgment to about the same thing as *nothing* in contrast to *something*. That the understanding is a complement of *formal* faculties, is a proposition which we not only are able to comprehend, but fully believe—that the *knowledge* we obtain by means of these faculties is *formal*, is a proposition which we frankly confess transcends our powers of thought—a *form* without *something* to which it is attached, passes our comprehension. The matter of knowledge means, if it means any thing, the *object* known. Now in intuition there is but a single object, which is apprehended in itself and as really existing—in the logical consciousness, there is a double object—the act of the mind representing what is immediately and presentatively known—and the thing represented, which is mediately and remotely known. The *matter*, therefore, both in intuition and the logical consciousness, is ultimately the same—it is only differently related to the mind—in the one case it stands before us face to face—in the other case, it stands before us through the forms of the understanding. Hence it is sheer nonsense to speak of the logical consciousness as *matterless*, which is equivalent to saying that it *knows*, but knows *nothing*. Mr. Morell, though expressing great admiration of Sir William Hamilton's theory, in which we heartily unite with him, departs from it precisely in the points in which it is absolutely fatal to idealism.

His fourth observation is that "the logical consciousness tends to *separation* (analysis,) the intuitional consciousness tends to *unity* (synthesis)." Analysis and synthesis, in the proper acceptation of the terms, are both expressive of purely logical processes—the one being the reverse of the other. The idea of a *whole* is a logical conception, implying the relation of parts, and presupposing both analysis and synthesis, as the condition of its being framed. The induction of Aristotle, for example, is a synthesis—the deduction, an analysis. Presentation may give us things in the *lump* or *mass*—a dead unity; but the separation and subsequent recomposition of parts are offices which belong exclusively* to the understanding. Mr. Morell has admitted as much—"knowing," says he—"as we do too

* p. 59.

well, that the intuitions we obtain of truth in its concrete unity are not perfect, we seek to restore and verify that truth by *analysis*, i. e. by separating it into parts, viewing each of those parts abstractedly by itself, and finding out their relative consistency, so as to put them together by a logical and reflective construction, into a systematic and formal *whole*. Hence the impulse to know truth *aright* gives perpetual vitality and activity to the law by which our spontaneous and intuitional life passes over into the logical and reflective. Logical reasoning is the result of human imperfection struggling after restoration." This is well and sensibly said—and as it is a clear concession that the logical consciousness *tends to unity*—that the very end of its analysis is an adequate synthesis—we cannot but marvel that either of these functions should have been ascribed to intuition. Kant's reason, accordingly, which aimed at an all-comprehensive unity of existence—is simply the understanding moving in a higher sphere—and its regulative ideas nothing but the categories under a new name and translated to a different province. There is no distinction according to him between the powers themselves or the *modes* of their operation—they were conversant about different objects—Reason being to the conceptions of the understanding, what the understanding was to the intuitions of sense. Kant, too, made his reason seek after its darling unity or totality of being, through the same processes of generalization, by which the understanding reaches its lower unities and separate totalities in the various departments of science.

The synthetick judgments of Kant, upon which Mr. Morell seems to have shaped his conceptions of synthesis, are not instances of synthesis at all. They are amplifications or extensions of our knowledge—they are new materials added to the existing stock, and are either presentative or mediate according to the circumstances under which they are made. The discovery of new qualities in substances is, of course, presentative, but what he denominates synthetic judgments a priori, involve only simple beliefs—the object of the belief being unknown—as in the case of substance—or an indirect and representative knowledge of the object as given in its relations to the things which spontaneously suggest it. In all cases in

which the ultimate object *known* is mediated and represented, in virtue of the essential constitution of the mind, upon occasions in which other objects are the immediate data of consciousness, the process belongs, according to the fundamental distinction of our author, to the logical and not the intuitional consciousness; in these cases there is a law of belief, necessary and indestructible, which authenticates the premises of a syllogism, conducting us logically, not presentatively, from what is given in experience, to what experience is incapable of compassing--and which, therefore, cannot be immediately known. We grant that such judgments are *intuitive*--the grounds of belief are in the very structure of the soul--they involve primary and incomprehensible cognitions--but the objective realities apprehended in virtue of these beliefs, are not themselves directly given in consciousness. They are conceptions of the mind *necessitated* as vicarious of real existence. The conclusion of such a syllogism is not the simple assertory judgment of presentative intuition, *something is*, but the imperative and necessary declaration of representative intuition--something *must be*; it is not expressed by the formula something is, because it is actually apprehended in itself and as existing--but something is, because the mind is incapable of conceiving that it is *not*. The mind does not so much affirm the reality of existence as deny the impossibility of non-existence. This is the nature of the synthesis in that class of judgments to which Mr. Morell has referred--and how it differs from what all the world has been accustomed to regard as the logical process involved in *a posteriori* reasoning, we leave it to the rationalists to determine.

Mr. Morell's fifth note of distinction is that, "the logical consciousness is *individual*; the intuitional consciousness is *generic*." That is, if we understand our author, the truths about which the logical consciousness is conversant depend, in no degree, for the confirmation of their certainty, upon the common consent of mankind, while the truths about which the intuitional consciousness is conversant are to be received in consequence of the universal testimony of the race.

