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THE

PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

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I. SOME POPULAR MISCONCEPTIONS OF PRESBYTERIANISM.

There is about the title of this article a faint and somewhat unpleasant suggestion of the old play upon the words orthodoxy and other-doxy, my doxy and your doxy. Bigoted though the paronomasia may sound, yet the gist of the jest is just; no one would willingly hold aught but the truth, or yet, aught less than the truth; any man's real creed, therefore, must necessarily be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, as he sees it; so, then, to a writer sincere in his purpose, and true to his conviction, every conception other than his conception is misconception. If, however, one readily recognizes and candidly confesses his limitations, repudiates all pretence to speak *ex cathedra*, disavowing any individual illumination to see, or any special authority to declare, the truth, perhaps there will be nothing presumptuous in an attempt to set forth, and to set right, what he believes to be certain very prevalent misconceptions of Presbyterianism in the popular mind.

Of course the writer recognizes the fact that Calvinism and Presbyterianism are not synonymous terms; yet as the Presbyterian Church is, more than any other, thoroughly and generally identified with this system of faith, and inasmuch, moreover, as the chief objections obtaining against Presbyterianism are directed against its Calvinistic doctrine, we may be pardoned in an article designed to be popular for using the terms somewhat interchangeably.

Abuse of Calvinism has long been the favorite resort of igno-

rant and shallow minds. It has been the fate of this truly great system of doctrine to suffer severely at the hands of its opponents. No other theology has been so bitterly assaulted, and what is far worse, so systematically misrepresented. We have found it sometimes very hard to stretch our charity sufficiently for even the scantest covering of a multitude of what seemed the malicious sins of writers too intelligent to be guilty of such gross caricature. To this inveterate custom of its critics may, in some measure, be attributed the fact that Presbyterianism is so greatly misunderstood by many people.

The first point that it occurs to us to make is, that it is a misconception of any system of faith to try it and judge it upon the merits of its distinctive principles alone. We do not say this because of any difficulty in receiving, or any disadvantage in defending, the distinctive doctrines of Presbyterianism; we believe it to be scriptural through and through, and strange to say, most distinctively scriptural in its most decidedly unpopular doctrines. This much in deference to any suspicious readers.

While distinctive principles are the *differentiæ* of any system, and as such are always important, and may, under some circumstances, become most important of all, yet they are after all but *differentiæ*, and on this very account must form a small part only of the faith in its entirety comprehended in any system. Surely the body of truth held by all evangelical churches in common must be much greater and of greater absolute importance than the few points which differentiate any one branch of the visible church from all others.

To illustrate: here is a professor in a certain faculty; his department is chemistry, in this he is pre-eminent, he is known throughout the intercollegiate world as, perhaps, its most renowned chemist, and his excellence in this branch of study differentiates him from all other men. It is perfectly possible, however, that he may be also an acute metaphysician, well and widely versed in literature, a fine mathematician, a profound classical scholar; he may be able to fill with credit any chair in the faculty. This being the case, and such instances are not unknown, it would be patent and gross injustice to the comprehensive scholarship of

this man to judge him solely by his knowledge of chemistry. One might reply, "well, but this knowledge is what differentiates him from his colleagues." Very true; but if he knows as much Latin as the professor of that language himself, he certainly must have credit therefor in any fair estimate of his attainments.

We believe that just this great and manifest injustice is done to Presbyterianism by the popular conception of it. If any comparison be instituted between the Methodist and Presbyterian Churches, the popular mind, having seized the fact that as between these two great churches the doctrine of election is distinctive of the Presbyterian, falls immediately to a consideration of the comparative merits of election and free agency, ignoring utterly the additional fact that the Presbyterian Church holds the doctrine of free agency not less decidedly than the Methodist. Now of course the reply will be made that she holds it inconsistently; a rejoinder to this would carry us too far out of our way, so that we can only answer that, however inconsistently it may appear to some, she does nevertheless hold the doctrine explicitly enounced in her standards, and that, too, in immediate connection with that of divine foreordination.[1] Such being indisputably the case, she deserves the full credit of holding it, and any comparison between her and the Methodist Church which ignores this fact, is manifestly unjust and unworthy of any intelligent, fair-minded critic. In all comparison or contrast with other churches, the Presbyterian deserves credit for all that she holds in common with them.

Perhaps some one may say, "I recognize in general the justice of what you say when considering the Presbyterian Church absolutely, but in comparison with another church, it seems to me perfectly just to try it on its distinctive doctrines alone, that which constitutes its *Presbyterianism*, so to speak."

Now this is just the kernel of our contention;—the distinctive doctrines do not constitute its Presbyterianism, "the distinctive doctrines alone" have no existence; there is no separation in fact, and there ought to be none in thought. The "Presbyterianism" of the Presbyterian church is not its distinctive doctrines, but

[1]Conf. of Faith, Chap. iii. § i.

the whole body of faith as colored, influenced, determined by the *differentiæ* of its own peculiar views; the whole field of faith and practice, creed and conduct, as affected by its distinctive doctrines. This is Presbyterianism, and nothing less than this.

To return: When this great church is weighed she has clear right to have put into the balance with her distinctive doctrines all her other excellencies; her almost equally distinctive liberality, her granite conservatism, not only a bulwark to her, but often a blessing to others; her varied services to the common cause of civil and religious liberty; her prominence in education; her pre-eminence in the great foreign mission work; all her manifold activities; her generous support of undenominational religious enterprises; all the benefits of the trained minds and disciplined characters she has furnished to every honorable calling, and to every branch of the visible church; the eminent men in state and church other than her own who found their inspiration and gained their qualifications from her influence and her training.

Let it be borne always in mind that Presbyterianism stands for much more in the world than the five points of Calvinism.

In this immediate connection is suggested a similar misconception, affecting that great system of doctrine of which the Presbyterian Church is, perhaps, the most illustrious and consistent representative.

It seems generally supposed that the prime doctrine of Calvinism is the divine election, or, as more usually entitled, predestination. As soon as Calvinism is mentioned, the popular mind reverts immediately to the doctrine of the divine decrees as the foundation of all its theology. It would be far more philosophical, as well as far juster to Calvinism, to recognize the fact that, though a great and gracious doctrine, predestination is not the pivotal point of the system. The fundamental doctrine of Calvinism, that which gives it its specific character amid all other theologies, that from which predestination and other co-ordinate doctrines develop as logical consequences, is the Divine Sovereignty. This is the basis of the whole; this determines the Calvinistic conception of grace and its grounds, of the covenant and its parties, of the Scriptures and their character and authority,

of sin and its heinousness, guilt and penalty, of salvation and its nature and extent.

A thorough and consistent Calvinist approaches every doctrine from the point of God's sovereignty; the corner-stone of all his theology bears the inscription: *Soli Deo Gloria.* Every other principle, every other element of religious faith must be subordinate and tributary to this the paramount principle, the dominant element of all; the whole character of his theology is colored by this; in comparing any particular tenet of this system with one of any other, the specific difference will be found directly traceable to the influence of God's sovereignty. Not in the realm of doctrine alone, but in that also of worship, in the various practical policies of church work, in the character of preaching and particularly in the plans of presenting and applying the gospel to the unconverted; indeed in the whole realm of faith and practice this doctrine is determinative. To give to any other this position in the Calvinistic system is a misconception; it is illogical, unphilosophical and equally unscriptural.

A very prevalent impression of Presbyterianism finds expression in terms which describe it and its theology as harsh, hard, narrow,[1] arbitrary and tyrannical. References to this alleged spirit are very frequent; an eminent instance is furnished by W. T. Stead's interesting and generally just and appreciative critique of Spurgeon. In this paper Stead says of Spurgeon:

[1] There can be no question about the liberalness of our terms of communion. We are ready to welcome members from any evangelical church, according exactly the same credit to their certificate that we give to our own. A certificate from a Methodist church is received by a Presbyterian session on the same footing with a certificate from a church in our own connection. This fact is decisive. Moreover, there is a significant difference between the wording of a Presbyterian certificate dismissing a member to a Methodist church and the wording of a Methodist certificate dismissing one to the Presbyterian church. We have been forcibly struck with this difference. But more reliable than any custom, however inveterate, is the established creed of a church. Now, so far as our acquaintance extends, the Presbyterian Church is the only one that in its very creed expressly repudiates any claim to exclusive rights and privileges, and explicitly recognizes the true character and claims of other branches of the great Christian family. This fact may sound strange even to many of our own members; we invite their attention to our Book of Church Order, chap. i., sec. 7, and chap. ii., sec. 2, par. 2. Such is the claim we desire to make, and we invite investigation into the justice of it.

"He roundly assailed the tendency of the present time to take a broader view of the fate of man and the love of God than seemed orthodox to the Calvinists, who implanted upon the plastic mind of the Essex boy their cast-iron conception of God and his world. . . . . The best men could no longer be cabined, cribbed, and confined within the pale of Calvinistic orthodoxy. . . . . He almost excommunicated those of his brethren who could not share his conviction that no one could really believe in God the Father and Christ the Son who was not certain that the majority of the human race were created to pass a whole eternity in endless torment," etc.

Surely when such a man will seriously write and deliberately publish such *stuff* as that, our topic is proven timely; yet the foregoing citation is simply a fair specimen of what continually offends the eyes of intelligent readers.

That the Calvinist is exceedingly jealous of the honor of the Lord God of Hosts goes without saying; it is the very genius of his whole system of faith; with him no other consideration is for a moment comparable to the glory of God. This may make him at times seem to be less considerate of man than some others who at the same time are less considerate of God. Between the two Calvinism never compromises, never trims, never hesitates. He believes with the Scriptures that it is "to the praise of the glory of his grace" that he hath "predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will"; he believes also that "the salvation of the righteous is of the Lord," wholly, in its origin, development and issue. This likewise is Scripture, and it is Calvinism pure and simple; it puts the whole of salvation, matter, method, extent, in the hands of God, whom it believes to be all-merciful as well as all-wise. Now there are several obvious reflections:

1. If the theology of such a system is harsh, hard, narrow, arbitrary and tyrannical, it must be because such is the nature of God. It has always seemed to the writer of this paper that these bitter arraignments of Calvinism, however unintentionally, were none the less really arraignments of God.[1] So also indeed

[1] An objector would of course say, "No; an arraignment of the Calvinistic conception only of God." Our reply would be, "Exactly; we recognize the difference

it seems to have appeared to the Apostle Paul when *identically the same objections* were preferred against his statement and exposition of the doctrines of grace and of the divine election; for his rejoinder, sharp and incisive, was, "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God"?

2. How this scheme begets in the minds of some the notion that the saved are but few is passing strange. Yet we read the charge that such a theology consigns the majority of men to the doom of the damned; or, to put it in Mr. Stead's somewhat unduly vigorous style, "that the majority of the human race were created to pass a whole eternity in endless torment." The insertion of the word "endless" is surely painting darkness on the midnight air, but we suppose a "whole eternity" is too limited to contain Mr. Stead's indignation. It is not so surprising, however. We are somewhat indignant ourselves when this vigorous writer not only saddles such a doctrine on us, but actually out-herods Herod by charging us with making subscription to it a condition of salvation! This goes a bow-shot beyond anything in the line of theological criticism that has fallen under our eye for some years.

It would seem to an unprejudiced mind, believing in the God revealed in the Scriptures and incarnate in the Christ of the Gospels, that a scheme which leaves the whole matter of man's salvation in method and extent to the sovereign mercy of such a God will secure the salvation of a greater number of souls than any other conceivable plan. Though we are not, and with our reading of the word of God, could not be, aught but a thorough Calvinist, yet it is our confident trust that in the final consummation of the kingdom the lost will bear but an insignificant proportion to the saved. When the blessed Jesus "shall see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied," no devout Arminian, however tender-hearted, will have cause to complain.

3. Another mystery of misconception is that any one should

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suggested; but then what is the difference after all but that which inheres in the sovereignty of God? Is not the objectionable feature in this Calvinistic conception precisely that which Paul so uncompromisingly defends against exactly the same criticism?" [Consult Rom. ix. 18–21.]

regard the decree of God as damning any soul. The decree so far as active at all, is saving in its influence; the only exercise of divine activity is a saving exercise. The election of grace is to life, not to death, and but for this election all without exception would be lost. The Calvinistic doctrine represents God as interposing to save some even at the infinite cost of his own life, and just this interposition is election. Of course this election implies and involves the passing over of those not elected; but their condition is not in any way or to any degree altered or affected by the decree; they are simply left to the natural, necessary, inevitable, just results of their own wrong doing. If we are asked why God should discriminate between sinners alike and equally deserving of wrath, our answer must be the same our Master gave when referring to the fact that enough divine energy had been apparently fruitless on the shores of Galilee to have saved the fated dwellers by the banks of the Mediterranean. God does not save all; but this objection obtains against all systems except that of the Universalist. Calvinist and Arminian both must confront this difficulty, and the answer above referred to is the resort of both alike, "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight."

4. The word "arbitrary," that in the mouths of objectors has become so wedded to the decree of God, is altogether out of place, and involves a grievous misconception. It conveys or insinuates the idea of something whimsical or unreasoning, a capricious exercise of sheer will; arbitrary, in the language of these critics, means practically groundless. Nothing that the God of the Calvinistic faith does can be arbitrary in this sense, because God is all wise. To say that we do not comprehend the reasons which influence the exercise of this infallible will is one thing; to say or to insinuate that there are no sufficient reasons is altogether another and a very different thing; the first we frankly admit, the second we shall always strenuously deny.

5. If the Calvinistic faith is tyrannical it is so only in the relation it teaches between God and man. There is no question as to the fact of its humbling man before God beyond any other system in the world. If this is what is meant by the charge, we yield the

point at once; only adding that this in our own estimate is the very essence of real religion, and, therefore, instead of denying the the charge we accept it as the crown of Calvinism. But while Calvinism inculcates absolute unquestioning submission to God, it resolutely resists such submission to any other being in the universe. That Calvinists have habitually been the sturdiest foes to oppression is one of the most incontrovertible facts of history. Men who have spent their lives and made their reputation in the field of historical study have called attention uniformly to the prominence of Calvinists in every struggle for liberty the world over. In his history of the Netherlands, Motley says:

"The earliest and most eloquent preachers, the most impassioned converts, the sublimest martyrs, had lived, preached, fought, suffered and died, with the precepts of Calvin in their hearts. The fire which had consumed the last vestige of royal and sacerdotal despotism throughout the independent republic had been lighted by the hands of Calvinists." Vol. III. 120.

To the Calvinists—"more than to any other class of men, the political liberties of Holland, England and America are due." Vol. IV. 347.

Bancroft, in the first volume of his great history of the United States, page 266, says:

"A young French refugee (John Calvin) skilled in theology and civil law, in the duties of magistrates and in the dialectics of religious controversy, entering the republic of Geneva, and conforming its ecclesiastical discipline to the principles of republican simplicity, established a party of which Englishmen became members and New England the asylum."

In his essay on Calvinism, Froude well says:

"Grapes do not grow on bramble-bushes. Illustrious natures do not form themselves on narrow and cruel theories. . . . . The practical effect of a belief is the real test of its soundness. Where we find an heroic life appearing as the uniform fruit of a particular mode of opinion, it is childish to argue in the face of fact that the result ought to have been different."

How a system can be tyrannical that begets such a uniform and inextinguishable thirst for liberty, is a problem we leave to those whose charge gives it rise.

A fourth misconception that we sometimes meet with is the idea that Presbyterianism "does not believe in revivals."

If by revivals is meant the manifold machinery in vogue in some quarters, ingeniously devised and systematically directed towards every possible stimulus of emotional feeling, the various devices for arousing and intensifying excitement by all sorts of scenic effects and dramatic appeals to eye and ear, the slow music, darkened lights, legerdemain style so common under the leadership of certain popular peripatetic evangelists, so-called—if this is what is meant by revivals, we had as well "confess judgment," for the Presbyterian Church has generally, and very properly and consistently, discountenanced all such. But, if by revivals is meant an outpouring of the Holy Spirit in response to earnest prayer and godly living, the blessing of that Spirit upon the continued and repeated offer of the gospel appealing to the heart *through the intelligence* and *conscience*, with the expectation, under God's blessing, of immediate and permanent results in regenerated souls and consecrated lives—if this be revival, then Presbyterianism *does* believe in revivals, and has always believed in them. She could not believe otherwise and be consistent with her creed; a Calvinistic theology requires this at her hands. It is a thoroughly revival theology, instilling just such a doctrine of man's depravity and dependence as will place him at the throne of grace, and just in proportion as he cordially believes it, *will keep him there.* Even the Arminian prays Calvinism, whatever he may preach. Men may talk Arminianism to man, but no Christian ever talks anything but Calvinism to God Besides inculcating such a doctrine of man's nature and needs as puts him in exactly the attitude to receive a revival, the Calvinistic theology proclaims just that plan of salvation which will lead the Christian to look directly and confidently for the baptism of the Spirit as his *sole* reliance for the salvation of sinners. As might be expected from such doctrine, the whole history of the Presbyterian family of churches is a history of revivals; a careful study of the subject will go far towards establishing the claim that nearly every great revival, general in character and permanent in influence, has been inaugurated under Calvinistic preaching; not even need we except the great Wesleyan movement, which is the

peculiar pride of the Arminian Church; for it is a matter of history that this great revival began under the preaching of the Calvinist Whitfield, and it was with no little difficulty that he induced Wesley to join in the movement. Most people consider the camp-meeting a peculiarly Methodist institution, and a Presbyterian camp-meeting is esteemed a sort of ecclesiastical hybrid—an innovation borrowed by the Presbyterians from the Methodists; whereas the camp-meeting originated with the Presbyterians and the Methodists borrowed it from them; wherever Presbyterians now employ it, they are simply returning to a custom of their forefathers.

Without referring in detail to the great Calvinistic revivals that marked the Reformation period throughout the various countries of Europe, we call attention to more recent history in our own land. The following widespread revivals are worthy of special notice: in 1734 under the preaching of Jonathan Edwards; in 1740 under the leadership of Dickinson and the Tennents; in 1789 under John Blair Smith, William Graham and others; in 1800 the famous revival beginning in Kentucky and extending as far north as New York; in 1820 under Finney, Nettleton and others; in 1830 chiefly associated with the venerable name of Daniel Baker. Indeed, the period extending from 1815 to 1834 was almost one continuous revival; during this time the Presbyterian Church increased more than five hundred *per cent.* It is a matter of history that the great, widespread, general revivals that have constituted epochs in religious history, have been distinctly Presbyterian.

The last misconception that shall receive our attention at this time is the idea that Presbyterianism is comparatively insignificant in numbers; that in this respect it is very far behind some other churches, particularly the Methodist and the Baptist. Many people suppose that these last two great churches dwarf the Presbyterian into utter numerical insignificance. There are not wanting Presbyterian people to accept this notion, some of whom lay the flattering unction to their souls that they make up in weight what they lack in bulk, that quality compensates the lack of quantity, saying sometimes in amiable satire, "We weigh, we don't count."

The writer of this paper has never been of the number of those who could take comfort in such reflection, and we are therefore the more glad to be relieved of the need of such consolation.

Presbyterianism suffers sometimes in comparison with some churches which report a much larger body of communicants in the United States, but when *ecumenical* statistics are taken into account, the Presbyterian church makes then her proper, proportionate showing; she is perhaps less local in character than any of her great competitors in faith and good words. Other great churches are almost distinctively American; the United States is practically their birth-place and to this day remains their great stronghold; whereas American Presbyterianism is simply an offshoot from the parent stem in Great Britain and the Continent. The American Presbyterian Church, which is the only one that many people ever think of, though numbering over a million communicants, is not half so large a body as that of Great Britain, or the Continent either. The United Kingdom reported to the Presbyterian Council of 1884, 2,999,038 communicants, and the European Continent, to the same Council, 2,352,421.

In that great gathering there were represented *sixty-five national churches*, reporting an actual membership of 6,750,460 communicants, with many omitted for lack of statistical reports. How many adherents these communicants represent it would be hard to say; certainly not less than twenty millions at the lowest estimate. No Presbyterian need blush for his church, even when numbers alone are under consideration.

In bringing this somewhat desultory and very unsatisfactory paper to its conclusion, we desire to disavow any apparent reflection upon any sister church in the great family of God; we wish to pay our hearty tribute to the truly glorious work they are privileged to do for our common blessed Master. If we know our own heart we would not rob them of one atom of the honor they so richly deserve; our only emulation should be one of good works and our only feeling one of devout thankfulness to God for his manifest blessing on their work of faith, their labor of love, and their patience of hope.

Samuel M. Smith.

Columbia, S. C.

II. PAUL'S PURPOSE IN WRITING ROMANS.

That man works best who thinks in his working. And that man thinks best who bases his thinking on the work that he has done. The minister, therefore, or the missionary who goes to his service thinking the truth of God, will make his work tell, and the preacher or the writer who utters his thoughts with the practical experience of his life work behind him will make his words tell.

Paul did both. However germinal may have been the theology he received on the Damascus road, he thought it out in the years that intervened between his conversion and his settled work, and kept developing it as his work went on. And however profound may have been the inspired thoughts which, when that work was over, he gathered into his epistle to the church at Rome, he had behind them the personal experience of all his journeys over the mission fields, and all the close contact into which those journeys had brought him with the souls of men, in the deep darkness and foul deadness of their sin. So the theology of Romans, God-given as it was, was perfectly natural too. What other theology could be expected when the man who wrote it had gone thinking through the Jewish and the heathen world? Paul was the Calvinist he was, not only because of the truths which he had received from God, but also because of the confirming facts which had confronted him in the world in which he lived and worked. Unconsciously, therefore, this great epistle has laid hold of the minds of men, because, unwittingly to them, it has put before them in theologic terms the very facts they had all along been conscious of in the actual life around them. And so men have treated it as they have treated these facts; as they have admitted the facts they have accepted the epistle; as they have denied the facts they have laid the epistle aside and said that Paul has not given us the last word about these truths. In an immeasurably large way, therefore, Romans is a great epistle.

But this is simply by way of apology for the paper which

follows. Romans has a reason for its importance in the study of the scholar and the thought of the church. That importance, we feel, justifies the investigation we wish to make. For if there is anything which determines the epistle's meaning it is the light and shade which fall upon its several parts. And if there is anything which determines the light and shade to be cast upon the epistle's statements, it is the angle at which the epistle was written. It stands before us according to the attitude of its author's mind when he brought it into being. It comes to us according to the motive he had in mind when he started it on its way. If it be then the great epistle that it is, to find the motive which its author had in writing it is no little matter. In fact, since Baur's day that has been the great question about the epistle. And in the zeal which has gathered round it, Godet is perhaps not exaggerating when he says that it has been one of the most controverted questions in the whole range of New Testament criticism.[1] What might be called the first move in the Tübingen attack on the New Testament, was in the direction of this epistle, and it was based on this question of the motive behind the letter's writing.[2] And though that attack has failed and the battle has begun from another quarter and is directed against another point, it is yet the chief question in the scholarly critique of the epistle, "Why was it written?"

The theories are legion, but they gather themselves readily into two general groups: 1, Those that hold that the motive was determined by the needs of the church to which the letter was sent. 2, Those that hold that the motive was determined by the needs of the apostle who sent it. The first group separates itself very clearly into two sub-groups: (1) The didactic; (2) The

[1] *Com. Romans*, p. 47. 1889. Revised translation.

[2] Baur's critical work really began with his articles in the *Tüb. Zeitschr. f. Theol.* on the *Christ Party in Corinth* (1831), which were followed by his work on the *Pastoral Epistles* (1835). Then came his discussion of the *Aim and Motive of Romans* (1836), which formed the basis of his great work on *Paul* (1845), that brought to issue the question of the New Testament's right to exist. Cf. Weiss, *Einl. in d. N. T.* (1886), p. 9 ff. Also his (*Meyer*) *Kom. üb. d. Römbr.* (1891), pp. 25–30. Godet, *Com. Rom.* (1889), p. 48, note. Hilgenfeld's article. *Römerbrief* in *Zeitschr.* f. *Wissensh.*. Theol. (1892), III., p. 297, note.

polemic; while the second group as clearly sums itself up into one which might be termed the apologetic. It will not be possible to come, in a proper way, to the position we take without a fair consideration of these groups. They have, each of them, something in their favor. They could not have been as widely held as they have been were they absolutely without support. The most isolated criticisms generally have some show of reason for themselves, and these criticisms are by no means poverty stricken for support. 1. The didactic group holds in substance that the epistle is an attempt on Paul's part to present to the Roman Church a systematic exposition of Christian truth for their enlightenment and strengthening in the faith, some taking this exposition in a more, some in a less, elaborate sense of the word. This is what may be called the ancient view. It was advanced as far back as the time of the Muratori Fragment, whose unknown author says: "The apostle explains to the Romans the plan of the Scripture by inculcating the fact that Christ is their first principle." It was taken up with varied modifications by several of the early Greek expositors (Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret), some of the middle age scholastics (John of Damascus, Œcumenius, Theophylact), some of the Reformers (notably Calvin and Melancthon), by Grotius, by later German critics (among them De Wette, Meyer, Reuss), also by Renan, and by Godet.[1] It is not difficult to understand why this should have been so generally the first view of the writer's motive, for the epistle seems to say as much by the general systematic character which it bears. Paul doubtless wrote all his epistles, more or less, for instruction's sake, but none of his epistles are written after such a thoughtfully laid out plan, so logically developed. Some of his epistles, doubtless, were written with a decided unity of thought, *e. g.*, Galatians; but none in which the unity was so deliberately purposed and so carefully carried out. Galatians' unity comes from the pressure under which the letter was written. It is the unity of quickness, of surprise and indignation and protest, put into a single thought, at a single writing. Romans' unity comes from the care of its

[1] Cf. Godet *Com.* p. 54 ff. Also catalogue of views in Holtzmann. *Lehrb. d. historisch.-krit-Einleit. in d. N. T.* (1892) p. 237.

composition. It is the unity of forethought and of systematic handling, of a distinct plan and a definite development. Romans stands by itself. Not even Ephesians is like it in its air of treatise writing. And while this has been made an objection against its genuineness, as though Paul could not write outside of one epistolary style,[1] it is held by the supporters of this view that it has not a little in its favor from the fact that Paul left no church which he counted as his own without a careful exposition among them of the great principles of his gospel, which exposition he is here supposed to send to the Roman church by this epistle in advance.[2] All this is to be admitted in favor of a didactic purpose behind the epistle's writing. 2. The polemic group holds in brief that the letter was written to combat a tendency to Judaistic views in the church at Rome, a tendency which, as some think, had already gained a foothold and formulated itself into a distinct Judaizing party in the church, or, as others believe, was simply threatening to enter in, and showed itself only as a possible trouble in the future. That is to say: Either Paul saw that the same struggle which had met him in Galatia and in Corinth was following him to Rome, and so wrote his epistle as he had written Galatians and II. Corinthians before, or else, having won the battle in Galatia and in Corinth, he determined it should not have to be fought in Rome, and so wrote his epistle to prevent its possibility. This is also by no means a recent view. It was held by some of the fathers (Augustine, Hilary), by some of the writers in the middle ages (Rabanus Maurus, Abelard), by one or two of the Reformers (Erasmus, chiefly), while in more modern times it has been supported by many of the German critics (Bleek, Tholuck, Philippi, Ewald, Volkmar and others), and in a certain sense is the view held by Dr. Charles Hodge. It contains within itself, of course, a maze of modifications, but they all tend

[1] Baur, quoted by Godet *Com. p.* 55.

[2] Cf. Godet *Com. p.* 56, where Thiersch (*Versuch Zur Herstellung des histor. Standpunkts, p.* 91, f.) is quoted. Also note recurrence of phrases in Paul's epistles which refer evidently to points of previous catechetical instruction in the churches to which he was writing. (1 Thess. iii. 3, 4; iv. 2, 6; v. 2; 2 Thess. ii. 6, 15; 1 Cor. iii. 16; vi. 2, 3, 9, 15, 16, 19; 2 Cor. iii. 5.) Also such historical references as Acts xviii. 11; xix. 8–10.

to this main idea.[1] And there is much in the epistle that would seem to justify this view; *e. g.*, There is the old familiar insistence upon justification by faith alone, and not by works of the law (chap. ii.–v.; cf. Gal. ii. 3.) There is the old rejection of the position which abuses the freedom from the Mosaic law (chap. vi.–vii.; cf. Gal. chap. v.) There is a seeming trace, at least, of the old personal element, as though over against those who would call into question his apostolic work; and an apparent hint at some who were causing divisions among them (chap. xv.–xvi.; cf. 2 Cor. x.–xii., Gal. i., ii., v., vi.) Paul seems to have his old controversy on hand again, either in actuality or in foreboding. Apparently the old objections are up once more for refutation, and his desire is either to rid his people of their present foes, or to fortify them against those which he fears may come. So at least these passages would seem to indicate These are the two groups of views which consider that the epistle's motive was shaped by the church's needs. The group, on the other hand, which considers it to have been determined by the apostle's needs, holds that the purpose was an apologetic one; that Paul's aim in writing the letter was to prepare for himself a favorable reception at Rome in view of the prejudices which existed in that church; some taking those prejudices to be against himself, some taking them to be against the doctrines of his gospel, and some taking them to be against the practice of his gospel work. In other words, Paul is supposed to be, at one or all of these points, hostile to the Jews and partial to the Gentiles, and he writes this epistle simply to show the falsity of the supposition. This is the view which Baur started and which, with varied modifications, has been held by most of his followers since.[2] And in its favor must be acknowledged that there is a strange prominence given to the Jews and to Jewish lines of thought at varied points in the epistle, as though the writer would testify to the high place they held in his theology, and so

[1] Godet *Com.* p. 52 ff; Holtzmann *Einl.* p. 237.

[2] It was advanced independently in the same year (1836) by Credner, in his *Einl. in. d. N. T.* § 142, and by Baür in *Tub. Zeitschr. f. Theol. III.*, but through Baur it was carried into the criticism of the Tübingen school. Cf. Godet *Com. pp.* 48–51, Holtzmann, *Einl. p.* 237.

conciliate them to his side, and further it is to be admitted that chapters ix.–xii. have a significance in the epistle's argument which it is useless to deny.

These, then, in general, are the views which have been held of the writer's motive, with the points which can be gathered from the epistle in their favor. It is evident that, in order to judge of their real value, even before the epistle is subjected to its inductive study, one question regarding the church to which the epistle was written must as nearly as possible be settled, and that is what was its composition?[1] Was it Jewish or Gentile? Or was it both, with the two elements nearly balanced? We believe the felt need of having this decided before the greater question be assumed accounts for the large attention devoted by the critics to this otherwise unimportant point. For the influence of its answer is apparent. Whether the chapter was Jewish or Gentile will mean a great deal as to whether the letter was or was not one which would instruct. A treatise on Paul's gospel for a Jewish church would have a different cast from that which it would have for a Gentile church. One has only to think of the character of Hebrews, and the question of its possible Pauline authorship, to see the direction in which a Jewish instruction can go. Whether the church was Jewish or Gentile will be quite significant in considering whether the letter was or was not a polemic against an actual or a threatened Judaizing tendency in the people's midst. A very decided proportion of Jewish element must have been necessary to make Judaizing possible. And this statement is none the less true from the fact that the churches of Galatia and Corinth were in Gentile lands. Whether the church was Jewish or Gentile will go far towards determining what sort of an apologetic the apostle would present to them, if any. For if his apologetic was shaped by their prejudices, their prejudices in turn would be shaped by what they themselves were. Jewish prejudices against Paul or his gospel, or his mission work, would be one thing; Gentile prejudices against them would be quite another thing. This problem then must be as far as possible solved. Can it be? We grant it is a difficult

[1] Holtzmann, *Einl*, *p.* 236, §3.

undertaking—difficult because of the lack of information about the church.

But, then, there are facts to be considered. 1. As to the church's origin, the theory that it was founded by the Apostle Peter during the reign of Claudius must be laid aside. It is incapable of historical proof, and impossible in view of Paul's distinct statement in our epistle (xv. 20) that the principle of his mission work forbade him building on another man's foundation, in view of which principle he was purposing to leave the East, where such independent work had reached its limits (vs. 23) and go to Rome. 2. We come thus to the choice between two possible positions, (*a*) That the church owed its origin mainly to the Jewish Christians who came to Rome from Palestine, which is the position taken by Weiss.[1] (*b*) That the church originated with Gentile Christians who came to Rome from other quarters than Palestine, which is the position of Godet.[2] To decide between these two positions we need merely a consideration of such facts as can be gathered in the case. (1), Whatever Jews may have been brought to Rome by Pompey from his Syrian wars, and his capture of Jerusalem (B. C. 63),[3] we are informed, (*a*) that by the time of the first triumvirate (B. C. 59) they had grown to be a considerable and not uninfluential part of the Roman population.[4] (*b*) Their growth continued until, under Augustus (B. C. 31—A. D. 14), they were assigned a quarter beyond the Tiber for their residence;[5] (*c*) While Tiberius, (A. D. 14—37), fearing possibly their increasing power, issued against them severely restrictive measures, among other things transporting 4,000 to Sardinia, to serve in war against the free-booters of that island (A. D. 19);[6] (*d*) Until at last Claudius (A. D. 41—54), seeing their continued increase in spite of all restrictions, deliberately, on account of alleged tumults

[1] *Kom.* pp 16–23. [2] *Com.* p. 40 f.

[3] Florus, iii. 5; Jos. Antiq xiv. 4, 4, 5; *Bell. Jud* i. 7.

[4] Cicero, *pro. Flac.* xxviii.

[5] Philo, *De Virt. et. Legat ad Cajum*, pp. 1014, 1015 (Ed. Frankfurt). Philo states here that the most of these Jews were freedmen; while we know from what Josephus says (*Antiq.* xvii. 11,1) as to the great company of them [8,000] that joined the popular embassy which came to Rome against Archelaus (A. D. 6) that their numbers must have been very considerable.

[6] Sueton. *Lib.* 36; Tacit. *Ann.* ii. 85; Jos. *Antiq.* xviii. 3, 5 .

among them, banished them from the city (A. D. 52).[1] (*e*) However, at his death (A. D. 54), they returned to Rome, where they resumed their former prosperous condition, making proselyting inroads upon the Roman population around them.[2] (2) Further, we know from Acts ii. 10 that "Roman sojourners" were present at Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost. They were doubtless Jews and prosleytes both, and they must have often afterwards come in contact with the Christian church in Jerusalem as they went up there to various feasts. (3) As to the presence of Christians in Rome, we know from classic testimony that there were Christians there prior to the writing of our epistle; for this edict of Claudius against them was for tumults which occurred "*impulsore Chresto*," which must mean disturbances in some way due to the claims of Christ, whatever else it may or may not involve.[3] (4) Further, from the epistle itself, it is clear there were Christians present in Rome at the writing of this letter, and present in some sort of an organized church character and form (Rom. i. 8, xvi. 1–16, 19, xii. 5–8).[4]

Now from these facts it must be said that, as far as these two theories are concerned, (*a*) It would seem in accordance with the nature of events that the Roman sojourners at Jerusalem should some of them be converted to the Christian faith on that day of Pentecost, and others afterwards, and returning to Rome, should preach Jesus

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[1] Sueton. *Claud.* c. 25; *Dion Cass.* lx. 6. [2] Juvenal, xiv. 96-98; Tacit. (as above).

[3] It is true that this question has been vigorously debated. Lewin (*Life of Paul*, vol. I., p. 274 f.) lays the whole statement of Suetonius aside, but apparently without justifying reason, while Meyer and Wieseler have maintained that *Chrestus* was simply a political disturber among the Jews; but (1), the very significant testimony of Tertullian (*Ad. Nat.* i. 3 and *Apol.* c. iii.), and Lactantius (*Inst. div.* iv. 7) that *Chrestus* is merely the vulgar mispronouncing of *Christus*, and (2), the serious difficulty of accounting for the complete historical silence regarding any such adventurer has brought the criticism of to-day almost universally to the position here taken. And if it be objected that, on this supposition, it is strange that, having come into conflict with Christians, the Jewish church should nevertheless at Paul's coming be in ignorance of a Christian church in their midst, it is to be remembered that the statement of the Jews (Acts xxviii. 21 f.) might have been made in perfect honesty and yet a Christian church be existing in their midst. Such a fact their statement does not at all deny. (Cf. Gloag, *Introd. Paul Ep.* p. 241.)

[4] Weiss, *Einl.* p. 226, note 3.

in the synagogue. (*b*) Further, it would seem in accordance with the nature of events that Jesus being thus preached, not only discussion should arise between Jews and Christian converts, but great disturbances should take place, which would agree with the cause assigned for the Claudian edict. In which case the first of these two theories would be right, and we would have to acknowledge that the church originated from Jewish Christians and through the synagogue. But, on the other hand, from these facts we also gather, (*a*) That nothing would prevent converts coming to Rome from the Christian churches in Gentile centres, as well as from the Christian church in Jerusalem itself. Rome was in touch with all the East, as well as with Palestine. It was the focal point towards which everything from everywhere made its way. (*b*) That nothing would prevent this disturbance between the Jews and the Christians, which was the cause of the Claudian edict, from being outside the synagogue and not inside it. In fact, the word *tumultuari*, which Suetonius uses, would refer to outward riot, rather than to inward dissension; in which case the second of these two theories would be right, and we would have to say that Christianity came into Rome through Gentile Christians, and was propagated, not through the synagogue, but outside of it. Which then is likely to have been the case? We see no reason why both may not have been, in a certain way, true. There is no reason why some of the "Roman sojourners" may not have been converted under the Pentecostal preaching of Peter, and have returned to Rome as the first Christians in the city. There is no reason why converts from the Gentile churches should not, soon after,[1] have begun coming to Rome, and have continued coming, in ever increasing numbers, as the Gentile work went on. But there is every reason to believe, that, even though the Jewish converts may have been the first to come, it was the Gentile Christians who began the organizing of the church at Rome, and carried it on to that degree of organization which it had when our epistle was written.[2] In other words, we see nothing against

[1] If Pentecost is placed in A. D. 33, it would be but seven years until the founding of the church at Antioch (A. D. 40).

[2] Cf. Godet, *Com.* p. 41, as to the hindrances likely to have been against a propagation of the gospel in the synagogue by the early Jewish converts.

the possibility of Jewish converts from Pentecost having been the first Christians at Rome (for which Weiss so strongly argues), and yet the formal church having been begun and carried on by the Gentile converts from regions outside of Palestine, and so having been definitely and decisively Gentile in its origin.[1]

At least this Gentile beginning of the church seems in every way the most reasonable; for (*a*) so comes to its best meaning the statement of the Jewish leaders on the occasion of Paul's arrival in the city. The Christian church was outside the synagogue. Its work was done mostly by Gentile converts and mostly among Gentile inquirers. So they would be less in contact with it than if it had been done by Jewish converts and among inquirers in the synagogue. Their statement, while not making impossible the existence of a Christian church in the city, makes most improbable that Christianity, as a religion, had been preached in the synagogue and grown up among the Jews as a heretical sect.[2] (*b*) So is best accounted for the fact that the church was only imperfectly organized (xii. 5–8)—a fact which would more likely be if it were founded outside the synagogue, and less likely if it were organized within at least the circle of synagogue people; since, in that case, the elder basis would have been followed,[3] (*c*) while, on the other hand, if the church was founded by Jewish converts, then we have a church founded out of analogy with all other churches in apostolic times; for it is a fact that the pilgrims at Pentecost who came from parts of the diaspora, where Paul afterwards labored, however truly they may have been converted at that great revival, in no case accomplished any church organization in the cities to which they returned. In each case Paul had to begin that work himself. But in Antioch, where the influence at the church's founding had been Gentile,[4] there a

[1] We cannot but believe that this is practically a solution of the much debated problem as to the origin of the church at Rome. It simply had two origins, an unorganized origin in the first Jewish converts from Pentecost. and an organized one in the first Gentile converts from the extra Judean work.

[2] Godet *Com.* p. 40.

[3] Weiss admits that the church was at least organized, if not fully so. *Einl.* p. 226, *note* 31. *Kom.* p. 17, *note.***

[4] See Appendix Note of W. & H. to the reading Ἑλληνιστάς, Acts xi. 20. (Greek Test. Vol. II. p. 23.) Also Warfield's *Text. Crit.*, p. 89 f.

church organization was accomplished, and an organization very much after the kind of the Roman church.[1] And if it be objected[2] that, unless the church were founded at the early date of Pentecost, there was no time for the gospel to have grown among them and spread out into the surrounding world so as to justify the liberal statement of the church's faith (i. 8), it is to be remembered that the church at Antioch was the first church established after the mother church, and that converts going thence to Rome would have given the church a life of eighteen years before the epistle was written.[3] In fact, those who, like Weiss, hold to a Jewish origin of the church, find themselves compelled to admit, that before the time of our letter's writing its character had completely changed to Gentile. The evidence furnished by the epistle itself leaves them no other course. The Greek persons saluted in the epistle's closing chapter—many of whom were the apostle's personal friends (ch. xvi.); the Pauline type of gospel, with which the church was evidently already acquainted (v. 17); the frequent classing of the readers as belonging under the ἐθνή (i. 6, 13; xi. 13); the connection of the epistle's writing with Paul's apostleship to the Gentiles (xv. 15 f.), and indeed the fact of the writing of the epistle at all (Gal. ii. 7 ff.; 2 Cor. x. 13 ff.), show, beyond doubt, what the character of the church was when the letter was written.[4] That its character, then, should have been essentially different from that which it had at the beginning of its formal life we feel, in view of the above careful survey of the facts, is hardly possible to be proven.[5]

It was, therefore, to a Gentile Christian church—Gentile in its development, Gentile in its then present condition—that the apostle sent his letter. But we see, at once, how our groups of views are affected by this fact. 1. The polemic group is

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[1] Compare Rom. xii. 6, 8, with Acts xiii. 1.

[2] Beyschlag, *Das gesch. Problem des. Römerbr. Stud. & Krit.*, 1867.

[3] Godet, *Com.* p. 41.

[4] Weiss, *Einl.* p. 226. *Kom.* p. 20, 23.

[5] It is interesting to note that since 1876 the German critics have, almost all of them, changed to the Gentile view. See Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr. f. wissensch. Theol.* 1802, *III.* p. 229.

virtually set aside; for if the origin and development and growing character of the church was Gentile, it becomes exceedingly difficult to find anything to justify the existence in its midst of a Judaizing party. Such a church would be the last kind to which such a party would find its way. Its Gentilism was evidently of too pronounced a sort and too far removed from the Jewish Orient to be attractive to such an attempt. 2. The didactic group is rendered most improbable; for if the character of the church was, from its origin, Gentile, and if that Gentilism grew as Paul's mission work extended and his gospel became known—a Gentilism of the Pauline type—where was the need that Paul instruct it in the principles of his theology? If this church had been in every particular a completely stranger-church to Paul and his gospel work, perhaps such an advance instruction could be accounted for. But out and out unknown to the apostle and his theology was just what this church was not. The necessity for its instruction, therefore, finds itself hard to be understood. 3. The apologetic group is thrown into a decided doubt; for if the church in its history was preëminently Gentile, and in its then present condition was Gentile, in a Pauline way, where could have been its prejudices against Paul himself, or his gospel, or his mission work? It was the Jewish element which found fault with the apostle's doctrine and work. If the letter was written to remove prejudices among them, and so, apologetically, to prepare the way for Paul's coming among them, then the trouble must have been of a kind to fit in with the Gentile character of the church and its religious views.

We have thus nothing but general uncertainty regarding these views, and so we are compelled, all the more, to come to the epistle and gather inductively the testimony which it is prepared to give. But, taking up the epistle for our study, we find that the didactic view is at once disposed of, and that too, simply because the contents of the epistle are not the contents of Paul's gospel. There is lacking all discussion of the doctrines of Christology and Eschatology, though elsewhere Paul had already given to the latter of these such particular treatment (1 Thess. iv.; 2 Thess. ii.; 1 Cor. xv.; 2 Cor. v.) *A fortiori*, are the contents of the epistle not the

contents of the general circle of Christian truth. There is no treatment of Creation, or the Incarnation, or the Church,[1] besides the untouched Pauline doctrines. The holders of this view have recognized this unquestionable objection and have sought, in various ways, to give an explanation of it. They have said that these themes are not wholly omitted; that they are touched upon here and there throughout the epistle—the apostle confining himself simply to those parts of Christian doctrine, the Law, Sin and Grace, on which, in reality, the knowledge of Christianity depends.[2] But this is just the fact which prevents the epistle from being a resumé of Christian doctrine, or a treatise on the system of truths which Paul has gathered up into his gospel. The epistle is not general. It is specific, even within Pauline lines.

A study of the epistle renders the polemic view also impossible. Strong and vigorous as the argument of the apostle is there is no trace of its being directed against any Judaizing party in the church. It is not, technically, a controversial epistle. Place it alongside of Galatians and the Corinthians and even the Thessalonians, and the difference is at once apparent. The very way the apostle introduces the objections which he feels his positions may provoke, is evidence in confirmation.[3] There is but one passage that can, in any way, be said to refer to Judaizers, and that is the passage, iii. 8, *καθώς Φασιν τινες ἡμᾶς λέγειν*; but *τινες* here loses all significance, from the fact that there is nothing in the reference that would in any way indicate that these slanders were in the Roman church, or even in Rome's com-

[1] Rom. xii. cannot be held to be a discussion of Ecclesiology, as Godet insists it is. And even granting that the Sacrament of Baptism is presented in ch. vi., there is no reference in the epistle to the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, of which, if we may infer anything from the experience of the Gentile church at Corinth, it would be quite necessary to treat.

[2] So Melancthon in his *Loci Com.*, 1521. Similarly, also, in general, Grotius, Tholuch (1st ed.), Olshausen, Meyer, Reuss, Godet.

[3] Chaps. iii. 1, 3, 5, 31; vi. 1, 15; vii. 7, 13; xi. 1, 11, present these objections as simply arising from the argument itself, not as coming from personal opponents, whose replies are anticipated and answered. Compare with this, 1 Cor. xv. 12, 35, and note that Gal. iii. 21, is of no weight against the otherwise clear presence of opponents in the letter's argument.

munity.[1] And even were that to be granted, the discussion to which this reference belongs (chs. vi. viii.), is one which is introduced and carried on in a way so apart from and so above any mere partisan opposition against its truth, that it is hard to see in it any hint at Judaistic foes.[2] Should there be cited, however, the passage xvi. 17–20, *παρακαλῶ δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, σκοπεῖν τοὺς τὰς διχοστασίας καὶ τὰ σκάνδαλα παρὰ τὴν διδαχὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐμάθετε ποιοῦντας, κ. τ. λ.*, and should it be said that this passage implies the presence of Judaizers in the church's midst, then it becomes very difficult to understand how, if the letter be a polemic against these errors, all specific mention of the errorists should have been omitted until the closing verses—in fact, until the postscript of the epistle. The place for such mention would have been in the introduction, or, at least, at the opening of the argument; but those parts are as innocent as they can well be of any rebuke to a straying church, or any arraignment of an errorizing teaching, or any warning against the possibility of coming trouble. If they are marked by anything, it is rather by a commendation of the church's faith, (i. 7, 8, 12).[3] Further, the moral exhortations of the epistle show no trace of any anti-Judaistic applications, which is in sharp contrast with Gal. v. 6–12, 14, 18, 23; vi. 12-16. And all this holds equally well whether the apostle's object be said to be the protection of this Roman people against errors already among them, or the fortifying of them against errors which threatened to enter in. In either case there is no apparent reference to the errors. If it be asked, then, how the seemingly controversial parts of the epistle are to be explained, the reply is ready, that, however argumentative, these portions are not a polemic against an opposition party in the church. The views which are discussed in ii. 1–iii. 20,

[1] Lipsius, *Holtzm. Hand-Kom. Z. N. T. II. Bd. II. Abt.* p. 67.

[2] Weiss *Kom.*, p. 28.

[3] Compare with this, 1. Cor. i. 4–11, where the Corinthians' otherwise good record is immediately contrasted with the dissensions in the church. Also 2 Cor. i. 16-24, where their complaints against his conduct are treated without contrast. Also 2 Cor. x., where, as soon as the corrections of the church's conduct are finished, the opposition of the false teachers is taken up and carried through the remaining chapters of the epistle. Also Gal. i. 6–9, where the rebuke has nothing of any kind to relieve it.

are the views, not of Judaizers, but of unbelieving Jews. The statement of the new way of salvation, with its Old Testament proof (chap. iv.), and its practical development (chap. v.) has to do with the trust which unbelieving Jews place in the law, and not with the Judaizers' application of it to the admission of Gentiles into the church, while chaps. vi.–viii, as said before, go out beyond all mere party discussion of the questions which they involve; and chaps. xv., xvi., have in them none of the hints at personal opposition which we would otherwise expect. In fact, nowhere in the epistle, within the limits of these apparently controversial parts, or outside of them, does Paul take up the question of his apostolic authority, either as opposed by others, or proclaimed by himself. These parts lack those features which characterize Paul's anti-opposition arguments. The peculiar personalness which marks the presence of opponents in the argument is absent from them.[1]

It would seem, then, that we were driven for refuge to the apologetic view. But a study of the epistle shows us how unsafe such a refuge would be. For if Paul desired, in writing this epistle, to remove from the Roman church the prejudices which it had against him, because of his hostility to the Jews and his partiality towards the Gentiles, then it is evident that he has taken a strange way of doing it. Granted the pro-Jewish tone of chaps. ix.–xi., how can the argument of chaps. ii.–v., be in any way considered conciliatory to a Jewish element in the church? Where is the applicability of the moral chapters (xii.–xiv.) on this supposition? What reference do they have to Jewish prejudices against his work? or, granted that they have, how would chapters xiv. serve to conciliate the Jewish views?

We come thus to the end of our testing of these groups of views by the epistle itself, and we find there is no one of them that we can satisfactorily hold. Where, then, are we to take our place? It seems clear that we must remember there are two things to be considered in the solution of the problem; first, the

[1] Compare chaps. ii., v., with Gal. iii. Also chap. vi., with Gal. v. Also chap. xvi., with 2 Cor. x., xii., and Gal. i., ii., v., vi. And see in general Lipsius, *Holtzm. Kom.*, p. 67f, and Weiss *Kom.*, p. 28f, for full treatment of this point.

epistle and then the apostle. In other words, we must first secure a view that will fit in with the exegetic character of our epistle, and then we must put that view to the test of the apostle's historical surroundings at the time of the epistle's composition. Critics are inclined to forget the latter point, much as they insist upon the need of historic criticism in Biblical work. They fail to give sufficient weight to the fact that, even after the epistle's approval has been secured, the peculiarity of the apostle's situation must have at least a veto power in deciding the motive with which the letter was sent from his pen. We must come now to the epistle for ourselves and find from our study of it what conclusions it justifies us in reaching. To make clear to the reader the line of thought which the epistle follows, we ask him simply to recall the outline of its doctrinal argument. After the greeting (i. 1-7) and introduction (i. 8-15) the epistle's theme is stated in verses 16, 17; thereupon follows,

(A.) The first general division, viz.: The dogmatic presentation of the Gospel Righteousness, as opposed to the alleged Law Righteousness (i. 18–viii. 39), which is subdivided into two parts:

(A) The necessity of the Gospel Righteousness (i. 18–iii. 20), which necessity is evidenced by the impossibility of a Law Righteousness.

(*a*) On the part of the Heathen (i. 18-32).

(*b*) On the part of the Jew, (ii. 1–iii. 20.)

Having reached this conclusion, the apostle is ready to give

(B) The positive presentation of the Gospel Righteousness (iii. 21–viii. 39), which presentation is arranged in the following order:

(*a*) The historical fact of the provision of this Gospel Righteousness (iii. 21-26).

(*b*) Its agreement with the Old Testament Scripture (iii. 27–iv. 25).

(*c*) Its surety for the present and all the future (v. 1-11).

(*d*) Its universality for the race of man (v. 12-21).

(*e*) Its result in the sanctification of the individual believer (vi. 1–viii. 39).

Then follows:

(B.) The second general division, viz., The presentation of the facts in the case regarding Israel's election, (ix. 1–xi. 36) which is accomplished in the following way:

(A) The fact of God's liberty in the election (ix. 1-29).

(B) The fact of Israel's responsibility in the election (ix. 30-x. 21).

(C) The plan which God has in the election (xi. 1-36).

Brief as this outline is, it cannot be fairly considered without the conclusion being formed that, true as it may be that this epistle is no didactic resumé of the system of Christian truth, or of the circle of Pauline doctrines, it is nevertheless didactic in its form of presenting what truths it does include. Evidently there is here a carefully prepared and conscientiously followed plan of instructing the church at Rome from some specific point of view regarding some specific matter. The claims of the didactic view are justified as far, at least, as concerns the general character of the treatment which the epistle's theme receives. Again, a consideration of the epistle's argument will bring us to the conclusion that, however far it may have been from being motived by a Judaistic opposition within the Roman church, there was evidently a desire on the apostle's part to direct his instruction against wrong views that this people held. The epistle is not merely instructive, it is argumentatively so; and in saying this we do not confine ourselves simply to the passage, ii. 1–iii. 20, where the claims of the unbelieving Jews are refuted and laid aside. We mean the whole discussion. Place the entire letter, if you will, alongside of Philippians and see the contrast; or, to be particular in comparison, place the theological argument of Philippians, chap. ii., over against the soteriological argument of Romans, chap. xi, and note the difference in tone. There is, to be sure, no party controversy in Romans. There is no trace of any combat against the Judaistic errors. The old struggle of Galatians and Corinthians is not here. But there is throughout the epistle's doctrinal discussion an evident attitude against some error point. It would solve the problem if we could find the point. Is it possible? We come back to the epistle's argument again

and we find ourselves justified in saying still further that, while the apostle had no motive towards apologizing before the Jewish prejudices of the church, he had a motive towards preparing the way for his coming to them and his working among them. Godet is right in saying that the introduction of the epistle's argument, by the transition from v. 15 to v. 16 of chap. i., shows clearly the epistle's didactic character.[1] But previous to v. 15 are vs. 8-13, and the transition from them to the epistle's argument shows just as clearly that the instruction which follows is to be an introduction to his own presence and preaching among them. Add then to the effect of these preceding verses that of the succeeding ones in chap. xv., where his writing of the epistle is connected with his apostleship to the Gentiles (v. 15 f), and that in turn with his soon-to-be-undertaken journey to them (vs. 17–24), and, to use the word in its most general sense, the apologetic character of the letter is without doubt.

But yet this leaves the specific purpose of the letter undiscovered. We have, to be sure, made progress toward the finding of it. We have secured an idea of the general epistolary lay of the land—a didactic argumentative letter sent ahead to prepare for the apostle's coming work. We have even located where the motive is likely to be found—in the erroneous views of his people, which the apostle had in mind when he wrote the letter. Now, as to what these views were, we believe they are very strongly hinted at by what we may term the peculiarities of the epistle's argument. (1) It cannot but be noticed that the argument begins with an arrraignment of the morals of the heathen world (ch. i.). Now logically, this is simply the first part of the general proof that mankind is in need of a righteousness other than his own, and with assigning it its logical place most critics have contented themselves.[2] But we cannot escape the impression of its signi-

[1] *Com. p.* 57.

[2] See Godet's outline of the instruction of the epistle, (*Com.* p. 56.) and his more particular reference to it, p. 99; also Lipsius' scheme of epistle's argument *Holtzm's Kom.* p. 4; and his more detailed outline, p. 70, § v; also Weiss's analysis of the passage, *Kom.* p. 73; and his note to p. 236 of his *Einl.* In all of these it is evident that the beginning of the argument with this church is not given any special meaning.

ficance. Galatians, which treats of the need of a righteousness other than man's own, does not begin its doctrinal argument this way—does not, in fact, introduce this element into its argument at all.[1] It occurs nowhere else in any of the apostle's letters, or in any of his speeches in his mission work. There must have been some reason for its introduction here, and if it be said that the reason is found in the generality of the argument, the apostle going back to the state of the sinful world around him, then we call attention to the counter peculiarity which meets us at the close of the epistle's argument. It cannot be unnoticed that the argument ends with a climax hope of the ultimate salvation of Israel (ch. xi.). Logically, also, this is merely the rounding up of the general discussion of the plan of salvation, as it had to do with the Jewish and Gentile worlds, showing how, in spite of the present rejection of Israel, the promises made to the fathers would ultimately be fulfilled; and with this logical statement of the chapter critics generally are satisfied. But again, it is difficult for us to escape the impression that there was a significance intended in giving the argument this ending. Galatians has no such ending to its argument—no such feature in it anywhere.[2] It does not occur elsewhere in the apostle's doctrinal discussion of Israel's future. Why should it occur here? Putting before ourselves these two peculiarities, therefore, we find ourselves asking, why such emphasis should be placed, at the beginning, on the moral death of the heathen world; and why such emphasis, at the end, on the promised future of the Jewish world? And these emphases are rendered still more striking by a third peculiar fact, that, so to speak, lies in between them. The argument in which are considered the views of the unbelieving Jews (ii., iii.) is conducted on a basis of perfect equality between Jew and Gentile in the salvation plan. The Jew is not treated by himself, but in connection with the Gentile; and while his greater advantages are acknowledged and, consequently, his greater guilt in abusing them, the last analysis always brings him to the same level as the Gentile—as without a righteousness before the judgment seat of God

[1] Cf. Gal., ii., iii. [2] Cf. Gal., iv.

(ch. ii. 6, 11, 25; iii. 9, 10–20, 22, 23, 29–31). Why should this be? We feel these things suggest the conclusion toward which we have all along been tending, and to which we are now ready to come. Paul's purpose was to correct the attitude of the Gentile element in the church at Rome. They were exalting his gospel at the expense of the Jew. His plan in writing the epistle, therefore, was to take up this gospel of his, so far as it was now wrought out intellectually in his mind and practically in his work, and show that, after all, it did not ignore the Jew, either as an essential element in the Christian church, or as the still unbelieving people of God outside of it. In other words, that his Gentile gospel was not to be overpressed and placed in opposition to all the revelation and work of God so far. That it did not separate the Old and New Dispensations, but rather joined them vitally together. That it did not alienate, but rather united, the Jewish and Gentile Christian life.[1]

We are convinced that this, and this alone, explains the introduction of the first chapter. It was the prejudice of the Gentile element in the church which he was combating, and he begins by reminding that element of what they had been, and of what their fellows in the world around them yet were. Gentilism had nothing in which to boast save the merciful grace of God,

[1] If it be said that this view gives a condition of affairs in Rome which lies in the direction of that represented in the Epistle of Barnabas, and that this epistle is of too late a date to stand in any connection with apostolic times, it must be remembered,

(1) That a very early date is claimed for the Epistle of Barnabas—not later than A. D. 119, and (Cunningham) as early as A. D. 79.

(2) That if Colossians and Ephesians represent the beginning tendencies to Gnosticism, it is not impossible that Romans may represent the beginning tendencies of this Anti-Judaistic phase of it.

(3) That, if this is the correct exegesis of the epistle, we are not critically wrong in asking: Why is not a connection with the Epistle of Barnabas thereby established? For, granting the right of historical facts to condition exegesis, the question here is: Are the historical facts in this case sufficiently strong in themselves to destroy the exegesis of the epistle which we have presented? We believe the only answer to this question is a negative one.

(4) That Romans is not the only epistle of Paul's in which this attitude towards the Gentile element in his churches is taken. It is present in Eph. and Phil. (cf. Dods. Introd. N. T., pp. 123–125, 132 note †. Salmon, Introd. N. T. pp. 428–431.)

which had rescued it from the wrath of God.[1] If the Jews, in spite of their advantages, entered the kingdom of God by grace, most truly so did they. If the Jews, in spite of their works of the law, had come to the level of faith, thoroughly so had they. And if it be questioned whether this meaning is not perhaps being read into the chapter, we have only to turn to the eleventh chapter, which holds the counter emphasis to it, and see how this very idea runs through it, and even forms the basis of its thought. The Jews yet hold a place in the salvation plan of God, Paul says, for they are yet the people of God, and God hath not cast his people away, (v. 1 f.) They have been rejected, (v. 7.) Yes, but only for the present, in order that his offer of the Gospel might come to the Gentiles, (v. 11 f.) When the fulness of the Gentiles is come in, then they shall be taken back, and all Israel shall be saved, (v. 25 f.) They are the root, the Gentiles are but the branches. There should be then no boasting by the branches against the root. They should not be high-minded, but fear, (vs. 16–24.) And in this we are convinced the introduction of this eleventh chapter itself is explained. And so also is explained the level placing of Jew and Gentile in the argument of ii. 1—iii. 20. In fact, we feel we are not going too far when we say, so is explained the introduction of the argument against the Jew at all—in order that the Gentile may understand how thoroughly he occupied before God the same place with the Jew (ii. 6–11; iii. 9–20). Paul had argued all through his mission ministry against the self-conceited claims of the Jew. He yet argued against them (ii. 1–5, 17–29). But his argument now has the aim and purpose of bringing Jew and Gentile to the same guilty standing-place before the judgment bar of God (ii. 9f; iii. 9), and to the same gracious standing-place within the kingdom of Christ (iii. 22–24, 28–30). His gospel against the legalism of the Jews had been misunderstood as giving the Gentiles the preëminence. He therefore repeats it here in order to

[1] See again Weiss' note (1) to p. 236 *Einl.*, where he brings out the fact that the gist of this first chapter is not so much the sinfulness of the heathen world as rather their condemnation under the wrath of God, (*Zornverfallenheit.*)

show its true bearing on Jew and Gentile alike.[1] In view of this it seems to us not impossible to understand the apostle's reason for developing his argument into that of chapters iv. and v. and chapters vi.–viii. He is still repeating his gospel, with this new application of it to Gentile and Jew alike, but to the Gentile first.[2] And it seems hard not to recognize this same equality as present in the moral part of the epistle (chs. xii.–xv.) with the special reference, however, rather to the offending Gentile element in its liability to be enslaved again in its previous sinful life and in its present disposition to boast.[3] While, lastly, it would seem to account for his mention of the offering which he had gathered and was now about to take to the saints at Jerusalem. He brings that into the letter in order to show that practically he was not, and never had been, ignoring the Jew in his gospel work.[4]

But we are under duty now to enter upon the second stage of our problem's solving. We have apparently accounted for the peculiar character of our epistle by the theory which we have

[1] It is interesting to note how the elements of the apostle's argument in Gal. ii. 14, 17 (on the self-sufficient position of the Jew as over against the Gentile) reproduce themselves in chapter ii. 1, 13, of our epistle; and the elements of the argument, Gal. iii. 10 f., on the inability in the Jew to keep the law, reappears in chapter ii. 17, 24. Also how the elements of the apostle's statement in Gal. v. 3, (as to the slavery of circumcision) come out in the argument of chapter ii. 25–29.

[2] The inversion of this order in the specific statements of chapters i. 16 and ii. 10 has of course nothing to do with the general argument of chapters iv. to viii, and is readily accounted for in the contexts. On the other hand, see the reappearance of the idea of equality in chapter v. 12–19, which equality is not without a trace in the balance between chapters vi. and vii., the argument in chapter vi. being from a Gentile point of view (see vs. 12, 13, 19, 21, which seem to forbid the specific Jewish meaning of *law* in vs. 14), while that in chapter vii. is rather from the Jewish point of view (see vs. 1, 4, 12, 14, 22), while chapter viii. sums up both sides in the common conclusions (see combination of the spirit of chapters vi. and vii. in vs. 2–9, 12–15.)

[3] Cf. xii. 2, 3, 9 f., 16; xiii. 13, 14; xiv. 3, 5 f., 13–17, 19–23; xv. 1, 2, 5–7, while note the concluding passage, xv. 8–14, in its connection with the statement about the writing of the letter, vs. 15 f.

[4] If the above view be correct, it shows in plain light the inconsistency of the old Tübingen position. They rejected the books which showed a balance between Jew and Gentile as being due to *Tendenz*. They accepted Romans, and yet it shows a most evident balance. Why, then, if balance is apparent in other writings, should they not be just as genuinely Paul's as this?

advanced. We must now test that theory by the apostle's peculiar surroundings when he wrote the letter. Does it agree with them? In reply to this let us notice the following facts: Paul had finished his work in the East, and was in purpose now to begin it in the West. But his work in the East had been largely the struggle and victory of his gospel of Gentile Christianity. What gospel more acceptable to the Gentile Christian church—the Pauline Gentile Christian church of Rome? Where would it be more likely to be accepted with heartiness and propagated with zeal?[1] And what more likely than that just this zeal would be an injury to the truth, distort it by overpressing one side of it, hinder it by overburdening one part of it? What then was there for Paul to do but send in advance a clear exposition—not of his whole system of Christian truth, but of that particular part of it which had to do with the relation of these two elements of Jew and Gentile in the salvation plan? His gospel after all was bound up with the fact of the Jews, with their existence in the economy of redemption, with their preëminence in it in view of their covenant relation to God[2]—all of which this overwhelmingly Gentile church of Rome was in danger of underestimating and letting go by. So then our view of Paul's motive agrees with just the historical situation in which the apostle found himself at the letter's writing. This being the situation in which he was, this was exactly the sort of a letter we would expect him to write.

We do not present this view, of course, with the hope that it will satisfy those who have worked out other theories; but we believe it will satisfy many of the necessities in the epistle on which these theories have been worked out. It will account for the didactic cast given to the epistle; for the misunderstanding of the apostle's gospel into which the Gentile element of this church had fallen necessitated that the true principles of that gospel should be didactically presented to it. It will account for what polemic tone there may be in certain portions of the letter; for the attitude which this Gentile element had assumed towards the Jewish element was one that needed to be opposed and very de-

[1] See Weiss' hints at this very situation of affairs. *Com.*, p. 20, § 2.

[2] See this in the epistle's theme, chap. i. 16, 17.

cidedly rebuked. It will account for the apologetic attitude which the apostle assumes in his writing; for the apostle's future work throughout the West was in the balance, and a removing of prejudices and a correcting of misinterpretations was necessary if that work was to be saved from hindering interference. At the same time, also, this view offers an explanation—whether the right one or not we are willing to leave to the criticism of others—of the peculiarities in the epistle which none of these theories wholly cover. It is well enough for Godet to say that this letter presents, in writing, the course of instruction which Paul was accustomed to give in other churches by word of mouth.[1] But how does that touch the selection of views which the letter has gathered into its instruction, and the strangeness of the way in which they are presented? It is right enough to say, with the Weizäcker school, that the attitude which the apostle has assumed in his epistle is one of hostility to opposing views.[2] But how does that account for his attitude being against the Gentile rather than the Jewish element? It is all proper to hold, as has been done so generally since Theodore Schott suggested it, that it was an apologetic idea which the apostle had in sending the letter ahead of his own coming.[3] But how does that explain the peculiarity of the church's Gentile attitude towards that work and the necessity of the apostle's restraining attitude against it?

In our opinion, Weiss is the one to whom is due, in largest measure, the credit of turning the critics in the right direction. He has shown that, if the epistle is to be lifted up to its rightful level, it is not by holding any one of the old line views, but by allowing to enter into the epistle's purpose the situation in which the apostle found himself at the letter's writing, namely, at the turning point between his finished work in the East, and his untried work in the West; and also the position of the church to which he was writing, namely, the position of influence and power for all this

[1] *Com.*, p. 56–58.

[2] See specially Grafe's brochure, *Ueber Veranlassung u. Zweck des Römerbriefes*, 1881.

[3] See his *Römerbrief seinem Endzweck u. Gedankengang nach ausgelegt*, 1858.

western world and all this untried work. So that it became an easily natural thing for him to write this epistle, which should place before his people his gospel in its world-wide meaning for Jew as well as Gentile—a gospel which knew no party in the church.[1] This is undoubtedly a point of view which cannot critically be ignored. But the question remains, why did Paul present to this world-important church of Rome his Jew and Gentile embracing gospel? We feel it is inadequate to answer, as Weiss does, that Paul wanted this great church to be the representative to all future time of an undivided Christianity. This gives the spirit of the letter, a dignified spirit we admit, well fitting the circumstances of its composition; but it is not the spirit of the letter for which we are searching.[2] What we want is the specific purpose for which the letter was written, and which lay behind its general spirit. The question is: What was the definite object which the apostle had before him in view of the condition of affairs in the church at Rome?[3] We believe this question is answered by the view which we have tried, however imperfectly, to present—the correcting of the attitude of the Gentile element in the church. And if it accomplishes nothing in the future study of the epistle beyond bringing this element into a more careful consideration, assigning it, at least, a more definite place in the church's position towards the apostle, and a more decided part in the apostle's thought towards the church, we will be satisfied.

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[1] *Kom.* pp. 31–33. *Einl.*, pp. 233–235.

[2] The fact is, this general spirit of an undivided Christianity may be said to have been present in most of Paul's letters, though not in the same significant way as in the epistles of his captivity and in this epistle to Rome. See especially 1 Cor. xii., xvi.; 2 Cor. xiii.

[3] Holtzmann shows this in the advance which he makes upon Weiss' view. See his *Einl.*, pp. 240, 241. See also Hilgenfeld's article in *Zeitschrift für Wiss. Theol.*, quoted above. And Lipsius, *Einl.* to his *Kom. über d. Römerbrief.*

III. THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION IN UNIVERSITIES.

A university, according to the generally accepted definition of the name, "is a universal school, in which are taught all branches of learning, or the four faculties of theology, medicine, law, and the sciences and arts." Such were the great universities of the middle ages, those of Paris, Oxford, Cambridge, and others. Such are the universities of modern Europe, of Germany, England and Scotland, and such is the plan upon which those institutions in America which call themselves universities are projected, though they may not all be able to work out the plan thoroughly, owing to circumstances peculiar to our own country. In those institutions which are established and controlled by the state, the theological faculty is omitted, as in the Universities of Virginia and Michigan. In those which are under denominational control, or which at least profess to bear a distinctive religious character, such as Harvard, Yale, Vanderbilt, Cumberland, and Sewanee, the theological faculty is accorded a place of special importance.

No one has ever seen fit to question the propriety of attaching the faculties of law and medicine to the university. Even religious institutions seek to enhance their importance and usefulness by founding or adopting such schools. Sometimes, it is true, the connection is merely nominal, there being neither local proximity nor direct control on the part of the parent institution; yet the idea of the university, it is thought, necessarily implies such an appendage. And it does seem to be reasonable that, if the church undertakes to direct the work of education at all, she should seek to exercise an elevating and sanctifying influence upon the higher class of studies, those which bear most directly upon the preparation for the active duties of life, and that she should seek to guard against materialism and infidelity in those professions which are so influential for good or evil, and so necessary to the existence and welfare of society. There is also something agreeable to the mind in that unity of purpose, of plan and of

result in a system of education which finds its visible expression in a great university, infusing a common spirit, and that a sanctified spirit, into all the various branches of human learning. Nor is it a matter of inferior importance that all the sons of the church, in preparing themselves for the several walks of life, should receive their education in the same institution, and thus feel themselves bound to one another by the bonds of a common maternity and a common brotherhood, and that intermingling with one another up to the very time when their paths diverge into their various occupations, they may form those affectionate relations which can never be entirely dissolved. Surely this would tend to prevent the narrowness, prejudices, and exclusiveness of the professional spirit now so common, and except for such influences as these, almost unavoidable.

Now, is it not strange that, while the importance of these considerations is universally admitted, and as far as possible acted upon, the education of the candidates for the ministry should be thought to constitute an exception? that while lawyers and doctors and scientists and men destined for all other occupations should as far as possible be educated together, and go out to their work acquainted with each other, in harmony with each other, ready to coöperate with each other in all the common interests of society and of the church, the ministry, which should be the least exclusive of all professions, the most human and many-sided in its sympathies, intended to interest and influence all classes, must be educated alone, shut off to themselves as if they would be contaminated by contact with other youth, or as if the purpose was to educate them out of all sympathy with their kind? This system would be much more in harmony with Romanism than with Presbyterianism. By those unacquainted with the history of our church it might be thought to be the outgrowth of that principle of the essential distinction of the clergy and the laity which so soon appeared in the early church, and which has been such a fruitful source of error ever since. To this principle is due the celibacy of the clergy, monasticism, priestly power, and the hierarchy. This system of education, however, is an anomaly in Presbyterianism, which

seeks to draw together the ministry and the people instead of separating them. Whatever tends to educate the ministry away from the people, to hinder a thorough identity of interest and sympathy between them, is unpresbyterian and a hindrance to our usefulness as a church. How often do we hear it said that Presbyterian ministers do not reach the people, and that they are surpassed in this important qualification for their work by men of inferior gifts and culture. Indeed, their defect in this particular is sometimes wrongly attributed to their excessive literary culture, to too much education. Should it not rather be attributed to their wrong method of education? Many a minister looks back with regret to his three years' seclusion within the walls of a theological seminary because he discovers there the fostering causes of his social timidity, his awkwardness, his inability to adapt himself to general society and to sympathize with the feelings and habits of thought of all sorts of people. His associates during that time were those of a single class, whose subjects of thought, experiences, characters, and expectations were essentially the same. Under such influences his own character becomes to a certain extent stereotyped in a form alien to that of the people at large. This would not have been true if he had been educated in contact with the great variety of characters which are represented in a school of general as well as religious learning. There is a certain flavor of monasticism pervading the air of a theological seminary which is not found in a university. The evils thus described are subtle and intangible, but they are not imaginary. The writer remembers to have heard at least one of his cotemporaries in the seminary say that during his three years' connection with the institution he had never entered a family or spoken to a lady, all his associates being his fellow recluses. Such a training would furnish a very unsuitable preparation for the office of pastor or evangelist. No doubt any system of education implies more or less seclusion from general society, hence all the greater reason why the associations of academic life should be as free as possible from the narrowing influences of caste. Let them be such as shall enlarge rather than contract the social nature.

These considerations seem to us of great importance. And yet, there are those who find fault with an earnest, and, it may be added, a successful, effort which has been making for several years to educate ministers for the Presbyterian Church in a seminary which is operated under the charter of a university, as if it were a dangerous novelty.

But whatever may be said about it, the plan is not a novelty. The historic method of theological education has ever been in connection with schools of general learning. The separate theological seminary is a modern and exclusively an American idea. Such an institution was never known until after the beginning of the present century. The first theological school of which we read in church history was the celebrated institute in Alexandria, in Egypt, in which Clement and Origen were the most eminent teachers. It grew out of a parochial school intended for the instruction of catechumens, or candidates for membership in the church; but became, especially under Origen, a seminary of secular as well as sacred learning, and was frequented by Jews, heathens, and Gnostic heretics, many of whom were there led to embrace the gospel. The principal universities of Europe anterior to the Reformation originated in the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and were schools of both secular and theological instruction. In them the great philosophical theologians, the schoolmen, great notwithstanding their defects and errors, taught. In them, the great Reformers, Wickliffe and Huss, taught. It was in such an institution that Luther began his great work. The clergy of the English Church have always received their training in the universities. The men who constituted the celebrated Westminister Assembly, and drew up our Confession of Faith and Catechisms were, with few exceptions, graduates of Oxford and Cambridge. The Presbyterian, John Howe, and the Independent, John Owen, were from these institutions. The Scotch Presbyterians knew nothing of theological seminaries distinct from the universities until the seceding bodies borrowed the American plan. It is very easy to see why *they* established separate theological schools and not universities. They had no need for the latter class of institutions, there was no place for them. The *national* uni-

versities were accessible to them, were ample in their provisions for all, and were unexceptionable as schools of secular learning. It was only necessary to provide for the training of their own ministry under their own care, and to place their schools in close proximity to one of the universities, to which their students might have access without restrictions. Coming to this country, we find that all the earlier schools of theology were in connection with universities or colleges. In the course of time, however, this combination was abandoned for separate theological seminaries, except in a few cases, such as Harvard and Yale. For this departure from the historic method of theological education, no adequate reason can be discovered, except such as arose from the force of circumstances. In some cases, no doubt, the funds of the colleges were insufficient to support a theological faculty. This was true of Oakland College in Mississippi, in connection with which an effort was made to establish a divinity school for the Southwest. After being successfully conducted for several years, during which time a number of able and useful ministers were graduated, the experiment was abandoned because of the loss of the endowment in the financial reverses of 1837 and 1838. In other cases it was impossible to secure the sufficient support of the church in favor of any one out of a number of rival institutions. And in others, the charters under which the colleges were operated did not give to the church that absolute control which would be necessary in an institution intended for the training of her ministers. But there seems to be no evidence that the establishment of separate theological seminaries was the result of a conviction that the older system was faulty.

The advocates of the university system have argued that the connection of its professors with a broader range of studies would in some measure counteract the well-known tendency of specialists to take one-sided views of truth and thus run into errors. On the other hand, a distinguished writer upon this subject in a recent number of the QUARTERLY[1] has undertaken to show by a historical review that, in fact, a greater number of heresies have

[1] PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY, April, 1892.

originated in the university than in the seminary, which is, no doubt, true for the simple reason that the university system has been in use for centuries, and still widely prevails everywhere except in America, while seminaries are of recent origin and are comparatively few in number. In regard to the perversion of Harvard from the orthodox faith, and the eccentric theology of Yale, especially cited by the writer, both of these facts may be accounted for as we account for the errors of the Union Seminary, New York; that is, by the absence of an efficient church control. The independent form of church government does not afford any efficient guard to the orthodoxy of its schools or its ministry.

The establishment of the Southwestern Presbyterian University in the city of Clarksville, Tenn., with a Divinity School as one of its constituent parts, has furnished the occasion for the discussion, before the courts of the church and by the religious press, of the comparative merits of the two methods of theological education treated of in this paper. It was a cherished idea of the late Dr. J. A. Lyon, of Columbus, Miss., to unite the whole Southern Presbyterian Church in the founding and support of a great university at some central point in our territory. It was his hope that with a patronage and endowments derived from so large and wealthy a constituency, an institution might be established equal in its equipment to any in the land, and in which all other academies and colleges in connection with our Southern Church might find their complement and crown. It was a grand conception, and met with considerable favor, but was found to be impracticable and was abandoned. This, however, suggested another plan both desirable and practicable. Looking over the States of the southwest at the close of the war, it was found that there was no Presbyterian college in a high state of efficiency between the southern border of Kentucky and the Rio Grande. La Grange and Oakland had perished; King, Austin, and Stewart, were struggling for existence. Then it was that the plan was conceived of uniting the whole southwestern church in the support of an institution, which, without interfering with local or synodical enterprises, would furnish facilities for the higher education, both academic and professional, accessible to all. Committees of conference and co-

operation were appointed by the Synods of Alabama, Arkansas, Memphis, Mississippi, Nashville, and Texas, to consider the whole subject and devise a plan for the establishment of such an institution. The result of their deliberations was the founding of the Southwestern Presbyterian University, and the selection of Clarksville as its seat. The names of the men who constituted the original board of directors will be regarded as a sufficient guaranty that their action was not hasty or ill-considered, either in the decision to which they came, or in the plans by which it was carried into effect. They were Rev. C. A. Stillman, D. D., and T. A. Hamilton, Esq., of the Synod of Alabama; Rev. T. R. Welch, D. D., and Rev. E. McNair, of the Synod of Arkansas; Rev. J. N. Waddel, D. D., LL. D., and Hon. B. M. Estes, of the Synod of Memphis; Rev. B. M. Palmer, D. D., LL. D., and Rev. Joseph B. Stratton, D. D., of the Synod of Mississippi; Rev. J. B. Shearer, D. D., and D. N. Kennedy, Esq., of the Synod of Nashville; and Rev. W. K. Marshall, D. D., and D. McGregor, Esq., (afterwards Rev.) of the Synod of Texas. They were a body of eminently wise and intelligent men, thoroughly acquainted with the wants of the southwest, and thoroughly conversant with the principles and practical details of the whole subject of education. Their action was cordially approved by their respective synods. The Synod of Texas, having undertaken a few years later to establish a theological school of their own, and becoming more deeply interested in the brightening prospects of Austin College, very naturally and properly withdrew from the active management of the university which they had helped to establish, in order to concentrate their efforts upon their synodical institution. But there was never any indication given that they ceased to approve the plan upon which the university was constructed. The other synods have never ceased to reiterate from year to year their expressions of interest and approval, and when recently earnest efforts have been made to induce then to adandon their cherished enterprise and join in the establishment of a separate theological seminary, they declined, not merely because they were pledged to the one, but because they preferred it to the other, deliberately preferred it after an experience of seven years. In this prefer-

ence they have the endorsement of some of the leading minds of the church, not members of these synods, who have made this whole matter of ministerial education a subject of profound thought. We cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of giving, in this connection, an extract from a letter of the most eminent living theologian of this country, Rev. Dr. R. L. Dabney, which has already appeared in print.

"The great Reformed churches of the Reformation era," he says, "none of them adopted the plan of educating their pastors in separate professional schools like our theological seminaries. They are an American invention, and, indeed, of congregational devisement, imitated by the Presbyterians, first by Dr. John M. Mason, and then at Princeton. The parent churches all preferred the plan of educating their pastors in the same Christian academies and universities in which other children of the church pursued their studies. I have never been certain that our plan was wiser than theirs; obvious advantages and economies of labor might be found in the old continental plan. And for many years I have felt convinced that one of the large mistakes made by the directors of Hampden-Sydney and Union Seminary in Virginia, is their failing so to affiliate their courses of instruction as to make them, combined, a university course. There are endowments buildings and teachers enough there to-day, and of sufficient talent and scholarship, if combined, to fill before the public eye the place of a great university and to do its work. Insulated from each other, they present to the public the aspect of two small institutions; and the learning and teaching ability of the theological faculty is confined to the theological students—a peculiar and insulated class, discounted by the press and public from general attention, so as to make no general impression for the truth on the mind of the country. Many other wastes of energy and ability flow from our present arrangements. You may judge, then, how entirely my way of thinking concurs with that adopted by the Southwestern Presbyterian University, in resolving to have, as a part of the university, and in strict affiliation with the other departments of the university, a theological department. It is precisely the experiment which I wish to see tried somewhere."

At the first formal meeting of the directors, a constitution and by-laws were drawn up in which it was provided, "that at the proper period in the progress of the university, the directors shall enlarge the scope of its operations by adding to the system departments of professional education, Theology, Law and Medicine." In 1885, it was judged by the board, that the time had come to make the first step in this advance, and the Divinity School was organized with four professors. The endowments of the university, together with a special fund raised for the purpose, enabled the board to make this enlargement without any violent strain. From that time the Divinity school has moved on *pari*

passu with the other departments of the university, growing in efficiency and in the favor of God's people, and accomplishing results fully as great as the most sanguine could have reasonably expected. Students completing their course in the academic department of the university and passing into the Divinity School, have furnished a regular supply of recruits from year to year, while a goodly number have come from other institutions, attracted by the peculiar features of the system. At the end of every collegiate year, the university has sent out its contribution to the ranks of the ministry, and has been gratified to know that these young men have been pronounced by the Presbyteries examining them the peers of the graduates of any institutions in the church. If the tree is to be judged by its fruits, the friends of the university have no reason to feel that their system is not a good one. "Men do not gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles."

It has been represented by some ignorant of the truth, or prejudiced against it, that because such a Divinity School is a *department* of the university and not an independent institution, it is necessarily a second rate and insignificant concern. But why should it be? Will not the same number of professors of equal learning, ability and fidelity, teaching the same course of study, accomplish the same results? There are as many professors in the Divinity School of the Southwestern Presbyterian University as there are in the seminaries of Union and Columbia, and it is the purpose of the directors to keep abreast, in this respect, with the foremost institutions in our church. But, they say, it is a mere *department.* Does any one object to the law school of the University of Virginia, one of the most celebrated in the land, that it is a mere department? The professors and students in the Divinity School of the Southwestern Presbyterian University sustain precisely the same relation to that institution that the professors and students of the Law school of the University of Virginia sustain to that institution. The one are members of the University faculty, and the others are members of the student body and subject to the laws of the university; that is all.

It is thought by others that the object of the university plan is to shorten the course of study. This is not true. Under the present arrangement of the only institution of the Southern Church

in which the historic system is in operation, the *time* is shortened but not the course of study; the time is shortened by lengthening the session and shortening the vacations, by omitting the weekly holidays, and by devoting more time during the academic course to the study of the English Scriptures than is usual in other institutions. But nothing could be further from the purpose of the directors than to shorten the course of study in the theological department, or in any way lower the standard of preparation for the ministry; on the contrary they hope to render the preparation more complete by affording opportunities for special study. Even the present two years' arrangement is not essential to the system, and may be changed whenever it is thought best to do so. But so far it has worked well, and under it the students gain one year in time, and the church is saved one-third of the expense of educating a candidate for the ministry. Another mistake as to the advantages of the university system made by those who are not familiar with its working is, that they are valuable only to a certain class of students, who, beginning their preparation for the ministry comparatively late in life, have only a limited time to devote to it. It is true that such combinations of studies may thus be made as will enable young men of mature years and defective academic training to repair somewhat their deficiences while pursuing their theological studies. This class of candidates for the ministry is becoming more and more numerous every year, but no suitable provision is made for their peculiar needs in the seminaries. By entering the university and taking a three years' course, they may devote part of their time to the pursuit of those academic studies which have a special bearing on their professional studies. Some of our best men decide to enter the ministry comparatively late in life, and no doubt many more would come to this decision if they knew of some means by which they could, in part at least, repair the deficiencies of their early education, without consuming too much time. We think that the provision made for this class of students by the university system is of very great advantage, especially in view of the urgent need of an increase of ministers. But at the same time it should be understood that this *is only an incidental feature in the system*, and that such combinations of studies are not re-

commended to those who are not too far advanced in life to take their academic degrees, and then pass on into the Divinity School.

The advantages of theological education in universities may be summed up as follows:

1. *The economy of means.* It costs far less to maintain such a combination of schools than separate institutions. The buildings, libraries, appliances, endowments of the university, constitute the support of the theological school. The amount of money necessary to found and conduct both a college and a seminary, if combined in one, would give the church an institution of incomparably greater respectability and usefulness.

2. *The economy of men.* Our colleges as well as our seminaries take many of our best men from the active duties of the ministry. It is unavoidable. For some branches of instruction they are specially qualified by their professional studies, while it is also desirable to have their moral and religious influence in the training of young men. But the church can ill spare them from the appropriate work of the ministry. In the university, the number of ministers required may be greatly lessened because the labors and influence of those engaged in theological instruction may be enjoyed by the whole institution.

3. *The wholesome effect upon the students of a literary institution of the presence of and their daily intercourse with such a body of Christian young men as are found in our theological schools.* They are young men of literary culture already, they are exemplary models of good order and diligence and Christian living. Their influence cannot but be powerfully felt in elevating the tone of college life, and leading many to Christ. Moreover, most of our educated young men make their choice of a profession while at college, and it is natural to suppose that the existence of a theological school at their side would be the means of leading many to adopt the ministry.

4. *The influence upon the theological students themselves of association with other young men not pursuing the same line of study and work.* The effect of this will be to prevent that contracted professional spirit which is apt to be engendered by the opposite system, to give a broader culture, and a more practical character to their preparation for the work of the gospel ministry.

Robert Price.

IV. PRESBYTERIANISM IN HISTORY.[1]

In the discussion of Presbyterianism in history, the time I have allotted to myself will not enable me to present anything more than a mere outline of the subject. The magnitude of the matter only becomes apparent when we find that through the centuries the subject is inseparably blended with momentous struggles in this and in foreign lands. The subject is all the more difficult to treat as we find how insidiously in the far past error germinated side by side with truth, and, by gradual steps downward, widened into its destructive forces, and how in rendering unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that God's, so much of the spirit of the gospel has been sunk out of sight.

It is well known that of the churches planted by the apostles, no one assumed, as of right, authority and discipline over any other. Elders or those most in repute were elected by the people as overseers of the flocks. Churches by the agency of these elders consulted and determined for the general good. But we notice as the years went by, and the religion of the meek and lowly Nazarene made inroads on the decaying institutions of Paganism, a discussion arose as to the authority and power of this elder, presbyter, or bishop. It is certain as a historical fact from the decided weight of authorities, even outside of the word of God, that these terms, bishop, presbyter, and elder were at first regarded synonymous.

One was not supposed to be superior to the other or to relate to a different office. Except a peremptory refusal to engage in idolatrous worship, the early churches had no connection with affairs of state. A dangerous, but perhaps not unnatural, pride found its way into those churches, which, from one cause or another, had endured and suffered most for the faith. Chief among these was the church established at Rome. This was one of the very

[1] Read before the Presbytery of Transylvania, September 7, 1892, and published at their request.

first primitive churches, and its early history is involved in obscurity. It was flourishing before Paul and Peter came to Italy. Here the Christians had confronted the Cæsars, the masters of the world. Here it was said Peter had been crucified and Paul beheaded. Here, clad in the skins of wild beasts and covered with pitch, the followers of Christ had been burned to illuminate the Emperor Nero's garden. Here the Christians had been thrown into the Coliseum to appease the hunger of the wild beasts. Notwithstanding all, the church flourished, when in the fourth century it completed its conquest of Paganism and became, as a political arrangement, the religion of the Roman state.

Was it not natural that the elder, presbyter, or bishop of Rome should claim that he should be treated with superior respect and reverence? We find that what was by other churches conceded to the Roman Church as of favor and not of right in the long ages that followed, ripened into the claim of legal supremacy, viz.: that the presbyter or bishop of Rome was of divine right the supreme bishop of all the churches, and finally the vicar of Christ on earth. It was the labor of centuries to fasten this dangerous error on the world. It is not necessary or proper that we should follow the checkered history of this Roman Church, as, full of earthly honors, rich and prosperous, it drifted away from the pure doctrines and practices of the apostles. It is cheering, however, to remember there never was a time in the history of the world when the lofty claims of the bishop of Rome in all of the religious tenets of his church were conceded by the entire Christian world. We find all along now and then a feeble and unextinguished spark of the pure faith of the primitive times.