"We feel conscious," says he, "that *there are* certain points of

truth respecting which we can appeal to our own individual understanding with unerring certainty. No amount of contradiction, for example, no weight of opposing testimony from others, could ever shake our belief in the definitions and deductions of mathematical science or the conclusions of a purely logical syllogism. On the other hand, we are equally conscious, upon due consideration, that there are truths respecting which we *distrust* our individual judgments and gain certainty in admitting them, only from the concurring testimony of other minds, (of this nature, for example, are the main points of moral and religious truth.) Hence it appears evident that there is within us both an individual and a generic element; and that answering to them there are truths for which we may appeal to the individual reason, and truths for which we must appeal to the testimony of mankind as a whole."—p. 52—3.

He then goes on to observe that "the ground of this two-fold element in our constitution, and the reconciliation of the respective claims of the individual reason and the *common sense* of humanity, is easily explained, when we take into account the distinction which we have been developing between the logical and the intuitional consciousness. It will be readily seen, upon a little consideration, that the logical consciousness is stamped with a perfect individualism, the intuitional consciousness with an equally universal or generic character. The logical consciousness, as we have shown, is *formal*; and it is in those branches of knowledge which turn upon formal definitions, distinctions and deductions, (such as Mathematicks or logic,) that we feel the most perfect trust in the certainty of our individual conclusions. The understanding, in fact, is framed so as to act on certain principles, which we may term *laws of thought*, and whatever knowledge depends upon the simple application of these laws, is as certain and infallible as human nature can possibly make it. The laws of thought, (or in other words, the logical understanding) present a *fixed element* in every individual man; so that the testimony of one sound mind, in this respect, is as good as a thousand. Were not the forms of reasoning, indeed, alike for all, there could no longer be any certain communication between man and man. The intuitional consciousness, on the other hand, is not formal but material; and in gazing upon the actual elements of knowledge, our perception of their truth just depends upon the extent to which the intuitive faculty is awakened and matured. The *science* of music, for example, is absolutely the same for every *human understanding*; but the real perception of harmony, upon which the science depends as its material basis,

turns entirely upon the extent to which the direct sensibility for harmony is awakened. And so it is with regard to every other subject which involves a direct element of supersensual truth. The intensity with which we realize it depends upon the state of our *intuitional consciousness*, so far at least as the subject in question is concerned. Here there are no fixed and uniform laws of intellection, as in the logical region, but a progressive intensity from the weakest up to the strongest power of spiritual vision, or of intellectual sensibility.—pp. 53—4.

We shall need no apology to our readers for these long extracts, when they reflect that the distinction in question plays a very prominent part in the author's subsequent speculations, especially in relation to the origin and development of the religious life, and the foundations and criterion of religious certitude. The whole force of the argument for that species of modern realism, which is involved in the modern doctrine of progress, and which Le Roux has so eloquently expounded and the socialists so coarsely practised, is here presented. The individual is nothing—humanity is every thing. The genus man is not a logical abstraction—not a second intention—but a real, substantive entity; and mankind is not the collection of all the individuals of the human race, but something which, though inseparable, is yet distinct, and to which each is indebted for his human character. Something of this sort seems to be implied in making intuition a generic element, in contradistinction from understanding as personal and individual, and depending for its perfection, not upon the culture of the individual, but upon the development of the race. Something very like it is directly affirmed, when our author teaches that

“Intuition being a thing not formal, but material—not uniform, but varying—not subject to rigid laws, but exposed to all the variations of association and temperament, being in fact the *function of humanity*, and not of the individual mind—the only means of getting at the essential elements of primary intuitional truth, is to grasp that which rests on the common sympathies of mankind in its historical development, after all individual impurities and idiosyncracies have been entirely stripped away.”—p. 55.

But, bating the vein of Realism which pervades this and the other passages we have quoted, the proposition

of the author, so far as it has sense, is that the operations of the understanding are as perfect in each individual as in the whole race collectively, and that its deliverances cannot be affected by an appeal to the testimony of mankind—that what it pronounces to be true must be true to *us*, though all the race should unite in contradicting it. We can never be assured of the certainty of intuitional truth, however, without comparing the deliverances of *our* consciousness with the consciousness of other men—the touchstone of certainty is universal consent. The understanding, in other words, vindicates to itself the absolute right of private judgment—the intuition appeals to the authority of Catholic tradition. This is the thesis. The arguments are: 1st. That, in point of fact, the most certain truths, those about which we feel it impossible to doubt, are the truths of the understanding—he instances, mathematicks and logick. The example of logick is unfortunate. That science is not even yet perfect.—There are sundry points upon which logicians are not agreed, and others intimately connected with the subject, to which hardly any attention has been paid. The Apodictic Syllogism has been thoroughly investigated—but will Mr. Morell venture to say the same of the Inductive? Will he pretend that any writer upon logick has kept steadily and consistently in view its distinctive character as a science of forms, and never interpolated or corrupted it with considerations of matter? As to mathematicks, its conclusions are certain, and certain precisely because it deals with hypotheses and not with realities. But, then, it is a prodigious leap from the proposition that *some* truths are certain within the circle of the understanding, to the proposition that *all* truths peculiar to it are certain—that because it admits of demonstration at all, therefore it admits of nothing *but* demonstration. The same process of argument would establish the same result in regard to intuition. What can be more indubitable to us than our own personality—our indiscerptible identity—the existence of our thoughts, feelings, and volitions? “no amount of contradiction, no weight of opposing testimony from others, could ever shake our belief” in the reality of the being which every man calls *himself*, or those processes of intellect which consciousness distinctly af-

firms. What human understanding can withhold its assent from the great laws of causality, substance, contradiction, and excluded middle? These are all intuitive truths—we receive them on the naked deliverance of consciousness; and we can no more deny them than we can annihilate ourselves. Certainty, therefore, is not *peculiar* to the understanding, as contradistinguished from intuition. But, says the author, *some* intuitional truths—those, for example, of morals and religion—are *uncertain*; in so far as we depend upon the single testimony of our own minds. But are not some logical truths uncertain also? Is every thing demonstrative, reduced to apodictic certainty in the *sciences* of morals, government, politics, chemistry, botany, and history? Is it not a characteristic of the evidence upon which the ordinary business of life is conducted, that it admits of every variety of degrees from the lowest presumption to the highest certainty? Is there no such thing as a calculation of chances? and no such thing as being deceived by logical deductions?—The author somewhere tells us that the “purely logical mind, though displaying great acuteness, yet is oftentimes involved in a mere empty play upon words, forms, and definitions; making endless divisions, and setting up the finest distinctions, while the real matter of truth itself either escapes out of these abstract moulds, or, perchance, was never in them.”*

One would think, therefore, that it was not so infallible after all. As then certainty is not restricted to the understanding, nor the understanding to it, the same ground of appeal, from private judgment to the verdict of the race, exists in reference to *its* deliverances which the author postulates from the testimony of intuition. The argument is valid for both or neither. 2d. His next position is, that the intuitional consciousness is susceptible of improvement, of education, developement. The logical consciousness is fixed and unchanging. If we admit the fact, it is not so easy to discover its pertinency as an argument, so far as intuition is concerned. We may grant that if the *understanding* is the *same* in all minds, the testimony of one is as good as the testimony of a thousand—but it does not appear that because the degrees of intuition are different in different minds, therefore each

* pp. 16--7.

mind must appeal to all others before it can be certain of its own intuitions. One man may see *less* than another, but it does not follow that he is dependent upon the testimony of that other for the assurance that he sees the little that he *does* see. We cannot comprehend why *he* should not *know* that he sees what he sees, however little it may be, as well as others know that they see their more. But it is positively false that the understanding is not susceptible of progress and improvement. The powers of reasoning and of representative thought can be developed and educated—have their germ, expansion, and maturity, as well as the powers of intuition. The laws of thought may be fixed, but the capacity of applying or acting in obedience to these laws, is by no means fixed. It is a capacity which requires *culture*; and the multiplied instances of bad reasoning in the world, to which our author has contributed his full proportion, are so many proofs that man must be taught to reason and to think, as well as to *know*. There is an immense difference betwixt the logical consciousness of a Newton and of a Hottentot; betwixt the logical consciousness of Newton at twelve and Newton at fifty. These *laws* of thought are the same to all men, and to the same men at all times; but the men themselves are not the same. If these laws were always faithfully observed, error might be avoided; but the amount of truth that should be discovered, would depend upon the degree to which the faculties were developed, and not upon the laws which preserve them from deceit. But unfortunately there is a proneness to intellectual guilt in transgressing the laws of thought, which is as fruitful a source of error as defect of capacity is of ignorance; and each is to be remedied by a proper course of intellectual culture. But if the argument from fixed laws proves the understanding to be fixed and unchanging, it may be retorted with equal force against the progressiveness of intuition. It is true that Mr. Morell affirms that this form of intellection “has no fixed and uniform laws;” but this is an error arising from the relation in which he apprehends that the laws or forms of thought stand to representative cognitions. They are the *conditions*, not the *matter*, of this species of intelligence. They are not the *things* known, but the *means* of knowing. They solve the problem of the possibility of medi-

ate knowledge. Now corresponding to them, there are, in all instances of representative cognition, *conditions* in the thing known, which render it capable of being apprehended by the mind. The qualities, phenomena—properties which make it cognizable—make it capable of coming within the sphere of consciousness---are laws of intuition as certain and fixed as the relations of things to the mind. In other words, the adaptations of things to our faculties are as truly laws of intuition, as the adaptations of our faculties to *think* them are laws of the logical consciousness. Hence, if the argument from the reality of laws cuts off the understanding from an appeal to universal consent, it cuts off intuition also, and we are shut up to private judgment in the one case, by the same process which shut us up to it in the other. It is no distinction, consequently, betwixt the understanding and intuition, to say that the one is individual and the other generic. They are both equally individual---both equally generic; both belong to *every* man, and therefore to all men; both may subsist in different degrees, in different men, and in the same men at different times, and both are consequently susceptible of education and improvement.