In its temporal consequences we will not say that the unfounded claim of supremacy of the church at Rome was wholly for evil to the world. Through the period of the dark ages, its monasteries, convents, and churches became receptacles for classical learning that otherwise might have perished. The rigors of the feudal system were checked, and the ferocity of manners softened by the ecclesiastical authority of this church. A discipline that may be commended for one age may become a curse in the next.

The sixteenth century dawned on the world and found the

Roman Church well nigh in possession, temporally and spiritually, of the civilized world. She had abated none of her lofty claims. Kings and princes were practically at her feet. The thunders of the Vatican hill could shake to its centre and imperil the existence of any government, institution or order on the globe. The proudest kings of the earth hardly dared to disobey any command or request of the Roman See. While externally the Church of Rome possessed all the insignia and substance of power, she internally had the elements of weakness and decay. She had become corrupt in her practices beyond all example. It is surprising how through ages error will ruin and be accepted as law and gospel. It goes on until its very magnitude destroys its cohesion.

God's time had come for the human mind to take a new departure. It is puerile to say the Reformation was the work of Luther or that of any other man. He was but an humble instrument in the great uprising of the smothered human intellect.

Prior to the sixteenth century, the long domination of the Roman Church in state affairs had disciplined the human mind into a conception of the objects and purposes of the civil government somewhat like this: All is of God, and the Roman bishop is God's representative on earth. The civil government must be deemed a dependence of the Roman Church, and should as its agent define and enforce religious faith Nor is this to be wondered at when we remember that as late as fifty years ago the Hon. W. E. Gladstone in England published a book in which the lofty claim of the state to define religious faith by act of parliament is defended. It is well known that Mr. Gladstone commenced his political life as a Tory of the first water. He has lived to see the day when he thought it right to disestablish the English Church in Ireland. The civil government had, therefore, the legitimate purpose, as it was said, to define and enforce by pains and penalties the religious faith of the individual, and the church stood by as master over the civil power and primarily defined that religious faith, and saw to it that the civil government had it obeyed. It is mournful to remember what in the ages gone by grew out of this unholy alliance of church and

state. On the dark background of this coalition is the lurid profile of the Inquisition—the wail of famine and death from the beleaguered cities of the Netherlands, the cry of suffering and death from the Waldensians in the valleys of the Alps, and the torrents of blood shed in the massacre of St. Bartholomew.

When the great religious movement known as the Reformation stirred the religious world, it is necessary that we should only allude to its effects on the kingdoms bordering on the German Ocean. The kings of England had, for generations back, been refractory sons of the Church of Rome. Henry VIII. was one of the most hardheaded of men, and when his divorce of Catherine was not sanctioned by Rome he raised the banner of revolt. There was no religion in the matter as far as the king was concerned. The whole of it was that, come what might, he determined to have his own way—to break with the Church of Rome and be his own pope. That object attained, he had no further objection to the Roman Catholic Church if it would just let him alone. He died more of a Catholic than a Protestant. His will required that masses be said for the repose of his soul. His parliament was wholly subservient to him, and the stand taken by the king against Rome shaped the course of his courtiers, nobles and time-serving subjects. It is a fact that the religious principles that actuated such men as Luther, Calvin and Knox made in their time no lasting impression on England, except on the despised sect of Puritans. English statesmen shifted about for a compromise, and they secured it in the establishment by act of Parliament of the Church of England. This church had Calvinism in its creed, a ritualism that savored of Romanism, and a church government that exalted the office of bishop as one of divine right. Rome had not gone any farther than this as to the office of bishop. Elizabeth, the daughter of Henry VIII., was never a stringent Protestant. Circumstances were such she could not be a Catholic, as it would have been her political ruin. For her to be a Catholic was to acknowledge that she herself was illegitimate, and her dangerous rival, the Queen of Scots, was rightful heir to the throne of England. So, with unsparing and impartial hands, she persecuted Catholics and Protestant Non-conformists alike. Both were out

of sympathy with her religion and her arbitrary conduct. It is to her credit that she was not willing for any foreign goverment to interfere. She claimed a monopoly in the persecution business. This English Church was a patched up compromise of the principles of the Reformation—a comfortable half-way house on the road to Rome. Its architect was the supple and time-serving Archbishop Cranmer. This church, in its birth, commanded the sincere respect of no one, but its adherents made it useful, in more ways than one, as the years went by.

In Scotland the case was radically different. Early in the centuries had Rome well-nigh made a spiritual conquest of this country. It had dotted the land over with convents, monasteries, and Gothic churches. It was filled with monks, nuns, abbots, and other orders of the Roman Church. Nowhere in Europe, in the lives of these people, was religion so dishonored. The clergy had become a hissing and by-word to the common people. To add to this, for fifty years next before the sixteenth century, and for the first half of it, Scotland was about the worst governed country in Europe. The nobles were unruly and turbulent, and the clergy for the most part corrupt, and the common people poor and uneducated, but singularly obstinate and unbending in their opinions. They had but little to love in the administration of governmental affairs, or in the church, but they clung with singular devotion to the banks and braes and bleak hills of their native land. When the ferment of the Reformation extended to Scotland, a deep and earnest opposition was made to the doctrine and practices of Rome. That church became to the Scotch the Iliad of all their woes. This brings us face to face with one of the most high and remarkable men of that age. John Knox was born in the fourth year of the sixteenth century. He was educated for the Roman Catholic priesthood. There is no one circumstance in his life that we can recall that turned him to join the revolt. He carefully studied the points at issue, and when forty years of age, at a small gathering of reformers at St. Andrews, in a short speech he fully gave his adhesion to their cause. This man has been in his grave in St. Giles' church-yard in Edinburgh more than three hundred years, but the world has never give him his full measure

of justice. It is the fashion now in some quarters to speak sneeringly of him and his life-work. Surely he did not oppose Rome from motives of worldly preferment or honor. He could have yielded, he could have made lowly obeisance to the queen of Scotland, and to her uncle, Cardinal Lorraine, and to the Guises of France; in other words, he could have stifled his conscience into a living lie, and become a tool; and there was no honor or preferment in the gift of Scotch royalty that he could not have had for the taking. He chose to be true to his convictions and leave results with God, and a stormy life he had, serving as convict on French galleys for complicity in a murder he was never guilty of,—an exile in foreign lands,—shot at from ambush,—hiding in Scotch hills with a price on his head; all went roughly with him. So high an authority as the historian Hume speaks of him as a rustic apostle, a turbulent and insolent ecclesiastic. This much of Hume's charge is true. Knox was not rustic, turbulent or insolent. He was a true man to his convictions. He had a profound knowledge of human nature, and of those with whom he had to deal. It was not possible for them to deceive him. He had a blunt way of calling things by their true names. It was no time for fine words or grace of manner. Possibly it is to be regretted he was not more courtly in his interviews with the queen. We admit her youth, beauty, and varied accomplishments, but John Knox knew very well that no faith could be put in her or her promises. He knew that she had been raised at the court of France, under the tutelage of the Guises and Lorraines, her kins-people, and had married a son of Catherine De Medici. He knew that these people directed her councils, and not her Scotch subjects. He knew these French bigots believed in assassination as a sovereign and legitimate remedy to check the Reformation. He knew the bloody Duke of Alva, and her uncles and mother-in-law had advised her to carry out in Scotland the principles of the infamous treaty of Bayonne, that provided for the massacre of St. Bartholomew; that she had written to the council of Trent; that she hoped soon to make Scotland all Catholic. He knew that it was expected she would carry out the bloody purpose of the treaty named. He knew very well she thought no faith should be kept with heretics.

He knew that, by means fair or foul, she would, if possible, crush the Reformation in Scotland. He knew that Elizabeth of England had been deposed by the pope, and her assassination advised. It was, therefore, simply impossible for such a man as Knox to do otherwise than he did. His words fell on the royal ear like thunderbolts, but as we read them now they were neither turbulent nor insolent, nor do they savor of the rustic apostle. They are solemn, plain and to the point. Said he, to the queen, "Madame, if princes exceed their just bounds, doubtless they may be resisted by force." Strange, and at that time unheard of, words for the rustic apostle to speak in the face of a queen with the blood royal of the Tudors of England, and of the Guises, Lorraines, and Medicis of France flowing in her veins, and yet those words are the basis of civil and religious liberty in every land, the last resort of a struggling and oppressed people to conserve and perpetuate the inalienable rights of man. For those words, if for nothing more, the world owes Knox a debt of gratitude.

When we remember that the decided weight of history points to the beautiful queen as a woman who in after years was an accomplice in the murder of her husband, and in three months thereafter married the murderer and was afterwards found in a conspiracy to murder her cousin, the queen of England, it is almost certain that the worst that John Knox imagined of the Scotch queen was true.

With many faults and errors, right manfully did he do battle for his native land. It was his life-work that he saved Scotland to freedom and free institutions. "Here lies a man who never feared the face of man," said the Regent Morton, as he lowered Knox into his grave. Since then the genius and worth of the sons of Scotland have made her famous. The land of the mountain and the flood has a fame world-wide, and all this, we do not hesitate to say, is in great measure the result of the life and labors of John Knox.

Of a kindred spirit with John Knox was John Calvin. He was five years the younger of the two. In his exile Knox lived for a time with Calvin at Geneva. Whatever may be said of

Calvin it was his glory to have systematized the principles of the Reformation, and organized its ecclesiastical discipline. He was a profound student of the word of God, and of the writings of St. Augustine, and his system of doctrines became, what it has continued to be to this day, the very backbone of the Reformation. We think it can be shown that to-day eight-tenths of the Protestants in the world adhere to the doctrines systematized by Calvin from the Bible and St. Augustine. Knox carried from Geneva to Scotland Calvin's principles of doctrine and discipline, and went to work to organize the reformers in his native country. His return from Geneva marks the beginning of the final triumph of his cause. What he distinctively contended for was Christ, the true and only head of the church, the parity of the clergy and the right of every congregation to a voice in the election of its officers. When we remember that in his time the State assumed to define and enforce religious truth, there was a direct revolt against the lofty pretensions of ecclesiastical tyranny, and here were the elementary principles of republican government. Calvin's *Institutes* has made a greater impression on the world than any book written since Mohammed penned the Koran. The pen of that apostle of civil and religious liberty was a greater menace to the despots of Europe than would have been a million of armed men.

In the providence of God John Knox did not live to see the full triumph of his labors. He died in the very year that in France the relatives and friends of the queen of Scotland on St. Bartholomew's day slaughtered the Presbyterians by the thousands.

All the conflicting claims to the throne of England were united in James I., son of Queen Mary of Scotland. It was unfortunate that this monarch entertained all the lofty ideas of kingly power that his predecessors had. He firmly believed in the divine right of kings to rule as they pleased. He was a learned man after a fashion, but his learning came to be his curse. He was a vain pedant, a religious intermeddler. Somebody truly said of him that he was the wisest fool in Europe. He had in his character scarcely a single element going into the make-up of a good or wise ruler, not a virtue that was not contaminated with a neighboring vice. He was scarcely seated on his throne when Ireland came to

the front with one of its usual rebellions. The O'Neills had rebelled under Elizabeth and she had forgiven them, and this leniency was, with the hotheaded natives, construed into fear and weakness on the part of England. The leaders of this last rebellion, the great earls Hugh O'Neill and Rory O'Donnell, who lived in the Ulster province in the north of the country, were put under the ban of attainder and outlawry, and by law their domains become forfeited to the crown. In 1605 they fled the country. The deserted district was peopled by a London company chartered by the crown. By the management of the king the colonists came chiefly from the lowlands of Scotland, from the counties where the Reformation had taken deepest hold, and where Knox and Melville had ever found their most devoted friends. These colonists became renters and not fee-simple title-holders of the land. Ulster, where the emigrants settled, comprised some six counties, and the forfeited lands were some 2,000,000 acres, 500,000 of which were occupied by the new Scotch colonists. It was a wilderness of dreary mountains overshadowing bogs and swamps. By the labors and enterprise of the colonists the district was transformed into the seats of thriving towns, fair fields and smiling gardens. Their chief city was named Derry. The colonists carried with them into their new homes, industry, frugality and unbending firmness of character. This forfeiture and colonization scheme cut deeply into the native pride. The Irish looked on their new neighbors as interlopers. The colonists or Ulster men (Scotch-Irish as we call them) looked with contempt on the natives they had so rapidly outstripped in prosperity. The curse of the Celt was answered by the scorn of the Scot. This bitter feeling is still alive and a power. Even now the scorn of a Derry Orangeman is as sharp and cutting as it was two centuries ago. The Boyne Water has never been avenged, and the thistle and bagpipe still wave defiance to the Shamrock and the Harp of Tara.

It is a fact that King James, himself a Scotchman, prided himself on his colonization scheme, and was careful to have the best of his Scotch people to make the experiment of redeeming Ulster, then the wildest, most savage and disorderly district in Ireland. It was his solution of the chronic troubles of that unhappy coun-

try. So to Ireland the Scotchman came, a stranger among strangers. In after years the colony became reinforced by Puritans from England, Huguenots from France, and Hollanders from the Netherlands. Nine-tenths of the colonists were Presbyterians. Ulster became a hive of activity and progress. To-day forty-six per cent. of the entire revenues from Ireland are paid by Ulster The king, as we have said, was, in the worse sense of the word, a religious pedant. So the royal blue-stocking, by the aid of his bishops and at their instance, went to work to cast out of Ulster the accursed Geneva heresy, as he called it. He could not see why everybody did not have his notions of government and religion, and why his colonists could not all be Episcopalians, while for himself he would lovingly lean toward the Roman Catholics. The secret of the king's apparent inconsistent conduct is this: The Ulster Presbyterians were unbending enemies of arbitrary power, and on this score the king had nothing to fear from the Catholics or Episcopalians.

He said, when he fitted up at Edinburgh the royal palace of Holyrood, that the bishops must rule the people, and the king, by divine right, must rule the bishops. For the most obvious reasons, reasons of bread and butter, pride, power, the bishops of the Established Church have ever been on the side of the crown in contests for the liberties of the subject. In England they have never been the friends of the rights of man. It was reserved for the despised Puritans by the sharp logic of powder and ball to fashion the English Constitution into a decent respect for the principles of freedom.

The king had permitted, under the superintendence of Dr. James Usher, in 1615, the colonists to frame their Confession of Faith. It embodied the principles of Presbyterianism as they have been in every land. It asserted strongly the morality of the Sabbath, and clearly implied the validity of ordination by Presbyteries. It was designed to strike out of sight the distinction between bishops and presbyters. These men of Ulster had gotten from king and parliament what the English Non-conformists had vainly struggled for. The king recanted and could not tolerate any imputation on his beloved bishops. So the Ulster confession was doomed to go. We cannot now go over the long lists of griev-

ances suffered by the Ulster colony at the hands of the unprincipled and tyrannical ministers of King James. The Ulster Presbyterian form of government was set aside by law; a court of high commission was held at Dublin, and all ministers who refused to obey the bishops of the English Church, or refused to use the English liturgy, were deprived of their churches and livings. Over in Scotland, the Presbyterian Non-conformists were, although undismayed in the meanwhile, suffering for their faith. In the Greyfriars church-yard in Edinburgh their representatives, their ministers and best men met by night. The articles of their National League and Covenant, as their bond of union, were read over. It was spread out on a grave-stone and signed, some of the signers after their names writing "*until death*" in letters of blood taken from their veins. That document was the Magna Charta of Scotland, the solemn memorial of the fidelity of its signers to Christ as the only head of the church. In Ulster every man, woman, and child over sixteen years of age, were required on their knees and on the Holy Evangelists, to swear never to oppose any of the king's commands, and to adjure all oaths and covenants to the contrary. To make this oath all the more exasperating, the king was suspected of being inclined to the Roman Catholic religion, and those who professed this religion were exempted from taking the oath. For refusal to take the oath the men of Ulster were fined and imprisoned by wholesale. Some fled to mountain strongholds, and others to foreign lands. To add to all these sorrows the natives thought the time had come to drive the interlopers out of the country. The Puritans in England were making things hot for the House of Stuart. English garrisons were withdrawn from Ireland. The Celt thought the time had come to strike the Saxon. In bands the natives invaded the settlements in Ulster, and there followed one of the most awful massacres in all history. The blow was struck in the depths of one of the severest of winters. In vain did the Scotch-Irish appeal to their Irish neighbors by the ties of common humanity to protect them. Says an eminent English historian: "Many resisted and were killed, many sought shelter in the houses of their Irish neighbors with whom they had lived in intimacy. The doors

of their neighbors were opened in seeming hospitality, but within they were not human beings. Not even human savages, but ferocious beasts. It was held a mortal sin to give relief or protection to the English. The one crime was to be a Protestant." The iron hand of Oliver Cromwell was laid on this rebellion, and soon all was quiet in Ulster.

It would seem that when a king of England had lost his head for his tyranny, and his family exiled for twenty years it would serve to teach that royal house that subjects have some rights that princes must respect. But the restoration of the Stuarts brought fresh persecutions to the Scotch-Irish of Ulster. It was resolved both in Scotland and Ireland to exterminate Presbyterians, root and branch. In all this nefarious business the bishops of the Established Church of England were the leading spirits. In Scotland, King Charles, the merry monarch, made himself joyous by drinking and carousing with his prostitutes in London, while his friend, the gentle James Graham Earl of Claverhouse, was making himself happy hunting like wild beasts the covenanting Presbyterians over the lonely moors of Scotland, or drowning women on the Solway sands. Again, the merry monarch made himself merry by slaughtering the peasant Presbyterians at Bothwell Bridge, hanging and quartering them by the roadsides, starving them in prisons, and shipping two hundred of them to the Barbadoes to be sold as slaves. In the lonely hills of Pentland, near Edinburgh, a company of Presbyterians were slain and their graves can be seen at this day. There is no more interesting place to visit in all Scotland. It is here the genius of Sir Walter Scott finds Old Mortality in his pious work of clearing and repairing the moss-grown tombs of the slaughtered Presbyterians. Hallam in his *Constitutional History of England* says: "It was very possible that episcopacy might be of apostolical institution, but, for this institution houses had been burned and fields laid waste, and the gospel had been preached in the wilderness, and its ministers had been shot in their prayers, and husbands had been shot before their wives, and virgins had been defiled, and many had died by the executioner and by massacre. It was a religion of the boot and thumb screw which a good man must be very cold-blooded if

he did not hate." The high-handed measures of the Stuarts brought on the revolution of 1688, and William of Orange to the throne. In the infinite confusion in which the administration of James II. had involved all England, Ireland and Scotland it was thought by James, then a refugee from his throne, an opportune time to strike a blow in Ireland for his crown. The Ulster men were to a man for King William. When he landed in England the Presbyterians in Ulster had sent him congratulations. For that, King James proposed to chastise them to the death. William was himself a Calvinist of the strictest sect. Ulster was invaded by a force of French and native Irish of twenty-five thousand men officered by trained commanders. Derrytown was marched on. The Scotch-Irish inhabitants, wholly unprepared for a siege, without a supply of provisions, and no soldiers, and no arms except such as by chance they could find in their town, and no one to command them but a preacher, shut themselves up in their only partially unwalled town of Derry and resolved to defend themselves to the last. Three months and a half the memorable siege lasted. In all the pages of history no braver defence is recorded. In all the dreary annals of Ireland, a solitary star of untarnished glory is this defence of Derry. Shut up from all communications with their friends in the country, the indomitable defenders were rained on by fire, shot and shell. Women were seen in the ranks fighting side by side with their husbands, brothers and lovers. Many of them died from famine, and others from pestilence. Fever and cholera walked in the streets at noonday. Children, by scores, succumbed to the horrors of the siege. Horses, rats, mice and vermin, were eaten as the last wretched recource for food. In cases when the men were too weak to stand up, they lay with their guns in their hands, resolved to sell their lives as dearly as possible. The principles of Calvinism had turned these militia shopkeepers of Derry into a band of men worthy of the fame of the Greeks at Marathon or Platea. At the very time when the besieged were debating the propriety of casting lots for the devouring of human flesh to sustain the conflict, the ships of King William came up the Foyle and broke the blockade. At many other points

in Ulster, the most desperate resistance was made. The citizens of Enniskillen defended their city with signal courage. King William was a true friend of civil and religious liberty, and throughout his reign, through many difficulties and discouragements, he endeavored to do the best he could to bring all religious animosities to an end. The men of Ulster had a short period of comparative repose.

His successor, Queen Anne, a Stuart, was scarcely seated on her throne when the Tories, headed by the bishops of the Established Church, commenced again their nefarious agitation for uniformity in religion which meant strict obedience and honor to ecclesiastical dignitaries of the English Church.

It is difficult for us here to fully enumerate all the wrongs suffered by the Non-conformists at the hands of the Protestant Bishop of Ireland, and the great land owners, who were all high churchmen, but not as much as one-third of the Protestants in Ulster. The Presbyterian Non-conformists were in places not permitted to bury their dead unless an Episcopalian officiated at the funeral.

Efforts were made to prevent parents from teaching their children the Cathechism of the Presbyterian Church. The officers were required to take oaths contrary to their consciences, and finally, in 1704, an act of Parliament was passed that deprived the Presbyterians of all public offices and places of trust which they then held, and rendered them incapable of being appointed to similar offices in the future. This act continued in force for seventy-six years. Marriages solemnized by Presbyterians were regarded invalid, and the children of such marriages, of course, illegitimate. Presbyterian clergymen were denounced as unsanctified up-starts, whose pretended ceremonial of marriage was but a recourse for sin.

It was announced that the children of Protestants not married in an Established Church should be treated as bastards and many persons married according to the forms and usages of the Presbyterian Church were prosecuted in the bishops' courts as fornicators. The act of 1704 was entitled an Act for the Repression of Popery. The act was ignored by the Catholics and their conduct

was winked at by the government; but as to the Presbyterians, it was enforced with merciless severity.

Charles II. reflected the views of the bishops when he said Presbyterianism is a religion not fit for a gentleman. Judge Jeffries, the intimate friend of Queen Anne's father when he was king, is recorded as shouting from the bench at the infamous trial of Lady Alice Lisle, "How difficult it is to get the truth out of a Presbyterian rogue," and on another trial said, "I can smell one of them forty miles."

In addition to all this, the men of Ulster were wronged by the British government in their trade. Like the Jews in Egypt, they had increased in numbers and wealth, under all their discouragements. They were beginning for Ireland to work out and demonstrate to the world a cure for many of the ills of their adopted country. From the two prevalent ideas of the native Celt, to stick to the soil and cultivate it, they were turning their attention to trade, merchandising and manufacturing. The government determined to make Ulster contribute to the wealth of the mother country, without any regard to the effect on Ulster or the rights of the people. Act after act was passed, forbidding the exportation of wool, of horses, of cattle, of butter, of cheese, and dead meats. Ireland was excluded from the navigation act. Shipping was ruined and business failed. Thus it was that the thrifty God-fearing Presbyterians of Ulster were wronged by the British government in the security of their homes, in their reputation, in their business, in their families, in their religion, even in their graves.

Is it any wonder that the Ulsterman's heart became ulcerated with hatred against his oppressor, and that with longing eyes he looked abroad to some land where the strong hand of avaricious landlords could not be laid upon him, and where, above all, he could not be dowered with the curse of English prelacy, as they had made its acquaintance under the hobbling and nondescript successors of St. Patrick in Ireland?

We all know through what trials the Calvinists of Holland passed in wrenching from the domination of Spain the civil and religious liberties of their native land. In their fight for freedom,

their country was a vast battle-field. All the horrors of desolating war swept over them like the waves of the ocean. When their independence was secured, their country became the refuge of their fellow religionists from other lands. The Calvinist Church at Leyden became the centre and mother church of the English emigrants. Thither came, under Robinson, the Puritan colony from England. After seventeen years here, the colonists sailed in the *Mayflower* for the western world. In 1685, sixty-five years after the sailing of the *Mayflower*, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes exiled four hundred thousand Calvinists from their homes in western France, in the Valley of Loire. They could not in their numbers boast of having any of the nobility or rich ecclesiastics, or men of court influence. They were for the most part traders, artisans, manufacturers, tillers of small land holdings. The undisputed record is, they were quiet, industrious, God-fearing people. A modern English writer says of them:

"The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was a sentence of civil death to the Huguenots, and their history is a standing marvel, illustrating the abiding power of strong religious convictions. Narrow in thought, pure in practice, they have stood as much ill-usage as has befallen any branch of Christ's church. A religion which does not abuse its power, a freedom from divided allegiances, an aptitude for constitutional institutions, and an intelligent belief in the sovereignty of the people, these are the elements which the Huguenots of to-day can bring to the service of the republic under which they dwell safely, none making them afraid."

Their only offence was their religion. They held to the doctrines of justification by faith alone, in the parity of the clergy, and in Christ as the only true head of the church. They practiced the system of church government as practiced in Geneva under Calvin. Their name came from that city and was one of reproach. The Edict of Nantes had for nearly a century secured them and their fathers in the observance of their religion. The revocation turned the fires of persecution on them. Rather than be apostates they chose exile. Like the wreck of a vast tempest, the shores of foreign lands were covered with groups of the forlorn and heart-broken wanderers. Like Christ, their master, they had not where

on earth to lay their heads. Some of them went to Germany, others fled to England where they were colonized and protected by Queen Elizabeth, others sought the Vaudois Valleys in north Italy, and some found homes among the snows and ice peaks of Switzerland. A very large number of them looking to the lands beyond the Atlantic as their final home, became, like their co-religionists in the *Mayflower*, the Argonauts of civil and religious liberty to the Western world.

Few of us can realize with what feelings of emotion these poor exiles, tossed in their frail ships on the billows of the ocean, saw in the eastern sky their native land fade from view. Alas! alas! for the accursed inhumanity of man to man. These forlorn exiles failed to see, indeed could not see, the hand of God in their sufferings, yet they became God's opportunity for founding an empire dedicated to freedom. These English and French exiles naturally sought to land at such portions of America as were related to their old homes in climate, soil, etc. The Puritans in the *Mayflower* intended to land in New York, but by mistake in navigation, drifted north to the then unhospitable shores of Massachusetts. The French landed along the shores of Cape Fear river in North Carolina, and on the Ashley, Cooper, and Santee rivers in South Carolina. The first Presbyterian Church in South Carolina was established by the Huguenots in 1686. This was only three years after the first Presbyterian Church in America was established by the Rev. Francis Makemie at Snow Hill on the eastern shores of Maryland. The emigration of Presbyterians from Scotland to America began at an earlier period than from the north of Ireland, but the emigrants were much more limited in numbers.

The general exodus of the Scotch-Irish to America commenced soon after the passage of the infamous test act in 1704. A few years after this the leases of many of the Ulster men expired, and notwithstanding the Presbyterians had converted a sterile country into busy towns and productive fields, their rapacious English landlords raised rents until the tenant was compelled to the alternative of beggary or exile. He chose the latter.

In the first half of the eighteenth century great numbers left for America. The English civil magistrates deplored the hallu-

cination which they said seemed to have seized the inhabitants and led them in multitudes to forsake their adopted land for homes beyond the Atlantic.

The Scotch-Irish had drifted into traits of character somewhat different from his brother in the fatherland. The bitter hard school of experience gave the Ulsterman more versatility of character; more capability to adapt himself to strange places; more flexibility; more fertility in resource; more loving and less clannish; loyalty to the right rather than sentimental opposition. Even his sorrows had softened his pugnacity. He could no longer claim Scotland as his father, and Ireland would not become his loving mother. England, too, had badgered and persecuted him until he felt she only wanted him as her hewer of wood and drawer of water.

Those in power, whom he had a right to suppose would protect him, had laid a wound under his head. The iron of ingratitude had gone into his soul. He looked across the Atlantic to America as his future Canaan, his fair and happy land. There he hoped to find a land where character, and not titles or individual worth and not a heralds' college, fixed a man's chance in life. There he could own the little spot of earth he might cultivate. Above all, he would not have to make his life a living lie by conforming to the episcopacy of England. There he could enjoy the fruits of his industry. There his children would not be deemed bastards and the marriage tie illegitimate. His vote would then be free and his grave inviolate. With such feelings as these the man of Ulster gathered his wife and children and all earthly possessions on shipboard and set his sails and compass for the shores of America. From year to year the exodus was kept up. From 1729 to 1750 it is estimated 12,000 annually came to America. English Archbishop Boulter mourned over the fate of what he called these deluded people. Froude, the historian, says the counties of Doum, Antrim, Tyrone, Armagh and Derry were emptied of their Protestant inhabitants.

Some of the colonists landed at Boston and moved out into Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut and New Hampshire. Some landed at Charleston, in South Carolina, others at Savannah, in Georgia. The greater portions landed at New Castle and Phila-

delphia. Prior to this time large numbers of Presbyterians had formed settlements in the colonies.

The Ulster men who came to Pennsylvania first occupied the eastern and middle counties of the province, and from thence one stream followed the great Cumberland Valley into Virginia.

Along the banks of the Shenandoah the Scotch-Irish from Pennsylvania took possession of the entire valley, except a few Germen settlements at the river's mouth. Going up the river they scaled the Alleghanies and poured into East Tennessee.

Another stream went into Western Pennsylvania and settled in the Monongahela Valley and around the headwaters of the Ohio. Pittsburgh very early acquired the name, and justly deserved it, of being the backbone of Presbyterianism. From here and the Valley of Virginia and North Carolina the stream of migration pressed on into Ohio, then a part of the Northwest territory. Through the Cumberland Gap they came, rifle and axe on shoulder, into the dark and bloody ground of Kentucky. So went forward these indomitable John Knox Presbyterians, the forest pale-face Stoics of the eighteenth century.

From the Valley of Virginia in 1783 came through the Cumberland Gap Father David Rice, the first Presbyterian minister that came to labor for the cause of Christ in Kentucky. At the ripe age of eighty-three, in the then thinly populated wilds of the Green river valley, he ended his earthly labors only a few miles distant from this church. That Valley of Virginia is to many of us our fatherland. Her name is to us one of affection and pride. No braver, better class of people have ever lived on this continent than were born, raised and have gone out from her Presbyterian homes. Their religious faith was their primary loyalty to Christ, they believed in individual freedom. They abhorred ecclesiastical tyranny. The social unit was the family. Their political faith as to our troubles with Great Britain followed as a necessary consequence.

After the close of the French and Indian war in 1763, when France surrendered to Great Britain all her possessions in America east of the Mississippi River, commenced that policy of England towards her American colonies that resulted in our war

of the Revolution. The Declaration of Independence recites our wrongs, but not all of them, indeed none of them of a religious character. In the wrongs declared in that memorable document, of course Roman Catholics and all shades of Protestant opinions had suffered alike. The Presbyterians of all other people had suffered for conscience-sake. The Calvinists in the colonies, to their dismay, found they had good reasons to think England intended to force episcopacy in the American settlements. Governors were in 1730 instructed to give all countenance and encouragement to the exercise of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bishop of London. In Virginia, Carolina and New York, episcopacy was supported by the strong arm of the law. Some of the Calvinists were fined for the offence of taking part in religious services after the Presbyterian mode of worship, and in other places Presbyterians were compelled to aid in support of clergy, upon whose ministry they did not attend, and were denied the rights of citizenship, and the right of marriage by their own pastors. It was proposed in 1748 to introduce by law episcopacy in New England.

The Presbyterians in America were more intensely opposed to England than all other religionists, because they had suffered at the hands of the mother country longer and more than all others. The exile of Ulster had ripened into an exasperated enemy of England. His anger kindled and burned fiercely.

Long years of outrages, tyranny and wrong had taught these men what to expect of their motherland. She might wheedle and deceive others, but the Ulster Presbyterians were not to be trifled with any longer, for their forbearance had ceased to be a virtue. The Ulsterman had been wronged in his earthly possessions; that was bad enough; but when he saw the skeleton fingers of English episcopacy reaching out to again clutch him, he of all others resolved to have no more of it. He would not longer be haunted by the spectre. Let the cost be what it might, it must go down. Froude, in his history of the English in Ireland, says: "In the war of American Independence, England had no fiercer enemies than the grandsons and the great grandsons of the Presbyterians who had held Ulster against Tyrconnel."

The same govermental measures were sought to be employed in America as had been employed in Ireland. The wrongs the American people were called on to resist had been inflicted on Ireland for generations.

We are not unmindful of the splendid patriotism of other religionists in our war of Independence. We are not unmindful of the record of our Roman Catholic friends in Maryland in favor of religious toleration as far back as 1649. We do not forget that Roman Catholic ink signed the Declaration of Independence, and members of this communion fought valiantly to make that declaration good; nor do we forget that Washington was a member of the English Established Church. But what we do claim and what history authorizes us to claim is, that the first voice publicly raised in America to dissolve all connection with Great Britian, came from the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians. So says Bancroft in his history of the United States. Among the first, Presbyterians of Western Pennsylvania at Hannatown, and those in Cumberland county met and memorialized the assembly of the provinces for open resistance to Great Britian.[1] More than a year before the Declaration of Independence was signed, and a few weeks after the battle of Lexington, the Synod of the Presbyterian Church, in session at Philadelphia, was the very first body to declare themselves in favor of open resistance and to encourage and advise the people to take up arms, to have their rights as Britians and freemen. This action of the Synod was laid before the Continental Congress, then in session in the same city. On May 20, 1775, the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians of North Carolina, in convention at Charlotte, adopted what is known in history as the Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence. That paper declares: "We do hereby dissolve the political bonds which have connected us with the mother country, and hereby absolve ourselves from all allegiance to the British crown. We declare ourselves a free and independent people, to the maintainance of which we solemnly pledge to each other our mutual coöperation, and our lives, our fortunes, and our most

[1] Nine-tenths of the colonists in North Carolina were Presbyterians, and four years before the battle of Lexington, they fought Tryon's militia on the bank of Great Alamance Creek, and nine of the insurgent Scotch-Irish lost their lives—the first blood shed in the revolution.

sacred honor." A special messenger was sent with the declaration to lay it before the Continental Congress in Philadelphia. Fourteen days after the battle of Lexington, in one county in Pennsylvania, settled almost exclusively by Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, three thousand men had enlisted in the continental army. The Valley of Virginia rose in arms to a man.

Ten years before the Declaration of Independence, Scoth-Irish Patrick Henry, "the forest-born Demosthenes," thundered against British aggression in the Stamp Act, and warned his countrymen not to listen to the song of the siren; that we must fight or be made slaves. The Scotch-Irish that fought at Cowpens and King's Mountain, under Morgan, Pickens and Shelby, all Presbyterian elders, I doubt not felt they were settling accounts for the slaughter of their ancestors at Derry and Enniskillen.

It is a fact that great principles are developed to our understanding by successive stages. We must be educated to know the truth, nationally as well as religiously. It is not in the providence of God, that truth like the lightnings of heaven shall smite the earth and be at once felt and known of all men. Many of the early reformers did not fully comprehend that it was not the business of the civil government to define and enforce the religious faith of the subject. What they demanded was toleration. The idea of toleration admits a superior right to withhold it if government chooses so to do. It is a significant fact that for fifty years after the adoption, in 1787, of our Federal constitution, in some nine of our State constitutions traces of religious tests can be found. Our Roman Catholic fellow-citizens are justly proud of their religious toleration act in Maryland, in 1649, but even that act was limited in its toleration to Trinitarian Christians.

The Synod of Philadelphia, embracing some four Presbyteries, in 1729, adopted, with some exceptions, the Westminister Confession of Faith as the constitution of the Presbyterian Church. That constitution had been always assented to as containing the standards of the Presbyterian Church. The exceptions made to it by the Philadelphia Synod related to the rights and powers of the civil government. The articles in the Westminister Confession that said or intimated that the civil magistrates had a controlling

power over Synods, or power to persecute for religion, were expressly rejected. Such was the standard adopted by the other Synods that in 1768 formed what is now known as the General Assembly.

So it can be safely affirmed that the Presbyterians in the United States and in the Colonies, before the Revolution, have ever held what they now hold as announced in their confession that, "Civil magistrates may not assume to themselves the administration of the word and sacraments, or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven, or in the least interfere in matters of faith"; that "God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in anything contrary to his word, or beside it in matters of faith and worship."

Men cavil at and find fault with the doctrine of the right of private judgment. It is, always has been, and always will be, the foundation stone of religious freedom. That doctrine once repudiated leads inevitably to persecution for conscience' sake. It is sheer nonsense for the civil government to formulate a religion for the subject, and then leave it optional with the subject to believe or not believe, as is the case to-day in England. People must be made to obey the law, and the difference between exclusion from office or a fine, and beheading or burning at the stake for nonconformity, is only a difference in degree and not in principle.

That Presbyterians were steadfast and earnest patriots, first and always in the front ranks in resisting British aggression, was not only because their civil rights were imperilled, but because their religious freedom was in danger. They knew that if England triumphed, prelacy as a state institution would follow. They recognized the fact that here, as in Scotland and in Ireland, civil and religious liberty stood or fell together.

Of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence we recognize fifteen of them as Presbyterians. A long list of Presbyterians who were captains, majors, colonels and brigadier and major generals in the army of the Revolution could be given. Prominent among those at home who urged resistance to Great Britain was Dr. John Witherspoon, a Presbyterian clergyman of

Princeton. He was a member of the Continental Congress that adopted the Declaration of Independence, and the bosom friend of Washington. No man in that memorable body exercised a wider influence in having the Declaration adopted than he. Many members hesitated about signing the dangerous document, and it was adopted by only a bare majority. We have good authority for saying that, at least at that session of Congress, the Declaration would not have been signed but for the personal influence of John Witherspoon.

It is said that in drafting the Declaration, Congress had before it as a model the declaration of Holland when it revolted against Spain. We have been unable to see a copy of that document, but we think the evidence very strong that the Mecklenburg Declaration made its impress in the composition of the Declaration of 1776. Congress had been furnished with a copy of the Mecklenburg act. That act used terse and eloquent English, it was plain and not evasive in its terms. It may be Jefferson had not seen the Declaration, but it had been published in the newspapers and had gone across the Atlantic. It voiced the sentiments of all the most determined enemies of England. Then we see that many of the expressions in the Mecklenburg act are used word for word in the Declaration of 1776. This may have been accidental, but we can hardly see how that was. Nor do we doubt that the polity of the Presbyterian Church had its influence in shaping the Constitution of the United States.

Whatever may be said of the New England Puritans and their love of liberty, we do not hesitate to say that the Presbyterians had the more accurate views respecting religious liberty. For instance, we find that in 1631 a law was enacted in Massachusetts uniting church and state, and that no one should vote unless he was a church-member and had been baptized. This was directly contrary to the standards of Presbyterianism. Examine the standards of the church, formally adopted in 1729, and trace it for a century before and you will find that all that Presbyterians have ever asked of the civil government was to protect the person and good name of all people in such an effectual manner, that no person be suffered, either upon pretence of religion or infidelity, to offer any

indignity, violence, abuse or injury to any other person whatever. Here are the principles of absolute religious liberty—entire separation of church and state.

Our Federal constitution in 1787, far in advance of many of the State legislatures, provided "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." According to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case involving the validity of Stephen Girard's will, all that any Christian can now claim for the civil government is that in common with the Jews and all other religionists he shall have protection. This is, and always has been the standard of the Presbyterian Church in America.

Let us, then, with unabated faith hold fast to the principles of our religion, coming down to us watered by the blood of our forefathers. God alone is Lord of our consciences. Let us not forget that civil and religious liberty are so intimately blended that the violation of the one is the entering wedge to violations of the other, and that our ultimate safety as Presbyterians as well as citizens of a free commonwealth in a large measure consists in vigilantly guarding against any encroachment of the one on the other. As free citizens of a great commonwealth, we cannot close our eyes, and ought not if we could, to dangers now on us and ahead of us. My brethren, our Heavenly Father may yet have for us a work that we know not of. Let us remain steadfast in the faith. Let us glory in what have been to others the despised doctrines of our church. God was with us before the foundations of the world were laid, or the morning stars sang together. We sadly remember our individual mortality; man perishes and wastes away. While on the one hand he fleeth as a shadow and continueth not, on the other hand, characteristics go down from generation to generation and survive the centuries. It is not true the world always grows wiser by experience, and the time may yet come when the few against the many will have to make a stand for civil and religious liberty; and when that day comes we do not doubt that, the first in the ranks to do battle against wrong and oppression, will be found the descendants of those Presbyterians in whose veins still flows the blood of the exiled Huguenots, the Pilgrims of Leyden and the men of Ulster.

W. J. Lisle.

V. USES OF THE IMAGINATION.

In earth there is nothing great but man, and in man there is nothing great but mind; then if the proper study of mankind be man, nothing more deserves the attention of the thoughtful than does man's mental and spiritual constitution. It is right that man should sweep the heavens with his glass, and with the camera and the spectroscope analyze and catalogue the sixty millions of stars whose light has reached him, and with the aid of the science of mathematics, whose inhuman exactness fits it to deal with the order of God's work, learn the laws which govern planets and suns. It is well too that he should read the records of by-gone ages in the rocks and strata of the earth, and grope patiently on toward that ultimate geology which shall furnish a true record of the past history of the globe, and aid us in appreciating the hints which revelation gives as to its future. And so too the powers with which the Creator has endowed him are profitably employed by the student under the spur of a liberal curiosity, in the pursuits of the chemist, the botanist, or the naturalist. Not one of the physical sciences, of those studies which deal with matter animate or inanimate, has failed to prove of enormous practical benefit to our race. Labor and capital indeed in their daily life are but the pupils and obedient subjects of natural science, for she reigns unrivalled mistress on land and sea, dictating to the mariner and the miner, the manufacturer and the farmer, with equal authority. But even were these practical results eliminated, no thoughtful mind would urge the abatement in the smallest degree of human interest in such studies, for the acquisition of knowledge is capable of being, like virtue, its own reward. But if, dazzled with the results and possibilities of the natural sciences, man shall bound with them his horizon and begin to scorn all that lies not within their domain, and cease to class among the knowable verities of the universe worthy of his attention those things which cannot be studied with the object-glass or analyzed with

crucible and retort, then indeed is the race in fearful peril. The positivist's philosophy, the materialistic and extreme theories of evolution, and agnosticism itself, are but the children of this abnormal and perverted state of human studies in our own day. In the domain of philosophy, erroneous theories of causation and dangerous speculations as to the limitations of thought may have done effective work to that end, but it is the subjection of modern thought to the natural and "exact sciences" to the exclusion of other matters, which has most contributed to the building up of that awful creed which to-day would thrust God out of his universe, not denying his existence, but eliminating him from the field of human regard. The voice of wisdom calls us back from a narrow-minded life whose results are so appalling.

And while it is well to trace the teachings of nature's book as confirming revelation, and as the crumbs of knowledge which fall from our Father's board cannot be at war with the bread of life, to expect thus eventually to confirm Christianity, it is yet true that the strongest weapons for the conflict with materialism are to be found on the walls of the temples of mental and moral science. Again, the anatomist lectures well on the being and character of God from the text of an eye or hand; surely not less information may be gained from the study of any single power of the mind or passion of the heart. The human body is studied too that men may know how to use their muscles, and how protecting their health, to guard that human life which has such vast possibilities; but surely the mind through which knowledge is acquired should be understood that its powers may be profitably employed, and that they may be preserved from injury through either neglect or improper use.

With this brief apology we now call the reader's attention to one of the powers of the mind which is unfortunately viewed with suspicion or treated with neglect by many sober and practical students, and which yet illustrates signally the wisdom and goodness of the Creator, and is one of the most potent factors in the life of man; we allude to the imagination. Definitions are dangerous things, and the fear of producing another Plato's man deters us from dogmatism in defining this power of the mind. A very partial definition given by the Scottish metaphysician

Reid and criticised by Sir William Hamilton is that imagination is simply equivalent to "A conception of the appearance an object would present to the eye if actually seen." A far better definition tells us that it is "the power which the mind has of combining previously acquired conceptions in new and varied relations." But, on the other hand, an able writer in speaking of what he calls "the idealizing faculty," says: "It is but one of the great cluster of powers within us for mentally making the most of the world we live in, which are commonly associated together under the comprehensive name *imagination*." We are inclined to accept his view and esteem the imagination, as we commonly use the word, something too vast in its range to be defined as a single faculty. A famous Englishman says: "It is the power of picturing absent things, of presenting to the eye visions of the past and future, of realizing the mental attitude and thoughts of another person or an alien race." The latter part of his definition is very valuable, but the first clause is somewhat misleading. Memory and expectation are distinguished from imagination by the more orderly and correct way in which they present ideas to us, says Mr. Hume, and here even his critics agree with him. That this faculty creates nothing, but only works through the aid of furnished material, is one of the best established truths of psychology. True originality is the attribute of God alone; not even imagination enables man to realize it.

Reid's narrow definition would not leave it impossible for the brutes to possess imagination; but the clearer and broader statements we have quoted show how in this regard the spirit of man which goeth upward is distinguished from the spirit of a beast which goeth downward. A dreaming dog upon the hearth rug who barks at an invisible hare evidently has "a conception of the appearance an object would present to the eye if actually present," but the lower animals are as destitute of the broader powers of the imagination as in Dicken's *Barnaby Rudge* the landlord of the May-pole inn declares his hostler to be. The beaver and the bee build well, aided by the instinct God has given them, but their structures continue the same through all ages; whilst led on by the imagination, man passes from the rude hut to the noble

triumphs of ancient and modern architecture. The horse is intelligent and the chimpanzee of such man-like appearance that St. George Mivart gravely tells us man is but a member of the family of anthropoid apes; but horse and ape alike stand beside their human master and look with dull beasts' eyes upon the landscape, painting, or statue which illumined by the imagination causes man the keenest pleasure or moves him most profoundly.

It is probable that there is still need of a sufficiently exact and comprehensive definition of this faculty. Whilst some writers have been too narrow, others have erred in giving it too much honor. Collier, Berkeley and Hume made imagination and perception differ only in degree, in the intensity of the impression produced, and upon this tenet hangs the whole philosophical system of idealism. Hume makes a "universe of the imagination," "a world of imagination," of all things about us. The importance of this faculty is illustrated by these facts, but no further reply is needed for those who deny the reality of the objective than is furnished by a proper distinction betwixt perception and imagination. They seem to us to be related somewhat as are substance and picture, or life and its representation upon the mimic stage. Perception is limited by facts, or at most, appearances, while the imagination "is subject to no other conditions than those of space and time, and consciousness itself is often at its mercy." It is true that imagination, according to Sir William Hamilton, is one of the three elements of self-perception, but reminiscence and sober judgment are the other two, and by them the imagination is kept within sober bounds in the well-balanced man. The mad-house with its victims of singular "hallucinations," shows us the lamentable results of a self-perception absolutely dominated by the imagination. When God created man he saw that his work was good, very good, but by the fall his being was fundamentally deranged along with the change in his outward relations. It is not true, as the radical evolutionists say, that "he fell up hill," and has been steadily improving at every point from the time of his first appearance in the earth. The second Adam excepted, none of his descendants have rivalled the primeval man at any point. He *was* "the goodliest man of all men since born" in his physical and

spiritual organization alike. South, in one of his sermons, speaks of Aristotle as the wreck of an Adam, and Athens as but the ruins of Eden. And so man's whole mental and spiritual constitution being marred by sin, the imagination is not merely defective in its abilities, but is subject to misuse which may render it hurtful rather than helpful. It is, therefore, necessary to speak briefly of the possible abuses of the imagination. Being now the companion of a depraved heart it is liable to become the store-house of corrupt images and a source of temptation to its possessor. Obeying an evil nature as one of the mind's members, it may yield itself a servant unto sin. Now, as far back as the days of Ezekiel certainly, men were taught that they are responsible for the deeds of the imagination; the chambers of imagery may witness idol worship and departure from God never realized in the life, but they are recorded on the leaves of memory's book and shall be read at the last day. It were well if every man knew enough of Biblical psychology to appreciate this fact. The imagination can never be tried for theft, adultery, or murder, in any human court, but he who has rejoiced in the mental picture of gratified lust, covetousness or hate, will have these things to answer for at the Great Assizes. So truly indeed is this faculty in its exercise the exponent of character, that we may safely say as a man *imagineth* in his heart, so is he, be his outward life what it may. There are two methods by which men should be taught to guard against this abuse of a great faculty which transforms it from a kind friend to a most treacherous foe. On the one hand, one should be careful as to the materials furnished this dangerous workman. In the present state of light literature this is a most necessary caution for all. It were well to ask ere continuing the perusal of a work of infidel speculation or an evil story of shame, blood and crime, what use may be made of this by the imagination? Is it safe food for that subtle enchanter? On the other hand, from every consideration of regard for their temporal and eternal well-being, men should realize that this faculty *may* be bridled and held in hand and *must* be kept in subjection. Our old blue back spelling books, which taught us psychology and moral science in the fables which formed their reading lessons, impressed upon our

childish minds in the fable of the milk-maid and her air-castles, the sober necessity of restraining the imagination, and in so teaching plainly implied that this was entirely within our power. And the same truth is set forth in some of the homely proverbs current amongst people who never saw, perhaps, a work on metaphysics.

This great faculty again is abused by many in what may be termed intellectual intemperance. Given to us as a means of making the most of the world we live in and a source of innocent happiness, men in pursuing its pleasures may be guilty of true dissipation. The man who is excessively fond of exciting plays, of fascinating romances, of novels with thrilling plots, may overwork and jade this faculty as does the epicure or drunkard his stomach. Such mental dissipation does not improve the moral character, it rather disorders it. Dionysius may weep over a pathetic scene on the stage, and be a greater tyrant the next day; and it is possible for a man in his leisure to grow lachrymose over the sorrows of Goethe's silly Werther, and be a brute in his dealings with living men. And as the drinker and the epicure are forced to stimulate the jaded and diseased palate with more and more powerful and unwholesome gratification, so does the victim of this vice seek plays more pernicious, and stories more full of mad and unbridled passion. It is a sad fact that many who would not think of drinking absinthe or smoking opium, will yet read the books, which under the law of supply and demand are to-day produced *ad nauseam* to cater to the depraved taste of intellectual inebriates. It is scarcely needful to say that the young, especially, must also guard against the dangers of idle though innocent day-dreaming. It is action which counts, and woe to him who wastes life's precious hours in idle dreams, while opportunities pass unheeded. A great man is *commonly* a man of great dreams, but he must be also a man of great deeds.

This glance at the nature and abuses of the imagination is not designed as an idle preface, but is a part of our task, which is to consider the value of this faculty. What has been said will enable us now to be more brief in the consideration of its uses. We may in the first place view it as a source of happiness. It operates in all

men for the increase or abatement of emotion. "Joy," says an acute thinker, "is sustained by the instinctive activity of the imagination in assembling kindred ideas round the original incident, and pain is relieved by the suggestion of ideas that soothe and tranquillize." This faculty then may claim for itself the work so often referred to a true and sympathetic friend; it doubles our joys and halves our sorrows. Hope's wings would often be clipped were he not aided by this powerful ally. Without imagination, man's endurance and fortitude would be greatly diminished, and many of his joys lose much of their zest. To this much is to be added. It is by the potent aid of this great cluster of faculties that man is enabled to appreciate and enjoy wit, beauty and grandeur. Very much in this world which diverts and charms and relieves from the strain of care and the burdens of a Gradgrind existence, depends upon the potent aid of this faculty. It is truly said, for example, that the imagination lies at the basis of the fine arts. It is the main source of our enjoyment here It gives a symbolic meaning to a simple natural object. The statue is Apollo, the female figure is Faith. The stone image of a man fallen to the earth becomes a dying gladiator, as we look upon it; and the great Roman theatre rises before us, the emperor sits yonder in state, the shouts of the cruel populace ring in our ears, and then the picture vanishes; seas and mountains are passed at a bound and with the eyes of the dying man we see his young barbarians sporting in the Scythian sun. The painter and the sculptor, the poet, and to a wonderful extent the musician also, require the aid of this faculty in enlisting the interest of men. And they themselves succeed by its exercise. Art's aim is idealized imitation. The artist is ever striving to reach some ideal if he be a true artist. He finds nowhere perfection realized, and by the aid of the imagination, he wins enduring fame, since it is the guide of his patient toil. What is said of Turner is true of others. Imagination, using well the products of observation and memory, is the secret of the great painters' power over us. Again, Wordsworth defines a poet as simply a man in whom this instinctive activity is stronger than in other men, and who voluntarily exercises it in its proper work of increase and consolation, and so in this faculty he finds the

grand secret of the poet's power. Rhyme and metre will make no poetry without its presence. What student of Dante, Shakspeare, Milton, Isaiah, Job, or the Psalmists, will dispute this dictum of the Master of Rydal's Mount? It were useless to hunt for illustrations. They abound in the pages of all great writers.

But the imagination does more than please us. It is a mighty instructor. We would be most unjust to the fine arts did we fail to recognize their value as educators. They are potent sources of knowledge, conveying instruction in most effective and impressive ways, and continually serving as spurs to the desire of knowledge. They are educators too in the technical sense of mental trainers. They develop, broaden and clarify the mind. Nothing indeed will take their place here, and without them mental development must be narrow and partial. And as excellence in their varied departments ever requires fidelity to an ideal, all that the fine arts have done for man illustrates the utility of the faculty we study. In the development of the practical arts and the sciences, its aid is needed still. It has been the guide of the architect, the pilot of the explorer, the inspiration and courage of the inventor. It has suggested to patient workers the manifold inventions which increase the comfort and happiness of our daily life, and men have improved upon the mechanical and scientific achievements of their predecessors by first employing the imagination in combining previously acquired ideas in new and varied relations. It broadened the conceptions of a Genoese navigator until the dreamer became a great discoverer, and it held its day of triumph before the eyes of Watts, Palissy, Fulton, Morse, Field, and Edison, until their dreams were made realities. Man has mastered and utilized the forces animate and inanimate around him by the powers of the mind, and amongst these the imagination has performed a double work, by first suggesting possible triumphs, and then aiding in bringing them to pass.

It is through this faculty that we are enabled to grasp the unseen, and the immediate tendency of the mind to make a mental picture of each conception is a common perception with us all. And so by its aid, history, geography, mathematics, and all the varied studies of youth, are the more readily comprehended and

the better remembered. Not even the judgment, the sober master who reigns in the imagination, is independent of its aid. When we call upon a man to picture the matter to himself ere he decides, we give our final recognition to the potency of the imagination as a mental factor. The moral nature and the ethical life of man are likewise greatly aided by these powers.

If the imagination, abused, debases and corrupts the soul, it is equally true that it is invaluable as an aid to the right development of character. The comprehensive law given to regulate our relations to our fellow-man is that we shall love our neighbor as ourselves. To exemplify this precept, few things are more needful than that we should obey the homely teaching, which says, "put yourself in his place;" that is, imagine yourself in his circumstances. When the Master bids us do unto others whatsoever things we would have them do unto us, he bids us use the imagination in determining our proper course toward all men. The mighty principle of sympathy, the tendency of one mind to take the complexion of another, is, to say the least, an intimate acquaintance of the imagination. The gracious passion of pity would act in a very limited sphere did it never pour its bounty upon the unseen under the stimulus of the imagination. Charity, material and spiritual, is alike developed by its aid. By its power the soul is at times deterred from evil. The hesitating conscience-fighting man has often been arrested on the brink of the abyss by a sudden flash of magesium light, revealing its fearful depths; it is the work of the imagination, showing him at one blaze the true character of the course proposed, with its issues and consequences made to stand before him as living realities. And while the rogue is only held back by the mental vision of the felon's cell, the less hardened sinner turns with a revulsion of feeling from the contemplated sin when the imagination has turned on the light and shown its true sinfulness and the character it would make his.

The imagination acts constantly upon the active powers of man, now awakening, and now controlling the emotions. The moral faculty, in its last analysis, resolves itself into the will, and the will in many ways is influenced by the subject of our study. We have alluded to the fact that great artists ever work on towards an

unrealized ideal. Nowhere is perfection realized, but by borrowing here a brow and there an arm, the genius struggles on towards the representation of absolute beauty, which, following any one existing model, he could never realize. Now in all life men succeed in proportion as they are faithful to the right ideal. The statesman may not find in all history that leader and ruler of men who was without a flaw, but by mentally combining the good traits of many, he may build the ideal statesman, who shall meet all the requirements of truth and righteousness in his official life. Thus he fixes before his eyes a high ideal, and seeks to live up to it. This *is* the great man. Talleyrand may have been a bribe-taker, and William Pitt, a bribe-giver; but not so with his ideal statesman; and, come what may, he makes strong his bosom to resist temptations, and mourns sincerely if at any time he weakly falls and proves false to his ideal. What is true of the leader of the cabinet may be true of all avocations. The carpenter, as he handles saw and plane, may have his ideal of what constitutes a good carpenter and an honest workman, and, refusing to be influenced by his mates, strives to realize his ideal. The merchant may refuse to do in Rome as the Romans do, because he is not imitating the Romans, but the ideal merchant his fancy paints. The same law enters our homes and touches powerfully the most vital features of our life. The world has many honored citizens to-day, each of whom owes an inestimable debt to the fact that, many years ago, a young mother determined, in the midst it may be of fashion's selfish customs, to be unlike the women around her, and at the cost of all the sacrifices involved to strive to be an ideal mother. Men who have in themselves fatal elements of weakness have succeeded in life because their wives strove to realize a high ideal and won a rich reward by fidelity to a correct conception of the character of a true wife.

The age in which we live needs nothing more than it needs to be taught to make better use of the imagination, to employ it wisely in setting up high ideals, and then let poet, writer and preacher ever cry "Be faithful to your ideals." The Man of Nazareth has given us the utmost ideal as the object of our imitative aspirations in saying "Be ye, therefore, perfect, even as

your father which is in heaven is perfect," and in him we see God become man, showing us the ideal man realized before our eyes. We may, indeed, be thankful for the story of his life, as a picture more perfect far than fancy could paint of the life one should lead, dominated by an absolutely righteous character. We know that he has been tempted in all points like as we are, and that, as boy at Nazareth and man at Jerusalem, he is the blessed model without a flaw whom the Supreme Ruler has given to us as a vastly safer guide than any who could be constructed by a defective human faculty, even with the aid of a perfect law. The story of his life, however, is made necessarily brief. It is sufficiently full to realize to us the character of absolute righteousness, but we are left at times to employ the imagination in order to gain the full force of his example. The writer was present one evening in a large city at the beginning of a series of special services in which many churches had united. The most famous (or infamous) of French actresses was advertised to appear during the week at the theatre in one of Sardou's corrupt plays. The burly evangelist, whose fame is world-wide, seemed to read the heart of the fashionable Christian in his immense audience. He spoke of following Christ, and asked if his hearers could conceive of him in attendance upon an immoral modern play. The words seemed akin to blasphemy, but the effect was electrical. It was a striking illustration of the value of the imagination to the preacher of righteousness, though the speaker might be criticised in this instance. The great preachers of literature are eminent in their use of the imagination. Wordsworth is, by its power, secure in his hold upon the hearts and lives of men. In his hands the imagination clothes the thread-bare principles of every-day conduct with robes of splendid beauty. Men listen with intense interest as he sings, and find the elementary principles of right living invested with new allurements and strange splendor. The poetic imagination is largely influenced by its physical or social environment, but a man reared like Robert Burns shows what it can do with the barest and most unpromising material. "Imaginative prose and poetry differ only in form," says the critic, and certainly prose writers, too, make free use

of these powers. The use of the imagination is so general in influencing the feeling and beliefs of men that the theory, social, political, or religious, which has not had a novel written in its interest, is poor indeed. But in spite of all abuses, the imagination does render immense service to humanity in enabling those who cry out against wrong, or urge on needed reform, to gain the sympathies of men through the medium of a story which sets forth the clear possibilities of existing evils. History and biography are safer guides, but the facts are as we state them. Nowhere are the abuses of the imagination greater than at this point. Men are startled to-day at the possibilities of applied physical forces in the hands of anarchists taught by modern science, but here is a power for evil greater still. The world has seen a conflict, giving death and destruction a holiday, precipitated by a single powerful novel, and the most insidious teachings of an able infidel made to reach a world-wide audience by the same means. Is it not legitimate to employ this enormous power for the right also? Is there no inference to be drawn in favor of this idea from the extensive employment of allegory and parable in the sacred Scriptures themselves? Undoubtedly the element of inspiration places the work of the Scripture writer in a different category from that of other men, and unquestionably it is better to feed the mind upon history and philosophy; but it still remains true that, even through the medium of what is called fiction, men may be ethically, morally, developed and improved.

The trend of all that we have said has been in the direction of adding to such phrases as applied mathematics that of applied metaphysics. Men should understand their mental powers that they may use them, and that they may use them aright. For this we are now humbly pleading, selecting as representative our present topic as a faculty too commonly regarded with most suspicion and treated with frequent contempt by sober minds, which yet deserves due honor as one of the good gifts of an all-wise Creator to man, the crowning work of the six days. It does not seem out of place, then, to note still further at this stage its practical uses.

The scientist who deals with matter makes free use of the imagination in his studies. He employs it to picture to us ages of ice

and of fire, ages of ferns, and stone ages, and describes with the utmost confidence the origin of strange formations in the earth's crust, and explains by its aid the unexpected appearance of certain fauna and flora in strange localities. He rises higher, and from a few old bones constructs a wonderful thing, at once fish, flesh and fowl, before which we stand in awe-struck amazement, until, remembering how few of the thing's bones he has on hand, we recognize in the product a brilliant work of the imagination. That he at times surpasses the novelist in the abuse of the imagination some of us gravely suspect, but that this noble faculty is his powerful ally in gaining and imparting valuable truth is undeniable. The imagination seconds the witch-doctor of savage tribes in making well men sicken and die, or sick men recover, according as they believe, or, in other words, imagine.

There is little of mystery left in the stories, and little of force in the arguments of Christian scientists and faith-healers, after we have allowed for the work of the imagination. The wise physician will call it to his aid then, and find it at times more potent than material drugs. The imagination has killed and it has made alive in the providence of God. The power of the will in resisting disease and holding off death has been often treated, but the imagination lies back of the will, and is often the power behind the throne. The power of the mind over the body has its most signal illustrations through this faculty. It may certainly be used for the alleviation of humanity's ills by the skillful physician. Nature, the great healer, employs it alike in sustaining and relieving the sufferer. Again, it is a striking fact that the historian, whose business it is to give facts merely, is also aided by the imagination. Sir Walter Scott, despite Carlyle's charge that his sole province is to amuse, arouses an interest in history and makes it a reality to us. But on the other hand, Carlyle makes history more fascinating than Scott's romances by the unconscious skill with which he furnishes to the imagination all the materials for vivid and glowing pictures. Without his lively imagination, Macauley's grand diction would lose much of its splendor, and his writings would cease to charm as they do. Imagination is a good thing for both the historian and his readers.

Nor is the essayist more independent. How many of their present readers would De Quincy, Hazlitt and Rogers charm and instruct without the lively play of the imagination which pervades all their writing? The tropes and figures, the images which at once catch the attention, make luminous the thought, and secure a hold upon the memory, these are the wings of the great writers. The successful orator must surely be a man of imagination. Rhetoric, Whately makes the art of persuasion, and the orator is more than a stage-performer or pastry-cook to amuse, or to tickle the palate—he is a "rhetorician." In seeking to be effective, the speaker may use many means, but he can find few friends who may rival this faculty. To give a few illustrations: If a congressman wishes to secure the passage of a bill for the protection of seamen against the perils to which the avarice and dishonesty of ship-owners expose them, he can follow one of two methods. He may address the law-makers, setting before them the figures and statistics on the subject which show the need of more stringent laws, and take his seat, having furnished solid reasons for the passage of his bill. But he will do better if he brings the imagination into play and pictures the shipwreck, the fury of the storm, the despair of the sailor as the rotten craft goes to pieces amid the waves, and lets his audience hear the shrieks of the drowning mingling with the hoarse voice of the gale. When John Bright wished to prevent a declaration of war he would have presented a solid argument in merely saying, "There is danger that men will be killed;" but with what superior effectiveness did he cry, "It seems as if the death angel were abroad in the air. I can almost catch the beating of his wings." Public debate furnishes few things finer than the speech of the Englishman who answered an advocate of war who had declared that the course of the government had been for peace, but the time had come now "to pause." The rejoinder carries the hearers to a battle-field, lays bare all its horrors, and says of each dying and groaning sufferer, "Gentlemen, that man is only pausing." On the other hand, when Patrick Henry cried in the House of Burgesses, "The next gale which sweeps from the North may bring to our ears the clash of arms," all Virginia felt the thrill of his words, and he moved men to action by the fervor of his imagination.

It is not necessary, surely, to elaborate the truth that the imagination is a potent friend of the successful preacher. He is called to labor to lead men to correct perceptions of truth and righteousness, to awaken them to sin and guilt, to warn them of their peril, and point them to divine mercy. God alone can accomplish all these things, but it has pleased him that by the foolishness of preaching men should be saved, and it behooves the preacher to employ all the powers of mind and heart in his task. In influencing the will and presenting considerations to control the moral nature, in enlisting the emotions in the right cause, he finds constant use for the imagination. He who employs it wisely and well will need no pictures or blackboards for "illustrated sermons" and will have few inattentive auditors. A member of Queen Victoria's cabinet, in an address to the students of the University of Edinburgh, directing his remarks to the future pastors and preachers of Scotland, employs the words with which we shall close this last branch of our discussion: "Future ministers of religion, what will be the use of imagination to you? It will be the secret of your power over others, the spell by which you will win your way into the hearts of your flock. What will it avail you to thunder words from the pulpit which will strike the minds of your hearers only to rebound from them, and which will fail to gain an entrance through those intricate channels which a sympathetic imagination alone can map out for your guidance? To you, above all, the power of realizing the thoughts and feelings of others is the highest gift you can possess, the best faculty you can cultivate."

Such is the imagination, and such are some of its uses but briefly outlined. Like other powers of mind and heart in a fallen being, it has been fearfully perverted and made an engine of destruction, but correctly understood and rightly used, we perceive it to be among the best gifts to man of an all-wise and all-gracious God.

John C. Molloy.

Owensboro, Ky.

VI. "ANNIHILATION."

They boast that "death is an eternal sleep,"
Where, if no morning e'er restores delight,
At least, no mourner ever wakes to weep.
The simile is false; the endless night
That has no dawn, brings not the soul to rest,
But to despair; for he who rests awakes
To conscious ease that satisfies his quest
For recompense of pain. The life that makes
A woeful ending is a woeful life.
He is the victor who retains the field
When battle ends; and thus the closing strife
Of earth-born anguish, if the future yield
No compensation, must forever cast
Its blackness backward on the wretch's fate.
Let nature speak, whose craving, deep and vast
Yearns for existence, be our conscious state
Or sweet or bitter; like the seeing eye
Insatiable of light, or ear of sound,
Desire instinct, inwrought of God most high,
Not rule of interest astutely found
By after calculation, as is taught
Of our first father's sleep in paradise,
"With drowsied sense untroubled, though he thought
He to the nothing whence he took his rise
Was passing then." It is the voice divine,
Wiser than reason, which instructs our wish
For endless being! Else, why is it mine,
Unlike the unreasoning bird or beast or fish,
To recollect the past; to anticipate;
To fear the future woe; to hope the good?
Accursed was the gift of prescient thought
That raised our empty pride above the brood
Of brutish things, for it a lie hath taught.
The hind can crop the herb and course the lawn,

Or drink the mountain spring with thoughtless glee,
Untroubled by the hour her dying fawn
Cost her a transient pang; nor doth foresee
The hunter's coming shaft that seeks her breast;
No memory brings past sorrows, no foresight
Arrays its future terrors to molest
Her present joy; one sudden thrill of fright,
One stoke, one death-throe ends the whole career,
Simple and brief, but full-orbed in its joy.
Why should I die like her if I must fear,
Remember, hope, desire, doomed to employ
My noblest powers of being to pursue
Futility? Why mine to stretch the thought
To progress onward, and the endless view
Of growth of soul with larger glories fraught,
In widening vistas mounting through the realms
Of knowledge boundless? Why when present love
With its alluring bliss the heart o'erwhelms,
Is it ordained our foresight still must rove
To future days, that love might fill like this
With equal joys, yet know it must not be?
Why is it reason will not, cannot cease
To frame that thought supreme, eternity,
Capacious of infinitude of good,
Mocking the soul with cravings infinite,
If life must be the span the bestial brood
Enjoys? Abhorred span! That art but meet
To shew us beings' woes, and then its loss
Irreparable; cursed be the boon
Of such existence, cheating with its dross
The golden hopes it sanctioneth, as soon
As they begin to glow. The better lot
Is given the brute, who drinks the trivial cup
Of life, and ends, forgetting and forgot.
If death ends all, a blacker thought looms up;
Then all we love must perish when they die;
We part forever, and the love that blest
Our hearts remains a wound that shall not dry
Its bitter stream till nothingness arrest
Our woe and being by one common blow.

Love is immortal: all things else may die;
The forest kings decay; the ceaseless flow
Of ancient rivers, proudly sweeping by
Long buried cities, wane; the steadfast heads
Of everlasting mountains waste and stoop;
The hoary seas desert their sunless beds;
This ordered frame may backward droop
To endless chaos; but the eye
That shines with love's self-sacrificing light,
Outlasts the beams which from Arcturus fly,
Orion or Boötes; it is bright
With God's own rays. He is the sun of love,
And they the orbs that round the centre roll,
Reflecting him, as they forever move
In circles shaped by his supreme control.
He is eternal; so the gift divine!
Is all we love then mortal? Do the fires
Of genius, kindled from the heavenly shrine
Of truth and beauty, perish, as expires
The gilded butterfly or tinted rose?
Or shall the sage's vision, that can pierce
Through nature's secrets, make the sea disclose
His deep abyss, and ride his billows fierce;
Can map the planets' pathway and foretell
Their sure returns; can bridge the flood;
That can the storm-cloud's subtile bolt expel;
"Can look from nature up to nature's God,"
And in his works can read his deeper thought;
Be quenched in darkness like the rotting eye
Of newt or toad? The heroism that wrought
A nation's disenthralment, fain to die
For country's weal, and seek no recompense
But conscious right, the martyr's steadfast faith
Which joys to die for truth, and own no sense
Of fiery torments; mother's love, which hath
No thought of self, consummate effluence
Of Heaven's own virtue; perish evermore
As utterly as hypocrite's pretence,
Or as the bubbles bursting on the shore,
Or as the glitter of the serpent's scales
Decaying back to dust? 'Tis blasphemy!

Bethink ye; if this creed of death prevails
To doom our spirits to mortality,
It leaves no trace of God on nature's page.
If man is soulless, then an atheist world
Is all he knows, where senseless forces rage
In fire, and sea, and storm, and suns are hurled
With troops of waiting stars, by aimless might,
Through voids immense, and blind mechanic fate
Inexorable, on its throne of night,
Sightless and pitiless, maintains its state.
In earth or heaven there is no ear to hear
The sufferer's prayer; no heart to feel his woe;
No hand to shield the just, or to repair
The foulest wrong that ruthless force can do.
So right eternal perishes, and crime
Endures eternal, scorning all repeal.
Then are this lower earth, these heavens sublime,
One vast machine, 'neath whose remorseless wheel,
The corn is human hearts, instinct of pain,
And joy, and hope, and fear, that writhe and bleed
Till ground to nothingness. Oh, piteous grain!
Oh, dreadful engine! monster! That dost feed
Thine endless grind with countless precious lives!
Is such a world our home? 'Tis dark as hell!
Its joys but mock us, since no joy survives,
But death and loss irreparable dwell
Perpetual masters. Yet one other fate
There is, more black, the eternal recompense
Which conscious guilt forewarns it may await
The soul which cannot die, nor find defence
Against the judge, changeless, omnipotent.
Ah! This the thought which drives the coward heart,
The desperate alternative to choose
'Twixt hell and nothingness. A better part
Appears to faith. Then why, oh mortals, lose
That nobler choice, redemption? Bought with blood
Of God incarnate, wrought by power divine,
The safe inheritance of perfect good.
The grace that shall your inmost souls refine
From error, sin and sorrow, and bestow

The angel's life of bliss and purity,
Whose years are measured only by the flow
Of God's eternity; the gift as free
To every thirsting soul as air of heaven!
Why do men turn from glories such as these
To dreary night and death? And still elect
Infinite loss and naught o'er boundless seas
Of joy? Because, oh shame; their guilty fears detect
The treason and the folly they have wrought
Against themselves and their best destiny
In serving sin! This infamy hath taught
(And this alone) the atheists' grovelling plea,
That death may be to them "eternal sleep."

R. L. DABNEY.

VII. NOTES.

COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES AS FACTORS IN A NATION'S LIFE.

College, from the Latin *Collegium*, means literally a collection. Webster defines it as, "A society of scholars or friends of learning incorporated for study or instruction, especially in the higher branches of study." University, from *Universitas* (the whole), Trubner, author of the World's Year Book of Universities, describes as "A group of faculties of schools, devoted to higher learning, under the direction of a single corporation, which confers the various degrees." If the specific difference between the two be the power to confer degrees, then most of our colleges should change their names, for they not only every summer make "A. B.'s" by the hundred, and "A. M.'s" by the scores, but turn out "D. D.'s" by the dozen! The differentiating qualities, to state them generally, are the relative number of students and instructors; and specifically, a compulsory or elective curriculum, and discipline or freedom. Without binding ourselves to its future use, we would for our purpose in the comparison to be instituted, use the term college in its larger and ambitious American sense, designating by it all institutions of learning for male or female, filling the interval between the grammar school and the university.

Further, our comparison will lie between the two classes of institutions as they are in this country; the one more or less distinctly and often professedly under religious influence; the other not even making such pretension. The term "life" is employed in the sense in which it occurs in the Scripture words, "A man's life (weal) consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth." A nation's life is its weal, its prosperity.

A nation "lives" when its fields, with diligent and skilful, and even scientific, cultivation, yield in good seasons abundantly, and with "garners full," "the joy of the harvest" becomes the general experience, when "flocks multiply in the fold and herds in the stall," and "oxen are strong to labor;" when its soil is thus made to produce every variety of textile and kind of food, "yielding all manner of store;" when

organized capital and labor quarry its hills, and bring up from earth's bowels treasures stored for man's use before his creation; when it possesses "a land whose stones are iron and out of whose hills thou shalt dig brass (copper)"; when manufactures add new values to the products of the soil; when there is constant and remunerative employment for all its citizens willing to work, and no just cause for "complaining in her streets;" when industry and economy characterize the masses; when there are few millionaires and little, if any, abject poverty. A nation "lives" when her rulers are honest and just, and her population patriotic and law-abiding; when officials of every degree recognize that "public office is public trust;" when their integrity is so manifest that attempt at bribery is an impossibility; when the machinery of law works with such speed, precision and certainty, that no temptation exists to resort to irregular methods of wiping away the stain of innocent blood and protecting society from murderous greed and brutal lust; when the words of a great living statesman are realized in her history. "Our government is so ordained, that its life blood flows from the virtue and patriotism of our people, and its health and strength depend upon the integrity and faithfulness of its public servants." (Cleveland.)

A nation "lives" when its population encouraged by these favorable conditions rapidly multiplies, not so much by a regulated immigration as by natural increase; when the hindrances to early marriages, in general impoverishment and extravagant ambitions are removed; the one sex willing to bear the pains of continued maternity and both to undergo the care of the upbringing of offspring; the land abounds with homes filled with strong, healthy, virtuous children; its many "sons as plants grown up in their youth," with a man's stature before they have attained their majority, with strength and health unsapped by dissipation, standing stately as palms, and its many "daughters," with the freshness of their maidenly beauty unfaded by late hours are "as polished" as the marble pilasters of the temple of God!

A nation "lives" when education, common and advanced, is general and largely free, and its facilities at least are within reach of her entire population.

A nation "lives" in the highest and best sense when religion prospers within her borders; when everywhere the church spire rises beside the school belfry; when her people are not only keepers of the civil code and of the moral law, but devout worshippers of heaven's King. "Happy is that people that is in such a case, yea happy is that people whose God is the Lord."

Now holding in memory our definitions, we recast our topic into the form of the more manageable proposition.

The college is a more potent factor in a nation's life than the university. Let us not be misunderstood as being inimical to the university; it has its uses; valuable uses in their places, and no scheme of education, private or national, is complete without it; the university is the highest development of the college and its fitting crown. The purpose of our comparison is to show that it is better for a nation's "life" to have many colleges than many universities, and that it were more conducive to a people's prosperity to have numerous colleges and no universities, than have a few universities and as few colleges, or none at all.

That a nation will prosper more in her material, intellectual and spiritual interests by the multiplication of the college than of the university will appear from the following considerations:

1. Because the college, as less expensive, is capable of greater expansion than the university. A college, in the sense defined, may be thoroughly manned by a force of comparatively few teachers—a half dozen perhaps—the university must have for complete equipment a score or more; a professor for every department and for every important sub-division of each department. Columbia University, New York, has six schools: art, law, medicine, mines, politics, philosophy; some add a seventh, theology. Now to teach in all these schools sub-divided into other departments, Princeton, in 1884, had thirty-nine professors; Harvard the same year, 135; all salaried men! (Encyclopædia Britannica.) Again, a college may be housed in a few and unpretending buildings; the university must have a large number and of spacious dimensions to accommodate students and professors and shelter, library, observatory, laboratory, and museum. From the authority just quoted we learn that Princeton, had in 1884, 519 students; Harvard, in 1882, 988; and Yale, the same year, 692. For the accommodation of this large student body, professors, and costly apparatus, Yale at the date above given, had six dormitories and thirteen other buildings; Harvard had "of halls, as they are termed, owned and occupied for college uses, 29 of brick and stone, and 10 for students' chambers." The cost of these many buildings must have been immense.

As the undergraduate has little time, outside of the studies of the compulsory curriculum, for special or general reading, the college needs but a few hundred or thousand books. The university, for the

necessities of professors and students following special studies must have books by the hundred thousand. Princeton has 68,000; Columbia, 90,000; Cornell, 150,000; Yale, 200,000, and Harvard, 365,000. (*Christian at Work.*) Now these books average perhaps more than two dollars apiece!

To yield an income sufficient for payment of salaries, improvement in apparatus and enlargement of library, and, in general, meeting current expenses, an enormous investment is needed. The endowment of Princeton amounts to $1,392,000, and of Harvard, $3,615,000. Now it is true that the larger part of these investments in building and interest-paying securities, is the result of individual or class generosity, still it is just so much abstracted from the circulating values of the country. It will be thus perceived that the wealth utilized in establishing, equipping and endowing a few great universities, giving the advantages of the highest education to a few hundred students, might establish, equip and endow perhaps a hundred times as many colleges, and afford substantial and liberal instruction to as many thousands of students.

2. Colleges if sufficiently multiplied, which their comparative inexpensiveness makes possible, bring a liberal education within the reach of more students, and thus actually draw more pupils to their halls than universities do. Tuition at the college is less, board less, clothing less, and travelling expenses less; in a word the cost of living and education less, and many an ambitious youth, despairing of ever accumulating means to enter the distant and great university, gets a broad and liberal education in a home college. A log school-house in a forest is an object lesson, inspiring a desire for education in the most illiterate community; for a greater reason every higher institution is just such an object lesson; but the college brings the lesson nearer to a greater multitude of spectators than the university. Farmers, who would never dream of sending their sons and daughters to Yale or Vassar, are encouraged by what they see in a neighbor's children, educated in the institute only fifty or a hundred miles away, to strain a point and work farm or dairy with one less pair of hands, and secure for their young people the polish of a collegiate finishing. The proof of the stimulating effect of a college upon the neighborhood, is seen in the fact that all our smaller institutions of learning are largely supported by local patronage.

3. The college furnishes the country more teachers than the university. When the writer was a student in Columbia Seminary, S. C., he well

remembers the intense excitement produced throughout the State by an unfortunate remark of a rising young lawyer from the coast who had been invited to deliver the commencement oration before South Carolina College. He was understood to have said that the true theory of education was to give the highest culture to the upper stratum of society, and then its fertilizing waters would percolate to the lower; or to use his metaphor: "Open the fountain upon the mountain top, and it will send its streams into the valleys." He was burned in effigy in the streets of Charleston by an indignant people, who, however, with their proverbial ficklenesss speedily reversed their own verdict. Whether the people through that reaction which invariably comes, which as readily passes from "crucify him" to "crown him" as the opposite, or through sober second thought, discovered that there was no design to offend, but some important truth at the bottom of the observation, is unknown; but undoubtedly it is true, that if you thoroughly educate the upper stratum of society the lower will feel its educating influence.

The masses have not time nor means to go to college or university; the necessities of manual toiling for a living make them in some sense "hewers of wood and drawers of water." But there is an informal instruction which the educated few will insensibly give the illiterate many. The most rustic community is the better for the presence in it of a few college-bred men. A neighborhood wholly illiterate will receive a kind of education from the new methods introduced even in husbandry by some farmer's son who has had the advantage of and has not been spoiled by a higher education. Both universities and colleges send out these informal teachers, but it is the latter that give the country the professional teacher. There are, so far as we are informed, few universities which have a school of pedagogy, and as a matter of fact, their matriculates are commonly students of medicine, law, arts, literature, mining, or electricity; but on the contrary a large number, perhaps the majority, of the graduates of colleges either teach for a time while seeking some other learned avocation, or make teaching their life-long profession.

4. The social training of the college is better than that of the university.

In the smaller institution naturally, and indeed necessarily, the student comes into more familiar and friendlier contact both with his teachers and his fellow-pupils than in the big caravansary of the larger. In the university the association in both cases is ordinarily confined to the class-room. This has been painfully felt by even

theological students, between whom and the professor and among themselves there is the bond of a common and brotherly pursuit of the highest and most uniting kind; as for example in students passing from Columbia, S. C., or Union, Va., to the much larger seminary at Princeton, N. J., they sadly miss the paternal interest and family relationship which seem to characterize the smaller, the lack not wholly due to latitude. The college student thus having his social nature better trained along with his intellectual, becomes a fitter citizen of the world, while the university scholar who for a term of years has been almost wholly deprived of it, is in danger of coming out a pedant rather than a many-sided man.

5. Another advantage of the college over the university is the superior opportunity of forming helpful friendships for after life. In society we stand as the trees of a forest, which together resist the storm; we are mutual helpers; and the friendships of scholastic life are among the most lasting. The college, gathering its students from a narrower area than the university; fellow-students of the one meet as they never do of the other. If a physician, your college graduate will find patients, or a lawyer, clients, or a merchant, patrons, or a clergyman, parishioners, who will be drawn to him by the memories of scholastic association, or by pride in alma mater, and interest in every generation of her sons.

6. College education gives a broader culture than university instruction. The curriculum of a college is so arranged as to develop and train every mental faculty; the university perfects only a given set of powers. The one simply sharpens the razor's edge and fits it for its one work, the other, to change the figure, trains by use the intellect as the teacher of the gymnasium does, every muscle of the body for service. The one is intenser, the other broader.

7. In the college an important department of our complex nature is apt to be cultivated, which in the university is ordinarily neglected—the spiritual. Surely while it is the special province of the family and the church to do this preëminently, education is all the better where incidentally, at least, this development goes on *pari passu* with the intellectual. An article appeared many years since in "Home, The School and The Church," edited by Dr. Van Rensellaer, which with singular ability demonstrated the refining and expanding effect of religious truth upon the human mind. It was noted, how the surrender to religious influences improved the intellectual powers of the illiterate, and refined the hitherto coarse, and even brutal features. One cause

assigned for this illumination and transformation was the transcendental character of Scripture themes. Now in some colleges the Bible is made reverently a text-book and in almost all such religious influences are thrown about the student as are rare in university life. If then religion fits one to be a better citizen, that education is preferable which develops his spiritual nature and grounds his character upon moral principles. Even Robespierre is reported by Allison in his History of Europe to have felt that religious faith is the necessary foundation of a nation's being and prosperity in saying: "If God did not exist it would be necessary to invent his being: The idea of a Supreme Being who watches over oppressed innocence and punishes triumphant crime is and ever will be popular."

8. Skepticism is oftener found in the university than the college. In filling the vacant chairs in the one, much regard is usually given to personal character and to religious beliefs; in the other the exclusive standard is apt to be learning and professorial skill. Commonly, the university professor is free to believe or disbelieve as he will; and neither belief nor disbelief will constitute qualification or disqualification.

Then further, the minute subdivision of branches of instruction tends to narrow the minds of teacher and pupil, and to exaggerate each special department out of all proportion to the rest of truth. Perhaps this is the psychological explanation of the vagaries of certain professors. The department of Biblical Theology for example, as contra-distinguished from Systematic Theology, is so narrow that its teacher may almost unconsciously yield to the temptation to spice it with a little startling heterodoxy. Infidelity on the continent is largely the hatching of university professors. In a Christian college, throwing religious influences about the young, in the most dangerous period of intellectual development, our young men and young women are apt to grow up reverent, believing and pious; while in too many instances they come back from the university scoffers at the faith of childhood and the creed of their ancestors.

9. Colleges rather than universities have been the subjects of revivals of religion and the sources of ministerial supply. As, from causes at work more in the one than the other, we should naturally have expected, more pious laymen are graduated from the one than the other to fill the learned and influential professions. And as it is a well-known historical fact that all the older American colleges were founded for the purpose of rearing a native ministry, and for the most part under clergymen-professors, fulfilled their design to a wonderful extent, so

are colleges to this day the chief sources of the recruiting of the gospel ministry. We see it stated that "the twenty-one academies and fifteen colleges aided the past years" by the Northern General Assembly, "report two hundred and twenty-seven conversions within twelve months, and that one hundred and seventy-six of their students expect to study for the ministry." In the South, Davidson College and the Southwestern University at Clarksville (which is more a college than a university) furnish a similar record. The large majority of the students in both institutions are professors of religion; many in the former are studying for the ministry, and seventy-six candidates are now prosecuting their studies at the latter.

It were easy to show in detail how in the three elements of a nation's life or prosperity—material, intellectual and spiritual, the college, for the several reasons elaborated, is a more potent factor than the university; but leaving the reader to make the application of the truths stated, we conclude with a few very practical inferences:

1. A complete education includes grammar-school, high-school, college and university, and should where possible be sufficiently protracted that the student shall pass from the broader culture of the three lower and their compulsory courses, with attendant discipline, to the elective and intenser culture with greater freedom, when years, experience, stability of purpose and character, and development of special aptitudes, shall have fitted him for a wise and successful use of the facilities of the highest of all, the university.

2. Where a student, by reason of local circumstances, must pass at once from the high-school to the university, he will show his wisdom by following in the latter a course of study which, in its broadness, will approximate the college curriculum, even if he must in consequence thereby forfeit his degrees, it will be better for him in after life to have gotten the wider mental culture than the coveted scholarly distinction for proficiency in some special department.

3. Where parents are limited to the choice between the college and the university in the higher education of their sons and daughters, they will show their wisdom in choosing the former.

4. And lastly, philanthropic men who have the means and the disposition to endow educational institutions, would do a more beneficient work for their race, if instead of adding their splendid gifts to the swollen endowments of such rich institutions as Princeton or Harvard, they would divide it out into smaller sums, distributed among a half dozen or so of the needy colleges, which with insufficient means,

are doing a noble work for church and state. Let us have here and there, as the Government erects its light-houses on the coast, great universities, shedding their brilliant illumination far and wide; but not neglect to build on our hill-tops everywhere, the countless and humbler bonfires of schools, academies and colleges.

New Orleans. R. Q. Mallard.

THE COMMUNION WINE QUESTION.

We but recently had the privilege of reading the Rev. Dr. T. D. Witherspoon's review of the proceedings of the Hot Springs General Assembly, published in the July number of the Presbyterian Quarterly. Our attention was particularly directed to the paragraph under the head of "Communion Wine," giving the author's views of the subject, and criticising the conduct of the minority in their opposition to so much of the majority report as recognized fermented grape juice to be the scriptural element in the celebration of the Lord's Supper. The general tenor of this review, and notably some of its particular representations, indicate that the author misapprehended, or was not properly advised concerning, the facts and motives which prompted the earnest opposition of the minority. We conclude, therefore, that in this important matter the true position of the minority should be fairly understood, and that in common justice the one who introduced the minority report, should, on behalf of his coädjutors and himself, have a hearing through the same channel in which they have been arraigned before the bar of public opinion.

The overture of Holston Presbytery may reasonably have been a surprise to a majority of the Assembly, as it was the first of the kind in the history of Presbyterianism in this country; but it appears somewhat remarkable that any one conversant with our current religious history should suppose that we were a unit upon the question of using "the ordinary wine in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper," when it is a matter of such general notoriety that several of our churches use only the unfermented wine, and a considerable number of our ministers and ruling elders, and many of our laity, conscientiously believe that to have been the element used by the Saviour at the institution of the Sacrament, to say nothing of the same opinion entertained by many throughout our sister church of the North. In the spreading and penetrating light of this gospel age, it certainly would have been a

marvellous event if the highest court of our beloved church had been permitted to give its judicial sanction to the use of alcoholic wine as an emblem of Christ's shed blood without a solemn protest.

We know nothing of the preparation of the wine used at the communion on the Sabbath during the Assembly, and therefore could not reasonably be supposed to recognize its quality as a test case, but it has since been demonstrated by careful analysis, made by competent chemists at the instance of the pastor of the church in which the wine was used, that it contained neither alcohol nor any "microbes peculiar to acetous fermentation." So the basis upon which Dr. Witherspoon declares "a practical break-down of the theory at the very outset" is shown to be a profound mistake.