The truth is, Mr. Morell has entirely mistaken the purpose for which philosophers are accustomed to appeal from private judgment to the general voice of mankind. It is not to authenticate the deliverances of intuition---not to certify us that we see when we see or know that we know---our own consciousness is the only voucher which we can have in the case. Every faculty is its own witness. In the case of the understanding, others may point out fallacies and guard against errors, but our *own minds* must perform the process, before there is any *logical truth* to us. In the case of intuition, the voice of mankind cannot help us, if we are destitute of the power, or if it is unawakened, nor add a particle to the degree of clearness with which we apprehend existences, nor to the degree of certainty with which we repose upon the data of consciousness. Others may suggest the occasions upon which the intuitions shall arise or indicate the hinderances which prevent them; but the intuitions themselves are and must be the immediate grounds of belief. From the very nature of the case all truth must be individually

apprehended, though all truth is not necessarily apprehended as individual. Private judgment is always and on all subjects the last appeal. Nothing is truth to *us*, whatever it may be in itself, until it is brought in relation to our own faculties, and the extent to which they grasp it, is the sole measure of our knowledge. But there is a question upon which an appeal to common consent is an indispensable means of guarding against error, misapprehension, and mistake; and of rectifying inadequate, false or perverted judgments; but that question happens to be one which concerns directly the operations of the logical understanding. It is simply whether reflection exactly represents the spontaneous movements of the soul. The distinction betwixt reflection and spontaneity has been ably and happily illustrated by Cousin:

“To know without giving an account of our knowledge to ourselves; to know and to give an account of our knowledge to ourselves—this is the only possible difference between man and man; between the people and the philosopher. In the one, reason is altogether spontaneous; it seizes at first upon its objects; but without returning upon itself and demanding an account of its procedure; in the other, reflection is added to reason; but this reflection, in its most profound investigations, cannot add to natural reason a single element which it does not already possess; it can add to it nothing but the knowledge of itself. Again, I say reflection well-directed—for if it be ill-directed it does not comprehend natural reason in all its parts; it leaves out some element, and repairs its mutilations only by arbitrary inventions. First to omit, then to invent—this is the common vice of almost all systems of philosophy. The office of philosophy is to reproduce in its scientific formulas the pure faith of the human race—nothing less than this faith—nothing more than this faith; this faith alone, but this faith in all its parts.”*

This is justly and beautifully said. It is assumed that all minds are essentially the same—and when the question is what are the phenomena of consciousness—what are the laws, faculties, and constitution of the soul—this question can only be answered by unfolding the nature of its spontaneous movements. In these the constitution of the intellect is seen. But from the fleeting, delicate, and intangible nature of the phenomena, it is extremely difficult to reproduce them in reflection, and make them the

* Phil. Frag. Pref.

objects of scientific study. It is no easy thing to reconstitute the intellectual life—"to re-enter," in the language of the distinguished philosopher just quoted—"to re-enter consciousness, and there, weaned from a systematic and exclusive spirit, to analyze thought into its elements, and all its elements, and to seek out in it the characters, and all the characters, under which it is at present manifested to the eye of consciousness." This is the office of reflection. As the phenomena which it proposes to describe are essentially the same in all minds, every man becomes a witness of the truth or falsehood of the description. Common consent is a criterion of certainty, because there is little possibility that all mankind should concur in a false statement of their own intellectual operations. It is particularly in regard to our original and primitive cognitions that this appeal to the race is accustomed to be made. One of the acknowledged peculiarities which distinguish them, is the *necessity* of believing, and of this necessity universal agreement is an infallible proof. We wish to know whether any given principle is a primary and necessary datum of consciousness—whether it belongs essentially to intelligence; and this question is answered by showing that it is a characteristic of all minds. But in all cases in which reflection appeals to the testimony of the race, that testimony is not regarded as the immediate ground of faith, but as a corroborative proof that we have not fallen into error. It is the deliverance of consciousness which determines belief; and when it is found that every other consciousness gives the same deliverance, we are satisfied that our reflection has not been partial or defective. But if the voice of mankind is against us, we feel that we have erred somewhere, and consequently retrace our steps—analyze thought with greater minuteness and attention; and thus make the verdict of the race the occasion of reflection being led to correct itself. This is the true nature of the appeal which a sound philosophy makes to the testimony of mankind.—The question is, what are the phenomena of spontaneity? Reflection undertakes to answer, and the answer is certified to be correct when all in whom these phenomena are found, concur in pronouncing it to be true. Each man answers for himself from his own consciousness, and the

philosopher feels that there is no further occasion to review his analysis. He has been led, for example, to announce the existence of the external world as an original datum of consciousness. He thinks he finds in his belief of it that criterion of necessity which distinguishes primitive cognitions, but it is so hard to seize upon the spontaneous phenomena of the mind with certainty and precision—that he may mistake prejudice, association, or an early judgment, for an original belief. He appeals to other minds—he finds the belief to be universal—he is confirmed consequently in regarding it as necessary, and therefore natural; and hence he is satisfied that reflection has, in this case, exactly described spontaneity. It would appear, therefore, that instead of saying the intuitional consciousness is generic, and the logical, individual, it would be much nearer the truth to assert that the *spontaneous* consciousness, in all its operations, whether intuitional or logical, is generic, or essentially the same in all minds; and the *reflective*, individual, or modified by personal and accidental peculiarities. And this is precisely the distinction which Cousin makes. Reason, which, with him, is synonymous with intelligence, without regard to our author's distinction of a twofold form—in its spontaneous movements is impersonal—it is not mine nor yours—it belongs not even to humanity itself—it is identical with God; and upon the ground that “humanity as a mass, is spontaneous and not reflective,” he declares that “humanity is inspired.” Reason, on the other hand, in its reflective movements—when its deliverances are made the object of attention, analysis, and study—is subjective and personal, or rather appears to be so from its relations to reflection, while its general relations to the Ego, in which it has entered, renders it liable, though in itself infallible and absolute, to aberrations and mistakes. “Reflection, doubt, and skepticism, appertain to some men,” such is his language, “pure apperception and spontaneous faith appertain to all; spontaneity is the genius of humanity, as philosophy is the genius of some men. In spontaneity there is scarcely any difference between man and man. Doubtless there are some natures more or less happily endowed, in whom thought clears its way more easily, and inspiration manifests itself with more