And he says: "It is strange that the advocates of the 'two-wine' theory do not see the practicable impossiblity of giving us unfermented juice of the grape except in the grape itself." In matters of controversy a simple denial establishes no fact and serves only to make up the issue; but to prove the error of the foregoing statement we have but to appeal to science, history and the testimony of trustworthy witnesses extending from the grape syrup of the ancient Jews to the pure, sweet wine that is preserved for medicinal and communion purposes in the very neighborhood of Dr. Witherspoon's Kentucky home. To us it has been a matter of knowledge and experience for years, that the juice of the grape can be entirely protected from ferment, and preserved with its natural flavor and native invigorating and food-giving powers from season to season. It is not recalled that "the mover of the minority report stated in so many words that the moment the juice of the grape comes in contact with our atmosphere fermentation begins." He did contend that there could be no fermentation without exposure to an impure or corrupt atmosphere, but at what particular time after such exposure fermentation would begin we do not think was stated. We respectfully submit, however, that this does not touch the merits of the question, as it is an easy matter to eliminate the comparatively harmless effects of the incipient stages of fermentation, and the clean-cut issue in the controversy was as to the Scripturalness of using *alcoholic, intoxicating* wine, affirmed by the majority and denied by the minority.

Again says Dr. Witherspoon: "To a student of the original Scriptures, nothing could be more painful than to see a member of the Assembly, an honest, earnest ruling elder, misguided by the ministerial fanatics of our land, who profess to study the Bible in the original,

taking two passages of scripture in which the Holy Spirit uses the same identical word for wine, and authoritatively declaring, with a dogmatism which nothing but a supernatural inspiration in the speaker could warrant, that when the Holy Spirit used the word in one place he meant fermented wine, and when he used it in another place he meant unfermented wine."

Now, as a matter of fact, the speaker, in making his plea for unfermented wine, based his entire argument upon the English Bible as given to the English-speaking people by the translation of 1611 and the revision of 1881–'85, according to the meaning of the language as defined by our standard English lexicon, and generally accepted by our scholars and people at large, and claimed that with these means diligently used by a consecrated common-sense the teaching of God's word upon the subject could be ascertained and understood. The whole trend and spirit of the argument was in the faith of that knowledge of the truth and consequent freedom which the Saviour promised to those who should abide in *his* "word," and, therefore, in plain and direct opposition to the influences of all "ministerial fanatics" of every grade and pretension, although the speaker indulged in no such epithets.

As a metaphysical proposition it may sometimes be difficult to identify every influence that enters into the formation of one's opinion, but we protest that nothing was said by "the minority" which could fairly be construed as the result of any human wisdom or device antagonistic to Holy Writ. The mere disavowal of "dogmatism" and of all pretensions to "a supernatural inspiration" would be but a step in the old beaten track of ordinary dispute, and therefore as a refutation of this sweeping charge, we beg leave to refer to "the law and the testimony" unnoticed by our critic, but which lead to our conclusion. Numerous passages of Scripture were cited in support of the "two-wine theory," and to demonstrate that the Holy Spirit sets forth a wine of blessing and a wine of cursing, as separate and distinct as good and evil. life and death, corresponding to the condition of "the creature" before the fall, and after the fall; and whilst "the same identical word" is used in each instance, the context always clearly shows which kind is meant. That the wine mentioned as in possession of the vine, "cheering God and man"; as being "gathered in with the harvest"; as "bursting out from the press"; as being "found in the cluster" with "a blessing in it"; and as a representative of "life," which all are exhorted "to come and buy, without money and without price," as free and unstinted as the "water" and "milk" used as co-

emblems in the same great invitation, *is the wine of blessing*, corresponding to the condition of "the creature" *before* the fall. That the wine which made Noah drunk and brought the curse of slavery upon a branch of his posterity, typical of the bondage of sin; which is declared to be "a mocker" and "raging"; which we are commanded not to look upon "in the cup"; which "at the last biteth like a serpent and stingeth like an adder"; which filled the tables of Ephraim with vomit; which was used as an emblem of God's wrath in the punishment of his rebellious people, and which caused the priest and the prophet "to err in vision," and "stumble in judgment," *is the wine of cursing*, corresponding to the condition of "the creature" *after* the fall. Moreover, that Webster's dictionary—our accepted standard of definition—gives as the first meaning of wine, "the expressed juice of grapes, usually the fermented juice," in exact accordance with the use of "the same identical word" by the Spirit as indicated in the two foregoing collations. So that with all this Scripture teaching, and accepted definition in our native language, plain and undisputed before the minds of the minority, we felt impelled to the conclusion, *nolens volens*, that the Spirit used the same word in one place to mean unfermented wine that he used in another place to mean fermented wine; just as he chose to call Adam by the same name before, as after, the fall, although his moral nature was as thoroughly changed by sin as the "new wine in the cluster" is changed by fermentation; just as he chose to call water by the same name, whether gushing from the smitten rock or lurking in the bitterness of Marah; and just as the Saviour called a fig tree by the same name, whether laden with the fruit of blessing or empty under the curse of barrenness.

Again we quote: "There was one point which the speaker, on behalf of unfermented wine as the Scriptural element, failed to notice, and that was that the Apostle Paul, when those irregularities were reported to him in the Corinthian church and so severely animadverted upon by him, did not tell the men who were drinking to drunkenness at the Lord's table that they were using the wrong kind of wine." We "failed to notice" this, simply because we could not, according to our arrangement of the Scripture evidences, reach it within the twenty minutes to which we were limited by the Assembly. But we had not overlooked the fact that the Apostle had said that "in *eating*" (italics ours), "one was an hungered and another drunken," and that the drunken condition mentioned as the result of *eating* is construed by eminent scholars as meaning gluttony, or excessive eating of any

kind. This appears consistent with all of Paul's teachings, for although in the immediate context of the succeeding verse, he says, "have ye not houses to eat and to drink in?" not naming any *kind* of drink, in the closing verse of the chapter he instructs them in these words: "And if any man hunger let him *eat* at home; that you come not together unto condemnation." Moreover, he brings to their minds the fact that he had received the ordinance from the Lord just as he delivered it unto them, and rehearses to them the use and design of the elements, which they would understand by exemplification without his naming the kind of bread or the contents of "the cup." And what more persuasive evidence could be offered to those Corinthians that no "mocker," nor anything that was "raging" or carried in itself the serpent's bite and the adder's sting, was proper to use upon such an occasion, than to hold up before them "the cup" containing that of which Jesus had said, "I will not drink henceforth of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father's kingdom?"

But, says Dr. Witherspoon, "If the mover of the minority resolution had been there he would have advanced his 'two-wine theory;' but the inspired apostle did not, for the simple reason that he had never heard of it."

If permitted to answer this hypothetical argument according to its *ad hominem* tendency, we would suggest that if its propounder had been with Isaiah when he issued to the world the great invitation to "come to the waters and drink," and "buy wine and milk, without money and without price," he would have importuned the inspired prophet to warn the people to drink sparingly of "the *wine*," take but "a drop" or sip at most, lest they should become drunken; and thus urged his *one-wine* theory of intoxicating drink. But the prophet recognized no such theory, and therefore put no more restriction upon the use of the wine than he did upon the water or the milk.

If our estimable brother intended to retaliate in surprises, he certainly succeeded in the statements, "It is the result of higher criticism." "It is purely rationalistic." The studious and prayerful research of the Scriptures, as literally inspired of God in every thought and expression, which has been instrumental in bringing so many earnest seekers after the truth to the conscientious conviction that Jesus did not take an agency of death to represent the life-giving blood of "the true vine," is so diametrically opposed to every pretense of "higher criticism" and "rationalism" that we can but wonder

what effect upon the minds of careful students will be made by such severe polemics above the name of a prominent theological professor. Again: "Its leading advocates do not hesitate to say that if they believed that the wine made by our Lord at the marriage in Cana of Galilee was alcoholic wine, they would say, 'down with Christianity!'" We have no such "leading advocates," cannot tell to whom reference is made, recognize no such rebellious sentiment, and classify all such extremists with those ultra advocates of alcohol who are bold to declare that if the Scriptures interfere with their "personal liberty" to drink what they please, "let the whole Bible go overboard!" It may be true that "the great cause of temperance can never be advanced by methods of this kind," but it is a serious question how far it will be advanced by legalizing "strong drink" in the church while condemning it as a beverage.

It might be anticipated that those whose cloistered lives have limited their experience in the fields of nature's bounty should not be acquainted with the strengthening and food-giving powers of the luscious grape but it is anomalous that any one versed in the rudiments of chemistry and physiology should venture the assertion that unfermented grape juice is "depressing." As a natural food it is generally conceded to have but few equals, it is a superior tonic, and is recognized by multitudes in sickness and in health as "the cup that cheers but not inebriates." Finally we quote: "But the very symbolism which makes a crumb of bread and a drop of wine sufficient, imperatively demands that the bread shall contain nourishment, and the wine shall contain exhilaration." This completes the issue between us. This imperative demand for "exhilaration" cannot be misunderstood, whether sought in a drink or symbolized in "a drop." But what is *that* "exhilaration"? The confirmed inebriates have testified that it was the first step that started, and the seductive influence which impelled, their downward career, causing them "to seek it yet again," and their testimony is confirmed by common-sense observation and the conclusion of scientists. And the greatest witness says "Wine is a mocker." Is it not self-evident that the active principle or effective agency of that "mocker" is the same identical "exhilaration" which is imperatively demanded by our opponents? If this is true, does it not settle the question against them?

In conclusion, the minority presented as their most persuasive argument the Scripture teaching that "the element" was used at the passover in a house where all ferment or leaven was expressly forbid-

den; that our Lord called it "the fruit of the vine;" that our standard lexicons define "fruit" as "a vegetable growth;" not the product of decay or fermentation; and that he sublimated and fixed this element far above and beyond the idea and possibility of an intoxicant when he declared to his disciples that he would drink it with them in the kingdom of God. This argument was not answered then, and Dr. Witherspoon has failed to notice it in his review. And we submit to the mind and conscience of enlightened, Christendom that unless the learned advocates of intoxicating wine can remove, or explain away, the inhibitions and condemnations of Scripture bearing directly upon it, and give some plausible version of the language and conduct of the Saviour by which fermentation or its effects can be admitted into the spotless, sinless and deathless kingdom of the everlasting Father, the minority will be justified in standing firm for the use of the literal "fruit of the vine," as the Scriptural emblem of the pure, life-giving blood of the world's Redeemer. J. H. Beauchamp.

Lexington, Ky.

THE TORONTO COUNCIL OF THE ALLIANCE OF THE REFORMED CHURCHES HOLDING THE PRESBYTERIAN SYSTEM.

Nearly a score of years have passed since the first efforts were made towards the formation of an Alliance of the Reformed and Presbyterian Churches throughout the world. After several years of earnest conference between leading men in Britain and America, the Alliance was formed on the general basis of the *consensus* of the Reformed symbols. Sixteen years ago the first Council was held in Edinburgh, the national and religious metropolis of Scotland. It was fitting that the first Alliance gathering should be held in the city where John Knox did so much for the cause of the Reformation. Nor was it inappropriate that the meeting should be held so near the place where Jennie Geddes bore her vigorous testimony against the imposition of Prelacy upon an unwilling people.

Since that memorable meeting in Edinburgh, where earnest and able men from many lands met to look each other in the face, to clasp each other's hands, and confer together concerning the Lord's work, meetings have been held every four years. The second council of the Alliance was held in America; and the city of Philadelphia, where Presby-

terianism is so strong, had the honor of first welcoming the Alliance to the New World, and the City of Brotherly Love did herself honor by the cordial and hospitable manner in which she entertained the delegates. Then the third Council met in Belfast, that city of the north of Ireland, and the Presbyterian metropolis of that quarter of the Green Isle, which at one time proved a haven for bands of loyal Presbyterians who were driven from their native Scotland by cruel persecuting hands, but who were again soon compelled to cross the stormy Atlantic in order to find homes in the wild wilderness regions of America, where they might enjoy civil and religious liberty in this New World. The fourth Council was held in London, England, the great metropolis of the British Empire, and in the heart of a population which has only a small percentage of Presbyterianism in it; and yet the Alliance could claim with special propriety that it had a right to meet near that time-honored abbey where the Westminster Assembly met to frame the Confession and Catechisms, which form the doctrinal symbols of nearly all branches of the Presbyterian family. The fifth Council met in Toronto, Canada, a very suitable place for the second visit of the Alliance to the continent of America.

Toronto is a city of nearly 200,000, and is growing rapidly, having almost doubled its population during the last decade. It is the capital of the Province of Ontario, and a large commercial centre. Here many of the leading educational institutions of Ontario are located, so that it numbers among its citizens many people of learning and refinement. Presbyterianism is also a strong factor in the religious life and activity of the city. It is represented by over thirty congregations and several prosperous missions. The Presbytery of Toronto, which also includes a few churches in the vicinity of the city, has just sixty ministers and over seventy churches on its roll, with a membership of over fifteen thousand communicants. In such a centre of Presbyterianism, the Alliance was sure to receive a hearty welcome, and the proceedings of the Council could not fail to elicit a great deal of interest. This interest was shown by the large audiences which attended all the meetings, and the excellent reports which several of the leading daily papers gave of the proceedings. The hospitality of the people of Toronto was unbounded, and no pains were spared by the Presbyterians of the city to make the sojourn of the delegates pleasant. The committee of local arrangements deserve all praise for the admirable manner in which their plans were made and carried out.

A stranger visiting Toronto for the first time must be impressed

with the good order which prevails on the streets, and especially with the strict manner in which the Sabbath is observed. Not only is the noise of street traffic and pushing of trade in small shops entirely absent, but the sound of the street cars is not heard, and there are no Sunday papers issued or circulated, nor is there any delivery of postal matter anywhere in the city. And yet the city prospers in its trade and in everything which goes to make up solid advancement. Attempts have been made to have the horse cars run on Sabbath, but a year ago the people pronounced against the proposal by a large majority at the polls. To some people a Toronto Sabbath may seem Puritan, but to Presbyterians it is very precious.

But we must hasten to the Council and its proceedings. The opening services were held on the 21st of September, and the closing exercises took place on the 30th of the month. The religious services with which the Council opened were held in St. James Square Church, of which Rev. Dr. Kellogg was pastor almost to the time of the Council, but from which he had retired to enter on the work of translating the Scriptures into two of the leading languages of India. The subsequent sessions were held in Cooke's Church, of which Rev. Prof. Gregg, D. D., of Knox College, was pastor many years, but over which the Rev. W. Patterson now presides with great vigor and success. The church edifice was admirably suited for the Council meetings; and, with a seating capacity of nearly three thousand, was capable of accommodating many of the large masses of the public which thronged every day to attend the meetings.

The number of delegates present was about three hundred and fifty. Several of the European delegates were detained by reason of the cholera, which threatened to be so serious just before the time appointed for the Council to meet, so that the membership of this Council was less than was expected. The *personnel* of the body was an interesting study. There were many grave and reverend seniors, and yet there was a greater proportion of younger men than might have been expected. They presented the appearance of a solid, cultured, earnest and practical body of men. Holding fast by the well-defined outlines of Reformed doctrine, they were also alive to the practical needs and dangers of the church at the present day, and, above all, they were filled with devoted missionary zeal. From every quarter of the world delegates were present, which shows that the doctrines of the Reformation and the Presbyterian polity encircle the globe, and flourish in every clime and among all peoples. The

British churches were represented by strong delegations from four bodies in Scotland, two in Ireland, one in England and one in Wales. The Continental churches were not largely represented, but they had some exceedingly able men on the floor of the Council. Then the churches in the United States and Canada were quite fully represented, no less than twelve distinct bodies having delegates present. One of the most interesting contingents of the Council was that from the foreign mission field, for almost every great missionary centre was well represented, and these delegates had some stirring things to say concerning the Lord's doings in pagan lands.

Our own Southern Church was very fairly represented, there being twenty-six of her thirty delegates present at this Council, and the majority of them remained throughout the entire proceedings, and took a share in the work of the Council. They were also called on to do a good deal of preaching on Sabbath in various city pulpits. Two of the delegation were on the business committee, two presided as chairmen of the Council at its sittings, three read papers, and several made addresses from time to time, on the subjects under discussion. On the Executive committee of the Western section six were appointed from the Southern Church, and three other permanent committees of the Alliance have each members from our church.

It is impossible, in a sketch like this, to describe many of the leading members of the Toronto Council. Perhaps the four most influential members of the body were Dr. Blaikie, of Edinburgh, the retiring president; Dr. Chambers, of New York, the president-elect; Dr. Caven, of Toronto, who preached the opening sermon, and was chairman of the business committee, and Dr. John Hall, of New York. These four men are in many ways unlike each other, but the opinions of each had great weight with the Council, and all had the wisdom neither to speak too often nor too long. Dr. Mathews, the General Secretary of the Alliance, deserves special mention for the exceedingly able service which he has rendered since its last meeting, and Dr. W. H. Roberts, of Cincinnati, the secretary of the Western section of the Alliance, proves an able and efficient officer. To name others worthy of mention would be to fill a whole page, so we refrain from further remarks of a personal nature.

The Council opened with religious services, at which a sermon was preached by the Rev. Dr. Caven, the eminent principal of Knox College, Toronto, and moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Canada. His theme was "the Holy Ghost, the

Church's great teacher." No outline of the sermon can be given. It was heard with the closest attention, and it struck the true key-note for the proceedings of the Council. The audience was, we may suppose, a critical one, and yet the sermon was received with the utmost satisfaction. It was able and devout, it was learned and spiritual, and, in view of the attacks made upon the Christian system, it breathed a spirit of hopefulness tempered with seriousness, which was admirable.

At the conclusion of the sermon the president, Dr. Blaikie, offered a fervent prayer in constituting the Council. The roll was called, and Dr. Blaikie then read his address. In this he set forth briefly the work of the Alliance, and pointed out some of the good purposes it had served. His allusion, made with delicacy and tender sympathy, to those who were members of the London Council, but had been called home since that meeting, was affecting, and it deeply moved the whole audience.

It was a happy arrangement of the programme that the first day's papers and discussions should be devoted entirely to the "Protestant Reformation." Various aspects of this great and many-sided subject were ably discussed in a series of papers and addresses. Professor Lindsay, of Glasgow, opened with a fine paper on the spiritual character of the Reformation and its fruits in the individual life. Professor Bavinck, of Holland, discussed the influence of the Reformation on the moral and religious condition of nations. Professor Leitch, of Belfast, treated of its influence on their intellectual state and progress, and Professor Baird, of New York, dealt with its influence on their civil and political institutions. These papers were all able, but that of Professor Bavinck, who spoke the English language publicly for the first time, was perhaps the ablest paper read before the Council. It commanded close attention, and elicited much applause. At night, addresses of a more popular nature were given by Dr. Van Horne, of Ohio, Dr. Gibson, of London, Dr. Van Slyke, of New York, and Dr. Eschback, of Maryland, on various topics bearing on the Reformed and Presbyterian Churches. The address of Dr. Gibson stirred the audience as the strength and weakness of these churches were discussed by this racy speaker.

The third day was a field-day for Foreign Missions. Admirable reports were presented by Dr. Swanson, of London, for the Eastern section, and by Dr. Ellinwood, of New York, for the Western section, of the Alliance. Home training of foreign missionaries, native agents and their training, native churches and their self-support, and the relation

of the native churches to the home churches, were the topics considered during the day. At night two meetings were held, one in Cooke's Church, and another in Knox Church, a few squares away. At both places the same addresses were given, the speakers passing to and fro and speaking twice during the evening. The speakers were: Dr. McKichan, of Bombay; Dr. Laws, of Livingstonia; Dr. Paton, of the New Hebrides; Rev. W. A. Wilson, M. A., of India; Dr. Mateer, of China; and Philip Cousland, M. D., also of China. These meetings were of great interest, and could not fail to make a lasting impression on the members of the Council and upon the large audiences in attendance. The address of Dr. Paton, of the New Hebrides, coming from one who has braved so many dangers and has seen such great results during over thirty years of faithful service, was exceedingly impressive, while each of the other speakers told of many things in their respective fields which gave much encouragement to those concerned in the welfare of mission work. The subject of missions most fittingly followed the discussion of the Reformation; and no doubt we may safely say that had there been no Reformation there would not have been the modern advance in Foreign Missions in which our hearts now so rejoice.

During the third day for regular discussions, at the morning session, the American churches and their work among the Negro races and the Indian aborigines engaged attention. The work among the Negro races was described by Dr. Saunders, president of the Biddle University, North Carolina, and by Rev. A. L. Phillips, the secretary of the work among the colored people carried on by our own church. Dr. Saunders was the only colored delegate present, and his paper, which was a good one, was well received by the Council. Mr. Phillips read an excellent paper, in which he described in a general way the work among the colored people of the South, and told briefly what the Southern Presbyterian Church is seeking to do on their behalf. During the afternoon, the American churches and their work among European immigrants and among the Asiatics was the theme. Three papers were read and both branches of the subject gave rise to some vigorous discussion. Some of the Continental and American delegates had a brisk passage at arms concerning the European immigrants, who come in such numbers to the shores of the New World unevangelized; but all parties agreed that the Chinese were severely and unfairly treated on this continent, and that the opium trade in China was a great evil. The Council subsequently passed strong resolutions regarding some of these practical evils. At night the Council was engaged

in discussing the work of the churches in the British Colonies. Canada was represented by Dr. Robertson, and Australia by Professor Rentoul, both of whom had many interesting and important things to say.

The fourth day was devoted to the condition and work of the Reformed Churches on the European continent. To an American audience the papers and addresses of the Continental delegates gave a vast amount of most valuable information, for as a general rule we in America have but little knowledge of the state of our sister churches on the continent of Europe. But the story is a somewhat sad one. Many of the churches of the Reformed order are very weak, and all the weaker because of their divisions on the one hand, and their alliance, in some cases, with the state on the other hand. The Alliance has already aided some of these churches in a substantial way, and proposes to continue, and, if possible, enlarge this work. Dr. Mathews during the past year or two has visited several of these struggling churches, and in his Alliance report gives a great deal of useful information, as well as a carefully compiled table of statistics. The afternoon of this day was assigned to a free conference on spiritual life. An address on the Holy Spirit was given by Dr. Henderson, of Scotland, and this was followed by other addresses on personal and family religion, and on revival. This conference was one of the best things of the whole Council. At night the relation of the church to outside societies doing christian work, supplied a subject which gave rise to one of the most vigorous discussions to which the Council was treated. The speakers were Dr. Burrell, of New York; Dr. Edgar, of Dublin; Dr. McKibbin, of Ohio, and Dr. Muir, of Edinburgh. These addresses were all of a high order, and Drs. Burrell and McKibbin crossed swords in a manner which entertained the audience in a high degree, if it did not greatly edify the Council. Dr. McKibbin on this occasion, as on others where he spoke, showed that he held clearly defined opinions and was able to defend them effectively. The general trend of opinion in all of the addresses, except perhaps that of Dr. Burrell, was towards the conclusion that all these societies should be under direct control of the church courts. The Council also evidently agreed in general with this view.

The fifth day was also a busy day. Three sessions were held, and each was devoted to some phase of practical church work Dr. McVicar, of Montreal, read a paper on the Biblical Idea of the Ministry, Dr. Oliver, of Glasgow, one on the Minister as a Teacher, and Dr. Taylor, of Glasgow, another on the Minister as Organizer. These

papers were pithy and practical. Professor W. W. Moore, of Virginia; Principal Hutton, of Paisley; and President Black of Missouri, had papers on different aspects of ministerial training. Professor Moore's paper was justly pronounced one of the best read at the Council. Its subject was the "The Drifts of Theological Thought in Apologetics and Criticism." It gave rise to considerable discussion, and one or two of the few members of the Council who seemed to regard with favor advanced Higher Criticism, found fault with the paper for being so conservative. This fact may very properly be regarded as a compliment rather than a criticism. The night session was devoted to Sabbath-School and Home Mission work. Dr. Cochrane, of Canada, and others took part.

The sixth day had a varied programme. In the morning Christianity in relation to social problems was the general subject. The wage question, the land question, and the opium question were dicussed by Principal Grant, of Canada, Alex. Watt, Esq., Glasgow, and Dr. McDonald, of Calcutta, respectively. An interesting discussion followed, during which great variety of view was expressed. At the afternoon session the recreation question and the drink question gave rise to a breezy debate. Dr. Park, of Belfast, spoke on the former question, and Dr. Hill, of North Carolina, opened the discussion of the latter. No definite conclusion was reached concerning the recreation question, but the sense of the Council was strongly against the traffic in strong drink. "Aspects of Romanism" was the theme for the night meeting, and an overflow meeting was held again in Knox Church. Both places were crowded. Addresses were given by Pastor Choisy, of Geneva, Dr. Kerr, of Glasgow, Dr. Laing, of Canada, and several others, on different aspects of Romanism and its attitude in various countries. These addresses produced considerable impression, and were variously discussed in the daily newspapers afterwards.

The closing day was devoted largely to routine business, and at night the valedictory meeting was held, at which addresses were given by members of the Council representing various sections of the Alliance. The delegates from Glasgow invited the Alliance to hold its next Council in their city, and the invitation was cordially accepted, so Glasgow will be the meeting-place of the next Council, which will convene (D. V.) in 1896.

During the course of the business part of the Council proceedings, several things emerged which gave rise to some discussion, and led to more definite statement of the functions of the Alliance in its Council

meetings. We can allude to only two points at present. The first had reference to the powers of the business committee, through whose hands all resolutions must pass before they are discussed by the Council. A resolution was submitted by a member of the Council, bearing on the observance of the Sabbath and the Chicago Exposition. This resolution went to the business committee and was reported back to the Council in an amended form. The author of the original resolution, and others, took the ground that the business committee had no such power. The discussion upon this point was earnest, and resulted in the appointment of a committee to consider the duties and functions of the business committee and to report at a subsequent meeting of the Council.

The other question had reference to the powers of the Council to define doctrine. This was raised by the following resolution, which was submitted by a member of the Alliance: "The Alliance hereby affirms its belief in the historic and supernatural character of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, and does not know of any sufficient reason for rejecting the uniform testimony of the church as to the authorship of these books. The Alliance also affirms its belief in the perfection of the work of the Holy Spirit, who so inspired the sacred writers that the original Scriptures were in very truth the word of God. This word of God, as delivered by him to holy men of old, is free from error, and is the only and all-sufficient source and seat of authority in all matters pertaining to the salvation of sinners." The business committee, into whose hands this resolution went, after most careful consideration, submitted the following finding to the Council: "That inasmuch as the Alliance of the Reformed Churches is based on the consensus of the Reformed confessions, this Council deems it outside its province to formulate definitions of doctrine." The time for business did not allow the Council to discuss this resolution when it was presented, and at a later stage in the Council proceedings, Dr. Caven, the chairman of the business committee, asked leave to substitute a more carefully worded resolution, as follows: "The Alliance of the Reformed Churches is based on the consensus of the Reformed confessions, and in these the doctrine of Holy Scripture is set forth in its proper place; but inasmuch as the churches composing this Alliance have conferred upon the Council no power to further define doctrine, it is resolved to take no further action on this resolution dealing with the authority of Holy Scripture." Dr. Caven made a few explanatory remarks in support of this resolution, and thereafter it was adopted by the Council without any dissenting voices.

It is proper to add, that it was not because the Council did not agree with the views expressed in the original resolution that it declined to take any action upon it. The business committee and the great majority of the Council were no doubt in hearty accord with the terms of that resolution. It was simply because the Council felt that it had no power to frame or define doctrine that it declined to act on the resolution. The Council was almost a unit in this view, and those members of the Alliance who were opposed to the formation of a concensus creed by the Alliance could not fail to feel that their general position was confirmed by this action of the Council.

One who attended the sessions of the Council could not fail to receive certain impressions. Three of these may now be noted very briefly.

In the first place, one was impressed with the strength and numbers of the Reformed and Presbyterian Churches throughout the world. Sixty-six branches of these churches are now represented in the Alliance, and the statistical table prepared by Dr. Mathews gives the figures of upwards of ninety branches. Consider the following figures: Presbyteries, 1,249; pastoral charges, 23,479; ministers, 23,951; elders, 120,933; deacons, 69,805; licentiates, 2,549; candidates, 4,169; communicants, 4,092,965; Sabbath-schools, 25,708; teachers, 405,985; attendance, 3,820,765. This represents a population of about 20,000,000 round the earth.

A second impression was the conservative character of the Council. In the devotional services the Psalms only were used, and the sound of the organ was not heard. Then, the opinions expressed in the papers and addresses were conservative with a few exceptions. In the light of the present unsettled state of opinion on some questions the Council was unusually conservative. This did not arise from any effort to shrink from these questions, but from a calm and intelligent conservativism which is the only basis of safe and healthy progress. When in one or two instances advanced views were expressed, they were promptly challenged and repudiated by the vast majority of the Council.

The third impression made was that this Council was eminently practical. It has been charged against some past Councils that the questions discussed were largely speculative in their nature. Such a charge could not be fairly made against this Council. Mission work at home and abroad, the aggressive work of the church, the care and training of the young, and perplexing social questions occupied the

chief place in the deliberations of the Council. And the whole tone and spirit of all the discussions was exceedingly earnest and intensely practical, so that good must result to the cause of religion in the world.

A few reflections upon the good purposes the Alliance with its quadrennial Councils serves may also be made. We pass by the advantages which may be deemed rather sentimental, though not entirely useless, in their nature, to mention a few of a more tangible character.

First, it is a good thing to have the real strength of the Reformed and Presbyterian Churches exhibited, as the Alliance is doing in connection with its work. It is inspiring to think that one belongs to any one of the large group of Reformed and Presbyterian Churches, with a membership of nearly five millions, and representing a population of about twenty millions. The lonely worker in distant home or foreign mission field may be cheered as he thinks of this fact. It is also an advantage to have it shown that the doctrines of the Reformed creeds are held by such a vast number. It declares most emphatically that Calvinism is not dying out, nor Presbyterianism going into decay.

In the second place, the Alliance has rendered valuable aid, both by counsel and contributions, to some of the weaker branches of the great family, especially on the continent of Europe. The members and office-bearers of these churches need aid and encouragement, and the Alliance has made it possible to give this in a practical and intelligent way. This reason alone justifies the existence of the Alliance. In this connection advantage comes to foreign mission work, as the workers of the various churches gather together and talk of the Lord's doings among the heathen.

In the third place, the Alliance is illustrating more and more the great fact that the Reformed or Calvinistic doctrine and Presbyterian polity are adapted to all the possible circumstances of mankind. All races, all conditions, and all ranks of men come under its sway. It gives solid religious instruction, it inculcates a high morality, it protects civil and religious liberty, and it proclaims to sinful men a pure and powerful gospel as their only hope. To have the strength and flexibility, the catholicity and aggressiveness, of these churches made manifest, as the Alliance is doing more and more, is an advantage of no little import.

In the fourth place, the Alliance is illustrating the radical difference

between the inner spiritual unity of all true believers, and external uniformity in ecclesiastical organization. There may be harmony without uniformity, and unity of spirit without outward union. Absolute uniformity may be the least desirable thing in religion, yet anything which reveals the unity of the Spirit in the body of Christ is of vast value. The Alliance, we believe, is doing much in this direction.

And lastly, each particular church which forms a branch of the Alliance receives a share in these benefits. The delegation which attends each Council cannot fail to bring back a blessing to its own particular branch. Views of the Lord's work in the world are enlarged, interest in mission work is increased, and new purposes of more devoted service are formed, and as these things become part of the working force of any church, that church is so much the richer and so much the stronger.

In closing this article, a few criticisms, made in the most kindly spirit, may be offered. The business arrangements of the Council, especially in the matter of changing the chairman at each session, do not seem to be in the interests of order and expedition in the transaction of business. Not every good and able man makes an efficient presiding officer, and each branch of the Alliance has its own ways of doing business, so when the chairman is now from one branch and again from another, confusion in procedure is sure to arise. Again, too much time in some cases was taken up in the reading of papers, or, perhaps, we had better say that there were too many papers and the time for each was too short. This is a difficult matter to arrange wisely. Sometimes free discussion is good, and sometimes it may be time wasted. Sometimes a paper is long at fifteen minutes, and again a paper is short at forty-five. The present Council is said to have been an improvement on any preceding one in this respect, and yet there is room for further study of this subject by the committee that prepares the programme. Another serious defect in the whole programme may be signalized, and that is the amount of preaching service held by the Alliance. Only one sermon was preached before the Alliance, and that was at the opening. Why should there not be a sermon preached every day, when veterans from all parts of the field are assembled? Perhaps no hour would be more profitable than one spent in this way. Then, too, one wonders why the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is not observed on the Sabbath embraced in the Council gathering. By this solemn service the spiritual oneness of the various members of the body of Christ would be set forth in a most vivid manner.

But this article must be speedily concluded. The Toronto Council is a thing of the past, and the members of it have gone to their respective posts of service. May the blessing of the triune Jehovah rest upon the several churches of the Alliance, so that four years hence their representatives may meet in Glasgow to praise the Lord anew for all his goodness to them and their work!

Francis R. Beattie.

Columbia, S. C.

VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

Douglas's "The Old Testament and its Critics."

The Old Testament and its Critics. The Introductory Lecture Delivered on Tuesday, November 3, 1891. *By Geo. C. M. Douglass, D. D., Principal of the Free Church College, Glasgow.* Glasgow : John N. Mackinlay. 1892.

This little brochure of twenty octavo pages deserves a wide circulation. Dr. Douglass has held the position of Professor of Hebrew and of Old Testament Theology in the Free Church College since its opening in 1857. In May last he resigned into the hands of the General Assembly his professorship as well as the office of principal. At the urgent request of the Assembly, however, he consented to retain the principalship In the present address Dr. Douglass reviews the history of Old Testament Criticism during the period of his incumbency. At its beginning the controversy concerning the authorship of certain books was opened in England by Dr. Samuel Davidson. A little later came Colenso. From this time the battle has not ceased until now, when the most advanced schemes of German criticism are openly defended by leading scholars of the English Universities. Of the final issue, Dr. Douglass entertains no doubt. "Notwithstanding its present popularity," he says, "and the strenuous efforts of able and learned men to make it more so in our own country, I venture to anticipate that it will pass away as the scheme of Baur has passed." The special point made in the scholarly address is the comparison which is drawn between the theory now held by the dominant school of Germany and that of the French school of Vernes (and the deceased Havet, and D'Eichtal). The French scheme, he rightly says, is as inconsistent with the German as the German is with its own conquered German predecessor. Nor are these French scholars any more despised and ridiculed by German critics than Vatke and his associates were in their day. It seems, by the way, to Dr. Douglass, somewhat ludicrous that these prominent French scholars look upon the Wellhausen scheme of criticism as played out just at the time when "many English people, hitherto profoundly ignorant and indifferent, are gulping down the whole of it with amazing relish." Vernes looks upon Wellhausen and his school as far too much of a traditionalist. Instead of dating with him the priest's code at the time of the Babylonian exile, Vernes, using arguments of the same style and nature, attempts to prove that the whole of the Old Testament literature is post-exilian, and that particular part of it not earlier than B. C. 200. He declares that Wellhausen's notion of a prophetical age followed by a priestly is a piece of fantastic formalism and that, historically, it is a mere assumption. "If," he says further, "the traditional school had the defect of conceiving a unity of the biblical works as implying a complete homogeneity, the school of rational criticism . . . does the still greater wrong of sacrificing the undisputed coherence of the whole to the herogeneousness of the parts." And of the German's scheme of compilation, he remarks : "What are we

to think of this editor, who amalgamates in strange disorder three books corresponding to three different social states? and of this good public, I mean the Jews of the Restoration, which absorbed without inconvenience this indigestible mixture?" Principal Douglass sees no sufficient reason for accepting the theory of Vernes any more than that of Wellhausen; but if he were expected to choose, the former must be regarded as having the more consistency and strength. "When once a man has brought himself to believe that those institutions of Jewish worship and polity were the product of the handful of poor Jews who colonized Judea after the Babylonian exile. . . . I see very little difference in the extravagance of the respective hypotheses, whether the composition and shaping occurred in the fifth and fourth centuries or in the third and second before Christ."

McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago. E. C. Bissell.

Stephens' "The Pauline Theology."

The Pauline Theology. A study of The Origin and Correllation of the Doctrinal Teachings of the Apostle Paul. *By George B. Stevens, Ph. D., D. D., Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in Yale University.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1892. Pp. 383.

This is a specimen of *biblical* theology, so called. This theological method, the present delight of a modern pretentious scholarship, is to be discounted for the following reasons:

1. The very name by which it is styled is an imputation upon all other theological methods and productions. They are, by implication, stigmatized as *unbiblical.* A graver insinuation would be impossible. The pretension and impudence of this method is paralleled by the Campbellites who arrogantly denominate their organization *The Christian Church*, thereby insinuating that other denominations are *unchristian.* The name is an offence.

2. This theological method under review traverses the organic unity of the Bible. The Bible, like the Bible's Christ, is a divine-human composition, but as the two natures in Christ are unified by his Divine Personality, so the divine and human elements in revelation are unified by the Holy Spirit. He is the author of the Scriptures, and the several books combine to form one organic whole. To attempt the construction of the theology of Moses, of Isaiah, of Paul, independently of their place in revelation and without reference to their relations to other authors, is equal to an attempt to interpret the text without regard to the context. The whole Bible is the context of every part of the Bible. The *systematic* method of interpreting the Scriptures regards them as a unit, and formulates doctrine by a careful collation of every passage bearing upon the subject. It refuses to isolate the writings of Paul, and treat them as independent and complete in themselves. It regards the writings of Paul as an organic part of revelation, and examines them as such. It is incomparably superior to the boasted method of higher scholarship, which loves to detect and exalt the humanistic elements in the word of God.

3. The results of the practical application of the biblical method have been unsatisfactory. It is leading many to devote their time and intellect to the removal of landmarks, the erasure of old lines, the obliteration of old paths, the abandonment of "the form of sound words." It is exposing many to suspicion and some to ecclesiastical discipline. The exegesis of all and every part of Scripture is not only legitimate but necessary, but the formation of systems out of parts

of the Bible is vicious in method, false in conclusions, and radical and destructive in consequences.

From the method of Dr. Stevens, we turn to the subject-matter of his volume. Its review has been a laborious task. At times we almost despaired. This distressing difficulty grows out of the author's free use of the orthodox terminology to express new ideas. He pours new wine into old bottles. Much of the work of reviewing consists in the explication of verbal puzzles. It seems to us fair to test the book with the doctrines of sin and redemption. "The Apostle's teaching centres in the doctrine of salvation; but as preparing the way for the exposition of it, he treats of the fact of human sinfulness."

"The sin of Adam in its relation to the sin of the race. The argument which rests upon the causal relation of Adam's sin to sin in general has the following presuppositions: (1.) Sin in general, sin as a principle or world-ruling power, had its origin in the transgression of Adam. This point the Apostle assumes without argument. It is with him a well-settled belief. . . . (2.) A second presupposition is that death is the consequence of sin. . . . It is rather the consequence of personal sin. . . . (3.) A third assumption of the argument is that Adam and Christ stand in analogous relations to the race, the former to the race of men considered as sinners and in need of redemption, the latter to the race considered as subjects of that redemption. . . . I hold that the much disputed phrase, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, means: All sinned when Adam sinned; all sinned in and with his sin. . . . In what sense, then, according to Paul's characteristic modes of thought, does he mean that all men sinned when Adam sinned? They sinned when Adam sinned in the same sense in which believers were crucified to the world and died unto sin when Christ died upon the cross. . . . 'All died when Christ died.' In what sense did all die in and with his death? Two answers are possible: (*a*), All were under sentence of death for their sins, but Christ appeared as their substitute, and making their case his own, died in their stead. . . . (*b*), All died to sin—that is, in an ethical sense—in and with the death of Christ. . . . It is a mystical identification in time of cause and consequence. . . . We have reached the judgment that in his death on our behalf, our own moral death to the old sinful, selfish life was accomplished, and that the whole meaning and purpose of his death for us, therefore, urge us to live lives of unselfishness and love. . . . In this view, Christ becomes a curse for us, not in the sense of becoming the object of divine wrath, but in the sense that he substituted his suffering for the penalty which threatened man. He was made sin for us, not by having a sinner's experience of punishment, but by taking the place of the sinner in an experience of suffering which, being instead of the sinner's punishment, met the ends for which punishment exists in the moral order of the world. The vicariousness of Christ's work does not consist in the substitution of Christ's punishment for ours, but in the substitution of his sufferings for our punishment." (Pp. 124, 126, 129, 135, 233, 246.)

These sentences are faithfully plaited together. They show that the author makes the race's connection with Adam and with Christ neither realistic nor federal, but *ethical*. His soteriology is that of hypothetical redemption founded upon an ethical atonement. Connection with this ethical atonement is made by an *ethical* faith. (Pp. 281, 282.)

The chapter on eschatology is an illustration of the author's violent method

of dealing with Scripture. He denies that Paul taught the resurrection of the ungodly. In order to fritter away Paul's assertion before Felix of "a resurrection both of the just and of the unjust" (Acts xxiv. 15), he says, "We cannot assume with confidence that the report of Paul's speech before Felix accurately reproduced his language in detail." R. A. WEBB.

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ABBOTT'S "EVOLUTION OF CHRISTIANITY."

THE EVOLUTION OF CHRISTIANITY. *By Lyman Abbott.* Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. The Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1892.

Dr. Lyman Abbott has been long recognized as an attractive and facile writer of religious articles. He has written quite a number of books. His position as pastor of Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, is one of commanding influence and secures a wide circulation of his writings. His latest contribution to religious thought is a volume of lectures on the "Evolution of Christianity." He informs us in his introduction that his purpose is to restate the doctrines of Christianity in terms of the Evolution Philosophy. His aim is "not to destroy but to reconstruct." He thinks that the "new wine" is in danger of "being lost," because it is kept in old bottles, and he endeavors to manufacture new ones that both may be preserved. His bottles possess to a remarkable degree the quality of elasticity. Indeed, they can hardly be called bottles. The word is a misnomer in the Evolution theology, which teaches that Christian truth is in a state of continual progress, and eludes definition and confinement. When wine has gone through the process of fermentation it does not need new bottles, but the wine which Dr. Abbott would give us has the wonderful capacity of repeating the process indefinitely. The doctor's bottles will not last long at the present rapid progress of theology, and really, according to his theory, the church is a tremendous bottling establishment, and will continue the business of turning out new bottles to the end of time. For he tells us that "love means in the nineteenth century what it could not mean in the first; from the lips of a Henry Ward Beecher what it could not mean from the lips of an Augustine or a Calvin" (p. 22.) The author ought to have added "or a John or a Paul." We fully agree that love from the lips of a Beecher does not mean what it meant in the vocabulary of Augustine and Paul. We prefer Paul to Beecher. Paul exalted and enthroned love. No process of evolution will ever produce any statements concerning love, surpassing those contained in the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians Paul had a very broad conception of God's love, and speaks of its length and breadth and height and depth. It "passeth knowledge." But the apostle did not teach that God's love swallowed up his justice; he did not reduce it to a maudlin sentiment. Beecher's views are rather in the line of a back-action evolution, and weaken rather than sustain the author's position. We believe that love in the first century meant just what it means in the nineteenth. And we doubt whether any prophet will arise who will have a deeper experience of God's love than John and Paul, or will be able to give a clearer exposition of it to the world. Certainly he has not yet been evolved.

The truth is, that Dr. Abbott, in attempting to translate Christianity in terms of the evolution philosophy, has translated it out of its true meaning. Instead of helping us to "solve some of the problems which are perplexing us concerning the Bible, the church, theology, social ethics, and spiritual experience," he only plunges

us into greater difficulties. His book is neither logical nor theological; it is evolutionary and revolutionary. There is nothing new, however, in the thought presented. Only the dress is new, consisting largely of modern scientific phrases. The author begins with Professor Le Conte's definition of evolution, "Continuous progressive change according to certain laws and by means of resident forces," assuming with the scientific world the truth of evolution, and attempts to show that Christianity is subject to this universal law. He first discusses the Christian religion in general, and this is followed by chapters on the evolution of the Bible, the evolution of theology, the evolution of the church, the evolution of Christian society, the evolution of the soul, and the secret of spiritual evolution.

Dr. Abbott belongs to that class of popular writers and preachers who have elevated the hypothesis of evolution into a sort of new gospel, and have undertaken with its aid to smooth down the rough places in theology and explain difficulties in the Bible which have been specially emphasized by those of a naturalistic turn of mind.

In attempting to make a rigid application of the theory of natural development to Christianity, the author has undertaken an impossible task. It cannot be made to square with the facts. No man can be blind to the fact that evolution is true up to a certain point, for he cannot open his eyes upon the material world without seeing it. Modern investigation has thrown a great deal of light upon the subject. Many eminent religious thinkers have accepted a modified theory of evolution, which does not necessarily antagonize the Bible. We believe in freedom of thought, and are opposed to thumb-screws In regard to matters not clearly revealed by the Scriptures, men have a right to indulge in speculations, provided they are held as mere speculations, and do not in any way contravene or obscure the truths which are plainly established.

The trouble is that most persons soon make a hobby of their private speculations and carry them into the region of dogmatics.

We readily agree with Dr. McCosh, a theistic evolutionist, that there is undoubtedly development in nature; that evolution cannot give us original matter; that it cannot account for the "beneficent order and special arrangements of the universe;" that mind cannot be evolved from matter; that consciousness cannot be the product of mechanical or chemical action; that new and higher potencies have been introduced acting upon and with previously existing forces; that progress goes on under the co-action of old and new forces in eras and epochs. Many interesting analogies may be traced between the laws of the material and the spiritual world. Drummond, in his popular work, "Natural Law in the Spiritual World," has brought out striking points of resemblance. But he failed utterly to prove the absolute identity of material and spiritual laws. The "resident force" in matter and the "resident force" in spirit are entirely different. In this latter force are the elements of freedom and the power of acting capriciously, and also the power of determining how the subject shall be affected by environment. Matter and spirit are acted upon by outside forces in an entirely different manner.

No one doubts that there is such a thing as spiritual evolution, if the word is used in the broad sense of development or growth. The kingdom of heaven in the soul and in the world is like leaven and has a *pervasive* power. It is constantly active and secretly active. It must be remembered that leaven " is taken " and put into the meal. It is not an inherent element, but a foreign importation. It is

not evolved in any sense from the mass. We understand our Saviour to say that Christianity is a hidden power, assimilating and diffusive, and in these respects resembles the action of leaven in a mass of meal. But he does not assert the absolute identity of material and spiritual law.

The mustard seed illustrates Christianity very aptly as we think of the apparent insignificance of its origin and the wonderful extent of its expansion, but we fail to see how the comparison instituted by our Lord sustains the theory of spiritual evolution as it is defined by Dr. Abbott. Our author's idea of evolution is utterly irreconcilable with the Scripture teaching concerning the intellectual and mora state of the first man. It plainly states that man was created with a moral nature in its integrity. He had the image of God stamped upon him. He had dominion over "every living thing that moved upon the earth." He "gave names to all cattle and to the fowl of the air and to every beast of the field."

The intellectual, moral and spiritual status of Adam, as described in Genesis, positively contradicts the notion that he had "just emerged from the animal state."

Dr. Abbott consistently denies man's original state of perfection. Furthermore, he candidly admits that the commonly accepted doctrine of the fall of the race in Adam is inconsistent with the doctrine of evolution. He says that the common theory is : ' An original state of perfection; a fall by the representative of the race; a consequent universal condition of sinfulness; and a restoration to that state from which the race fell."

"The doctrine of the fall and of redemption, *as thus stated*, is inconsistent with the doctrine of evolution. It is impossible to reconcile the two. Evolution declares that all life begins at a lower stage and issues through a gradual development into a higher, etc." According to the evolution theory, man came gradually into the possession of his moral attributes, and, therefore, if he ever fell, he fell upward. The theory makes no provision for universal degeneracy. Reversion to type cannot explain it, as the type had not been attained. Dr. Abbott tries to get over the difficulty by attacking the reliability of the records. He says : "The historian makes no claim to have received a revelation of the facts from God. Presumptively, he gathered his materials, as other historians gather theirs, from such sources as were accessible to him—legends, myths traditions. This presumption is strengthened by the fact that such materials are found in ancient legends of other nations, and in the Chaldean tablets, whose age is at least as great as that of the Book of Genesis. . . . It receives additional confirmation from the nature of the story of Eden, which, if found anywhere save in Hebrew literature, would at once be characterized by the reader as poetic and imaginative, not as scientific or historical."

But unfortunately, this relegation of the earlier portions of Genesis to the sphere of the allegorical, the "legendary," the "fragmentary," the "poetical" does not relieve the difficulty. Because there is a basis of history under the form of the narrative, even if it be "poetical" and "symbolical," upon which the New Testament writers make some very clear and dogmatic statements. But the inspired writers of the New Testament treat the Genesis account of man's fall as veritable history. We read in 1 Tim. ii. 13,14.: "For Adam was first formed, then Eve, and Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression." Here we have a distinct confirmation of the literal truth of the primal apostasy as related by Moses. Paul's statements are very clear as to the fall. "By one man's disobedience many were made sinners." (Rom. v. 19.) "For as in

Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." (1 Cor. xv. 22.) And really there is no other rational explanation of the prevalence of depravity in the world.

Dr. Abbott in order to fortify his theory takes the astounding position that the Bible makes very little of the fall. He says that ecclesiastical systems have brought about the errors which prevail in the church concerning the fall. "I went to the Bible to make a fresh investigation of this subject. The Bible lays no such stress upon the fall as the ecclesiastical systems have done. There is an account of the fall in the third chapter of Genesis, but elsewhere in the Old Testament no direct reference to it. The law does not mention it; the Old Testament historians do not refer to it; the poets and the prophets do not so much as allude to it. In the New Testament the reticence is equally marked and significant. Christ never mentions Adam's fall. Neither does John, nor Jude, nor Peter. Neither Peter nor Paul refers to it in their reported sermons. Paul once gives an account of it in one of his epistles, but that in a parenthesis. . . . But he never treats it as a fundamental and essential fact."

We must confess to amazement at these words. The whole redemptive economy is based upon the fact of the fall and ruin of man. There is no other explanation of the incarnation and crucifixion of Christ. How many times is it necessary for the Scriptures to plainly affirm a thing in order to make it credible? "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."

All of Paul's writings are clearly based upon the fact of the fall. It runs throughout the famous epistles to the Romans and Hebrews.

Why should Christ and his apostles frequently state a truth which was plainly taught in the Old Testament and recognized as the basis of the work of redemption? We might as well argue that the soul is not immortal because the Scriptures say so little which is distinctive upon the subject of immortality. Dr. Abbott has put screws to the Bible and subjected it to a terrible strain to make it conform to his evolution theory. He explains many truths by explaining them away. How few approach the Bible with an entire willingness that it shall mean what it wants to mean.

It is an old saying that a man's philosophy determines his theology. It is pre-eminently true of Dr. Abbott. He has evolution on the brain, and the Bible must work into his theory.

When he attempts to apply his theory of natural development to the Bible as a structure, he makes havoc of the views and principles which have reigned in the church for centuries. He denies that the Bible is an infallible rule of faith and practice. "An infallible book is an impossible conception, and to-day no one believes that our present Bible is such a book." "God has not given us an infallible standard, but something far better—namely, a divine revelation." "The Bible is not an infallible standard of truth or life. It is the history of the growth of man's consciousness of God. . . . . Its history is composed, as other histories have been composed, out of such materials as were at hand or could be secured; but the historians saw what other contemporaneous historians did not see, God in his world, and wrote the history with God manifested in it." It is evident that this theory almost entirely eliminates the supernatural. There was no direct revelation of truth to man, but it was evolved in some mysterious way from his experience and consciousness. The sacred writers "saw God in history" and had a "power of spiritual perception." Their writings were the

product of their own thought and reflection. The farther we go back in sacred history the more imperfect and unreliable are its teachings. There was a gradual advance in truth, as the capacities of men were enlarged. They did not give a "moral standard for all time," but "prepared men for a better standard in the future." The gradual revelation of truth came through the Hebrew people because they had a "genius" for religion, and were more "susceptible" to religious impressions than others.

The Old Testament and the New Testament were constructed "by a process of natural selection." "As collections of literature, both can be described in terms of an evolutionary philosophy as the result of a practical process of selection and elimination."

Our author holds that his conception of moral evolution in the Bible relieves a great many difficulties which could not be explained on the theory of a complete revelation. He says, for instance, that it is impossible to believe that God should tell a father to kill his child. Now, it is plainly stated in the twenty-second chapter of Genesis that God commanded Abraham to offer his son as a burnt offering, and the statement is confirmed in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. But relief comes in this way: Abraham's religious consciousness was evolved at an early stage in the process of moral evolution, and consequently was very imperfect. The "unveiling" must keep pace with his consciousness, and with his capacity. In his ignorance and superstition, he imagined that God gave him the command, or he had a strong impression that it was God's will. Abraham had a strong imagination and a peculiar susceptibility to religious impressions. The story must be explained in this way or entirely rejected as a myth. If we accept the author's explanation of this difficulty, we must apply his philosophy to the other writings of the Bible. In doing so, we are perfectly at sea as to what we must accept and what we must reject. And the Scripture loses its force as an authoritative standard of faith. We can accept what our reason approves and reject what it disapproves. According to the Bible account, the revelation made to Abraham was very far in advance of his religious consciousness. The "resident force" evolving in a gradual progress, and "according to certain laws," cannot account for the production of the divine light which illuminated his mind. According to our author's philosophy the doctrines of Scripture can never rise above the lives and minds of those who wrote it. And the lives and experiences of the earlier writers of the Bible must have been on a low plane, as the evolutionary process had not then sufficiently advanced for the removal of "the veil" on their faces. The trouble with the theory in question is that all the facts are against it. The deep piety of some of the primitive Old Testament saints, their knowledge of God and their highly developed characters are inexplicable upon the hypothesis of a gradual evolution. Enoch, the seventh from Adam, "walked with God," and "had this testimony that he pleased God." He was "not found because God had translated him." Have any Christians of this age gone very far beyond Enoch in piety and practical knowledge of God? The spiritual development of God's kingdom cannot be explained by a "force resident in humanity." The only rational explanation is based upon the existence of a power from outside and above humanity. There is a sense, of course, in which God is in all history, but he was in the history of his people in a special manner, manifesting himself by special inspiration, miracle and prophecy. We confront supernatural interference on almost

every page of the sacred record. "God, who at *sundry times* and in *divers manners* spake in times past unto the fathers, &c." The series of revelations began, as recorded by Moses, with Adam (Gen. III.) and terminated with Malachi, a period of more than three thousand years.

In order to make his view plausible, the author gives us a new interpretation of the Decalogue. "The ten commandments are simply prohibitions of the more palpable violations of the laws of social well being." Our Saviour recognized the law as a complete rule of conduct. He came "not to destroy but to fulfil." He did not add another commandment, but showed the breadth and spirituality of the old.

Dr. Abbott finds the conclusions of the most destructive school of higher critics favorable to his evolution theory and he readily adopts them. The authenticity of the books of the Old Testament is surrendered. Miracles, as generally understood, are denied, but the resurrection of Christ is accepted as a well-authenticated fact.

The author gives us a new view of Paul, which is of a piece with his other speculations. He tells us that Paul was not by nature a philosopher or a logician. He was a seer rather than a logician. "His logic is often defective, and it is always the logic of an advocate. He appeals to the established prejudices of his hearers in order to secure their assent to the truths and principles which he is inculcating."

The author sweeps away the old foundations, and ignores the doctrine of inspiration as it has been generally understood by the church. The views advocated by him in regard to the evolution of the Bible are becoming popular, and are in accord with the naturalism of the age. In the July number of this review, Dr. J. B Shearer, in an article on the "Object and Scope of Written Revelation," makes a very strong point against Dr. Abbott's idea of the evolution of the Bible by showing the extent and sufficiency of the revelation given to man by the Almighty in the early history of the race. We cannot but think, however, that he goes too far in holding to the fulness and absolute completeness of the truth from the beginning. God gave man a revelation of salvation, through a mediator to come, at the beginning, which was sufficient to secure his redemption.

But are we to understand that all subsequent revelation is intended merely "to preserve and vindicate" what had been revealed? Must we believe that the sacred writers only recorded "the history of the conflict between what was revealed at the beginning and subsequent enemies as they arose in the process of the ages?" Did they expound and illustrate only what was revealed in Eden?

We entertain very grave doubts about this position. The word rendered "at sundry times" in the beginning of the Epistle to the Hebrews is πολυμερῶς and means *in many parts.* The revised version reads: "God having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by *divers portions* and in divers manners, &c."

These words teach us that the former revelation had been given in various parts. It had not been given all at once. God communicated it from time to time as he chose, and as the necessities of the people required. God also employed various methods for communicating his will. It can hardly be made out from the data we have in Scripture that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit was revealed in Eden or even soon afterwards.

Men are saved now as they were saved in the first family. The plan of salvation has undergone no change.

But this is not incompatible with the fact that God continued to make new revelations of himself and his purposes as he chose. And there is nothing to show that these revelations were only intended to preserve, vindicate, or illustrate what had been already revealed. The fact that God made clearer revelations of himself and new revelations as the race advanced, is no proof whatever of the evolution theory. Those revelations came from without and not from a "resident force." Nor are we to understand that the Old Testament saints were incapable of receiving more light than was given to them. We believe that Abraham might have known a great deal more about spiritual and divine things, had it pleased the Almighty to reveal it. It appears that the prophets were wiser than they knew, and sometimes uttered words the full significance of which they did not realize.

While we utterly reject Dr. Abbott's views of the evolution of the Bible, we would not forget that the Scriptures have a human as well as a divine side. They come to us in the form of human thought and experience. The Bible like the Saviour is human and divine at the same time. Sometimes the divinity of Christ is emphasized so strongly that his humanity is left out of view. At other times his humanity is emphasized while his divinity is lost sight of. The Bible has been treated in the same way. To understand its growth, we must keep in mind that it is thoroughly human, while it is divine. The elimination of either element will involve us in difficulty and darkness. The limitations imposed by the human mind do not necessitate error. The presence of the divine insures truth. We may emphasize the natural and overlook too much the supernatural. Or we may emphasize the supernatural and overlook the natural. Possibly at times there has been too strong a tendency to refer the inexplicable to the arbitrary will of God. But the trend of thought is now more in the direction of the natural, and many are disposed to make human reason the measure of every thing. It is well known that the speculations of Kuenen and Wellhausen have as their philosophic basis pure naturalism, which is atheism; and we may see that an insinuating and stealthy rationalism underlies and determines the views of many of those who are to-day advocating the "new theology."

We shall not attempt to follow Dr. Abbott in his effort to apply the theory of natural development to theology, the church and Christian society. The conclusions he reaches are in keeping with those already mentioned on other branches of Christianity. We are struck with the fact that those who profess to eschew metaphysics in theology, and make a great tirade about it, use metaphysical conceptions as freely as their opponents. The new lights use metaphysics as profusely as the old school; the only difference is the latter is the best.

Dr. Abbott says some very severe things against dogmatic formulas. The dogmatic theology of such men as Hodge, Shedd, and Dabney is his "*bête noir.*" "The Bible never falls into the error of the church. It never attempts to reduce truth to a dogma, never crystallizes it in a creed." When Christ declared his oneness with the Father, when he stated the office and function of the Holy Spirit, he expressed the truth in a dogmatic form. If the Epistle to the Romans does not contain dogmatic formulas, we fail to understand what they are.

The author repeats over and over again the saying that religion is not a creed, but a life, the life of God in the soul. While it is true that Christianity is the life of God in the soul, it is also a creed. But for the creed, we would not have the life of God in us to-day. The reduction of Christianity to pure subjectivism, strike

us as irrational. "Revelation is not a final statement of truth, but a gradual and progressive unveiling of the mind that it may see truth clearly and receive it vitally." But how can the mind see the truth, if it has no objective form? The great facts of redemption are certainly final. What is written in regard to the way of salvation, and in regard to duty, is final. Revelation has been progressing for the last two thousand years according to the author, and yet it has not added one new truth to the Bible.

Has the "unveiling" which has been going on opened up new truth, or has it given clearer insight into truth already declared? The Scriptures teach that the Holy Spirit "unveils," and this unveiling is done in the presence of the truth as recorded in the Scriptures.

Our author says little or nothing about the doctrine of the Holy Ghost in his book. He is practically ignored. If Christianity is the evolution of a "resident force" in humanity, acting according to "certain laws," there is not much need for the Holy Spirit. Christ came to evolve the "latent divinity" in us.

If the doctrine of the direct operation of the Holy Ghost in renewing, sanctifying, illuminating, communing with the soul is taken away, Christianity is at once reduced to a mere system of ethics and is robbed of its spiritual power.

The residuum of truth which remains after the rationalizing process of Dr. Abbott is very small. The authority of Christianity goes with the doctrine of the supernatural and miraculous character of the revelation of the Bible.

It cannot demand of us faith in its teachings unless it comes as a sure and infallible utterance of God's voice. Implicit faith in the authority of the Bible has been the basis of all powerful preaching in the past. A "thus saith the Lord" ended all controversy. Much of the preaching of the present day is lacking in efficiency because it fails to rest directly on God's authority.

But the worst feature about Dr. Abbott's theology is his doctrine of the atonement. The Socinian element dominates. The substitutionary feature of Christ's sacrifice is ignored. His death was not a ransom-price to redeem the sinner. There was no remission of penalty. "There is not one single passage in the New Testament that in explicit terms promises remission of penalty."

"Sacrifice is not penalty borne by one person in order that another person may be relieved from the wrath of a third person; sacrifice is the sorrow which love feels for the loved one, and the shame which love endures with him because of his sin."

It is very remarkable that one can express such views in the face of the almost numberless passages which unquestionably teach the doctrine of vicarious expiation for guilt

To hold that salvation comes to us only through exemplary and didactic influences with such clear declarations as these, "the Lord has laid on him the iniquities of us all," "obtaining eternal redemption for us by his blood," &c, &c., is, in our judgment, virtually equivalent to a rejection of the whole Bible. We refer the reader to Dabney's *Theology* for a masterly vindication of the Scriptural doctrine of vicarious sacrifice, and a complete refutation of all those theories of the atonement which deny Christ's endurance of the penalty of believers' sins.

Dr. Abbott's view of the atonement accords with, if it does not grow out of, his conception of sin. "Sin is not man setting himself against a law external to himself. Every man is two men; every man is a battleground in which the higher

and the lower man are contending one against the other. . . . . Sin is a relapse," &c. "It is not the things I have done, it is not the things I have undone, which call me to repentance; it is the kind of being I am." It is not strange that one with such views of sin should adopt the Socinian notion of the atonement. The author's discussion of the atonement is calculated to lower the importance of Christ's work, to obscure his divinity and weaken man's sense of the need of a sacrifice. Probably some of the old theologians laid undue emphasis upon the legal and sacrificial element of the atonement, and overlooked too much the moral, vital and dynamic elements, which are now brought more to the front. But it is plain that without the doctrine of Christ's atonement by vicarious sacrifice, there is no system of redemption and no salvation provided for sinners. A religion evolved from a "resident force" in humanity, according to "certain laws," can never be sufficient to redeem a lost, ruined, condemned sinner. Dr. Abbott disclaims a surrender of the essential articles of Christian faith, and uses the old terms inspiration, revelation, sin, redemption, atonement and justification ; but as translated in terms of evolutionary philosophy, we do not recognize them as the same.

J. S. Watkins.

Spartanburg, S. C.

Baird's "The Great Baptizer."

The Great Baptizer. A Bible History of Baptism. *By Samuel J. Baird.* Second Edition. Pp. 489. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1892.

The first edition of this able treatise was issued from Philadelphia in 1882. At that time it attracted considerable attention and elicited many favorable notices. The ability, the scholarship, and the independence of the treatise at once commended it, and its thoroughness in the treatment of a great subject was highly praised. It is gratifying that a second edition of the work has been issued by the Presbyterian Committee of Publication at Richmond in a style leaving nothing to be desired. In this brief notice no succinct outline of the work before us can be given. Its secondary title—*A Bible History of Baptism*—very properly denotes its method and subject-matter. It is entirely biblical in its nature, and the rite of baptism is traced with great care throughout the sacred Scriptures. Its main title—*The Great Baptizer*—indicates its great central thesis, that Jesus Christ, as the Head of the church, by the agency of the Holy Spirit, is the great source and author of the spiritual baptism of men.

The treatise itself is divided into two books. The first treats of the Old Testament History of Baptism, and the second of its New Testament History. The Old Testament History is presented under six separate heads as follows: The Baptism at Sinai; The Visible Church; Administered Baptisms; Sprinklings; Ritual Self-Washings; Later Traces of the Sprinkled Baptisms; State of the Old Testament Argument. The whole of this discussion is again sub-divided into forty-five sections, so that its treatment is most orderly in its nature, and reference to any part of the elaborate presentation of the subject is easily made.

The New Testament section is divided into eleven parts, with the following titles: Introductory; The Purifyings of the Jews; John's Baptism; Christ's Baptism and Anointing; Christ, the Great Baptizer; The Baptist Argument; Baptismal Regeneration; The New Testament Church; Christian Baptism; The

Family and the Children; Conclusion. This part is further sub-divided also into fifty-six sections, making one hundred and one sections and seventeen chapters in the two books of the treatise. The thorough manner in which the wide field is mapped out renders its survey comparatively easy on the part of the reader.

The following condensed summary will give the reader a bird's-eye-view of the main positions which the author with care and ability seeks to establish.

It is maintained by our author that baptism was not a new ordinance instituted by Christ, but was imposed on Israel at Sinai by God's authority; that there were no immersions under the Levitical law, nor allusions to them anywhere in the Old Testament; that the covenant at Sinai was sealed by the sprinkling of sacrificial blood and water; that those who by defilement were excluded from that covenant were re-admitted by the sprinkling of sacrificial ashes and water, and proselytes were thus received; and that this ordinance is traceable through the entire Old Testament. These points are supported, illustrated and enforced by means of an exhaustive exposition of the passages of the sacred Scriptures which relate to them.

Our author further maintains that three hundred years before Christ, in the Septuagint Greek "baptism" was designated by the new Greek words *baptisma* and *baptismos*, and that it was known by that name in the time of Christ and his apostles; that the prophecies clearly present it as a type of the effusion of the Spirit by the coming Messiah, and that this was especially true of John the forerunner and his baptism; that in the beginning of Christ's ministry, and probably to its close, his disciples, contemporaneously with John, administered *this baptism*; and that Christ's last instructions to his apostles did not institute baptism, but merely admitted Gentiles to its privileges.

Still further, in regard to Christian baptism, our author also argues that it is literally one and the same in form, meaning and office with the sprinkled seal of the Sinai covenant and of the Old Testament history and prophecy; that the history culminates on the day of Pentecost, when the promise of the Father was fulfilled by the affusion upon the apostles of the Holy Ghost; and that, as the Old Testament types and prophecies of purification by affusion all point forward and upward to this outpouring of the Spirit which is to continue until Christ comes again, so Christian baptism points backward and upward to it, as the consummation of grace in the plan of salvation.

All through the discussion of these and other important points, the main thing kept in view is the meaning and mode of baptism. But side by side with these discussions, and especially towards the close of the treatise, there are important conclusions bearing upon the *subjects* of baptism as well. Thus our author maintains that not only in the covenant with Abraham, but especially in the Sinai covenant, when Israel was organized as the visible kingdom of God, the little ones were included in the fold of the covenant, and that under its terms the first instance of distinctively infant baptism presents itself, when 32,000 infants, the captive daughters of Midian, were received into the fold of the covenant at one time, by the sprinkled baptism.

It is further argued by our author that, since it is an undoubted fact that the infants of Israel were included with their parents in the covenant, it is impossible to reconcile the acts, the testimonies and the commands of Jesus in regard to them with the assumption that he intended now to exclude them or to deprive them of

any privileges hitherto enjoyed by them ; and it is shown in this connection that the facts and circumstances of the household baptisms mentioned in the Acts entirely confirm this view, and that Paul expressly asserts the position of infants in language which could, to his readers of that age, mean nothing else than that they were entitled to the privileges of the visible church.

All through this discussion, most thorough exposition is made of all the leading facts and statements relating to baptism in the New Testament, and upon some of the most difficult passages of the Scriptures our author throws light which goes far to remove difficulty, and bring out precious truth of deep spiritual significance.

In regard to the treatise as a whole a few general remarks may be added.

1. It is written in a simple clear style, which makes it easily read. Even when the truths discussed are profound, and the argument subtle, there can be no difficulty for the ordinary reader to follow the author.

2. The discussion has the great merit of being biblical. It is truly a Bible History of Baptism, and our author has taken great pains to go over the entire ground. Even if the reader may not be able to agree with all the interpretations of Scripture given, still the treatise has the great excellence of being professedly grounded on, and of really growing out of, the sacred Scriptures.

3. No one can read this treatise, even hurriedly, without being impressed with the great importance of baptism, and of the profound and vital spiritual truths which it signifies and sets forth. This is a point which perhaps not a few Presbyterians need to regard more than they do at the present day, and this treatise is suited to render an important service in this connection.

4. Whatever difference of opinion there may be in regard to some of the details of the discussion, there can be no difference of opinion in regard to the author's conclusions regarding the mode of baptism. The treatise leaves not a shadow of foundation for the immersionist, and we may wait with patience for his reply.

5. Equally effective, though in a measure subordinate, is our author's vindication of the place of infants in the covenant, and of their right to the privileges of the visible church.

6. Our author makes a distinction between the self-washings and the administered baptisms of the Old Testament, which is of importance in this discussion, and which we do not remember to have seen discussed by any previous writer on this subject. This distinction, as set forth by our author, solves some difficulties in a satisfactory way.

7. One of the special excellencies of the treatise is the truly spiritual plane on which it rests. The chapter on "Christ the Great Baptizer," deserves special notice, and merits careful reading in this connection. Due honor is given to the Holy Spirit also.

8. It may be added that there are one or two important positions taken in the treatise which probably will not be approved of by all who read it. One position which some will likely call in question is that there are four sacramental ordinances in the Old Testament—sacrifice, circumcision, passover and baptism. Others will not readily admit that circumcision was the seal of the Abrahamic covenant only, while baptism was the seal of the Sinai covenant. A third position which some will hesitate to admit is, that the visible church was first organized at Sinai. We simply call attention to these points as they are fundamental positions likely to be disputed, but space entirely forbids us now entering into the merits of their dis-

cussion. We know of nothing better that we can do than to commend to our readers a careful perusal of the entire treatise, with the assurance that even while the reader may not agree with all the positions of the author, he will nevertheless not read in vain.

FRANCIS R. BEATTIE.

Columbia, S. C.

OTTS'S "FIFTH GOSPEL."

THE FIFTH GOSPEL: The Land Where Jesus Lived. *By J. M. P. Otts, LL. D., Author of Laconisms; The Wisdom of Many in the Words of One; Nicodemus with Jesus.* Fleming H. Revell Co., New York and Chicago. 1892. 12mo., pp. 367. $1.50.

Whatever may be the shortcomings of American scholars in other departments of biblical learning, it must be conceded that they have made the most notable contributions to the science of sacred geography. Dr. Edward Robinson's *Biblical Researches*, which laid the foundation for all scientific exploration in the East, Lieutenant Lynch's *Expedition to the Dead Sea and the Jordan*, Dr. Thomson's monumental work on *The Land and the Book*, H. J. Van Lenneps's *Bible Lands*, Barclay's *City of the Great King*, Bartlett's *From Egypt to Palestine*, Schaff's *Through Bible Lands*, Field's *Among the Holy Hills* and *On the Desert*, Merrill's *East of the Jordan*, and Trumbull's *Kadesh-Barnea*—not to mention a number of lesser works—all these are products of American scholarship and enterprise. But, as in nearly everything else, so here, the South has lagged somewhat. Quite recently, however, two interesting books on the subject have been published by two gentlemen of our Southern Presbyterian Church, one entitled *The Land of Holy Light*, by the Rev. R. P. Kerr, D. D., and the other entitled *The Fifth Gospel*, by the Rev. J. M. P. Otts, LL. D. They are both well written, but they are quite unlike. The chief interest of the former lies, perhaps, in its descriptions. The chief interest of the latter lies in its discussions. Dr. Otts's purpose is clearly set forth in the following paragraphs taken from different parts of the work.

"This is not a 'book of travels,' though it never could have been written if the author had not travelled in Palestine; for it is the result of the careful reading of the Gospels in the lights and shades of the land where Jesus lived and taught. When so read it is found that the land of Jesus so harmonizes with the four written Gospels, and so unfolds and enlarges their meaning, that it forms around them a Fifth Gospel." (Preface, p. 5.)

"We do not offer our book as, in any sense, a biography of Jesus or a geography of the land in which he lived, but as a number of broken sketches of certain prominent events in his life, and disconnected descriptions of certain localities in the land which throw a special light upon the passages brought under review and into discussion. Thus, it is the aim of the author, not by a complete description of the whole land, but by a delineation of its characteristic features, to place under the eye of the reader a pen-picture, so far as his words can paint it, of the present aspect of the land where Jesus lived, and to contrast that picture with what must have been its general appearance in his day, and to connect therewith careful studies of certain typical and exponential passages in his life, the true and inner meaning of which is unfolded and elucidated by the scenes and circumstances under which they occurred." (Preface, pp. 6–7.)

"The land where Jesus lived stands to these four [canonical] Gospels as a Fifth

Gospel, not as giving an additional revelation of the life of Jesus, but as a witness to the truth of the revelation of Jesus Christ which they give. The land shows that the evangelists, who never assumed to be critics, were simple, artless and faithful chroniclers of events that are so strikingly in accord with the places mentioned, and the customs referred to, that they bear on their very face the unquestionable stamp of veracity and historic truth." (P. 27.)

The title of the book is taken of course, from the celebrated phrase of Renan, who says: "I have travelled through the evangelical province in every direction; I have visited Jerusalem, Hebron and Samaria; scarcely any locality important in the history of Jesus has escaped me. All this history which, at a distance, seems floating in the clouds of an unreal world, assumed a body, a solidity which astonished me. The striking accord of the text and the places, the wonderful harmony of the evangelical ideal with the landscape which served as its setting, were to me as a revelation. I had before my eyes a *fifth gospel*, torn but still legible, and thenceforth, through the narrations of Matthew and Mark, instead of an abstract being, which one would say had never existed, I saw a wonderful human form live and move." In quoting this passage from Renan and acknowledging his indebtedness to him for the felicitous phrase which he adopts as the title of his book, Dr. Otts adverts to the inconsistency of the gifted Frenchman in acknowledging the reality of the gospel history, and yet denying the divinity of its central figure. One of the good points of this book is that it insists upon the naturalness of our Lord's life, on both its human and divine sides. His development as child and youth and man was natural as distinguished from unnatural. In like manner, even his miracles were not unnatural, though they were supernatural. His supernatural works were natural to him. And he is the only man that ever lived to whom miracles were natural. Other wonder workers of Scripture performed their miracles by a delegated power, but he by inherent power. "Young man, *I* say to thee, arise." They sometimes bring the wonder work to the birth hardly and with difficulty, as Trench says, but he with perfect ease. It was as natural to him to work miracles as it is to us to breathe.

The reader will find here many fresh and stimulating discussions of such questions as our Lord's miracles, the nature of his human development, the gradual growth of his consciousness of his divinity, the meaning of his baptism, and the like. He will probably not agree with Dr. Otts in all his views on these subjects, and he will almost certainly dissent from his opinion that Adam and Eve *together* were the federal head of the race, that they were divorced by their sin, and that after the fall they were re-married by the Son of God—and a few other ingenious, but, as they seem to us, untenable interpretations. But, whether readers agree with the author fully or not, they will always find his discussions vigorous and thought-provoking. In short, this is an uncommonly interesting and instructive book. It would be extravagant to compare it with Dr. Thomson's *magnum opus*, but many of the reflections are more striking and original. And it cannot be so easily read in snatches, partly because there is more of sustained argumentation, and partly because the plan is different. The material is arranged in the order of the events of our Lord's life, beginning at Bethlehem and ending at the Mount of Olives, overlooking Bethany.

This is a new way of treating the geography of the Holy Land. The only other work that we know of in which this course is followed is *The Beautiful Land*

by Dr. John Fulton (1891), a book which has been warmly praised by good authorities, but which, in our judgment, is distinctly inferior to the work now under review. The chief advantage of the plan adopted by Dr. Otts is that "by this arrangement one is able, with clearer view, with a far more vivid perception, with profoundly deeper pleasure, to realize the coördination of scene and event, and, by associating them in actual order, obtain a truer conception of our Lord's biography, and one which will be more enduring in the memory." The chief disadvantage of the plan is that localities associated exclusively with Old Testament history cannot properly be treated at all, and places that are common to both Testaments can be fully treated only by a partial sacrifice of unity.

The title of Dr. Otts's book does not indeed lead us to expect any reference to Old Testament sites as such, and his exclusion of these has been more rigid than Dr. Fulton's; but now and then he introduces them and their history, *e. g.*, the reading of the blessings and curses from Gerizim and Ebal, and the sites of Shiloh and Bethel. By the way, in speaking of Jacob's vision of the ladder, the author had a fine opportunity to connect what he has to say about Bethel with his real subject, by introducing and expounding the statement of Jesus to Nathaniel: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, ye shall see heaven opened, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man" (John i. 51). While we are on the matter of possible additions to our author's statements we will ask whether Capernaum ought not to be included among the most important cities in the history of Jesus (p. 19). But the most serious omission of all we have still to mention. The book has no index. We could scarcely believe our eyes when we discovered this fact. We have ourselves needed an index to it a dozen times since we began to read it. There is too much valuable matter here to be comparatively lost by the want of an index, and we trust that in a second edition this defect will be supplied first of all.

There are four maps and plans at the back of the book, the first of which is quite inferior, and the others are fair. A few *good* illustrations would add to the attractiveness and value of the book. It is substantially bound and clearly printed. But there are typographical errors on pp. 15, 123, 128, 138, 181, 213, 216, 251, 365 (two), and 366, *e. g.*, "in of used" for *infused*, "Arnon" for *Aenon*, "Goliah" for *Goliath*, and "Jordon" twice for *Jordan*. We think chapter xiii. should be divided; the last ten pages have nothing to do with the subject of the chapter as given in the title of it.

That Dr. Otts has made the best kind of preparation for writing on his subject is shown by the fact that, in addition to his own tour through the country, he has read carefully the best books on Palestine, as shown by his quotations from such writers as Robinson, Stanley, Delitzsch, Edersheim, and Stapfer. He shows acquaintance too with the more recent work of explorers in identifying biblical sites, adopting, for instance, the view of the Palestine Survey that Bethabara was not in the neighborhood of Jericho, but far up the river at the mouth of the valley of Jezreel. But we are disappointed to find no reference to the recovery of the Pool of Bethesda, and we think he is wrong in regard to the position of the Cave of Adullam. He says, too, that the Jordan "has never been navigated, and it empties itself into a sea that has never had a port." But Edrisi, in speaking of the Dead Sea, says, "In it are small ships in which one can travel in that part, and bear the

crops and fruits of various kinds from Zoar to Jericho and the rest of the portions of the Ghor." Dr. Otts's statement therefore is too strong. There are several other instances of overstatement, as where he speaks of "this worn out land of universal wastes and perpetual desolations"; the insertion of "well nigh" before "universal," would have made the statement exact. He says that "Luke connects the birth of Jesus with the inn of Chimham." Dr. Otts thinks it was the inn of Chimham, but Luke does not say so. By the way, he might have got some support for his theory about the inn of Chimham from the marginal rendering of Jer. xli. 17 in the Revised Version, as well as from the original to which he very properly appeals. He might have appealed to the Hebrew in another case with advantage; in speaking of the parti-colored cloaks worn by the shepherds he saw in the neighborhood of Dothan, he asks: "Did Joseph's coat make such a profound impression as he journeyed along this way that the people then caught the fashion of it, and have never given it up for all these thousands of years?" This suggestion rests on the common version and seems fanciful. There is nothing about "many colors" in the original. The marginal rendering of the Revised Version in Gen. xxxvii. 3, is, "a long garment with sleeves," thought to be the kind of tunic that princes wore; and hence the aggravation of the jealousy of his brethren. Nor can we agree with the author about Leah's eyes; in suggesting a possible connection between the beautiful eyes of the present women of Bethlehem and their "tender eyed" ancestress, he says: "This caused me to examine the Hebrew word translated in our version 'tender eyed,' and I found just the opposite to the generally entertained idea; that it means soft or beautiful eyes, and not eyes that are weak and squinting in the light. It designates the one mark of peculiar beauty that belonged to Leah, while Rachel had a fine figure and a beautiful face." This is opposed by the Septuagint, the Vulgate, Gesenius, and Delitzsch—a most formidable consensus, not to mention scores of other good authorities. And if this had been the meaning of the sacred writer, would he not have used the expression found in 1 Sam. xvi. 12, where beautiful eyes are described?

These are trifling matters, and we mention them only to show that even Dr. Otts, whose common sense is one of his strong points, yields occasionally to the fascination of novelty. But he certainly does not belong to that class of writers who are "to nothing fixed but love of change." We are glad to see that in his remarks upon Ezekiel's vision of the healing waters that issued from the Temple (Ezek. xlvii.), there is no nonsense about the fulfilment of that prophecy by means of the Jordan Valley Canal, which for a while fascinated a certain class of interpreters. And we like what he says about the site of Calvary. He discards decisively both the traditional site at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the site outside of the Damascus Gate, the hill of Jeremiah's Grotto, for which many now contend, including even so high an authority as Dr. Selah Merrill, who has an article on the subject in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for October. One of the stock arguments in favor of this last view is the alleged resemblance of the hill in question to a skull. "But," asks our author, "is there such a striking resemblance to a skull that the skull-like shape forces itself upon the unprompted notice of the observer? I do not think any one except Mr. Talmage, or some one with a mind constituted like his, could be bold and reckless enough to venture an affirmative answer to this question." Dr. Otts himself is disposed to place the site of the crucifixion just outside the gate on the east side of the city, and he gives good reasons for his opinion.

We would call special attention to his theory of Jacob's well, which is new, ingenious, and probable. At any rate, it furnishes the best answer we have yet seen to the questions, Why did Jacob go to the trouble and expense of digging a well in the midst of a valley where there were so many natural fountains? and why did the woman of Samaria pass by so many springs to get water out of Jacob's well? Dr. Otts thinks that in both cases there was a *religious* motive. This is the starting point of his intensely interesting exposition of our Saviour's conversation with the woman.

We find throughout an intelligent appreciation of all the great problems which he has occasion to deal with, a sturdy independence of judgment in forming his own opinions, and an able championship of the views he adopts. The style is generally strong and clear, at times homely and abounding in colloquialisms, some of which are questionable on the score of correctness and dignity. There are passages here and there of considerable beauty, though some of the descriptions are overdone, and there is perhaps too much of a certain sort of alliteration which gives the style an appearance of artificiality. Nevertheless, it flows in a full, strong stream. The principal defect is its occasional lack of harmony and grace—in a word, felicity. For instance, he says: "On this point we will let Dr. Thompson" (incorrectly spelt with p), "of the *The Land and The Book*, speak." This is awkward and could have been avoided by saying, "Dr. Thomson, author of *The Land and The Book*." There are also grammatical slips now and then, though most of these should perhaps be laid to the charge of the compositor. "Plead" for *pleaded*, however, on page 282, and "will" for *shall*, on page 344, are doubtless the author's. But it is hardly fair to criticise a man for a mistake so nearly universal among our people as this last.

These are mere specks—minute blemishes which a careful proof-reading might have prevented, and which will no doubt disappear in a second edition. The book deserves a second edition. In view of the enormous literature of the subject, and the fact that it has been ably discussed from almost every conceivable point of view, it is by no means easy to write a fresh, strong, helpful book on Palestine. But this is what Dr. Otts has done. And to any Bible student who wishes to review the principal features of our Lord's life with a *vade mecum* which strikes the golden mean between the jejune "harmonies" and the voluminous biographies, which will coördinate vividly the scenes and the events, which will renew and deepen the impression of reality, which will stimulate him to renewed and wholesome thought in regard to the great mysteries of the gospel, however different his conclusions may be in some cases from those of the author, we would say that "The Fifth Gospel" is just such a book.

Hampden-Sidney. W. W. Moore.

Harris' Hegel's Logic.

Hegel's Logic: A book on the Genesis of the Categories of the Mind. A Critical Exposition. *By Wm. T. Harris. LL. D., United States Commissioner of Education.* Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1890.

This book is one of a series of philosophical classics edited by Professor George S. Morris, late of the University of Michigan, and the object of which is to furnish the English reader a popular and yet critical exposition of the masterpieces of

German philosophical thought. Expositions of the systems of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Leibnitz, have previously appeared, and Hegel's Logic, by Mr. Harris, completes the series. They furnish to the English student an easily accessible and yet the clearest statement in our language of the views of these philosophers. Mr. Harris is especially fitted by intellectual gifts and by long and careful study of his acknowledged master to prepare a reliable and adequate account of the Hegelian logic.

The two most powerful and dangerous errorists in the history of modern speculation, are Baruch Spinoza, and George William Frederick Hegel. Their systems are substantially the same, for while Spinozism has received new forms, yet it has received no essential additions from the German Pantheism of Fichte, Schelling or Hegel. Spinoza, in his denial of the Cartesian distinction between primary and secondary substance, laid the foundation for the whole course of modern pantheistic speculation. And in his application of the philosophic idea of development or evolution to the infinite substance, or the Absolute, he completed the equipment required for the construction of those pantheistic systems which are the legitimate offspring of his philosophy. Hegel, the lineal descendant of Spinoza, through Fichte and Schelling, with an analytic and constructive ability almost unrivalled, has wrought into system, with only slight modifications, however, as to doctrine, the views which he inherited as a member of this pantheistic school The entire school are agreed, *first*, in the denial of the distinction between primary or uncreated substance, and secondary or created substance. and *second*, in the attribution of development to the Absolute, which they are bound to assume as the first postulate of their philosophy. The Absolute may assume different names, as the infinite substance with Spinoza, the infinite subject with Fichte, the infinite mind with Schelling, and the perpetual process of thought or eternal thinking without beginning or end with Hegel. and yet the system remains in all of its forms substantially the same.

In the Hegelian philosophy logic signifies, not as usually, the science of the formal laws of thought, but those laws which govern the development of the Absolute in all of the forms it is supposed to assume in nature, history, mind or religion. Logic, therefore, means metaphysics or philosophy, and in addition furnishes the laws of all the sciences as well. A complete view of the Hegelian system is therefore to be obtained from the logic alone. The reader who wishes to find a lucid and interesting exposition of Hegelianism,—the subtlest and the boldest of all the pantheistic systems,—cannot do better than consult this manual, prepared with so much painstaking care and evident ability by Mr. Harris.

This book is one among the many signs that the Hegelian philosophy has not altogether lost its grasp on scholarly and thoughtful minds, and a revived Hegelianism seems even now making an earnest and systematic attempt to capture the Universities of this country, just as it succeeded in doing in the land which gave it birth. There is certainly a growing literature devoted to the exposition of the philosophy of the whole pantheistic school, and in some quarters the dangerous and fatal policy has been adopted of adjusting theology like a nose of wax to the demands of this false philosophy. The church and the "orthodox" philosophy may yet find that their most dangerous foe is not the materialism which in recent years has been so vexatious and assertive. The materialistic philosophy commands the assent of the shallower and less earnest type of minds, and its epicurean ethics ap-

peals only to the grosser and crasser natures. The time may not be far distant when the theologian and the true philosopher must meet, not a foe so easily vanquished as a vulgar and blatant materialism, but a far more dangerous adversary in that subtle, and, in some respects, lofty philosophy which has captured the minds of some of the ablest thinkers in the history of speculative thought. The materialism of Hobbes, the agnosticism of Hume, the syncretism of Spencer, are puny antagonists when contrasted with the pantheism of Spinoza, or Schelling, or Hegel.

The church will do well if, in her colleges, universities, and seminaries, she provides her future champions with the weapons with which they may overcome this ablest and therefore most dangerous of all the false philosophies. The issue of such a contest will not be doubtful if the philosophic student be grounded in that true theistic philosophy which, originating in the Grecian theism of Plato and Aristotle, was adopted by the great theologians of the church, which shaped the thinking, and, in large measure, determined the theology of Augustine and Anselm, Calvin and Melancthon, Owen and Howe, and which was reproduced for substance by Leibnitz and Des Cartes, Kant and Sir Wm. Hamilton.

THORNTON C. WHALING.

BARBOUR'S "END OF TIME."

THE END OF TIME. A Poem of the Future. *By L. G. Barbour, D. D.* G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 27 W. 23rd St; London, 24 Bedford St., Strand. The Knickerbocker Press. 1892.

It need not surprise us that this epic drama has come from the philosophic and scholarly professor of mathematics and astronomy in the Central University at Richmond, Ky., as our greatest epic issued from the most learned head of his day, and the Shakspearean dramas are thought by some to be the work of the inductive philosopher.

It is the last night of time and the early morn of eternity; and the scene is laid on earth, when the forces of light and darkness, truth and error, Christianity and infidelity are gathered for the final struggle. It seems the hour of Satan's certain triumph; his legions are countless, flushed with success and confident of complete and speedy victory; while the Christians are few, and, though faithful, yet sadly discouraged.