brightness ; but, in the end, though with more or less energy, thought develops itself spontaneously in all thinking beings ; and it is this identity of spontaneity, together with the identity of absolute faith it engenders, which constitutes the identity of human kind." The distinction here indicated is just and natural, but it is very far from the distinction signalized by our author.

His sixth and final observation that "the logical consciousness is fixed through all ages, the intuitional consciousness *progressive*," is but a consequence of his positions which we have just been discussing. We need only detain the reader to remark that the author has evidently confounded the progress or education of the *faculties* with the progress and improvement of society. The probability is, that among any cultivated people the degree to which mind is developed is not essentially different in one age from what it is in another. The thinkers of the present generation, for example, have no *greater* capacity of thought than the Greek philosophers, the schoolmen, or philosophers and Divines of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The present age may *know* more, in consequence of the labours of those that have preceded ; but as its greater amount of knowledge, under the circumstances of the case, involves no greater amount of effort ; and as it is healthful exercise, and not the number or variety of objects that elicit it, which develops the mind, Society may be in advance in point of knowledge—the standard of general intelligence may be higher, while yet the standard of intellectual vigour and maturity may be essentially the same. The tyro now begins where Newton left off—but it does not follow that because he begins there, he has the capacities or intellectual strength of Newton—all generations, mentally considered, are very much upon a level. Every man has to pass through the same periods of infancy, childhood, and youth—but in reference to the *objects* which occupy attention, each successive age may profit by the labours of its predecessors, and thus make superior attainments in knowledge, without a corresponding superiority of mental intensity or power. The progress of society, therefore, is not due, as Mr. Morell seems to intimate, to the progress of intuition—it is not that we have *better faculties* than our fathers, but that we

employ them under better advantages. Their eyes were as good as ours, but we stand upon a mountain. We need not add that we have no sympathy in the mystic realism which dreams of a destiny of humanity apart from the destiny of the individuals who compose the race—a destiny to which every generation is working up, and which is yet to be enjoyed only by the last, or by those in the last stage of developement—we can hardly comprehend how that can be a destiny of *humanity*, in which immense multitudes, to whom that humanity belongs, have no immediate share, and to which they stand in no other relation than that of precursors and contributors. Least of all do we believe that any progressive developement of human nature *as it is*, will ever conduct any individual to that condition of excellence in which the “whole sensibilities of his nature” are brought “into harmony with the Divine—with *the life of God.*” This consummation requires a transformation as well as education—renovation as well as progress. We must be new creatures in Christ Jesus, before we can be partakers of a Divine nature.

Having explained the distinctions betwixt the logical and intuitional consciousness, Mr. Morell proceeds to expound their connection and dependence. He represents “logical reasoning as the result of human imperfection struggling after intellectual restoration.” The case is this: The harmony of our nature with moral, intellectual, and religious truth has been disturbed and deranged, and the consequence is “that the power of intuition is at once diminished and rendered uncertain. The reality of things, instead of picturing itself, as it were, upon the calm surface of the soul, casts its reflection upon a mind disturbed by evil, by passion, by prejudice, by a thousand other influences which distort the image, and tend to efface it altogether.” To correct our defective and imperfect intuitions, we resort to the double processes of analysis and synthesis. We separate the parts, compare them with each other, and from the perception of their consistencies and adaptations, re-construct our knowledge into a logical whole, which shall more faithfully correspond to reality than the original intuitions themselves. Upon this remarkable statement we hope to be indulged in a few observations.

As logical or representative truth is based upon and necessarily presupposes presentative, it never can be more certain than intuition. Demonstration is strictly an intuitive process. In the pure Mathematicks, the conceptions involved in the definitions, which are the subject matter of the reasoning, are not regarded as *representative*—they are the *things* and the only *things* to which reference is had—and every step in every demonstration is a direct gazing upon some property or content of these conceptions. As the logical consciousness only reproduces the elementary cognitions of intuition, it can add nothing to them—it can neither increase their intensity, remove their obscurity, nor directly reduce them to consistency. It must faithfully represent them just as they are. Inconsistencies in our reflective exhibitions of truth may indeed send us back to our original intuitions and make us repeat the occasions on which they are produced, so that we may question them with more minuteness and attention—but it is not the *intuitions* which we suppose to be defective, but our *accounts* of them. We seek to correct the inadequacies of memory by the completeness of consciousness. If a man's powers of intuition, therefore, are deranged upon any subject, no processes of ratiocination will cure him. Logic is neither eyes to the blind, nor ears to the deaf. And if a man is destitute of the moral faculty, reasoning will be utterly incompetent to put him in possession of the notions of right, duty and obligation—or if his intuitional faculties are defective and disordered—he can only reason upon the defective and distorted conceptions which faithfully represent them. He can never have clearer notions till he is furnished with sounder faculties. It is true that logical exposition may be the means of awakening, developing and maturing intuitions—but then the logical expositions must come from others who have actually had the intuitions described—or from the God that made us. They cannot come from the man to be awakened. So that *his* logical consciousness cannot stand to *his* intuitional in this relation of a help. We cannot comprehend how Mr. Morell, without departing from every principle which he has previously laid down, and upon which as occasion requires he is not backward to insist, should represent the logical understanding as a remedy.