The body of the poem and the main interest centre in the camp of the infidels, where the leaders are assembled at the headquarters on that last night. The chief characters are Seymour, Walton, and Belmont, the leader of the Satanic army.

Seymour represents sensualistic atheism; a gay, heartless, sentimental libertine; Byron without his brains; a man that silly women worship, and who repays their adoration by sacrificing them on the altar of his passion. He loves the lighter forms of art, things he can see and hear with the outer sense, the music of the lute, the melancholy sun-set, the radiant dawn; but has no soul for the deep things of time nor the sublime realities of eternity. God is too great a thought for his small mind, and immortality too serious; so he believes in neither.

Walton has risen by his merit to the second place in the army; an earnest, sincere spirit, like Saul thinking that he ought to do what he can against Jesus of Nazareth. He does it ignorantly through unbelief. A Bible comes into his hand,

a book he has never read, perhaps has never seen before. He opens it and begins to read. He is attracted; it evidences itself to his candid mind; he becomes a theist, a Christian. His brave, great soul bows lovingly, penitently, trustingly, without reserve, to the lowly Jesus, and he goes, like Paul to Rome or Luther to Worms, to defend Christ's cause before his enemies. In the presence of that ribald, rebel host, Seymour, Belmont and the rest, he pleads eloquently and strongly for the truth, seeks to win these to faith in Christ, and, failing, shrinks not from a martyr's death. Walton is a character we love, admire, venerate; a kind of Abdiel.

Belmont, however, is the hero of the poem, as is Satan of the Paradise Lost. He is a cultured, liberal-minded, evolutional pantheist. He is the generalissimo, and thus is indicated that the latest and most powerful foe of Christianity will be Spinoza. Belmont has studied Confucius, Buddha, Zoroaster, Mohammed, Moses, Christ, and finds them all inspired, the teachers of the race. One would think that Buddha would be put upon the topmost throne, as the Light of Asia was a pantheist, if not an atheist; but no, the crown is placed on the head of Christ, "that more than wondrous man." But Belmont is an eclectic bee, he gathers honey from all, and rejects what does not pass the test of his taste. Like all eclecticism, his philosophy is really shallow and inconsistent. As belief broadens it becomes superficial. He disavows materialism and yet holds that Ether is God. This is as false in science as it is in philosophy; for Ether is matter and is not God. It is not even pure pantheism, for the universe, not a part of it, is the God of Spinoza. Belmont is a proud spirit, like Manfred, Faust. He despises the sensual atheism of Seymour, and patronizes the Christian faith of Walton. Yet his ambition is that of Satan; he would love to wield the power of omnipotence, not to bless, but merely to have the consciousness that he can do as he lists. He would blacken and blast and burn, rather than build or bless. With all his liberality, he is at heart intolerant, for he raises his sword to slay the heroic Walton, who has merely confessed his Christian faith. With all, he is like the moon he describes, an exhausted soul, whose springs of love are dry; as he says, "this dead heart of mine." Such is unbelief, proud, cheerless, dead.

The eschatology of the poem is orthodox. The general resurrection and judgment take place at Christ's coming. The renovated earth is the saints' eternal home.

The meter and rhythm are not faultless, as they are not in any extended poem, but they are both excellent. While the body of the poem is heroic measure, room is found for several other varieties; even dactylic hexameters are essayed.

It is a poem; not prose in verse form. The interest is early awakened, at times becomes thrilling, is well sustained throughout, and has its climax in the closing scenes. There are many fine passages; we can find room for but two. The first describes the sunrise.

"Day dawned, yet darkness mingled with the light;
But presently a shaft of living fire
Shot through the lofty chambers of the east;
Another and another. Morning's wings!
How beautiful their downy pink and gold!
The sun arose, and from the slumbering world
Lifted the darkness, as a mother takes
A veil from off a sleeping infant's face;
And earth awaking oped her eyes and smiled."

The other sings of philosophy:

"The meteor flashes, then in darkness dies;
Day's splendor dawns but slowly in the east.
A flower springs up and lives a summer through;
The yew tree stands while centuries pass away.
And so with thee, divine Philosophy;
Some son of earth doth plant thee in the soil
And die, and others that are later born
Water and tend, then sleep beneath thy shade.
O, ancient yew, thy roots are under ground,
And feed upon the bodies of the dead."

Lexington, Va. J. A. Quarles.

Mallard's "Plantation Life."

Plantation Life Before Emancipation. *By Rev. R. Q. Mallard, D. D.*, pp. 237. Richmond, Va.: Whittet & Shepperson. 1892.

This admirable volume has been before the public for several months, and has been received everywhere with that cordial approval to which by merit it is entitled. Though it has already been noticed in this Quarterly, yet the importance of its subject, the prominence of its author as one of the recognized leaders of Southern thought, and the felicitous manner in which he has handled his subject call for a more extended notice.

Seldom have we spent a more delightful day than that in which we perused this charming book from beginning to end. It begins with an elaborate, yet affectionate, dedication to the memory of the late Dr. Charles Colcock Jones, of Georgia, whose untiring missionary labors among the blacks are widely known, and justly entitled him to the name which was frequently accorded him of "The Apostle to the Negro Slave." It was first published as a serial in the columns of the *Southwestern Presbyterian*, of which the author is now the accomplished editor, being suggested by an article in a Northern religious journal, written by a Southern lady resident in the North, in defence of Southern Christian slaveholders from the aspersions of a secretary of the Presbyterian Freedmen's Board. Having in his possession abundant documentary sources of information on this subject, and having been reared among slaves in the midst of that "Plantation Life" which we find so graphically portrayed in his volume, the author is peculiarly qualified for the work he set before him. His purpose, as he himself states it, is "to portray a civilization now obsolete, to picture the relations of mutual attachment and kindness which in the main bound together master and servant, and to give this and future generations some correct idea of the noble work done by Southern masters and mistresses of all denominations for the salvation of the slave." It was written in the hope that it might "contribute to the restoration of the mutual relations of kindness and confidence characterizing the old *regime*, and sorely strained, not so much by emancipation as by the unhappy events immediately succeeding it." The topics treated in its twenty-four chapters are, the writer's connection with slavery and slaves; the old plantation described; plantation occupations and sports; houses, food, physic, work, government and family relations; Sacrament Sunday on the plantation; interspersed with many anecdotes, mainly religious, illustrative of the

times and of negro character, and concluding with some account of what the South, and especially the Presbyterians of the South, did for his elevation and salvation. It is largely a book of reminiscences of the author's happy boyhood in old Liberty County, Ga., where, on his father's extended rice plantation, he saw slavery in its most favorable aspects. If he seems to dwell upon his childhood's associations with the negroes it is in order to establish his competency and credibility as a witness.

Chapters III. and IV. picture for us the old plantation and the sports and pastimes of the children both white and colored. No one who has been reared amid the activities and enjoyments of plantation life, or has dwelt even as a passing guest in the midst of the gentle surroundings and animated scenes that are here delineated can read this part of the work without emotions of delight.

The provision made for the slaves in the way of houses, food, clothing, physicking, &c., and the work exacted of him, as seen in chapter V., is a fair picture of the conduct of the entire South. Commenting on the fortunate condition of the laborer under slavery in these respects—fortunate compared with the scant provision so many of our colored population are now able to make for themselves—the author adds:

"Compare the average house of the slave with the one-room mud hovel of the Irish tiller in Roman Catholic Ireland, with no privacy by day or night, the suitable and substantial clothing and bed covering supplied the slave with the scanty and sometimes ragged raiment of the poor in our great cities, and even laborers in our factories, their big fires, wood *ad libitum*, with the miserable smouldering embers over which the poor sewing women crouch shivering in Northern cities; the excellent nursing and good medical attention given the slave, with the condition of many of the poor work-people who dare not, or will not, in their pride, call in a physician, for whose services they are unable to pay; compare the hours of labor in the open air, not pushed to exhaustion and comparatively short, with the long drastic work of many artisans against which there is a constant demand for restrictive legislation, and add to this the consideration that if the white master lived in comparative luxury upon the fruits of the labor of his slaves, he had all the care and forethought and responsibility of directing and organizing the labor for united efficiency; in a word, that he supplemented the African brawn with Anglo-Saxon brain, and it will be perceived that no laboring population in the world were ever better off than the Southern slaves, and that there never was a falser accusation made against the Southern planter than this, harped upon by abolitionists of old, and repeated sometimes by Northern preachers now, that 'he kept back the hire of the laborer.' The plain truth is just this, that no tillers of the soil in ancient or modern times, received such ample compensation for their labors. He was not paid down, it is true, in cash, but he was amply compensated for his toil in free quarters, free medical attention, free food, free fire wood, free support of sick, infirm, aged and young, and the free supply of that organizing faculty which utilized labor and made it more productive and capable of supporting, without the remotest fear of starvation, or even of scarcity, and without appeal to public charity, entire slave communities often as large as that of a good-sized village of whites!"

Chapter VI. tells of how the slave was governed. It shows in what respects his government was patriarchal, and how it differed from that of Abraham's household. Here the author tells us frankly of abuses that occurred under this system;

not frequent, when we consider the imperfection of human nature, yet far too frequent, and at times even flagrant, in the way of punishment in excess of the requirements of discipline. Such abuse was doubtless unavoidable, yet lest it be thought that cruelty to slaves was a vice chargeable only to Southern men, the author calls attention to the fact, well remembered and frequently remarked upon, that the Northerners who were employed here and there as overseers, made the severest masters, in consequence no doubt of their not having grown up with and formed attachments for the negro, and their judging his capacity and energy by a white man's standard.

Several chapters are devoted to Old Midway Church, and the peculiar and active relations it sustained to the great work of evangelizing the colored people. No church in the South has had a more memorable career or been more eminently useful than Old Midway in the palmy days before Emancipation. Equally honorable with the long roll of illustrious ministers it sent forth to the church at large is the abundance of its labors to promote the religious culture of the slaves of Liberty County. A perusal of the pages bearing upon this topic, together with those which give a detailed account of the missionary labors of Dr. C. C. Jones among the blacks, is calculated to quicken the interest of the church in our work of colored evangelization by showing how great success has been in other days achieved in this broad and inviting field of labor. That the negroes are capable of becoming staunch Presbyterian Christians this book amply shows. That piety of the Presbyterian stamp is of the greatest practical worth is shown by the developments in the recent Messiah craze which swept over the county in which Midway Church was located. While almost all the plantation negroes in other churches were carried headlong by the wild and demoniacal excitement that attended the movement into many strange and foolish excesses, the colored Presbyterians that yet remain are reported to have held aloof from the movement and refused to lend it any countenance.

The concluding chapters give us much interesting documentary history relative to the attitude of the earlier Southern Assemblies on the subject of the evangelization of the negroes. How near this subject has ever been to the heart of the church and how thoroughly we of to-day are committed to large and systematic efforts to extend the knowledge of salvation to our brethren in black is here fully set forth.

No where is our author more felicitous than where he delineates the more excellent traits of negro character, and especially when that character is adorned with the divine grace shed abroad in the heart and life. Chapter XXIII., which portrays with singular beauty the fidelity of the negro to his master during the troublous times of the war waged to give him freedom, touches upon a theme that always stirs the gratitude and admiration of Southern people, and that constitutes no small part of the debt that to-day we owe to this less favored race.

This work is not polemical. It is marked throughout by a yearning desire for the material and spiritual welfare of the colored race. By the intimate associations of a life time, beginning in the plastic and tender years of childhood, the author is prepared to feel with and for this people, and their wider evangelization has no more ardent or eloquent advocate; but his instincts as a chivalrous Southern gentleman would not permit him to be silent while history was being misrepresented and his own people being aspersed. Hence he has given us in this work a

timely testimony to the noble deeds and beneficent character of a civilization now obsolete, and that ere many years are flown will have faded from the memory of the living. It is well for Southern literature and for Southern history that we have had published among us this charming narrative that is destined to a more than ephemeral existence. W. A. Alexander.

Southwestern Presbyterian University.

The Review of Reviews.

The Review of Reviews. New York: Review of Reviews, Astor Place.

The *Review of Reviews* for December sustains with remarkable enterprise and ability the great reputation this magazine has won for timeliness, exact pertinency and wide range of interest. The editor's review of the election and his discussion of the results will attract wide attention.

Among the important subjects presented will be found a well-digested summary of the most important legislation enacted by American State legislatures in the year 1892, a discussion under the title of "How to Abolish the Gerrymander," of reform in electoral methods, an article upon physical culture, an extensive contribution to the Tennyson literature which has appeared since the poet's death, etc.

Among the illustrations of this number of the *Review* one finds the strong, manly face of Mr. Gilroy, Tammany's Mayor-elect of New York; Charles A. Dana, of the *Sun;* the late Mrs. Harrison; President Harrison and his little grandson; Mr. Gladstone and his granddaughter; five extraordinary composite photographs of different groups of the English Cabinet; some thirty new governors elected in November in those States of the Union which held gubernatorial elections; Mr. Kinloch Cooke, the new editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette;* various portraits of the late Lord Tennyson, including two full-page illustrations; portraits of Miss Anna Wood and Miss Lucile Hill, of the Wellesley College Gymnasium; a portrait of the distinguished Professor Ihne, of Heidelberg; excellent engravings of seven prominent English poets of the present day who have been considered candidates for the poet laureateship; portraits of past incumbents in that office; new portraits of Mr. Edmund Clarence Stedman, Mr. Edward Eggleston, Mr. Bradford Torrey, Miss Harriet Monroe, of Chicago, an excellent engraving of Dr. Weir Mitchell, Mr, Timothy Cole, Mrs. Annie Thackeray Ritchie, and other persons eminent in literature and art.

IX. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE EXPOSITOR'S BIBLE. *Edited by the Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll, M. A., LL. D., Editor of "The Expositor."*

THE GOSPEL OF ST. JOHN. VOL. II. *By Marcus Dods, D. D.*
THE EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS. *By Rev. C. G. Findlay, Headinglay College, Leeds.*
THE BOOK OF JOB. *By Robert A. Watson, D. D.*

Each volume crown 8vo, of about 450 pages. Singly, $1.50. A yearly series of six volumes, $6.00. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1892.

Our notice of the first volume of the commentary on John will furnish a sufficient view of the method, nature and principles of Dr. Dods' exposition in this series of that Gospel.

The Epistle to the Ephesians is treated by the same author who gave us the admirable exposition of *Galatians*, one of the very best of the entire series. In this volume he discusses briefly and disproves the position of those who doubt or deny Paul's authorship of the epistle on internal grounds, but finds it harder to believe that it was addressed to "the saints which are in Ephesus," seeming to prefer the view that regards it as addressed to the churches of Asia Minor, or the region at large adjacent to Ephesus. He does not seek to qualify the glorious statements of the Apostle in the first chapter, and states the doctrine of election in all its force and sweetness. His analysis of the epistle is happy and helpful, and the Apostle's thought and purpose are unfolded with unusual clearness. The technicalities of theology and criticism are avoided, but the careful reader will readily perceive that the author is familiar with them. The exposition is sound, reliable and useful. The subdivisions of the epistle as given by the author are, the Introduction, Praise and Prayer, the Doctrine, Prayer and Praise, the Exhortation on church life, on Christian morals, on family life, on the approaching conflict.

In the *Book of Job*, Dr. Watson has one of the most difficult books of the Bible to deal with. The critical questions are numerous and puzzling. He decides them all along the lines of modern criticism. He scouts the idea of the writer being of as early a time as Moses. He dates the book somewhere in the period lying between the two parts, so called, of Isaiah. He pays little attention to the question of the authorship of the book. He locates Uz, and the home of the patriarch, in some oasis in the North Arabian Desert. The analysis of the book is good, though incidentally he regards the part attributed to Elihu as a post-exilic interpolation, containing the "wisdom" of later times than the body of the book. The sharp, clear-cut analysis of Dr. William Henry Green, the best, we think, that has ever been made of this book, would be most useful to the reader if studied carefully before the reading of this exposition.

Outline Analysis of the Books of the Bible. *By Professor Barnard C. Taylor.* 12mo.; pp. 191. Philadelphia. American Baptist Publication Society. 1892.

The surprising number of manuals like this that have appeared during the year is indicative of increased interest in the Bible, and in the intelligent study of its books. Manifestly one can have little conception of the meaning of an author when one knows nothing of the purpose for which he is writing, the plan he is pursuing, the relations of one part of the book to another, and the order or development of the thought. Professor Taylor has, in the little volume before us, compacted together much information of a general nature, as to the author, date, historical occasion, leading topic, chief purposes, points of specific interest, relation to other books of the Bible, as well as given us general analyses of the several books of the Old Testament. Indeed, we think he would better have called his work an introduction and analysis than an outline analysis. In dealing with the disputed parts of the Old Testament, he accepts with confidence their historical trustworthiness, the unity of their authorship, and the reliability of the canon as we have it.

An Epitome of Introduction to the Books of the Old Testament. *By Ira M. Price, Ph. D. (Leip.), Professor of Hebrew and the Cognate Languages in the Theological Seminary at Morgan Park, Chicago.* 12mo.; pp. 164. St. Louis. Missouri State Sunday-School Association. 1891.

The Missouri State Sunday-School Association, under whose auspices this book is issued, has in contemplation the publication of a series dealing with Biblical Introduction, Biblical History, Biblical Theology, and the Biblical Languages The manual before us is the first of these. It is brief, but full of the richest matter. It gives some account of the land, literature and chronology of the Bible, as well as a more detailed account of each book, its meaning, age, author, purpose, relation to other books, and analysis. It is finely adapted for use by those who have not access to the author's more complete work, *A Syllabus of the Old Testament*, or to the many other voluminous works covering the same ground. The author devoted rightly no space to the discussion of critical questions. He accepts the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, the Davidic origin of most of the psalms, and the unity of Isaiah's authorship. Sunday-school workers and students will find the little volume most helpful. It is well printed, but is intended to be cheap and within reach of every one.

An Introduction to the Study of the Books of the New Testament. *By John H. Kerr, A. M., Pastor of the Central Church of Rock Island, Illinois.* With an Introductory Note by Professor Benjamin B. Warfield, D. D., of Princeton Theological Seminary. 12mo., pp. xx. 333; $1.50. New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1892.

A work in which the author makes no claim to having presented anything new and startling, but to have given the results of patient and painstaking investigations. It is a book intended to present in popular language the best results of the critical study of the New Testament. It is intensely conservative in tone and position. It stands up for the old views. It stoutly maintains the canonicty and genuineness of the Gospel of John and the Second Epistle of Peter as against rationalistic criticism. It follows the chronological order of the books in the study

of them, after having presented first the Gospels. It discusses at length the authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and after confessing on the first page devoted to this subject that we must all agree with Origen in saying, "Who wrote the epistle, God only knows certainly," acknowledges on the last page that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of a Pauline authorship. The study of the relations of the Gospels is rather meagre and unsatisfactory, though perhaps full enough for the author's special purpose. Altogether, it an admirable book, deserving to be read and studied, and calculated to strengthen the faith of those who read it in the New Testament as an inerrant part of the inerrant word.

THE BOOKS OF THE BIBLE BRIEFLY ANALYZED. For use in Bible Instruction and for Bible Students in General. *By A. Schultze, President of Moravian Seminary.* Fifth edition, 16mo., pp. 40; 20 cents. Easton, Pa.: H. T. Frueauff, 1891.

In this little book the sacred writings are considered in their order as found in our Bible, and a brief comprehensive view is given of their contents. The introduction and analyses are necessarily very short, but will be found sound and useful.

OUR SIXTY-SIX BOOKS. How they came to us, and what they are. *By Edwin W. Rice, D. D., author of People's Commentaries on Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, etc.* Third revised edition, with analysis and questions. Fourth thousand. 12mo., pp. 159; cloth 50 cents. Philadelphia: The American Sunday-School Union. 1892.

This book appeared only a year ago and has passed to a third edition. No better proof could be given of its popularity and usefulness. It is especially adapted to Sabbath-school teachers and pupils and to non-professional Bible students. It is a compend of biblical literature, giving in small compass a very clear account of the various versions of the Scriptures, a history of the translations, writers and contents of the books, the structure of Hebrew poetry, prophecy, theories of the Pentateuch, etc., etc. The appendix, containing an analysis and questions, facilitates a thorough inductive study of the facts it contains. The book is a timely and most valuable contribution to popular knowledge of the subject with which it deals.

THE PREACHER'S COMPLETE HOMILETIC COMMENTARY ON THE OLD TESTAMENT. (With critical and exegetical notes.) By twenty distinguished Homilists. Vol. I. Genesis. *By Rev. J. S. Exell, M. A., and Rev. T. H. Leale, A. K. C.* Cloth, 8vo., 747 pp. $3.00. New York. Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1892.

This is the first volume of a series of twenty on the Old Testament, proposed to be issued by the publishers, and printed from the plates from which an English edition has been issued. As its title indicates, the work is prepared by various authors, and is designed to be a purely homiletic commentary, a sermon outline and homiletic suggestions being given on every verse or section of the Old Testament which admits of it. While there is a faithful use of it, there is no mere display of critical apparatus or technical study, but an abundance of illustration, selections from various sources, and other homiletic matter. The usefulness of

the book will be largely determined by the conscientiousness of its possessor; for however helpful it may be, if he makes too free a use of its pages, it will be but a little time until he will come to depend upon it in the loss of his own powers of sermonizing.

This, the first volume in the series, is sound and evangelical. It advocates the Mosaic authorship of Genesis and of the Pentateuch, upholds the authenticity and maintains that the unfoldings of time and the outworkings of science are a constant refutation of the theories of the materialistic school which would impugn the book's veracity.

Hints and Helps on the Sunday-School Lessons for 1893. *By Rev. David James Burrell, D. D., and Rev. Joseph Dunn Burrell.* 12mo., pp. 388; $1.25. New York: American Tract Society. 1892.

We know of no series of expositions of the International Lessons that one finds more stimulating and suggestive than that prepared from year to year by the Brothers Burrell. The present volume is up to the standard. In the study of the difficult portions of the Bible which lie before us in the next half year, it will be found especially useful.

The People's Bible. Discourses upon Holy Scripture. *By Joseph Parker, D. D.* Vol. xvii. Hosea-Malachi. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1892. $1.50.

The great preacher goes somewhat rapidly over the books embraced in this volumes, but he is as fresh and original as ever, and seems to be growing in his appreciation of the value and usefulness of the expository method of preaching.

The Soteriology of the New Testament. *By William Porcher Du Bose, M. A., Professor of Exegesis in the University of the South.* New York and London: MacMillan & Co., 1892.

A not remarkably able, clear nor sound treatise upon the subject given in the title. Much could not be expected from an interpretation of the Scriptures which is based upon the doctrine that the Scriptures get their authority from the church, which seems to be the author's teaching when he says "It was the selection and acceptance of the church that made (the Scriptures) Scripture, and the church selected and accepted them because they expressed its own true mind." The author teaches a peculiar doctrine also of incarnation, holding that incarnation is of two kinds, one the general, the incarnation of God in humanity, a process still going on and to be completed when Christ is glorified in his mystical body, the church; the other a particular incarnation, completed in the incarnation of God in the man Christ Jesus. As can be seen "the church" comes near filling up the author's entire horizon, and thus the reader will not be surprised to find that the book is full of sacramentarianism, and that the church has much to do with saving the soul.

The Sabbath—The Lord's Day. A Treatise on Sunday Laws. *By George E. Harris*; pp. 338; $3.50. Rochester: The Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Company.

The author is a member of the Bar of Washington, D. C. The book, resulting from a collection of data for his own use, is a practical, judicious and reverent

treatment of the question of the Sabbath from the historical and legal standpoints. Its great value lies in its collection of the laws of England and America, civil and criminal, bearing upon the matter. It considers the Jewish law as well, and the changes of to-day. The edicts and laws prohibiting judicial proceedings on the sacred day, the general statutes and their construction by the courts, and kindred topics, are fully and intelligently presented and studied. The volume is a most useful one.

Papers of the American Society of Church History. Vol. IV. Report and Papers of the Fourth Annual Meeting, held in the City of Washington, Dec. 29 and 30, 1891.

The object of the American Society of Church History is, apparently, to awaken an interest in the study of church history, and to stimulate original research. Nothing could be more desirable. Church history has not received the attention which its importance demands in the curriculum of seminary studies in this country. The contents of the present volume seem to indicate that the object is being at least partially attained. Besides the constitution of the society and the minutes of its fourth annual meeting, there is a valuable list of "works of interest to the student of church history which appeared in 1891," together with several articles of great interest and value. We would especially call attention to the chapters on the "Mediæval Sects," by Professor Newman, of Toronto, Canada.

Presbyterians. A Popular Narrative of their Origin, Progress, Doctrines, and Achievements. *By Rev. Geo. P. Hays, D. D., LL. D*, with special chapters by W. J. Reid, D. D., and Rev. A. G. Wallace, D. D., of the United Presbyterian Church of North America; Rev. J. M. Howard, D. D., and Rev. J. M. Hubbert, D. D., of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church; Rev. Moses D. Hoge, D. D., of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, and Rev. W. H. Roberts, D. D., LL. D., American Secretary of the Presbyterian Alliance. *Introductions by Rev. John Hall, D. D., LL. D., and Rev. William E. Moore, D. D., LL. D.* 8vo.; pp. 544. Cloth, $2.75; half Morroco, $3.50. New York: J. A. Hill & Co. 1892.

With such an array of names before him, one would expect a volume of rare value and interest. Nor will he be disappointed upon opening its rich pages. In twenty three chapters, only two of which are devoted to the discussion of the general principles of Presbyterianism, as to its origin (but why doos the author go no further back than Moses? Abraham was a fine old Presbyterian elder!), its synagogue pattern as to form, its apostolicity and early history, the contributors trace the history of American Presbyterianism and give us a full account of most of the branches of the great family that bears that name. In the discussion of the distinctive peculiarities of Presbyterian denominations, in the eighteenth chapter, we cannot but think the editor would have found sufficient reasons to exclude the "Cumberland" Church from the family, for this church totally denies that faith which is the bond of family union, and the absence of which puts that church out of the family, though it still calls itself "Presbyterian." And we cannot bring ourselves to enjoy the fact that our own Southern Church, second in numbers in the land and first in the strict type of its polity and doctrine, is set off in next to

the last chapter in the book, and after the so called Presbyterians of the Cumberland type. And what will that stalwart band, our brethren of the Associate Reformed Synod, with their college and seminary and paper, and with their grand missionary work in Mexico, and with their great and growing zeal for evangelization think and say when they find their name and work altogether passed by in this history of Presbyterians? The work is of special value in the account it gives of the various departments of church work, as, for instance, education, schools, colleges, and seminaries, the executive agencies of the churches, the religious literature, philanthropies etc. The treatment of present issues, as revision, the higher criticism, and kindred matter, is necessarily cursory, though faithful and sound. As a volume of facts, rather than of discussions, of history rather than of theology or doctrine, the volume is extremely valuable, and should be in every intelligent Presbyterian's library. The many illustrations of leaders in the various branches of the church and of institutions of learnings, add largely to the interest and value of the work.

The Fifth Gospel. The Land where Jesus Lived. *By J. M. P. Otts, LL. D., Author of "Laconisms," etc.* 12mo : pp. 376. New York and London: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1892.

Few subjects have been as much written upon, and as poorly, within recent years, as Palestine. A fair proportion of the American tourists who spend four weeks in the Land of the Book rush into print. If the future travellers will follow Dr Otts' example they will do well. He has not written a book of travels nor pretended to carry his readers over the entire land. He has devoted himself to the study of a few points, here and there, and has sought to obtain and impart a clearer knowledge of certain teachings of our Saviour, from the light shed upon them by the land in which he lived and taught. The successive chapters are really studies or discourses, illustrated by the local setting of the event discoursed upon. They are at once entertaining and instructive, and prove their author to be both a close observer and faithful, conscientious student. A fuller account of the book appearing in our preceding pages, we refer the reader to that, reserving only the privilege of urging every one to supply himself with the book, not only because of its great intrinsic value and the profit it will be to him, but also because all the proceeds of the work have been generously donated by the author to that grand charity, the Alabama Synod's Orphan Home, of which the accomplished and liberal author is the chief executive.

A Picnic in Palestine *By Rev. M. H. Wharton, D. D., Author of "Gospel Talks." "Curse and Chains of Rome," "Pulpit, Pew and Platform."* 8vo. : pp. 380. $2.00. Baltimore: The Wharton & Barron Publishing Company. 1892.

As handsomely printed, bound and illustrated as any book that has been placed in our hands in a long while. The title is somewhat against it, one thinks at first, but a careful reading shows that it is not a misnomer. The author describes most pleasantly a most pleasant tour through Palestine. There is no pedantry about the volume, no attempt to be learned or to make a display. The author and the party which enjoyed his genial companionship simply "had a good time" on their oriental outing, and his book is an account of it. He writes in a happy, natural style, full of brightness, and never wearying, and carries the reader agreeably along as one of the company. The narrative is enjoyable from beginning to end, and incidentally affords much historical and geographical information.

Bible Baptism. *By Robert P. Kerr, D. D., Author of "Presbyterianism for the People," "The People's History of Presbyterianism," etc.* 16mo.: pp. 56. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1892.

A brochure, consisting of two parts, and dealing with the mode and the subjects of baptism. It is written in its author's best vein, and will be found to present the old arguments in a peculiarly happy manner. The spirit of the discussion is admirable, and will attract rather than antagonize those who oppose the author's position. In the discussion of the subject of infant baptism, the doctrine of infant church membership is rightly put well to the front. It is well handled and the argument is convincing.

The Sermon Bible. Acts vii.—1 Corinthians xvi. Cr. 8vo.: pp. 394; $1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1892.

The ninth volume in a series designed to cover the entire Bible. This volume, like those preceding it, contain about five hundred outlines of sermons by leading preachers upon the Scriptures embraced, with copious references to homiletic literature, theological treatises and commentaries, with blank pages for notes comments, etc. The selections are admirably made and drawn from the best sources.

The Story of Mackay of Uganda Told for Boys. *By his Sister.* 12mo.; handsomely bound in colored cover. pp. viii. 338: $1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1892.

As the author tells us, and as we find from its perusal, this book is made up of material that is fresh and not of that which was given in her recent work, *Mackay of Uganda*, which we were glad to commend so heartily to our readers. Like its companion work, it is full of the most interesting details of the life and work of a man whose name will ever live as "The Apostle to Uganda." It describes those features in particular which will interest the young and stimulate their interest in missionary work in Africa. The book should be placed in every home and especially in every Sunday-school library.

The Pilgrim's Progress. *By John Bunyan.* With over one hundred illustrations designed *by Frederick Barnard and others*, engraved *by Dalziel Brothers.* Chromo-Lithograph Plates in nine Colors. An Introductory notice of the Author *by Rev. William Landels, D. D.* Large 4to.; pp. 327. Philadelphia and Chicago: John C. Winston & Co. 1892.

A sumptuous volume truly called "The Peerless Edition." For a holiday book nothing could be better. We commend it to all who would put in their children's hands a volume which will be at once attractive and profitable.

The Character and Services of the Rev. Thomas Harvey Skinner, D. D , LL. D. A Memorial Address Delivered Before the Officers, Faculty and Students of McCormick Seminary. *By Rev. David R. Breed, D. D.* Chicago: 1892.

A noble tribute to a noble man. Doctor Skinner deserved all the love, respect, veneration that were given him. Few men of the present generation equalled him in the breadth of his views, the vigor of his intellect, the soundness of his

theology, the strength and force of his character, the tenderness of his heart. He had a tender affection for the Southern Church, and his sympathies were with us as to the distinctive principles of our beloved Zion. McCormick Seminary may regard him as the founder of its fortunes. He was as benevolent as he was learned and consecrated. The portraiture of his face that accompanies the little pamphlet, is the most life-like and true to the original that we have ever seen.

The Crowning Sin of the Age. The Perversion of Marriage. *By Brevard D. Sinclair, Member of the American Academy of Political and Social Science; late Member of the Bar of the Supreme Courts of Ohio, North Carolina, etc.* 12mo., pp. 94. Boston: Scriptural Tract Repository, H. L. Hastings. 1892.

The author is a preacher and pastor as well as once a lawyer. This volume consists of a well-considered, bold sermon upon the subject named in the title, followed by several chapters containing the views of eminent writers and thinkers upon the same topic and commending his position. In a short chapter on the decay of New England, the author traces that decay to "the Crowning Sin of the Age," and presents a strong array of statistics to prove it. Another chapter gives us the testimony of the church against the sin which the author is denouncing, especially as uttered in a deliverance of the Presbyterian General Assembly and in a pastoral letter of the Roman Catholic Church.

Columbus. An Epic Poem, Giving an Accurate History of the Great Discovery in Rhymed Heroic Verse. *By Samuel Jefferson, F. R. A. S., F. C. S., author of "The Epic of the Invincible Armada."* 12mo.; pp. 239. $1.25. Chicago: S. C. Briggs & Company. 1892.

The Columbian literature is rapidly growing. The above contribution to it is well worthy of a place by the side of what we have already noticed. The heroic verse lends too great a dignity, perhaps, to some passages in Columbus' life, yet withal it is attractive and gives interest to the story. Some recent biographies of the great discoverer may seem to contrast with the poet's conception of him when he sings:

> "Thou Searcher of the Ocean, thee to sing
> Shall my devoted lyre awake each string!
> Columbus! Hero! would my song could tell
> How great thy worth! No praise can overswell
> The grandeur of thy deeds!"

Songs of the Covenant, for the Sabbath-School, Prayer-Meetings, etc. *C. C. Converse, Editor.* pp. 291. Net 35 cents. Words only, boards, 20 cents; limp cloth, 10 cents. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1892.

We hail with delight a new collection of hymns and tunes suitable for the Sabbath-school and prepared and adapted for use in our own church. The editor is not only a gifted author, but a man of the rarest judgment and taste. His own musical works have given him rank among the best of Americal composers. His tune to "What a Friend We Have in Jesus" alone gives him a permanent reputation. In the ripeness of his experience and power, he has completed the

book before us and given us the best collection of the kind that our church has ever had. The book is daintily but substantially bound, is printed in large, clear type, and is offered at a very low price. It is not a cheap book as to quality. It contains nearly three hundred pages of music, and three hundred and forty hymns. The collection is sufficiently advanced to educate our schools in their musical tastes, but not so far advanced as to be beyond the reach of young people not possessed of long early training. There is nothing objectionable about the collection in music or words. The setting is admirable. Altogether it is a bright, fresh, and popular collection, the general use of which will go far to give correct musical tastes to our young people and to be the medium of their sweetest praise to the God of the Covenant. It should be in every school of our church, and its wide use among others for whom it is well adapted, would bring blessing and profit.

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I. THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION AS AFFECTED BY THE ESSENTIAL RELATION BETWEEN THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE.

Do we think in words? Do we think only in words? Do we always when we engage in thought employ for that purpose language? Is it possible to think fruitfully, to think to any advantage, to think at all in any other way? On the assumption that one can think without words, is it possible to express, even to one's self, to formulate,—to communicate one's thoughts, *i. e.*, convey them intelligibly to others,—through any other medium? Must there not be some medium or vehicle for every form whatever of thought-expression; and must or must not that medium be language?

Some of these and kindred questions are not merely of curious interest, but also of profound significance and consequence, and have accordingly not only awakened the attention and occasioned and stimulated the researches of the great body of philologists and logicians, and the specialists in physiology proper, and of course those in mental physiology and what is now known as physiological psychology, but have also occupied the minds of some of the wisest philosophers and greatest intellects the world has ever seen. But what is still more to the purpose at present, the answers given to some of these questions have an incidental bearing on the inquiry as to the fact and extent of an infallible inspiration.

It will be the aim of this essay to indicate and touch upon the main problems which arise from a consideration of the more important of the interrogatories just referred to, and then to point

out briefly in what way some of the conclusions thus arrived at are obviously related to the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of the sacred Scriptures, and the special tenet, which we believe to be involved in that doctrine, of a universally infallible Bible.

It will, accordingly, be our endeavor to investigate the point, whether language, besides being, as is everywhere conceded, the ordinary *medium*, is also the invariable and indispensable *instrument* of our thinking. Manifestly either it is, or it is not. We shall, therefore, go on to consider the issues of this unavoidable alternative, and to show that in either case, that is, whether it be true or false that we can in some sense and to some extent think without words, the position is equally incontrovertible that there can be no communication, no formulation, no expression even of thought, without words or their equivalent; and that consequently the claim of infallibility for any given body of ideas *ipso facto* involves the claim of infallibility for the vesture of language in which those ideas are confessedly conveyed.

In the October number of the Quarterly for 1892, we gave a compact critique of Max Müller's *Science of Thought*, but reserved for subsequent and rather more particular consideration the principal theme of discussion in those deeply interesting volumes, namely, what the famous Anglo-German scholar and Oxford professor conceives to be the essential and inseparable relation betwixt thoughts and words.[1]

We now proceed to enter upon the examination to which we then looked forward. Following the well-established continental fashion, Dr. Müller pursues the historical method in connection with the one of critical philosophical inquiry, and sets before us a remarkable conspectus of the opinions and surmises of most of the expert logicians and philologists, and of some of the most notable amongst the world's great men and sages, on this difficult subject. He also, as would have been anticipated, favors us in advance, as well as in the progress and sequel of his argument-in-chief, with his own clear, resolute, vigorous, and striking views in reference to the matter.

[1] As he does also betwixt words and things.

The great student of cognate vocabularies is not insensible to the danger of falling into logomachy in the conduct of this, as of other abstruse or intricate explorations which involve the use of terms that may vary in their meaning. Unfortunately he is not always on his guard against this source of fallacy. What is the precise shade of signification that we are to attach to the term "thought," and to the term "language"? When these definitions are agreed upon, the field of intelligent debate is at one stroke very much reduced in its dimensions. Men who before appeared to be at dagger's draw with one another in their attitude towards this problem, then are seen to be standing shoulder to shoulder. Max Müller would himself confine the term thought to the domain of concepts, and thinks a majority of writers on this subject, though by no means all the eminent ones, must be understood to have done the same. The term language he would extend so far as to make it include gestures, signals, and pantomime or dumb-show. It is sufficiently evident from this, that the man who affirmed and the man who denied the proposition in dispute would not be necessarily contradicting each other. For the man who affirmed that language is essential to thought, might by thought mean exclusively such thought as is involved in concepts; while the man who denied the statement, might by thought mean merely a vague percept, or a vanishing and illusory impression. Or, the first man might by language mean articulated words, whereas the second man might mean to comprehend under the term language that which is expressed in mute acting, or in symbolically suggestive rather than vocally or visibly declaratory signs.

We deem that we owe it to Professor Müller to allow, upon due attention to these distinctions, that on the whole he has made out a *prima facie* case as to the number of authorities who have taken his side in the controversy. We must, however, not forget the fable of the painter and the lion, or fail to bear in mind that the selection of the authorities is left, for the most part, in very partial, though very honorable, hands. It may be further conceded to him, that among these authorities, and we do not intend to travel much beyond his own register, are, perhaps, a small majority of the expert specialists in logic, as well as of those in the

special science concerning the phenomena and laws of articulate speech, and besides these some of the monarchs in the realm of intellectual speculation and achievement. Those which he does not cite may be safely relegated to one of the other classes.

There remains after this process of sifting a group of independent thinkers, some of whom appear, and others are known, to take the other side; and though these may not be quite to the same extent *multi* by the count, they would be admitted on all hands to be *multum* by the estimation of the scales. It may also be said, that several of the most conspicuous names on the affirmative side of the question are men who on other questions have maintained the side that could be clearly and forcibly made to seem to be the true one, rather than the side which, however awkward and difficult to champion, actually was the true one. As a counterpart statement it may be justly pleaded that an apparent adhesion to the affirmative can be attributed with propriety to some of the subtlest as well as most cautious of the special experts, as well as to some of the greatest thinkers of whom the world has record. It is thus seen to be "a pretty quarrel."

Professor Müller touches only incidentally, though shrewdly and knowingly, on the physiological and physiologico-psychological aspects of the question. It is our wish to say something on that branch of the subject on some other occasion.

Before making a survey of the authorities, we would interpose a word in passing. We cannot help thinking that Professor Müller is continually begging the question in dispute in his comments upon the views of those who have seen fit to take a different view, or who may be reasonably suspected of having done so, from the one he entertains himself and defends with so much zeal. He is also forever repeating, in varied forms of expression we admit, one and the same chime of bells. He exaggerates, too, the importance of the question itself when he represents it as—with its answer—lying at the root of all philosophy, and when he predicts or fancies that it is destined in the future to revolutionize the methods and conclusions of intellectual science. We are also convinced that this distinguished philologist is, unintentionally of course, hardly always quite fair in the accounts and criti-

cisms with which he favors us of the grounds respectively occupied by those writers who chance to be of a different mind from himself in this debate. At times he is faultlessly satisfactory as a reporter. He is, in our judgment, somewhat over eager to class amongst his aiders and abettors men who might with equal or greater show of reason be classed amongst his opponents. And when he half concedes the point, he is almost sure to speak of the writers' views as "vague" and their statements as "obscure." When he is constrained to give up all claim to a writer who manifestly belongs to the other camp, he is too prone to disparage the value of his testimony by asserting or insinuating that the writer never quite mastered the subject. Still he is careful to give us a judicious selection from the writers' own words, which enables the reader to judge fairly well for himself.

We shall not pursue the order adopted by Max Müller, but shall classify the authorities to suit ourselves. Our plan will be to take up first the declarations of the men who appear to agree with Max Müller in the view, of which he is himself so much enamoured, that language and thought are universally inseparable. We shall next examine what has been said by those who have not been entirely outspoken on this question, who have been silent or ambiguous, or who have spoken in tones of hesitation. We shall reserve for the last the exhibition of the views of those who stand arrayed on the opposite side of the question from the one taken by Professor Müller. We shall add but one or two to his own catalogue. We are on the whole content with the list, regarding it as, in the main, substantially a safe one as it stands.[1] It is

[1] Our delightful compiler may in general be trusted out of sight, and he has displayed an "erudeetion" "prodeegious" enough even for Dominie Sampson. He would be sure to leave out, or neglect, none of the authorities on his own side, and we need no more on ours. On this basis we are half tempted to cite also the eminent authority of Professor Ludwig Noiré, to whom Max Müller's book is dedicated, the author of *Der Ursprung der Sprache*, in the second class, or those who are either dumb, or else dally or doubt. Max Müller debates with Professor Noiré through page after page and chapter after chapter of the second volume, yet he never once, so far as we have noticed, mentions Noiré's view on the point discussed chiefly in the first. We are strengthened in this impression of ours by the circumstance that Professor Müller should have reviewed Noiré's book on *The Origin of Language* in an essay entitled *The Origin of Reason*.

furthermore our purpose to revise, and even to reverse, several of the classifying judgments pronounced by Max Müller.

The only citations we are willing to make under either the first or the third head are those which are reasonably clear and unequivocal.

The first name to be called of the first class is that of the author of *The Leviathan*. "It is evident," says Hobbes, "That truth and falsity have no place but amongst such as use speech." This, of course, is indecisive. Nothing, however, could be more explicit than the following clever dictum: *Homo animal rationale, quia orationale.*[1]

Similarly Condillac, who maintained that "all science is but a well made language." Care must, however, be taken not to press too far what may have been intended merely as a Gallic paradox or figure of speech. But all the world is agreed about the learned abbé.

The late Archbishop Whately comes out boldly on the same side. Whately's opinion was that "Logic is entirely conversant with the use of language." A position that Sir William Hamilton protested was unworthy of an archbishop, but which was reasserted and ably defended by Sir William's astute commentator and remorseless critic, John Stuart Mill.

Turning now, for a change, to Germany, we find Herder, the founder of the historical school in that great bee-hive of industry and learning, committed to the unqualified statement, that "without language man could never have come to his reason," to which Doctor Müller appends the witty remark, "and, we might add, 'to his senses.'"[2]

From Herder we naturally pass to Hamann, the epigrammatic contemporary and the friend of Kant, who was himself one of the coëvals of Herder. Hamann was for "his short and telling oracular sayings" dubbed by his admirers "the Magus of the North."

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[1] We might here raise the point as to exceptional instances, but we are good-natured and yield up Hobbes.

[2] Herder, *Ideen Zu Geschichte der Menscheit.* Müller, p. 44.

According to this Teutonic sorcerer, "language is not only the foundation for the whole faculty of thinking, but the central point also from which proceeds the misunderstanding of reason by herself."[1] Hamann's fearlessness, not to say audacity, no less than his acuteness and originality, express themselves in the exclamation, "The question with me is not, what is reason? but, what is language? And here I suspect is the ground of the paralogisms and antinomies with which reason is charged." To the same purport he says again: "Here I feel almost inclined to believe that our whole philosophy consists more of language than of reason, and the misunderstanding of numberless words, the prosopopœias of the most ordinary abstraction, the antitheses τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως; nay, the commonest figures of speech of *the sensus communis* have produced a whole world of problems which can no more be raised than solved. What we want is a Grammar of Reason."[2] This, we are free to say, strikes us as nothing but dazzling superficiality.

Max Müller plainly has the high authority of William Von Humboldt to support him in what to some might appear to be his eccentric attitude; an "authority" to which he is fully justified in appealing as having been "equally great, both as a scholar and as a thinker," in the heroic epoch of scholarship in Germany. It will be remembered that this, the far-famed and philosophic linguist, who was as great and famous a man in his special lines as his encyclopedic brother Alexander in his wider sphere, was one of the very first of the few who near the beginning of the century that is now drawing towards its close broke ground for the new, and then scarcely nascent, science of comparative philology. Sir William Humboldt's position on the question we are now examining, is one which hardly admits of misconstruction. "If," he declares, "we separate intellect and language, such a separation does not exist in reality." . . . "The language of a people is its mind, and

[1] Gildemeister, *Hamann's Leben und Schriften*, Vol. III., p. 71. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 43.

[2] Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by M. M., Vol. I., p. xxix. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 43.

its mind is its language; we can never conceive the two as sufficiently identical."[1]

It is interesting to put side by side with this emphatic deliverance the kindred utterances of the great idealistic metaphysicians, Schelling and Hegel, and the great rationalistic and semi-pantheistic critic and theologian, Schleiermacher.

This is what Schelling says: "Without language it is impossible to conceive philosophical, nay, even any human, consciousness." To the same purport that Corypheus of analytic thought in modern Germany, the problematic Hegel, announces to mankind that "we think in names,"—appearing to imply that we do so in no other way.[2]

Schleiermacher, who powerfully leavened the speculative and religious thinking of the dawning century, expressed himself in the same unambiguous fashion: "Thinking," he writes, "and speaking are so entirely one that we can only distinguish them as internal and external; nay, even as internal every thought is already a word."[3]

Dean Mansel, the pupil and editor of Sir William Hamilton, who is usually either at one with the dauntless Stagirite of Scotland, or else sends his cloth-yard shaft a bow-shot beyond him, here for once asserts his own individuality, and differs from his renowned preceptor *toto cœlo*. What he says on the subject before us is characteristically clear and able, and is not susceptible of perversion. Here is one of his numerous statements: "That language, verbal or other, is inseparable from thought, is rendered morally certain by the impossibility under which we labor of forming universal notions without the aid of voluntary symbols."[4] The noted author of *The Limits of Religious Thought*, is, if possible, more explicit still in another of his perspicuous declarations. "As a matter of necessity," he says, "men must think by symbols; as

[1] *Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus*, Vol. II., p. 52, ed. Pott. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 44.

[2] We raise no point here, and yield Hegel as we yielded Hobbes. We nevertheless must be pardoned for doubting if anybody ever did find out exactly what Hegel was driving at.

[3] *Dialektik*, p. 449. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 44.

[4] *Letters, Lectures, and Reviews*, p. 8. In Müller, Vol I., p. 49.

a matter of fact, they do think by language." What follows this is highly interesting, but must be omitted. [1]

We close this list of the acknowledged, or fairly presumable, fautors of the theory advocated by Max Müller by introducing, with the εἰ φανεῖη with which Eusebius estimated the canonical value of the Apocalypse, the distinguished name of the younger Mill. We refer now to Mill's maturest utterances on this subject. Presently we shall see that his earlier ones, in his *Inductive Logic*, were of a wholly different character.

In his masterly critique upon the writings of Sir William Hamilton, Mill takes that Achilles of the insular metaphysics to task for the view the great Scotchman had presented of the matter now occupying our attention; a view which we shall soon inspect, and which in its illustrated form and interpreted agreeably to his own ideas, came near satisfying, as it quite charmed, Professor Müller himself, but failed to meet the even more exacting demands of Sir William's cool-headed English censor. Mill, in the course of his acute comments on Sir William's statements, all at once insists upon it that concepts, or what are called general notions, cannot be formed without the aid of signs.[2] These signs he contends, need not be, and are not, conventional or artificial, but are natural. He argues that we think by means of concrete phenomena, as presented in experience and represented in imagination; and of names, which, by reason of association with certain elements of the concrete images, arrest and fix our attention on those elements. "To say," he continues, "that we think by means of concepts, is only a circuitous and obscure way of saying that we think by means of general or class names." [3]

The richly decorated Doctor of Oxford contends at this point that when once fairly confronted with the champions of the view that concepts precede names, and that while it is easier to think in names it is possible to think in concepts as yet unnamed, Mill makes a radical advance upon the ground he occupied originally, viz., in the "logic," and "is in possession of the whole truth," and

[1] *North British Review*, 1850. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 49.

[2] *Examination of Sir William Hamilton*, p. 384. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 47.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 387. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 48.

in entire agreement with Professor Müller himself. This result he thinks grew out of Mill's eventual perception of "the truth," that names are natural instead of being artificial signs. It does look as if there might be something in this. In his latest enunciations, Mill did have the air of having gone over bag and baggage to the other side. Whether this is only another case of a man who has changed his opinions but is incapable of answering his own arguments, is a very different question.

In connection with this matter Mill's subtle no less than learned expounder makes one of the most striking and pregnant remarks to be found in his voluminous writings. Doctor Müller finely points out that *nomen*, name, is the result of *notio*, which denotes the act, although often taken for the result of the act, just as *conceptio* is often taken for *conceptum;* and he holds that if Mill had always perceived this he would have occupied a different position from the one he actually occupied at the first. Then comes the remark to which we just now called attention, and which is this: that if Sir William Hamilton had himself only discerned the true relation between *notio* and *nomen*, he would thus have gained the best foundation possible for his otherwise rather rickety theory of the identity at bottom of Conceptualism and Nominalism. Mill elsewhere inveighs against that attempted identification; yet Doctor Müller keenly argues that there is little difference observable between the position assumed by the Scotch philosopher and the final view of his English critic, viz., that we think by means of ideas and of names conjointly.[1]

We have now arrived at that stage in our progress of citation that it is in order to refer to the views of those writers who either give a wavering or hesitating answer to the question principally discussed in *The Science of Thought*, or else are silent, or more or less ambiguous on the point at issue.[2]

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[1] *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I., p. 48. The difference is no more than that between *almost* and *quite*.

[2] In speaking of those who make no declaration of their views on the point in question, we have reference only to the few great leaders of human opinion in general, and the well-known specialists in philology and logic. Our interesting Oxford friend is apt in certain moods to "claim the earth," but neither he nor we would venture to count all the absolutely silent members of the human family in either one of the three classes.

It should be stated that Professor Müller counts on his side not only the testimonies of individual men, but what he considers to be the implications of the scholastic philosophy, and also those of the Greek and Sanskrit tongues. We do not ourselves scruple to class these *en bloc* testimonies in the second, not the first, division. Max Müller finds ingenious support for his favorite dictum respecting language and thought in the double use of the Greek word *λόγος* to denote on the one hand speech, and on the other, reason. The later distinction between the *λόγος προφορικός*, or the spoken word, and the *λόγος ενδιάθετος*, or the inner thought, he regards as a backward movement in analysis, if meant to be anything more than a distinction between two sides of the same thing. This may or may not have been the case, but in either event we are disposed to look upon the distinction as an advance in philosophic precision, and as leaving the testimony of the Greek language, so far as it has any bearing at all upon the present investigation, in the category of doubt.[1]

Max Müller regards the early Hindus as having been even more philosophical than the Greeks; they can at any rate be classed more speciously with his supporters, since their term for things in general, *πραγματα*, *res*, was padârtha, which signifies "meaning of the word." So, too, certain of the representative schoolmen defined the essence as the meaning of a name.[2] "What a man thinks with his mind," says the Kkândogya Upanishad, "that he speaks with his tongue, so says the Sruti, (revelation)."[3] Dr. Müller, however, goes too far when he insists that an attempt is here made to express the simultaneity of the two acts.[4]

[1] Max Müller has more colorable if not really solid ground for citing the illustrious name of Plato on his side, notwithstanding the latitude of meaning given to this very word *λόγος*. It is true we should greatly prefer an answer direct, and not merely by construction, to the inquiry we are now making. But the antithesis, the sense thus obtained, and above all the *ὧν ἀν*, appear to leave us no clear option. The sentence quoted is from the *Theaetetus*, p. 189 E., and is as follows: *τὸ διανοεῖσθαι λόγος, ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἀν σκοπῃ.*

[2] See T. H. Green, Works, Vol. II., p. 221. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 35.

[3] *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I., p. 47.

[4] He elsewhere speaks of the difficulty of expressing this alleged simultaneity by similes, as he has demonstrated by his own simile of the orange and its peel.

Abelard's words are: *Sermo generatur ab intellectu, et generat intellectum.* We may admit that the rationalistic schoolman here employs "the quaint yet very telling expression," that language is begotten by intellect and in turn begets intellect, without necessarily agreeing with Professor Müller that he does so "in order to express the inseparableness of language and intellect."

We, therefore, class this great Twelfth Century Nominalist and semi-rationalist, *not* as Max Müller would, in the first, but in the second, group of our authorities, viz., those in reference to whose settled opinions on this subject we are insufficiently apprized.[1]

In the same division, we insist, should probably be placed Abelard's and Acquinas's Master Aristotle, and possibly that also of the worthy successors of the great Greeks, and of Cicero and Augustine.[2]

Professor Müller has some good remarks on the accuracy of thought to be met with in the discussions of the schoolmen—a class of thinkers often derided by those who know nothing about them and who are pigmies where they were giants. The great mediæval controversy, that has not yet been absolutely silenced betwixt the Realists and the Nominalists, brought up at once the question concerning ideas and their verbal signs. Those great disputants, like the earlier philosophers of the modern period, worked in the dark where light has now fallen from "the historical and comparative study of languages" in the present century. Of the mediæval writers, too, it should be added, that their

[1] Abelard studied Nominalism under its founder, Roscelin, and in a measure anticipated in his day the great *naturalistic* movement of the later centuries.

[2] The author of *The Science of Thought* mentions the name of Aristotle fourteen or fifteen times in those two volumes, and discusses more than one of his opinions. If he thought the Stagirite was with him he would have been sure to say so, and apt to have done so if he regarded him as hostile; but he does neither. Yet he might have argued for Aristotle just as plausibly as for the schoolmen, and on the the same ground, viz., his definition of *essence.* This, and also Plato's, the reader, we think, may find in Bishop Lightfoot's excursus on the word μορφή. We have not our Aristotle, or Dr. Lightfoot's *Commentary on the Philippians,* by us as we write. We should be charmed to know the view of Pascal. As to Augustine, the words quoted in *The Science of Thought* are too general to decide a question bearing on exceptions. *Cogitamus, sed verba cogitamus.* Ostensibly here the African thinker stands with Plato and—Max Müller.

labors preceded the eras marked by the *Novum Organon* of Francis Bacon, and the *Principia* of Newton.

We now cite the great name of David Hume—one of the most renowned of modern historians, one of the most plain and influential writers of his generation, being one of the conspicuous ornaments of the eighteenth century, and without doubt one of the most subtle, adroit, and perspicacious of his fellow-countrymen, though sophistical and misleading.[1]

Hume accepted Berkeley's view that we have no general concepts (percepts), but only particular ones with corresponding terms annexed, giving them a wider meaning. "But," concedes Professor Müller, "whether he thinks that we can have ideas with this extensive signification without such terms, he does not say, at least I have not been able to find any decisive passage on this subject."[2]

Archbishop Thompson in his *Laws of Thought*, 1860, p. 46, admits that any theory is pressed by logical absurdities which affirms the possibility that either thought or language can antedate the other; "yet," Doctor Müller is constrained to testify that the cautious prelate "hesitates to draw the only conclusion," which he holds would be legitimate from such premises.[3]

With equal circumspection Mr. Jevons, in his latest work, expresses himself in such a way that we were inclined to put him down as one of Max Müller's positive opponents. We shall nevertheless be fair to the limit of generosity, and class him with "the *non liquets*."

Mr. Jevons says: "We can hardly think without the proper words coming into the mind, and we can certainly not make known to other people our thoughts and arguments unless we use words."[4] Professor Müller, in commenting on this admirable statement queries, falling *suo more* little short of a *petitio principii* in doing so, what should we think of a manual of music that should inform us that we can hardly sing at all without the proper notes coming into our mind, and that we can certainly not make known to other people our songs unless we use notes?

[1] *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I., p. 38.

[2] *Ibid*, Vol. I., p. 42.

[3] *Ibid*, Vol. I., p. 36.

[4] *Logic*, in Science Primers, p. 23. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 36.

Here, in our judgment, the learned commentator was either merely joking or else has blundered. The analogy is in more ways than one sufficiently diverting, but it is deceptive. Songs, in the proper sense of the term, must be sung through the exercise of the vocal organs, and are essentially audible; but thoughts may and do exist in the mind that are never communicated by the thinker to others.

Professor Fowler, in his *Elements of Deductive Logic*, occupies a similar but somewhat bolder ground. After speaking of the dispute that has been constantly going on amongst logicians and psychologists as to whether it is possible to think without the aid of language, he observes, that all logicians are agreed that we cannot *communicate* our thoughts without the aid of words or of equivalent signs, and for himself contends that practically we do always think through the instrumentality of language.

Professor Fowler does not, however, consider a logician bound to decide the point. The safer phraseology he is inclined to think is that of those authors who hold a belief like that of Max Müller in this controversy. He is far from expressing himself dogmatically, but on the whole would rather speak himself of terms and propositions than of concepts and judgments.[1] This is certainly a very qualified statement, and at last an acknowledgment of hesitation.

The late distinguished Professor T. H. Green is admitted by the author of *The Science of Thought* to have been "certainly an honest and painstaking thinker," but to have evaded "a straightforward answer to this," which his learned, if whimsical, critic pronounces the "question of all questions," by the rather perfunctory remark, that "it is hard, some say impossible, to think without expressing thought in language."[2] This remark strikes us not as perfunctory, but as just—no less than compendious; and as likely to have proved more embarrassing than gratifying in certain quarters.

We are now prepared to summon to the witness-box representatives of that class of writers who judged by all, or by some, of

[1] *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I., p. 37.

[2] T. H. Green, *Works*, ed. R. L. Nettleship, Vol. II., p. 175. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 37.

their utterances, unquestionably take sides *against* Max Müller in this debate; holding, as they do, that language, or its equivalent, while it is, beyond question, the only vehicle for the conveyance of thought, and also the usual instrument of our thinking, is not in the invariable sense the indispensable instrument of our thinking.

Let us go back for a moment and refresh our memories as to what is the precise point in dispute. It is not whether language, either in the narrower or wider acceptation of the term, is rigidly necessary for the *expression* or *communication* of thought. Everybody, or nearly everybody, worth attending to is agreed about that. Neither, which amounts, however, to much the same thing, is it whether language, broadly considered, is the invariable *vehicle* of thought—when thought has to be or is conveyed. There is scarcely one who has the temerity to deny that. Nor is the question whether language is the ordinary, the prevailing, or even the *almost* invariable instrument of thought. Part of this interrogative statement would be affirmed by all, and the rest, clearly so if the term "thought" be confined to concepts, would be disputed, if by any, but by few. The exact point of difference between the two sides in this encountre of wits, is as to whether language—taking the term liberally—is *absolutely* the requisite and invariable instrument of our thinking.

The first witness we call for the traverser is no less important a one than John Locke, who, when he admits that "in treating of mental propositions, language is *almost* unavoidable,[1] obviously implies that it is, or may be not *quite* so." This is honorably, but sadly, admitted by Max Müller in the following ample manner: "But what can philosophy do with such an *Almost?* By this *Almost*, Locke admits the possibility of thought without language; nay, in another place, he actually imagines that men, after they had formed their ideas, might, simply for the sake of social intercourse, have chosen certain words arbitrarily as the marks of certain ideas."[2]

The next to testify is Bishop Berkeley. How great and good a name this is, no reader of this review can well be ignorant.

[1] *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I, p. 38.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 39.

Max Müller is even more put out with Berkeley than he was with Locke, and it does indeed seem a pity that so many of the world's foremost advisers in such matters should have deliberately gone aside out of the path in which the benevolent Oxford professor walks secure as if by instinct.

There was, according to Professor Müller, one redeeming feature in Locke's belief. Locke was a Nominalist, and held to the inseparable connection betwixt words and general ideas. He went further: he argued from the absence of language in the brutes, the non-existence of general ideas in the brute mind. Berkeley, on the other hand, was so fully convinced that he could strip ideas bare of all names, that in the introduction to his treatise concerning the principles of human understanding[1] (1710), he declares: "Since, therefore, words are so apt to impose on the understanding [I am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use of them as possibly I can[2]] whatever ideas I consider I shall endeavor to take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those names which constant use has so strictly united with them."[3]

We now pass across the seas to obtain the testimony of the illustrious Leibnitz. Leibnitz was the greatest of these "universal geniuses" who seemed to have rather abounded in the latter part of the sixteenth and the whole of the seventeenth centuries.[4] But Leibnitz was as deep, as original, as "creative," as he was large. Leibnitz is not everywhere the safest of guides, but he is as much so as many of his illustrious coëvals and successors. Leibnitz's express assertion, in the *Dialogus de connexione inter res et verba* (1679), that thought is impossible without words, receives a significant qualification from what he puts into the mouth of *A*, who makes answer: "*Imo si characteres abessent, numquam quicquam distincte cogitaremus neque ratiocinaremur.*"[5] This at once determines the

[1] *Works*, ed. Fraser, Vol. I., p. 152. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 41.

[2] This Irish bull is said to have been omitted in the second edition. See Müller, Vol I., p. 42.

[3] See Max Müller, Vol. I., pp. 41 and 42.

[4] We do not forget that Leibnitz lived on into the eighteenth.

[5] Leibnitz, ed. Erdmann, p. 77; Geiber, *Sprache und Erkennen*, p. 144. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 42, n.

position of Leibnitz as belonging to the class of those who take the negative in this special controversy.

The name we next call is the imposing one of Kant—the but half-dethroned monarch of speculative thought in Germany to-day. Max Müller, himself an enthusiastic Kantian, confesses his inability to get at Kant's view on this subject. But Max Müller is apt to be slightly color-blind when contemplating the view of an opponent whom he wishes to class among his friends. Kant, in *Anthropologie*, § 36, says that to think is to speak with one's self. Kant admits that without an expression accurately corresponding to its concept, we cannot become quite intelligible either to ourselves or others. But Doctor Müller sees and allows that that is not the point to be determined.[1] Kant does call language the greatest, but his Anglo-German reporter concedes and draws attention to the fact that the sage of Königsberg does not call language the *only* instrument of understanding ourselves and others.[2] We venture to add—what Professor Müller would not care to deny—that the very declaration that language is the greatest instrument of our thinking, would, especially in the case of such a marvellously analytic mind as that which conceived and constructed the *Critique of Pure Reason*, seem fairly to imply that there were, or might be, lesser ones.

We proceed to lay before the honorable judges the affidavit of another and an especially sharp and dispassionate witness, by submitting to the court the gloomy and yet glittering pages of Schopenhauer, the more popular of the two far-famed representatives of the school of modern Pessimism.[3] Max Müller's endorsement of Schopenhauer's entire competency as an expert is frank and hearty, where he speaks of him as "generally so much more bold and keen-sighted than either" Hegel or Schelling. If Professor Müller was pensive in his references to Locke, and miserable in his references to Berkeley and Kant, he is in a state of dejection that borders on despair and mutiny when he comes to Schopenhauer. Ah, how could it be otherwise when the imperturbable exponent of the scheme of

[1] *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I., p. 42.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 42.

[3] The other was, of course, Hartmann.

theoretic wretchedness "expresses himself," but not, as it appears to us, "somewhat obscurely," after this hopeless fashion: "Thoughts die the moment they are embodied in words."[1] Once more this prince of metaphysical paradox goes on to say in plain terms, "So important an instrument of the intellect as the concept cannot be identical with the word—a mere sound." The troubled commentator, while owning the gravity of the situation, here manfully and justly protests that the word is not a *mere* sound. But does the shifty pessimist whose view he is considering actually mean here to imply that there are, or may be, *other*, although *less* important, instruments of thought than language? It certainly looks that way. The doughty champion of purely verbal thought obtains but a crumb of comfort from Schopenhauer's partial, but by no means conclusive, admission: "Nevertheless the concept is a presentation, the clear consciousness and preservation of which depends on the word." But the disconsolate reporter and critic owns that the prospect of any aid from Schopenhauer is dim, indeed, when that frisky foe to philosophic happiness fires hot shot at him in the following remorseless way: "Nevertheless the concept is totally distinct both from the word on which it depends, and from the perceptions from which it has sprung." This awful statement Doctor Müller admits settles the question as to the status in relation to the problem under discussion of this aggravating detector of the world's ultimate and irremediable disaster, and thinks it justifies his own remark that "Schopenhauer never reasoned out the true relation between words and thoughts"; which is tantamount to saying that upon the main question under examination Schopenhauer had come to a different conclusion from the one very confidently arrived at by Max Müller himself.

The authority next to be appealed to is that of the Oxford teacher's own old preceptor at Leipzig—the venerable, the honored and admired Lotze.[2] Lotze took the place of mark in metaphysical Germany that had been vacated by Trendelenburg, and, like

[1] *Paralipomena*, II,, p. 52. See, however, *Welt als. W. und V.*, p. 511. *Ethik*, p. 148. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 45, foot-note.

[2] Max Müller also attended the lectures of Schelling at Berlin, and knew Schopenhauer and the Chevalier Bunsen.

him, belonged to that series of commanding thinkers, who, beginning with Kant, have filled not only all Teutonic centres but Europe and the world with their influence and their renown. The two more recent of the names just mentioned signalize a strong conservative reäction against the speculative skepticism that had for so long a time retained its ascendency on the continent.

It would be interesting to know just what Trendelenburg's notion was on the curious subject under consideration. He is not referred to in *The Science of Thought*, and the surmise may or may not be a groundless one that he never committed himself one way or the other.

With Lotze it was different. We cannot with his accomplished pupil observe any "hesitation," only a becoming caution and prudence as well as fairness, in what he has to say upon this topic. It is true that Lotze remarks of logic that it "has never concerned itself with a thought which did not make its various ideas, one after another, the object of its attention, which did not move amongst them comparing and relating them to each other, and which did not symbolize abstract ideas by spatial images, which finally did not express its thoughts in the forms and constructions of a language."[1] But he is equally emphatic in the announcement, that "the logical meaning of a proposition is in itself independent of the form in which language expresses it," and that whether or not he speaks of more than one instance of the kind, "an inward act of analysis and combination would remain the same if it employed other forms of communication."[2] We can sympathize with the author of *The Science of Thought* when he inquires how we could ever arrive at the logical meaning of a proposition *except* through language, and what *other* forms of communication Lotze can be dreaming of. If indeed he only means numbers or hieroglyphics, Max Müller would withdraw his protest, and agree to widen the definition of language so as to include such signs. But all this does not touch the question as to where Lotze stands in

[1] Lotze, *Logic*, translated by B. Bosanquet, p. 476. In Müller, p. 38.

[2] *The Science of Thought*,, Vol. I., p. 38.

this trial, which is plainly with the traverser and not with the plaintiff.

We at this point make a somewhat retrograde movement in order to cite in evidence the earlier view on this head of that lynx-eyed investigator of difficult subjects, the late J. S. Mill. That perspicuous and courageous thinker, like Aristotle and the schoolmen and the German masters and Sir William Hamilton, was equally an expert in logic and in philosophy. In his celebrated work on *Inductive Logic*, Mill clearly seems to us to have, for the time being at any rate, aligned himself with those who dissent from the view since so attractively advocated by Professor Müller. His own language will scarcely admit of any other construction. "Reasoning," he says, "or inference, the principal subject of logic, is an operation which usually takes place by means of words, and in all complicated cases can take place in no other way." Professor Müller appropriately remarks here that Mill nowhere points out "in what other way it might," however exceptionally, "be possible to reason . . . without language." But it might be rejoined that Mill was not absolutely required to do that. Besides, that is not the question immediately before us. The question pending at this moment is not the one, elsewhere discussed, as to the *legitimacy*, but the question as to the *nature*, of the views entertained, and as to *this* question, the language just quoted from Mill leaves no loop-hole for doubt. The affirmation that a man "usually" talks with his mouth, would fairly imply that a woman does not do so, or else might be understood to intimate that talking is sometimes done with the ear or the nose. Notwithstanding Doctor Müller's faint protest against this conclusion as to the position occupied by Mill, it would appear to be sustained by other things that Mill says. Thus, Mill contends that language is one of the *principal* elements or helps of thought which certainly justifies the inference that thought has, or may have, certain *other* principal elements or helps besides language.[1] This is quite consistent, it appears to us, with what he broadly allows in another passage,

[1] This view of Mill's meaning is fully confirmed by the whole context in the *Logic*. We could make other extracts exactly to this purport from his clear and decisive statements.

viz., that "language is a catalogue raisonné of the notions of all mankind,"[1] and is not to be confounded with the more extreme affirmation of Condillac, that all science is but a well-made language. As is pointed out in Professor Müller's own volume, Mill himself assails Condillac for ever uttering such a dictum, "and with a warmth quite unusual in so mellow a reasoner." What a red rag is to a bull that Doctor Müller would have us to believe what Mill calls "mere names," are to the English critic. He distrusted and he decried what he stigmatized as "verbal knowledge." Mill, it is asserted, was affrighted and enraged by "the spectre of Nominalism."

Max Müller favors us at this point with some of his own finest observations. On a desert island a gold coin worth a pound sterling might be a mere sovereign to a wrecked sailor, but that same coin in England would stand for food and life. So, he reminds us, "a name in a living language is never a mere name. A name is nothing if it is not the name of a thing, a thing is nothing if it is not the thing of a name."[2] Mill in some places fully recognizes this. Mill too admits that "we think" "to a considerable extent by means of names;" he does not, however, hold with Max Müller that we do so "always and altogether." Both these writers have valuable remarks on the kind of thinking that is carried on by algebraic and other artificial signs; what Leibnitz has called "symbolical thought."[3] What we mean by names must be determined by definition, and is variable from time to time. As our knowledge widens and advances, our names must undergo a corresponding change. Max Müller illustrates this necessity by saying that a soldier's cartridge may be either little or much, either damp or dry, and he might have added, it may be either properly or improperly charged and rammed, but unless he has some sort of a cartridge—the learned Professor means *load*—in the chamber of his gun, he will be unable to fire it off.

The next witness on this side, and the last one that we shall call in the line of professional philosophers and logicans, is Sir

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[1] Vol. I., p. 25. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 33.

[2] *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I., p. 34.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 34.

William Hamilton, the wizard scholar and champion critic of the North. We should do well too if we gave heed to his well-considered utterances.

Sir William Hamilton's position is unequivocally that the concept must always *precede* the name.[1] This position he elucidates by two capital illustrations. "Language," he contends,[2] "is the attribution of signs to our cognitions of things. But as a cognition must have been already there before it could receive a sign, consequently that knowledge which is denoted by the formation and application of a word must be preceded by the symbol which denotes it." Here Sir William introduces his first illustration. "A sign," he says, "is necessary to give stability to our intellectual progress,—to establish each step in our advance as a new starting-point for our advance to another beyond. A country may be overrun by an armed host, but it is only conquered by the establishment of fortresses. Words are the fortresses of thought. They enable us to realize our dominion over what we have already overrun in thought; to make every intellectual conquest the basis of others still beyond."

If Doctor Müller admires this illustration, and he declares it to be a most happy one, he is fairly carried away with the second, and well-nigh (playfully) convinced by it that Hamilton had become his convert. Here it is: "You have all heard," continued Sir William Hamilton, "of the process of tunnelling—of tunnelling through a sand-bank. In this operation it is impossible to succeed, unless every foot, nay, almost every inch, in our progress, be secured by an arch of masonry before we attempt the excavation of another. Now language is to the mind precisely what the arch is to the tunnel. The power of thinking and the power of excavation are not dependent on the words in the one case or the masonry in the other; but without these subsidiaries, neither pro-

[1] Max Müller appends to this the similar doctrine of Renan: "Prétendre que dans l'esprit humain la notion de la chose signifiée ne précède pas celle du signe, que l'homme spontané crée le symbole avant de savoir bien précisement ce qu'il y met c'eût été vraisemblablement parler une langue inintelligible en un temps où l'on était convaincu que l'esprit humain avait toujours procédé selon les règles tracées par l'abbé de Condillac." *Etude d'histoire religieuse*, p. 11.

[2] Examination, p. 379. *The Science of Thought*, p. 46.

cess could be carried on beyond its rudimentary commencement. Though, therefore, we allow that every movement forward in language must be determined by an antecedent movement in thought, still, unless thought be accompanied at each point of its evolution by a corresponding evolution of language, its further development is arrested."

Mill, in his *rôle* of critic of Hamilton, was not satisfied by either of these comparisons; but Max Müller seems almost ready to clap his hands and cry "*brava*" at the one just given. He is so captivated, indeed, that he actually exclaims that "there could not be a more accurate or a more telling simile of the progress of thought and language." He of course regards the two processes in both cases, the physical and psychological, as being simultaneous,[1]—Sir William Hamilton, as being closely successive.

Max Müller's own illustrations are also ingenious, by which he endeavors to show the inseparable connection—by some of them the organic identity—of language and thought. After all, it would sometimes look as if this crafty rhetorician, though far from wishing to impose on others, had unwittingly imposed upon himself, by now and then enunciating, or making out that he holds a rather more extreme ground than he really occupies. If language and thought are in one sense the same, he would hardly be willing to say that it is only as the dark and bright sides of the moon, or the silver and gold sides of the shield are the same, *i. e.*, as being the two complements of a common whole.[2] But he does say, and says with truth, that we should be on our guard against the error that things which can be distinguished from one another must necessarily have an independent existence. We can distinguish, he tells us, between the hair and the scalp, but the hair must have something to grow on. We can distinguish between the orange and the orange-peel, but there can be, so he says, no orange without a peel, and no peel without an orange. We can distinguish, he goes on, between the colors on the surface of the orange-peel and the surface itself, "but *in rerum naturâ* no color

[1] *The Science of Thought*, p. 47.

[2] These two illustrations are our own.

can ever be conceived to exist without a surface, as little as a surface without color."[1]

We are ourselves not so sure about all this. There are inseparable things which may be differentiated from one another, as, for example, Professor Whitney's tortoise and its shell; but a separation actually occurs, and leaves the better part intact, when the human soul quits its tenement, the body. We hardly know how to decide in the case of the orange and its rind, and of the scalp and its hair. The orange and the orange-peel are organically united, and can be torn from one another only by artificial violence. But it remains true that the fruit can be detached from the tree, and its covering from the fruit, without immediate detriment to the quality of the fruit. We do not cease to call the fruit an orange after it is plucked from the bough, or has been stripped of its skin. Something originally belonging to the orange is indeed gone, its vegetative life has been injured or destroyed; but all that gives worth to an orange, except as a vital part of a growing plant, or as a spectacle, is for a while retained and made more accessible. No one would any more confound the peel with the orange, or be in any dubiety which to eat and which to throw away. And is it certain that a growing orange might not under anomalous conditions run all to peel—just as we have seen a pine run all to leaves, without the semblance of a trunk or major limbs? So, too, hair can be shaved off and the roots be extracted from the human scalp; and we have been informed that some scalps are congenitally bald. On second thoughts, we consider Max Müller's similes to be sufficiently *ad rem*. The illustrations drawn from the surface-color and the surface itself of the orange-peel, and from the enclosing lines and enclosed angles of a triangle seem to be more exact; though in the last case the connection is not organic, but, of course, they are merely expository.

We consider that Sir William Hamilton has come as near to the

[1] This comparison is by no means a new one. The reader may put it, if he likes, side by side with the fine image of Cicero in reference to another matter; which image is, however, analogous, but not the same: "*Ut, quum in sole ambulem, etiamsi aliam ob caussam ambulem, fieri naturâ tamen ut colorer.*" *De Oratore*, Lib. II., Cap. XIV., 59. (*Tauchnitz*, 1827, p. 90.)

bottom of this matter as any other with whose opinion on the subject we are acquainted.[1] The great authority next to be cited has fathomed the question equally well and has arrived at precisely the same conclusion.

We now finish the whole catalogue of the witnesses, as well as the particular list we have in hand, by citing the weighty name of Professor Whitney, of Yale College; who without the versatility and brilliancy, is also entirely devoid of the volatility and amiable dogmatism of Max Müller; and while probably inferior to him as a mere verbal *prestidigitateur* is his close rival as a popular first-hand expounder of linguistic science, and at least his equal as a Sanskrit scholar, and in the judgment of many, his superior in the unfailing exactitude of his statements and in thoughtful philosophic poise and cool judgment. American scholarship has indeed good reason to be proud of Professor Whitney, as the English universities and pulpit of the late prelate of Dublin.

Dr. Whitney, as is his wont, expresses himself briefly on this point, but clearly and decisively. He thinks he sees something approaching palpable absurdity in the doctrine that words and thoughts are identical.[2] "How futile . . . to talk of such a thing as identity between thought and the expression which sits so loosely upon it, and can be so easily shifted. As well compare the house of the hermit-crab—which, born soft and coverless, takes refuge in the first suitable shell which chance throws in its way, and thenceforth makes that its home, unless convenience or opportunity lead it to move to another—with that of the turtle, whose horny covering is a part of its own structure, and cannot be torn off without destruction of its life." He also argues strikingly, and we think cogently, from the procedure of those who, from any

[1] We are sorry that Professor Müller did not favor us with the views of Coleridge and De Quincey on the point at issue. Both of them had minds and education that eminently fitted them to illuminate if not to decide it. We should also have been pleased to have heard from our old guide, Archbishop Trench. Trench, it is true, was no great adept in comparative philology; but he was a scholar and a man of genius and sense, and had looked with penetration and sagacity into kindred questions. In his work on *The Study of Words*, Trench to some extent identifies the word and the thought; and De Quincey in his essay on *Style* does the same.

[2] *Language and the Study of Language.* Charles Scribner's Sons. 1887, p. 410.

cause, make signs without speaking, and especially from the phenomena presented by the deaf and dumb. Professor Whitney concedes the enormous importance of language to thought, and that some such mode of expression is rigidly necessary in order that our thoughts may be communicated to others. But he suggestively adds, that we do not half express ourselves in language or in signs; we leave much quite unexpressed. Thought, he holds, has a wider circumference than speech.[1]

The operation of thinking in words, according to the philosophic linguist of Yale, is a double one, consisting of thinking, and putting the thought into words. "We conceive the thought and also its expression." That we are conscious of the thought and its expression together only proves the intimacy of the association that has been established between our ideas and their signs, and the controlling influence of the habit of expression.

He accuses those who differ with him of gaining their point by so defining thought as to exclude all that is not done by means of speech. "Apprehension of generals and particulars, comparison, distinction, inference, performed under the review of consciousness, capable of being remembered and applied to direct the conduct of life, these are the characteristics of the action of mind in every grade; where they are present there is thought."[2] He then proceeds to apply this criterion to untrained deaf mutes, and even, within limitations, to the brute animals. That we ordinarily think in words he admits may be true, but imagines that the extent to which we do so, and the necessity of the accompaniment of thought by language have both been considerably exaggerated.[3] "When we think most elaborately and most reflectively then we formulate our thoughts as if we were speaking or writing them; but we need not always think in that style." Can a child not come into the world, he asks, until a layette and a nursery have been provided for it; or along with each infant must there also be born its swaddling clothes and a cradle?[4]

[1] *Language and the Study of Language*, p. 412. Where in this article we do not expressly quote an author's own words, we sometimes approach them more or less closely; at other times vary from them indefinitely so as to condense the meaning.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 414.

[3] *Ibid*, pp. 412, 413. [4] *Ibid*, p. 412.

And now what is the sum of it all? So far as pertains to the expert witnesses, they are substantially agreed on the matter that is most vital to the *theological* controversy, though, while uppermost in our thoughts, that is not the question which has been chiefly discussed in this essay. There is little need for discussion in any field where there is practical unanimity amongst the debaters. Difference of opinion has emerged as to whether we always think in words, whether it is ever possible to think without them. The authorities, allowing for the occasional difficulty of placing them, would seem to be pretty evenly divided. What may be wanting in force of numbers in one quarter is amply made up by weight of metal in another.

Some of the authorities are ambiguous; some of them use qualifying terms; some of them hesitate; some of them are silent. A large majority consent that if by thoughts are meant concepts nearly all our thinking—and almost everybody, that absolutely all our sharply outlined, clean-cut thinking—is done through the instrumentality of language, taking language in its broadest acceptation; and that if by language is meant strictly verbal language, through language or its equivalent in signs.

But all the authorities without exception, unless it be Kant and Lotze on a strained construction, so far as they have been at all explicit on this point, and doubtless also, if we could but get at it, where they have not, are absolutely agreed in the entertainment of the view, that thought can never be even approximately, however inadequately *expressed*, and never be in any degree *communicated*, *i. e.*, conveyed to others, except through the intervention and mediation of language in the sense defined. This is in fact pronounced by Max Müller to be a truism, and there is no one, we suppose, who is bold enough to dispute the proposition.

It surely follows, then, incontestably and self-evidently, that if infallibility be predicated of the thought of Holy Scripture, that infallibility must attach also and equally to the language in which that thought is admittedly expressed.

Our final conclusion, then, and this has been the ultimate aim of our whole contention, is that the vital question about the authority of the Bible is not the question, signally important as the right an-

swer to that question is admitted to be, as to a verbal inspiration; inasmuch as the question of the verbal inspiration of the whole or of a portion of any given volume goes without saying—if only there is once allowed to be such a thing as an inspiration of infallibility, and if that infallibility can be, and is predicated of the whole or of any portion of that volume. The hinge of the whole debate has thus been demonstrated to be not a question about the mere *language*, but a question about the *substantial averments* of the Bible. It is not, at last, our readers will take notice, then a question about *words*, but a question about *facts*. That is to say, the transcendently vital question has been ascertained to be not the question whether the Holy Scriptures are infallible in their language, considered merely *as* language, but the ulterior question whether they are infallible at all; and if so, whether they are infallible in whole or only in part. Such, if we mistake not, will be found to be the precise aspect and situation of the supreme argument in this debate. That momentous question is the one which is now rocking, is destined one day to rock still more severely, and, if we do not err in our forecast, the foundations of the Christian church.

That paramount and sovereign issue has not, however, been directly dealt with in the present article. Our more restricted business, after carefully examining the relation between thought and language, has been simply to try to establish the position, that precisely that issue is the capital and peremptory one which has confronted the church from the beginning, and, underlying as it does all others, is the one which must at last be joined.

The adherents to the doctrine of the infallibility of the Holy Scriptures attribute that infallibility to the Divine inspiration of the original penmen. The question that has been before us is not, however, whether God can or cannot think without words. The mode of the Divine operations, except in so far as it has been imperfectly revealed to us, is by us utterly unknown. It would seem to be a legitimate inference from God's omnipotence, that had he so chosen, he could have communicated his noblest message to mankind in some other way than through the vehicle of human speech. He has not so chosen. He has, in point of fact, been pleased to communicate with the race of men through the medium of their own intelligence and their own tongues.

But had the contents of the Bible been human in their originating and authoritative source—as they undoubtedly are human in their outward form and method of presentation; and if the position of Max Müller and his associates can be sustained, that human thought and human language are strictly inseparable, being, indeed, but differing phases or aspects of one and the same complex reality, then we see no escape from the conclusion; that to have predicated infallibility of the concepts of the Scriptures would have been *ipso facto* to have predicated infallibility also of the words, or signs, in which those concepts were essentially embodied or incarnated in the minds of the human authors themselves, anterior to all outward or inward expression of them, and of course, anterior to all conveyance of them to others.

But such is not the posture of the matter as the case now stands. On the assumption of the Divine plenary inspiration and infallibility of the Scriptures, the question need not be taken up whether the thoughts contained in them were previously and externally clothed in a vesture of language; the palpable and acknowledged fact is, that they are clothed in such a vesture now, and the language selected has been the familiar one of ordinary words. In the existing situation, Max Müller's "question of questions," so far as the exigencies of theology are involved, might be left wholly unnoticed. For it is agreed on all hands, that whether it is true or false that we can only think in words, or signs, it is an unquestionable fact, that all expressed or communicated thoughts, or signs, must be expressed or communicated in words; and that the words, or signs, in any such conveyance of ideas are essentially inseparable from the ideas themselves which are thus conveyed. If, then, the Bible be God's thought, it must equally be God's word. The human instruments might be equally or unequally "inspired" in some other sense of the term inspiration. They might not all possess even the inspiration of infallibility to the same extent; that is, some might have it longer, or more constantly, or in greater measure, so far as the mass of the communications was concerned, than others. There is no question that God, had he so desired, could have brought about such an inspiration, *i. e.*, one producing infallibility, in different cases by varied kinds of exer-

cises of his omnipotence. But there is no paralogism or sophistry that could enter as a disturbing element into the simple mental process which leads us to the inevitable conclusion, that in the *infallibility* itself, thus effectuated, there can be no degrees of greater or less, distinguishing one inspired man, or writing, on the score of his infallibility and authority, from another. This statement, whilst only made *obiter*, and though repeated substantially from another article in a previous issue of this review, is, we are persuaded, one of the utmost importance, and is one that is often, but vainly, challenged.

In a comprehensive review of the whole subject, which has sufficiently engaged our reflections for the present, we beg leave to say, and we do it in all candor and respect, that we find that we can, in a manner, "put ourselves in the place" of many who differ from us most widely and radically in the light in which they view the word of God. We can, for instance, though not with the sympathy of assent or approval, put ourselves in the mental attitude of those who deny the infallibility, or "inerrancy," of the Scriptures, in part or in whole. We can put ourselves in the mental attitude of those who deny the possibility of "a book revelation." We can put ourselves in the mental attitude of those who oppose, deride, and utterly reject the Bible. We can put ourselves in the mental attitude of those who would have us throw out certain books, or great sections of books; as, for example, Deuteronomy, or Chronicles, or Daniel, or half of Isaiah, or Esther, or the Song of Songs, or Second Peter; or those who contend that only the *spiritual* teachings of the Bible are infallibly inspired, and who can thus *ex animo* accept it as an unerring religious, but not as an unerring secular or scientific, rule. But we own that we find ourselves quite incapable, even in imagination, of putting ourselves in the mental attitude of the man who can assert and believe that any of the concepts contained in the Bible are inspired so as to be infallible, whilst the *words* in which it is conceded those concepts are embodied and expressed, are left fallible and even false.

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II. THE CANON OF SCRIPTURE—IS IT DIVINELY AUTHENTICATED?

There are many interesting questions concerning the Scriptures which are not yet answered; and there are some others, not yet formally asked, for want of a definite sense of their importance. If all could be answered in a satisfactory way it would greatly simplify Christian apologetics, and supersede much hostile criticism. It has been long a matter of comment that most of the attacks on the Scriptures originate either in ignorance of the matters objected to, or of the evidence therefor, or in a misapprehension of some important principle or fact on which the authority of the Scriptures hinges. No question has occupied more attention than that of the authority of the Canon.

By Canon we mean the authoritative list of books in our Bible. Such questions as these have given much trouble: Why does the Canon include certain books and exclude others? How do we know that all the books have been included or excluded that ought to have been? Did the list of books need an inspired authentication as well as the books themselves?

Various answers have been given to the trend of these questions. The Papist claims the obvious necessity for a divine authentication of the Canon. He finds it in the claimed infallibility of "Mother Church," in the exercise of which she includes in her list certain books which Protestants reject as spurious. She charges Protestants with rejecting these on purely rationalistic grounds, on a mere criticism of their contents. She says that if we reject the infallibility of her councils there is left us no authoritative Canon. The Higher Criticism, in minimizing the miraculous, and in reducing inspiration to a higher action of merely human faculties, finds the criterion of all truth in Christian consciousness discerning truth as its own sole witness. This most refined form of rationalism finds some truth everywhere, both inside and outside of the Scriptures, and makes the question of canonical authority

of little moment. It dismisses Papist and Protestant alike as worshippers of a kind of fetish called the Canon.

It is not now the purpose to give these critics more than a passing notice, and such incidental refutation as may follow from an attempt to set up the truth. Nor is it our purpose to make formal reply to the Papist, for he seems to us to be right in his fundamental proposition that the Canon needs divine authentication. His mistake is in lodging it in the infallibility of his church.

We are concerned with the Protestants' view. They believe in canonical authority for each and every book in the sacred volume as received. They hold this view in the full exercise of the right of private judgment as against the claims of popes and councils. But how do we reach it?