for dimness of vision. Did Adam have no understanding before the fall? Are the angels without it? and shall we drop it at death? Is it an endowment vouchsafed to the race only in consequence of the moral confusion and disorder which have supervened from sin, and are we to look to it as the Holy Spirit by which we are to be renovated and saved?

The true view of the subject we apprehend to be, that the understanding is designed not to cure the disorders and remedy the imperfections but to *supplement the defects* of the intuitional faculties. It is the complement of intuition. Finite and limited as we are, presentative knowledge can extend but a little way—and the office of the understanding is to stretch our knowledge beyond the circle of our vision. We are so constituted that what we see shall be made the means of revealing more than we see. Presentation and Representation—Intuition—Induction and Inference—are all instruments of *knowing*—and by virtue of the constitution they describe, man is able to penetrate beyond the limits of time and space to which consciousness is evidently restricted. It is, therefore, distinctly to add to his knowledge, to complete his constitution as an intelligent creature that God has given him understanding. It is true the necessity of an understanding implies defect—intuition is the highest form of knowledge—but it is a defect which attaches to all finite creatures. They must either supplement intuition by inference—or their knowledge must be limited in time and space to the sphere of their personality. It belongs to the Omnipresent God alone, as He is uncircumscribed in His being—to embrace all things in a single glance of unerring intuition. Creatures, however glorious and exalted, from the very limitation implied in being creatures, can never dispense with the faculties of mediate and representative cognition—this is the law of their condition—and a fundamental error which pervades Mr. Morell's whole account of the understanding is that it is *not* a faculty of knowledge. Had he, in this point, risen above the philosophy of Kant, many of the paradoxes and inconsistencies of his treatise might have been obviously avoided. He professes to be a natural realist—and as such contends, and very properly contends, that we have faculties by which we

can immediately apprehend existencies—but his theory of the understanding, instead of being constructed in harmony with this hypothesis, instead of making it that complement of powers by which the mind can represent to itself the properties and qualities of absent objects—instead of treating its categories and forms as the conditions in conformity to which its representations shall be adequate and just—has made it the organ of the rankest delusions—of the most contemptible and puerile trifling.

Our author takes occasion to caution his readers, “in the outset, against the supposition that the distinction” which he has elaborately expanded between the intuition-al and logical consciousness, “is any thing at all novel in the history of mental philosophy. So far from it,” he affirms, “that it is almost as universal as philosophy itself, lying alike patent both in ancient and modern speculation.”* This we cannot but regard as a mistake. Our acquaintance with the history of philosophy is small, but we know of no writer previously to Kant, who took precisely the same views of the nature, office and operations of the understanding—and we know of no writer but Mr. Morell who has restricted reason or intuition exclusively to the faculties of presentative cognition. It would require more space than we can, at present, devote to the subject, to discuss his ancient authorities, but we cannot forbear a word upon his modern examples. To begin with Kant, we very frankly confess, that in his *Critical Philosophy*, we never could distinguish betwixt the operations or *modes* of action which he ascribes to reason and those which he attributes to the understanding. They seem to us to be exactly the same faculty, or complement of faculties, employed about different objects; and in this opinion we are confirmed by an authority which it is seldom safe to contradict. “In the Kantian philosophy”—says Sir William Hamilton—“both faculties perform the same function—both seek the one in the many—the idea (*idee*) is only the conception (*begriffe*) sublimated into the inconceivable—reason only the understanding which has overleaped itself.” Intellect directed to the objects beyond the domain of experience, is the Kantian reason, within the domain of experience, the Kantian understanding. Intellect in search of scientific unity is understanding—

* p. 27.

in search of absolute unity---the reason. Employed about the finite, limited, contingent it is understanding---employed about the correlatives, the absolute, infinite, necessary, it is reason. Or in one word, as the faculty of the *conditioned* it is understanding---as the faculty of the *unconditioned*, it is reason. But if the science of contraries be one, the faculty in each case, as an intellectual power, must be the same. There is, accordingly, a much closer correspondence between Mr. Morell's logical consciousness and Kant's speculative reason---than between Kant's reason and Mr. Morell's intuition, and Mr. Morell's intuition, in turn, is much more analogous to Kant's sensibility than to his reason. Mr. Morell's intuition is the presentative knowledge of supersensible realities. Kant pronounced all such knowledge to be a sheer delusion. Mr. Morell's intuition is exclusive of analysis. Kant's reason reached its highest unity through processes of generalization. Mr. Morell's intuition has no fixed and permanent laws. Kant's reason had its *ideas* as his understanding its categories. Between Kant's *practical* reason and Mr. Morell's intuition, there are some striking points of correspondence, but they are points in which Mr. Morell is inconsistent with himself. Both attribute our firm conviction of the divine existence and of a future life to our spiritual cravings and the authoritative nature of conscience---but in thus representing them as a *want* on the one hand, and an *implication* on the other, our author abandons his fundamental principle that in intuition, the object reveals itself.