We get it first by tradition and by authority, just as we do the most of our knowledge before we begin to verify for ourselves Tradition gives presumptive and prescriptive authority, even though we do not accept it as final, as does the prelatist. When we wish further confirmation we usually discuss the claims of the several books themselves, the external and the internal evidence of their genuineness and authenticity, both separately and as parts of a whole. And as believers, we rely on the self-evidencing power of the Spirit operating in our hearts through the truth and giving us what is aptly termed spiritual discernment. This last is the beginning and the end with most minds, and ought so to be, for it is an experimental knowledge of God and truth. A believer might, however, attain this from having seen and read one single gospel or epistle, or even from having heard one single sermon with no knowledge of the Canon as such. Many books of the Bible set up no special claim to canonical authority, such as Esther and Ruth. Is the Canon to be settled only by an examination of the inspiration of each several book? And if we could by examination determine the inspiration of any book, have we a right to assume that every inspired book belongs in the Canon and was enrolled therein? Our writers have realized the difficulty of a final argument from this source. They have, therefore, sought to set up the Old Testament Canon on the authority of the New. Nor is there any question that Christ and his apostles do give the

most abundant and satisfying testimony to the exact Canon as it stands to-day. Uninspired authors do the same, but not in a way so satisfying to the believer in both Testaments.

Having accepted the Old Testament Canon on the authority of the New, it becomes necessary to vindicate the New, else both are put into the same jeopardy, unless we accept as final and satisfactory the usual argument from tradition confirmed as already outlined. The same instinct that seeks divine authentication in one case craves it also in the other. Does the authority of the whole Canon depend on a sound induction of particulars, and has such induction been exhaustive both by comprehension and by exclusion?

The more we look at this matter, the more we feel the need of an attested Canon, carrying with it the same authority as a list of books that we claim for their contents if they belong to it.

It does not seem final and sufficient to rest the Old Testament Canon on the references of Christ and his apostles, for they do not so rest it. They found that Canon in existence as an authorized Canon, settled as against the Samaritans, who accepted only the first five books, and as against the earlier Sadducees, who rejected the later prophets. The question therefore recurs: On what authority did the Jews the world over accept it as complete and authoritative? Such authority, if they had it, would amply justify Christ and his apostles in bringing all their claims and teachings to the test of its contents. An appeal to it was a final appeal to divine authority itself divinely attested.

The Old Testament Canon was settled during the intermediate period between Malachi and Christ. If it be true, as is commonly stated, that the Jews were without prophet or oracle during that period, then the Canon could not have had more than the human authority of those who settled it. If, however, it can be shown that there was prophet and oracle during that period, then it may be possible to connect the settling of the Canon with them in such a way as to find a divine authentication. To this new question let us therefore address ourselves:

1. The civil government of the Hebrew commonwealth was a theocracy, in which the Lord Jehovah was the civil head or king.

The human head, whether judge, king, or governor, was his viceroy who ruled in his name and by his authority. The organ of communication between the king and his viceroy was prophet and oracle. The prophet was a civil functionary as well as a religious teacher. The oracle was limited to the high priest, and belonged to him by virtue of his office, as will be shown presently. If we are right in claiming, as all the authorities do, that the theocracy continued from its institution at Mount Sinai to the coming of Christ, with a claimed interregnum during the period of the kingdom (which is hardly probable), then the prophet or oracle, or both, were a necessity. A means of inter-communication is an essential feature of a theocracy. Pagan theocracies had their oracles. The Papacy, which claims to be a theocracy, has been consistent in claiming infallibility. We thus have an *a priori* argument for the existence of prophet and oracle down to the time of Christ, which at least raises a presumption in its favor sufficient to throw the burden of proof on him who denies it.

2. When Zacharias, the father of John the Baptist, saw the vision while ministering in the temple, and afterwards came out and "could not speak unto them," the people "perceived that he had seen a vision in the temple; for he beckoned unto them and remained speechless." Luke tells the story so simply that we are constrained to conclude that the people were no strangers to such marvels. We need hardly quote the matter of fact way in which Mary received her vision, nor the recorded inspiration and prophecies of Mary, of Elizabeth, and of Zacharias, given before Christ was born, because plausible exception might be taken to the fairness of their citation in this connection.

3. There are two cases much more to the point, Anna and Simeon. Anna, the prophetess, a "widow of fourscore years, which departed not from the temple, but served God with fastings and prayers night and day," was only exercising her prophetic function when she saw the Babe, and "spake of him to all them that looked for redemption in Jerusalem."

Simeon was "just and devout, waiting for the consolation of Israel; and the Holy Ghost was upon him, and it was revealed unto him by the Holy Ghost that he should not see death before

he had seen the Lord's Christ." There is no need to quote his beautiful prophecies.

Now both these, Anna and Simeon, date many years back into the intermediate period of which it is claimed, "they had neither prophet nor oracle," and cannot in any sense be called a part of a new dispensation.

4. Josephus makes mention of two prophets who lived half a century before the birth of Christ, Simeon or Pollio, and Sameas, his colleague. The former is supposed to be the father of the Simeon mentioned in Luke. Pollio and Sameas were president and vice-president of the great Sanhedrim, and also of the great university at Jerusalem, and were the most learned and influential of all the Jewish doctors. Josephus not only tells us that they were prophets, but he also gives some of their prophecies and their fulfilment, admixed with no puerilities. Why need we reject or even suspect his story when we find the cases of Anna and Simeon, belonging to substantially the same period, attested by the inspired historian? The critic complains that there is no profane testimony to the Scripture prophet, and when we cite this testimony of Josephus, he flippantly rejects the whole because, forsooth, Josephus played the sycophant to the victorious Romans in his history of the Jewish wars. Away with such destructive criticism.

5. The crowning fact, however, is found in the eleventh chapter of John. In that last council of chief priests and Pharisees, in which it was decided to compass the death of Jesus, the leading argument was made by Caiaphas in these words: "Ye fools, ye know nothing at all, nor consider that it is expedient for us that one man die for the people, and not that the whole nation perish." The Evangelist in commenting on this says, "This he spake not of himself; but, being high priest that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation." In other words, he prophesied by virtue of his office as high priest. John evidently knew that the oracle belonged to the high priest by virtue of his office, even though the office had been made venal by the Romans, and degraded to an annual appointment. Note also the remainder of the prophecy, "And not for that nation only, but that also he

should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad." The first part of the prophecy he used in its literal terms in furtherance of their malicious purposes; the last and more glorious part he could neither comprehend nor use. We have here a case like Balaam's, officially true, personally corrupt. The office of Caiaphas, and his prophecy as high priest belong without question to the theocracy and not to a new dispensation.

6. There is one parallel fact which bears distinctly on these interpretations by way of corroboration. God did not leave his people without miracles of power as well as of knowledge for a testimony during the intermediate period. John tells us of this also in the fifth chapter of his Gospel: "Now there is at Jerusalem by the sheep market a pool, which is called in the Hebrew tongue Bethesda, having five porches. In these lay a great multitude of impotent folk, of blind, halt, withered, waiting for the moving of the water." The new version puts the next verse, about the daily visit of the angel to the pool, on the margin, questioning its authority; but the material facts remain the same if this verse be rejected altogether on what many regard as insufficient grounds. The story is familiar. This sanitarium, so aptly named Bethesda, "House of Mercy," was an old institution at Jerusalem. The five porches and the multitude of sick folk, and the Sabbath visits of numerous friends on errands of mercy, were all a Jewish product, and the cures were miracles of power, or were nothing. John evidently believed in the whole, but mentions it only incidentally, not so much to give an account of the pool and its cures, as to tell of the malignity excited against the Master for healing on the Sabbath day the impotent man who had so long been unable to avail himself of the God-given cure. Such incidental mention rather strengthens the testimony of the historian. Much hostile criticism of this passage gets an honest backing in the supposed necessity of eliminating the miraculous from this period of the history. The facts cited all reinforce each other, and disarm such hostile criticism arising from such pre-judgment. Indeed, there is no presumption against either miracle or oracle at any stage of the Mosaic dispensation. Besides, the distinction of Jewish and

Christian is of little moment in this connection, for Christianity is only the culmination of Judaism and its full fruitage; and all the prophecy and miracle connected with the birth of Christ, and of his forerunner, John, and with the ministry of both, are in their last analysis as distinctly a part of Judaism as the signs and wonders of Sinai. Nay more, the last tragedy, in which they slew their King on Calvary, closes the theocratic covenant set up at Sinai; and the darkness, the quaking earth, the rending rocks, the opening graves, and the veil of the temple rent in twain, are but the fitting counterparts of Sinai's scenes.

Let us return to the question of the Canon. There is no denying that it was settled in the intermediate period. It was a burning question in its day, on which largely turned the long and bitter feuds of Pharisees, Sadducees, and Samaritans. It is fair to assume that so important a question enlisted the best talent, the largest learning, and the highest authority to be found among the Jewish people. We are, therefore, prepared to accept the substantial truth of the Jewish traditions, which tell us that the Canon was the special care of what they call the Great Synagogue, for want of a better name, consisting of one hundred and twenty men, beginning with Daniel, the prophet, and closing with Simon, the just, running over a space of two hundred years, and including the post-exilic prophets as well as their most learned doctors and their high priests. They ascribe much work to Ezra and his associates, and much also to the last on the list, Simon, the just, whose reputation for sanctity, piety, and learning seems to overtop all the rest, himself the most famous high priest of his people, to whom also belonged the oracle by virtue of his office, as it did to all his predecessors. It is significant also that numerous traditions and fables of the supernatural cluster around his memory.

We are warranted in accepting the work of such men, itself of such gravity and perfected in such conditions, as final and authoritative. The Jews accepted their work as having the divine *imprimatur* upon it. Not only are the presumptions all in its favor, but the evidence is all concurrent. Such claims are paramount and could be set aside only, if at all, by the most overwhelming counter testimony, and that indisputably divine. None were left

to question the authority of the completed Canon except the outside Samaritan, whose voice was no longer heard and to whom Daniel, Ezra, and Simon were a rejected tribunal.

Starting on this impregnable foundation of divine authority, Christ and his apostles enforced their claims by continuous reference to "Moses and the prophets," with the superadded infallible witness of the Holy Ghost in signs and wonders following. The authority of that Canon was so well attested that Father Abraham can say to the rich man in torment, "If they believe not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead."

The heresies of Christ's day did not attack the canonical authority of a single book on the list. That had been settled beyond all cavil; they rather perverted and nullified certain Scripture teachings. Here, in part, originated the necessity for those additions to the canon which we call the New Testament. Just here also we may discover the necessity for the wondrous miracles of that generation.

The miracle, in its last analysis, is the prophet's testimonials, God on the witness-stand along side of his servants guaranteeing their claims and avouching their teachings. The numerous miracles of Christ served this purpose: "Believe me for the works' sake"; every word was established by triple testimony of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Then came the apostles doing "greater works than these," greater certainly in their number and variety, and in the prodigious number of miracle workers, every one of whom was a proper prophet and a divinely commissioned teacher. We hardly realize their number. Beginning with Pentecost, the most extraordinary charisms of the Holy Ghost were distributed direct from heaven on great numbers, as also on Cornelius' household. The same gifts came lavishly on all on whom the apostles laid their hands. These teachers were so numerous at Corinth that it led to ambitious, but well-meant, disorders.

It was proper, easy, and natural that the writings of inspired teachers should be received as of equal authority with their oral teachings, and be even more highly prized because of their permanent value. The church in the first century of its existence

was practically a miracle-working and inspired church. One of the apostles lived till the close of the first century in the full exercise of his faculties and his office, and it is fair to presume that some on whom he had conferred the charisms of the Spirit lived until the middle of the second century, and that multitudes of competent witnesses who had seen them lived to a much later date. The gradual disappearance of these miraculous gifts must be recognized if we would account for variant and semi-contradictory statements of later uninspired writers when referring to the continuance of miracles in the early church.

The question now recurs: How was the New Testament Canon settled? On what principle were the names of the several books enrolled on an authoritative list? It is confessed that the list was perfected and promulgated and transmitted by uninspired men sitting in council. Did they sit in judgment on the inspiration of each book, and pass upon it as an original question? If so, their adjudication was only a matter of opinion and not final, and would be of no more force than if they had promulgated the meaning of any passage of Scripture. The best human opinions are subject to revision, and often need it.

Competent human testimony, however, is final as to questions of fact, Hume to the contrary notwithstanding. It is here that the human and the divine meet in our faith. We need a divine attestation for revelation, and we rely on human testimony to perpetuate the facts of the attestation, and here our faith rests secure.

Now the acceptance of any book of the New Testament by the church of the first century and the early part of the second as authoritative is sufficient evidence of its canonicity, because the early church was for all practical purposes an inspired church, and the consensus of that church was final on vital matters. This would be the more obvious if some master hand would discriminate among the promises of the Holy Ghost and his infallible guidance, and show just how many of them were limited specifically to the apostolic church, and how many of them were of general application to the end of time. Such a discrimination would be of great value to settle many other matters that still need elucidation, such as the Papal infallibility, witness of the Spirit,

higher life, faith cure, the limitations of church authority, the right of private judgment, and many others.

The real question to which the fathers addressed themselves was this: What books did the church contemporary with the writers receive as genuine and canonical? This question they were abundantly competent to handle, for the evidence was all accessible; more so, however, for some books than for others, as the history shows. Some of the books were written earlier and had a wider publication than others. The acceptance of these, of course, was the promptest. Others were not accepted universally till the facts were known. It is true also that some of the books were strenuously objected to. This goes to show that they were wide awake and determined to sift all the evidence so as not to be imposed upon by candidates for canonization. And what is more to the point, the objections raised against the canonicity of certain books were based on their internal character and innate difficulties, as was notably the case with the Book of Revelation, rather than on any lack of evidence as to authorship, or as to acceptance by the contemporary church. In other words, the objectors sought to parry positive evidence by arguments purely rationalistic, a form of polemics not yet obsolete.

There is no place here for the infallible attestation of "Mother Church" expressed by councils or otherwise, nor is there any need of it. We have a Canon, both the Old and the New, attested by those who were as competent to do so as the authors themselves to write with divine authority. We depend on competent uninspired testimony to bear witness to the fact of such attestation, and to transmit the list of the books as a substantial fact, just as also we depend on testimony for the contents of the books themselves.

The case before us may not be made out as lucidly as could be desired, nor as conclusively as may be possible from a more careful study of all the facts bearing on the question; still, there is no other hypothesis that satisfies the necessities of the problem so well. The Sacred Book furnishes us an infallible standard of faith and practice. Its authority must rest on other attestation than itself, and as infallible as itself; otherwise, the argument be-

comes the fallacy of reasoning in a circle, all which has often been shown in discussing the necessity for the miraculous in attestation of a revelation from God. God has never left divine truth as its own sufficient witness.

We do not depreciate the value of special evidence, both internal and external, to the genuineness and authenticity of particular books of the Canon, but the argment is, in the main, only ancillary and confirmatory, and is adapted to silence the caviller, or to strengthen the faith of the doubter. Such arguments confirm a claimed authority, but do not lay the foundations of it.

If Christian apologetics shall once occupy this ground of a conceded Canon divinely authenticated, she can then cry with Paul, "To the law and to the testimony," or with Christ, "It is written"; her weapons shall be offensive instead of defensive; her arrows shall be sharp in the hearts of the King's enemies. Modern criticism, a wild and careering steed, unmanaged and unmanageable, shall then be broken to harness, docile as any cart-horse. When genius, and faith, and critical acumen shall work together to decipher the oracle and to ascertain *what* is written, and *what* "saith the Holy Ghost," then shall criticism herself use her weapons, destructive and remorseless, but "mighty through God," for the "casting down of strongholds," and for "casting down imaginations and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ."

NOTE.—The Jewish Synod of Jamnia, about A. D. 70, issued an authoritative list of the Old Testament books. This list is claimed to be the same as that recognized in Christ's day and subsequently confirmed by Josephus. The action of this Synod may be fairly interpreted as declarative against certain new sects, the Ersenes and Zealots, as well as against Sadducees and Samaritans, some of whom made an additional plea for certain apochryphal books, while some perhaps objected to including any but the five books of Moses. This Council did not make the list, but vindicated and declared it.

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III. DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY IN ITS APPLICATION TO CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE.[1]

Sovereignty is the possession of original authority and jurisdiction and the efficacious exercise of supreme power. To say that God is a sovereign is equivalent to saying that God is God. To deny that he is a sovereign is logical atheism; for a God less than his own work is unthinkable.

We shall not seek to demonstrate the divine sovereignty either upon the plane of nature or within the limits of revelation—it is deeply imbedded in both and the argument direct and easy—but we shall endeavor to interpret its meaning in Christian experience. All truth is efficient in life and "is in order to godliness;" especially is this so in regard to primary, cardinal truth. "As a man thinketh in his heart so is he." "Sanctify them through thy truth, thy word is truth."

Divine sovereignty properly interpreted is in every way wholesome. Of the many ways in which it enlarges the Christian life, and enriches the fruits of experimental religion, I shall mention only two.

First, It girds every servant of God who receives it into his heart with strength and courage. If one can say with the psalmist, "O Lord, truly I am thy servant," then he can say, "God is on my side" or rather "I am on his side." Celebrating God's power over all the kings of the earth, over the sea and the winds and over the church, David calls upon Zion to rejoice and Judah to be glad, "for this God is *our* God forever and ever." "The Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoice and let the multitude of isles be glad thereof." Search and you will find that everywhere in sacred teaching and history the mention of God's sovereignty is a song of triumph for the righteous and a standing admonition to the wicked. To the righteous it is a shout, "God is our refuge and

[1] Read before the Presbytery of Transylvania, Sept. 7, 1892, and published by request of that Presbytery.

strength, a very present help in trouble; therefore will not we fear though the earth be removed and though the mountains be carried into the midst of the sea, though the waters thereof roar and be troubled." To the wicked it is a message in season saying, "He is wise in heart, mighty in strength; who hath hardened himself against him and prospered?" It clothes the Christian with the power of a dauntless courage because God is for him and no enemy can prevail against him.

Is not this the very bed-rock on which the security and perpetuity and ultimate triumph of the church of God is built? "Thy kingdom is an everlasting kingdom," for "no weapon formed against thee shall prosper." Why? Because God has promised? Yes, but what would the promise avail if the power were wanting? There are two things necessary to the security of a promise, one is the *will* to perform, the other is the *power* to do. What can the will avail without the power? In truth, every prophecy and every promise God has ever made was anchored for security in God's efficacious power over nature and over man; over the whole periphery of being without abatement for one moment.

Man, and man's power "both to will and to do" are certainly within the definition of any sovereignty that is sovereign. No Christian who is familiar with God's word in its fulness of prophecy and promise can ever, in his own mind, debate the question of the ultimate triumph of the Church of God. The ocean currents may change, the winds may veer, the storms may sweep the seas, he may hear the roar and moan of the surf; but he knows that it is beating in vain upon the immovable shore-line of God's eternal unchangeable purpose of grace.

Is there not strength in this, and courage too? Some one has defined a Calvinist as a man who fears God and nobody else. Every man who serves God acceptably must sometimes face danger for duty's sake. In the face of every foe he may answer as the three saintly heroes of the olden time answered the mightiest king that sat upon a throne, in the presence of a burning fiery furnace. Said the great king: "Do not ye serve my gods, nor worship the golden image which I have set up?" "ye shall be cast the same hour into the burning fiery furnace, and who is that God that shall deliver

you out of my hands?" They made reply: "O Nebuchadnezzar, we are not careful to answer thee in this matter. If it be so, our God whom we serve is able to deliver us from the burning fiery furnace, and he will deliver us out of thine hand, O king. But if not, be it known unto thee, O king, that we will not serve thy gods, nor worship the golden image which thou hast set up."

When we look into history what do we find? Observe those peculiar and striking epochs that possess the true revolutionary grandeur and stand out like mountains—these are times that test principles and try men's souls, and impart a thrilling emotion to history—times when men, fighting for truth and righteousness, had great dangers to encounter, great obstacles to overcome. Observe those men who in such times bore "the heat and burden of the day," lived and died for God and fatherland; heroes of faith, who have made luminous the pages of history, whose names are an inspiration and a benediction, and ask, What was it that sustained them? Was it not an abiding faith in the presence of the omnipotent One? They endured as seeing him who is invisible. Observe the patriarchs and prophets of the old time, as delineated in the eleventh of Hebrews—the roll-call of faith. They subdued kingdoms and wrought righteousness by faith. Faith in whom and in what? Faith in God's sovereignty, in his willingness and power to meet his promises.

Is there any trace of this sublime principle in modern history? The great historians who search for the sources of action, for the motives that impel men and the principles that sustain them have seen it and felt it and confessed it. Motley, in his *History of the Netherlands* and *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, declares that in that titanic struggle against Phillip and the Duke of Alva, had it not been for the sturdy Calvinism of William the Silent and his confederates, liberty would have perished forever in Holland and Belgium. So Froude and Green have traced the influence of this conviction in the struggles for civil and religious liberty in England.

The eloquent tributes of the first mentioned of these great historians to the heroic element of Calvinism are well known. The most ardent believer in its moral worth could not say more. But

Green, in his *History of the English People*, has felt with equal force the value of this strenuous faith. In the chapter which delineates that long and memorable conflict in the time of Elizabeth that settled the question whether England should be Romish or Protestant, whether England should be England or sink into a vassal of Spain, he says, "To the bulk of men the victory seemed wholly due to the energy and devotion of Calvinism. Rome had placed herself in the forefront of England's enemies, and it was the Calvinistic Puritan who was the irreconcilable foe of Rome. It was the Puritan who went forth to fight the Spaniard in France or in the Netherlands. It was the Puritan who broke into the Spanish Main, and who singed Phillip's beard at Cadiz. It was the Puritan whose assiduous preachings and catechisings had slowly won the mass of the English people to any real acceptance of Protestantism."

Again, speaking of the victory of the Scottish people over the despotic designs of James, and its reflex action upon English liberty, he gives us this striking portrait of John Knox: "One well-known figure embodied the moral strength of the new movement. In the king's boyhood, amidst the wild turmoil which followed on Murray's fall, an old man, bent with years and toil, might have been seen creeping with a secretary's aid to the pulpit of St. Giles. But age and toil were powerless over the spirit of John Knox. He believed to leave the pulpit at his first entry, but ere he had done with his sermon he was so active and vigorous that he was like to ding the pulpit into blads and spring out of it." It was in vain that men strove to pen the fiery words of the great preacher. "In the opening up of his text," says a devout listener, "he was moderate; but when he entered into application he made me so grew and trembled that I could not hold a pen to write." What gave its grandeur to the doctrine of Knox was his resolute assertion of a Christian order, before which the social and political forces of the world about him shrank into insignificance. The meanest peasant, once called of God, felt within him a strength that was stronger than the might of nobles, and a wisdom that was wiser than the statecraft of kings. In that mighty elevation of the masses which was embodied in the Calvinist doctrines of

election and grace, lay the germs of the modern principles of human equality. The fruits of such teaching soon showed themselves in a new attitude of the people. Said Melville, over the grave of John Knox, "Here lies one who never feared the face of man," and if Scotland still reverences the memory of the reformer, it is because at that grave her peasant and her trader learned to look in the face of nobles and kings and "not be ashamed."

Again, speaking of the effect of Calvinistic preaching by the ministers of the Church of Scotland, he says: "Strange to modern ears as their language may be, bigoted and narrow as their temper must often seem, it is well to remember the greatness of the debt we owe them. It was their stern resolve, their energy, their endurance that saved Scotland from a civil and religious despotism, and that in saving the liberty of Scotland saved English liberty as well."

When this heroic struggle against despotism in church and state was transferred to the New World, we are not surprised to find that the first great charter of liberty on this side of the waters closes with these words: "And for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor." Our own judicious and exhaustive Bancroft finds this religious conviction giving indomitable courage and endurance to the fathers of the Republic. So much is he impressed with it, that he declares that "the American citizen who does not revere the name of John Calvin knows nothing of the history of American liberty."

George Alfred Townsend (Gath), speaking of the religious element in the Revolution, says: "When I want to find the grave of an officer in the Revolutionary army, I go to a Presbyterian grave-yard, and there I find it."

History certainly bears us out in saying that the doctrine of divine sovereignty gives strength in the midst of weakness, and courage in the face of danger.

Second, I mention as another wholesome and blessed fruit of

this teaching in Christian experience—the grace to bear affliction. In interpreting the mystery of sorrow, this is our only key; in seeking solace in a time of adversity, it is our only refuge. To eliminate God from our afflictions is practical atheism; to say that he cannot avert them is to deny his omnipotence. Christian experience can trace many blessed results from affliction; the schooling in humility, patience, and holy resignation; the weaning of our affections from carnal pleasures, the decay of unholy ambitions, the purification of our faith. But as an abiding source of consolation, a great rock foundation upon which we may rest our weary feet amid all the storms, nothing will do but the sovereignty of God. There is one all-embracing statement that covers every case: "All things work together for good to them that love God; to them who are the called according to his purpose." If all things work thus, they must work upon the line of sovereignty. Nothing else will do. To say that it is God's will, is to settle all doubts and cancel all regrets.

Do we mourn the devastations of the elements; the arrow that flieth by day; the pestilence that walketh in darkness? Does the pale messenger beckon? "Is there not an appointed time to man upon earth?" And is not that God's time? We cannot go one day beyond that time; nay, not one hour! And why these childish fears! Are we troubled over the agency of wicked men in seeking to accomplish our ruin; in thwarting our holiest purposes? They cannot go beyond the power of God to do more or less. Over all these plots and counter-plots, over the intrigues of most astute diplomacy, over marching armies and military genius, there is the shadow of a mighty right hand, a force which is above man; and in those striking moments of destiny which we call crises, men feel the presence of that hand and the great souls lay down their swords. The unbeliever, the scoffer and blasphemer, the despiser of God, must stumble down in time, and go out with a shriek like the wild old King Clotair, "What great God is this that pulls down the strength of the strongest king."

Are we troubled over the metaphysical hiatus between God's efficacious power and man's freedom of choice, so that what was

revealed for godly edifying and holy consolation becomes a source of anxiety, or a vexatious puzzle, forever eluding the grasp of our wit? Let a few examples of this problem solved in concrete form by sacred history, and divinely interpreted put our faith to rest. The charming story of Joseph and his brethren is familiar to all—the paternal favoritism—the fraternal strife, resulting in the wicked and cruel act of selling Joseph into Egypt—and his troubles and subsequent elevation to power in the kingdom of the Pharaohs—the dream, and the interpretation thereof, and the storage for the time of famine, when his brethren go down into Egypt for corn—his making himself known unto them, and their deep penitence in remembrance of past guilt; in all this tangled web there is a naturalness, a great free earnestness, full of pity and fear; but one word from Joseph explains it all: "Ye meant it for evil, but God meant it for good."

Take one more object lesson from sacred history; the darkest tragedy of time, at which the world still gazes and shudders, and upon which its only hope of deliverance from guilt rests. The perpetrators of this deed assumed the most dreadful guilt ever incurred by man when they cried, "His blood be upon us and upon our children." But it is thus interpreted by God's inspired servant: "For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together for to do *whatsoever thy hand* and *thy counsel determined before to be done.*" Why do questionings arise in our hearts with such object lessons before us?

Divine sovereignty in its application to Christian experience is beautifully expressed in the prayer of John Henry Newman. Calvinism when renounced in theological formula will still assert itself in the voice of prayer.

"Lead kindly light amid the encircling gloom,
Lead thou me on;
The night is dark and I am far from home,
Lead thou me on;
Keep thou my feet; I do not ask to see the distant scene,
One step enough for me.

"So long thy power hath blessed me, sure it still
Will lead me on,
O'er moor and fen, o'er crag and torrent, till
The night is gone;
And with the morn those angel faces smile,
Which I have loved long since
And lost awhile."

Not less beautiful are the lines of our own Quaker poet, so recently gone to his rest:

"I know not where his islands lift
Their fronded palms in air,
I only know I cannot drift
Beyond his love and care."

HARVEY GLASS.

IV. PROVIDENCE AS A DOCTRINE OF SCIENCE.

I. Huxley's Picture of the World.

"The conception of the constancy of nature," writes Professor Huxley, "has become the dominant idea of modern thought. To persons familiar with the facts on which this conception is based, and competent to estimate their significance, it has ceased to be conceivable that chance should have any place in the universe, or that events should depend upon any but the natural sequence of cause and effect. We have come to look upon the present as the child of the past and as the parent of the future; and as we have excluded chance from a place in the universe, so we ignore, even as a possibility, the notion of any interference with the order of nature. Whatever may be man's speculative doctrine, it is quite certain that every intelligent person guides his life and risks his fortune upon the belief that the order of nature is constant, and that the chain of natural causation is never broken."—*New York Lectures on Evolution, Lect. I.*

"The history of every science is but the history of the elimination of the notion of creative or other interference with the natural order of the phenomena which are the subject-matter of that science. When astronomy was young, the morning stars sang together for joy, and all the planets were guided in their courses by celestial hands. Now, the harmony of the stars has resolved itself into gravitation according to the inverse squares of the distances, and the orbits of the planets are deducible from the laws of forces which allow a schoolboy's stone to break a window. The lightning was the angel of the Lord, but it has pleased Providence in these modern times that science should make it the humble messenger of man; and we know that every flash which shimmers above the horizon on a summer evening is determined by ascertainable conditions, and that its direction and brightness might, if one's knowledge of these were greater, have been calculated. Plague, pestilence, and famine are admitted by all but fools to be

the natural result of causes, for the most part fully within human control; and not the unavoidable tortures inflicted by wrathful Omnipotence upon his helpless handiwork."

"Harmonious order governing eternally continuous progress, the web and woof of matter and force intertwining by slow degrees, without a broken thread, that veil which lies between us and the infinite, that universe which alone we know and can know, such is the picture which science draws of the world; and in proportion as any part of that picture is in unison with the rest, so may we feel sure that it is rightly painted."—*Lay Sermons*, pp. 282, 283.

Such is the picture which Professor Huxley, and the class of scientists to which he belongs, would have us accept as a true picture of the world in which we live, and of which we form a part. Our world, according to this representation, is but a vast machine working out results—history, in the wide sense of that term—just as some great power-loom weaves out a piece of figured damask according to the pattern to which it has been set. The loom, once started at its appointed task, works on without any possible interference, or even supervision, on the part of him who originally built it, and set it in motion.

II. Is this Picture True to Nature?

1. For convenient use in the business of life man has embodied the knowledge of the earth's surface acquired by direct observation in what we style maps, and these maps form a most important part of our treatises on geography, *i. e.*, the picture of the earth. Look at one of these maps now, and you will find laid down there continents and oceans, islands and lakes, mountain ranges and rivers, all of which we may naturally suppose to owe their present existence and form to the operation of what Huxley calls "natural agencies," by which he means mechanical forces, *i. e.*, forces acting without intelligence or will. But in addition to all these, our maps are filled with marks of the location of cities, and canals, and railroads; and our geographies are filled with particular descriptions of them, as if this knowledge was of even greater practical importance than that of continents and islands and mountains.

Cities, and canals, and railroads do not owe their existence to mere mechanical agencies. They are confessedly the work of man. His intelligence has located them, and his will, as an efficient cause, has determined their construction.

And this condition of things in our world is not a new condition, which has begun to exist in our day. As far back as history throws any light upon the subject, our world has had its cities, canals, and roads, if not railroads, all acknowledged to be the work of man. In every part of the world which man has inhabited in the past, we find remains of his workmanship in some form or other; from the stately ruins of pyramids and temples in Egypt, to the chipped knives and arrow-heads of the lands in which savage man has had his home. Now, in "the picture which science draws of our world," according to Professor Huxley, cities, and canals, and railroads are entirely left out, and so the picture is incomplete, as even the schoolboy will see.

2. Turn now from our examination of maps to a study of the world, as it everywhere surrounds us and presents itself to the eye. Among the phenomena which challenge our attention, alongside of ocean billows raised by the wind, and streams of molten lava pouring forth from volcanic mountains, and the flow and fall of waters in rivers and waterfalls, are ships making their way over the ocean, often in the very "teeth of the wind," and fires "cribbed and confined" in furnaces, in which man is extracting useful metals from their ores in spite of the chemical affinity which binds the elements of the ore together; and railroad engines moving up the very mountain side in opposition to gravity. In all these, and in a thousand similar ways, man is doing a work in the world in which he appears as an efficient cause in making the world what it is to-day.

"The natural sequence of cause and effect," in the sense in which Prof. Huxley uses that phrase, never built the city of London, or dug the Suez Canal, or constructed the Pacific Railroad; nor does it sail our steamships in their voyages across the ocean, or manage our iron furnaces, or run our railroad engines. If history, in the wide sense of that term, be a piece of figured damask woven in nature's loom, there are figures there to which the

loom was not originally set, but which have unquestionably been introduced by the free will-power of man.

Professor Huxley's picture of our world is fatally defective, in that the phenomena resulting from the operation of the will-power of man are entirely left out. His map is worthless to the active man of business, because it makes no note of the location of cities, the centres of business, and of canals and railroads, the great channels through which the business of the world is conducted. Such a map might serve well enough for the parched desert of Sahara, or the perpetually ice-covered regions around the poles, but for the habitable portions of the world, the portions in which alone man has any special interest, it is glaringly defective, and so, untrue and utterly worthless for all practical purposes. That so well-trained an observer, as Professor Huxley undoubtedly is, should take no account of man and his works in his picture of our world, is passing strange, when in the very picture he gives us, he finds himself compelled to recognize their existence. Thus, he writes, "plague, pestilence, and famine are admitted by all but fools to be the natural result of causes, for the most part, fully within human control." How can this be reconciled with his statement, "we ignore all possibility of any interference with the order of nature?" And again, "the lightning was the angel of the Lord, but it has pleased Providence, in these modern times, that science should make it the humble messenger of man." By the phrase "science should make it the humble messenger of man," he must mean, that man through his science has made it his humble messenger. Man, and not science, is the efficient agent here.

The Duke of Argyll has well said: "A fallacy is getting hold upon us from a want of definition in the use of terms. 'Nature' is being used in the narrow sense of physical nature. It is conceived as containing nothing beyond the properties of matter. Thus the whole mental world in which we ourselves live and move and have our being is excluded from it. But these selves of ours do belong to nature. Let us never forget, then, that the agency of man is of all others the most natural, the one with which we are most familiar—the only one, in fact, which we can be said, even in a measure, to understand."—*The Reign of Law*, p. 7.

III. Man's Agency in our World.

Professor Huxley tells us, and tells us truly, that man, in our day, has "made the lightning his humble servant"—it lights up his cities when the sun has gone down,—it carries his messages with a speed to which no other messenger can attain,—it is beginning even to take the place of water and steam-power in driving his machinery. And this, which is true in the case of electricity, is true also, to a greater or less extent, of all the mechanical forces of nature. In view of this fact several questions of no little interest at once present themselves:

1. Is man's control of these forces of inanimate nature limited? And if so—how, and to what extent is it limited? "Man's power in respect to these laws," *i. e.* mechanical forces, "extends only, first to their discovery and ascertainment, and then to their use. He can establish none, he can suspend none. All he can do is to guide, in a limited degree, the mutual action and reaction of the laws," *i. e.* mechanical forces, "among each other. They are the tools with which he works—they are the instruments of his will. In all he does or can do he must employ them. The more he knows of them, the more largely he can employ them, and make them minister to his purposes."—*Reign of Law*, p. 12. As illustrating the truth stated above, take the case of the electric telegraph. Man ascertained certain laws governing the transmission and operation of electricity, viz., that through certain substances, "conductors" as they are called, electricity passes freely, and with inconceivable rapidity; and further, that when an electric current is made to pass through a coiled conductor surrounding a bar of soft iron, the iron, for the time being, becomes a magnet; and then, by stretching a wire conductor from one place to another, and arranging instruments at the two ends of the wire so that the continuity of the current of electricity may be broken at will, by the application of his finger, breaking the current in the instrument at one end, the instrument at the other end is made to "click" out every such breakage. Having before arranged that "clicks" of certain kinds represent certain letters of the alphabet, the operator in New York is enabled to "click" out a communica-

tion to another operator at the other end of the wire, in London, it may be. In all this, there is no establishment of a new law, or the impartation of a new property to electricity, nor is there any suspension of an old law. The electricity which transmits man's message across the Atlantic to-day is the same in nature, and in the laws which govern it, that electricity has been from the beginning; and man has made it "his servant" by ascertaining those laws, and conforming the action of his will-power thereto.

2. The fact just stated, that man in making use of the forces of inanimate nature—the only forces of which Professor Huxley's picture of the world takes any account—must first ascertain the laws which govern them, and then conform the action of his will-power thereto, will explain to us, in so far as the matter is capable of explanation, how it comes that the free operation of this will-power causes no disorder or derangement in nature. Were there no forces in operation in our world but the forces of inanimate nature, then would the world be neither more nor less than a vast machine—a power-loom, such as Huxley has represented it—and could work out no pattern in the damask it was weaving but that to which it was set at the beginning. Fatalism would be the true philosophy; and fatalism in a form in which it would inflict a death-blow on all effort on man's part to better his condition, and would make progress in science not only utterly useless, but a curse rather than a blessing. Why should an intelligent man labor to attain that which he must know is unattainable? Or, why should he seek to increase his knowledge when an increase of knowledge would be, in nine cases out of ten, but an increase of sorrow? Man may well be thankful for the knowledge that our world is no mere machine, driven by mechanical forces only, *i. e.*, forces acting without thought or will. It is a vast law-governed world in which free will-power is ever at work, often controlling and directing the operation of the mechanical forces inherent in matter; the two classes of forces acting in perfect harmony one with the other; and any picture of it which does not take account of both these classes of forces is essentially defective, and so untrue.

3. A characteristic difference between the free will-power of

man and the mechanical forces inherent in lifeless matter, such as gravity, is that the one is guided and governed by mind—mind in the sense of, "The intellectual power in man; the power that conceives, reasons, judges, wills, imagines, remembers, or performs any intellectual operation" (*Imperial Dictionary*); the other by inflexible law. Man's works all bear the marks of the directing mind of man, and of the knowledge and skill to which he had attained at the time at which the work was done. A traveller through the Syrian desert comes across certain marble columns, some standing, others prostrate, at a point once occupied by the city of Palmyra. At once he recognizes the work of man here—that these columns are the remains of an ancient man-built temple. In what is yet evident in their arrangement, contrivance appears, and in their forms, the fluting of the columns and the carving of their capitals, the architectural taste and mechanical skill of man such as it was in the East two thousand years ago are seen, and there is no doubt in the mind of the traveller that man's will-power has been at work here. Mere mechanical forces, acting without man's direction and control, would never have produced such results as these. The marks of the operation of man's mind may be very faint, and yet, when they appear, Professor Huxley and the class of scientists to which he belongs, are accustomed to treat them as indubitable proofs of man's agency, as in the case of the arrow-heads of chipped flint found in the superficial strata of many lands. They even designate the men whose work they believe them to be as paleolithic or neolithic men, according to the comparative excellence of the work. It may be difficult to define in general terms the characteristic marks of the operation of man's mind, but practically there is very little difficulty in distinguishing man's work from that of the mechanical forces of nature.

IV. The Agency of the Lower Orders of Animals.

The will-power of man is not the only will-power operating as an "efficient cause" in our world. The flight of the eagle toward her eyry on the mountain cliff, the spring of the tiger upon its prey, the darting of the fish through the water, all furnish evi-

dence of the existence of a will-power in the lower animals, entirely distinct from the mechanical forces of nature, such as gravity and heat. In these instances will-power in the lower animals acts in perfect harmony with the established laws of inanimate nature just as it does in the case of man, and this, for the reason that it acts under the guidance of mind, using the word mind in its wide sense, as is evident from the results of its action. In the lower animals instinct does the work of reason in man, and within its proper sphere instinct is as trustworthy a guide to will-power as reason.

This agency of the will-power of the lower animals is not something peculiar to the present day; but, as is evident from many traces of its operation it has left behind it, it has been at work through ages antedating the existence of man on the earth; and so like are these results to those effected by the will-power of man that in some instances it is difficult to distinguish one from the other. As instances in point take the following: "Bones have been found cut and polished in deposits which seem to have been immersed in water since man dwelt upon the earth, yet so finely cut and polished as, in the opinion of many, to prove human skill, aided, too, by instruments of rare perfection. Sir Charles Lyell, however, ventured to put among the beavers in the Zoölogical Garden in London some bones similar to those discovered; and after leaving them for some time, recovered them, cut and polished by the beavers so nearly like the others, as to leave no doubt that in both cases the same agency had been employed. So, in this case, the pre-Adamite man proved to be a beaver, and the perfect tools, which argued such high civilization, the beavers' teeth."—*Pierson's Many Infallible Proofs*, p. 139. Sir J. W. Dawson tells us, "A very remarkable discovery was made in 1875 by Professor Rutmeyer, of Basle. In a brown coal deposit of tertiary, or at least 'interglacial', age—whatever that may mean—in Switzerland, he found some fragments of wood so interlaced as to resemble wattle or basket work. Steenstrup has, however, examined the evidence, and adduced strong reasons for the conclusion that the alleged human workmanship is really that of beavers."—*Origin of the World*, p. 386. In view of

such facts as these it must be admitted that any picture of the world which fails to take account of the operation of a will-power in the lower animals is essentially defective, and so untrue.

V. The Agency of God.

If there be a will-power at work in the world lower in the scale of excellence than that of man, and the proof of the existence of such a will-power, as we have seen, is undeniable, the question will naturally present itself—May there not be a will-power more excellent than that of man at work in the world also? An affirmative answer to this question seems to be demanded by such facts as the following:

1. Thoughtful men from the very earliest times, and in every part of the world, have believed in the existence and continued activity of such a will-power—the will-power of God—working out what we are accustomed to speak of as his providence. Among the earliest records of human thought and opinion which have come down to us, is the celebrated Behistun inscription. In that inscription, as translated by Oppert, we read: "And Darius, the king, says, these are the princes which call themselves mine. By the grace of Ormuzd"—Ormuzd was the supreme god according to the faith of the Persians—"to me they made subjection, brought tribute to me, what was ordered by me unto them, in the night-time as well as in the daytime they executed. And Darius, the king, says, in the provinces the man who was my friend, I cherished him; the man who was my enemy, I punished him thoroughly. By the grace of Ormuzd, in these lands was my law observed; and what was ordered by me unto them, that they executed. And Darius, the king, says, Ormuzd gave me this kingdom, and by the grace of Ormuzd, I possess this kingdom." *Records of the Past*, Vol. VII., pp. 88, 89. This belief, often greatly distorted, lies at the foundation of all the ancient religions, and pervades the writings of all the most ancient authors—those of Herodotus among the Greeks, Berosus among the Babylonians, and Manetho among the Egyptians. Another proof of the universal prevalence of this belief in early times we have in the fact, that the most ancient ruins found in all lands are not the

ruins of palaces erected as the habitations of kings, nor theatres erected for the amusement of the people, nor forts built for defence against the attack of enemies, but temples erected for the worship of a higher order of beings than man, and worshipped because of the belief that they took an active part in the affairs of the world.

2. To the faith common to all Christian people in our day, Dr. C. Hodge has given expression in his words: "The theory of the universe which underlies the Bible, which is everywhere assumed or asserted in the sacred volume, which accords with our moral and religious nature, and which, therefore, is the foundation of all natural, as well as of all revealed religion, is that God created all things by the word of his power; that he endowed his creatures with their properties or forces; that he is everywhere present in his universe, coöperating with and controlling the operation of second causes on a scale commensurate with his omnipotence, as we, in our measure, coöperate with and control them within the narrower range of our efficiency."—*Theology*, Vol. III., p. 698. The greatest of English dramatists gives expression to this same common faith in his words:

> "There's a divinity that shapes our ends,
> Rough-hew them how we will."

Even Professor Huxley, when representing the world as a vast machine, in which mechanical forces alone are active, writes: "It has pleased *Providence*, in these modern times, that science should make it" (the lightning), "the humble messenger of man." Now, whether we regard this recognition of Providence as governing the progress of science, as the expression of a real though unacknowledged belief on the part of Professor Huxley himself, or as merely a form of expression he found current among men, and adopted to make himself understood; it furnishes at once an illustration and a proof that the belief in Providence is a common article of faith among the English-speaking peoples of to-day, the peoples who stand highest in all that is embraced under the comprehensive title of "modern civilization."

3. This on the one hand. On the other, it may be said that while the belief in Providence in all ages and countries has been

that of the multitude, there have always been those who rejected the doctrine, the philosophers, as they style themselves among the ancients, and the school of scientists to which Spencer and Huxley belong in our day. This is true. But, then, it is at the same time true that this seems fairly traceable to the fact, that in their study of nature they confine their attention to the mechanical forces at work around them, taking no account of the operation of the will-power of man and the lower animals, and thus are led to give us a picture of nature fatally defective, and, for all practical purposes, utterly worthless.

It is characteristic of the human mind that when its powers are concentrated on the study of even the narrowest field of research all the world outside that narrow field is forgotten, or remembered only as it stands related to the subject-matter of that study. To the enthusiastic entomologist, "the wide world" is little more than a vast hive for the breeding and transformation of insects; and to the devoted florist, the production of a new variety of some favorite flower is an event more interesting than the revolution of an empire. Remembering this, we can account for the fact, that so careful and accurate an observer as Professor Huxley has shown himself to be in the department of science to which he has devoted his life, can trace the operation of gravity, heat, light, and electricity where the common observer does not dream of their presence, and yet take no note of the operation of the will-power of man or God, at work side by side with them. This, if I mistake not, gives us the true explanation of the disbelief in Providence, and, in some cases, in the existence of a personal God, on the part of a few scientists, and if so, that disbelief is entitled to little weight as an off-set to the almost universal belief of mankind in every age and in all countries.

Charles Darwin, referring to his entire loss of all taste for poetry and painting of which he was conscious in his old age, writes: "My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of facts, but why this should have caused the atrophy of that part of the brain alone on which the higher tastes depend, I cannot conceive. . . . The loss of these tastes is the loss of happiness, and may possibly be injurious to the

intellect, and more probably to the moral character, by enfeebling the emotional part of our nature." And again, "In my journal I wrote that whilst standing in the midst of the grandeur of the Brazilian forest, it is not possible to give an adequate idea of the higher feelings of wonder, admiration, and devotion which fill and elevate the mind. I well remember my conviction that there is more in man than the mere breath of his body. But now the grandest scenes would not cause any such convictions and feelings to rise in my mind. It may be truly said that I am like a man that has become color-blind, and the universal belief by men of the existence of redness makes my present loss of perception of not the least value as evidence."—*Life of C. Darwin*, Vol. I., p. 311.

4. The proof of the operation of a will-power mightier than that of man—a will-power such as the common faith of mankind attributes to God—as an efficient cause in the original creation of our world, meets us everywhere. "I am fearfully and wonderfully made," wrote a thoughtful man three thousand years ago; and this saying has been repeated by thoughtful men in every succeeding age down to the present, whenever they have given careful study to the structure of the human body. The eye presents us with the most perfect achromatic lens in existence. The hand, as an instrument of grasp, is perfect. The simple hinge of the finger-joint, with the "universal joint" exhibited in "the ball and socket" of the thigh, man has imitated but never equalled. In these, and in a thousand other particulars, the structure of the human body exhibits evidence of a skill and power on the part of the maker far superior to that of man; and to trace them to the agency of mere mechanical forces is but one degree more foolish than to credit them to the operation of chance.

Admitting then, that the operation of a will-power mightier and more excellent than that of man can alone give us an explanation of the marvelous structure of the world—of which man's body is a part—in its origin, is it reasonable to believe that having made, the Creator has abandoned, it? To this question, Professor Huxley would reply, The universe is governed by natural law. "Is it natural law which governs the universe? Or, does God govern

it by natural laws? Men perpetually cheat themselves with the idea that law is a power, whereas it is simply the method of a power. Whence the power of the natural second cause? Originally from God. Hence it is utterly improbable (whether we can comprehend it or not) that God shall have so arranged his own power communicated to his works as to obstruct his own personal will. Remember that God is a person, and not a mere *anima mundi*. He is a sovereign, moral person."—*Dabney's Theology*, p. 719.

VI. God's Agency Unlimited.

Man occupies a higher position in nature than other animals, in part, because he has reason as a guide to his will, whilst in them the will-power is put forth under the guidance of instinct. The bee can build as perfect comb for storing its honey as the most skilful man can; but, even if it had the might, it could not build a ship or construct a steam engine. Instinct is limited in its range, though perfect within the narrow bounds of its operation; and so must be the will-power which it governs and guides. Reason has a far wider range; and a range becoming wider and wider as science—in the sense of man's knowledge of nature—advances; and so man's will-power can act in a thousand directions where that of the lower animals is powerless. And yet man's efficient agency is limited, and that in various ways. Not so with the efficient agency of that Being, higher and more excellent than man, to whom we give the name of God. As we learn God's nature from the study of his works, he is omniscient—knows and understands nature in all its parts; with him, science is complete – he is omnipresent—not confined to a particular locality as man is—he is almighty—able to accomplish any and every purpose he may form; and hence, while the will-power of man as an efficient agent is confined to matters few in number, and limited to the narrow circle of which he forms the centre, the operation of the will-power of God may be traced everywhere and through all time.

"In that intelligible order," writes Dr. A. Hodge, "which pervades the infinite multiplicity and heterogeneity of events which makes science possible, we see and certainly know the presence of intelligence, of personal will, of moral character, *i. e.*, of all that is

connoted by our common term 'personal spirit.' God is seen to be of common generic character with ourselves. The great difference we see is that while we are essentially limited in respect to time or space, or knowledge, or power, God, the personal agent we see at work in nature and history, is essentially unlimited in all these respects. The only reason that so many students of natural science have found themselves unable to see God in nature is that their absorption in nature has made them lose sight of their own essential personality. Hence they have attempted to interpret the phenomena of consciousness in terms of mechanical nature, instead of interpreting nature under the light of self-conscious spirit. But the scientist, after all, comes before his science, the reader before the book he deciphers; and the intelligibility of nature proves its intelligent source, and the essential likeness of the author of nature who reveals himself in his works, and the interpreter of nature who retraces his processes and appreciates alike the intellectual and artistic character of the design."—*Presbyterian Review*, January 1887, pp. 2, 3.

VII. God's Agency the Highest Agency at Work in the World.

Among the mechanical forces at work around us the most subtile and mysterious is that to which we give the name of life, or the vital principle. We must class it among mechanical forces because, in so far as we can see, it acts without thought or will of its own. Its subtile operations are known to us through the effects produced, and within its proper range it dominates all other mechanical forces. For example, under its operation rotting matter, which man casts forth as loathsome to his senses of sight and smell, is transformed into the beautiful and fragrant lily; and again, ages ago a particle of carbon was by vital action incorporated in the structure of some gigantic fern or lepidodendron, and when thus fixed it was by pressure and heat made to assume the form of coal. This coal, in our day, is dug from the earth and burned, and so disappears from our sight. It is not destroyed, but, floating about in the atmosphere, it may a second time be laid hold upon by a living organism, and, under the operation of the vital principle, become a part of that organism, plant

or animal—it may be of man himself. The story of its manipulation by this subtile force is more wonderful than the metempsychosis of Eastern fable. The structure of a living plant seems very simple. The cellules of which it is made up, even when studied with greatest care and with the help of the most powerful microscope, seem very much alike in form and structure. And yet, under the operation of the vital principle, crude sap is transformed in one cellule into sugar, in another into starch, and in yet another into coloring matter. We say "under the operation of the vital principle"—for let the crude sap be absorbed by a piece of dead wood, wood which has died so recently as still to retain its original structure—and no such transformations are wrought.

What is this life, this vital principle, this subtile force in nature, working so quietly, and yet so mightily, and with such strange results? We can answer with certainty it is not gravity, it is not light, it is not heat, it is not electricity; it sometimes makes use of one or more of these as man does, but it is something distinct and different from them all. Of its essential nature we know absolutely nothing.

Of its operation we know, (1), That it pervades the whole living organism in which it works. In the growing plant, for example, this vital principle causes the absorption of the crude sap by the roots, its rise through the stem and distribution among the leaves for elaboration by the exchange of certain of its elements with the atmosphere, and then its return and distribution for a further elaboration in the cellules, by which it is transformed into lignine, starch, gum, sugar, and coloring matter, each one of these proximate elements being produced in its own appropriate cellule. This exceedingly complex operation is going on in all parts of the living plant at one and the same time; and with such unfailing accuracy that the typical form and composition of each several part is never departed from; and (2), The vital principle works from within. Living organisms, whether plants or animals, are not builded, as a house is, but grow.

As this vital principle, whether we regard the subtilty of its nature or the wonderful character of the work it accomplishes, must be regarded as the highest form of mechanical force, so,

among the will-powers at work in the world, the will-power of God, manifested in his Providence, is undoubtedly the highest form of will-power of which we know anything. And it should cause no surprise, certainly it furnishes no sufficient ground for cavil, that we find it, (1), Pervading the world in all its parts; a truth sometimes expressed by saying that "God is immanent in nature"; nor (2), That we find the will-power of God "working from within," and not from without, as that of man does; that God's providential purposes are not built up, but reach perfection by a process of growth.

Professor Huxley tells us: "Every science must consist of precise knowledge, and that knowledge coördinated into general propositions, or it is not science."—*Humbolt Library*, No. 21, p. 472. In the coördination of precise knowledge, or facts, in any particular case, it is of the first importance that the coördination embrace all the facts which properly belong to the case. In our courts of justice, a witness is sworn to tell "the truth, and *the whole truth*"; and this, for the reason that a partial statement of truth is often a most mischievous falsehood. And this partial statement of the truth is just what Professor Huxley is guilty of in his picture of our world according to science, quoted at the beginning of this article. He has taken account of the mechanical forces at work in nature, but utterly ignored the several kinds of will-power at work side by side with them. And, what makes this neglect the more fatal to just conclusions is, that will-power often controls and directs mechanical force; as in the case cited by Huxley himself, where "the lightning is made the humble messenger of man."

Our world is not a great automatic power-loom weaving out the pattern to which it was set in the beginning by the hand that made it. "The harmonious order," of which Professor Huxley speaks as characterizing the progress of events, can be reasonably accounted for in no other way than by considering it the product of the will-power of God—and of one God only—"coöperating with and controlling the operation of second causes on a scale commensurate with his own omnipresence and omnipotence, as we, in our measure, coöperate with and control them within the

narrow range of our efficiency." Divine Providence, and neither chance, nor fatalism, is the philosophy to which true science points us.

We have a statement of the doctrine of Divine Providence such as true science demands, made by one of the kings of ancient Babylon in the words: "And at the end of the days I Nebuchadnezzar lifted up mine eyes to heaven, and my understanding returned unto me, and I blessed the Most High, and I praised and honored him that liveth for ever, whose dominion is an everlasting dominion, and his kingdom is from generation to generation; and all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing: and he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?" (Dan. iv. 34, 35.) Should Professor Huxley ever turn away from the contemplation of mere matter and mechanical force, and "lift up his eyes unto heaven," I doubt not "his understanding would return unto him," and Nebuchadnezzar's faith in Divine Providence would become his faith.

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V. A GENERATION OF DARWINISM.

It is now more than thirty years since Mr. Darwin published his doctrine of evolution. Even the most superficial review of this period would exhibit a more wonderful devotion to the theory of this man, a more popular following, a more noisy proclamation, than has ever been accorded to any of the great philosophers of ancient or modern times. A more critical and philosophic review would disclose a succession of groundless opinions, displaced, in turn, by others equally groundless, old ways suddenly abandoned for new paths of perilous speculation, hereditary faiths reluctantly repudiated or dishonored by false interpretations, and the infallible standard for errant and dying men subordinated to a hypothesis which never is, but always to be, verified.

How such words as these may be regarded, will depend upon several pre-conditions, such as a knowledge of the trend of religious opinion among the thinkers in our day, some knowledge of books, and of what our colleges are doing for their students; but more especially will it depend upon the nature and extent of a personal belief in the divine authority of the Bible.

Some fifteen years ago Professor Stanley Jevons wrote in his *Principles of Science:* "I cannot for a moment admit that the theory of evolution will alter our theological ideas. The precise reason why we have an erect stature, a complex brain, about two hundred and twenty-three bones, and many other peculiarities, is only to be found in the original act of creation." Had his life been prolonged ten years, he no doubt would have been greatly surprised, to read in this year of grace, the language of one of his most distinguished associates in this theory: "That the wide diffusion of the doctrine of evolution has during the past thirty years had a great effect upon religious belief is unquestionable. That it has destroyed in many minds their conviction as to God's existence, we know through our own personal experience, while a much greater number have been thus led, tacitly or avowedly, to abandon their previous belief in Christianity." Here are two ad-

vocates of evolution, the one looking forward and the other looking backward. The one has no idea of the impending change in theological opinion; the other bears witness to the change as an accomplished fact. No thinking man, who has had the opportunity to mark the spread and effect of this doctrine, doubts for a moment that its tendency is strongly opposed to Christianity. One of the leading conservative writers of the day says in reference to Darwinism: "The logical results of this view would be a mortal stab to revealed truth. It would entirely upset all the great doctrines of Scripture. It rejects the Bible order of creation, the fall of man, the nature of sin, the need of a Saviour."

A. R. Wallace, in his recent work on "Darwinism," bears witness to this change in opinion effected by Darwin. "Before his work appeared the whole literary and scientific world held firmly to the belief that *species* were realities . . . and that they had originated by some totally unknown process so far removed from ordinary re-production that it usually was spoken of as a 'special creation.' But now all this is changed . . . The idea of special creation or any other exceptional mode of production is absolutely extinct." And yet his book is confessedly written in honor of Darwin, although excepting to the doctrine of natural selection in some important particulars. Sufficient time has elapsed to discover the animus of evolution; and by evolution we mean that of Darwin, Huxley and Spencer. It has a purpose. The purpose is to remove God out of the range of our every day perceptions and of our belief. Darwin has put himself on record as to the final cause of his theory. In writing to Lyell, in 1859, on the postulate of divine agency, he says: "I cannot see its necessity; its admission would, I think, make the theory of natural selection valueless." Elsewhere, he says: "I would give absolutely nothing for the theory of natural selection if it requires miraculous additions at any one stage of descent."

The sage of Chelsea was not slow to point out the destructive aim of these men. With a fine *a priori* spirit he divines their purpose and unmasks their pretensions. "So-called and literary classes," he says, "in England now proudly give themselves to protoplasm, origin of species, and the like, to prove that God did

not build the universe. I have known three generations of the Darwins, grandfather, father and son, atheists all. The brother of the famous naturalist, a quiet man, who lives not far from here, told me that among his grandfather's effects he found a seal engraven with this legend, '*omnia ex conchis*'—'everything from a clam shell.' I saw the naturalist not many months ago; told him that I had read his *Origin of Species*, and other books; that he had by no means satisfied me that men were descended from monkeys, but had gone far toward persuading me that he and his so-called scientific brethren had brought the present generation of Englishmen very near to monkeys. A good sort of man is this Darwin, and well-meaning, but with very little intellect. Ah! it is a sad and terrible thing to see a whole generation of men and women professing to be cultivated, looking round in a purblind fashion, and finding no God in this universe! I suppose it is a reaction from the reign of cant and hollow pretence, professing to believe what in fact they do not believe. And this is what we have got; all things from frog-spawn; the gospel of dirt the order of the day. The older I grow—and I now stand on the brink of eternity—the more comes back to me the sentence in the catechism, which I learned when a child, and the fuller and deeper its meaning becomes, 'What is the chief end of man? To glorify God and to enjoy him forever.' No gospel of dirt, teaching that men have descended from frogs through monkeys, can ever set that aside." Thus writes Carlyle in a letter first published in Scotland, and reprinted in the *London Times*.

Before attending directly to the purpose in view in the preparation of this paper, it may be well to notice certain reactionary tendencies on the part of those who have, with more or less zeal, supported the evolutionary theory. Professor Joseph La Conte was wont formerly to define evolution as "a continuous progressive change according to certain laws, by means of resident forces." However accurate this description of the process may be, it is certain that this definition was intended to teach a mechanical form of development, but his most recent utterance indicates a change of position. "We must," he says, "return to the old idea of direct divine agency. We must believe in a God, not out of

our reach, not one who long ago created forces which continue in themselves to run the machine we call nature, but a God immanent, a God resident in nature at all times and in all places, directing every event and determining every phenomenon, a God in whom, in the most literal sense, not only we, but all things, have their being."

If all who profess and teach evolution would guard their instructions with similar language it would only be necessary in that case to call attention to the use of a terminology which is becoming more and more misleading.

The address of Professor Stokes last year before the University of Edinburgh marks an epoch in the history of evolution. Speaking from his high position as president of the Royal Society, he says, "The evidence appears to be utterly insufficient to establish on scientific grounds the derivation of man by continuous natural transmission from some different form of living thing. And as to a continuous development of mind leading up to the mind of man, of direct evidence we seem to have absolutely none. The evidence seems to be the other way."

More emphatic still is the language of the Berlin biologist, Professor Virchow, which has been quoted so frequently of late: "We have," he says, "sought in vain to connect man with the ape. The pro-anthropos has not been discovered; he is not even a subject for discussion; he is only a dream. At this moment we are able to say that among the peoples of antiquity no single one was any nearer to the apes than we are. At this moment I can affirm that there is not upon earth any absolutely unknown race of men. It can be positively demonstrated that in the course of five thousand years no change of type worthy of mention has taken place. Twenty years ago the leaders of our science asserted that they knew many things, which, as a matter of fact, they did not know."

Having thus introduced expert opinon in evidence of the character and present status of evolution, or, as it has been called, the theory of derivation, let us now proceed historically and exhibit something of its development and its vicissitudes. A careful and inductive survey of its history would give rise to certain moral and logical judgments, which must inevitably prove unfavorable to

it, and these in turn might be stated in the form of propositions with their appropriate proofs. For it must be confessed, even by the warmest friends of evolution, that the theory is incomplete, and that there is no prospect of its completion. Every attempt to bring the phenomena of mind under the dictum of natural selection, or to annex the realms of morals and spiritual life to their theory has proven conspicuous by its failure.

I. The errors and concessions of evolutionists tend to discredit their whole theory.

Twenty-four years ago Professor Huxley introduced to the scientific world his far-famed "Bathybius." It was his name for a transparent substance found in the beds of the deep sea. He called it living matter, an organism without organs, the father of all life in the past and which was destined to become the parent of all life in the future. The gap between the organic and the inorganic was at last to be filled. This mysterious something, matter or life, which Tyndall might have described as bearing "the promise and potency of every form and quality of life," received the great homage of science. Häckel applauded from the University of Jena. Strauss aroused himself from his dying stupor and declared in the name of "Bathybius" that educated men could no longer be Christians. For seven long years the virtues of "Bathybius" were sounded in great physical laboratories. It is true the voices of Carpenter and Beale and Mivart were raised against it. And then came the revelation. The good ship *Challenger* returned from her voyage and "Bathybius" was proclaimed with unerring certainty to be—sulphate of lime—and "crystallizes, when dissolved, like gypsum"! "Bathybius," as representing protoplasm has disappeared. It does not even appear in the index pages of the *Britannica*; Huxley has discarded it. *O, si sic omnia!*

Again, Professor Huxley has been equally unfortunate in his specifications of time. Near the close of his third lecture before his New York audience he said, "We take our time from the geologist. I have no means of guessing whether it took a million of years, or ten millions or a hundred millions or a thousand millions of years to complete these changes."

Now, it is well known, that vast periods of time have been re-

presented as necessary to the theory of evolution. In his *History of Creation*, Häckel says, that the organic history of the earth must be counted by paleontological periods, each of which comprises many thousands of years, and perhaps millions, and perhaps millions of thousands of years." And this appears evident if the doctrine of the transmutation of species is to stand any reasonable chance. The increment or decrement of change in this process of becoming is admitted on all hands to be indefinitely small. In his second lecture, Huxley affirmed that in the region of Niagara, in the superficial deposits which cover the surface of the rocks, there are found animal remains, and among them shell-fish; the latter exactly identical with the species now inhabitating the still waters of Lake Erie. He assumes that these shell-fish were living thirty thousand years ago, and he asserts that these are identical with their survivors of the same species to-day. He also declares that we find species of animals in the tertiary formations and even in the cretaceous epoch, which the closest scrutiny cannot show to be different in any important particular from those living at the present time. In this conclusion he is borne out by Cuvier, who made a comparative study of animals and corresponding parts of skeletons for the time extending over the greater part of the historic period of man. Professor Huxley admits that the conclusion of Cuvier, that no appreciable change in structure had taken place in this lapse of time, is beyond contradiction. How, then, can evolution, he asks, be tenable? In no wise, he answers except on the assumption that four thousand years, or even thirty or more thousands of years are insignificant in comparison with these vast periods of geologic time which are necessary to the transmutation of species. And it must be remembered, that neither Darwin nor Huxley allow for a moment the possibility of any breach in the continuity of natural causation. What must be thought of a theory which resorts to such desperate expedients as this, especially when it is understood that infinite time is not at their disposal, even if it would save them?

Suppose, then, we take our time from geologists and astronomers, as the evolutionists profess to do, and what have we? A geological time of some twelve or fifteen millions of years, accord-

ing to Professor Newcomb and Sir William Thomson. Will this satisfy the conditions of evolution? Certainly not, says Häckel, each geological period may contain, perhaps, "millions of thousands of years." And this is manifestly the demand of the theory, and necessary to its existence—indefinitely extended time.

Professor Huxley, when pressed with the objection that four thousand years show no appreciable change in species, takes refuge in almost immeasurable time. When geologists and astronomers reduce their time from four hundred million to less than one-tenth of this, he begs the question by affirming that evolution is true, and that the ultimate reduction of geologic time to a small finite quantity is a matter of perfect indifference. Surely this playing fast and loose with the element of time is not calculated to inspire respect for his theory of evolution!

As to the concessions of evolutionists, one paramount and determinative consideration ought to be borne in mind, *i. e.*, no proof of evolution exists. This admission, frankly offered by all who defend the hypothesis, should have great weight. No doubt it will be suggested that there are many things we believe which are not susceptible of proof. Whether evolution ought to be received into this category is just the question at issue. Undoubtedly the inductive sciences are accustomed to fill many a hiatus with deduction. Precisely how far induction should preponderate before we are entitled to fill a gap by deduction it is impossible to state in general terms. But surely science has no right to draw a conclusion outside of the premises. Of course this is freely admitted in theory; nevertheless the admission is immediately cancelled in practice. And this seems to be a prominent vice of physical science. The haste to settle premises involves hasty generalization. Induction without principle leads nowhere. Hence the inductive method requires frequent recurrence to intuitive, as distinguished from demonstrative, knowledge, and a rigid adherence to the laws of thought. Herein is reasonable safety. Beyond this lies the region of the grotesque, and wild, objectless chimera. In the inductive sciences the process of thought is from the special to the general—from many individual experiences to a general law. In the act of deduction the natu-

ralist, for instance, returns from the general law of nature to an individual case. The biologist asserts, as a great inductive law, the theory of descent, as an empirical fact, emerging from the widest possible experience. Now man, Häckel tells us, is a special case. The general inductive law of evolution being true, the derivation of man from the lower animals is a deductive law, which follows as a special and inseparable part of the inductive law. Evolutionists assert the general inductive law of the derivation of species, and then, assuming this law to be proved, assert the right to intercalate, by deduction, the special case of the derivation of man from ape-like mammals. Now, it is conceded that natural selection proceeds by exceedingly small increments or decrements, and hence can take no leaps, and that many links must have existed between man and the highest apes. It is conceded that not one of these links has been found. Here, then, is a chasm in the general law. It cannot be filled by induction. The resort is to deduction. But this is manifestly illicit except on the sole ground of the validity of the inductive law. This revives the whole question. Is the theory of the origin of species made good by the inductive law? Or is the inductive process discontinuous—*i. e.*, broken by frequent gaps which must be filled by deduction? This is certainly the fact, as is evidenced by the number of concessions which evolutionists are compelled to make. 1. That the theory of human descent from apes is the product of speculation, and not of observation. 2. That the difference between the cubic capacity of the brain of the highest ape and that of the lowest man is one-half, and further, that there is no link between the two. 3. That the eye of the trilobite, a remote fossil form, is full and perfect. 4. That the derivation of species is impossible, if the sterility of hybrids is a fact. 5. That man as well as every other animal presents structures which, so far as we can judge, are not now, nor have been at any time, of any service to him; so says Darwin, so say they all. Professor Huxley could not have been ignorant of these concessions of his associates when he said in the last of his New York lectures: "An inductive hypothesis is said to be demonstrated when the facts are shown to be in entire accordance with it. And the doctrine of evolution at

the present time rests upon exactly as secure a foundation as the Copernican theory." *Credat Judæus Apella!* Not only are not all the facts in accord with evolution, but many are conceded to be wholly against it. The list as given above, to which many other concessions could be added, is conclusive on this point. As long as these stand, all talk about an inductive argument in proof of evolution is mere declamation and would never be risked ex cept before a popular audience.

Undoubtedly naturalists discover many facts in fossil remains, in zoölogical geography, in unity of type, in rudimentary organs, and in zoölogical classification which favor the hypothesis of evolution, but when we come to consider its defects, the helpless concessions of its friends, their utterly irreconcilable statements, their failure to find intermediate forms to fill inconvenient gaps, we find abundant reason to discredit their whole argument.

II. Darwinism tends to obscure the idea of intelligent design.

Darwinism saves itself from blank atheism by describing four typical forms—mollusks, radiates, articulates, vertebrates—as representatives of creative action, and from which all species have been derived, with the reserved hypothesis, however, that even these forms may have arisen from one primordial cell.

Whether in deference to religion or to science this last view should be permitted to survive, is a question of debate; some evolutionists preferring to take refuge in spontaneous generation, which is not, but which was, rather than to posulate what Huxley calls an "inconceivable creation"; some prefer to save science at the expense of religion, while others would save both by a judicious modification of each. But this question immediately divides again on the subordinate issue, Which is more scientific, the conception of supernatural interference in nature to span bridgeless chasms, or to dismiss the supernatural altogether? It is contended that the *Deus ex machina* while adapted to the Greek mind is altogether unworthy of modern science. Some, therefore, prefer to be consistent, if anything, and proceed to out-Darwin Darwin. Others reluctantly admit divine agency into a few first terms of the series, but continue the development absolutely by means of natural selection.

Out of this confusion of opinion one result clearly appears: the retirement of creative power, either wholly, or almost wholly, from the field of nature. This statement requires no debate; it is conceded. The common theistic argument from design is superseded by a more scientific and comprehensive view of nature. Evolutionists regard this as one of their most valuable results. This view of Darwin's labors prevails with, perhaps, but one respectable exception, Professor Kölliker, whose remarks may be quoted for the purpose of introducing the critical testimony of one or two distinguished evolutionists. In seeking to define the philosophical position of Darwinism, Professor Kölliker says, "Darwin is in the fullest sense a teleologist. He says quite distinctly that every particular in the structure of an animal has been created for its benefit. The teleological general conception of Darwin is a mistaken one." Upon which Professor Huxley remarks: "It is singular how differently one and the same book will impress different minds. That which struck the present writer most forcibly on his first perusal of the *Origin of Species* was the conviction that teleology, as commonly understood, had received its death-blow at the hands of Mr. Darwin." And after demolishing Paley's watch, as he supposes, he proceeds to illustrate Darwinism in this wise: "Far from imagining that cats exist *in order* to catch mice well, Darwinism supposes that cats exist *because* they catch mice well—mousing being not the end, but the condition of their existence. . . . So far from being a teleologist in the fullest sense of the word, we should deny that he is a teleologist, in the ordinary sense, at all."

It must not be supposed from this evidence that Professor Huxley proposes to break with teleology altogether. He has a good word for teleology, but as "commonly understood" its days are numbered. When reconciled, however, to morphology by the hypothesis of Darwin, it will no longer prove false to the fundamental principles of a scientific conception of the universe. From all this we learn, that intelligent design in nature, as commonly understood, must be abandoned. It will no longer serve the theist either as an argument or as an illustration of the divine existence.

More explicit and more spirited is the testimony of Professor

G. J. Romanes, whose competence to expound evolution will nowhere be doubted. "Let us," says he, "weigh the evidence in favor of organic evolution. If we find it wanting, we need have no complaint to make of natural theologians of to-day; but if we find it to be full measure, shaken together and running over, we ought to maintain that natural theologians can no longer adhere to the arguments of such writers as Paley, Bell and Chalmers without deliberately violating the only logical principle which separates science from fetichism. To avoid misapprehension, however, I may add here that while Mr. Darwin's theory is thus in plain and direct contradiction to the theory of design, or system of teleology, as presented by the school of writers I have named, I hold that Mr. Darwin has no point of logical contact with the theory of design in the larger sense." To the small philosophers who attempt to generalize the particulars of a hypothesis which they do not understand, and to restless theologians who are ever on the alert to disport themselves in the garb of some new speculation, he administers the following implied rebuke: "Some minds, even highly cultured, unaccustomed to scientific modes of thought, make a radical misconception of the whole logical attitude of science. The objection is made merely to his (Mr. Darwin's) interpretation of the facts, because these facts might *equally well* be ascribed to intelligent design. And so undoubtedly they might, if we were all so childish as to rush into a supernatural explanation whenever a natural explanation is found sufficient to account for the facts." These extracts from two eminent naturalists evidently reveal an animus, and contain a warning. This animus is a spirit of hostility to supernaturalism. The warning is that any attempt to apply evolution to theism, as commonly understood in nature, will be resented as childish or as a return to fetichism. But I shall, no doubt, be reminded that our most respectable evolutionary literature is nevertheless theistic, regarded as a comprehensive view of the operations of nature. The answer would be that Darwinism has indeed given rise to many so-called systems of evolution, but that in so far as these systems are entitled to share in the name evolution, so far they must be held responsible for the doctrines of Darwin. The question would then recur, What

is the theistic standing of Darwinism? Manifestly the only authoritative interpretation must come from those who know it best. What do Huxley and Romanes say? The former that the doctrine of Paley has received its death-blow; the latter that natural theologians can no longer adhere to Paley and Chalmers without passing over to superstition.

Now this understanding of nature did not obtain before the time of Darwin. An atheistic view of nature seemed impossible. The book of living nature was the one unassailable text-book of the evidences. Contrivance, design, instinctive actions, pointed to God. Now all this is changed. Blind physical force comes to the front. Chance seizes upon useful variations and preserves them. Relation of variation to environment determines selection. Species are derived by eliminating the weak and conserving the strong. Purposive action is denied. The whole pull of physical science, if evolution is accepted, is away from God. And this certainly must have been Darwin's view when he wrote to Lyell: "I would give absolutely nothing for natural selection if it requires miraculous additions *at any one stage* of descent."

As a philosophy, evolution neither has, nor can have, any standing. It professes to explain the universe, including man, science and religion. But environment is treated as if it were no part of nature. Also the processes of reproduction, death and survival, are considered independently of their ground. This process, together with the proposed environment, requires a metaphysical basis, and it is precisely this basis which evolution cannot provide. And the reason is obvious. The evolutionary hypothesis demands, in order to a philosophical standing, a regress of thought to a beginning, a first term, which must be conceived as actuated by supernatural or spontaneous agency. The latter results in intellectual suicide, the former, it is said, in superstition! Hence evolution treats us to a groundless show upon a groundless environment.

But surely, it may be replied, the system of Spencer, reflected as it is in modern scientific thought, must be regarded as an exception. By no means. It illustrates our position. It is not necessary to attack his system in detail. It wrecks itself on its own inner contradictions. It posits two factors, matter and force. What

is this force? A spectre, blind, objectless, unintelligent — a mere physical activity. Were there no mind, no will in our experience to be accounted for, his system, no doubt, would achieve a grand philosophic unity. But mind is a fact. Between mind and matter is a logical chasm. This Mr. Spencer admits. Yet from his two factors, mind must somehow be obtained. He therefore resorts to the desperate expedient of deducing mind from a premise which contains no mind.

Then as to will. He rightly maintains the Cartesian doctrine of consciousness as the underlying principle of certainty. On this sure ground we also affirm the freedom of the will. He denies this. His denial springs from the necessity of his system, otherwise he must deny the "persistence of force." He therefore discredits consciousness of freedom to save his determining principle. Thus, in evolving mind and will from matter—order from mechanical unintelligence, he discredits himself, and falls a prey to the unavoidable contradictions of his philosophy. His ethical system is utterly baseless. His *Data of Ethics* and *Justice*, divorced from freedom and conscience are simply a dream. His evolution of a perfect society is as groundless in philosophy as it is inconsistent with observation and experience. In following the doctrine of evolution, he obscures intelligent design. He thus fails in logical unity, and his whole system, vast as it is ambitious, falls, on examination, into hopeless incoherence.

III. The doctrine of evolution tends to obscure Christianity.

This, of course, follows from the preceding proposition. It is plain that whatsoever is antitheistic is also antichristian. But the converse is by no means true. Many persons assault Christianity who exhibit no hostility to theistic doctrine. Thus we distinguish two tendencies, differing in their strength and their effects. Under adverse influences, other things being equal, Christianity must suffer more than theism. This is obvious when we consider the greater number of assailable points which it offers. Before the advent of the *Origin of Species* by Darwin, physical science as written and as taught, seemed always on the side of design and contrivance, and therefore impliedly in the interests of theistic belief. Natural theology was considered to be a strong support of

Christianity The organisms which the naturalists described, and the functions which the anatomists brought to light became at once the capital of the natural theologian to illustrate his theme. Now, the latter will have science to reckon with if he undertakes to prove design by facts drawn from the storehouse of nature. Thus religion has suffered in what was formerly the house of its friends. There has been a defection from accustomed standards, which is without parallel in the history of religious opinion. Says Professor Mivart: "We know no records which show us that the change from geocentric to heliocentric astronomy was accompanied by anything like the religious devastation which has attended the promulgation and wide acceptance of the doctrine of evolution," and again: "It is a fact within our personal knowledge, that a certain number of young men have assigned evolution as the reason why they gave up Christainity; while it is notorious that opponents of that religion have loudly proclaimed the incompatibility of evolution therewith."

This evidence from a friend of evolution is significant. Its occasion should be noticed. He is preparing the way not to sacrifice evolution, but to destroy natural selection. He proposes to show how a doctrine, professedly evil, can be made innocuous. On what grounds a theory which has no justification in experience is worth saving, he fails to explain. He does, however, confess that "not one single instance of evolution can be demonstrated to have occurred." By evolution he here means, of course, Darwinism, in which natural selection plays a dominant part; this term being applied to a supposed process of nature whose destructive and preservative influences are maintained by a mere sightless and purposeless force. Nevertheless, this force selects and preserves all useful variations, themselves accidental, and rejects all those less favorably developed in the struggle for existence. In this way species are conceived to have originated. If it is inquired as to the cause of these variation, the answer is, chance. If a reason is asked why the destructive forces of nature fall on these less perfected variations, we are told that the fittest survives. If we ask for the law or purpose, we are informed that purposive law is a mistaken conception of nature, or that it is unknown,

or unnecessary. Physical force, other organisms and environment, to the exclusion of mind, account for the selection of different kinds. No wonder that Mivart, many years ago, called this a "puerile hypothesis" Failing, therefore, to account for evolution which he still maintains, and which he sometimes calls "a fact," and sometimes "a speculation without proof," he proposes a solution of his own. He attempts to put evolution on a metaphysical basis, by positing in nature, in every form of life, especially in all lower animals, a progressive spirit, analogous to the human spirit—a life whose becoming continually transcends itself. That is to say, objects of sense must be interpreted from the side of the self-conscious spirit rather than from the side of sense perceptions. He illustrates his theme by reference to the genesis and growth of the body. The mind also exhibits an ever-increasing variety of modes of being. Change follows change. The man is more than the boy. There is a real psychogenesis due to an internal force, and this he describes as evolution. But Mivart strangely forgets that change and variety are not inconsistent with identity. He must know that he can never escape from himself. Out of the past and present he can never fail, by self-consciousness and memory, to constitute his own oneness of personality. The *ego* remains the *ego*. And as there is no consciousness of ancestors, he can never know by any metaphysical process that his selfhood has been differentiated from his progenitors. Thus his argument is barren of result; so far from affording any probability in favor of evolution, it recoils upon himself.

But this Proteus-like theory escapes all restraint. No argument can bind it. Like the demoniac of the tombs, it seems possessed of many desperate spirits which drive it everywhere but into the abyss. Morals, society, religion must be subjected to its authority. Students of physical science make it a term of communion among themselves. Its compulsory demands warn the recalcitrant. The fear of losing caste keeps men silent. And why do we object? Because its fruits are sufficiently apparent. The tree is not good. And if the fruit is corrupt we are entitled to lay the axe at its root. Perhaps if man were not implicated in evolution, we might consent, as Professor Tyndall suggests, to the derivation of animal

and vegetable life from inorganic nature. But such exception would necessarily leave the theory incomplete. It, therefore, enters the field of anthropology, and teaches, so far as it may possibly be regarded as theistic, the remoteness of God from man.

(*a*), Christianity teaches the nearness of God to man. "Wherefore if God so clothe the grass of the field which to-day is and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?" Here the doctrine seems to be that even the ephemeral life of the grass is *to-day* made the intimate concern of God. In opposition to this let us hear Romanes: "The law of parsimony constitutes the only logical barrier between science and superstition. For it is manifest that it is always possible to give a hypothetical explanation of any phenomenon whatever, by referring it immediately to the intelligence of some supernatural agent; so that the only difference between the logic of science and the logic of superstition consists in science recognizing a validity in the law of parsimony which superstition disregards." Ordinarily evolutionists do not regard the providence of God worthy of notice. Even the doctrine of creation appears as a vanishing quantity. Thus again Tyndall: "Diminishing gradually the number of progenitors, Mr. Darwin comes at length to one primordial form; but he does not say, as far as I can remember, how he supposes this form to have been introduced."

In opposition to this, Paul taught from Mars Hill: "God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth . . . giveth to all life and breath and all things; and hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him, though he be not far from every one of us." When we consider that the nearness of the Heavenly Father, who "knoweth that ye have need of all these things" is the rock of confidence which Christ offers to his disciples, and that this is the foundation upon which it becomes possible for them to secure "the kingdom of God and his righteousness," and compare this teaching with the notion of evo-

lution, our moral judgment and our moral feeling revolt against it, as untenable as it is unchristian.

Professor Tyndall told his Belfast hearers, "If to any one of us were given the privilege of looking back through the æons across which life has crept towards its present outcome, his vision would ultimately reach a point when the progenitors of this assembly could not be called human." This is sound Darwinism which finds evidence, it is said, to make it demonstrably certain that man must be placed in structural unity with the rest of the animal world, and more especially and closely with the apes. In the discussion of man's moral nature and mental faculties, Mr. Darwin's argument tends to the conclusion that mind, howsoever or wheresoever exhibited, has been derived from its rudiments in the lower animals, in the same manner and by the action of the same general laws which mark the development of his physical structure.

As this contradicts Scripture it cannot be true. The first chapter of Genesis takes us back to the beginning of things. At the very outset of organic life, animal and vegetable, each is represented as bringing forth after its kind. Here we are introduced not to primordial cells and protoplasm, but to cattle and fowls and creeping things, distinct from one another. Over these man is created to have dominion. He is further distinguished, in creation, by the image and likeness of his maker, as his crowning dignity. He is also differenced from the brutes by his destiny. The spirit of the one returns to God who gave it—that of the other goeth downward to the earth. Over such a creation we should expect to hear its Author exclaim not only that the sparrow's fall is noticed by the Father, but that the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Christianity accepts the Bible as true, and is itself true only upon this ground. Revelation is not subject to the doctrine of evolution, neither indeed can be. Hence it is taught, not wisely but too well, that if Bible doctrine cannot be brought into harmony with evolution, such failure proves revelation unworthy of credit! To secure this harmony, sundry theologians have set themselves to the task of showing how Scripture can be made to converge upon evolution. Some, more wise than their fathers, have ventured to assert that the human body may have been derived

from the lower animals. Such an assertion is both groundless and gratuitous. It is groundless since there is no evidence to justify it—it is gratuitous since theologians are not set for the defence of the theories of physical science. As to the motive for their zeal only an unavoidable surmise remains, and this would be unwise and perhaps uncharitable to express.

(*b*), Again, evolution finds itself in direct antithesis with the fact that Christianity teaches the possibility of miracles. Evolutionists do not insist upon the absolute exclusion of the supernatural from the universe, neither do they defer at all to the claims of Christianity. Mr. Darwin suddenly becomes metaphysical, and assumes that continuity must be the law of the universe. He then proceeds to verification by attempting to show that all the rudimentary forms of nearly all the faculties of mind are discoverable in some animals. He makes a wide induction of particulars, embracing instances of animal memory, wonder, shame, kindness, etc., as manifestations of intelligence. A sense of beauty also, and even evidences of incipient religion are noticeable. In this manner he arrives by a continuous development to the phenomena of savage life. Darwin holds with Spencer that the moral sense arises from the exigencies of life and the social instincts. Then follow the mental struggles incident even to society in its lowest estate—then conscience and the elementary principles of morality.

The continuity of structure and adjustment of man's physical nature must necessarily be followed by a corresponding development of his mental nature. And it is described with great care as proceeding by small increments from the lower animals up to savages, and from savages up to man in his highest estate. It is progression without a break, and, since continuity holds equally in vegetable life, the presumption against miracles amounts almost to a demonstration. Of course such an event as a miracle could not be so much as named among evolutionists, at least if the following remark of Wallace can be verified: "The whole scientific and literary world, even the whole educated public, accepts as a matter of common knowledge the origin of species from other allied species by the ordinary process of natural birth." The

ground taken by Wallace in his *Darwinism* reflects undoubtedly the position of evolutionists who, by the nature of their studies, have a right to the name. And it is his opinion that the idea of special creation, or any other altogether exceptional mode of production, is absolutely extinct.

It needs no argument to show that if special creation is inadmissible, much more so, in consistency, are the miracles of Christ. But the proof of Christianity is suspended upon his moral and physical miracles, and he is himself the greatest of miracles. But perhaps it will be said that there are forms of evolution which certainly are not antitheistic, and may be interpreted in favor of Christianity. In regard to this statement two important facts should be noticed: First, every theory finds its best explanation and ultimate definition in its chief representatives; second, Darwinism as represented by Huxley, Spencer, and Wallace has won the day, along the line of average academic thought. What, then, should be the attitude of Christianity? This paper has sought to answer the question. No student of physics need fear that a denial of evolution is a denial of any ascertained truth of science, and no believer in Christian doctrine need hesitate to repudiate the whole theory of evolution in the name of the infallible word of God.

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VI. GEORGE ELIOT.

Her Portrayal of Religious Characters.

No one can read the writings of George Eliot without being struck with the frequently recurring types of religious character in her novels. Not only in *Scenes of Clerical Life*, where the title would lead us to expect them, but scattered all through her writings, especially those of her earlier years, her use of the religious type of character is as distinctive an element in her work as the rare skill which she displays in the analysis of motive and purpose. Her greatness as a novelist lies in her clear insight into human nature, and her marvellous fidelity in portraying that nature without exaggeration or distortion.

She has a passion for unfolding the gradual development of some particular feature in a character, which finally becomes the dominant trait in that soul. At first, a mere tendency, half-formed and wavering, it gathers strength as it is swayed by outward circumstances, until it assumes the place of a fixed habit, which enlarges and gains portentous strength, until, like some overshadowing fate, it hurries away at its own will the soul now blind and unresisting.

If we compare George Eliot with two other recent masters of fiction, Dickens and Thackeray, as to the presence of this religious motive in their works, we will see how large a place it occupies with her.

There is very little religion in Thackeray's novels—still less in those of Dickens. The latter caricatures, now and then, some vulgar religious pretender, or uses hypocrisy as a darker shade with which to blacken some odious character. But the portrayal of a deep, earnest, religious nature, swayed by tempests of passion, and, at times, well-nigh overthrown by human frailty, was far beyond his power. It was not in the soul of the man, and it could not, therefore, come out of him. Take his kindly, charitable people, and they are all secondary and shadowy personages

with little flesh and blood, as compared with his odd, or his criminal characters.

Thackeray has little place in his novels for the religious sentiment. His nobler characters, like Henry Esmond and Colonel Newcome, are somewhat stiff and stately; but we do not see down into the depth of their souls, and sympathize with their struggles against weakness and evil. Thackeray's sphere of observation is the "Vanity Fair" of this world. Would you see its hollowness exposed, its false pretences shown up, its foibles and follies laid bare to all eyes, you have only to follow the guidance of this master of satire. Your own shoulders may wince at times under the stroke of his cutting lash, but we cannot deny that he lets in a flood of light on all the inner springs of modern fashionable life. But are there many of Thackeray's women whom we can heartily respect or love? Does he not seem to treat the best of them with a pitying fondness, as if, after all, they were poor, weak, creatures from whom no strength of character could be expected?

Wonderful as he is in his knowlege of the world, and powerful as a preacher against shams, he is more an iconoclast than a hero-worshipper, and a better expounder of society as an organized whole than of the secret windings of one humble human heart.

Dickens has little skill in depicting mixed characters. He rarely attempts to analyse the growth of some trait, at first indifferent in its moral character, but deteriorating gradually as it trends toward the base and selfish side of our nature. His characters come on the stage duly labelled, classified, and consistent all through with a fixed type. They are personified virtues, vices, oddities or sentiments, but that is all. Take them as you will, they are like the prophet's figs, the good, very good, and the naughty, very naughty. Pecksniff is a walking embodiment of hypocrisy, Mark Tapley is cheerfulness in human form, Agnes is always prim, pure and perfect, Micawber always gushing and expectant, and Uriah Heep always crawling and deceitful. When you once know these people, you can rely with certainty on what they will do under all circumstances.