Neither is Mr. Morell's intuition precisely the same with the principles of common sense or the fundamental laws of belief of the Scottish school. These were not faculties *presentative* of their objects, but vouchers of the reality of knowledge; and as to the Eclecticks, they make no such distinction between reason and understanding as that signalized by Kant, Coleridge and our author---but treat the categories and ideas promiscuously as laws of reason or intelligence. "The one catholic and perennial philosophy---notwithstanding many schismatic aberrations" is not that all objective certainty depends upon the actual presentation of its realities, and that the understanding cannot conduct us beyond the circle of sensibility---but that all knowledge is ultimately founded on faith,

and "the objective certainty of science upon the subjective necessity of believing." If Mr. Morell had meant by intuition nothing more than "the complement of those cognitions or principles which we receive from nature--which all men, therefore, possess in common, and by which they test the truth of knowledge and the morality of actions," or if he had defined it simply as the faculty of such principles, we should have regarded him in this matter beyond the reach of any just exceptions. But this is not his doctrine.

The importance of the points upon which we have been insisting, will appear from their application to the great problems of Religion. What is God? What vouchers have we for the objective certainty of His being, and what kind of intercourse can be maintained betwixt Him and His creatures, are questions which will be variously answered according to varying views of the nature and extent of human knowledge, and the offices and operations of the human faculties. We have already seen that, in describing the developements of the higher stages of the intuitional consciousness, Mr. Morell has confounded the intuition of a principle with the presentation of an object—representing our *inference* in relation to the Divine existence, authenticated by the necessary law of causation, as a direct perception of the Deity Himself.—His language in many places will bear the interpretation that our knowledge of God is intuitive only in so far as it rests upon original principles of belief—but there are other passages in which he unquestionably teaches that God reveals Himself as an immediate datum of consciousness, and that we know Him in Himself precisely as we know the phenomena of matter, or the operations of mind. These two sets of statements are really inconsistent—an unjustifiable confusion of intuition and presentation—but it is easy to see how they have arisen in the rationalistic school. The law of substance has been marvellously confounded with the law of causality, and an *inference* from an effect to its cause has, accordingly, been treated as a perception of the relation of a quality to a substance. The proof of a cause has, in other words, been taken for the presentation of a substance, on the ground that the effect is a phenomenon which, as it can-

not *exist*, cannot be *perceived*, apart from its substratum or "fundamental essence." To affirm, therefore, in consistency with these principles, that the external world and ourselves are a series of effects, is simply to affirm that they are a series of phenomena which must inhere in some common substance, and of which they are to be regarded as the manifestations. "In my opinion," says Cousin, "all the laws of thought may be reduced to two, namely, the law of causality, and that of substance.—These are the two essential and fundamental laws, of which all others are only derivatives, developed in an order by no means arbitrary." Having shown that these two fundamental laws of thought are absolute, he proceeds to reduce them to identity: "An absolute cause, and an absolute substance, are identical in essence, since every absolute cause must be substance in so far as it is absolute, and every absolute substance must be cause, in order to be able to manifest itself." To reduce causality to substantive being, and effects to phenomenal manifestations, is to deny the possibility of a real creation.—Substances *as* such cannot be relative and contingent—to make them *effects* is to make them phenomena. There can, therefore, be but one *substance* in the universe; and all that we have been accustomed to regard as the *works* of God, are only developments to consciousness of the Divine Being Himself. The world stands to Him in the same relation in which thought and volition stand to our own minds. This is the necessary result of confounding causation with substance, and yet this is what Mr. Morell has done, and what his psychology absolutely demanded to save it from self-contradiction. At one time we find him ascending, by virtue of the law of causality, from the finite, contingent, and dependent to the infinite, necessary, self-existent—from effects to their causes, in the very track of the argument which he affects to despise.—He finds God, not in Himself, but in His creatures. At another time, "in loftier moments of contemplation," he seems to stand upon the verge of infinity, and to gaze upon "Being (substance) in its essence, its unity, its self-existent eternity." At one time the great problem of reason is to discover the power and wisdom which gave the world its being, and impressed upon nature its laws; at

another "to find THE ONE FUNDAMENTAL ESSENCE by which" all things are upheld. At one time, in a single word, God is contemplated and known as the *cause*—at another, as the *substance* of all that exists. This confusion pervades the book, and is constantly obtruded upon us in that offensive form which makes the Deity nothing but the bond of union or the principle of co-existence to his creatures. This is the plain meaning of all that eternal cant about "totality and absolute unity"—about the tendency of reason to *synthesis*, which is echoed and re-echoed in various forms, without any apparent consciousness of its wickedness, blasphemy, and contradiction.—The whole doctrine of the *absolute*, which has played so conspicuous a part in German speculations, turns upon this blunder. To get at the *cause* of all things, is only to get at the *substance* in which all inhere and co-exist—to get at *Being* in its necessary and fundamental laws—which, of course, would give all its manifestations.

Those who wish to see what this philosophy has achieved in other hands, will do well to consult the pages of Mr. Morell on the systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; and those who would appreciate its pretensions to truth and consistency, would do well to study the masterly article of Sir William Hamilton, upon the Eclectic Scheme of Cousin. We shall add here only a few reflections, that the reader may distinctly see where Mr. Morell's principles would conduct him.

In the first place Deity, as absolute substance, is necessarily *impersonal*. The idea of individuality, or of separate and distinct existence, is indispensable to our conception of a Person. But *absolute Being* has no distinct existence—to distinguish is to condition it—to make it *a* being and a being of such and such qualities, which is to destroy its absoluteness. In the next place, it obviously follows that every thing is God, and God is every thing. As absolute being, he is the generative principle of being in all that exists. He is their *essence*—that upon which their esse depends, and without which they would be mere shadows and illusions. Just as far as any thing really exists, just so far it is God. He is the formal and distinguishing ingredient of its nature as an entity or existence.

Hence, it deserves further to be remarked, that there can be no such thing as real causation. The law of substance is made to abrogate the law of causality. The absolute is not a *productive*, but a *constitutive* principle—a fundamental element or condition, but not an *efficient* of existence. It is no more a cause in the sense in which the constitution of our nature determines us to apprehend the relation, than body is the cause of extension—mind the cause of thought—or the sun the cause of light. Absolute beauty, for example, is not the Creator, but the essential element of all particular beauties—absolute right is not the producer, but an indispensable constituent of all particular rectitude—and absolute Being is not the maker, but the necessary ingredient or characteristic principle of every particular being. There is then no creation—no maker of Heaven and earth—no father of the spirits, nor former of the bodies of men. There is simply *ens reale*, from which what we call creatures emanate, as its properties and adjuncts. This doctrine is unblushingly avowed by the great master of the Eclectic School; and it is deeply embedded in every thing that Mr. Morell has said of the relations of the Deity to the world. We need not say that a philosophy which contradicts a fundamental principle of belief—which denies the law of causality, or what is the same, absorbs it in another and a different law, is self-condemned.

We affirm finally that every form in which the philosophy of the absolute ever has been, and we venture to say, ever can be proposed, necessarily leads to nihilism—the absolute annihilation of the possibility of knowledge. The very notion of the absolute is inconsistent with the conditions of knowledge—merging all difference in identity, and all variety in unity, it is evidently incompatible with the nature of consciousness, which evidently implies, as Cousin has lucidly explained, plurality and difference. The only consistent hypothesis is the intellectual intuition of Schelling, “in which there exists no distinction of subject and object—no contrast of knowledge and existence; all difference is lost in absolute indifference—all plurality in absolute unity. The intuition itself, reason and the absolute are identical.” But consistency is here evidently maintained at the sacrifice of the possibility of

thought. Fichte, though his confidence in his system was so strong that he staked his everlasting salvation on the truth of even its subordinate features, yet confesses that it was after all a mere tissue of delusions.

“The sum total,” says he, “is this: there is absolutely nothing permanent, either without me or within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even my own. I, myself, know nothing, and am nothing.—Images there are—they constitute all that apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is after the manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there being aught to witness their transition; that consist in fact of the images of images—without significance and without an aim. I, myself, am one of these images; nay I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream—into a dream made up only of a dream of itself. Perception is a dream—thought, the source of all the existence and all the reality which I imagine to myself of *my* existence, of my power, of my destination, is the dream of that dream.”

Melancholy confession! God grant that it may serve as an awful warning to those who, with presumptuous confidence, would plunge into the fathomless abyss of the absolute!

The certainty of God's existence rests upon no such flimsy speculations. Through the indestructible principles which are not merely, as Kant supposed, regulative laws of thought, but guarantees for the objective realities to which they conduct us—we have an assurance for the Divine existence which cannot be gainsayed without making our nature a lie. Reason conducts us to God—its laws vouch for His existence; but it is in the way of inference from what passes around us, and within us.—He has so constituted the human mind that all nature shall be a witness for Himself. Every thing is inexplicable until He is acknowledged. But we know Him, and can know Him only *mediately*. We spell out the syllables which record His name as they are found in earth, in Heaven, and in ourselves. What is *presentatively* given is not the Almighty, but His works—but reason, from the very nature of its laws, cannot apprehend His works without the irresistible conviction that He is. The

principles are intuitive by which we ascend from nature to its author, but the substance of the Godhead never stands before us face to face as an object of vision, though these deductions of reason are felt to have an objective validity independent of the subjective necessity of believing.

Let it be granted that our knowledge of God is mediate, and that the understanding is a faculty of cognition, and the whole ground-work of Mr. Morell's system is swept away. All that remains to prove that the logical consciousness may be an adequate medium of revelation, and a competent instrument of religion, is to indicate the fact that through its representative conceptions it can reproduce every emotion which the original intuitions could excite. The copy can awaken all the feelings of the original. Vivid description may produce the effects of vision. The peculiar emotions of religion, consequently, are not dependent upon the power of gazing upon its actual realities. If they can be embodied so as to produce what Lord Kames denominates ideal presence, the result may be the same as if the presence were real. To this principle painting, poetry, and oratory owe their power to stir the depths of the human soul—to rule like a wizard the world of the heart—to call up its sunshine, or draw down its showers.

The remaining portions of the book we must reserve for another opportunity.