Thackeray stops as he pulls the strings of his puppets to moralize on their follies. Perhaps there is too much of this

preaching, if we judge him merely as an artist. But he means to be more than an artist, and does not hesitate to set aside many of the so-called canons of art. He writes with a purpose and a meaning, and if you are too dull to apprehend it he will come from behind the scenes to impress it on you.

George Eliot does very little of this preaching, except in brief paragraphs which seem more like comments on actual events than lessons which her characters are designed to bring out. The lesson she has to teach is impressed by the development of her characters, and they become such real flesh and blood creatures to us, that we find it quite natural to ponder on their destiny or their influence. And among the varied types of human beings, those of a decided religious character seem to have the greatest interest for her. Religious motives and feelings are recognized by her as among the most powerful forces which act upon the character, and in all fiction no finer studies of these types are to be found. Take her portraits of Dinah, of Seth and Adam Bede, of Savonarola and his power over Romola, or the spiritual aspirations of Dorothea Brooke, as contrasted with the one-sided, dry, intellectual creed of Casaubon, or the half-unconscious hypocrisy of Bulstrode; and how true to life they all are! How clearly has she looked into some of the deepest recesses of the human heart! It is said that her books are disappointing and dreary, that her characters break down in the most unexpected places, and that they are not consistent with their own high ideals.

But in this is to be found their consistency with actual life. Who of us is always consistent with his own ideal? Who does not learn from life this very lesson of disappointment, arising from our perception of sadly mixed motives in those persons in whom we have believed most fully? It is much the same picture that Thackeray sets before us, but painted in somewhat different colors, and lit up by another atmosphere.

The interest which George Eliot takes in religious types of character seems to find its best explanation in the fact that she herself possessed a deeply religious nature; while her prevailing tone of sadness and even despondency, in her later books, may be owing to the fact that her religious nature craved nourishment which

it never received, because her intellect was over-clouded by doubt. And perhaps the break-down in her characters, and their failure to realize their own high ideals, may be an echo out of her own life, caused by the step which she took in her relation to George Henry Lewes.

George Eliot, or rather Miss Evans, had a deep, earnest, religious nature. There was a spirituality in her which made her turn, even in her unbelief, to the contemplation of spiritual things. She was much more truly religous than some whose easy Christianity never takes any hold upon their nature, and whose shallow and selfish lives declare that no true idea of religion has ever dawned upon their minds. We can but feel a deep sympathy with a nature so deep, so earnest, and so unsatisfied as hers, and our judgment of her life-work is full of the wish that she might have had a clearer light upon her earthly path. In her treatment of religion there is no shade of irreverence. She does, indeed, disclose the ugliness of hypocrisy, and show how far a soul may fall below the standard which it seeks to attain; but there *is* a standard which she respects, although she had lost her faith in the great motives which lead to seeking it.

Those of her characters who are represented as striving after the right and the true, are among the noblest and purest forms in literature. No shadow of doubt in their sincerity, no sneer at human inconsistency, no attempt to throw discredit on their religion by their failure to embody it in perfection, is to be detected in her writings. They may fail, and *do* fail often; but she does not say with a sneer, "See! this is what must be expected from those who dream of the impossible." Rather does she mourn, with the sorrow of a generous nature, over that weakness of humanity which makes these failures inevitable.

There was a time in Miss Evans' history when she was distinctively and entirely Christian. But she reached that stage of mental development when the intellect discovers that there are doubts and difficulties in the way of faith. This crisis is not inevitably followed by unbelief, but when the mental struggle is over our faith is stronger; for now we believe, not through ignorance of the difficulties of belief, but from a knowledge of the greater difficulties of unbelief.

Many an earnest Christian has had this same struggle to encounter, and it has come upon some who afterwards have been most active and sincere in their defence of religious truth. But Miss Evans seems to have lacked, just at this time, some friend intellectually strong enough to meet her doubts honestly, and able to convince her of their futility. Those who defended her former faith used arguments which she could but feel to be puerile, while those to whom she turned for light were seeking some new and better way. These later friends directed her attention to the freshest and most formidable school of German criticism. She applied herself to the translation of Strauss' *Life of Jesus*, and this was followed by a translation of Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*. This was tough spiritual meat for a young maiden, not long out of her teens. To her active and gifted mind there was a great attraction in this contact with men of learning and powerful intellect, although, under their withering touch, all the fair blossoms of faith seemed to droop and decay. The very title of the *Positive* Philosophy had a charm for her earnest nature. Is it any wonder, that with Strauss apparently resolving the whole story of the founder of Christianity into a slender background of history, with a surrounding atmosphere of clouds and myths and imaginative coloring; while on the other hand the Positivists announced that they had touched bottom in metaphysical speculation—is it any wonder that she should turn from myth and shadow, as she supposed, to substance and reality?

Yet many earnest seekers after religious truth have gone as far and farther than she did then, and yet returned to the stand-point of simple faith. Charles Kingsley was thus "perplexed in faith and pure in deeds," for a long time; and we find abundant evidence of the questioning spirit of the age in Alfred Tennyson.

Hand in hand with this loss of faith went that error in life, arising from her relation to George Henry Lewes. Upon this delicate subject let us speak honestly and plainly. It was not an indifferent action, and while we may hesitate to lay to her charge any conscious wrong-doing in the matter, it is hard to believe that she did not sin against her own better judgment and her deeper convictions. However we admire her genius and respect her

ethical teaching, we must always be perplexed and disappointed by this act. If she was free of any evil in intention and conscience, we cannot deny that it was anomalous and illegal. Lewes had a wife living, from whom it was impossible to obtain a divorce, and any legal marriage with Miss Evans was out of the question. Yet he offered to her what he was pleased to call marriage, and she, after learning all the facts, accepted the proposal. Some sort of a ceremony was gone through with, which, we are told, satisfied her conscience, and she was ever afterward, until her second marriage, known by courtesy as "Mrs. Lewes." No wonder that this step saddened and shocked her former friends. Is marriage a subject to be left entirely to the individual conscience, however enlightened? Leaving out of consideration the precepts of Christ and the laws based directly on them, which she would claim had lost their significance for her, had she a right to set herself in defiance of the laws of the state, and the strong, unanimous opinion of the vast majority of her fellow-men?

It is a dangerous precedent for a great genius to claim exemption from those laws which control the lives of less highly gifted men and women. Those who set themselves up as teachers of mankind, whether openly claiming such a title or not, should take heed to their own course, and walk as they direct others.

There was one great soul in the past, a quaint, homely, gifted teacher of mankind, who has left an enduring example of the reverence felt by the highest natures for the majesty of law.

In that scene, immortalized by the genius of Plato, where Socrates, condemned to an unjust death, is wakened at the early dawn by his friend Crito, with the offer of an escape from his doom, the philosopher rejects the offer on the ground that he cannot violate the laws of his city simply because they turn now, even though unjustly, against himself. He who believed so firmly in the voice of God speaking in his own breast, yet seems to see the laws embodied before him in the prison, and to hear them pleading with him not to lessen their authority by his own transgression. How that earnest voice, through all the centuries, has rung out of the darkness of that prison, nerving the soul to tread unflinching and uncomplaining the rugged path of duty! Nay, let us hear George Eliot herself on this point:

"Where is the rebel's right for you alone?
Noble rebellion lifts a common load;
But what is he who flings his own load off,
And leaves his fellows toiling?
Say, rather, the deserter's!"

"It is certainly curious," says Miss Blind in her little book on *George Eliot*, "that the woman who had in her own life followed such an independent course, severing herself in many ways from her past with all its traditional sanctities, should yet so often inculcate the very opposite teaching in her works; should inculcate an almost slavish adherence to whatever beliefs, surroundings, and family ties a human being may be born to." But is this so strange? Is not this deliberate utterance of an honest woman the real judgment of her true and better self? Is it not significant that this very subject of marriage should be treated in so serious and thoughtful a strain in all her works? How clearly she brings out the truth that a mistake here may be the warping of a whole life! Romola and Tito, Dorothea and Mr. Casaubon, Adam in his love for the shallow little Hetty, Lydgate and Rosamond Vincy are all types of ill-assorted couples; while in *Middlemarch* the contrast between Mary Garth's fine influence over Fred Vincy sets off his pretty selfish sister's ruin of her gifted husband. And what abject misery does Gwendolen bring on herself by her match deliberately made for wealth and luxury!

Not one hint is ever given in George Eliot's books that it is well or wise or justifiable in man or woman to despise the lowliest duty which is laid on them by our common lot. Reverence for truth, loyalty to duty, continuance in the humble path of order, these are the lessons most frequently inculcated. And what are we to think of her second and speedy marriage to Mr. Cross, if her whole heart had been laid in the grave with Lewes? A woman of sixty is not apt to be hurried by the fickleness and ardor of youth into such a connection; and in *this* case, all the outward sanctities of marriage were observed.

Another prominent feature in George Eliot's novels brings out her clinging womanly nature. Her characters are often represented as seeking some one on whom they may lean for help and guidance. Deronda becomes "an embodied conscience" to Gwendolen Har-

court; Dorothea turns to Mr. Casaubon because she thinks his great intellect will direct her spiritual aspirations; Dinah brings strength to poor weak Hetty in her distress; and Romola, after discovering her husband's baseness, seeks a director in Savonarola. But side by side with this longing for help, we find taught the weakness of all the sources from which that help is sought. One after another these helpers fail and disappoint the soul that leans upon them. Either their own weakness and inefficiency bring fresh sorrow to the trusting heart, or the circumstances of life interpose some barrier which keeps them forever apart. It is a sad lesson, a dreary outlook, if this were truly all of life. Culture, philosophy, intellect, and genius—what do they avail in the presence of those darker shadows which must fall at times upon every human soul!

There is one figure, patient in suffering, and perfect in obedience, who moves in the clear light of truth, across the stage of human history. To Him, many hearts who have found their earthly idols but clay, their earthly props but broken reeds, have turned in the hour of disappointment for help and consolation.

In Ary Scheffer's great picture, the weary and suffering souls of earth are grouped around that gracious figure. The slave lifts his shackled hands in supplication, the mother lays her dead baby at his feet, the helpless turn their pleading gaze to him, and the dying smile as the light of his countenance irradiates the dark valley. Yet, as of old, even so now is it true, that in that little company, not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty are found. While the ignorant and the oppressed turn to him for consolation; while the weak and obscure rest on his arm, too often some of the gifted sons and daughters of mankind pursue the flickering *ignis fatuus* which guides them no whither, and sheds not one fitful gleam of light upon the sullen stream of death.

Out of the heart of revelation echoes the sad voice of the doubter who rings his perpetual refrain over all the coveted objects of human life: "The thing that hath been it is that which shall be, and that which is done is that which shall be done, and there is no new thing under the sun. * * * For in much wisdom is much grief, and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow!"

W. S. Bean.
Sumter Co., S. C.

VII. NOTES.

THE TRIAL OF PROFESSOR SMITH.

The gravity of the questions which have been at issue recently before the Presbyteries of Cincinnati and New York is indicated by the character and the extent of the interest with which the proceedings have been followed. Of course the accused, whose ministerial standing was at stake, and their presbyteries, whose fidelity to Scripture and to the standards was supposed to be compromised, had the first interest in the result; but in the church at large, communicants as well as presbyters were impressed with a common sense of responsibility. For once at least the arbitrary lines which divide the church were forgotten and its unity was realized in the concern and anxiety which pervaded it throughout. Beyond even these wide limits, that interest spread not only to the various evangelical churches, but to religious bodies of all sorts, and to men who were unattached religiously. Sermons were delivered, addresses were made, interviews were published, all bearing upon the one theme, and presenting, of course, conflicting views, which were more or less coherent and pertinent; while all classes of society freely and copiously commented and criticized, as the stages of the proceedings were passed, one by one.

The only explanation of this genuine popular interest is the instinctive recognition of the gravity of the issue. The busy world cannot pause long for mere questions of ecclesiastical detail; conscientious members of Christian churches find enough ordinarily within their own spheres to absorb their interest and their effort without busying themselves about the progress or the difficulties of sister churches; popular sympathy with those who are at variance with ecclesiastical authority is local and transient; and the only satisfactory explanation of the widespread interest is that the issue really affected all Christian churches alike, and raised questions which even irreligious men had long conceded to be settled forever. The Bible, rather than the men, or the church, was felt to be on trial, and for this reason, the men

supposed to assail it and the church supposed to defend it were brought into a factitious prominence. It was in vain that the accused denied a purpose to impair the authority of the Bible, and that the church denied that that authority could be impaired; it was in vain, that, with some impatience, this widespread interest was deprecated as an interference with the internal affairs of the church: the issue was fixed in the public mind, and it could not be dislodged. How far the public mind was right, will, from one standpoint, be made evident in these pages, which are set apart for a note on the trial of Professor H. P. Smith by the Presbytery of Cincinnati.

That trial was in keeping with the gravity of the interests involved. It continued through eighteen days and covered a month of time. It raised questions of doctrine and the history of doctrine, of exegesis and hermeneutics, of ecclesiastical ethics and jurisprudence. It has left behind it a mass of material[1] that deserves careful study by those who would form a reliable judgment of the issue.

The History of the Case.

The occasion of this trial was partly an address delivered by Professor Smith before the Presbyterian Ministerial Association of Cincinnati, on March 31, 1891, at its invitation, and in view of the then recent utterances of Professor Briggs. When the invitation was extended to Professor Smith, he suggested that his colleague, Dr. Evans, be included, which was agreed to, and accordingly, on two successive Mondays, the Association listened to Professor Evans, whose paper had been prepared as part of a discussion in Presbytery, "on the

[1] The pamphlet *Biblical Scholarship and Inspiration* covers one hundred and twenty-six pages and the indictment thirty-one pages octavo; the *Response*, *Rejoinder* and *Argument* of Professor Smith, one hundred and sixty-two pages octavo; the preliminary arguments of the Prosecuting Committee, one hundred and fifty-four typewritten foolscap pages; the argument of one member of the committee, on the merits of the case, ninety pages octavo of closely written matter; the minutes of the court, one hundred and eight pages folio. The best report published, that of *The Independent*, extends through seven issues and fills thirty columns, equal to one hundred pages octavo. Just as these pages are finished, a volume appears, entitled *Inspiration and Inerrancy, a History and a Defence*, by Henry Preserved Smith, Professor in Lane Seminary, Cincinnati; Robert Clarke & Co., 1893, pp. 374. It contains, in addition to the writings of Professor Smith referred to above, chapters on "The Situation," "The Occasion," "The Debate," "Action Proposed," in which a full, and, from the author's standpoint, a correct history of the movement which culminated in his trial is given.

relation of the General Assembly to the teaching of Biblical criticism in our theological seminaries," and by courtesy of the Association "delivered there instead of in the Presbytery"; and afterwards, on one Monday, to Professor Smith. These papers were published in a pamphlet, entitled *Biblical Scholarship and Inspiration*, which has reached a third edition. The Presbytery of Cincinnati, on December 21, 1891, adopted a resolution, approving of the action concerning the Scriptures taken by the Assembly, which had been in session at Detroit during the month of May, and appointing a committee "to have this subject under consideration, and report at the next stated meeting what further action, if any, should be taken by this Presbytery."

Parallel with the action of Presbytery and necessary to the history of the case was the action of the Board of Trustees of Lane Theological Seminary, in which for seventeen years Professor Smith has occupied the chair of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis. The Board is a self-perpetuating body and draws its membership from all parts of Ohio and Indiana. It is composed of ministers, elders, and private members of the Presbyterian Church, although it has sometimes elected to membership Congregational ministers. It reports annually to the Assembly, but, like some other seminaries, its relations to the Assembly are not very clearly defined. On March 15, 1892, the Board gave consideration to the "petition" of twenty-six ministers, members of the Presbytery of Cincinnati, which recited the foregoing action of Presbytery, and suggested that the Board "take such action as it deemed wise in the premises, with a view to obtaining the indorsement of the Presbytery and that prosperity to the Seminary which all its friends desire"; and also to a paper, signed by four of the professors, in which they took occasion "to subscribe individually to the foregoing formula,[1] and hereby declare anew our full purpose to observe faithfully all the terms and

[1] In the presence of God and of the trustees of this Seminary, I declare my belief in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as the word of God, and the only infallible rule of faith and practice.

I receive also and adopt the Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures.

I likewise approve and engage to support the government and discipline of the Presbyterian Church in these United States, and to be zealous and faithful in my endeavors to maintain the peace and purity of the church.

And also to qualify those young men who may be under my care, to explain, defend and apply the truths of the gospel.

conditions contained in this covenant, and to teach nothing that is contrary thereto"; and also a communication from the fifth professor, Dr. Roberts, saying that he was ready to take the pledge, *ex animo*, at any time appointed by official authority, adding that the question confronting him as a professor, in connection with the pledge, "is not concerned with the form of words found therein, but with the meaning of said words."

The action of the Board upon these papers was as follows:

"The Board appreciates and heartily commends the desire and purpose of the members of Faculty in the communication just submitted, and in view thereof it is

"*Resolved*, That this Board is fully assured that the obligations expressed in this 'Formula of Inauguration' are, and will be, faithfully recognized by the members of the Faculty, and that nothing is now taught in the seminary, or will be taught in the future, that would tend to impair the faith of the students in the Scriptures as the word of God, or to lessen their loyalty to the system of doctrine and duty embodied in the standards of our church."

Further, it was ordered that copies of this "be furnished members of the Presbytery of Cincinnati." No formal answer to the "petition" appears to have been adopted. In accepting the resignation of Professor Evans the Board resolved, among other things:

"That we also testify our high appreciation of his Christian learning, fidelity and courage as an eminent and conscientious teacher of God's word, knowing as we do his abiding confidence in, and love for, 'the faith once delivered to the saints.'"

About this time, there appeared two newspaper articles, dealing with the question, How much is implied in ordination vows? signed by Professor Smith.[1] These, together with the address referred to above, were the occasion of the trial.

[1] It was privately reported during the progress of the trial that there was no significance in the appearance of these articles at the time at which they were published. The first article was said to have been written months before and to have been held during that time by the editors, so that Professor Smith was himself surprised by its appearance. This report, however, was not confirmed by Professor Smith. The second article was written in answer to criticisms upon the first. Now that the trial is over, Professor Smith breaks his very honorable reserve and says: "None the less have I had occasion to regret the publication of the articles. They were at once seized upon as an attempt on my part to justify myself for remaining in the church after I had consciously departed from its system of doctrine. . . . . They gave impetus in fact to the movement in Presbytery, and gave occasion to what was to me the most painful of the charges brought afterward by the prosecution."—*Inspiration and Inerrancy*, p. 175.

The report of the Committee of Presbytery appointed December 21, 1891, was ready at the spring meeting of Presbytery, April 19, 1892, but it was not presented because of the illness of Professor Smith's son; nor at the next stated meeting, June 20, 1892, because of his absence abroad, and also because "Professor Smith may soon place himself in such relation to the Presbyterian Church and its teachings, as will be satisfactory to the Presbytery and the church at large, and thus avoid the necessity for further proceedings." At the stated meeting, September 21st, the report was presented, consisting of two parts, in one of which it was recommended that process be instituted against Professor Smith, and in the other that the endorsement of Presbytery be withheld from Lane Seminary until the teachings of its Faculty were in harmony with the deliverances of the Assembly. The first part of the report was taken up, and after full discussion and by a vote of forty-two to sixteen, a Committee of Prosecution was appointed and directed to present charges and specifications at a meeting of Presbytery to be held October 17th. On that day the committee presented its report, a copy was served upon Professor Smith, and the summons was made returnable on November 14th, all rights under the statute of limitations having previously been waived by him.

The Procedure.

The contrast between ecclesiastical and secular procedure came out very forcibly during the trial, and there was the usual effort to exalt the latter at the expense of the former, and to reason from what the one is to what the other ought to be. It was, however, soon made clear that secular procedure was as rigorously barred as the procedure of one State would be in the courts of another State. The procedure which is adapted to criminals is not needed among professing Christians, especially among Christian ministers; that which is calculated to dispose of person or property is no guide to that which is designed to affect the conscience and to determine ecclesiastical relations; and that which is necessary in courts whose daily business it is to try cases is not in any sense a standard for courts which sit judicially but once or twice in a generation. The church has never been put to the necessity of constructing an elaborate penal code, and, while the lack of precedents and of authorities is perplexing when a judicial case is before it, that very lack is indirect testimony to the infrequency with which such cases arise. Substantial justice can be secured by the constitutional procedure, and beyond this the church need not go.

The procedure under which the trial was had differed in some important particulars from that which is in force in the Southern Church. The procedure of 1821 remained in the Southern Church until 1879, and in this, until 1884. It would be interesting to trace these variations from a common stock throughout, but it is essential to a fair understanding of this trial that they be noted so far as they bear upon the case. These variations are:

Presbyterian Church, U. S. A.	Presbyterian Church, U. S.
1. *Object of Process.*	
§ 4. Nothing which cannot be proved to be contrary to the Holy Scriptures, or to the regulations and practice of the church founded thereon.	§ 152. Nothing which cannot be proved to be an offence from Scripture as interpreted in these standards.
2. *Proceedings upon Return of Citation.*	
§ 22. Objections may be filed to regularity of organization, jurisdiction of judicatory, sufficiency of charges and specifications in form and legal effect. Judicatory determines and may dismiss, or permit amendments.	§ 174. Charges read to the accused if present, who then is called on to say whether he is guilty or not.
3. *Effect of an Expression of Opinion.*	
	§ 188. Pending the trial, any member expressing an opinion on the merits to either party or to any person not a member of the court is disqualified.
4. *Minutes of the Trial.*	
	§ 189. "All the testimony" in addition to other items specified by both procedures.
5. *Definition of Censures.*	
§ 40. Admonition, rebuke, suspension, [which may issue after one year in] deposition, excommunication.	§§ 156, 158. Admonition, definite suspension, indefinite suspension, deposition, excommunication. A higher censure may be inflicted if a lower fails to reclaim.
6. *Rights of Members in the Higher Courts.*	
§ 70 ff. Lost in review and control, complaint and appeal; not lost in reference.	§ 239. Not lost except upon challenge of one or other of original parties, the challenge subject to the vote of the members of superior court who are not members of the inferior.

7. *Effect of Appeals.*

§ 100. Notice suspends proceedings in admonition and rebuke; in other cases judgment in force pending decision of appeal.	§ 255. Arrests sentence, but § 265 continues judgment in suspension, excommunication and deposition.

8. *Order of Appeals.*

§ 102. Generally to judicatory immediately superior.	§ 259. None other than to judicatory immediately superior except by its consent.

9. *Judicial Commissions.*

§ 118. All judicial cases to a judicial commission.	§ 94. May be appointed for any case of trial on appeal. Consent of parties required. Composed of others than members of inferior court.

The difference between the two procedures as to the object of process is formal rather than practical, the one coördinating Scriptures and the regulations and practice of the church, the other holding the formularies of the church which contain this practice to be authoritative interpretations of Scripture. The proceedings upon the return of citation under the one are manifestly more specific than under the other, and afford protection to the accused from unjust charges and from irregularly constituted courts, while on the other hand the provision for access of any sentence in the U. S. procedure is an improvement upon the U. S. A. procedure which allows access only in suspension. Under U. S. procedure, appeal to the Assembly from the decision of Presbytery would be impossible. Jurists will, of course, differ in their estimate of these two procedures. Each case must, however, be judged by its conformity to the procedure which governed it, and, by this standard, the trial of Professor Smith was notable for the rigid adherence to the forms and methods prescribed.

This trial served to bring out the fact that many of the precedents found in the various Digests are valuable only as information, having been invalidated by the adoption of the new Book in 1884. They are invalidated also by the adoption of the new Book U. S. in 1879. Thus, in the Craighead case, the Assembly of 1824 laid down certain directions for framing charges. Under the procedure of 1821, these directions were not complied with in the case of Professor Smith, but it was shown that, under the procedure of 1884, these were no longer in force and could not be introduced to sustain objections to the suffi-

ciency of the charges in form and legal effect.[1] Under both of the new procedures, only those precedents are in force which were taken under provisions that have remained unchanged, and where new provisions are introduced no precedents are authoritative, except those made since the procedure was adopted.

The Court and the Parties.

The court was composed of the ministers of Presbytery, except those absent and excused for cause, and the elders who were members of the last stated meeting, except that when these could not attend, substitutes, appointed by sessions, were admitted. The roll showed sixty out of a possible one hundred and twenty, and outside criticism fastened upon this fact. Yet those familiar with the rolls of Presteries, at even stated meetings, will not wonder that, at a meeting which was to last for weeks, so many churches were unrepresented.

The court sat as a body of judges, not as a box of jurors; the Moderator was not a foreman but a chief-justice, the result was a decision, not a verdict. The nearest parallel in secular procedure is the Senate of the United States in proceedings of impeachment. The failure to recognize the real constitution of the court gave occasion to various misleading arguments from jury-practice. Thus, although no provision is made in the constitution, an effort was made to exclude three members of the court, on the ground of previously expressed opinions, and failure in this is one of Professor Smith's grounds of appeal; yet, however cordially the propriety of the restraint of such expressions be admitted, it cannot be made, as in jury-practice, a qualification. The provision concerning this in the procedure of the Presbyterian Church U. S. is only "pending the trial." So, unanimity in the decision was not, as in jury cases, essential, but, as often occurs in courts of law, dissent from the majority was recognized. And, further, the court was the judge in all questions of law, order and fact, the decision of the Moderator being always subject to appeal.

The competency of the court has, in some quarters, although not by Professor Smith in the remotest way, been assailed on the ground that ordinary pastors and elders, busy with the practical duties of life, are not qualified to pass upon delicate questions of a literary or linguistic character, and it was even proposed that hereafter questions of this sort be remitted for judicial action to a court composed of spe-

[1] The same effort to use the Craighead case was made in the trial of Dr. Briggs, and apparently with more effect.

cialists. The members of the court gave no evidence of an ambition to decide questions beyond their depth, and were apparently conscious of their want of special training, particularly in the mysteries of Higher Criticism; but they felt that they not only might, but, according to their vows, they must decide upon the conformity of these views with the standards of the church. For the church the standards present a rule by which the ever-changing theories of men may be tested as to their relation to revealed truth, and the plain men who make up the body of the ministry and of the eldership are competent to apply this rule, even while they are entirely incompetent to pass opinions on the theories in their scientific and philosophic aspects. If the Scriptures be true and the standards accurately express that truth, nothing which contradicts the standards can be true, however strong the grounds on which it may rest. For the church the Scriptures are true and the standards express that truth, and it is not nearly so difficult to determine the question of conformity to or contrariety with the standards, as has sometimes been supposed; and, further, whether difficult or not, the constitution lays it upon presbyters, and not upon specialists, to decide all questions concerning ministerial standing.

The open-mindedness of the court was manifested in the variations of the votes. On one vote only nine sustained Professor Smith, while on another, forty sustained him; on one vote, seventeen was the number opposed to him, on another, forty-nine were opposed to him; thus making a change of thirty-three. This relieves the court of any appearance, even, of voting blindly either for or against Professor Smith. It assures impartiality.

Of the parties, it must be said that their sincere desire for a righteous decision was unmistakable. Neither side sought undue advantage over the other, nor wasted time on technicalities, and although they occupied many hours of the attention of the court they held that attention because they were believed to be endeavoring to present each his own side in the best possible way. The Committee of Prosecution, appointed by the Presbytery to act in the case, was treated, as is always the case, to popular odium, and various epithets intended to express dislike were applied to its members. It was, however, recognized by the court and by Professor Smith that this committee was acting only in the discharge of duty, and that personally its members were reluctant to take many steps which that duty required of them. The chairman was Dr. McKibbin, pastor of the Walnut Hills Church,

with which the Seminary Church united some years ago, and which is now one of the largest and most influential churches in the Synod. He is a man of most generous impulses and yet of unflinching courage, intrepid in the maintenance of the truth, whose duties in the prosecution involved the sacrifice of many pleasant personal relations. Mr. Lowe, the second member, was formerly a judge on the State bench who, after an honorable and promising career, entered the ministry several years ago and brought with him his judicial habit of mind. Elder Shields was the third member, and his argument upon the case was a happy illustration of the statement made above, that a specialist is not the only one who can grasp the merits of the case from an ecclesiastical stand-point.

Dr. Smith, of course, appeared in the two-fold aspect of the accused and counsel for the accused. For once the old adage was disproved, and the accused had perhaps the very best counsel he could have chosen, for it is impossible to recall an instance in which he failed to take the course most favorable to his client. The court was fortunate, too, in that, if it must try one of its members, that member should prove himself so capable of clear and lucid statement, so careful to confine his argument to the exact point at issue, so free from the influence of the abounding popular sympathy thrust upon him, so devoid of effort to propound his theories of criticism, or to arrogate authority by reason of his special studies. One of the most effective passages in his *Argument* was in reply to a charge of arrogance based upon his statement that "for our present inquiry, the testimony of one exegetical scholar is worth more than that of three systematic theologians." (*Insp. and Iner.* p. 281.) No one who witnessed the calm, dignified, deferential demeanor of Professor Smith can fail to admire the fine mingling of indignation and injured feeling, when he says (p. 11):

"They accuse me of arrogance and contempt of my fellows—pluming myself on my small attainments in scholarship. If this be so, I will ask the pardon of the youngest member of this court. If this be so, I will accuse myself of worse heresy than any the committee have discovered. 'He that hath not the Spirit of Christ is none of his.' 'He that receiveth not the kingdom of God as a little child shall not enter therein.' If there is anything I had supposed myself anxious to avoid it is the pride of attainment. If there is anything I had supposed myself anxious to cultivate it is the habit of viewing things as a believer in Christ, one of his followers, one who sees light in his light. That I have fallen short of my ideal and of yours in this respect I can very well believe. I beg you not to apply to me a standard too high for human attainment."

The Charges and Specifications.

The charges and specifications were, at the close of the preliminary argument, amended by the committee with the consent of the court. They are given in full below, except that repetitions of phrases such as "In the pamphlet referred to," etc., etc., with which each specification begins, are omitted. The original form is indicated by the use of brackets, the differences between the two being purely technical.

CHARGE I.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Rev. Henry Preserved Smith, D. D., a minister in said church, and a member of the Presbytery of Cincinnati, with teaching (in two articles in the New York *Evangelist*, dated respectively March 10, 1892, and April 7, 1892,) "contrary to the regulations and practice of the church founded" on the Holy Scriptures, and set forth in the constitution of said church, that a minister in said church may abandon the essential features of the system of doctrine held by said church, and which he received and adopted at his ordination, and rightfully retain his position as a minister in said church.

Specification I.—He teaches erroneously in the New York *Evangelist*, March 10, 1892, that a doctrinal qualification is only required in the officers of the church at the time of ordination.

Specification II.—He teaches erroneously in the New York *Evangelist*, March 10, 1892, and April 7, 1892, that whether in any individual case the church requires continued adherence to the doctrinal standard received and adopted at ordination is only to be made known by judicial process.

CHARGE II.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Rev. Henry Preserved Smith, D. D., being a minister in said church and a member of the Presbytery of Cincinnati, with teaching, in a pamphlet entitled *Biblical Scholarship and Inspiration*, contrary to a fundamental doctrine of the word of God and the Confession of Faith, that the Holy Spirit did not so control the inspired writers in their composition of the Holy Scriptures as to make their utterances absolutely truthful; *i. e.*, free from error when interpreted in their natural and intended sense.

Specification I.—In a pamphlet entitled *Biblical Scholarship and Inspiration*, published by the said Rev. Henry Preserved Smith, D. D., in different editions in the year 1891, which pamphlet has been extensively circulated with his knowledge and approval, he teaches that the inspired author of Chronicles has asserted [been guilty of asserting] sundry errors of historic fact. (Pages 92, 100, 101 and 102.)

Specification II.—He teaches that the inspired author of Chronicles has suppressed [been guilty of suppressing] sundry historic truths, owing to inability or unwillingness to believe them. (Pages 104, 105, 107, 109.)

SPECIFICATION III.—He teaches that the inspired author of Chronicles incorporated into his narrative, and endorsed by his authority, material drawn from unreliable sources. (Pages 101, 103.)

SPECIFICATION IV.—He teaches that the historical unreliability of the inspired author of Chronicles was so great, that the truth of history therein contained can only be discovered by such investigation, discrimination and sifting as is necessary to the discovery of the truth in histories by uninspired and fallible men. (Page 100.)

SPECIFICATION V.—He teaches the historic unreliability of the inspired author of Chronicles to have been such that "the truth of events" cannot be ascertained from what he actually asserts, but from what he unwittingly reveals. (Pages 100, 108, 109.)

SPECIFICATION VI.—He teaches that the historical unreliability of the inspired author of Chronicles extended to other inspired historic writers of the Old Testament. (Page 102.)

SPECIFICATION VII.—He teaches that the historic unreliability charged by him upon the inspired historical writers of the Old Testament is chargeable, though in a less degree, upon the inspired writers of the New Testament. (Page 115.)

SPECIFICATION VIII.—He teaches that the disclosures of religious experience given by the inspired authors of the Psalms are not in accord with the mind of the Holy Spirit, and free from moral defect. (Page 101.)

SPECIFICATION IX.—He teaches that the assertions made by the inspired authors of the Psalms are not to be relied upon as absolutely true. (Page 101.)

SPECIFICATION X.—He teaches that the last twenty-seven chapters of the Book of Isaiah are not correctly ascribed to him. (Pages 95, 96, of pamphlet.)

SPECIFICATION XI.—He specifically affirms the impossibility of the Old Testament Scriptures being free from all error, whether of doctrine or fact [or precept.] (Page 92, cited below.)

CHARGE III.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Rev. Henry Preserved Smith, D. D., a minister in said church, a member of the Presbytery of Cincinnati, in a pamphlet entitled *Biblical Scholarship and Inspiration*, while alleging that the Holy Scriptures are inspired, and an infallible rule of faith and practice, with denying in fact their inspiration in the sense in which inspiration is attributed to the Holy Scriptures, by the Holy Scriptures themselves and by the Confession of Faith.

SPECIFICATION I.—He teaches that the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures is consistent with the unprofitableness of portions of the sacred writings. (Page 116, cited below.)

SPECIFICATION II.—He teaches that the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures is consistent with error of fact in their affirmations. (Pages 92, 95, 96, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, 115, cited under Charge II.)

Specification III.—He teaches that the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures is consistent with such unreliability in their utterances that the truth of events can not be ascertained from their utterances themselves. (Pages 100, 102, 108, 109, cited under Charge II.)

Specification IV.—He teaches that the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures is consistent with a bias in the inspired writers, rendering them incapable of recording the truth of events because incapable of believing it. (Pages 104, 105, 107, 109, cited under Charge II.[1])

The Preliminary Argument.

When the court was formally constituted on November 14th, Pro-

[1] In the parallel case before the Presbytery of New York, Professor Briggs was not liable to Charge I., made against Professor Smith, and he was charged, as Professor Smith was not, with erroneous views concerning the authority of reason and of the church, the fulfilment of prophecy, the process of redemption after death and sanctification. The parallel includes Charges III., V., VI., of the New York indictment, as follows:

Charge III. "The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D., being a minister of the said church and a member of the Presbytery of New York, with teaching that errors may have existed in the original text of the Holy Scripture, as it came from its authors, which is contrary to the essential doctrine taught in the Holy Scripture and in the standards of the said church, that the Holy Scripture is the word of God written, immediately inspired, and the rule of faith and practice." The specification quotes from the Inaugural Address, p. 35.

Charges V. and VI. "The Presbyterian Church, etc., as above, with teaching that Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch [Charge VI., that Isaiah is not the author of half of the book that bears his name], which is contrary to direct statements of Holy Scripture and to the essential doctrines of the standards of the said church, that the Holy Scripture evidences itself to be the word of God by the consent of all its parts, and that the infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself." Specifications from Inaugural Address, p. 33.

A critical comparison of these indictments shows that that prepared by the New York committee is, as to its form, the more exact, in that, (1), Each charge states the particular doctrine of Scripture and the standards which is contravened; (2), Each specification quotes the exact words which are objected to; (3), The denial of the Mosaic and Isaianic authorship is made the basis for two separate and distinct charges; (4), The whole of Scripture and of the standards is offered in evidence. Yet the form was not of essential importance, seeing that the less exact form was found sufficient to warrant the court in Cincinnati in entering a judgment of guilty, while in New York, the charges, although found sufficient, were not sustained as proven, despite the fact that the only evidence offered consisted in quotations from the acknowledged writings of the accused.

fessor Smith appeared, in compliance with the citation, and presented exceptions[1] to,

"(1.) The qualifications of three members of the court.[2]

"(2.) The order and regularity of the preliminary proceedings.

"(*a.*) The prosecution was resolved upon in pursuance of the report of a committee not empowered to deal with this subject.

"(*b.*) The prosecution was resolved upon in pursuance of a partisan and prejudiced report.

"(*c.*) The prosecution was resolved upon without inquiry whether it were necessary for the ends of discipline to investigate the alleged offence.

"(*d.*) The prosecution was begun without any effort by conference with me to avoid the necessity of actual process.

"(3.) The sufficiency of the charges and specifications in form and legal effect."

To consider these in their order—

(2.) (*a.*) There is no constitutional provision which outlines the course to be pursued prior to the decision of Presbytery to initiate process. That decision may be reached with or without the report of a committee. It is enough that the Presbytery have information which, in its judgment, requires investigation, whether, as in this case, it comes through a committee appointed to have in consideration certain teachings in seminaries, or through a committee appointed to consider a particular case, or through no committee and upon the common knowledge of the Presbytery.

(*b.*) No evidence was adduced to sustain this exception.

(*d.*) The means of reconciliation required by our Lord in Matthew xviii. 15–17 are applicable in cases of alleged personal injury, and are not required when the prosecution is initiated by a Presbytery. As to the effort to avoid actual process, by private conference, the evidence was conflicting.

(*c.*) The protracted discussion in Presbytery at its stated meeting in September, when the process was ordered, was concerned almost exclusively with this question. Long arguments were made dealing with the various ends of discipline, each in detail, to show that these did not require action; *aa.* that the point at issue was merely a conflict between two theories of inspiration neither of which was of confessional authority; *bb.* that Professor Smith, together with his colleagues, had recently re-affirmed his adherence to the Confession; *cc.*

[1] These exceptions are quoted in the language of Professor Smith's appeal to Synod, which is probably their most mature form.

[2] This has been considered on page 10, above.

that the General Assembly had both at Detroit and Portland made sound deliverances on the subject of biblical authority, besides which the Presbytery of Cincinnati had issued and circulated extensively a Pastoral Letter on the word of God, and that, if this was not enough, another paper could be passed by the Presbytery, disclaiming approval of the views of Professor Smith and beseeching him to be as mild as possible in his utterance of them; *dd.* that the processes of discipline are not the best weapons with which to combat the results of historical criticism; and *ee.* finally, that ecclesiastical trials do more harm than good.

It is strange, in view of these various arguments, made in his behalf, at a full meeting of Presbytery, that Professor Smith can allege as a ground of appeal that inquiry was not made concerning the necessity of process; that the inquiry issued in a decision contrary to his views, and to the views of those who so ably supported him, must not be taken as proof that it was not made. On the contrary, the arguments there adduced produced so great an effect that they sensibly colored the views and the votes of a number of presbyters throughout the entire course of the trial. On more than one occasion it was acknowledged that the position taken was due rather to a continuing disapproval of the initiation of process than to any fault found with the particular steps of that process. Various utterances during the progress of the trial, and notably since its close, by writers well-thought of in the church, go to show that they have been unable to get beyond this initial stage, so that of course they see and write of the entire proceedings from the standpoint at which they have viewed the preliminary questions. Due allowance must be made for this in any effort to estimate the importance which ought to be attached to these utterances. Starting with such views, deprecating the very first steps in the direction of process, it was to be expected that such writers should find that every step, however conformed to the law, only tended to exacerbate their feelings, until, by the time the issue was reached, they found it difficult to express sufficiently the vehemence of their disapproval. For this reason, it is all the more needful to analyze these arguments, and so, taking them in their inverse order, it may be remarked—

(*ee.*) Many of the utterances would suggest that the question at issue was the efficacy of discipline in general rather than the proper steps under our established procedure. "Does the word of God need this severity of process to sustain its claims?" it is asked, and the "barbarity" of the Book of Discipline is enlarged upon, while the

the process itself is characterized as "the harsh use of power," and the experiences of those who have witnessed similar cases of process are related to show how mischievous these are. It is difficult to see the pertinency of such reasonings, however cogent they might be if the Rules of Discipline were undergoing reconstruction; nor is it any less difficult to understand how those who have "approved" of the government and discipline of the church can occupy ground which seems to indicate disapproval of discipline, for it cannot be supposed that they sympathize with the Kentucky legislator, who, when a rigid prohibition measure was before the House, announced himself as in favor of it as a law, but against its enforcement. Our judicial procedure is not perfect; in many ways it is open to desirable amendments, and it is quite within liberty for one to seek its entire abolition; but questions of this sort must not be confused with the questions of the proper steps to be taken under that procedure as it is. Reflections upon the inefficacy of discipline in general cannot serve as censures upon the court which dealt with the case of Professsor Smith. It is not allowable to smite our judicial procedure over the back of any specific case under it.

(*dd.*) The purpose of discipline is well enough known to prevent any very widely spread misconceptions. Rhetorically, it is of course very effective to propound the query, How can church-censures affect the conclusions of criticism? but it is understood by all parties that the effect is rhetorical only. Discipline is not a method by which it is proposed to "combat" historical criticism. With historical criticism as such, discipline has nothing to do in the way either of help or of hindrance; it is concerned neither to propagate nor to prosecute any opinions or results which in that or any other department of inquiry may be reached; its function is to conserve the moral and the doctrinal purity of the church, to maintain unimpaired among church-officers as a preëmption-right that system of doctrine which has been sincerely received and adopted by every one of them. It deals with the conclusions of historical criticism or any other science only as these intrude themselves upon its domain. Upon a *prima facie* case it inquires into the plans of the new-comer, and demands of her whether she come peaceably or to establish herself as an independent, irresponsible, and antagonistic influence; if she come peaceably, she is welcome for the sake of the good she may do, but, if not, she cannot think herself outraged if she is escorted beyond the frontier as an unwelcome intruder. In the buoyancy of her youth the new science of historical criticism, or, at least, certain of her representatives, has been

tempted to make light of established metes and boundaries, as merely "arbitrary" and quite beneath the notice of so exuberant a spirit as hers: it is to be hoped, however, for her own sake at least, that she will gradually learn that there are rights which by long years antedate any she may have acquired, and that her future depends upon the respect she can win from these her seniors. The "fire and knife," by which one of these has proposed that she shall establish herself, have been tried hitherto with disastrous results to those who handled them.

(*cc.*) Professor Smith has so aptly answered his own defenders on this point that it is enough to quote his words, *Argument*, p. 9:

"It would have been easy for me to leave the church, especially when the General Assembly urged upon all not in agreement with our church to leave her ministry. And we are told that any company of citizens has a right to associate to defend any absurdity and may determine the objects they will pursue and the terms of their membership. But this comparison seems to forget the very point at issue. The company of citizens who associate in a club to advocate (let us say) the flatness of the earth will be held by law strictly to its own articles of association. It will not be allowed to expel members at the mere will of the majority. That is the very point in hand. All that I have ever claimed is that, being myself convinced that I am in entire harmony with the doctrine of the church, I cannot yield to the resolution of any majority which assumes to decide that question contrary to the constitution of the church."

This is said by Professor Smith in view of the deliverance of the Assembly at Portland.[1] It would apply, *pari passu*, to the Pastoral Letter of the Presbytery of Cincinnati and to all similar utterances of church courts on doctrinal questions. So far as these utterances deal with the doctrine of the church, they are deliverances, not judicial decisions. They express the views of the majority, and so of the judi-

[1] "The General Assembly would remind all under its care that it is a fundamental doctrine that the Old and New Testaments are the inspired and infallible word of God. Our church holds that the inspired word, as it came from God, is without error. The assertion of the contrary cannot but shake the confidence of the people in the sacred books. All who enter office in our church solemnly profess to receive them as the only infallible rule of faith and practice. If they change their belief on this point, Christian honor demands that they should withdraw from our ministry. They have no right to use the pulpit or the chair of the professor for the dissemination of their errors until they are dealt with by the slow process of discipline. But if any do so act their Presbyteries should speedily interpose, and deal with them for violation of ordination vows. The vow taken at the beginning is obligatory until the party taking it is honorably and properly released. The General Assembly enjoins upon all ministers, elders and Presbyteries to be faithful to the duty here imposed."

catory by which they were adopted; and thus they carry great weight and are entitled to respectful consideration. They properly restrain or modify the utterances even of those that oppose them, but they do not bind the conscience; they do not determine finally what is the doctrine of the church upon the point in question; and they do not affect the standing in the church of those who dissent from them. Ecclesiastical standing cannot be invalidated by resolution; doctrine is defined in the constitution authoritatively interpreted, and the conscience is bound by this, the organic law of the church, only.[1] Pile deliverance upon deliverance, yet the doctrine of the church remains unaffected, and the liberty of the individual unrestrained. A deliverance is not a judicial decision, as is illustrated by the course of a number of ministers belonging to the Presbytery of Cincinnati, who supported very cordially the deliverance of the Presbytery contained in its Pastoral Letter, but who dissented from and protested against the decision of the same Presbytery against Professor Smith, whose views were contrary to those set forth in that letter.

Others who sustain Professor Smith appear to confuse a deliverance with a decision from a standpoint directly opposed to this. If the one thought that a deliverance would be a sufficient end to the issue, the others seem to hold that a deliverance was entirely beyond the prerogatives of the Assembly, and in no measured terms they censure the Assembly for establishing "new tests of orthodoxy." This is to mistake the significance of the deliverance entirely. According to the constitution there belongs to the Assembly the power of "reproving, warning, or bearing testimony against error in doctrine, or immorality in practice, in any church, presbytery or synod." Its utterance quoted above was such a reproof of and testimony against what it held as error in doctrine, and this was not in any proper sense a new test of orthodoxy, but the interpretation which that Assembly put upon the

[1] The Assembly's "functions in this regard [disciplinable offences], we judge, are of two kinds—*advisory* and *authoritative;* and between these there should be a careful discrimination. . . . This function of reproof may be exercised in reference to any evil grave enough to call for it. The testimony of such a body as the General Assembly, especially if unanimously given, must needs have great weight. It has, indeed, only a moral influence. It is not authoritative. It binds no other body, not even a succeeding Assembly. It binds no individual; yet cases are not infrequent in which a moral influence of this sort, if not the only one that could be employed, is the most efficacious. . . . As respects the authoritative function of the Assembly, or its power of discipline, that, we judge, can only be exercised in the forms and methods marked out in the constitution." N. S. Assembly, 1856, pp. 197–201.

established tests of orthodoxy. That interpretation is not binding[1] upon any conscience which cannot receive it, because it is not a final decision; but it was entirely constitutional for the Assembly to set forth that interpretation as it did. There was no "usurpation" in the Assembly which passed it, and there is no law against a respectful dissent, or even a protest properly framed and presented in or to the judicatory of those who reject it. It was clearly within the rights of the Assembly to bear its testimony, to advise the withdrawal of those who dissented, and to enjoin upon lower courts to institute inquiry; but it is equally within the rights of those who differ to lodge their protests, to seek by open and honorable means to have the testimony modified, and to remain in the church, if convinced that the testimony is unscriptural, and to require the usual procedure for the determination of their standing. Yet it has been assumed that the Assembly sought to impose doctrine by a majority vote, greatly to the disregard of the rights of presbyters.[2]

(*bb.*) The sincerity with which Professor Smith had so recently readopted the standards was not brought in question by the decision to initiate process. The significance of the words, not the sincerity of the subscriber to the standards, was the point at issue. If sincerity were the only point at issue in subscription, that subscription might soon be dispensed with altogether, for men equally sincere might from

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[1] "It does not appear that the constitution ever designed that the General Assembly should take up abstract cases and decide on them, especially when the object appears to be to bring those decisions to bear upon particular individuals not judicially before the Assembly."—*Minutes*, 1822, p. 50.

[2] While these notes are in course of preparation, a very spirited, though somewhat tardy, protest against the deliverance at Portland is uttered from a pulpit in Washington, in which city the next Assembly will in a few weeks convene. It is pronounced "an act of the grossest usurpation, to resist which is the urgent duty of every Presbyterian that loves his church and cherishes her historical stand for liberty, both personal and ecclesiastical. The General Assembly is as much bound by the constitution as is the humblest minister or member of the church. It has no more authority to impose the opinion of a majority of its members upon us as a doctrine than it has to declare that its views about lynching shall have all the force and weight of a federal statute, and to send a district-attorney or a judge to prison because he fails to prosecute and convict accordingly." It is evident that the distinction between a deliverance and a judicial decision is in this passage obscured; but even upon the lowest view of the authority of a deliverance resistance thereto cannot be said to be "the urgent duty" of any Presbyterian under any circumstances.

the same words reach conclusions directly opposite, in which case the words would cease to be in any sense a rule or standard.

(*aa.*) This will be considered under "The Effect of Inspiration." It may, however, be remarked that many who opposed the initiation of process on this ground did so, not because personally they held "the theory of inspiration" attributed to Professor Smith, but because they felt that it was within the limits of confessional liberty. Indeed, it is one of the features of the controversy that those most strenuous in his support were equally strenuous in rejecting his theory and were zealous in asserting their adherence to the historic position of the church. It ought, therefore, to be understood that the personal faith of none of the members of the court was under investigation, and, indeed, was quite aside from the case. The question was one as to the range within which differences among those who accept the standards do not impair the system of doctrine, and the lines were drawn between those who would and those who would not define these limits in such a way as to exclude the theory of Professor Smith. The responsibility of those who sanction the toleration of the views is as great as that which attaches to those that hold the views. There is no third course open. The so-called Middle Party in the church is supposititious only.

The Charges in General.

Three questions must be answered affirmatively before a charge can be established under our procedure. First, Is the charge conformed to the law? Does it allege a real offence? Second, Do the specifications sustain the charge and comply with the rules laid down for the preparation of them? Third, Do the facts as found in the evidence sustain the specifications and thus carry the charges? A vote upon any one of these questions is not by any means an infallible index to the doctrinal position of the voter. One must distinguish sometimes between what might have been charged and what, as a matter of fact, is charged, and then a negative vote would not indicate approval of the accused, but criticism of the framers of the charge; or granted the charge was properly drawn, the selection and arrangement of specifications might be found insufficient and a negative vote would follow quick upon an affirmative vote; or once more, the facts established in evidence may fail to warrant the specifications and thus to sustain the charges; and a vote of *not proven* might be given by one whose doctrinal position was directly antagonistic, and who, under other circum-

stances, would have voted condemnation. Apparent inconsistencies are sometimes unavoidable to one who exercises a judicial self-restraint, and to those familiar with the complex questions involved, "straight" voting is conclusive evidence neither of abounding zeal for the truth nor of intelligent sympathy with an accused party.

Under the procedure of the church, the first and second questions proposed above are held to deal with "the sufficiency of the charge and specifications in form and legal effect," while the third question deals with "the merits of the case." Both are open to argument; in the former the charge and specifications are (or are not) sustained as sufficient; in the latter, they are (or are not) sustained as proven. In the trial of Professor Smith eight days were occupied in the argument of the parties and the discussion of the court on the sufficiency of the charges, and no more than eight days were devoted to the merits of the case, and of this time comparatively little was occupied by the court. The explanation of this apparently undue proportion is that the two questions were unavoidably considered together; the sufficiency could not be established in entire independence of the merits of the case. The parties were therefore not held down to the argument upon sufficiency, and the court ignored the distinction in its deliberations. The effect of this was that the strength of all parties in the case, with the exception of Professor Smith,[1] was laid out upon the first question, and when the second came up nothing was brought out that had not in some form been previously considered. The "careful deliberation" required of the court in private session was therefore not wanting, but it had in large measure been anticipated.[2]

The present writer does not feel called upon to separate these two questions, nor, indeed, to dwell long upon the technical features of the case. Such consideration as they call for will be given under each charge and in connection with the merits of the case.

It ought to be added that much of the argument by the parties and by the court was devoted to Scripture passages and to theological authorities. To enter upon these would prolong this note unduly, especially as the quotations from authorities would involve the history of the doctrine almost from the beginning.

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[1] His *Argument*, which is devoted to the merits of the case, is the most cogent and comprehensive part of his defence.

[2] In the case of Professor Briggs, comparatively little time was spent on the question of sufficiency, the arguments being chiefly on the merits of the case.

CHARGE I.—THE OBLIGATION OF ORDINATION VOWS.

The following extracts from Professor Smith's articles set forth the substance of this charge:

"It is a good time to consider the question: How broad is the Presbyterian Church? The question concerns doctrinal belief, and it refers to officers of the church. For it is clear that our standards are not intended for laymen and are not applied to them. Any man who 'professes the religion of Christ,' can become a church member.

"The question then is: What latitude of belief is allowed to *officers* of the Presbyterian Church? The answer must be sought in what are called the *vows* taken at ordination. These obligations are set forth in a series of questions to which affirmative answers are required. It is worth noticing, however, that these questions do not all require vows. And the only one which is a vow concerning doctrine, is the one in which the ministers promise 'to be zealous in maintaining the truths of the gospel and the purity and peace of the church.' The form of this vow is significant. The candidate does not engage to be zealous in maintaining the doctrines of the Confession or the Westminster system, but to be zealous in maintaining *the truths of the gospel.*"—*Insp. and Iner.* p. 176.

The following is quoted in the indictment:

"But it is worth remarking, that this doctrinal qualification is required only at ordination. That men's views may change after ordination was as true in the last century as it is now. Had it been the intention of the church to secure strict doctrinal uniformity, it would have required frequent subscription if not frequent examination. Not only is no provision made for this, but the candidate for ordination is nowhere warned that if his doctrinal views should change, he must acquaint his Presbytery with the fact. Even in the present doctrinal alarm, but one man has proposed repeated subscription, and even he limited his proposition to professors of theology. It is clearly the theory of the church that a minister once inducted into the sacred office may be safely left to the guidance of the Holy Spirit. By his success in the ministry he acquires a right not to be disturbed, except in cases of exceptional gravity, and even here the presumption may be said to be in his favor." P. 178.

"Practically, the answer to our question is this: The Presbyterian Church is broad enough to retain in its offices any man who has once sincerely received and adopted the Confession as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Scriptures, until by judicial process the courts of the church have deposed him from office. In the best sense this is not High nor Low, but Broad." P. 179.

This charge was the occasion of more perplexity than the other two combined. Professor Smith was less lucid in his defence here than at any other stage of the proceedings. He left the impression of one whose views had not been fully set forth in his utterances, yet who, for the

time being, felt constrained to make the best possible defence of those utterances. For every sentence he quoted in vindication of his position another was quoted by the prosecution which was beyond vindication. Finally, the court settled it by acquitting Professor Smith upon a statement not properly before it in evidence.

Three distinct questions are presented by this charge:

1. What are the regulations and practice of the church as to ordination vows?

2. Is an assertion contrary to these regulations or to this practice an offence?

3. Was such assertion made by Professor Smith?

1. The organic law is the only authority on this point.

Among the preliminary principles of the Form of Government is—

"II. That, in perfect consistency with the above principle of common right, every Christian church, or union or association of particular churches, is entitled to declare the terms of admission into its communion, and the qualifications (*sic*) of its ministers and members, as well as the whole system of its internal government which Christ hath appointed."

The Synod of 1729 declared:

"And in case any minister of this Synod, or any candidate for the ministry, shall have any scruple (*sic*) with respect to any article or articles of said Confession and Catechisms, he shall at the time of his making said declaration declare his sentiments to the Presbytery or Synod, who shall, notwithstanding, admit him to the exercise of the ministry within our bounds, and to ministerial communion, if the Synod or Presbytery shall judge his scruple or mistake to be only about articles not essential and necessary in doctrine, worship, and government. But if the Synod or Presbytery shall judge such ministers or candidates erroneous in essential and necessary articles of faith, the Synod or Presbytery shall declare them incapable of communion with them."

The Synod of 1736 hoped that its declaration would "satisfy all our people as to one firm attachment to our good old received doctrines contained in said Confession without the least variation or alteration" (*sic*).

The first paragraph of the terms of reunion of the Synods of New York and Philadelphia in 1758 is as follows:

"Both Synods having always approved and received the Westminster Confession of Faith and Larger and Shorter Catechisms as an orthodox and excellent system of Christian doctrine founded on the word of God, we do still (*sic*) receive the same as the confession of our

(*sic*) faith, and also adhere to the plan of worship, government, and discipline contained in the Westminster Directory, strictly enjoining it upon all our members and probationers for the ministry, that they preach and teach (*sic*) according to the form of sound words in said Confession and Catechisms, and avoid and oppose all errors contrary thereto."

The Assembly of 1824 declared concerning the Confession of Faith and the Standards of the Church: They "as a system of doctrines, therefore, cannot be abandoned (*sic*) in our opinion without an abandonment of the word of God."[1] The plan of reunion of 1870 contained the following:

"2. The reunion shall be effected on the doctrinal and ecclesiastical basis of our common standards; the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments shall be acknowledged to be the inspired word of God, and the only infallible rule of faith and practice; the Confession of Faith shall continue to be (*sic*) sincerely received and adopted as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures; and the government and discipline of the Presbyterian Church in the United States shall be approved as containing the principles and rules of our polity."

These citations show clearly enough that adherence to the system of doctrine is an obligation not restricted to the moment of licensure and ordination, but is continuous, that is, it is taken as indicating the fixed opinion, the abiding faith of the subscriber. Whatever license be allowed in other Reformed churches, these passages show that the American Church requires the acceptance of the standards as the confession of the faith of every office-bearer, and that when his faith changes so that these standards no longer express it, he loses thereby his right to office in the church. The adoption of the system of doctrine is a qualification, not in the sense of a term of admission, but as indicating one's abiding convictions; that is, it is not merely a door through which one must pass, but a mental habiliment, without which it were indecent for him to appear. Men, therefore, who have once taken the vows, cannot, as Professor Smith claims, "be safely left to the guidance of the Holy Spirit"; or, if so, that guidance is interpreted for them in the standards, and variation therefrom indicates the loss of that guidance.

Further, the distinction which Professor Smith draws between "the doctrines of the Confession or of the Westminster system" and "the truths of the gospel" is contrary to the principles on which that system rests. Doubtless many find a ready excuse for their attitude towards confessional doctrines on the theory that they are something more

[1] This has not the force of organic law, but is quoted for information.

than and apart from the truths of the gospel, which for its own purposes the church has imposed upon office-bearers; but the theory will not justify the attitude. The doctrines of the Confession or of the Westminster system are to the church a correct and comparatively complete statement of the truths of the gospel, so that it is impossible to maintain the one at the expense of the other. The true contrast is between gospel truth as stated in the Confession and gospel truth as stated in other than confessional language. The Confession is, therefore, not a burden of tradition which, with Pharisaic zeal, the church has bound upon the backs of her representatives, but a systematic interpretation of the truths of the gospel which the church has adopted because it states those precious truths accurately and fully, and which she very naturally proposes to those who would bear her name and proclaim the gospel under her authority.

2. All assertions contrary to the regulations and practice of the church are not offences within the exact sense of the word. Some errors arise from mere ignorance, others are on minor points. All errors are not equally pernicious, and the courts are charged to distinguish between the fact of error and the gravity of error before pronouncing any error an offence. This must be taken account of in this charge.

Further, the personal adherence of Professor Smith to the system of doctrine is not under this charge challenged. It is a general and a hypothetical question that is raised, not a personal one. But if so, wherein is his statement concerning doctrinal qualifications an offence?

The answer to this question is: It is not a doctrinal question that is at issue. He has successfully challenged the citation of a single doctrine of the Confession which is impugned by his statement concerning ordination vows: he is entirely guiltless therefore of heresy under this charge. If the Confession of Faith and the Catechisms constituted the standards, it would be impossible to locate a charge against him for his utterances concerning these vows.

But because it is not a doctrinal question, it does not follow at all that it is merely a historical question, as Professor Smith claims, which is to be determined by an ordinary investigation of the facts. This is not a doctrinal question, but doctrinal questions are not the only ones which determine ministerial standing.[1] The Confession and

[1] Professor Briggs in his *Defence* (p. 2), and more fully in his *Response* (p. 122), to the old charges, apparently labors under the same impression that a charge must contravene some essential doctrine of the Westminster Confession, as if the Form of Government and the Rules of Discipline were not as really part of the Constitution as the Confession and the Catechisms.

the Catechisms are not impugned by Professor Smith's views, but these are only a part, although a large part, of the standards of the church. Heresy and immorality are offences under our procedure, but they are not the only offences.

Questions of order, questions of government, as distinct from questions of doctrine, have their influence upon ministerial standing. They relate not to the faith, but to the practice of the church; they are found not in the Confession and Catechisms, but in the Form of Government and the Rules of Discipline; they deal not with heresy and immorality, but with ecclesiastical disorder, the extreme form of which is ecclesiastical rebellion. The stability of the church as an organization rests upon the maintenance of order, the administration of government, and that which threatens it from this quarter is as truly an offence as the denial of a cardinal doctrine of the faith.

3. The charge was not sustained by the court, not because of any doubt concerning the utterances of Professor Smith, but with some because these were held insufficient to establish the charge, and with others, enough to make a majority, because of the following from his *Response:*

"Neither in this article, nor anywhere else, do I assert that a minister may 'abandon essential features of the system of doctrine held by said church, and which he received and adopted at his ordination, and rightfully retain his position as a minister in said church.' Nor do I believe it." *Insp. and Ine .*, p. 204.

Being of the nature of argument and not evidence, this statement was not properly before the court. The Prosecuting Committee offered to dismiss this charge at once if Professor Smith would put this statement in such form that the court could consider it, but he preferred to argue on the "text of the articles." This he did, and his statement was at no time within the judicial knowledge of the court, [1] yet, by a stretch of these functions, a majority determined to accept this as a disclaimer, and, therefore, a sufficient reason for acquitting him of the charge.

The effect of the acquittal, therefore, in no sense implies a toleration of the view that one who has once subscribed to the standards may be safely left to the guidance of the Holy Spirit, but a conviction on the

[1] Quite a discussion arose over the proper disposition of this statement. It was claimed that the *Response* and *Rejoinder* had been admitted in evidence and then excluded. A protest was offered and answered, and Professor Smith makes it a ground of appeal to the Synod, notwithstanding his decision to argue on "the text of the articles."

part of the majority that Professor Smith did not believe this in the sense which his words seem to convey. The acquittal must in one sense have proven a disappointment to him in that it was not based upon the articles, but upon the statement in his *Response*, so that after all, his articles on ordination vows are not vindicated.

The broad question raised in this charge is stated thus by Professor Smith: "Now the question arises, how shall we know *what are essential articles?* It was *this* matter which I had in mind when I spoke of the church herself drawing the line. Let me illustrate: Dr. Hodge, in the article already alluded to, mentions a definite atonement as one of the essential articles of our system. On this point some would not agree with him (*sic*). How does the church decide between them? I cannot see any way which is conclusive of the mind of the church except by judicial process."

On this subject Dr. McKibbin, speaking of the second specification, said:

"Suppose that is true, and if we tried Professor Smith for an offence committed three weeks after his ordination, he could claim he did not know how much would be required of him until after a trial, and might say, 'You can try me.' Now suppose you convict a man of having taught something erroneously, upon this view what would you convict him of? You would have to convict him of teaching what was contrary to the doctrinal standard received and adopted at ordination, and he would claim that he did not know how much of this doctrinal standard was required until after the trial. It is perfectly preposterous to suppose that the faith of the church is to be settled by ecclesiastical trials. An ecclesiastical trial settles the fact as to whether a man's faith is in harmony with the church. There is a limited sense in which some points of dispute may be settled in the court. * * * * The obligations of a Presbyterian minister are settled by what that Book requires of him. * * It might be a question as to the divinity of Jesus Christ. Suppose a man says, 'I do not know whether the church requires me to believe in the divinity of Christ until they try me.' * * * You can see at once that it would lead to utter anarchy in the church."

Upon this question, it need only be added:

1. Dr. Hodge has expressed the common view of the church in the article (*Bib. Rep.* xxx. 669) referred to by Dr. Smith. He says:

"The substance or essence of a system of doctrines is the system itself. In this case the essence of the thing is the whole thing. The essential doctrines of Pelagianism are Pelagianism, and the essential doctrines of Calvinism are Calvinism (p. 672). The words 'system of doctrine' have a fixed historical meaning. The objection that it is an open question, what doctrines belong to the system and what do not,

and therefore if the objection be limited to the adoption of the system, it cannot be known what doctrines are received and what are rejected, is entirely unfounded" (p. 688).

It should be easy to see the difference between the relation which the doctrine of a definite atonement sustains in such a system and that which is held by the confessional sections on the power of the state, marriage, divorce, etc.,—the one a necessary part of the system without which it falls to pieces, the others not in any way deducible therefrom.

2. The remark of Professor Smith that as to the essential importance of the doctrine of a definite atonement "some would not agree with" Dr. Hodge, suggests that they receive the Confession "for substance of doctrine," and not as "containing the system of doctrine;" the former leaving it open to each one to define for himself what that substance is, the latter affixing the definite historical meaning, universally recognized as belonging to the Reformed theology, and familiar to all who intelligently adopt the Confession.

3. The conclusion that the essential articles of faith are determinable only by judicial process is not in consonance with the historic position of the church. It would change the rare exception into a regular and established function; it would afford license to every one who chose to impeach any doctrine however fundamental until he was formally disciplined; it would make "heresy-hunting" the only reliable process of learning the doctrine of the church, and make of the heretic one who merely affords occasion to decide what is fundamental; it would precipitate upon the church a series of trials, which her constitution never contemplated, from which her high calling must exempt her, and which her plain and straightforward Confession makes needless. Doctrine is determined already and discipline is not to make it any more clear, but to deal with those who, under vows, yet reject the doctrine.

Charges II. and III.

These were considered together in the court for the reason that they necessarily involved one another. The views of Professor Smith are set forth below, in one column, first as given in his *Pamphlet*, and in the other as stated during the trial; and the references are to the pages of *Inspiration and Inerrancy:*

P. 122.—"Unless we can assume the standing miracle, the historical sources of the Old Testament need, in order to discover the truth of events, the

P. 282.—"There is no instance that I can recall from a prophet where a writer as distinguished makes such a claim to identify his utterances with God's. What is

same sort of analysis, sifting and cross-questioning that must be given to other sources of history, and this analysis, sifting and cross-questioning is precisely—Higher Criticism."

P. 124.—"For our present inquiry, we are interested in the two forms of the history of Israel as presented on the one side by the Books of Samuel and Kings, and on the other in the Books of Chronicles. The study of these books shows the method of the authors with a definiteness which leaves nothing to be desired. We see that the chronicler had before him our Book of Kings as one of his sources. He takes from it what suits his purpose. What he takes he generally transfers without material change. He omits a good deal which does not answer his purpose, and he inserts a good deal from other sources. He pursues exactly the plan, that is, which we suppose to have been followed by the other historical writers."

P. 125.—"Remembering that the chronicler was much further away in time from the events narrated, we find it natural that he should have an exaggerated idea of the resources of his country in the days of her glory. In the case of David's purchase of the field of Ornan, he finds the price a niggardly one for the prince to pay. He, therefore, does not hesitate (supposing that a mistake has been made) to put in a larger sum. Of course we need not lay this to the charge of the final redactor of the book. He had probably before him other written elaborations of the history in which his exaggerated idea of the past was already embodied. The meant is that the *prophets* claim to speak as God's spokesmen. *They* identify their utterances with God's. *Their* right to speak is that they are commissioned by God. If any one doubts this let him take the plainly historical portions of the Old Testament. Let him make a thorough examination of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings, Chronicles, Esther and Nehemiah. He will find not one single instance, I venture to say, in which the writer clearly claims even to be God's spokesman. Much less will he find one where he identifies his utterances with God's utterances. In the books of the prophets we find such expressions in abundance, because the prophet was God's spokesman. He did identify his utterances with God's, and he had a right to. But in the historical portions even of the prophetical books the writer carefully refrains from making such claims."

P. 216.—"Now I suppose it to be generally understood—the committee certainly have no reason to be ignorant of it—that we stand on the common ground of the infallibility of the Scriptures as the church's rule of faith and practice. There is no difference between us, therefore, as to *doctrine* or *precept*. The sole question at issue is whether every statement on matters of fact *outside the sphere* of doctrine and precept is without error."

P. 225.—"It is entirely legitimate, therefore, to distinguish between two elements in Scripture: What was the subject of revelation, and what was not the subject of revelation. But it is easy to see further that these two parts have a close connection. What is drawn from tradition, written

personal equation is as difficult to suppress in the historian as is individuality of style. Why should one be overruled any more than the other?"

P. 130.—"It is clear that we cannot ascribe freedom from error to the statement of a book compiled in this way. You will say, then it should be cast out of the Canon. To which I reply, by no means. The Book of Chronicles is invaluable to us, not for what it directly teaches, but for the light it throws indirectly upon its own time. What the Jews of the Persian monarchy were thinking, how they regarded the older history, how they were preparing the way for the Scribes and Pharisees, for the crucifixion and the Roman war, for the Talmud and Barkochba—this is made known to us in the Book of Chronicles and by almost no other book in the Bible. But it is made known to us by reading between the lines, that is to say, by considering and weighing not what the author says of others, but by what he betrays of himself. What is the truth of history, my friends? Is it simply the narrative of events definitely defined, and labelled, and arranged in order? Is it a catalogue of kings, of each of which it records that he was born, made war and died? Is it not rather a series of pictures, each of which describes an age with its thoughts, its aspirations, its ideals? If so, sacred history cannot be made up by a string of inerrant statements."

Note, p. 130.—"As some questions have been raised by my assertions about the chronicler, I will add that of course I do not suppose him guilty of intentional documents, or the observation of the writer, has a distinct bearing upon that which is directly revealed. It furnishes a comment upon it, shows the setting, the time, and circumstances in which the revelation was given. It shows the progress of revelation, the difficulties it met, the manner in which it was received, and the experiences of those who received it. These two parts in this way make up a homogeneous book. It consists of a revelation with illustrative material, and the latter is of course subordinate in importance to the revelation. Precision of language would require us to say the Bible *contains* a revelation. In common language, however, we say not only that it contains a revelation, but that it *is* a *revelation*. This is speaking *a parte potiori*, and not with scientific exactness."

P. 236.—"Bear in mind the exact point which is to be tested by Scripture. It is not whether the Bible contains a revelation—this is admitted on all hands. It is not whether the recipients of the *revelation* were fitted by inspiration both to receive and communicate *it* —this is equally admitted. It is not whether the writers of the books were divinely guided in choice of material from whatever source, for this is not contested by any. The only issue is the further one: Whether they were also divinely guided to remove from previously existing literary material every error of fact, no matter *how indifferent in its bearing on faith and morals;* and, whether in giving their own observation and experience they were so far lifted above the universal liability to error that they never *made a mis-*

falsification of the record. He had before him, it would appear, a considerable literature which commented on the history in the spirit of the time—his changes are made from these documents. The ideas which govern this literature were a part of the mental furniture of the chronicler himself. His inspiration, which made him a source of religious edification to his contemporaries, and which makes his work still a part of the infallible rule of faith, *did not correct his historical point of view*, any more than it corrected his scientific point of view, which no doubt made the earth the centre of the solar system."

take, even in the sphere of secular science or history. For this is the doctrine of the committee, and this they affirm to be a fundamental doctrine of the Scripture. They claim it is so fundamental that no one accepts the system of doctrine contained in the Scriptures who does not accept this doctrine. Now, I hope to show you not only that this doctrine is not a fundamental doctrine of Scripture, but also that it is not a doctrine of Scripture at all. The only way to do this is to examine the texts adduced by the committee, for it is clear that they have cited every thing that bears on the subject."

P. 249.—"Here is biblical inspiration. When God sends a man to deliver his message, it is in vain for the man to try to change it. The divine *afflatus* carries him along so that he cannot resist. But this is evidently true only of direct revelations of God's will. No such inspiration is anywhere intimated concerning the writers of the record."

P. 286.—"Make the clear distinction between biblical inspiration of the prophet and theological inspiration of the scribe, and while you will find one asserted frequently (though not on every page) you will find the other faintly and rarely indicated. In this method you will find less definiteness, perhaps, but in the long run more certainty."

P. 225.—"Now, up to this point we are all agreed. All parties here acknowledge the following points: (*a*), The Bible contains a revelation from God; (*b*), It contains other material not in the proper sense revealed; (*c*), This material is of importance (32) to us

> because of its bearing on the history of revelation; (*d*), This material was chosen and arranged by men acting under a distinct influence of the Holy Spirit, which influence we call, technically, inspiration; and (*e*), The result is a book which in its totality is the church's permanent and infallible rule of faith and life."

Before proceeding to the consideration of these charges in detail, it may be remarked—

1. Any discussion within even the extended limits of this note must necessarily be cursory and superficial, because of the many points which must be covered. Upon any one of these enough to fill these pages might profitably be written, but with obvious injustice to others which bore with equal force upon the result of the trial. Nor will it be expected that one who is not a specialist, but an active pastor, will essay to speak with authority upon the questions of criticism which are at issue.

2. The term inerrancy had no place in the judicial aspect of the case. It is not a confessional term, and it cannot be used as a test of ministerial standing. As a convenient phrase, synonymous with "immediate inspiration," it is perhaps defensible. The same is true of "verbal," "plenary," as applied to inspiration—they are convenient, but they are not "tests of orthodoxy."

3. The Books of Chronicles are, of all Old Testament records, the chief barrier to the post-exilic theory of the Pentateuch. They contain frequent references to the laws of the Pentateuch in the life of Israel long before the time of Ezra, and many of those who have accepted the prevailing critical theories make no concealment of the dislike they entertain for the chronicler, and of their desire to be rid of his testimony. Professor Smith has disclaimed such a motive, and his disclaimer must be accepted. Moreover, he has not pronounced upon the post-exilic theory,[1] and he ought not to be charged with its conclusions. Yet his charges against the chronicler are made also by those who maintain the post-exilic theory, and they may very properly be

[1] In a very exhaustive review of Wellhausen's theories, in *The Presbyterian Review*, III., 357, he criticises adversely some of the leading conclusions of this theory.

scrutinized lest they contain somewhat of that "bias" which they so freely attribute to the chronicler.

4. It is not wise to impale ourselves upon the alternative that the authority of Scripture stands or falls with every conclusion we may have reached in our investigations. This has the effect of keeping us in continual suspense, for our conclusions are undergoing continual modifications; or else of straining our arguments beyond what they will legitimately yield, lest, by their failure, Scripture, too, shall fail. Neither should we permit ourselves to draw inferences concerning the state of mind of those whom we are obliged to controvert; or to attribute to those who fail to accept the true view of the divine authorship of Scripture what seem to us to be the logical consequences of their principles.

5. The present writer will not undertake to follow or to criticise the various steps in the proof of these charges, but rather to indicate only the main points which were involved.

The Historic Truthfulness of Scripture.

In his *Argument* Professor Smith says (pp. 54, 55):

"To deny *all* historic truthfulness to the Scriptures is of course destructive of Christianity. If the Gospels be myths, if the Acts of the Apostles be a romance, if the Epistles be forgeries—then the historic facts which lie at the basis of our religion are gone. I hope I need not protest that *this* historic truthfulness is as dear to me as to anyone."

Professor Smith, therefore, does not deny *all* historic truthfulness to Scripture, and he particularly emphasizes the Gospels, the Acts and the Epistles as containing "the historic facts which lie at the basis of our religion." But he leaves us to conjecture concerning the truthfulness of other historic portions, and the gravity of the conjecture appears from the fact that half of the Scripture at least is of a historical character, and he has given us no assurance concerning any Old Testament history. Further, he has in his *Pamphlet*, cited above, charged that the chronicler "had an exaggerated idea of the resources of his country in the days of her glory," that his book is "invaluable to us, not for what it directly teaches, but for the light it throws indirectly upon its own time." "His inspiration . . . did not correct his historical point of view." What the Jews of the Persian monarchy were thinking is in Chronicles "made known to us by reading between the lines, that is to say, by considering and weighing, not what the author says of others, but by what he betrays of himself."

This theory[1] concerning the Books of Chronicles has some far-reaching implications, which must be taken into account. Thus—

1. It assigns them the character, not of history, but of the sources of history, which call for analysis, sifting and cross-questioning, before they can be expected to yield satisfactory results. If they are history in any real sense, this process has already been applied to their sources by the same writer, and we have before us the results in such form that we can accept them; but if they are only sources of history, the process falls to us to apply, and the apparatus of criticism must be worked under high pressure, for, upon this alternative, the history has not yet been written, and during all the centuries past our fathers have been content with the sources alone.

2. It refuses them a degree of trustworthiness often granted to secular and uninspired writers, who, while liable to err, are recognized as authorities on the periods of which they write. Of this, Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire*, Green's *England*, McMaster's *United States*, will serve as fair examples in that they are quotable as settling the questions with which they deal. They attain to this authority not merely because they are free from intentional falsification, from which Professor Smith would relieve the chronicler, but also because their pages are free from broad misstatements of facts, however unconscious and unintentional. They not only mean to tell the truth, but as a fact they tell it. They are not only sincere, which Professor Smith would probably allow the chronicler was, but they are also competent, which the chronicler was not, upon the theory under present consideration. If we had to "read between the lines," to watch, not for what the writer says of others, but for "what he betrays of himself," to discount "the exaggerated ideas of the resources of his country," they would instantly lose their character as historical authorities and sink to the level of Pepys and Froissart and the mass of other "sources."

It cannot be too much insisted upon that this is the immediate consequence of Professor Smith's theory: Chronicles is not even good secular history. Green and Bryce without inspiration could do better than he with all his inspiration. Professor Smith demands that we treat the Bible as we do other books; upon this showing, we could wish he had treated it even as well as he does other books.

3. It vitiates the revelation which, according to Professor Smith, is contained in Scripture. This could easily be shown to come in large measure through the medium of history. In the structure of Scrip-

[1] The case of Professor Briggs does not raise this question. It is, however, involved in his recent work on "The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch."

ture, there is no division between the historical and the doctrinal portions. The light of revelation shines through every-day occurrences. The will of God is made known through events as well as through formal messages. Doctrine springs out of fact. Divine truth is taught in the types and ceremonies of the church in the wilderness and through the later dealings of God with his people in Canaan. If history must now for the first time be gathered out of these sources which we have had unsifted for so long, we will be obliged to revise our whole conception of the contents of revelation and prepare to re-adjust our doctrine upon the new basis. Our doctrine must be as unsifted as the history that bases it, and the system of doctrine we have been receiving is evidently open to rigid and damaging cross-examination.

This is exultingly asserted by some of the school of critics, but it has been denied by Professor Smith, who reiterates his acceptance of the system of doctrine contained in Scripture. With unabated confidence in his sincerity, it must be added that the exultant tone is by far the most natural one, and that his personal rejection of these consequences will not abate in any degree the force with which they will tell against the doctrinal system he has adopted.

4. It is contrary to the confessional doctrine. In his *Argument* (p. 53) he says:

"In this particular connection I beg your attention to the argument made in the court that the doctrine of the historic trustworthiness (by which in order to the decision of the case before you must be understood the *entire* historic trustworthiness) of the Scriptures '*underlies* the whole confessional doctrine, and requires no explicit and formal statement, just as the doctrine of the divine existence underlies the Scriptures themselves and does not require a formal statement. For both in the Scriptures and in the Confession there are some things which constitute the bed-rock of faith, the statement of which would be mere surplusage.'"

From this Professor Smith dissents, first, because the difference between Scripture and the Confession is that the latter "exists to *state* doctrine," which it fails to do so far as historic trustworthiness[1] goes; and second, that the denial of the divine existence "simply reduces the Scriptures to inanity," but the withdrawal of the absolute historic truthfulness seems to him to leave the building undisturbed (p. 54). But, the historic truthfulness of Scripture is not merely fundamental in the sense in which its independence, its sufficiency, its authority, in

[1] The overture to insert the words "The truthfulness of the history" in Ch. I., § V., has not as yet been finally adopted.

faith and practice are fundamental, for this is the sense in which the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Resurrection are fundamental, while the historic truthfulness of Scripture is the basis on which these fundamental doctrines rest. Can Scripture be "independent" in any real sense if its historical statements are open to continual and radical correction? In what sense is it "sufficient" if it needs the reconstruction which our present critical school is attempting? and how much of an "authority" is it under this theory? It is, therefore, not one with these fundamental doctrines, but underneath them all, and therefore it does not require the same formal statement, although perhaps the proposed amendment to the Confession may, if adopted, save similar misunderstanding hereafter. The Confession without the doctrine of historic truthfulness might be less "inane" than Scripture without the doctrine of the divine existence, but it would have a slender basis for the doctrines of the independence, the sufficiency, the authority of Scripture. Indeed, so closely are these dependent upon the doctrine of historic truthfulness that the charge might have been based upon one or other of them.

This is the gravamen of the second charge. It does not enter upon the question of inspiration. It is properly confined to a merely secular historic trustworthiness. This Professor Smith has denied, and for this he was adjudged to hold views in conflict with the doctrine of the church concerning the Scriptures. That he personally believes in biblical history is no relief from teachings that would make that history untrustworthy, or at least indeterminate for others less settled in their faith. Further, that the instances cited are of minor importance is no protection against the application of the same reasonings to those portions of the history which are inseparable from the revelation itself.

The Effect of Inspiration.

The view of Professor Smith is with some fullness set forth in the foregoing citations. He would distinguish between two elements in Scripture: What was the subject of revelation, and what was not the subject of revelation. "Precision of language would require us to say that the Bible *contains* a revelation," and only *a parte potiori* can we say, "it *is* a revelation." In the *Argument* he says (page 50):

"What I am concerned to point out is, that there are two senses of the word [inspiration], and that there is a difference between theological and biblical usage. In theology, inspiration is the organizing principle of the books. In the Bible itself, inspiration is the activity

of the Spirit which fits the organs of *revelation* for their work. Now, if this distinction is clearly grasped, it shows that a member of the court was mistaken in thinking that I confound inspiration and revelation."

The question at issue, then, is not the nature or the mode, but the effect, of inspiration. This was clearly recognized in the court, and the significance of the distinction between nature and mode, on the one hand, and effect, on the other, was appreciated. The former, being within the sphere of the mysterious agency of the Holy Spirit, being, indeed, as inscrutable as the act of regeneration, or the conception of our Lord by his mother, the Virgin Mary, are clearly beyond the reach of theological or confessional definition; and the church has not only never sought to impose, or even to formulate, a theory as to the nature or the mode of inspiration, recognizing that whatever opinions might be held were lacking in Scripture warrant, were clearly outside the system of doctrine, and afforded no ground for difference among those who together adopted that system.

But it is very different with regard to the latter, the effect of inspiration, which is neither inscrutable nor mysterious, but is manifest in the pages of Scripture, and is so definite that it has afforded basis to the historic doctrine that the Scriptures thus inspired are the infallible rule of faith and life; that this is part of the system of doctrine itself, and so affords a test of good standing in those churches which receive that system. The issue, then, was not merely "between two theories of inspiration, neither of them confessionally defined," but rather about the confessional doctrine as to the effect of inspiration. It was a question as to the authoritative interpretation of the standards as we have them, and not as to some extra-confessional refinement of modern schoolmen.

The question may be stated in various forms. Thus: Did inspiration secure the record of Scripture as we have it, or merely the utterances of the prophets and apostles contained therein? Did it give an infallible revelation in a fallible or in an infallible record? Was its effect upon the writer only, or upon the book which he wrote? Is the Scripture as we have it the word of God, or does it merely contain the word of God? It is submitted that the citations made above from the utterances of Professor Smith sustain this as a fair statement of the question.

The distinction between the Scripture as being and as containing the word of God may be taken as the key to the situation. Professor Smith and those who think with him stand upon the latter alternative.

That distinction was first propounded by J. G. Tollner, who died in 1774, and who maintained that there were some things in Scripture which do not belong to the word of God, such as historical events; that although all in the Scripture has respect to the word of God, all parts are not equally rich in the word of God; that on the other hand, the word of God is not limited to the Scripture, and he who propounds divine truth propounds the word of God, which also is contained in reason, and found in the different forms of religion known among men; Christians possessing that word, however, in its most excellent, most perfect, and clearest form. The comparatively recent origin of the distinction and its implications as to the relative value of the word of God in Scripture are, of course, significant, but the distinction itself is enough for our present consideration. It has been variously stated, and these various statements have been held as divergent theories, while the unifying principle will, upon close examination, appear. Those who hold that Scripture contains the word of God may all be classified as separating either between—

1, The fundamental and the non-fundamental; or, 2, The substance and the form;[1] or, 3, The doctrinal and the historical; or, 4, The revealed and the non-revealed.

Professor Smith emphasizes the fourth of these pairs of alternatives, although the third also finds place in his defence. He believes that the Scripture contains a revelation and that in its doctrine it is infallible, but that the "illustrative material" used along with the revelation and the history in which the doctrine is found does not come to us with the same infallible authority.

The question, however, is not as to the existence in the record of the two elements, whether they be called human and divine, or historical and doctrinal, or revealed and non-revealed: there is no issue here at all, and, except perhaps in one writer quoted, all admit the fact that these two elements are combined in Scripture. The question is not as to the existence of the two, but as to the possibility of separating them, of reducing the compound into its original elements. The fact that

[1] Professor Briggs apparently adopts this statement. Besides the citation from his Inaugural given in the charges against him, he says in *Biblical Study*, p. 161: "We cannot, in the symbolical or historical use of the term, call this providential (*sic*) care of his word, or superintendence over its external production (*sic*), inspiration. Such providential superintendence is not different in kind with regard to the word of God, the visible church of God, or the forms of the sacraments."

the two are there, would, upon the analogy of human sciences, such as chemistry, suggest that analysis could distinguish them; and in the great desire to treat the Bible as we treat other books, this has been very cheerfully undertaken, and great confidence in the result has been felt. We have been taught to expect within a few years a new Parallel Bible, in which we can read on one side the divine, the doctrinal, the revealed, the fundamental; and on the other side, the human, the historical, the non-revealed, the circumstantial elements. Indeed, recent literature has afforded several essays in this direction, but unfortunately these have not had a wide circulation, perhaps because they lack the imprimatur of critical authority, which, while it raises our expectations and tells us of its progress, is not yet prepared to furnish even an outline of this new and very interesting work. The news which leaks out to the world, it must be added, is not very encouraging as to the rate of progress. There appears to be some difference of opinion among the editors. What is divine to one is human to another; what one of conservative antecedents regards as doctrinal is to another of liberal ancestry historical only and possibly merely circumstantial. Professor Smith finds in Scripture the full system of doctrine taught in the Westminster Standards, and if he were editor-in-chief, the new Bible would contain upon its divine side nearly everything which the Reformed churches have been accustomed to find in Scripture; but unfortunately the editorial authority appears divided, Professor Smith evidently has not the last word, and there is no telling in what form the new Bible will ultimately appear, nor when it will be issued.

It must be manifest to any who have studied the structure of Scripture, that although the two elements are there they cannot be separated. Where does the revelation end? Where does the merely historical begin? What is the essence of Scripture? These questions seem at first-thought to have ready answers, but the farther we go the more elusive we find these answers to be, and the greater room for the vitiating personal equation of the student. The fact is, that doctrine is taught in history as well as in direct communications from God; that revelation is given by the deeds as well as the words of the inspired men, it being a principle in ecclesiology that apostolic practice is of equal authority with apostolic doctrine; that the fundamental is often discovered in what apparently is non-fundamental, as in New Testament uses of Old Testament facts. If the two were to be separated, some rule of separation would be necessary, else every one would find in Scripture just what suited his preconceived ideas; that

we have no such rule is strong presumption that the separation is not to be made, and that the two elements constitute the unit of Scripture. Accordingly, both in Scripture and in the standards, Scripture is treated as one. Ten times in the standards is it called "the word of God," once "the word of God written," twice "the very word of God." God is the author of it in such way as to cover with his authority what is compiled from records, or what might have been stated by the writer unaided from above. The Westminster divines, who in one place spoke of the word of God contained in Scripture and in another place of the Scripture which is the word of God, can hardly be quoted in support of Tollner's distinction.[1] It can be shown that they sought to distinguish Scripture not from Scripture, but from a tradition and priestly authority which made itself of equal authority with Scripture.

This naturally leads up to Professor Smith's doctrine of inspiration, which, in its biblical sense, is to be restricted to the revealed portions of the word. A careful perusal of his *Argument* shows that the member of the court referred to was mistaken in thinking he confounded inspiration and revelation; perhaps it can be shown even that he did not identify them; but it is clear that he regards them as conterminous. Biblical inspiration secures to us the revealed will of God, and what is not revealed is beyond this influence. If we ask, What does inspiration bring? we are told, The revealed will of God; if we ask further, What is the revealed will of God as distinguished from "illustrative material"? we are told, That which biblical inspiration conveys. There is no definite idea to be had by this use of terms; there is rather an ambiguity which, as Mr. Sidgwick tells us in his new book on *Distinction and the Criticism of Beliefs*, is "like every other insidious fault, most effective when it is least suspected, least easy to see at a careless glance." For practical purposes biblical inspiration, as defined by Professor Smith, affords no help in determining the will of God in Scripture, but leaves it open to the individual to decide first what is revealed; then only is the inspiration brought in, as if to confirm each one in his own views of what that will is. But besides biblical inspiration for the revealed portions of Scripture, Professor Smith believes in a technical or theological inspiration, which to some

[1] The argument of Professor Briggs that *contain* rather than *is* is the doctrine of the standards, because "no statement of the Confession should be regarded as an essential and necessary statement which has not in its doctrinal parts its necessary statement in the Larger and Shorter Catechisms" (*Defence*, p. 13), would make the Shorter Catechism to be the ultimate standard.

extent influences the form in which the non-revealed matter comes to us. Both of these kinds of inspiration are said to be taught in Scripture, the one asserted frequently, the other rarely and indistinctly.[1] The non-revealed matter is inspired, not biblically and infallibly, but technically, and so in any given passage we have to decide which element is present before we can know which inspiration it has.

The present writer must confess that Professor Smith is the first theological authority from whom he has learned this distinction. It is not a distinction among the three functions of the one influence, viz.: the conveyance of divine truth, the restatement of the truths of natural religion, the truthfulness of the ordinary statements of the writers. These, Reformed theologians usually acknowledge, without feeling obliged to discriminate sharply among them. This is rather a distinction in kind; which to be operative requires the reduction of Scripture into its two component elements.

The Confession does not apparently afford any ground for this distinction. It knows but one inspiration, "immediate inspiration," and this is attributed neither to the revealed nor to the non-revealed portions, but to "the Old Testament in Hebrew," and "the New Testament in Greek," and its function was to keep the Scripture pure in all ages, and therefore authentical. Neither is the scriptural warrant for the distinction very clear, and it would have been helpful if Professor Smith had classified the passages wherein biblical inspiration is asserted, and those in which, however "rarely and indistinctly," technical inspiration is taught.

This he has not done. Moreover, the term, inspiration, *πασα γραφη θεοπνευστος*, 2 Tim. iii. 16, suggests no such distinction. Its influence extends to "all Scripture," to "the Holy Scriptures," which from a child Timothy had known, and which were able to make him wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus. If this is biblical inspiration, it covers the Old Testament Scriptures as a whole without distinction of elements; if it is merely technical inspiration, it is, on Professor Smith's ground, insufficient to convey to us the revealed will of God: it is one inspiration in either case.

That one inspiration is "the organizing principle of Scripture," as Dr. Henry B. Smith, of Union Seminary, New York, taught. Under it he held, in his *Sermon on Inspiration*, that—

[1] Professor Briggs, quoted above, evidently discards the theory of technical inspiration, and leaves the form or external production of Scripture to the mere providential care of God.

"All, even the most insignificant, portions of the original Scriptures have their life from the Spirit, even as the principle of life embraces the hairs of the head as well as the beating of the heart. All is shaped by the wise builder into one glorious temple, which speaks of him from the foundation to the topmost stone."

No authority, scriptural or confessional, can be adduced for the critical separation of the record into divine and human elements; that record, as such, is made our infallible rule of faith and practice. If it were not thus infallible as a record, its inspiration would for us mean nothing. It is no assurance to us to be told that, long ago, prophets and apostles spoke words which God gave them, for, unless we can know what those words were, it would be tantalizing to be told that they were spoken. Scarcely less tantalizing would be the other and modified statement, that the revelation is in the record, and is to be discovered there by the reader; for with the consciousness of bias and of our infirmities of judgment, we would be ill-fitted to pick out the portions clearly revealed. Who shall define for us? To whom shall it be given to locate the boundaries of faith? Wherein are we better, amid the darkness and superstition and the obtrusive falsehoods of the day, if there is a revelation in the record, but only somewhere? Those very falsehoods can and do shelter themselves behind the name of Scripture, and claim to be within the circle of Scripture truth; and when we would dislodge and expose them, they can, under Professor Smith's distinctions, claim that the passages which condemn them are historical, or circumstantial, or non-revealed, or only technically inspired. Professor Smith insists that we remember the language of the Confession, that Scripture is an infallible rule *of faith and practice.* We agree; and we in our turn insist that it be a *rule* indeed, and not a mere column of smoke, rising beautifully straight in a still atmosphere, but twisted into every variety of shape by the first zephyr of doctrine that moves across the theological firmament.

We are now prepared to define, with Professor Smith, the points of which we can say, "Thus far all are agreed." He has stated them very clearly from his position, and on that statement he proceeds to consider the errors in the present text of Scripture, as if these were the only points at issue. How far his statement expresses the agreement between the parties will appear by comparing with it a corresponding statement of what may, from the historic position of the church, be held as fairly implied in the statement of Professor Smith. If he can accept ours we will gladly accept his, and thus by an interchange of statements establish clearly the agreement between us:

(*a*), The Bible contains a revelation.	(*a*), The Bible cannot be separated into revealed truth and other material.
(*b*), It contains other material not in the proper sense revealed.	(*b*), The other material is an essential part of the history of revelation.
(*c*), This material is of importance to us, because of its bearing on the history of revelation.	(*c*), The same influence, which secures to us the revealed, secures also the other material to us.
(*d*), This material was chosen and arranged by men acting under a distinct influence of the Holy Spirit, which influence we call, technically, inspiration.	(*d*), That influence is inspiration.
(*e*), The result is a book which, in its totality, is the church's permanent and infallible rule of faith and life. *Insp. and Iner.*, p. 225.	(*e*), An infallible rule of faith and life cannot be afforded by a fallible book.

No substantial agreement can be reached unless one of these statements be allowed to explain the other. If it be held that they are not mutually explanatory, it is needless to pass on to other points at issue, for here are points of fundamental importance on which divergences have arisen, and which must be settled before other minor and secondary questions are raised. This is the justification of the arrangement of this note and of the consideration already given to "The Historic Truthfulness of Scripture," and "The Effect of Inspiration." This is the difficulty in the way of those who represent the issue as being about a few insignificant discrepancies in Scripture. Doubtless Professor Smith sincerely desired to offer the best possible explanation of these, and, as will appear below, these ought to be explained. But his explanation is a costly one if it carries away not only these discrepancies, but the truthfulness of Scripture history and inspiration in any effective sense also. One does not make war on mosquitoes with a Gatling gun, especially if those mosquitoes are flying around one's front door; and if one persist, his friends restrain him before even his first discharge, rather than leave him to learn the certain consequences of his method of warfare in the house which he himself loves so well. Wreck and ruin are heavy damages to pay for experimental methods of warfare, and also for experimental methods of biblical study.

It remains for the church to determine in an authoritative way how far away from "the historic basis of the church from the Reformation onward" is the lower court which condemns one who denies the truthfulness of Scripture history and any effective inspiration. If these be "new tests of orthodoxy," the old ones ought to be stated with great

force. If the church is in danger of a new departure under the slavery of "a mere theory," there can be no language too vehement in which to arrest her progress, but at the same time it must be clearly shown that both the trustworthiness of the record and the substantial unity of the Book under the influence of inspiration are mere theories. It cannot be too strongly or too frequently urged that the question is not primarily about "the inerrancy of the original autographs," but about the historic truthfulness and the effective inspiration of our present copies. It is to be feared that attention has been withdrawn from these, the most important points at issue, to the issue of "inerrancy," and that positions are taken in the discussion of this issue which tend to obscure those other and more important points. This applies both to those who accept inerrancy as commonly stated, and to those who reject it as an innovation—the one failing to realize that inerrancy is important only in its relations to historic truthfulness and effective inspiration, the other thinking that these being certainly secured, inerrancy is entirely unimportant. On the one hand it must be admitted that sometimes inerrancy has been treated outside of its relation to the ends which it subserves, and on the other hand it is clear that it has been lightly discarded as if those ends were already and independently attained. We are persuaded that the latter is the greater danger. The mine which has been dug under "the dry and brittle fences that constitute denominationalism," has not been stopped at the fences, but has been carried underneath the very citadel of the faith, for the reason, possibly, that the miners, working underground, have lost their bearings. Were it sprung in its present form, the fences would indeed be destroyed, but the citadel would go with the fences. This would prove a great disappointment to the victorious hosts of critics, who are represented as panting after "the heavenly glories" contained in the citadel, and just ready to capture them from the church which has for so long held them, while amid the wreck and ruin of the citadel, those who, not critics themselves, have given the critics full license, will in deep sorrow of heart wish the mine under the fences had never been begun.

The Errors in the Present Text of Scripture.

From the standpoint of historical criticism this, the last, should have been first. The order of discussion observed throughout this note is the reverse of that which prevails in writers of the school of Professor Smith. These would have given first consideration to the errors, and from their conclusions as to these would have constructed

their theory of inspiration. The present writer is not directly concerned with historical criticism as a science, but with the authority of Scripture as to faith and life. Professor Smith, and others, assure us that their views concerning these errors do not impair this authority, so that we are justified, perhaps, in giving first consideration to the questions which do so deeply involve that authority, and in leaving to the last those errors which, whatever our view about them, do not, according to Professor Smith, abate it. For Bible students generally, and for the great body of the church, this method is valid, even if, for specialists, the method adopted by the school of criticism be preferable.

It is hardly necessary to say that these errors are not a new discovery. The surprise and even alarm with which they have recently been greeted are periodical in the history of the church. The controversies of the last century, which dealt largely with the various discrepancies, variations, and contradictions might profitably be studied by any who, for the first time, have heard of these. And it is quite superfluous to confront the church at large, as has been done in a recent and widely-distributed sermon, with the alternative of confessing to a "lack either in candor or in mathematical common sense," for there is no disposition to deny any of the "contradictions between the Book of Kings and the Book of Chronicles."

But while there are errors, there is no conceded list of errors. We are frequently warned that, unless we are prudent, the critics will publish their list, but it is open to doubt whether the list is entirely ready for publication. Indeed, we might almost be reconciled to its appearance, if it were ready, because then our Damoclean suspense would be ended and we would know the worst. Meanwhile our broad, modern investigation is continually bringing unlooked-for confirmations of Scripture and correcting our misinterpretations of obscure passages, and men like Canon Rawlinson are telling us that "when such a contradiction has seemed to be found [between authentic history and the Hebrew records], it has invariably happened that in the progress of historical inquiry the author from whom it proceeds has lost credit and finally become to be regarded as an entirely untrustworthy authority."

Until this forthcoming list of errors appears, any thorough-going analysis is impossible. The favorite term is "errancy," but obscurity must lurk in any term that covers not only grammatical and literary faults in general, but mistakes in names and numbers as in the list of the dukes

of Edom, the roster of David's army, and the figures in certain wars; variations, as in the forms of the Lord's Prayer, the Decalogue and the words of Institution; exaggerations, and a bias which makes it necessary for us to read between the lines to detect what the writer may betray of himself. A like obscurity must attach to any doctrine, such as the so-called doctrine of inerrancy, which seeks to vindicate moral faults on the same principles which it applies to clerical errors and poor syntax, and which labors with variant accounts along the lines needed for tainted testimony. For these reasons the controversy, while noisy, has been desultory.

Nor is the real importance of the question at issue fully agreed upon. Professor Smith apparently is not at one with himself. He says—

In his *Insp. and Iner.*, pp. 301, 302: "We who study the Bible as exegetes are obliged to notice the actually existing discrepancies. We cannot deny their existence, or say, with Mr. Lowe, that they are not material [*sic*]. We know they are there."

In his *Insp. and Iner.*, p. 343: "Remember the point at issue. It is not whether there is material [*sic*] variation. It is not whether the New Testament writer makes a legitimate application of what he quotes," etc., etc.

The passage from his *Argument* refers to but one class of discrepancies—the variations of the New Testament quotations from the Old Testament language; but it does not appear how these can be immaterial, while of the discrepancies in general we cannot "say that they are not material."

In this state of the question, it may suffice to remark that,

1, To those who regard the authority of Scripture, an error in the original means more than an error in our copies, for the same reason that, if water be poisoned in its source, the damage is more serious than if that poison be introduced at some point along its course. It is, therefore, legitimate to assign to transmission as many of the errors noted as it will fairly explain, without being chargeable with overzeal for the authority of the Scripture.

2, The authority of Scripture depends, not necessarily upon exactness, but rather upon accuracy, in its statements. The distinction is one to be felt rather than fully expressed. It implies that this authority is vindicated if it "secure a correct statement of the facts and principles intended to be affirmed," and that more than this is not essential. This is the answer to Professor Smith's query, which in substance is, You admit grammatical errancy, why deny historical errancy? And the reason is, that the one is consistent, and the other inconsistent, with a correct statement of these facts.

3, It is doubtful if an admission of historical errancy would satisfy some of the critical school. Already a philosophical errancy has been asserted, and an eschatological errancy is at least suggested. This Cerberus has not yet stated just what sop will appease him, and those who long for peace are liable to disappointment very soon after they have formally conceded historical errancy. In fact, peace between the church and the present critical position seems rather far away.

The Judgment.

In the case of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America against the Rev. Henry Preserved Smith, D. D., Presbytery, after careful deliberation upon the charges, specifications and testimony, has arrived at the following conclusions:

(1), Charge I. and the two specifications under it are not sustained. Dr Smith is, therefore, declared not guilty of this charge, and is hereby fully acquitted.

(2), Charge II. is sustained. All the specifications under this charge are also sustained except the eighth, which is not sustained.

(3), Charge III. is sustained. All the specifications under this charge are sustained.

Charges II. and III. have thus been proved, and Dr. Smith is found guilty of both of these charges.

Therefore, the judgment of the Presbytery, sitting as a court, is that the Rev. Henry Preserved Smith, D. D., be, and hereby is, suspended from the ministry of the Presbyterian Church, until such time as he shall make manifest, to the satisfaction of Presbytery, his renunciation of the errors he has been found to hold, and his solemn purpose no longer to teach or propagate them.

At the same time, the Presbytery expresses the kindest feelings toward Professor Smith, and it makes this disposition of the case because the interests of truth imperatively demand it.

This judgment is based upon the decision of the court acquitting Professor Smith of charge I., and sustaining charges II. and III. Its effect is to declare that the court found that the views charged to Professor Smith were his views, and that they were contrary to the standards of the church. So far as a court of original jurisdiction can decide, this is a judicial decision, although not a final decision.

The censure imposed has been made a distinct ground of appeal by Professor Smith in that this "penalty would be excessive even if I were guilty of the offences charged." It should be borne in mind, however, that it was recognized from the very beginning that the issue involved ministerial standing. Any sentence lighter than suspension does not do this. If the present writer is not mistaken, Professor Smith in insisting upon certain technicalities during the

trial did so on the very proper ground that his ministerial standing was in question, and that he must protect himself in every possible way. And, even if this be untrue, there was no suggestion made in the discussion of the case, that it was merely a question of admonishing him for his utterances; on the contrary, one of the strongest pleas in his behalf was that it would imperil his future usefulness to the church. Not until the decision of the court upon the charges was about to be rendered was the question raised between admonition and rebuke on the one hand, and suspension on the other.

Further, the same reasons which led a portion of the court to oppose the initiation of process, led them with accelerated force to oppose the sentence of suspension. They thought at the outset that no ground for action existed, and very naturally they voted against the resolution appointing the Committee of Prosecution; against the sufficiency of the charges in form and legal effect, though not against all of the specifications; and against sustaining any one of the charges. It was to be expected, therefore, that if some censure must be imposed they would also favor the mildest one possible. To these must be added another portion of the court which, while it sanctioned the initiation of process, disapproved of one or more steps in that process, and accordingly of the censure imposed. The opposition to the sentence of suspension was, therefore, in one sense original and in another sense cumulative.

The censure itself stands midway in the ascending scale; it is as far away from the severest as it is from the mildest; and it ought to be taken as expressing the degree of disapproval felt by the court for the views of Professor Smith. If only a mild disapproval of the views held by Professor Smith was felt, this penalty was excessive; but the only measure of the degree of disapproval is the censure itself, and, by imposing suspension, the court indicated how deep that disapproval was. The censure is a judicial condemnation of the error as radical, and it was chosen in preference to deposition, only because of the hope that the future might effect some modification that would justify the court in removing it. If the procedure had provided for access of penalty from any lower censure to the one next above, that of rebuke might have been urged on the ground, that, if it proved ineffective, suspension could, without further process, have been inflicted; but, as shown above, this access of penalty is limited to suspension in relation to deposition. The effect of a censure of admonition or rebuke is ex-

hausted as soon as the formula has been pronounced, and it not only leaves ministerial standing unimpaired, but imposes no further restraint unless fresh utterances be made the subject of entirely new process. As Professor Smith gave no intimation of any purpose to modify or restrain the expression of his views, rebuke would, therefore, have been inadequate.

The Appeal and the Complaint.

Twelve grounds of appeal are stated by Professor Smith, some of which have been cited and discussed. The others pertain to the sufficiency of Charges II. and III., to the action of the court in sustaining these charges, to certain testimony, and to the vote of a member of the court, which was recorded and counted in his absence.

A complaint is also lodged by certain members of the court, not of the Prosecuting Committee, against the action in dismissing Charge I. as not sustained on the ground of evidence which the complaint affirms was not properly before the court.

In this double form, the case will be heard by the Synod of Ohio, which convenes in the Second Church of Cincinnati in the month of October.

Meanwhile, Professor Smith has called the attention of the Board of Trustees of Lane Seminary to the censure under which he is resting. As the constitution of the Seminary requires only that professors be members, not necessarily ministers, of the Presbyterian Church, the question of the status of Professor Smith at this time might have been raised. It was not raised, however, and Professor Smith was, after this session (not immediately, because of the practical difficulty of providing a substitute), relieved from his duties until his case be finally decided. In deference to the Presbytery the Board could not do less; in justice to Professor Smith, it ought not to have done more.

W. S. Plumer Bryan.

Cincinnati.

VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

Dabney's "Discussions."

Discussions. *By Robert L. Dabney, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Texas, and for many years Professor of Theology in the Union Theological Seminary in Virginia.* Edited by C. R. Vaughan, D. D, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church of New Providence, Va. Vol. III. Philosophical. 8vo, pp. 611. $4.00. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1892.

Dr. Dabney's contributions to ethical literature have long challenged the respect of scholars. Those who have followed his distinguished career will hail with much satisfaction the third volume of the series in which more than a score of his best-known productions appear. Rigidly conservative in tone, they are the deliberate conclusions which have been reached through his experience and varied studies. He eminently deserves our thanks and appreciation.

To enunciate and defend many of his propositions requires intellectual fortitude of a high order. There is something magnetic and dynamic in the atmosphere of that writer and speaker who can exhibit the full strength of his convictions, who will neither prevaricate nor retract.

We are struck with the condensed energy of the author in the opening article of this third volume, "The Morality of the Legal Profession." Nothing can exceed the fine spirit and vigor which mark his attack upon the traditional morality of the profession. Nowhere in literature can be found a clearer exposition of the claims of society upon the lawyer, nor a more relentless criticism of the sophistries by which, too often, members of the legal profession seek to defend their conspiracy against justice. To do such work for the public requires a strength of character which cannot palliate nor excuse. Speaking of the hardening influence which results from tampering with our moral faculties, he says: "It may not be done with impunity. Truth has her sanctities, and if she sees them dishonored she will hide her vital beams from the eyes which delighted to see error dressed in her holy attributes, until the reprobate mind is given over to delusions, to believe lies." No man could know better than Dr. Dabney the entire improbability of any tangible result from his arraignment of the practical ethics of the bar. No personal advantage could be derived from such bold utterances as these. The words, however, were necessary to be spoken. We are thankful for them. We rejoice also in such an exhibition of loyalty to duty.

The next article is a calm philosophic survey of that period when the aims of Buckle and Mill began to be understood in Great Britain.

Under the head of "Positivism in England," he traces the genesis, progress and development of that peculiar phase of thought which gained a bad prominence

under the name of Comptism. Positivism affected the name of Comte for thirty years. It embraced two continents. Our author correctly describes its progress. Starting with the sensational philosophy of Locke it was transformed by Hume into a philosophy of skepticism; was differentiated by the encyclopedists of France into ethical, political, and religious forms, till it had spent its popular force in the Revolution of 1792. The fathers of Comte's philosophy were Montesquieu, Turgot, and particularly Condorcet. The bald materialism of the preceding century was suppressed, but new functions were ascribed to matter, and mind was regarded as its phenomenon.

In a succession of six particulars Dr. Dabney points out the claims and the errors of the positivists. We should have been pleased to see more space allotted to the refutation of the errors. For Positivism is really nothing unless materialistic, and emerges in philosophy in three forms: First, The mind is a series of phenomena or a sum of exercises. Second, The mind is the result of material organism. Third, The mind is one side of a double-faced substance, or, without being the effect of the material series, it is its shadow, and, as Clifford says, "goes along with it." Now, for all this pretended show of science, there is a refutation short, sharp, and decisive. It is grounded in the law of continuity and conservation of energy. It results in a scientific demonstration that puts the materialist wholly out of court. Spencer, twenty years ago, felt its force, and re-installed mind as a real, substantive agent. Scientific infidelity now falls back upon Agnosticism. Whether under this name the reticent and sad-visaged crowd of materialists are more potent for evil than before, is an open question, but it is certain that they have made good their retreat beyond the missiles of philosophy.

A number of Dr. Dabney's articles are interesting and important only as mirrors of the times and occasions which called them forth, as "Liberty and Slavery," "Geology and the Bible," "A Caution against Antichristian Science," and others. This would almost necessarily be the case, in any current literature, after a lapse of twenty-five and thirty years. This cannot, however, be said of "Popish Literature and Education." It is more important than ever before in the history of our country. It is saying no more than is commonly said by our highest authorities, that we are on the verge of perilous times. Daily events as well as our newspapers seem to be conditioned by the Spectre upon the Tiber. In this article we see, it seems to me, Dr. Dabney in one of his finest moods. In the power to launch invective without acrimony he appears to have few equals. One instance must serve to illustrate this: "The policy of Rome in her education is that of the lordly slave-owner towards his bondsmen. To promote the interest or the pomp of their lords, slaves were trained to be masterly musicians, scribes, rhetoricians, and even poets and philosophers; but still they must exert their attainments only for their masters. And so would Rome lay hold on our children, the sons of freemen of free America, and make them only accomplished slaves." Every sentence in this noble defence of Protestant education should become a text for meditation and instruction in every household in all our land.

"The Philosophy of Dr. Bledsoe" and "The Philosophy of Volition" occupy nearly one hundred pages. The latter is implicitly contained in the former. The discussion would be regarded as wearisome in its prolixity and reiteration were it not for the polemical skill of Dr. Dabney. The whole is worthy of a trained logician. There are, however, one or two points which may be mentioned, in which there

appears to be a departure from the common apologetics of the Reformed Churches. In defending the certainty of a future event it is customary to ground this certainty in God himself. To erect a philosophy here, to attempt to construe this mystery in thought, has produced no satisfactory result.

Dr. Dabney grounds the divine foreknowledge in the certain prevision of a chain of human volitions. The volitions, then, must be certain. But this can only result from the efficiency of motive. Motive must then be connected with a certain tendency, and this in turn with environment, etc. In other words, the defence in this form is committed to a fruitless *regress*, and the mystery remains as opaque as ever.

The other point referred to relates to the imputation of Adam's sin. Dr. Bledsoe's allegations are manifestly directed against the common doctrine of the Reformed Churches. Dr. Dabney answers by defending, not the Calvinist's position, but the doctrine of Placaeus. It is apparently a case of *ignoratio elenchi*.

Aside from this, he abandons a strong scriptural position for an exceedingly doubtful one in philosophy. Scripture teaches that the penalty pronounced upon Adam was alienation from God. This alienation, with its consequent depravation of nature, has been the lot of his descendants. This lot may be called an inheritance by natural law, but it is a punishment inconceivably great; such punishment presupposes guilt. We are not guilty because born in sin, but rather born in sin because we are guilty. If Adam's sin is imputed because of our depravity, then Adam's sin becomes the effect of its own consequence. Federal guilt is the analogue of federal righteousness, according to the standard of Scripture. The ground of this guilt is, of course, judicial; its justice, in this sense, we do not need to argue. The discussion does not appear to throw any new light upon the subject of determinism.

What is the value of such discussions? Neither side is convinced. The direct object is probably never attained. The value, however, is very great. The mind is acuminated and strengthened. Studies in Calvinism supply to the mind an inexhaustible source of stimuli, and, under the regulative influence of Scripture, awaken its deepest energies. The formal principle of Calvinism is the divine sovereignty. To this principle the soul returns again and again for rest and inspiration after painful flights in the regions of abstract thought.

The essay on "The Emotions" is professedly a review of a book of the same title by Dr. McCosh. Of this book little is said, perhaps because but little could be said. If Dr. McCosh has made any valuable contribution to psychology, the critics have been painfully slow in finding it. Dr. Dabney treats his subject with a clear and comprehensive insight. In a terminology somewhat antiquated and cumbersome, he has given the essential elements of the best modern exposition. His fault possibly may be in over-elaboration. He says, "Feeling is the temperature of thought. . . . . If a man lost totally all feeling, what would then be left to energize his attention so as to direct it voluntarily to any given subject of thought? Nothing."

This is true, but it requires a more general and fundamental statement. Feeling cannot indeed be defined, but it can be stated in terms of consciousness. It is itself a state of consciousness, that is to say, more explicitly, it is the medium in consciousness by which the relation of self to its state is constituted. Or, in other words, there is no consciousness without feeling; or, as it has been stated by

an eminent psychologist, there is no consciousness which is not feeling. Hence feeling is coëxtensive with self. Still further: Self does not possess, but is activity. Consequently feeling is one side of all mental activity. To give a complete account, therefore, of feeling would be to follow self in its every process of realization, both in direction and content. This is numerically impossible. But a ground of division is seen in the activities of self. There are, then, as many classes of feeling as there are varieties of self-realization. Following this order of development there is no difficulty in writing out a logical and comprehensive classification of the feelings.

Dr. Dabney does indeed recognize the above basal idea as a fact, but not as a fundamental and regulative principle. He proceeds to his classification by a metaphysical method. We should proceed by the empirical method. His list has a theological bearing of considerable significance. As such it is worthy of attentive study.

The discussion, "What is Inductive Demonstration?" followed by "The Nature of Physical Causes and their Induction," and also by "Applications of Induction and Analogy," may be considered as one subject. In these articles the learned author proceeds to show, first, what is the common view of induction; second, the true nature of physical cause; third, some applications of his results. The whole is highly original. We regret to add that it is not convincing. He proposes to break with the whole literature of logic, when he closes his second article with the conclusion that "induction and deduction are not two forms of reasoning, but one and the same." We had supposed there was a difference, and if it turns out now that we were mistaken, much of our "time has gone to waste" in explaining the distinction.

He closes his first article with the statement, "Real demonstration cannot be grounded in uncertainties." This we freely admit. Real demonstration belongs only to apodictic knowledge, and this kind of knowledge belongs, as Aristotle pointed out, chiefly to the mathematical. Notwithstanding the interesting and learned argument of our author, it seems to me that we shall have to rest content with what Paley calls "the probabilities of life" rather than demonstrated certainties. Nor is mathematical certainty at all necessary in the affairs and morals of life. Manifestly that which is the most probable, is, in morals, the most certainly in the line of duty. The only possible way in which "real demonstration" can be predicated of induction is by the dogmatic method of Professor Bain, that is, by sacrificing our intuitions at the altar of the idol of the sensationalist's experience. This is to assert that our axioms and the causal notion are inductions from facts of experience. This our author would not consciously do. He firsts selects the definitions of various writers upon logic, inductive and deductive, such as Whately, Whewell, etc., and states his objections. Thus quoting from Whewell: "Deductive truths are the results of relations among our *thoughts*. Inductive truths are the relations which we perceive among existing *things*." He says, "Now the insufficiency of these descriptions is obvious from these remarks; lines, angles, solids in geometry, are as truly *things* as any observed phenomena or effects in physics." Upon this objection no comment is necessary save that the concepts of mathematics as lines, angles, etc., are not *things* at all, neither are phenomena, nor are effects things.

Next he passes in review Bowen, Porter, Stewart, and Mill, frankly admitting

that these authorities, with Hamilton, concede that "physical induction can never demonstrate absolutely a universal truth." One would suppose that this weight of authority ought to settle the question. Our author thinks otherwise, and proceeds to prove his point. He first, however, illustrates his meaning of an inductive argument, one that amounts to a "real demonstration," by supposing a party exploring "a Brazilian forest where every tree and fruit is new to them. One of the travellers sees a fruit of brilliant color, fragrant odor, and pleasing flavor, which he plucks and eats." The result is described as giving evidence of the poisonous quality of the fruit, first, because of the sensations which follow the eating, and second, because of the fact that nothing has been eaten, excepting the fruit, but the dried beef, the biscuits and the coffee which constitute their daily fare. On the strength of this the sufferer exclaims to his companions, "If you eat this fruit you will be poisoned." "What," asks our author, "constitutes his demonstration?" His answer is, "This fruit, the sole antecedent of the painful effect, *must therefore be the true cause*, and must affect other human lips, other things being the same, in the same way."

Upon this proof we may remark, first, travellers have not altogether escaped the experience of poisoned coffee, biscuits, and even dried beef; second, toxicologists inform us that poisons frequently exhibit queer freaks of discontinuity. The same circumstances apparently yield opposite results. One man eats his dose of poison and is poisoned, his companion eats the same dose, at the same time, and in the same way, and is not poisoned. If the cases were not alike, and the same, human induction could not detect the difference.

The next proof of the author is found in the "method of agreement." He makes the following supposition: "Let us suppose the cases agree in this: one antecedent remains the same in each, and the same effect appears after each cluster of antecedents, however the other antecedents may change. Thus, in case first, $a + b + c$ are followed by x. In case second, $a + d + e$ are followed by x. In case third, $a + f + g$ are followed by x. Let it be postulated that these are all the antecedents. Then the true cause of x must be among them. But in case first, neither d, nor e, nor f, nor g, could have caused x, for they were absent. In cases second and third, neither b nor c could have caused x for they were absent. Therefore a was the true cause each time. . . . . The law of nature gotten in this case is, that a will always, *ceteris paribus*, produce x."

If all the antecedents except a are regarded as absent in the named order, then, of course, they were not antecedents at all, and we have only to consider the relation established between a and x. We cannot doubt that a will be followed by x, *ceteris paribus*, in every experience, provided we can identify the concrete a. But how about *ceteris paribus?* How shall we know that things are equal? Is the same conjunction of circumstances ever duplicated? The axiom of Leibnitz on differentials teaches that no two things are exactly alike, not even two rain-drops. Can we know that things will reappear in the same order of relation and efficiency? Unless we can affirm this and prove it, we have reached, not a "real demonstration," but, at most, only a high degree of probability. Our author proceeds to display the whole apparatus of the inductive logic, and reaches a conclusion directly opposed to all authority as to the nature of the proof afforded by inductive logic. In confusing inductive and deductive reasoning, he completely ignores the whole

field of pure mathematics, which is deductive or nothing, and those numerous cases when a universal principle is made the ground of deductive applications. Our author further concludes that induction is syllogism, and cites Mill to sustain this opinion, but it is a citation which does not sustain. We think induction is not syllogism, and think further that this is the consensus of modern authority.

Aside from these conclusions, and the trifling errors we have been enabled to point out, these articles will abundantly repay a careful perusal. They abound in useful knowledge, which find varied and important applications in literature.

We think the best article in the series is the one entitled "Final Causes." This is a teleological gem of the first quality. It is in entire consonance with the highest Christian thought. It is original, if anything on this subject can be said to be original, and of permanent value. We have space to quote but one of the many forcible and suggestive illustrations: "Here are several batteries set in array to break down an enemy's wall. We observe that the guns throw solid shot, convergently at every discharge, upon a single fixed spot in the opposing curtain, with the evident design to concentrate their forces, and break down one chasm in that wall. Now, it is mere mockery to say that, given the cannon and the balls, the explosive force of gunpowder and gravity, the fall of these shots is accounted for. . . . The thing to be accounted for is their regular convergence. The blind causes do not and cannot account for it; it discloses design."

The next article we notice is "Monism." There are two ways of refuting a speculation. We may show its evil tendency in society or in the church, in morals and in the Christian religion. But the evidence ought to be fairly given, and the causal relation very evident. The other method will be to pull down, philosophically speaking, the whole edifice. Dogmatic realism might well content itself with exposing the many, and often latent, sins of idealism. In this case we think the author could have realized his purpose more directly had he described the evils which Monism has inflicted upon morals and the Christian religion. It is easy, and generally quite safe, to predict impending evils as incident to a certain speculation or philosophy; it is better, if possible, to exhibit some of the ripened fruit. In any statement of this kind, adverse to certain kinds of Monism, we should, no doubt, cheerfully agree with the author. Since he has taken a different course, and shown why on philosophical grounds Monism should be rejected, we feel inclined to except, in part, to the adequacy of his showing.

Monism presents itself under three general forms: 1. Matter and its phenomena, as presentation, are modes or products of mental activity. 2. Mind and its phenomena are modes of matter or products of physical organization. 3. Both mind and matter and their phenomena are the two sides of a substance which is at once their unity and reality. The second form, under criticism, takes refuge in the third, whence it is driven to a final retreat by the application and force of recognized scientific principles. Under the first form nearly every surviving Monistic system may be grouped. Here realism and idealism meet and recoil; realism expresses itself in ephithet, idealism retorts with contempt. The novice is apt to join himself to realism. Its propositions are few, and easy to be understood, and very comforting to common sense. Idealism, on the contrary, has much to say, and things hard to be understood and repugnant to the impromptu philosophy of men.

Into such studies have been cast the most patient abstractions of the race. I take it the author means to include under the head of Monism the entire succes-

sion of post-Kantian absolutists. Would he deny to these studies any claim upon our attention, that they are among the most powerful instruments of mental discipline? If these claims are to be set aside they should be set aside for good reasons. If, however, they are evil in tendency and clearly inflict more evil than good, that of itself ought to determine our position in relation to them. But our author does not attempt to impeach the moral character of these studies, but proceeds to arraign them for their rational obliquities, and herein writes like an opponent determined to relegate them to philosophical ignominy. His reasons, then, directed against all those who teach Monism are, of course, well selected and the strongest we may assume within his reach. We have no time to more than glance at these, but we will begin at the first. "Monism is to be rejected because its inevitable corollary must be either atheism or pantheism. If there is no being that is real in the universe, except the one, the absolute being; if all phenomenal beings are but *modi subsistendi* of this one, then it must include God along with all creatures (so called) in substantive oneness." The major proposition here, that Monism teaches there is no being that is real but the one, is defective in material, inasmuch as the fundamental proposition of Hegel is, *whatsoever is rational is real.*

Our author adds, very wisely, we think, "It is not said that every monist has avowed either (pantheism or atheism) or that all of them have seen clearly whither their speculation will lead them." This is charitable, but it is rather a reflection on their intellectual competency, especially when the author further adds: "But none the less is the corollary as unavoidable as it is simple," particularly when it is understood that two, at least, of the British universities are represented by Hegelians, whose power as thinkers is everywhere recognized, and whose orthodoxy as true preachers of the Word has never been questioned.

The next objection urged against Monism is thus stated, "Monistic speculations are obviously the results of an over-eager craving for simplification." What is exactly meant by "over-eager craving" does not clearly appear. But if the author means to say that the desire for simplicity has been excessive, the fact can only be known in the performance. If the performance is evil, its very simplicity will help uncover the evil. To seek a simple expression for our knowledge must, we think, be an advantage in physics, as it certainly is in mathematics. How much more so in subject-studies where even the data of its problems are in question?

Time fails to follow all the objections offered by the learned author. They do not seem to attain their end. They are far too general. Their spirit is not calm and philosophical. They lack the marks of research and patient effort. In saying this we are not to be understood as holding a brief for Monism. Our author has included under this term some of the chief lights of idealism. He uses the argument common to realism. The two principal divisions of philosophy are set in opposition to each other. We care for neither as speculations, nor as purposive. They are too human to be worshipped. But we do care for them as mental exercises. As such they are not necessarily antithetic, they are complementary. In study they should be conjoined, not only for the purpose of exhibiting the resources and modes of mind, but usefully serving as checks upon each other.

Monism, as comprehensively used by our author, includes in its ranks the profoundest inquirers since the time of Kant. Shall the reader be warned off this field as profane, as illusive, as dangerous to faith? We know of no act of our

life, no study of human production which is not attended with danger. To be born is dangerous. No kind of philosophy, as such, is free from error, and its study, apart from the regulative principle of the Bible, is sure to lead astray. In this Book may be found the indicia of enduring truth, the Ariadne thread which gives both direction and confidence to the philosopher as he gropes his way amid the dark moral and mental problems of our life.

Aside from the distinguished names which he has described as monists there is one which is, perhaps, as frequently quoted on the side of Monism as on the side of realism. I refer to Lotze. His enemies, as well as friends, claim him now as a realist, now as an idealist. He is both. Under the magic of his philosophy the most diverse, so-called, and irreconcilable principles are received into a common unity and there abide in peace. It seems proper that this name should be mentioned in this connection as our author has seen fit to mention it with respect. But if this great philosopher is also to be banished, who is left in the modern field? Kant alone, and he, possibly, also under ban. It is true our author has given a list of five names which he declares to be illustrious. Of these, Jouffroy left no philosophy, for he created none. His only claim to notice is that of a commentator of the Scotch philosophers of his time. As to Cousin, he was, as is well known, an eclectic, and, as we think, a syncretist. He extended toleration to all philosophies. He declared that Monism was not false, but incomplete. Hamilton's position as a relativist and as a redactor and interpreter of Reid is too well known for comment. The last on the list will go down in the history of philosophy as the daring and subtle expositor of ontology, who began and ended his exposition in two sentences thus: "What is Being? All we can say of Being is, that Being is Being!"

Not one of these writers has given us anything which is entitled to the name of a metaphysic. And this is especially significant since evolution has, as it is thought, cancelled the argument of teleology for the divine existence. If the argument from design must indeed be withdrawn from Christian theism, then realism alone is not adequate to fill the hiatus with a philosophical conception of the infinite, as unitary, personal, being with metaphysical attributes. Our author speaks in high respect of Hamilton, and in corresponding depreciation of Spencer. Now this is worthy of notice since Spencer traces his agnosticism directly to Hamilton's doctrine of the unknowable, and especially since it is well-known that Spencer has reinstated mind as the prius, or the necessary implication in a philosophical view of the universe.

With that form of Monism which was the more common view of the Stoics as held by Cleanthes and probably by Zeno, that cause is not to be distinguished from matter; with that Monism also, which characterized the philosophy of Spinoza and his followers, we of course have no sympathy. Against this form of Monism we regard the objections of the author as almost unexceptionable. But to regard Fichte, Schelling and Hegel as properly classed with Spinozists, with Comte, or with materialists of any name, is a misapplication, it would seem, of terms of the doctrine and the essential aim of the post-Kantian absolutists. It is now generally conceded that the polemics of Mansel and Hamilton against the Absolute of Schelling and others of his following, were wholly misdirected.

Prof. Flint, of the Chair of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh, is both clear and emphatic on this point. The one animating principle of the philosophy of these absolutists was, according to his authority, to make it manifest

that God must be the sole object of all philosophy, and as self-evidenced in all science. Hence we claim that the absolute philosophy disclosed a high aim and achieved a great advance toward a philosophical theism. That this view must be accepted seems certain on the authority of Erdmann, Ueberweg, Kuno Fischer, and Pfleiderer. But how about the tendency to pantheism? This tendency is conceded. It was inevitable at first as the unforeseen implication of a philosophy determined to exhibit God as the ground of all existence, and the pre-supposition of all knowledge. Immanence seemed for a time to obscure transcendence. This was soon seen to be a misrepresentation of the absolute philosophy, and Ulrici, Weisse, and last but not least, Lotze, have abundantly vindicated the transcendence of God while maintaining the fundamental conception of a unitary and personal ground of all reality.

From what has preceded, Monism, it will be seen, may embrace a great variety of speculations. We now replace the three divisions previously given by a somewhat different and a more explicit doctrinal classification, as follows: Monism may mean (*a*), materialism; (*b*), pantheism, of which Spinozism is the type; (*c*), an all-embracing, impersonal force, which view is commonly charged upon Spencer, and to which he has given both assent and denial; (*d*), the affirmation of one basal, personal spirit, in whom and by whom all things consist. The chief representative of the last form is Lotze. Monism is, therefore, many. Our author treats it as one. Hence, our contention is manifest. His article, we think, lacks a proper discrimination. All that part of modern philosophy which prevailed after the time of Kant, and which has been the ambition of our most learned scholars to understand and exploit, he lays under sweeping and unreflecting condemnation. Nevertheless, within proper limits, as has been already pointed out, his objections to Monism are, in the main, acceptable, and, we think, just.

In this volume there are many articles of great merit which we have no space to notice. In conclusion, we are satisfied it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to find a book so many-sided, abounding in debatable subjects, and with so few errors. We hope Dr. Vaughan may be permitted to glean again in the literary workshop of his friend.

W. J. Wright.

Fulton, Mo.

Robertson's Early Religion of Israel.

The Early Religion of Israel, as set forth by the Biblical Writers and by Modern Critical Historians. The Baird Lecture for 1889. *By James Robertson, D. D., Professor of Oriental Languages in the University of Glasgow.* New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co.; Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1892. Pp xii., 524.

The fires of criticism still burn fiercely on the field of Old Testament literature. For some time the advanced critics seem to have had things pretty much their own way; Kuenen, Wellhausen, Dillmann, Stade and Renan on the continent, and Robertson, Smith Driver, Cheyne, Toy and Briggs among the Anglo-Saxon writers, have all written on the side of advanced historical criticism. Writers on the other side have not been found wanting; still it must be confessed that the advanced critics are bold and confident, and to a certain extent have secured a hearing from the public. In these circumstances it is refreshing to find a book like the one

before us, which so confidently calls in question the soundness of the results of this school of Higher Criticism. Professor Robertson, in this Baird Lecture, undertakes to vindicate in a very intelligent and satisfactory way the real historical nature of the account given in the Sacred Scriptures of the origin, nature and growth of the early religion of Israel. And while it cannot be said that our author holds very definitely to what is now termed the "traditional" theory, still we are satisfied that his treatise will serve to call a halt on the side of advanced criticism. Moreover, we are willing to say that even though at several points we are inclined to think that our author concedes too much to the critics, yet we are sure that criticism must answer this book before it can attempt to continue its victorious march. We, therefore, hail with joy a treatise which will do something to vindicate the historicity of the biblical account of the religion of the Israelites, and help men to look fairly at both sides of very perplexing questions.

Perhaps this review can do the reader no better service in this connection than to present an outline of our author's reasoning in support of what he terms the biblical theory of the early religion of Israel. In doing so a little criticism will be mingled with much commendation of a very effective discussion of the question.

In an introductory chapter it is shown that the English reader of the Bible is not necessarily so helpless in relation to these inquiries as is often supposed, and as the advanced critics would have us believe. He maintains, and with good effect, that scholarship and a technical knowledge of the Hebrew, however valuable in many respects, is not absolutely necessary in order to a proper estimate of the problems raised by historical criticism, for the appeal in most cases may very properly be made to an intelligent common sense. Our author proposes to conduct the discussion in such a manner that the ordinary reader may understand the reasonings; and there can be no doubt that he has succeeded well in his endeavor.

The first chapter treats of the religious character of the history of Israel. It is shown that Israel's place among the nations is unique. The peculiar features of its history are connected with its religion. The influence of that religion, in spite of adverse circumstances, is shown to have been world-wide, as appears in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Then the real question in debate is stated thus: What is the essential difference between the religion of Israel and that of other nations, and how can that difference be determined? What is the origin of this peculiar religion, and how is its history to be understood?

The second chapter states the two contending theories which undertake to explain this remarkable history. The one is that of the Biblical writers, and the other that of modern historical critics. Of the main factors in each our author gives a concise and comprehensive statement. According to the Biblical theory the Israelitish people from the days of Abraham stood in a peculiar relation to God, according to which they received in various ways intimations of his will. They were brought to Egypt and fell into bondage there. By a signal display of divine power they were delivered from that bondage, brought safely through the Red Sea, and led up to Sinai. There they received from God in a miraculous manner the law and ritual, and were enjoined to observe the things which were commanded them by the Lord. They were thus constituted a holy nation, the people of Jehovah, but they never actually attained fully to the ideal set before them. For unbelief on the borders of Canaan they were doomed to wander in the wilderness till that generation all died. In due time under Joshua they entered

Canaan, and got possession of the most of it. During the subsequent period of the Judges they relapsed often into idolatry and were punished in various ways. During this period it is not easy to get at the exact state of affairs in Israel. Under David and Solomon the nation attained its greatest glory. Afterwards the nation was divided into the two kingdoms of Judah and Israel, and a period of conflict and declension followed, ending in dispersion and captivity. Then comes the restoration in Ezra's day, and the period of rigid Judaism leads up to the advent of the Messiah. Such is a brief outline of the Biblical theory which our author defends. The modern critical theory is stated in substance as follows: Some wandering Hebrew tribes came from the desert and settled in Canaan. Their tribal or national deity was Jehovah. They had certain religious traditions, but their religious faith and practices were not unlike those of surrounding tribes. They by degrees adopted many of the religious ideas and customs of these tribes. These customs gradually grew into laws, and their early legends became history. When history, strictly so-called, finds these people they were found to be practicing religious rites which had grown up in this way. The biblical books which relate this history, at least up to about the eighth century B. C., did not come into existence in their present form till long after the events occurred. These books were manipulated by later hands, and later ideas were thrown back to earlier times in a sort of fictitious way. The prophets then appear upon the scene to elevate and purify the religious ideas of Israel. They were the first to teach ethic monotheism. The result was that the fully developed legal and ritual system came last, from the days of Josiah on to Ezra and the exile. The last is the real starting point of mature Mosaism, out of which arose modern Judaism. The whole progress is purely naturalistic, and takes place according to the principle of continuous natural development from animism to monotheism, from simple native customs to elaborate Mosaism. This is the modern critical theory in general which our author proceeds to criticise and set aside. The religious history runs through a course of development, and the question is as to the explanation of that development. The method our author proposes to follow is to deal with the period from Moses up to the time when, as is admitted on both sides, we find the writing of some of the contemporary prophets. The starting point is from the first *writing* prophets, and from this period our author works his way carefully backwards to the age of Moses. The two theories are to be tested by historical inquiries instituted concerning this period. Our author evidently shows a good deal of skill in the choice of the battle-ground, and yet even his opponents cannot fairly find fault with the way in which the lines of conflict are laid down.

In chapter III. our author enters at once on his task. As already indicated he begins with the early writing prophets. These are Amos and Hosea, about 850–750 B. C. From a study of the writings of these prophets some hints are gathered regarding the condition of Israel in their day, and during the age immediately preceding it. Starting from the fact of the *existence* of these writings they are considered as mere *literary* products and as *religious* compositions. Regarded as literary productions he concludes that the writings of Amos and Hosea show a very considerable degree of literary activity and attainment. Language was well developed, and it was written and read as well as spoken. It was in fact a literary age with a reading and writing community of considerable extent. Considered as religious compositions the writings of Amos and Hosea imply a very considerable

degree of religious intelligence and education. These writings also indicate an antecedent religious culture of no mean degree, for if there were no such culture the people would not have understood the utterances of the prophets. Our author makes some pertinent references to these writings in support of his view, and concludes by saying, that surely Amos and Hosea knew better where they got their religious education than half a dozen modern professors can tell us, and that these prophets clearly indicate in their day no mere infantile condition of religion in Israel.

The fourth chapter gives a very good account of the earlier prophets and their work. Here an attempt is made to discover the nature of that literary activity and religious culture which the admitted writings of the eighth and ninth centuries imply the existence of, and, further, an attempt is made to find out what the antecedent literary and religious condition of Israel really was. It is shown that writing existed in various countries from very early times, and that possibly written compositions existed long before the ninth century B. C. In connection our author gives a very reasonable account of the guilds or schools of the prophets, and of the part they played in developing the literary and religious character of the people in the centuries immediately before Amos. The attempt of the critics to separate Samuel and Amos from these prophetic circles is ably resisted; and the accuracy of the oldest writings in matters of topography justifies the conclusion that we have here real history and not mere traditions and myths. This chapter is a very satisfactory one.

The fifth chapter considers the testimony of the ninth and eighth centuries to the antecedent history. Inquiry is made as to whether it is possible from the admitted writings of this period to determine the main facts of the previous history. In making this inquiry our author appeals to what he calls the consciousness of the nation, rather than to the order of the composition of the books. In a very satisfactory way he shows that Amos and Hosea hold in substance, for the period succeeding Moses, the same scheme of history which modern critics pronounce to be late and unhistorical. In regard to the history of the time of the patriarchs, the allusions made by these prophets agree, so far as they go, with the narratives in the Pentateuch. In this discussion our author deals the critics some very hard blows, and shows that their theories, especially that of Wellhausen, are "nebular hypotheses of the early history." In a solid satisfactory manner he reaches the conclusion that the eighth century is a time of broad historic daylight, when Israel had a definite account to give of herself and her early history. Up to this point our author has dealt with the literary, religious and historic character of that period, and has shown that it was real and not mythical, and thus the biblical theory is confirmed.

In chapter VI. the key to the critical position is considered. That key is to be found in the answer to the question, whether the early writing prophets were *originators* or *reformers?* The biblical theory says that they were reformers, that of modern criticism holds that they were originators of religious ideas. Assuming the literary, religious and historic status of these prophets, our author raises the pertinent question: How can the modern critical theory explain the pre-prophetic religion? Or, if the critics deny the reality of the pre-prophetic religion, how can they account for the sudden rise of the religion of the age of the first writing prophets? In a very able manner our author shows that the biblical theory gives

a far better explanation of the facts than that of the modern critics. The status of the writing prophets of the eighth and ninth centuries can only be understood upon the supposition that there was a long and gradual preparation for it, such as the narratives of the Bible, regarded as real history, present. Wellhausen and Stade come in here for careful and effective criticism. Then the three points which the critical theory must make good before it has made out its case are stated: First, it must be shown that the pre-prophetic religion of the Israelites was on the same level as that of the tribes about them; secondly, the factor in the religion of Israel which differentiates it from that of the other tribes must be clearly pointed out; thirdly, the process, stage by stage, of the development, of the Israelitish religion must be traced out. The five succeeding chapters of the treatise before us are devoted to these three important questions, and this constitutes the heart of the discussion.

Four chapters are devoted to the first question, and along several lines the low tone of the pre-prophetic religion of Israel is discussed. The critics insist that the earliest religion of Israel differed in no essential respect from that of the other tribes. A brief reference to Kuenen, Pfleiderer, Stade and others confirms this statement, and it may be taken in general as that of modern advanced criticism.

The seventh chapter treats of the names applied to deity in pre-prophetic times. The critics argue from these names to the low tone of Israelitish religion. Our author examines the reasoning based on the name of Baal, and shows that Baal is a general appellative term whose use gives no good ground for the conclusions of the critics. He also shows at length that this whole mode of reasoning proceeds on a false view of the nature of mythology, and at the same time it fails entirely to adduce the historical proof that is absolutely necessary to confirm the theory. This is a very satisfactory and suggestive chapter.

In the eighth chapter the dwelling place of deity and its meaning in regard to the pre-prophetic religion is considered. The critical theory holds that the original home of Jahaveh was Sinai, that he went with the people to Canaan and there had many sanctuaries in the land. The worship of pre-prophetic Israel was that of the high places. In reply to all this and much more of a like nature, our author shows that reasoning from the case of other nations and their worship is really begging the question; that the theory puts a forced meaning on metaphorical language, that superstition is no proof of the non-existence of a pure faith; and that an appeal to the early books of Scripture shows that the critical theory receives no just support from what is said about the dwelling place of deity.

The ninth chapter deals with the visible representations of deity in the pre-prophetic age. Here the critical theory makes much of the calf-worship and of the ephod, claiming that these were representations of deity, and elements in the Jahaveh worship of early times. The views of Vatke and Kuenen are those which our author chiefly discusses. He shows that their reasonings are often contradictory, and always far-fetched and uncertain.

In the tenth chapter three topics are considered in their bearing on the status of the pre-prophetic age: Molech-worship, human sacrifices, and fire-worship. Concerning these matters, the critical school, as represented by Kuenen Daumer and Ghillany, maintains that Jahaveh-worship was at first fire- or sun-worship, in which at times human sacrifices were offered. Our author takes up four or five points in order, and patiently considers them one by one in criticising the theory of the

critics. He points out that the critics, with all their bold pretensions, succeed in proving very little; that they mix up events of early and late date in a way inconsistent with their development theory; and that the critics, by showing the low tone of the pre-prophetic religion, make it very difficult for them to explain the sudden rise of the prophetic form of religion with its admitted maturity of ideas and rites.

The eleventh chapter proceeds to show what the Jahaveh religion of Israel really was. The two points raised for discussion are its *origin*, and its *specific meaning*. Concerning the first, our author concludes that it is not Indo-Germanic, nor Assyro-Babylonian, nor Egyptian, nor Kenite, nor Canaanite, but distinctively Israelitish in its genesis. In regard to the second question, our author presents and defends the biblical theory. He insists that there is no evidence that Jahaveh was a tribal deity; that no reason can be given by the critics for the substitution of the name Jahaveh for El; and above all, the conclusion is reached and well supported, that the higher qualities associated with the nature of Jahaveh were present from the first. Thus the pre-prophetic conception of Jahaveh was much loftier than the notion of deity held by the tribes of Canaan. These four chapters unite in giving the answer to the first question to the effect that the tone of religious thought and life in pre-prophetic times in Israel was different from, and higher than, that of the surrounding nations.

The twelfth chapter takes up the second and third questions and seeks to point out the element in the religion of Israel which marks it off from the other religions of that early time. That distinctive element is that of *ethic monotheism*, and this gives the subject for an exceedingly able and interesting chapter. Our author deals with two topics in this chapter. In the first place, he shows the necessity there is of postulating moral elements in Jahaveh's character; and, in the second place, he indicates how the transition to ethic monotheism is effected. He shows that the critical theory can give no satisfactory account of the origin and growth of the moral elements which enter into the notion of Jahaveh, as presented in the early religion of Israel. Jahaveh-worship was never mere nature-worship, and the attempt of the critics to transform nature-worship into ethic monotheism utterly breaks down, and this failure at the outset means failure all the way through. Our author further shows that the conception of Jahaveh which the early prophets exhibit was not a new one, but was a return to and re-expression of what really existed from the beginning of Israelitish history. But no outline such as can be given here does the faintest justice to this splendid chapter. The critics must meet and answer its reasonings, else their progress is blocked.

The limits of this review forbid that anything more than a hasty glance can be given to the remaining six chapters of the treatise before us. Two of these chapters deal with the authoritative institutions of Israel, and discuss in a somewhat thorough manner the legal and ritual system of the Israelites. The reasonings of the critical school concerning the various so-called codes—covenant, deuteronomic and priestly—are examined with care, and the conclusion is reached that a norm or law outside of the prophets and superior to them was acknowledged, and the presumption is that this was Mosaic.

In the fifteenth chapter there is a very complete discussion of the three main positions of the critical school in regard to the codes: First, that there are three distinct codes; secondly, that they are far apart in time; and thirdly, that they are

inconsistent with each other. At several points it may be that our author concedes too much to the critical school, still, the main positions of that school are assailed with great success. Two following chapters treat of the law books and of law and prophecy, but we cannot even outline the contents of these useful chapters. We shall only say that the discussion of the inversion of the order of law and prophecy which the critical theory makes is most satisfactory. Law is first, prophecy follows and is in harmony with law.

In concluding, our author justly claims to have made good these two positions: First, that the earliest writing prophets, Amos and Hosea, give clear evidence that the ethic and spiritual elements of the religion of Israel were firmly grasped in their day and long before it; and, secondly, that there existed in the earliest literary age certain books which were ascribed to Moses and regarded as authoritative, and which set forth specific religious institutions relating to sacrifice and ritual as well as to idolatry and morals. Summing up his examination of the modern critical theory, our author claims that he has made good against it such points as the following: It professes to be a thorough-going theory, but still it does not do justice to the facts of the case; its treatment of the books and writers of the Old Testament is arbitrary; its great weakness appears when great crises or turning points in the history are to be explained; it does not go to the core of the religion of Israel, but dwells on details; it rejects the supernatural and yet is itself unnatural; on its literary side it is not as strong as it appears; and it fails to give as good an explanation of the development of the religion of Israel as does the biblical theory.

At some length we have tried to give the reader a general idea of the line of reasoning pursued by our author in his critique of the modern theory of the early religion of Israel, and of the solid manner in which he supports the biblical theory of the origin and growth of that religion. The importance of the subject in itself at the present day, and the ability and thoroughness of our author's treatment of it must be our apology for such an extended notice. While, perhaps, there is not much in the discussion that is really new to those who are familiar with the subject, yet our author shows real skill in both the plan and performance of his work. Even though at times what may be regarded as undue concessions are made to the critical school, still in no case, so far as we can judge, does he betray his cause to the foe. Perhaps the fairness and conciliation of the treatment will secure for this treatise a hearing all the more readily, even in critical circles. Our author, in our judgment, is right when he seizes hold of the historical development of the religious life of the nation of Israel as the real core of the discussion, and he has kept to this line of discussion all the way through. If doing this seems to narrow the discussion too much, it certainly cannot be said that the treatment of it by our author is not deep and thorough. The critical school must give a more profound philosophy of the religion of Israel in its relation to other religions than it yet has given, and it must reckon with this treatise in particular, before it can cherish any hope of winning its way among thoughtful men. These theories dazzle not a few, but are not yet demonstrated; they may fascinate some minds, but they cannot fortify our religious faith.

Francis R. Beattie.

Columbia, S. C.

Smyth's Christian Ethics.

Christian Ethics. *By Newman Smyth.* 8vo. Pp. x, 498. $2.50. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1892.

This book is the second volume in the series entitled, "The International Theological Library." The library is issued under the editorship of the famous Dr. Charles A. Briggs, who has as his associate in this undertaking the Rev Dr. S. D. F. Salmond, Professor of Systematic Theology in the Free Church College, Aberdeen. The object which these editors propose in the publication of these volumes is "to secure the services of specialists in the different departments of theology and to associate them in an enterprise which will furnish a record of theological inquiry up to date." The public is to be congratulated that these distinguished editors have succeeded in inducing such specialists as Drs. Driver, Bruce, Davidson, Francis Brown, Fisher, Fairbairn and others to agree to write up the latest results in their respective departments, and that their combined efforts are designed to cover the whole field of theology. It is with unmingled satisfaction that one hails the opportunity of having representative scholars of recognized standing in their several fields of theological learning, inform us just what are the "great and rapid advances" which theology has made in recent years. The "progressives" have claimed much; let us see whether their claim will be made good.

The first volume, by Dr. Driver, has already been carefully reviewed in these pages, and on account of many merits well deserves all the attention it has received on both sides of the water. It has fallen to the lot of Newman Smyth to undertake the difficult task of preparing a treatise on *Christian Ethics.* Newman Smyth was first widely introduced to the American public by the historic contest over his appointment to the Chair of Theology in Andover Seminary. His election by the Board of Trustees, the controversy which ensued, and his rejection by the Board of Visitors of that Institution are all vividly remembered. He is the author of some half-dozen books, most of which are designed to exhibit "Old Faiths in New Light"; a number of these were written before he had left the Presbyterian for the Congregational ministry. It is doubtful whether he or his brother, Egbert Smyth, Professor in the Andover Seminary, has done the more to give celebrity to the name they bear. This volume is Mr. Smyth's first attempt at the production of a scientific and exhaustive treatise.

The discovery of the author's standpoint is not difficult. He is a thoroughgoing and consistent evolutionist; not simply in the field of natural science, but in philosophy and theology as well. He derives both soul and body by this process. He accepts the results of the "liberal and advanced" school of biblical critics as represented by Robertson Smith, and Driver. He proposes, however, some revision of the current literary criticism of the Old Testament from a sociological point of view. Alas! "Woe worth the day" when the complex problems of the Higher Criticism are to be still further complicated by considerations drawn from the analogies and laws of sociology. The author's philosophy is Hegelianism, with a spice of Neo-Kantianism; his theology, Schleiermacherism, with a seasoning of Ritschlian elements. He is an idolater at the shrine of German learning. He seems to have been most influenced by the philosophy of Hegel, and by the theology of Schleiermacher and Rothe. No traces even of influence from the school of pietistic supernaturalism as represented by Neander, or Tholuck, or from the

school of "orthodox" confessionalism as represented by Luthardt or Kahnis is discoverable. He is sensitive only to the movements of the "upper currents" of the most "advanced thought." (See p. 249.)

So far as this book shows, Mr. Smyth ignores altogether those great continents of theological thought: the Puritan theology of Great Britain, the Reformed theology of the continent, and the Mediæval theology of the scholastics like Anselm and Thomas Aquinas. The Nicene Trinitarianism and the Augustinian Anthropology are antiquated and "outworn," because irreconcilable with the latest results of German thought. He betrays, indeed, the fact that he has been influenced somewhat by the New England theology, and especially by the leaders of the Broad Church party in Great Britain; but, then, Maurice and McLeod Campbell, and Rothe and Ritschl, are sufficiently homogeneous to dwell harmoniously in the same mental home.

This book, however, has merits which justify the place accorded it in this series. The spirit is good, the temper excellent, the style admirable. We know few writers in our country who have so thorough a mastery of the resources of our wonderful language. Clearness, force, and beauty are combined to an unusual degree. Mr. Smyth writes admirably when he knows what he is writing about. The theologian, however, who ignores the profound distinctions which the œcumenical mind has drawn as the result of patient centuries of investigation, must cover his own lack of profundity by the convenient cloak of haziness and obscurity—which is found in the style because first it resides in the thought.

This volume, however, is not destitute of marks which indicate that its author is by no means destitute of analytic and philosophic abilities of a high order. He has undertaken, however, more than he can accomplish; and in reading his able and learned volume, we are reminded of a remark made by Dr. Charles Hodge in his celebrated controversy with Horace Bushnell: "There are two kinds of minds," said Dr. Hodge, "first, those of original power, who blaze out new paths, and show new truths, or undiscovered relations of old truths, to others; second, there are minds not possessed of this original power, who yet can see all that abler and original minds may show them. Now," said he, in effect, to Dr. Bushnell, "come down out of that first class, where you have no just place, and join me in this second group." A similar invitation might be extended to Mr. Smyth.

Another merit found in a high degree in this volume is, that we are here furnished with the "latest results" of the "most advanced thought" of the most "progressive schools" in all spheres of thought. We have heard much of the "New Theology"; we have eagerly sought for a formal and enucleated statement of it; we have been often disappointed in failing to find it. This volume, although called *Christian Ethics*, must be intended as an attempt to supply this demand. He who wishes to prepare for the "great debates" of the immediate future may well study this publication. There are some points on which our author makes sound and admirably clear statements of the truth, as, for example, his discussion of the relation of religion and ethics, the use of Christian liberty in things morally indifferent, and particularly the duties of the Christian citizen to the state. The whole department of sociology as a section of Christian ethics needs development, and Mr. Smyth gives some valuable suggestions in this direction. Then, too, the most satisfactory chapter in the book is his admirable discussion of the Christian moral motive power, with which he closes his volume.

We will now point out more distinctly what we regard as some of the chief defects of this really able and yet unsatisfactory book. 1. His definition of Christian ethics is defective. He makes no clear discrimination between Christian dogmatics, or systematic theology, and Christian ethics, and hence his book is largely theological. He tells us: "While Christian ethics finds its subject-matter in the same Christian consciousness of man from which theology derives its materials for dogmatic construction, each of these sciences will regard the whole contents of the Christian consciousness (including historic revelation) from its own point of view. Ethics holds the contents of Christian faith in immediate and constant relation to the will and character of the Christian man and the Christian society. Dogmatics is concerned with the Christian truths as materials of knowledge to be combined with all our knowledge in a Christian conception of the world and God." (P. 12.)

Starting thus, our author is compelled to confuse departments of science; to confound law and gospel; to mix theology and ethics; and as a result his whole treatment is vitiated as also, and for the same reason, is the celebrated work of Rothe upon this same subject. Then, too, his definition is defective in that it makes no provision for either the psychology or metaphysic of ethics. Ethics treats not simply of the practice of morality, but must also include a scientific presentation of the knowledge of moral distinction and of the existing moral system. Moral philosophy must discuss not simply our moral actions but our moral nature and our moral relations as well. Any system of Christian ethics is defective which does not include the biblical teachings in respect to man's nature and endowments as a moral agent and of his necessary relations as a moral creature. The applied ethics of practical conduct, while important, is only one section of this science. 2. Our author is in error, too, as to the source from whence Christian ethics should draw its materials. Of course as a disciple of Schleiermacher he must make the Christian consciousness the source from which theology and ethics alike derive their subject-matter. But the Bible is the only source from which a true Christian ethics is to find the materials which it becomes its function to organize into the living unity of a true science. Christian consciousness is the mirror, the Bible contains the realities and truths which the Christian consciousness more or less perfectly mirrors: strange to study the contents of the mirror, and that a "cracked" and imperfect one, when the living, breathing realities themselves may be before you! In addition, we find it impossible to conceive how our author could discriminate between philosophical and Christian ethics, for on his definition they must coincide. There is no line of distinction, unless that line be that Christian ethics derives its materials from the inspired Scriptures, while philosophical ethics draws its materials from the human consciousness, whether natural or Christian. It follows, of course, that the method employed must be defective. Our author insists that the true method is historical, examining the development of the Christian consciousness in its moral aspects through all of its successive stages.

The true method, if Christian ethics be founded on a biblical basis, is the application of sound methods of interpretation to the Scriptures, in order to discover their moral teachings. True exegesis is undoubtedly represented by the historico-critical method, but the use of such method in interpreting the inspired book is very different from Mr. Smyth's historical method of interpreting the Christian consciousness, whose development begins with the dawn of moral life on

the globe, and which, having passed through several *stadia* in its unfolding process, is moving still toward its unseen goal.

3. The derivation of conscience by evolution, of course, harmonizes with this historical method and this view of the Christian consciousness.

"If we sum up the contributions which we may receive from these various endeavors of recent writers to trace the natural history of conscience, they may be stated as follows: (1), A clear recognition of the fact that man, morally and spiritually, is a growth, and not the result simply of some stroke of creative power. (2), In man's growth all his being has been involved, and each part and power of his nature has been developed to all the other parts and powers of his nature. (3), The highest and most distinctively human issues and powers of this development have their antecedents and conditions in less human and more animal capacities and processes. (4), Man's moral consciousness has some continuity with all man's preceding life and growth. (5), Man's moral life takes up and transforms previous non-moral elements and experiences. (6), The moral development of the individual cannot be held separate from the moral development of the race; there is a moral solidarity of the race; the individual conscience is conditioned by the social conscience. (7), With more or less distinctness and precision the history of this growth into moral consciousness, from its germinal emergence out of the pre-existing soil of the non-moral, may be conceived and traced; or what we have called a natural history of the rise of conscience may be written with sufficient plausibility to give it value. (8), Any further determination of the nature of conscience from psychological analysis must now be conducted under the light which may be thrown upon the formation of conscience from this natural history of it." (Page 32.) Of course it goes without saying that such development of conscience leads to utilitarianism in morals. It cannot be harmonized with the intuitional theory of our knowledge of moral distinctions, or with that doctrine, so fundamental in all sound moral philosophy, that the ultimate ground of right is to be found in God's nature rather than in his arbitrary will.

4. Another serious defect is Mr. Smyth's gratuitous depreciation of dogmatic theology. He tells us: "The moral consciousness of our age has grown peculiarly impatient of church dogma." Well, what of it? Perhaps so much the worse for the moral consciousness of our age. He draws with much care the contrast between the religious-ethical teaching of Christ and the more dogmatic teaching of the epistles, somewhat to the disparagement of the latter, which is just as sensible, and no more so, than would be the disparagement of the religious-ethical as compared with the dogmatic. Christ is as closely related to the one as to the other. He tells us, not only that "Christian ethics must be allowed to follow closely, and should remain true to, the ethical religious consciousness, without prevention or prejudice from Christian dogmatics," but he insists also, that "Nothing can abide as true in theology which does not prove its genuineness under the ever-renewed searching of the Christian moral sense"; and that Christian ethics "offers a further revision of theological conceptions in the light of the Christian moral consciousness." It would seem that the world would long before this have learned the lesson of the supreme folly of subordinating one department of science to another. Systematic theology is a distinct science, having its own sphere and its own methods, and is supreme within its own field; and the same is true of Christian ethics, and neither can be subordinated to the other without harm to both.

And yet while thus disparaging theology, far the major portion of Part First of his treatise is distinctively theological. There are two chief objections to his theology, first, it is entirely out of place in a book of Christian ethics, and second, the theology is false. The first division of the volume is devoted to a more or less formal discussion of the following theological topics: "The Christian Consciousness and the Bible, and their Mutual Relations," "The Kingdom of God," "Creation," "Fall," "Incarnation," "Atonement," "Nature of Faith," "Justification," "Regeneration," "Sanctification," and "The Doctrine of the Church." Of course our author does not always use these terms, nor discuss these topics from the "orthodox" standpoint of the Reformed theology. The Incarnation is the central, organizing principle of his theology; not the incarnation of the Council of Chalcedon and of the patristic, mediæval and Reformed theologies, but the incarnation as construed by the Hegelian philosophy as the process of the self-impartation of God to the creation, and which is also the necessary condition of the construction of the doctrine of the Trinity in that philosophy. The atonement is the result of this process by which God has become immanent in his creation. But it is not necessary to remark further, for the reader will recognize at once Hegel and Schleiermacher and can add the rest.

5. In the Second Part of his volume Mr. Smyth is much more successful than in the discussion of the lofty problems of speculation and theology. The instinct of the preacher and practiced speaker, trained in the art of putting things, asserts itself, and we have much admirable writing and some fine discussion. The discussion, however, is vitiated by the author's resolution of virtue into love or benevolence. Of course our author is acquainted with the arguments of the acute and perspicacious Bishop Butler, which to many sober and thoughtful minds amount to demonstration, but he has advanced with the "progressives" out of sight of the good English bishop. He no doubt is acquainted with the clear statements of Dr. Archibald Alexander in that admirable little manual on "Ethics," which some yet believe is unsurpassed in the field of theoretical ethics, but doubtless our author would tremble at the thought of being suspected of Princetonian theology or philosophy. While having a high respect for the scholarship and ability of German philosophy and theologians, and while conceding their superiority in many fields of research, perhaps one might yet discover some Englishmen who have as great respect for the views of Butler as for those of Schleiermacher, and some Americans who think as highly of Dr. Archibald Alexander as they do of Dorner, Rothe or Ritschl.

(*a.*) The practical result of this analysis of virtue into benevolence is seen most clearly in the discussion of the obligation to speak the truth. Of course, the duty of truthfulness arising from benevolence, there can be no intrinsic obligation binding to veracity; but when benevolence calls for the utterance of a falsehood, lying becomes as truly a duty as truthfulness previously had been. And so, Mr. Smyth, "Not only in some cases of necessity is falsehood permissible, but we may recognize a positive obligation of love to the concealment of the truth. Not only ought one not to tell the truth under the supposed conditions, but if the principle assumed be sound, a good conscience may proceed to enforce a positive obligation of untruthfulness." (P. 398.) And again, "To sum up, then, what has been said concerning the so-called lies of necessity, the principle to be applied with wisdom is simply this: give the truth always to those who in the bonds of humanity have right to the truth; conceal it, or falsify it, only when it is unmistakably evident that the

human right to the truth from others has been forfeited or temporarily is held in abeyance by sickness, weakness, or some criminal intent; do not in any case prevaricate unless you can tell the necessary falsehood deliberately and positively, from principle, with a good conscience, void of offence toward men, and sincere in the sight of God." (Pp. 399–400.)

This book is designed as a text-book. We trust that the youth in our schools and colleges will not be educated thus to play shuttle-cock with the truth. Without further remark on this point, we turn Mr. Smyth over to the tender mercies of Henry Clay Trumbull, the accomplished editor of the *Sunday-school Times*, who has already dealt with this view as it in righteousness deserves.

(*b.*) The discussion of marriage and divorce illustrates also the evil practical refults of a false principle adopted and applied. Instead of limiting reasons for divorce to those given in the Scriptures, our author makes "large provision" for many others which are to be deduced from the Christian consciousness. *Ex uno disce omnes.* (*c.*) The chapter upon our duties towards God is singularly meagre and shallow, and that in the face of the fact that the scriptural materials for this discussion are so rich and abundant. But Mr. Smyth's method, again, is not the interpretation of Scripture, and arrangement of these exegetical results into an organic system, but the historical examination of the Christian consciousness, and of course there is less of God in this consciousness than in God's inspired word.

(*d.*) A signal omission is the failure to discuss the subject of *Money* in any of its phases, and this, despite the fact that so many of the parables of our Lord are evidently designed to teach the ethics of property, and that so much biblical matter can be gathered for this purpose. This is "the era of industrialism," and the commercial spirit needs to be instructed and tempered by the teachings of God's word on this supremely important point. A thorough exposition of the teachings of Scripture as to the ethics of money is one of the needed, but as yet unwritten books.

On the whole, we believe that the great book on Christian ethics has not yet been published. And there is no subject which might more justly tax the powers and inspire the energies of one who seeks to benefit his kind and build up the kingdom of Jesus Christ. Our theological seminaries ought to take this as one of their next forward steps in the movement of preparing well-equipped preachers for the church, viz., the establishment of courses of Christian ethics. Is it not evident that where a preacher delivers one sermon upon themes derived from dogmatic theology, he delivers at least another upon subjects which can only be adequately handled as a result of an equally scientific knowledge of Christian ethics? The Bible has been given its rightful place as the centre of theological education, and practical theology is being recognized as of transcendent importance. Christian ethics and theology of experimental religion yet remain for the future.

THORNTON WHALING.

Southwestern Presbyterian University.

COCKE'S STUDIES IN EPHESIANS.

STUDIES IN EPHESIANS. *By A. R. Cocke, A. M., Pastor at Waynesborough, Va.; Professor in the Valley Seminary.* Pp. 137. Fleming H. Revell Company, Chicago, 148 and 150 Madison Street, and New York, 30 Union Square, East. 1892.

This admirable little treatise is from the pen of one of the younger ministers

of the Southern Presbyterian Church. It is excellent in every respect, and gives fine promise of a rich harvest from the author in the future.

Though quite unpretending in its nature the work itself is almost without a blemish either in manner, matter or tone. The style is good, simple, often graphic, and at times really eloquent.

The treatise consists of ten studies based on leading passages in the Epistle. The method is expository, and the studies taken together give the reader a very good grasp of the whole epistle, and of the course of argument followed by the apostle in this letter on the heavenlies. The author in the preface tells us that the studies were prepared for the Wednesday-night meetings in course of his regular ministration. Since reading them we are not surprised that those who heard them wished to have them in permanent form, and we are sure that the congregation which enjoys such rich ministration of the pure word of God cannot fail to grow in grace and abound in good works.

The following is a list of the topics together with the texts on which the studies are founded. I. God's Purpose toward us in Christ, i. 1–14. II. Prayer to the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, i. 15–23. III. One New Man, ii. 1–16. IV. Prayer to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, iii. 14–21. V. Principles of Church Growth, iv. 1–16. VI. The Christian Walk, iv. 17–32. VII. Imitators of God, v. 1–14. VIII. The Holy Spirit in the Epistle of the Heavenlies, v. 18. IX. Christ and the Church, v. 22–33. X. The Whole Armor of God, vi. 10–19.

No outline of the contents of these several studies can be given. Not one of them is weak, and several of them are of a very high order. They should take rank at once with the richest and most edifying of our devotional literature. For a quiet half-hour we know scarcely anything that could be more helpful than the perusal of one of these studies.

It is proper to add, that while no effort is made to show great learning, yet each study bears abundant evidence of diligent work, accurate scholarship, and exegetical ability of a high order. Indeed, there is a ripeness, alike in knowledge and experience, not often in works of this kind, apparent on every page.

Moreover, these studies give a fine example of what can be done in the way of expository preaching. This kind of preaching done after the model of these studies is to be highly commended. To young ministers they set a capital example of what hard work may do. We cordially recommend the book to all those who are seeking help in expository preaching. Here is a noble ideal.

We most heartily congratulate the author on the great merit of his work, and feel sure that it is but the first-fruits of what he may be expected to do for the church wherever his post of service may find him.

FRANCIS R. BEATTIE.

Columbia, S. C.

ROBERTS' PRESBYTERIAN SYSTEM.

THE PRESBYTERIAN SYSTEM. A Sermon preached before the Synod of Ohio at Delaware, Ohio, October 11, 1892. *By Rev. William Henry Roberts, D. D., LL.D.*, Moderator of Synod. Printed by request of Synod. Cincinnati: Elm Street Printing Co. 1892.

An added interest will be felt in this sermon on account of its author's relation

to the controversy which is now agitating the Northern Church. Dr. Roberts has held a number of positions of prominence and influence, as Librarian of Princeton Seminary, Stated Clerk of the Northern Assembly, Professor of Practical Theology in Lane Seminary, Moderator of the great Synod of Ohio, but the general public knows him best as the courageous defender of a stalwart orthodoxy and an intense conservatism, and as the unflinching opponent of Smith and Briggs, although his opposition to the former has cost him his professorship at Lane.

This sermon, printed at the request of the Synod of Ohio, contains as clear and adequate a statement of the Presbyterian system as could well be compressed within the compass of a single discourse. Of course nothing original or striking could be expected. But we are presented with a comprehensive and accurate statement of the recognized principles of the Presbyterian Church in the spheres of dogmatics, ethics, worship, and ecclesiastical polity.

Especially admirable is his condensed account of the theology of the Presbyterian Church. His division of the contents of the Presbyterian doctrinal standards into three theological elements, respectively, Christian, Protestant, Calvinistic, is exceedingly happy, and is one against which the most ultra and rabid conservatism can object nothing.

Some of the most satisfactory statements of the sermon are found in his discussion of the extent of the obligation imposed by the acceptance of the Presbyterian system upon its officers. We do not see how any one can doubt that Dr. Roberts is right in insisting that when an officer of the Presbyterian Church holds views antagonistic to the standards, he ought to propose the same to the proper church court, that its judgment may be secured as to whether such antagonism affects any of the necessary articles of the Presbyterian system. The church court and not the individual conscience is the judge as to what are the essential elements of that system of doctrine taught in the Scriptures and reproduced in the standards.

The following extract will be read with interest, as showing the views and spirit of the majority in the Northern Church: "One reason why the present controversy which agitates the church wears a portentous aspect is because it appears to involve fundamentals. Many Presbyterians believe that the organizing principle of our system is being assailed, unwittingly it may be, but nevertheless assailed. God forbid that injustice should be done to any brother in this matter, but frankness is certainly the best thing on the part of all. Presbyterians never have and do not propose to deny to any member or officer a proper liberty in the investigation of truth. It is alleged, however, in some quarters, that the investigations made by certain higher critics show that the church's position as to inspiration must undergo modification, and it is a fair question what such a statement means. Many think that the objective point of the negative critics is the denial of inspiration to the Bible as a whole, and a limitation of inspiration to certain portions of the book. But, according to our Confession, the fact of inspiration is true of every book and every portion of every book of the Holy Scripture. If, therefore, as an alleged result of investigations conducted by certain scholars, a restatement of Chapter I. of the Confession of Faith is to be attempted on the basis of a partial inspiration of the Scripture, then a direct assault will be made on the organizing principle of the Presbyterian system, the infallibility and supremacy of the whole Bible, as the rule of denominational faith and practice. Such an attempted restatement would

not be revision, but revolution, revolution at the very foundation; and against such revolution, not only loyal Presbyterians, but all true Protestants, will earnestly contend" (pp. 25, 26). THORNTON WHALING.

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HUIZINGA'S ANALOGY IN THE SEMITIC LANGUAGES – DISERTATION.

THE ANALOGY OF THE SEMITIC LANGUAGES. A Disertation. *Presented to the Board of University Studies of the Johns-Hopkins University for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. By Abel H. Huizinga.* Baltimore: Press of Isaac Friedenwald Co. 1891.

For one, the writer welcomes as a hopeful sign this publication from the pen of Dr. Huizinga, and others of a similar character which have fallen under his eye within the last few years. They seem to mark a step forward in the development of our educational interests and methods. We do not speak now of the intrinsic merit of this paper, or of that of other similar papers; that point we reserve for comment later on. The hopeful sign to which we refer is the fact that there are now a number, yes, we are glad to say, an increasing number of institutions in our country where such papers as the one at present under consideration are demanded as a condition to the reception of the highest degrees. This is a hopeful sign because of the idea which lies behind this demand, and because of the idea that is bodied forth in the very form, and—shall we say it—in what the ordinary reader will consider the dry and even repulsive subject-matter of these papers. That idea is, that, in any department, all knowledge worthy the name, must begin with the observation of the facts with which that department, whatever it may be, is concerned. To prepare one of these papers, the student must first of all have gone over the entire field covered by his thesis, and have gathered all the facts that bear upon it. This is not only his first, but in some respects his most important business. The field covered by the thesis is usually a limited one. But within that limited field the student is expected to make a practically complete exhibit of the facts involved. Not only so, he is expected to bring to light some new fact or facts which have escaped the observation of previous investigators in the same field. Further, to prepare such a paper, the student must not only carefully collect all the facts, but he must also show that he has studied them in themselves and in their mutual relations, until he has thoroughly mastered their significance. The paper when completed is expected to constitute and does constitute an actual contribution to our knowledge of the subject handled. There is that about such monagraphs which will impress a certain class of readers as needlessly and wearisomely minute, as offensively pedantic. Yet the idea that lies behind them, and the method employed in them, mark the line of cleavage between the less scientific scholarship of the past and the more scientific scholarship of the future. The method is essentially the plodding one of Germany. But let it be remembered that this same plodding method, if any choose to call it such, has made Germany what she is to-day, namely, the teacher of the nations.

It is time, however, to turn our attention to the brochure of Dr. Huizinga itself. It deals with analogy as one of the forces which determine the structure of a language. Its special purpose is to trace the operation of this force as it has affected the forms of the several Semitic languages. Analogy is defined to be

"the modification of an existing form, or the origination of a new form after the model of another form with which it is associated." It might be described as a labor-saving device which our Maker has wrought into the very structure of those wonderful machines which we speak of as our minds. It is the joint product of the law of parsimony and the law of association. Just as a physical force seeks and follows the line of least resistance, so we leave off saying—íc rad, ou ride, hé rad, wé, gé, hié ridon, and say instead—I rode, you rode, he rode, etc. "The operation of analogy in language," says Wheeler, as quoted by Dr. Huizinga, "is in every case ultimately conditioned and determined by the natural quest of the mind for unity to replace muliplicity, system to replace anomalous diversity, and groups to replace monads." The fact is, as Dr. Huizinga observes, that "the whole structure of language, in its grammatical forms and categories, is, in a sense, analogical. It exhibits the operation of what we may call *constructive analogy.*"

In his study of the operation of analogy in the Semitic languages, Dr. Huizinga propounds and seeks to answer the three following questions, viz.: "1. What is the relation of analogy to the characteristics and structure of the languages in which it occurs? Are its nature, manifestations, and the scope of its application at all modified or conditioned by the well-known peculiarities of these languages? 2. What individual instances of analogical formations are found in these languages? 3. How are they to be classified?" The conclusion at which he arrives in reference to the first of these points may be summed up in the following propositions: 1. The whole structure of the Semitic languages and all the formations and inflections of words are analogical, using the term analogy in its widest sense. 2. Using the term analogy in its restricted and more usual sense when speaking of it as a linguistic phenomenon, those cases of analogical formation which do occur are connected most closely with the structure and various characteristics of these languages, and thus they are easily accounted for, *in fact they occur just where this structure and these characteristics lead us to expect them.* His enumeration of the instances of analogy found in the Semitic languages, especially the Hebrew, is quite full. They are all reduced to three main classes, as follows, viz.:

Class I.—Analogical formations in the inflection of the verb or in the formation of verbal derivatives with reference to the different classes of stems. Under this class he notes three subdivisions, viz.: (1.) Confusion of the different classes of weak stems. (2.) Weak stems after the analogy of the strong. (3.) Strong stems after the analogy of the weak.

Class II.—Analogical formations involving changes and confusion in vocalization.

Class III.—Analogical changes in the formative elements of words. Under this head, again, he notes four subdivisions, viz.: (1.) Mistaking servile or formative elements for a part of the stem. (2.) Mistaking a stem-consonant for a servile. (3.) Analogical changes in the formative elements themselves; influence of one formative element upon another. (4.) Addition of servile and formative elements where they do not belong.

In concluding our notice of this monograph, we ought to say that it shows throughout an acquaintance with the most recent literature of the subject, and a judicious use of the same. It is, moreover, a monument of patient painstaking investigation which is greatly to the credit of the author and to that of the institu-

tion which conferred upon him his degree. We had noted a few typographical slips, and also a few statements in regard to which it was our purpose, if not to express dissent, at least to raise a question. For lack of space these must be omitted or merely hinted at. Among the former were the words "Slovenian" (p. 24) נגוון (p. 17) אהב (p. 38). And among the latter are the statements made (on p. 14) in reference to the operation of analogy in the case of the Hebrew *Piel*, and (on p. 18) in reference to the original class to which the verb ידע belongs, and, not to mention others, that made (on p. 22) as to the original bi-consonantal character of the words "blood" (דם) and "name" (שם).

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IX. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Manual of Natural Theology. *By George Park Fisher, D. D., LL. D., Titus Street Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale University.* Price, 75 cents. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1893.

Another product of the busy pen and scholarly mind of Dr. Fisher is to be added to the growing list of valuable publications already given to the public by the same hand. This "Manual of Natural Theology" is intended as a popular discussion for general circulation like the author's "The Christian Religion," which was so widely used as a part of the course of the Chautauqua Literary and Scientific Circle The manual has all the characteristics which have marked the preceding works of our author, a luminous style, sound scholarship, catholicity of spirit, and philosophic discrimination.

Theosophy, Buddhism, and the Signs of the End. *By G. H. Pember, M. A., Author of the Great Prophecies, the Anti-Christ, etc.* Price, 50 cents. Fleming H. Revell Company, New York, 30 Union Square, East; Chicago, 148–150 Madison Street. 1892.

The fundamental thesis of our author's book is the kinship which exists between all false religions, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, etc.; and he accounts for this close relationship by their common origin in Satanic influence. The *Mysteries* of Grecian, Roman, and other religions, he believes were the methods employed for the Satanic propaganda. Theosophy and Spiritualism are reduced in the same way. The philosophic and scientific attainments of false religionists he easily explains by communications held with infernal spirits. He says: "Nor are we bewildered by the assertion that many of the vaunted results of modern science were included in the instruction given to the initiates of the Hermetic, Orphic, Eleusinian, and Cabalistic mysteries, and were familiar to Chaldean Magi, Egyptian priests, Hindu Occultists, Essenes, Therapeutæ, Gnostics and Theurgic Neo-Platonists." While there are some fanciful vagaries, yet on the whole our author furnishes us an interesting and instructive book, and his learning in the particular fields involved is unquestioned. He who wishes to see Theosophy ground to powder may well purchase this book.

The Life and Light of Men. Expositions of John i.–xii. *By F. B. Meyer, B. A., Author of "Abraham; or, The Obedience of Faith"; "Elijah, and the Secret of his Power"; "Israel, a Prince with God"; "Tried by Fire," etc.* Fleming H. Revell Company: New York, 30 Union Square, East; Chicago, 148–150 Madison Street. 1892. Price, $1.00.

These expositions have all the qualities which have rendered so popular the preceding works of Mr. Meyer. The style possesses clearness, force, and considerable beauty. They are characterized by the repose of conscious strength, and are

enriched by evidences of ample learning. One of their chief charms is found in the illustrations scattered with a prodigal hand over every page. These discourses are sound, orthodox, thorough scriptural expositions; and, with the exceptions of Doctors McLaren and Taylor, lately of the Broadway Tabernacle, we know of no other living preacher who is so thorough a master of expository preaching; however, they are somewhat injured by the vice of allegorizing (see p. 161). They are spiritual also, revealing a deep religious experience, and exalted spiritual attainments. There can be no question as to the mental power and comprehensiveness of grasp manifested in these pages. There is a fulness and depth of thought which is somewhat rare in the current publications derived from the pulpit utterances of the day. Mr. Meyer deserves high rank among living preachers, and we trust that he may be spared to the great congregation in the world's metropolis which he now serves, as long as his distinguished predecessor, Newman Hall, was permitted to serve. Dr. McLaren, however, prophesies that his days will be short unless he reduces his amount of work. We are glad that Mr. Moody has introduced Mr. Meyer more widely to the American public through the presence of the latter at the summer school at Northfield.

The Inspiration of Holy Scripture: Its Nature And Proof. Eight Discourses, preached before the University of Dublin. *By William Lee, A. M., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College.* 8vo, pp. 478. $2.50. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1892.

"Lee on Inspiration" has been too long and too favorably known to call for any statement here of its character and contents. Since its appearance, nearly forty years ago, it has held its place among the standard works in the department of theological truth to which it belongs, and to-day, as in the past, it is the first of all bearing on the subject that the student, teacher, or minister should place on his shelves. In this edition there is no change from the edition of 1854, the same plates, purchased from the Carters' estate, having been used. It is to be hoped that the work will receive a renewed and wide circulation. It is more than ever needed and is even more timely to-day than when it was first written.

Genesis Printed in Colors: Showing the Original Sources from which it is Supposed to have been Compiled. With an Introduction. *By Edwin Cone Bissell, Professor in McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago.* Pp. xvi., 59. Hartford, Conn.: Belknap & Warfield. 1892.

Professor Bissell has anticipated Messrs. Haupt and others from whom it was currently reported a year or two ago that the Christian public might expect an edition of the Bible which has been well named beforehand "The Rainbow Bible." We are glad that the first appearance of such a book, showing the results of destructive criticism, comes from the hands of a man who is as eminent for his conservatism as he is for his scholarship. The Introduction is worth the price of the book. It furnishes a succinct account of the methods of the higher critics, showing that the latter indulge largely in presuppositions and conjectures; that they and the "redactor" whom they conjure into existence are in antagonism rather than agreement. He then indicates briefly the lines upon which the debate lies, and lays down the principles that should guide the student in the examination of

the alleged grounds for denial of the unity of the authorship of Genesis. To support his position, he refers the reader to the analyzed text, which he has, with the aid of a most skilful printer, fully presented, different colors being used to indicate the several parts claimed by the critics as emanating from different sources. He follows the analysis of Kantzch and Socin, with the English text of the Revised Version. Even the English reader will be able, by the help of this book, to see the methods of the critics, and to some extent to judge of the question whether there is evidence of the asserted composite authorship. The publication will, we think, do much to disarm the forthcoming edition of the entire Bible as promised by Haupt and others, and especially will its influence be salutary when accompanied by so scholarly and conservative an introduction.

Gloria Patri; or, Our Talks About the Trinity. *By James Morris Whiton, Ph. D.* 12mo, pp. 162. $1.00. New York: Thomas Whittaker. 1892.

An attempt, in the form of dialogue, to present the fundamental doctrine of the Trinity in such terms as will, in the author's judgment, deliver it from the cloud which he thinks scholastic controversy has raised about it. We would like it better but for its implied disparagement of theological methods and sneering at metaphysical thought. We would rather be theological and metaphysical than, like the author, believe that our knowledge of God is obtained by a process of evolution through the activity of human thoughts and conscience working under the direction of the spirit; or like him, think that the supernatural is not an exercise of the divine power independently of natural causes but the immanence of God in the operations of nature.

A New Harmony of the Four Gospels in English, According to the Common Version. Arranged with Explanatory Notes. Designed for Popular Use and adapted to Sunday-Schools. *By George W. Clark, D. D., Author of "Notes on the Gospels," etc.* Revised Edition, with corrections from the Revised Version of 1881. 12mo, pp. 302. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1892.

First published in 1870, and widely circulated. The author incorporates in this edition the results of the studies of the past two decades. The general arrangement of the text is substantially the same. The chronological position of Matthew's feast and of the raising of Jairus' daughter, given as after the healing of the Demoniacs, instead of immediately after Matthew's call as in the former edition. The Sermon on the Mount and "The Sermon on the Plain" are given alongside, simply to meet the wishes of many, and not because the author regards them as having been the same or delivered upon the same occasion. Many of the renderings of the Revisers are attached as foot-notes. The analyses before the sections are most valuable in enabling a teacher to seize upon the main points of the narrative.

Lead Me to the Rock. *By Rev. T. W. Hooper, D. D.* Price, 60 cents. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1334 Chestnut St. 1892.

Dr. Hooper has been pastor in Christiansburg, Lynchburg, and Selma, Ala., and his book is dedicated to the beloved people of his respective charges to whom,

for more than thirty years, he has been an acceptable and beloved pastor. Without pretence or display, in a simple nervous style he treats some of the most important practical problems of the Christian life. The various chapters in this book are evidently copies or sketches of discourses actually preached in the course of his ministry. They are clear, sound, practical, and spiritual, and we are glad their usefulness is to be continued by their publication. Our author is especially happy in the apt use of illustration, and his book may teach our younger ministers valuable lessons as to the power and attractiveness of apposite and telling illustration.

What and How to Preach. *By Rev. Alexander Oliver, B. A., D. D.* Pp. 189. Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson and Ferrier.

This volume comprises eight lectures delivered by the author to the students of Theology of the United Presbyterian College, Edinburgh, the author having been the lecturer in that college on Practical Training. The topics discussed are: The Christian Ministry, its Duties and Difficulties; The Manner and Form of Preaching; The Manner of Preaching; Choice and Treatment of Texts; Variety in the Pulpit; Speculative Difficulties in the Pulpit. The treatment is practical and suggestive, and the points well illustrated.

Three Discourses on Baptism: I. The Design of Baptism; II. The Mode of Baptism; III. Infant Baptism. *By Rev. Russell Cecil, A. M.*, Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Selma, Alabama. Selma Printing Co. 1892.

We have here three excellent sermons by the scholarly pastor of the noble First Church of Selma, Ala. They are fine illustrations of a work all of our pastors ought to do, viz.: the indoctrination of our people in the distinctive doctrines of our church in reference to the design, mode, and subjects of baptism. While plain and popular they are admirable as to style, and show the ample scholarship and comprehensiveness of mind which characterize their author. While brief and compact they are at the same time eminently satisfactory and adequate. There is not a single illiberal or uncharitable word to disfigure the pamphlet, although Presbyterian doctrine is strictly maintained. We wish many of our pastors would imitate Mr. Cecil in undertaking like work.

The Case Against Professor Briggs. Part. II. Pp. 161. Price (paper), 50 cents. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1892.

Inspiration and Inerrancy. A History and a Defence. *By Henry Preserved Smith, Professor in Lane Seminary.* Containing the Original Papers on Biblical Scholarship and Inspiration. Pp. 380. $1.50. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1893.

From these two volumes, which are quite portly, the reader may have a complete account of the two great heresy trials of the past winter from the standpoint of the defendants. They furnish us with the complete statement and defence of the two Professors whose standing was involved, and, as such, will be read by all who wish to become thoroughly and actually acquainted with that side of the case. The great space which we have already given in the Quarterly to one of these now noted cases renders it needless to do more than notice these books.

NINITO: A Story of the Bible in Mexico. *By Annie Maria Barnes.* 16mo. Pp. 214. Cloth, 90 cents. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1892.

A touching and instructive story of the way in which the knowledge of the cross was presented to a Mexican child The incidents are drawn from real life, and in themselves appeal with pathetic power to the hearts of those who love a Saviour whom they have not yet done all they can to tell others about. The little book may be safely placed in every Sabbath-school library.

RHETORIC OF VOCAL EXPRESSION: A Study of the Properties of Thought as Related to Utterance. *By William B. Chamberlain, A. M., Professor of Rhetoric and Elocution in Oberlin College.* Oberlin, Ohio: E. J. Goodrich, Publisher. 1892.

This is a good book upon an important subject. It is a book which has grown out of the practical work of class instruction and not been manufactured to order. There may be some speakers foolish enough to regard the study of elocution as beneath their intellectual notice, but he who wishes to influence his fellow-men by spoken words must cultivate the best and most impressive methods of speech. This book is not a complete treatise in itself, not considering vocal technique or gesture, but it covers well the ground proposed in its title, and together with Vance's or McIlvaine's manual furnishes a good outfit for the study of this subject.

LAWS OF BUSINESS: For All the States and Territories of the Union and the Dominion of Canada; with Forms and Directions for all Transactions, and Abstracts of the Laws of All the States and Territories on Various Topics. *By Theophilus Parsons, LL. D., Late Professor of Law in Harvard University, etc.* New Revised Edition. Pp. 868. Hartford: S. S. Scranton & Co. 1892.

A marvelous compend of law, set forth in an orderly manner, and easy of reference, for the use of men of business generally. It contains all the principles of all the branches of the laws which regulate the common transactions of life, together with the forms which general legal usage has approved, together with a full statement of the minor differences in both principle and form which are to be found in different states. All the principles are stated so accurately and clearly that any man of fair capacity can readily understand them and see their application in the various forms which are given. It is a book in which to find a clear and intelligible answer to the questions which constantly arise in regular business life, or in the occasional business relations of those who are not called upon to become versed by practice or profession with such matters. It is better than an "Every Man His Own Lawyer," or an "Every Man His Own Doctor." It is not designed to make quacks, but to be of real practical use. The present edition, enlarged and revised, is not only justified by the success of the first but demanded by the addition of laws in recent years. With the aid of this book, all the ordinary transactions of business life may be made with ease, safety and certainty.

EUCLID AND THE ANTI-EUCLIDIANS: A Paper read before the Missouri Teachers' Academy in June, 1892. *By J. N. Lyle, Ph. D., Professor in Westminster College, Fulton, Mo.* St. Louis: Frederick Printing Co. 1892.

Professor Lyle shows up in fine form the errors of Lobatschewsky, John Bolycei, and Riemann in the field of mathematics, arising in part from their more

or less complete acceptance of the false philosophy of Hume, Leibnitz, Kant, Lotze, Bowne, Cams, and others in reference to space. It is a suggestive fact which Dr. Lyle points out that agnosticism, David Hume and Company are endeavoring to expel Euclid from the throne from which he has so long ruled the mathematical world. A false philosophy, whether agnostic, materialistic, or idealistic, vitiates mathematics just as truly as the natural or the probable sciences. The author deserves the thanks of the public for pointing out this danger, for already disciples of Lobatschewsky hold the chairs of Mathematics in the Universities of Texas and Missouri. We shall look for further fruit from the same scholarly pen.

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I. NATURAL RELIGION AND THE GOSPEL.

Assuming that theology is a science, and that it pursues the method of definition adopted by all sciences, that is to say, one derived from the object-matter about which they are concerned, we define it, with others, to be the science of religion. But religion, comprehensively taken, is easily distributable into two kinds: natural religion and evangelical religion, or, briefly, redemption. The latter member of this division is the gospel. These are the only two schemes of religion that God has given to man. The first was communicated to Adam in innocence, the latter to Adam and his race in sin. The gospel, specifically considered, has been developed in great dispensational forms contradistinguished to each other, not as to their essential, but as to their peculiar and distinctive, features; but, generically considered, it is as a scheme of religion contradistinguished to natural religion. It is, therefore, interesting and important to ascertain the relations which subsist between natural religion and the gospel; and we propose to indicate their points of similarity and difference. What are the elements of natural religion? How do they come to be incorporated into the gospel? And what are the peculiar and differentiating elements of the latter scheme?

I. Their points of similarity.

1. Some of their contents are alike. Taking it for granted that the articles which will be enumerated are, in some sense, embodied in the gospel, the question will be whether they were component parts of natural religion.

(1.) The doctrine of God's existence. It cannot be supposed

that man at creation was ignorant of the Being who created him. To suppose that he was, would be to suppose that he was destitute of all capacity for religion, and as we are not pursuing the mere investigations of natural theology, but follow the guidance of the Scriptures, which speak definitely upon the subject, there is no necessity for a discussion of this point.

(2.) The doctrine of God's triune existence—of the trinity. We would conclude that man in innocence was acquainted with this doctrine on two grounds: first, from the nature of the case, that is, rational considerations antecedently to any direct statements of the Scriptures as a new, supernatural revelation. For, if God made himself known to his creature, he must have revealed himself to him as he really is, otherwise the information communicated would have been deceptive and misleading. Idolatry would have been the result. But, secondly, we know from the Scriptures that God is triune, and, putting these two sources of proof together, we must infer that the doctrine of the trinity was an article of natural religion.

(3.) The moral government of God. It is needless to enforce this position. For, if Adam knew himself to be a creature of God, he must have equally known himself to be a subject of his moral government. His reason and conscience, with their fundamental laws of belief and rectitude, would necessarily have led him to this conclusion; and in addition to this, he was privileged to receive from his Maker the immediate revelation of the fact, through oral instructions delivered in the converse held with man in the walks of Paradise. Our first parents "heard the voice of the Lord God walking in the garden in the cool of the day." In short, if man at first had any religion at all, it must have contained so fundamental a principle as that of accountability to moral government. He must have known, he did, in fact, know, his relation to law, and that involved the knowledge of a Lawgiver, Ruler, and Judge.

(4.) The principle of grace. Considering the benevolence or goodness of God as generic, it is manifested in the two specific forms of grace and mercy: grace being favor shown to the undeserving; mercy being favor to the ill-deserving and the wretched.

Whatever obligations God may be conceived to be under—so to speak—to himself, to his own faithfulness and honor, resulting from the fact of his creating intelligent and moral beings, it is clear that, from the conditions of their existence, they could demand nothing at his hands. Their creation is the product of a free determination of his will, and it is certain that previously to their being created they could not, as non-existent, have merited anything at their Maker's hands. When, then, our first parents were created, their existence was a result of grace, and every rich endowment of their nature, with the delightful circumstances and relations in which they were placed, were the fruits of the same unmerited goodness. They could have earned nothing; all was given.

While this is true of the natural elements of man's first estate, it is still more conspicuously evident of that supernaturally revealed covenant which was superadded to the simple relation of law. Such a federal arrangement was obviously a free product of the divine will, in no way necessitated by the natural relations which man sustained to him. When, therefore, instead of leaving man under a naked dispensation of law, in which the retention of the divine favor would have been suspended upon the condition of obedience for ever contingent, God instituted an economy in which the race was collected into the person of a representative amply qualified for the high trusts reposed in him, limited his time of trial, so that the probation of himself and his constituents may have been finished in a definite period, and perhaps restricted the field of temptation, making it possible that the representative should be tempted only in relation to the positive command touching a single tree, it is plain that the principle of grace was exhibited. The covenant, consequently, was the offspring of grace, although, on account of its embodying legal obedience as the condition of justification, it assumes the character of a legal compact, and has properly received the denomination of the covenant of works. Hence, we do not characterize natural religion as a religion of grace. We justly designate it as a religion of law. We confine the title religion of grace to the scheme of redemption; for however true it is that both schemes originated in grace

as their source, they receive their respective denominations from the fact that one specifically proceeds, and the other does not, upon the principle of acquiring self-justification on account of one's own conscious, legal obedience.

Had Adam, as a representative under a legal covenant, stood, his posterity would have been freely justified through the imputation of another's conscious, subjective righteousness, and in that case the religion of nature would have been *to a justified race* a religion of grace. But that case was not historically realized. Adam fell. The whole case, under the first covenant, was exhaustively developed in him, so far as possible justification was concerned. To him that covenant was one of works, and its failure to secure the end contemplated by it warrants its exclusive appellation as a legal, and not a gracious, covenant. Still, as that whole federal economy originated in grace, and supposed the possibility of justification by grace for the constituents in case the representative had secured the reward on the ground of legal obedience, we are entitled to affirm that the principle of grace was one of the elements of natural religion.

(5.) Federal headship and legal representation. There is no need to elaborate the proof. It is sufficient to know that both Calvinism and Evangelical Arminianism affirm the fact. It is true that the mode in which it was actualized is differently conceived in the two systems, the latter viewing federal headship and legal representation as concreated with man, as necessarily implicated in parental headship; the former, as instituted by God after man was created, and freely added to the parental constitution. But this does not militate against the position conceded by the *consensus* of the church, that the doctrine of federal headship and legal representation was one of the articles of natural religion.

This view is clearly sustained by the Scriptures. The Apostle Paul, in the fifth chapter of Romans, draws a parallel between the case of Adam and that of Christ. In that comparison the real, if not the only, analogy described as between the two consists in the fact that they both stood, in relation to their respective seeds, upon the footing of representation. It was precisely

because Adam was a representative that he was "the figure"—the type, pattern, or resemblance—"of him who was to come." That is, he was not an instituted type, as was the high priest of the Jewish dispensation, of Christ; but he acted in relation to his posterity upon the same principle as that upon which Christ acted in relation to his. In the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians, Paul brings out the same principle: as all represented in Adam die, so all represented in Christ shall be made alive. And in the second chapter of Hebrews, the chapter which proves the necessity of the incarnation, the writer, if we mistake not, shows that the Son of God, in becoming the representative and substitute of his people, must have been conformed to the Adamic law of a race-connection, a blood-tie, between the federal head and the members, between the representative and the constituents. Not that the great principle of representation must always proceed upon that condition in its application; it may be capable of being employed wherever a number of individuals can be collected into unity upon a basis of classification. Similarity of nature, as among the unfallen angels, might constitute such a basis; but when the principle was applied to man, the old basis, which had been recognized from the first in the history of God's dealings with the race, behooved to be adopted. The second Adam must sustain the same blood-relation to men that the first Adam had sustained. Adam knew his solemn position as the federal head, representative, and trustee of his posterity, with all the weighty responsibilities which attached to it; and this fact, as it ought to have contributed to deter him from sinning, stamped, on the side of his human relations, the peculiar aggravation, the fearful enormity, of his transgression.

(6.) The doctrine of the immortality of the soul. It hardly needs to be said, that the question here is in regard to the perpetual existence of the soul, considered not morally or spiritually, but physically, that is, as to its natural essence as an entity. Was the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, in this respect, an article of natural religion? It ought to be remarked, too, that in this discussion no sharp distinction is emphasized between the soul and the spirit.

First, On the supposition that the *rational* arguments in favor of the soul's immortality have any validity for man conditioned by sin and imperfection, they must have had at least equal, and, we may confidently hold, greater, validity for man in innocence. What these arguments are, it is not necessary to state here. They are familiarly known. The most formidable objections to these arguments have been urged by the materialist and the pantheist. The "mortal deists," in the age of the famous Apologies for divine revelation against English deism, assumed materialistic ground. They were answered by Bishop Butler, in the opening chapter of the *Analogy*, by a powerful argument, based in the probabilities furnished by analogy, in support of a future life, which he justly terms "the foundation of all our hopes and of all our fears; all our hopes and fears which are of any consideration." That argument, reinforced, strengthened, and amplified by other writers, amounts to a probable proof so convincing as to have satisfied nearly all theists. At least, it may safely be said that it never has been refuted. It may be asserted that this argument against the materialist goes no further than to establish the continued existence of the soul after the dissolution of the body; its immortal existence still remains a question. But the argument avails to prove the soul's independence of its connection with the body for existence; and as it has been shown that the soul survives the shock of its separation from matter, and passes undestroyed through the tremendous crisis of death, it may, with a probability amounting practically to certainty, be inferred that no other change will destroy it; in other words, that it will continue to exist immortally.

Here we encounter the more modern agnostic, who is radically a materialist. He contends that we cannot know what lies beyond the sphere of phenomenal observation. It would follow that, as the continued existence of the soul after death is not phenomenally observable, we cannot know it. The question, however, is given up by the admissions of Herbert Spencer, the philosophical leader of the school. In holding that the various forces operating upon the phenomenal system of the world infer a central force upon which they may be collected into unity, he passes

beyond the limits upon the mere observation of facts. For he characterizes this central force as "an infinite and eternal energy." Most certainly infinity and eternity are not phenomena falling under the scope of scientific observation. We are, then, according to the admission of the agnostic, justified in pushing an inferential, mediate knowledge beyond the contents of empiricism. We postulate an occult force, which Mr. Spencer denominates the Absolute, that not only collects into unity the special forces operating phenomenally in nature, but furnishes the fundamental ground of a reconciliation between religion and science.[1]

Upon the same principle, necessitating inferences from phenomena, we are warranted in concluding that back of the conscious phenomena of thinking, feeling, willing, and passing moral judgments, lies an occult force which thinks, feels, wills, and passes moral judgments. And as force implies power, and power is an attribute, we necessarily infer an essence or substance to which it belongs, for a quality without a thing qualified is utterly inadmissible. We reach an inferential and mediate, but valid and trustworthy, knowledge of the soul. Granted this, the further inference to its immortality is justifiable, and it is actually justified by the unanswered argument against the materialist which has already been noticed. If we may infer the existence of the Absolute without knowing the mode of its existence, we may equally infer the continued existence of the soul, however ignorant we may be of its supersensible mode. And if we may do this in our imperfect and crippled condition, the first man may have done it in his innocent and unimpaired estate.

But we are told that all things, according to the general law of evolution, proceeding by the special laws of dissipation and equilibration of forces, are destined to absolute quiescence, and it would follow, one may infer, that along with all else the soul will be reduced to absolute quiescence. Well, is that the final outcome? No, we are further informed that, by some unaccountable maggot of restlessness, the whole quiescent mass begins to rotate, under a law, the name of which may, without intermeddling presumption, be suggested to the learned speculator—that of circum-

[1] See his *Synthetic Philosophy; First Principles.*

gyration, or, in plain English, roundaboutness. How now? All forces are, according to the supposition, quiescent, that is, they cease to operate. They are no longer dynamic. Whence, then, this incipient circumgyratory force, which performs the wonderful office of starting the whole resting mass into a whirling motion again? We have a remarkable instance of an absolute commencement. But granted the marvel, as the quiescent soul is a part of the system, one would naturally conclude that it begins again to circumgyrate. It still manifests motion and life. And as the ground is taken that this law of quiescence and successive restoration of energy is an eternal one, the immortality of the soul is conceded. Add to this the assertion of the agnostic school, that no elemental force is susceptible of annihilation, and the admission of the soul's immortality is complete.

But the pantheist here comes on the field, and it would be disrespectful to his philosophic pretensions not to endeavor to meet his arguments. The strongest of them in opposition to the immortality of the soul which we can conceive is the Aristotelian. So long as we are encompassed with a mundane environment, the soul possesses an individual existence. When the bodily organism dissolves, the soul continues to exist, but not as individual. It is reäbsorbed into the general fund of being, the soul of the world. It is immortal as that general soul is immortal, but as an individual entity it is mortal. This is equivalent to a total denial of at least the intelligent immortality of the soul. It punches out its I.

There is a single line of argument which will be adverted to, as it seems fatal to this view, notwithstanding its distinguished parentage. The soul is conscious of personality. Of course, it must lose this personality if reabsorbed into an impersonal divine substance. Now, either the personality is destroyed, or not. If destroyed, as it is claimed that God comes to consciousness in the person of man, God loses the climax of his manifestation, and to that extent suffers degradation; and this must occur in the innumerable instances of absorption of souls. But this is absurd. If these personalities are not destroyed, they are lost attributes, divorced from the essences to which they belong, incapable of re-

suming their attachment to them, or of being transferred to individual souls already personal, or of being taken up by a confessedly impersonal God. Like feathers plucked from birds, and floating in the air, they wander about in the vacuity of space, lamenting that they are qualified to do duty in connection with substances, but can find no substances to employ them! Conscious personality is the *pons asinorum* of the pantheist. How it came to be evolved from an impersonal substance, and what becomes of it when the soul ceases to be an evanescent manifestation of that substance and is refunded into it, are questions which he cannot answer. How different from the doctrine that the soul immortally advances in personal communion with a personal God!

Secondly, God communicated the revelation embraced in the Scriptures. They therefore teach true religion. But they definitely declare the doctrine of the soul's immortality as naturally belonging to man. For, those who will not be saved through the atonement of Christ are represented as continuing forever in conscious existence. Immortality, consequently, was not conditioned upon the redeeming work of Christ.[1] It is involved in the sanctions of religion, as such. If now God had not made known to the first man the immortality of his soul, he would have taught him a mutilated religion. The supposition is inconceivable, and the conclusion follows that the scheme of natural religion contained this as one of its elements.

Thirdly, That the immortality of the soul was an article of natural religion may also be collected from the testimony of the Scriptures, that man was made in the image of God, and that his Maker was pleased to enter into a covenant with him, the reward of which was eternal life. Divines have properly regarded the image of God in which man was created as natural and moral. It may fairly be inferred that he was made immortal so as in some measure to shadow forth God's immortality, at least to believe with greater clearness in God's immortality from the analogy of his own being. The covenant which promised a confirmed and indefectible life of holiness and happiness on condition of obedi-

[1] A happy immortality is to sinners a result of redemption, but that is not the same with immortality.

ence during the specified time of trial, for in no other way could justification have been attainable, proceeded on the pre-supposition of a natural immortality. This consideration could only be rebutted by proving, as certain writers like Bishop Warburton have essayed to do, that the natural immortality of the soul was a gift conditioned upon man's maintenance of integrity. When he fell, consequently, they contend that it was forfeited, and is only restored by Christ. But apart from the scriptural declaration that the gospel brings life and immortality to light, which implies that they are not for the first time created by it, the view under consideration is refuted by the teaching of Scripture that the immortality of the soul exists *notwithstanding* sin, and will exist as a fact in spite of the greatest of sins—final unbelief in Christ. This is enough to settle the question. The truth is, that reason itself is able to see that annihilation, either under the scheme of natural religion, or that of redemption, would render punishment for sin impossible, such punishment as implies suffering—and no other is strictly punishment—inasmuch as it would defraud justice of its dues. The transgressor of law would break jail and avoid the infliction of the sentence. A threatening of annihilation would be a promise of escape.

2. Natural religion and the gospel are alike in the fact that they were both revealed.

The distinction between natural and revealed religion is a mistake. There is one often taken betwixt natural and revealed theology, but the terms theology and religion are not convertible. As it is on all hands admitted by Christian writers that the gospel is the product of supernatural revelation, the only question that here requires discussion is whether natural religion was also revealed. This need not detain us long.

The first religion of man consisted of two elements—a natural and a supernatural. The supernatural embraced those articles which the natural and necessary progress of the unaided reason could never have evolved. They were probably the doctrine of the trinity, certainly that of the covenant of works. The latter may be confidently spoken of. A federal economy could never have been thought out or suggested by man. It was the result of

a free, unnecessitated determination of the divine will, and consequently man could only have become acquainted with it through a supernatural revelation. To this extent, therefore, natural religion must have been a revealed religion. The natural element of this first religious scheme was the internal constitution of man, as a being furnished with intelligence, feelings, a will, and a conscience, adapting him to the knowledge, service and worship of God, in connection with the lessons of external nature. The heavens and the earth, which declared the glory of God, illustrated his invisible natural perfections, and conducted him, as by the rungs of a ladder reaching to the skies, to God their Creator and providential Governor. These constitute a natural revelation of God to man. He could not have endowed himself with his religious nature, and it is equally certain that he could not have inspired the teachings of the glorious universe above, around and beneath him. The instructions derived from both these sources were divine gifts—in other words, they were a divine revelation. This is the testimony of Scripture, which affirms that man contains in him a divinely implanted law, that the heavens declare the glory of God, the firmament manifests his handiwork, and that the earth in her manifold works proclaims his existence and his government.[1]

There is still another view that may be added. The Mosaic record informs us that God held oral converse with Adam in the garden. It is true that this fact is stated as having occurred after the commission of the first sin; but we irresistibly infer that the personal intercourse which his Maker condescended to hold with man did not then begin; and this inference is confirmed by the express statement that God delivered to Adam the command touch-

[1] Dr. Thornwell, speaking of the gospel and natural religion, says: "They are both *revealed*. The difference between them is radical and essential, not accidental or contingent. They are different *religions*. One is the religion of our nature before the fall; the other, the religion of grace after the fall." (*Coll. Writings*, Vol. II. pp. 61, 62, note. See also Vol. III. p. 210, note.)

Dr. A. A. Hodge, in his *Outlines of Theology*, is very explicit: "The natural revelation which God makes of himself to man, in the constitution of the human soul, and in the works of creation and providence, would unquestionably have been sufficient to lead him to the knowledge of God, if man himself had continued in his natural moral condition and relations." (Pp. 13, 14.)

ing the forbidden tree. If so, God orally communicated to man a knowledge of his relations and duties; and then it would follow that the two religions we are now comparing did not differ even as to the circumstance of *immediate* revelation. God himself verbally communicated the promise of redemption to the guilty pair, and, according to the testimony of the evangelists and the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the gospel was "spoken" by the Lord Jesus. So God himself orally imparted instruction to Adam in innocence in regard to his religion.

The question now arises—and it will be but briefly touched upon—What relation does the gospel sustain to natural religion?

In the first place, if what has already been said is true, it is evident that it is not the peculiar office of the gospel to originate the doctrines of the divine existence, the trinity, the moral government of God, grace as favor manifested to the undeserving, federal headship and legal representation, and the immortality of the soul. They were created by the revelation of man's first religion.

In the second place, the gospel employs these great pre-suppositions of nature as fundamental. They constitute an impregnable natural basis upon which the superstructure of redemption is erected. Hence they are not so much articulately and formally proved as taken for granted. They lie necessarily at the foundation of all religious obedience and worship.

In the third place, the gospel takes up and republishes these old articles of natural religion under new relations and sanctions. Obscured by vain speculations, corrupted by wicked imaginations, and buried almost out of sight under the accumulated rubbish of sinful passions and conduct, they needed to be revealed afresh. This is done by the Scriptures in general, and by the gospel in part. The Bible is to sinful men what magnifying glasses are to the eyes of the old, and the dim vision induced by disease. The objects may be there, but the sight is wanting clearly to descry them.[1]

[1] Nempe sicuti senes, vel lippi, et quicunque oculis caligant, si vel pulcherrimum volumen illis objicias, quamvis agnoscant esse aliquid scriptum, vix tamen duas voces contexere poterunt, specillis autem interpositis adjuti distincte legere incipient: ita Scriptura confusam alioqui Dei notitiam in mentibus nostris colligens, discussa caligine liquido nobis verum Deum ostendit.—Calvin, *Inst.*, Lib. I., cap. vi.

Adam knew distinctly the truths of natural religion, Socrates groped after them like a man partly blind, and Paul reannounced them from the *bema* of the Areopagus with glorious clearness and power. The Scriptures as a whole, even in those parts which are not identical with the gospel, state and enforce anew these ancient and venerable principles of religion; but the gospel republishes them in their bearing upon men in new relations, the relations induced by redemption, and urges them upon the heart with new motives and new sanctions springing from the mercy of God and the cross of Christ. This leads us to the last head of this discussion.

II. Let us consider the points of difference between the gospel and natural religion. What are the differentiating features of the gospel? What its characteristic and distinctive province?

1. These two schemes of religion differ in regard to their *relations*. Natural religion was related to a party that had not fallen, the gospel is related to a party fallen. The former was a religion of the innocent; the latter, the religion of sinners. Adam in holiness needed no redemption and no incarnate Redeemer; his sinful descendants must have both, or perish eternally. Innocence and guilt designate the respective parties on whom these different schemes of religion terminate.

2. They differ in important respects with reference to their *sources*. Both sprang from God, but natural religion had its origin partly in his justice and partly in his grace, considered as unmerited favor to his creatures. Its fundamental principle, as it came under the scope of moral government, was justice, and hence it was dominantly a religion of law. Personal obedience to law was its matter, and legal justification on account of it its reward. At least, this was true of the first man, regarded both in his individual and federal capacity. But at the same time some of its provisions originated in grace, as has already been pointed out in these remarks. On the other hand, the gospel had its source in the mere mercy of God, considered as favor shown to the guilty and miserable. To say that the gospel originated in law, as is done by certain popular scientific writers on religion, is a profound error. In its origin it was extra-legal and "super-

legal," although in its execution it conforms to the most rigid exactions of law.

3. They differ in regard to their *ends*. Natural religion had for its end the conservation and establishment of man in holiness already existing; the gospel contemplates as its end, first, the recovery of man as guilty to God's favor; secondly, the restoration of man as polluted to God's image; and, thirdly, the conservation of man in holiness thus secured by the provisions of redemption.

4. They differ as to some of their *contents*. A great theological thinker has observed, that the gospel has introduced no new original principle into the moral government of God.[1] If by an original principle is intended one which was an element in the moral government of God, conceived in its widest sweep as extending to angels as well as men, of which we derive our information only from the Scriptures, it would seem to be true that the gospel has introduced no new principle unknown to the procedures of that government. In this wide view of the case the gospel incorporates into its scheme, and proceeds upon, the old principles of the religion of nature. While, however, this is so, the applications which the gospel makes of those original principles are so novel and wonderful, they lie so completely beyond what the hopes of sinful man could have dreamed of realizing, or the reason of sinful man could have dared to suggest, that they stamp it as a wholly new scheme of religion, entitled to be called "the glorious gospel of the blessed God." It is chiefly these new applications of recognized doctrines, these fresh and unexpected forms of administering primitive principles of moral government, that attach to the gospel its distinctive marks, and differentiate it from the religion of nature. While, therefore, in these remarks there will be an undertone of comment on the fundamental likeness of the two religions, their main office will consist in signalizing the distinctive peculiarities of the gospel. What are they?

(1.) The relation which God sustains to man. The existence of God and the relations he naturally sustained to his creatures, together with those which were instituted in connection with the

[1] See Thornwell, *Coll. Writings*, Vol. II. pp. 71, 74.

covenant of works, were, as we have seen, part of the doctrinal matter of natural religion. It is not, therefore, a peculiar characteristic of the gospel to announce the doctrine of God's existence and his relation to the race as creator, providential ruler and final judge. This it assumes as part of its natural foundation. But it *is* a distinctive office of the gospel to reveal God as a redeemer. Natural religion made, could have made, no provision for redemption; when its requirements were infringed naught remained but the infliction of its penalty. The reason of fallen man could no more have furnished a prophecy or hint of redemption than hell could of heaven. It pleased God in the freedom of his infinite sovereignty to take the attitude of redeemer, and this fact it belongs to the gospel alone to declare. It begins with redemption, and the redeemed church will forever celebrate the theme.

(2.) The redemptive relations of the trinity. The doctrine of God's trinal existence was an essential component of the first religion. Its revelation, therefore, it is not the peculiar province of the gospel to make. It alone, however, reveals the redemptive relations and offices of the divine persons. It is its prerogative alone to make known the Father as ordaining salvation, the Son as purchasing it with his blood, and the Holy Spirit as applying it by his grace. But this is not all. It embodies in itself, as a scheme of salvation, a fellowship with the Father and the Son in these tender relations, through the communion of the Holy Ghost, on the part of the believing and penitent sinner—a communion which restores to him a lost God, constitutes a channel through which he derives holiness from the fulness of divine grace, and fills his soul with a happiness which is the rich foretaste of heavenly bliss. This is a constituent element of the gospel, and constitutes not the least of its singular glories.

(3.) The mercy of God. It has already been shown that God manifested his goodness to Adam in the form of grace, which is goodness conceived in relation to those who can merit nothing. But mercy could not have been exhibited to man in innocence, inasmuch as it supposes the object upon which it terminates to be ill-deserving and miserable. Grace may, of course, be shown to sinners, since they are emphatically undeserving, and hence the

gospel is denominated the gospel of the grace of God. We are saved by grace, for by meritorious works of our own none could be saved. But while this is true, it is a peculiar office of the gospel to reveal the redeeming mercy of God to sinners. Man in innocence may have known something of it by description, but he could have had no experimental acquaintance with it. Indeed, until the sin of man occurred, we have no information of its ever having been exercised in the concrete. "But after that the kindness and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared, not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us." The pity of God, when there was no arm to save, and we lay down despairing under our guilt, helplessness, and misery, it is the beneficent office of the gospel alone to manifest.

(4.) Election. The Scriptures seem to intimate that the angels who maintained their integrity when their brethren fell were elected to be preserved from sinning. They are expressly alluded to by Paul as "the elect angels." But man was not elected to be kept from falling, for, had he been, he would most certainly not have fallen. After the fall—we speak now of the case as presented to the divine mind in eternity, that is, God foreknowing the fall as the result of man's free decision to sin—he was pleased, in his mere sovereign mercy, to elect some of the guilty mass to be saved. It is obvious, then, that in revealing this electing purpose of God the gospel is conspicuously distinguished from man's first religion; and although the principle of election may have been employed in relation to the unfallen angels, its application to human sinners was seriously modified, for the former, on the supposition, were elected to be saved from sinning; the latter, to be saved from sin.

(5.) The federal headship and representative character of the Son of God, his mission, mediation, incarnation, and person. Here we have the old principle of federal headship and representation as employed in natural religion, but with what a vast modification! In the first place, the federal head and representative is divine, as contradistinguished to one who was human under the covenant of works. In the second place, he was appointed the

head and representative of the elect, who were by the Father given to him to be redeemed, whereas Adam was the head and representative of all mankind. In the third place, he was the federal and the spiritual, but not the natural, father of his seed; he has no descendants according to the flesh. On the other hand, Adam was first created the natural parent of the race, and then, by a free, separate, subsequent constitution, was made their federal head and representative. In the fourth place, the Son of God, begotten of the Father, but not created, was sent into the world; but Adam was created a human being, and constituted a trustee of the race on the spot where he originated. In the fifth place, the federal head of the elect was appointed a mediator between God and men. Adam sustained no such office. In the sixth place, the Son of God became incarnate and assumed our nature by a free act, in which, as divine, he consented to the mediatorial commission. Adam existed as a human being, by necessity springing from God's creative act. Further, the incarnation was a miracle in a sense in which Adam's creation could not have been; for the creation of the latter contravened no law of nature, and attested no revelation from heaven. The incarnation traversed the law of ordinary descent by generation, and was evidential of the supernatural scheme of which it was a constituent element. In the seventh place, by the incarnation, in which the eternal Son of God contracted a new relation by assuming human nature into mysterious union with his divine person, he became a federal head who was not, like Adam, merely human, but divine and human, the God-man. In consequence of this transcendently wonderful fact, no contingency attached, as in the case of our first father, to the fulfilment of his engagements as the covenant head and representative of his seed. The question, whether an intrinsic mutability inhered in his merely human will, as the law of probation might suggest, need not now be discussed. It is sufficient to know that the stipulations of the covenant of grace, the union of his human nature with his divine upon his eternal personality, and the immeasurable unction of the Holy Ghost with which his humanity was endowed, placed him absolutely beyond contingency in the discharge of his stupendous trust.

(6.) The priesthood, atoning death and resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ. We meet here again a modification of the principle of federal headship and representation. Adam in innocence was as the federal representative of his posterity, and as the interpreter of nature's homage to its Maker, and in that sense its representative, a minister of worship; but he was not, strictly speaking, a priest; for a priest is a public minister of worship officiating at God's altar for guilty men by the offering of expiatory sacrifice. In this respect, Christ differed from him. He presents priestly worship to God for his people through sacrifice, and through the sacrifice of himself. Adam's death was the judicial result of his own conscious sin, and was a solemn sentence of violated law, which from the moment that it began to take effect in the loss of spiritual life and the mortality of the body, laid a dreadful arrest upon his functions as a representative. On the contrary, the death of Jesus, as the priestly substitute of his people, was the meritorious consummation of his expiatory work and sufferings on earth, and grounded the continuance of his sacerdotal office through intercession in the heavenly holy of holies. So far, in this case, was the death of the representative from being the evidence of his own failure and the signal of doom for his constituents, that it furnished a perfect ground for the remission of his people's guilt, and for their acceptance before the divine tribunal. His cross, which was an outward symbol of shame, became his glory, and the glory of the gospel scheme. Adam could only have wrought out righteousness as a living representative; Christ completed his righteousness as the dying substitute of his seed. The atonement, therefore, is justly regarded as the central fact and the peculiar glory of Christianity. It is this which more than all else stamps the gospel with its own individual genius. In nothing else is its difference from natural religion so illustriously exemplified. The paradise which had been lost in Eden was regained on Calvary.

When Adam died, he could have had no hope of rising from the grave except through another, who was his federal head and representative under a different covenant from that which he had ruthlessly broken; but Christ, having died, rose again from the dead as the representative of his people. In his resurrection God

the Father set his seal to the fulfilment of his covenant engagements, and publicly proclaimed to the universe the acceptance and approval of his finished righteousness. He was proved to be a priestly representative, made not after a carnal commandment, but after the power of an endless life.

(7.) Justification from guilt. Justification was the promised reward of the first covenant, alike for the representative himself and for his posterity. But the moment that guilt was contracted justification was made impossible to him on account of his conscious sin, and it was rendered hopeless to his seed because of the imputation of the guilt of that sin to them. His endurance of the penalty could not be federal, and could justify neither himself nor them from guilt. But the Lord Jesus, the glorious representative of his guilty people, having, in the mysterious economy of redemption, voluntarily assumed their guilt, and the Father having judicially imputed it to him, was enabled, on account of his conscious, subjective innocence, and the infinite dignity of his divine person, to take their place in law, and, by his piacular sufferings vicariously endured for them, to exhaust its tremendous penalty, and render perfect satisfaction to the vindicatory justice of God. He thus won for his people justification from guilt. The blood of atonement "cleanseth from all sin." Here then we discover another distinctive feature of the gospel which signally discriminates it from natural religion.

The ascension to heaven of the risen representative, his intercession there, and his session on the mediatorial throne, it is scarcely necessary to remark, constitute other new and glorious applications of the principle of federal headship and representation.

(8.) On the supposition, which to us appears just, that Adam in innocence was a son as well as a servant of God, he would, had he fulfilled the probation assigned him, have been confirmed in the filial relation. In like manner, when a sinner is by the new birth made a child of God, he is, in consequence of the finished obedience of Christ his representative, and through the exercise of faith,[1] confirmed as a son in the divine family. But here the

[1] John i. 12: "But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name." Gal. iii. 26: "For

difference emerges between the two cases. Adoption takes place. The sinner is formally translated from the family of Satan into the family of God.

(9.) The supernatural grace of the Holy Spirit in regeneration and sanctification. In the first place, regeneration is a new and peculiar application of creative power. An existent being is created anew in Christ Jesus. In the second place, sanctification is the continued application of the blood of the great representative, purging the conscience from dead works to serve the living God, cleansing the soul from the polluting stain of daily defilements, arresting the sentences of fatherly justice, and averting the temporal consequences of sin. To this the Holy Spirit adds his dynamic influence, strengthening the believer for the discharge of duty, the resistance of temptation, and the endurance of trial. In the third place, Adam was endowed with grace, with sufficient, but not determining, grace. But under the gospel scheme the believer in Christ is determined to holiness by the efficacious grace of the Spirit. He is confirmed in his standing by the merit of his representative and the continued infusions of grace. In the fourth place, there is a basis in nature for the supernatural graces of the Spirit. As, in regeneration, he creates no new faculties, so he creates no new original powers. The graces of the new man are natural powers born again. The unregenerate sinner has natural faith, love and hope. When he is regenerated, these original powers are pervaded by the spiritual life which had been exsiccated by sin, and become new-born habits of the soul.

(10.) Consolation. This was not needed, it is true, in natural religion, and no provision, consequently, was made for it in that scheme. It supposes sin and the retinue of afflictions which follow in its train. But the representative of the elect passed through the furnace of trial for their sake, and, having been made perfect by disciplinary sufferings, extends the cordial of his sympathy to them, as they walk through the fiery ordeals of life and through

ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus." It is clear that faith cannot condition regeneration, but in these passages it is said to condition sonship, which must, therefore, be adoption.

the valley of the shadow of death. This consoling sympathy his Vicar, the ever-blessed Spirit, applies with his own soft hand of love to the souls of his afflicted people.

(11.) The brotherhood of believers. Had not Adam sinned the human race, as it came into existence, would have been bound together by the tie of a brotherhood resulting from a common relation to the same progenitor. And even now in our poor, sinful world there lingers a shadow of it, faint and imperfect though it be rendered by the strifes of wicked passion. Superinduced upon this original principle by the grace of the gospel is the brotherhood of believers in Jesus. A new and supernatural relation is constituted, attended by corresponding affections and duties—an inner circle within the general community of men, the centre of which is the elder brother of the saints. United to him by the vital influence of his Spirit and by their own personal faith in him, they are his brethren of whom he is not ashamed, for his Father is theirs. "A new commandment," said Jesus to his disciples, "I give unto you, that ye love one another"—a new commandment, not because it was an eleventh added to the Decalogue, but because it was a new and peculiar modification, induced by the gospel, of the old commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

Lastly, the resurrection of the dead. Singular and glorious as will be this fact, of which we are assured by the express testimony of Scripture, it will involve a new and peculiar application of the old principles of creative power, federal representation and the moral government of God, which were embodied in natural religion. It will afford an instance of the exercise of creative power, for no power short of that could accomplish so amazing a result. It will constitute a new application of the representative principle, so far as the saints are concerned, for the great argument of the apostle in its favor is founded upon the union of believers to their head: "Now is Christ risen and become the firstfruits of them that slept." The resurrection of the representative necessitates that of his constituents. It will furnish a new illustration of the moral government of God as modified by the mediatorial rule. For if the wicked be not raised, the sentences of justice will not

be fully executed, the demands of a violated law not fully met, and the threatenings of the gospel not fully enforced. Held as prisoners in the grave, they must when the hour of judgment is sounded appear, in their whole personality, at the bar to give account of all that they had done in the body. An instrument of the soul's sin, the body will be an instrument of its punishment.

This then is the distinctive peculiarity of the gospel—redemption from sin, death and hell. Jesus incarnate, Jesus living and dying, Jesus rising, ascending to heaven and sitting upon the throne, Jesus interceding and sending the Spirit of all grace, Jesus coming again to raise the dead and dispense the final measures of mediatorial rule,—this is the burden of the gospel, this its glory and its crown.

John L. Girardeau.

II. THE TRUE AND THE FICTITIOUS JESUITS.

President Francis L. Patton has remarked that every age has its special vocation respecting the divisions in the Christian Church. The age of the Reformation plainly had a call to polemics. Even then, it is true, fairness was commendable, and mere contentiousness censurable. It is to the credit of Rome that her great controversialist, Cardinal Bellarmine, is so careful and discriminating in his statement of the Protestant positions as to have given much offence to the more heated tempers of Italy. It is equally to the credit of Luther and Calvin that they would never allow that the Catholic Church had gone off the common foundation of Christianity, and never would impeach her sacraments of invalidity, but maintained that "many and mighty saints had remained under the pope." Calvin even instructed Protestant parents, where they could not obtain Protestant ministrations, to have their children baptized by the Catholic clergy. Yet undoubtedly at that time an excess of polemical vehemence was a lesser fault than a sickly disposition to compromise in the midst of the conflict, such as that with which Melanchthon was repeatedly, and not unreasonably, charged.

On the other hand, President Patton is undoubtedly authorized to say that the vocation of our age, in dealing with the great antagonism of Western Christendom, is predominantly irenical. Assuredly he does not mean that the principles of the Reformation are not to be steadfastly affirmed. Princeton does not need to vindicate her attachment to Protestantism, and to its stricter wing. General Presbyterianism, indeed, has small occasion to indulge in the coarse commonplaces of vituperation against Rome, which seem perfectly natural to certain Arminian bodies. There is a double reason for this. Arminianism, it is true, is genuinely Protestant, and cannot, since the days of Laud, be accused of any disposition to betray the common cause. In its most highly organized form it is more inclined to domineer than to betray. Nevertheless, its theology forms a bond of unconscious sympathy

with Rome which perhaps requires more violence of effort to maintain distinctiveness than is any way necessary for Calvinism. Rome is the true mother and mistress of Arminianism. As remarked by Gibbon, she has always received the teachings of Augustine with open applause and secret reluctance. This may, perhaps, give a reason why some Arminian schools are inclined to be peculiarly virulent against her. For some reason, also, the leading Arminian bodies incline to a centralization of church-government, which, as has been lately pointed out by Mr. Snell in *The Independent*, decidedly surpasses that of Rome in adaptedness to the ends of ecclesiastical ambition. Aims of universal conquest are sometimes avowed by organized Arminianism, which are not essentially distinguishable from those avowed by Rome in their goal, and, if carried out, might put on a disagreeable resemblance in their methods. Already two contiguous Canadian provinces are, the one controlled, the other powerfully influenced, by the two rival sects, which Mr. Goldwin Smith describes as both exceedingly arrogant in enforcing their civil domination on the rest of the citizens.

Now, Calvinism, and, therefore, Presbyterianism, its most actively theological wing, to which we may add the Congregationalism of New England, has no bond of connection with Rome, and no possibility of compromise with her. Presbyterianism may resume fellowship with Rome when the latter removes the ban from Jansenism, when she no longer permits the Jesuits—those Arminians of the Arminians, if we must not rather call them Pelagians outright—to disfigure and distort the teachings of Thomas Aquinas concerning grace and predestination, and to force their denaturalized interpretations upon the Dominicans, who, as Dr. Thomas Davidson says, have literally received them with weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth. Presbyterianism may fraternize with Rome when Rome once more allows the unabated teachings of the great Bishop of Hippo, as in earlier ages, to be heard in her schools, and to resound from her pulpits. Whatever disagreements of rite, or doctrine, or administration might still remain, this removal of restriction against genuine Augustinianism would signify that the deep tide of spiritual life

had burst its way through all hierarchical barriers, and was once more flooding and refreshing this vast episcopacy. It is perfectly safe to say that Presbyterianism will resume ecclesiastical fellowship on such conditions, for, when they are accepted, the Roman Catholic Church, as the name is now understood, will have ceased to exist, and the Reformation, as to its essential ends, will have triumphed throughout Christendom. The question how far it will retain its present historical forms is, of course, secondary and accidental. A moderated episcopacy may remain, but Presbyterianism is appointed to be, everywhere, the death of prelacy.

Meanwhile, Calvinism, above all in its Presbyterian embodiment, will do well to inquire how the irenical vocation of this age of the church, which Dr. Patton is doubtless right in affirming to be incumbent upon her, is to be understood, above all, as respects itself. One thing we may say: Calvinistic Presbyterianism ought to detach itself from the warping influence of Protestant schools or churches whose recent origin has thus far been decidedly prejudicial to the development of a genuine historical sense. It would be too much to hold these responsible for various virulent misrepresentations of the great opposing camp which float around from one religious newspaper to another, confirming themselves in general belief by uncontradicted repetition, although resting on absolutely no evidence. On the contrary, it can be shown that some of the most malignant of these, especially such as are directed against the Jesuits, distorting their teachings (in themselves, one would think, sufficiently exceptionable) out of all recognizable shape, have originated in learned Germany, and have been taken under the special patronage of great universities. Nevertheless, there are in America ecclesiastical parties shamefully prone to slovenliness of historical treatment, to malevolent credulity, and to the unscrupulous manufacture or distortion of facts, from which it is of the utmost importance that Presbyterianism should detach herself. Her high character of reflective scholarship is too precious to be imperilled by unadvised alliances. She, at least, is bound to insist, in the controversy with Rome, on rigid historical inquiry and evidence, such as shall bring the exaggerations of popular fiction—some of which are absolutely enormous—within the limits of ascertainable fact.

The real relation of the Society of Jesus to the Roman Catholic Church is well defined by *The London Spectator* as being that of an order which makes it its business to keep that church, in season and out of season, up to the height of its theoretical pretensions, both as over against Protestantism and over against the state. Its central inspiration may be described as being the wish to maintain mediæval principles by modern methods. This has given to it its tremendous effectiveness. We must not, indeed, imagine that it was primarily instituted to combat Protestantism. Ignatius Loyola was a thorough Spaniard, and a Spaniard of very limited education, not even knowing Latin until he learned it for his new purpose, and too completely restricted in his range of thought to be at all aware, for a good while, of the portentous significance of the great Northern revolt. Indeed, as the eminent Old Catholic antagonist of Jesuitism, Professor Huber, remarks, when Loyola first had the thought of founding his order, he had never even heard Luther's name, and ten years later, appears to have had a very dim apprehension of the dangers to Catholicism involved in Luther's movement. He seems simply to have had a vague sense that a new age was coming in, not very friendly to the old forms of Catholic piety, and to have wished to revive, or, we might say, to galvanize, these into a new lease of life. The early bulls of confirmation adduce this, together with general charity, as the special, or rather, the sole object of the institute. Indeed, it was not until six years after 1534 that Loyola sent a solitary brother to Germany, and then only at the solicitation of the emperor's ambassador. At a time when we are wont to picture him as devising a deeply-laid campaign against heresy, his mind seems to have been more largely taken up with the best means of rescuing fallen women from their life of shame. Instead of a journey of defiance to Wittenberg, his heart was set on a pilgrimage of devotion to Jerusalem, and when this was accomplished, he chose as his special field of activity Italy and Spain. This would have been wisely done, indeed, had he forecast the whole, for these two citadels of Catholicism needed to be first secured; but, apart from this, the two Latin peninsulas probably bulked larger in his eyes than all Teutonic Europe taken together.

And even as late as 1556, when he died, of the twelve Jesuit provinces, three were in Spain and two in Italy. Indeed, the papal edicts concerning the Society, down to the very brief of Clement XIV. which dissolved it in 1773, scarcely mention heresy, or, if they occasionally do, subordinate the conflict against it to the conversion of the heathen, while the constitutions of the Society itself only mention heresy in an incidental way. Nevertheless, the implacable Spanish hatred of heresy was communicated by Loyola to his order in the fullest degree, and during its prime was most intense and active in its operation. And yet, by what appears, though only superficially, a strange inconsistency, it is the Jesuits principally who have established in the Roman Catholic Church the opinion, which has now been formally approved by Rome, that Protestants, being such in good faith, may lay hold on eternal life. They hold that Protestantism is utterly evil, but that the all-abounding grace of God may, even in this poisonous atmosphere, raise up many children to him. We may return the compliment by saying that, notwithstanding the poisonous atmosphere of Jesuitism, many good and godly men have drawn from it only its elements of health, and have left behind an honorable memory in the church of God.

The order has always proceeded on the lines laid out by Loyola. It may, indeed, have incorporated elements of evil not to be reasonably laid to his charge, yet the scandalous ethics which so many of its writers have taken up, and against which the society has seldom raised any energetic protest, have found only too fit a soil in the spirit of craftiness, in which its founder, for all his undoubted piety and profound benevolence, was by no means lacking. His successor, Lainez, with less piety had more craft than he, and under him the Declarations, which he succeeded in raising to equal authority with the Constitutions, have given a considerably wider scope for worldly policy. Yet, as Loyola hardly had Protestantism in mind, how is it that, for more than a century after his death, Jesuitism was so effective in helping to check the advances of the Reformation, and to recover from it half Germany and all Austria and Bohemia? It seems to have been mainly its extraordinary adaptedness to the revival of Catholic

devotion, in the fantastic and sensuous forms of the Middle Ages, yet with sufficient pliancy to be at home in the new era. Indeed, it appears from Canon Mozley, that in Spain, that intensely mediæval land, Blanco White judges the Jesuits to have been an influence for intellectual and moral elevation, because they understood so much better than the other orders the requirements of modern times. Besides, the extravagant sentimentalism and superstition of Jesuit piety could not do much harm in Spain, which was already about as superstitious as it could be. Then the Jesuit methods of education, remarks Huber, though now far behind the standard of the age, were, for the first century or more, a good deal before it. Their guidance of consciences, which by 1650 was already sinking into a shameful accommodation to the desires of penitents who wished to be saved without entering in by the narrow gate, appears, for the first generation or two, to have been wise and mild, without as yet being lax. Huber himself thinks that the scandalous morality which is intermixed with strict morality in such a singular way in many Jesuit works—by no means in all—was not originally the fruit of a desire to accommodate their teachings to men of the world. It originated, he says, in a scholastic habit of following out every case of casuistry into all possible forms and consequences, a course of proceeding which was sure to weaken the simplicity of the moral sense. But when the order, which only too quickly became an end to itself, discovered how very convenient this way of confusing the straightforward dictates of the Christian conscience proved for multitudes of the rich and mighty, it insensibly entered upon a downward course, which has almost evacuated the confessional of all moral power, and, unless the influence of the Jesuits in the church can be overthrown, bids fair to render Catholicism, what it has already become in some countries, a stench in the nostrils of men. Blind obedience, gross superstition, contemptibly childish piety, directed to almost every object more than to God in Christ, and a rooted antipathy to all advances of thought which may endanger the dominion of Rome over the church, and the dominion of the Jesuits over Rome, are traits imprinted too deep on the history of the Society to leave any hope that it can ever be reformed. Who-

ever it was that, to those that desired a change in the laws of the order, answered: *Sint ut sunt, aut non sint* ("Annihilation, if it must be so, but never Change"), knew what he was saying.

As Pascal remarks, although the Jesuits, in their corporate influence, have often been so ready to excuse their penitents from observing the evangelical precepts, yet, taken man for man, they have by no means been neglectful of them for themselves. Although there have been among them shameful examples of luxury, and still more shameful of immorality, yet, as a whole, they have always maintained a higher standard of personal character than either the secular clergy or the other monastic orders. If the Society is really so enormously rich as many say, it uses its riches for other ends than personal gratification. From the General down to the humblest temporal coädjutors, modest frugality is admitted by opponents as well as by friends to be its prevailing type of living. Their institute exempts the Jesuits from unpractical asceticism and excess of ritual observance, but not from the obligation of maintaining great simplicity of living. Ignatius, a chivalrous soldier, meant his "company," as he called it, to be always in marching trim.

Another great reason of its effectiveness has been, as Professor Huber remarks, its skill in having fused into one great plan the various diverging objects of the elder orders. The Jesuits have rivalled the Benedictines in devotion to learned pursuits, the Dominicans in zeal for preaching and catechising, the Franciscans in care for the sick and poor. Yet this last work, which comes so near to the heart of Jesus, is not that on which they have laid out their chief strength, and in some generations and regions they have been bitterly reproached with indifference to the interests of humanity. In the time of the great plague at Milan, Saint Charles Borromeo found them a broken reed. They have rivalled, however, and then supplanted, both the Dominicans and Franciscans in their influence over the universities, while they have left both orders far behind in a reckless exaltation of the papal power.

Among the Jesuits, the professed of the four vows, who form, it is computed, hardly more than a fiftieth part of the order, but that the governing part, take, besides the three solemn promises

of chastity, poverty, and monastic obedience, common to them with all other orders, the special vow of obedience to the pope *for missionary purposes*, for so it is limited in the Constitutions. A *general* vow of obedience to the pope no Jesuit takes. Outside of his missionary vow, therefore, he owes the pope, if a priest, only canonical obedience in matters of religion. The formulas of unbounded obedience which we often see circulating are drawn up by men who know nothing about the relations of the Society to Rome. Of course, there are plenty of mendacious and malignant Protestants, and it has long been an article of faith among us that whatever blackens the Jesuits is proved to be true by that very fact. An unscrupulous fabricator, therefore, has only to accommodate himself with a little adroitness to popular credulity concerning this formidable and mysterious Society, and he knows well enough that the more the Jesuits contradict his fictions, the more firmly these will be believed. This is the penalty which they pay for their equivocations and reserves. Yet these fabrications are none the less disgraceful to us. As Dr. Schaff well says, there is very little choice of sides in the unscrupulousness and virulence of the long controversy between the two religions. We stand rebuked before the words of an unbelieving woman: "The world is only beginning to outgrow injustice." I will consider some of these spurious formulas further on.

The stream of Jesuit priests which poured into Great Britain during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was doubtless, in great measure, an exemplification of the vow of missionary obedience to the pope. It is no wonder that they gained an unbounded influence over the English Catholics, from their exemplary lives, deep devotion, and unreserved self-dedication to an almost continuous series of martyrdoms. Here, however, we see occasion to lament that spirit of intractable obstinacy by which they brought so much unhappiness upon the English Catholics. They did not, it is true, after the accession of James I., at all dispute that the Catholics owed allegiance to their Protestant king. No title of a Stuart before the Revolution appears ever to have been called in question by an English Catholic. The few desperate men, driven mad by persecution, who conceived the Gunpowder

Plot, found no defenders. But although the Jesuits admitted that the Catholics were bound to promise and perform allegiance to James and his posterity, and to lay aside all thoughts, near or remote, as to the possibility of their deposition, they insisted that the oath of allegiance required a declaration upon purely abstract prerogatives of the pope, which encroached on the religious conscience. The moderate Catholics, on the other hand, contended that the oath had a purely practical bearing, and did not, in reasonable interpretation, call upon Catholics to sit in doctrinal synod to judge public acts of popes who had reigned many ages before, under an entirely different order of society, or who might reign in some vague futurity, when the face of the world should have undergone another fundamental mutation. They maintained that the oath had, and was meant to have, a purely practical bearing, and signified only that they bore an unreserved allegiance to the English succession as determined by the laws of England, uncontrolled by Rome. The Jesuits contended that it meant more than this, and more than a Catholic could in conscience admit. I have given the most favorable view of their position in the controversy, and even on this interpretation, which I have strained in their favor, they thus, for generations, imprinted a gratuitous stigma of disloyalty upon their coreligionists, which must have augmented their miseries enormously. Of course nothing can atone for the hideous butcheries of innocent and noble Catholics during the monstrous and foul imposture of Titus Oates. Yet the narrow-minded obstinacy of the English Jesuits for several preceding reigns, in accord with the like action of Rome, appears in a certain measure to explain the fanatical credulity of the nation.

Of course, the Jesuits resorted to England principally to confirm the faith of the Roman Catholics already there, and to supply them with the necessary ministrations. Proselytism was a secondary aim. The thesis soon began to find favor among them that the English Protestants, especially the Anglicans, were included within the covenant of salvation. They declared that of those whom they had received into the Catholic Church, many had evidently never forfeited baptismal grace, and that of those who still remained Protestants a great part were in reality not heretics,

nor even schismatics, but genuine Catholics, although, by virtue of false education, estranged from Catholic communion, imbued with various doctrinal misapprehensions, and embittered against the Roman see. We might wonder, therefore, that they were so acrimonious against Anglicanism. And, indeed, they do not seem to have been very deeply disturbed over the spiritual state of the Protestant English at large. Here as everywhere, however, they were always on the alert for converts of high rank. In France, also, they had all that disdain of petty proselytism which, as a gentleman bears witness who has lately left the order and the church, distinguishes them everywhere to this day. Small pickings they toss over contemptuously to the other orders, or to the secular clergy. In France they gave great scandal to the Jansenists by their jaunty answer when solicited to join in efforts for the conversion of Protestants: "*Quand on croira en Jesus-Christ, on se sauve partout*" ("If any one only believes in Jesus Christ, he'll be saved in any church"). But only let them have a chance to make a haul of twenty or thirty thousand converts at once, or let them see a prospect of bringing over one of the higher nobility, a prince or princess, but, above all, a king or queen, and they would compass sea and land to make one such august proselyte, even when, as in the case of Christina of Sweden, it could have no effect upon the nation, but must be followed by abdication. As they did not imagine the soul of a king to be worth any more than that of a peasant, their solicitude to gain these converts in high life can hardly be put down to the account of an evangelical zeal for the salvation of men. It must rather be regarded as the fruit of an inordinate eagerness for the reputation and influence of the Society. This opinion is confirmed by the facts adduced by Pascal, showing the unmeasured exasperation displayed by the Jesuits whenever such a noble or princely convert was brought off the perch by any priest of another order. Marcus Aurelius's saying, "If good is only done, what matter who does it?" was as far as possible from expressing their feelings. Indeed, it has been suggested by the late Dr. Leonard Bacon, that the intensest controversy between the most widely alienated Protestant denominations has usually fallen far short of the bitterness which has often

prevailed between the monastic orders, while we may say that all previous disputes of these have been mild compared with the relentless animosity with which the Jesuits have been wont to hunt down their rivals in the church. This charge is so abundantly supported, that it would be the mere insanity of charitable interpretation to call it ill-founded.

Of course, a great part of the Jesuits, and very probably much the greater part of them, have had little or nothing to do with these schemings and strifes. As Huber remarks, thousands of them have been men of deep piety and simplicity of character, devoted to the purest ends of the order as these are expressed in its constitutions. Indeed, the larger part of them have nothing to do but to be loyally attentive to the particular functions assigned them. Nor need we, unless we have distinct evidence in particular cases, assume of any individual Jesuit whatever, whether writer, missionary, superior, provincial, or general, viewed in his personal character, that he was an unprincipled or a crafty man. We all know how we can do things organically which no one of us would do singly. And when we consider the extraordinary, I might fairly say the infernal, compactness of the Jesuit organization—for whatever inspirations Loyola may have had from Christ, we may be sure they have been terribly crossed by Lucifer—we find no difficulty in crediting the Society with an intensity and unscrupulousness of partisanship on its own account, which we have no sufficient reason to attribute to any one of its members, considered as detached from his order. Were various popular notions of the Society and of the obligations assumed by its members founded on fact, individual honesty would be quite impossible within it, but these notions have no more substance than so many childish fancies about Giant Blunderbore.

Nevertheless, as Professor Huber rightly remarks, we must not let charity towards individuals carry us too far. How can we believe that the General, Lainez, was influenced only, or mainly, by pure zeal and upright conviction when, at the Council of Trent, he relentlessly sacrificed the rights and interests of the church to the exaltation of the papal authority, which he treats, not as a means to a great end, but as itself a supreme and final end?

How, especially, can we credit him with simple purity of aim in his resolute vindication of the abuses of the Curia, which had made it for ages such an incubus upon the wealth, and far more dismally still upon the purity, as well as upon the free activity, of the Church? Lainez was ready, not indeed to approve, but to overlook, every abuse, if the removal of it weakened in the least the unbounded despotism of Rome. He doubtless believed this to be for the general good, but no frank simplicity of thought and aim would ever have brought him to so monstrous a conclusion.

I may remark, on the other hand, that we are obliged to charge Huber himself with having violated the good faith of controversy in accusing Bellarmine of having taught that, if the pope—which, indeed, says Huber, he holds to be impossible—should command "open sin," or forbid a virtue, the church would be bound to believe and obey him. What Bellarmine actually does say is this (*De Romano Pontifice*, Lib. IV., C. V.): "Now, if the pope should err"—which Bellarmine denies to be possible—"by enjoining vices, or prohibiting virtues, that is, by enjoining some act which should be in fact a vice, *but not manifestly a vice*, or by prohibiting an act of virtue, *but not manifestly a work of virtue*, the church would be held bound to believe vices to be good, and virtues evil, unless she would sin against conscience. For the church is held bound, *in doubtful things*, to acquiesce in the judgment of the Supreme Pontiff, and to do what he enjoins, not to do what he forbids; and, lest she should perchance act against conscience, she is bound to believe that to be good which he enjoins, that evil which he forbids." Here, by omitting the clauses which I have emphasized, Huber has entirely altered Bellarmine's meaning, which is simply this, that in a doubtful question of duty, the church must give the pope the benefit of the doubt. Suppose now that an American controversialist—say Dr. Josiah Strong in *Our Country*, who, I suppose, has written on this subject—were detected in such a vital mutilation of this passage, what an outcry we might expect to be raised over his unscrupulousness! Yet we Americans always hold ourselves liable to be corrected by German learning, but when German learning itself leads us into paths of falsehood and slander, *custodes quis custodiet?* Yet, as

I often cite Huber, I hold it necessary to confine myself to passages which speak with sufficient distinctness for their own authenticity, or which are ratified from other sources. Huber does not quote what is not said, but we see that he is capable of omitting what is necessary to give to what is said its true sense.

What doctrine of the state do the Jesuits teach? For instance, a Jesuit is required by the order to defend certain Arminianizing doctrines as to grace; also, the thesis that the bishop is of a different order from the presbyter, not, according to the mediæval and ancient doctrine, one with him in order, though specific in function; also, the thesis that the pope must always be the bishop of Rome; also, the thesis that, if the pope (which, they piously believe, God will never permit) should become a public heretic, the bishops may try him, and declare that, although they are incapable of deposing him, he has thereby deposed himself. Such theses, not being articles of faith, are called simply "doctrines of the order." Now, is there any *doctrina ordinis* concerning the state? I believe there is none. Any opinion concerning the state, which leaves a man in Roman Catholic communion, a Jesuit, so far as any rule of the Society is concerned, appears to be at liberty to maintain. He may teach that the pope is direct temporal lord of the world, or indirectly such, or neither directly nor indirectly such, according to his view of the matter.

But although the Society has no distinctive *doctrine* of the state, it has most decidedly a distinctive *tendency*, and that is, to keep the church as near up to the ideal of Boniface VIII., which views the state as the mere deputy of the pope, as is in any way possible under modern conditions.

Practically, the Jesuits, by 1600, seem to have settled down on that doctrine of the civil power which is taught by their great writer, Cardinal Bellarmine, especially in his treatise *De Romano Pontifice*. Huber informs us that Sixtus V. was so displeased with the comparative moderation of this, that he had it put on the Index of Prohibited Books. After the usual fashion of controversialists, he forgets to mention that, when Sixtus was dead, it was taken off the Index, and has ever since remained in high repute among the more strenuous papalists. The Jesuits, by their

solicitude to secure the canonization of Bellarmine, in which, however, they have been unsuccessful, show their approbation of his teachings. He denies that it is ever lawful for other men to pretend to any manner of authority, religious or civil, over the pope. When pressed with the argument that, if the pope makes a personal attack upon me, and puts my life in danger, I have certainly a right to resist him, and, if necessary, to kill him, Bellarmine replies that this signifies nothing, for that the mere exercise of the natural right of self-defence has never been held to be an exercise of authority. He would view this as only the happy divorce of the papacy from a ruffian who had been transiently invested with it. The pope's civil authority in Middle Italy he treats as simply of historic right. As it still stood firm, he had no temptation to take up with the modern absurdity, which it is rumored that the Jesuits are trying to push into an article of faith, namely, that the possession at least of the city of Rome is a part of the *jus divinum*. That this gives a blow right in the face to all history for more than eight hundred years will hardly hold it back from acceptance, for when was a thorough-going dogmatical prepossession ever very much embarrassed by such a trifle as a fact?

Over the many thousands of the clergy, however, Bellarmine maintains that the pope alone is sovereign in matters of every kind. He, therefore, absolves the priesthood and the inferior orders from all civil allegiance whatever. Rome, however, has not maintained this claim, and has long since, by pacts and concordats innumerable, surrendered all her subject clergy to civil jurisdiction in temporal matters. She held out long for exclusive authority at least over cardinals, but has finally given it up. She saves her dignity now—as, of course, she has a right to do—in case of an infamous crime, by degrading a priest before he undergoes his punishment.

Bellarmine ascribes only one point of civil authority to the pope over the unbaptized. He maintains that Rome has a right to depose a heathen king of a recently converted nation, if he persecutes the Christians, but only then. Among Christians, he maintains that the pope has the right to depose an heretical government, or even a Catholic government which is notoriously indifferent to

the faith. And, more than this, note, he maintains that the pope has power to change kingdoms, or to abrogate laws, when the salvation of souls manifestly requires it! Beyond that point, he affirms that the pope, that is, in the sphere of mere political expediency, has no civil authority in an independent state. If he transcends this limit, the cardinal declares that he becomes "a disturber of the commonwealth," and is to be resisted, like any other turbulent person, by refusing to do what he commands, and by putting positive obstacles in the way of his will. It was after Newman had repeated this sentence of Bellarmine, that the present pope ratified it by making him a cardinal.

There is a droll forgery, which seems to have originated in France, but which is more or less current here. It represents every Jesuit as solemnly disavowing all allegiance to every heretical government, on the ground that it has no validity, because it has not received "the sacred confirmation" of Rome. I scarcely need say that hardly the most extravagant canonists of the darkest periods of the Middle Ages dreamed of propounding so wild a tenet as that a civil government has to wait for papal confirmation before coming into lawful effect. Rome managed to get a round dozen of kingdoms under her feudal suzerainty, but did not claim this as an intrinsic prerogative. She does not maintain that even a bishop is obliged to wait in all cases for her explicit confirmation. What was never taught then has, I need not say, never been taught since. Even the doctrine that the pope has power to *depose* an heretical government, is not one of those theses which a Jesuit is bound to defend, though perhaps most Jesuits hold that, abstractly speaking, it might be true, were it not for the principle which they, like all people that have possession of their wits, allow, and have repeatedly acted on, namely, that when a supreme governor, in church or state, acts like a madman, out of all relation to the conditions of his age, such an act is void by its very nature. Bellarmine lays down that even an ecclesiastical law of the pope is of no force unless it fulfils the two conditions of justice and right reason. He can never, says he, render vice virtue, or virtue vice, although in obscure questions the church will not be held subjectively faulty if she abides

provisionally by his provisional judgment. He, however, held the deposition of Elizabeth by Pius V. to be valid, but if he were living now, he would doubtless allow that a pope who should undertake to repeat the act by deposing Queen Victoria could not require obedience, but would show himself to require the salutary restraint of a strait-jacket.

After 1600 all thought of deposing a Christian government, orthodox or heterodox, passed out of the papal mind. Although Rome does not hold that the functions of the state are in abeyance until they receive her recognition (for even Boniface VIII. does not go to such a length), she has, nevertheless, recognized all sorts of governments, in all sorts of ways, and has enforced the duty of allegiance to them upon her spiritual subjects with an energy which occasionally, as in Ireland and in France, has almost urged the discontented into a schism. The loosest casuists have never taught that a Catholic, by any mental reservation, can excuse himself, on the ground of obedience to Rome, from allegiance, in all matters lawful for a Christian, to a government for which Rome herself authorizes public prayers to be offered during the mass, and she authorizes such prayers for every established government in Christendom, to say nothing of the regions outside. The "sacred confirmation," therefore, of which this curious imposture speaks, although not held to be intrinsically necessary, has been abundantly afforded. The pope, it is true, in the *sixteenth* century, in awe of Spain, refused to absolve Henry IV. of France, until his own confessor refused to absolve him so long as he should delay. Then at length he received the already victorious king into the Catholic Church, and doubtless maintained, what Henry did not allow, that only from that point on was the King of Navarre in the full sense King of France.

The notion that the Jesuits, at least, hold themselves exempted from all civil allegiance, above all to heretical governments, shows how curiously nebulous are the popular fancies concerning the relation of this Society to the Catholic Church. I fear that we must say of the Jesuit order, what Doctor Döllinger says of the Roman Catholic Church, that it has been worse in practice than in theory. I would, indeed, be mindful of the admonition given

in friendly correspondence by an able and highly competent Methodist brother, whose historical sense is rightly extolled by Bishop Hurst, and who taxes me with having brought accusations in print against the Jesuits which go beyond all reasonable limits of charity. We are not angels, but imperfect and prejudiced men, incapable of entering fully into the facts or the feelings of schools standing at the very antipodes to our own. Still, I must say, subject to correction from the better informed, that I apprehend the Society to have been often exceedingly arrogant towards the papacy, though in theory acknowledging that its members have just the same obligations to the church, and now to the state, as all other Catholics. It seems to have been sometimes openly refractory, sometimes subtly evasive, even when, as in China and India, Rome appears, on the whole, to have represented the cause of Christian ingenuousness against indefensible accommodations to heathenism. Of course the stories that the Jesuits poisoned this pope and that, whom they did not like, are fables, which are now left to the compilers of abusive libels, such as are hawked about to this Conference and that Presbytery, to the infinite discredit of our American intelligence and Protestantism. They are a part of that general insanity which, as Lord Macaulay remarks, prevailed throughout Europe down to this century, and led people to imagine that no notability could die without having been poisoned by somebody that bore him a grudge. It was a long survival of the African credulity, which will not allow that anybody whatever can die except by casualty or by witchcraft. There was a faint attempt, at the close of our civil war (though the good sense of the nation at once extinguished it), to fasten on the Southern people the unintelligible wickedness of having poisoned those two infirm old men, President Harrison and President Taylor, which shows to what extremes credulous animosity is capable of proceeding against antagonists in church or state. As to Clement XIV., it has been well said, and by an enemy of the Jesuits, that the conclusive proof of their not having poisoned him is the fact that they never tried to do it when they still had access to him, and when it might have done them some good. Doctor Döllinger, nevertheless, says

that he rather foolishly poisoned himself with antidotes, in the fear of what they might do. If, however, anybody should charge them with having been the death of more than one pope by their refractory determination to bully him or trick him, as they found most expedient, into surrendering his thunder into their hands, it might be hard to disprove the accusation. They have tricked the present pope into a condemnation of the teachings of the great saint and author, Rosmini, which they never could wring from Pius IX.

In reading their history, one is sometimes reminded of the virtuous determination of the young Scotchwoman tied to an old husband:

> "I'll cross him and rack him, until I heart-break him,
> And then his auld brass will buy me a new pan."

They were a sore affliction to that admirable pope, Innocent XI., whom Herzog's *Encyclopædia* declares to have been one of the most ideal characters, and most worthy of canonization, that has ever sat in the Roman chair. Yet their unabated malice, together with that of France, has always frustrated the endeavors to raise him into the calendar, while that pure-minded, but relentless, inquisitor, Pius V., who is even said to have been hurried by his intolerance into sacrilegiously breaking the seal of confession, stands there undisputed, the solitary pope who, reigning since the Reformation, has been found worthy of the honors of sainthood. I may be wrong in supposing that they lead the party in the Roman Catholic Church which is hostile to Savonarola, but, as at present advised, I must esteem it fortunate that in 1569, before the Society had risen to much influence over the papacy, Rome had cleansed Savonarola's memory from all imputation of heresy, and had solemnly pronounced him an altogether orthodox and Catholic man. Since then, those Catholics who dislike him, among whom I think I am not far out in placing the Jesuits, are obliged to content themselves with growling at him as a good Catholic, indeed, and doubtless, as the very pope who destroyed him officially intimated, a saint in glory from the moment of his death, with no intermediate suffering in purgatory, but nevertheless, while on earth, a fanatic and a visionary.

To come back to the forged oath which I have cited: It may be asked how we know it to be spurious. How do we know a pewter quarter to be spurious? Because it does not ring like a genuine one. But how do we learn to distinguish a silver coin? By instinct, improved by use. Even so, by the time a man, familiar with educated Roman Catholics from early boyhood, has read an untold number of books written by them and about them; and, in addition, coming to the Jesuits in particular, has read through every word of their voluminous Constitutions, with their equally authoritative Declarations, preface, index, and all, besides all the papal bulls relating to them for the first century, and a good amount of the later provisions; has pondered every syllable of Pascal's august assault upon them in his own immortal style, with the learned annotations of so impartial an editor as De Soyres; has with equal attentiveness read from beginning to end the able and stinging treatise of Döllinger and Reusch, as well as the six volumes of Sainte-Beuve's detail of their persecution, through half a century, of the illustrious monastery of Port Royal, and the doctrines of grace as embodied in it, and of their influence over that King of France who, after being guided by them through a long lifetime, came out, as his wife says he began, "a very orthodox man, but unhappily with no notion of either repentance, or the love of God"; after reading all this, besides all manner of articles upon them from Protestants, Roman Catholics, unbelievers, and Jesuits and ex-Jesuits themselves, he ought to be able to detect at the first glance an imposture absolutely and grossly incongruous with the tone of every genuine document of the Society, public or confidential, large numbers of which last, it must be remembered, have been seized and published by hostile governments. These genuine documents are, some of them, intolerably exceptionable, but have not the faintest resemblance to the two coarse and clumsy formulas of a vow which run their rounds through American religious papers (humorously so called), and then, taking a little recess, run their rounds again, until, if the original forgers are living yet, and were living here, it should seem that even they themselves would at last come to believe them by sheer force of iteration.

However, as most of my readers, even if clergymen, do not pretend to even that moderate sense of the expert in Roman Catholic matters which would be quite sufficient to detect the imposture in question, we may note two or three points of evidence which speak for themselves. The forger makes the new Jesuit to confirm his oath by his "hand and seal." He was unaware that no Jesuit is permitted to have a personal seal. In another point, of vital moment, he has been, unluckily for himself, at once too learned and not learned enough, and between these two stools comes bump to the ground. He makes the Jesuit to sign and seal the vow "in the presence of this whole convént." He knew that almost every monastic house limits the authority of its superior by the "convént" (*conventus*), or chapter, of the brethren. He did *not* know that no Jesuit house has a "convént," but is governed solely by its superior, limited only by an appeal to *his* superiors. The Constitutions restrict the term *conventus* to provincial and general congregations, which have nothing to do with receiving members, a function belonging to the individual superior, who is troubled by no local congregation whatever. Not very long after 1600, the Society was convulsed by a determined effort on the part of a resolute minority to introduce conventual government, but this attempt was relentlessly crushed.

Even when a forger is more intelligent that the one in hand, he is almost sure to betray himself by some little slip. An ordinary man, accustomed to speak of a confessor as a "spiritual father," would be very apt not to notice, as this fabricator has failed to notice, that the Jesuit, who here is not confessing, does not, in the authentic vows, mention the superior as "spiritual father," but simply as "reverend father."

The forger, of course, is too ignorant to have noticed that he is out-Heroding Herod in putting into the mouth of the candidate a doctrine of church and state not taught by the stiffest school of the Society. He has not the advantage enjoyed by the author of that most adroit of all the libels against the Jesuits, the *Monita Secreta*, who, being himself an expelled Polish Jesuit, writing about 1612, is able to imitate the unctuous piety of the Jesuit style in a way which gives to his slanderous satire a certain veri-

similitude which we can hardly help applauding even while we detest it. The *Monita Secreta* were exposed and denounced at once, but they had the advantage of coming out just previous to the flaming up of that exterminating struggle, the Thirty Years' War. Of this, that staunch Protestant, Archbishop Trench, assigns three causes: the intrigues of the Jesuits, the reäctionary zeal of the Catholic princes, and the "utterly loveless temper" in which the controversy with Rome was carried on by the Protestants. Of course, this was no time for any honest examination of such documents, and thus the *Monita Secreta* obtained a circulation and credit which, as the Jesuit-hating and Jesuit-hated Adolf Harnack remarks, raises a serious question whether the ninth commandment stands in our Decalogue. They have also evidently given an impulse to these clumsier attempts to imitate them, which is not likely to be exhausted in our day. The Jesuits are generally passive, too passive, in such matters, but they did, a few years back, bring a suit against a Canadian newspaper which published the still more clumsy and vulgar forgery which we occasionally see flying about like a twin imp of the pit. I have heard nothing of the result, but it is almost impossible to get into the head of an American Protestant the notion that there is any sin in slandering the Jesuits, and to get this notion into the head of a Canadian Protestant is probably *quite* impossible, until you reach the uppermost level.

A good part of this manufactured oath is made up of a stupid repetition of mere commonplaces of Roman Catholic doctrine. The candidate is made to declare that he is perfectly honest in acknowledging the pope to be the earthly head of the Catholic Church, and that he regards Protestant doctrine as damnable. He might as well be made to declare that he believes, without any mental reservation, that three and three make six. The Jesuit vows, a number of which are prescribed in the Constitutions, are all alike in this, that they pass over what belongs to a Catholic as of course, and include only what belongs to a Jesuit distinctively, according as he is professed, coädjutor, or scholastic. The declaration of belief that Protestants are damned is, of course, heretical, since no Roman Catholic is permitted to assume that any man is

damned while he yet lives. If it is to be taken as meaning that a wilful adherent of heretical doctrine is condemned, damned unless he repents, that is a mere superfluity, for who denies that a wilful adherent of false doctrine is condemned unless he repents? If, however, it is meant to be interpreted as signifying that a Protestant, by the simple fact of being a Protestant, is out of a state of grace, the forger has been ludicrously unaware that he is pushing the candidate right upon the sharpest spikes of Jesuit teaching. For at least two hundred and twenty years the Jesuits, in their most influential schools, have stood manfully for the salvability of Protestants. They have acknowledged, of course, that their salvation, other things being equal, is more probable in the Catholic Church, but they have insisted that their salvation is possible out of it. They did not, in the seventeenth century, hesitate sometimes to put their own reputation for orthodoxy in considerable peril, in order to defend this tenet, and even to incur, in Naples, some risk of inquisitorial severity on account of it, although in general the Inquisition was shy of meddling with them. A French Jesuit, it is true, declared that he should have great misgivings as to the salvation of a Protestant who had not, at least on his deathbed, come over to the Catholic Church; but upon this his brethren set upon him, and belabored him well. A Protestant, they declared, who regards his own religion as *probable*, even though he holds Catholicism to be *more* probable, is under no obligation, in life or death, to leave his own. Of course, they acknowledged that, lacking all the sacraments except baptism and matrimony, he would need greater grace to be saved than if a Catholic. Yet, as they maintained that many Protestants, in England, France, and elsewhere, had never forfeited baptismal grace, they must have held, according to settled Roman Catholic principles, that these Protestants were rapidly accumulating merit, and were likely, long before death, to have merited the grace of perseverance, which would render their salvation secure. This was the good side of Jesuit Arminianism, as of Protestant Arminianism, that it gave them an overpowering sense of God's purpose of salvation towards all who are not of a reprobate mind, whatever their defects of knowledge, or prejudices of education.

A few dissentient Jesuits appealed pathetically to the General at Rome against this dismal heresy, but he bluntly rebuffed them, and signified to them that what was orthodox enough for their brethren was orthodox enough for them.

The Jansenists, noble and saintly men and women, but who limited the hope of salvation strictly to the Catholic Church, thought they could pin them down by citing St. Augustine, who declares that out of the church the sacraments may be valid, but do not communicate grace. The Jesuits' answer to this was, through their compliant instrument (at least, as coërced by France), Clement XI., to promulgate, in 1713, the famous or notorious Bull *Unigenitus*, which, among one hundred other propositions, solemnly condemns, as certainly rash, and perhaps heretical, this thesis: "Grace is not given out of the church." Since then the teaching of this proposition, under any limitation, reservation, or interpretation whatever, has been severely restricted, and practically proscribed. The Jesuits still suffer catechisms to be used which declare that "Protestants cannot be saved," but insist on interpreting "Protestants" as meaning those who have a clear view of Catholic truth, and yet adhere to heresy. "Those," say they, "who love God and Christ, and wish to know his truth, may be Protestants externally and circumstantially, and may even be zealous for heresy, mistaking it, in good faith, for Catholic truth, but they are really Catholics." "Such Christians," says the standard Jesuit catechism, that of De Harbe, "belong to the soul of the church, though not to its body, and are partakers of its gifts and graces." This doctrine has been formally ratified by the late pope, in his encyclical to the bishops of Italy. The composer of this oath, therefore, makes his Jesuit talk in a very singular style for a Jesuit, unless he merely wishes him to say that he believes Protestantism to be false, and in its first propagators to have been a sign of mortal sin, a statement for the support of which a Roman Catholic has no occasion to take an oath. A few, like Cardinal Newman, may doubt whether even an abandonment of Catholicism is always a sign of mortal sin, but they must surely be very few.

To conclude with this pretended Jesuit formulary: The forger,

if he knew, evidently did not suppose that his readers would know, that no monastic order in the Roman Catholic Church can impose on its members any vow or oath whatever which is not authorized by the pope. The Society itself owes its permitted existence to him, and its continuance, and the validity of every one of its statutes, from least to greatest, depends, from moment to moment, on the breath of his mouth. His mere will, in 1773, broke up the Society of Jesus for forty years. His mere will, in 1814, restored it *in integrùm*. His mere will can at any moment dissolve it again. The Jesuits have often evaded his authority, but they cannot deny it. The attempts of various popes to bind their successors in favor of the order have a certain moral force, but can have no legal force. The attempt, on its part, to impose on its members an oath which Rome has never authorized would be a distinct act of rebellion, if not of sacrilege. All this would be true of a much more modest vow; how much more of one which arrogates for the order exemptions and obligations right athwart the present discipline of the church! Were the Society to assume to bind its members to such a doctrine of the civil power as is here expressed, Rome would be compelled, in common prudence, to abolish it at once.

I need hardly remark that all the Catholic enemies of the Society, who have numbered thousands and ten thousands, popes, cardinals, bishops, priests, and laymen, disdain to notice these pretended vows, as they detect their spuriousness at the first glance. And of the numerous Jesuits who have left the order, and a good many the church, none have ever heard of any such vows, any more than of the *Monita Secreta*. We need, therefore, trouble ourselves no more about them.

It is an interesting fact, that about forty years ago, two young American Jesuits at Florence were tried before their superiors on a charge of having spoken favorably of republicanism. They were acquitted, however, on the ground that, being Americans, they had a natural right to favor the institutions of their country.

What is the Jesuit doctrine of obedience? It is clearly expressed in the Constitutions: "I will obey my superior as I would obey Christ himself, in everything in which it cannot be de-

fined that any manner of sin intervenes." This is borrowed from Loyola's famous letter on Obedience, in which he declares: "The civil magistrate, even though a heathen, so far as he exercises a well-ordered sway, is the delegate of our Lord Jesus Christ, and is to be obeyed as Christ," of course within the reasonable limits of civil authority. Suarez, the greatest theologian of the order, adds to this, it appears, the definition, which, indeed, speaks for itself, that all authority, civil, ecclesiastical, or monastic, is limited by the object for which it is given. Bellarmine, also a great Jesuit authority, remarks, as we have seen, that authority which contravenes good sense cannot bind the conscience, except so far as we sometimes, where there is no sin involved, may avoid scandal by complying with it.

The following, then, is the doctrine of blind obedience, as developed by Loyola, the Constitutions, Suarez, Bellarmine, and other great Jesuit authorities: If a magistrate, superior, bishop, or pope, not commanding a sin, not commanding a frivolity, not commanding anything outside the range of his office, lays any injunction on a subordinate, the latter is bound to comply with it, not merely in act, but in inward disposition. Having satisfied himself that the superior is within the range of his just authority, the subordinate is bound to assume that he is also commanding wisely and well. He is, therefore, in such a case, no more to rebel in thought, while complying in act, than a corpse borne along by the living, or a staff wielded by the hand of age.

This, so far, is all very well. Yet, if we read all that the Constitutions say about obedience, and all that is gathered from the writers of the order, the hyperbolical, and sometimes absolutely blasphemous, commendations of the obedient temper, given by themselves, or by favorites of theirs, it is impossible to deny that Jesuitism exaggerates the duty of obedience as enormously as China the duty of filial reverence. A Jesuit is not bound, it is true, to commit adultery or murder, to lie or steal, at the command of a superior, and all allegations to the contrary are mere calumny. But the order is so closely knit together, and everyone is so constantly observed by all, and the corporate power is so tremendous, that, excepting here and there, a man of so grand

a make that his superiors, in very reverence, have let him create his own atmosphere, individuality, manly independence, and the strength of an unsophisticated conscience have been apt to be sadly weakened, and the judgment of a mortal man to take the place, in a perilous degree, of the voice of Christ in the soul. Too inflexible a strength of "the ethical consciousness" is no more a favorite in theory, and much less a favorite in practice, than with some modern Protestant divines.

Does Jesuitism teach that for an end of religion it is lawful to assassinate an heretical king or magistrate? Considering its strong mediæval character, it is probable that it adhered longer than some other orders to the mediæval principle of the ban. In the Middle Ages, when this was pronounced by competent authority against any one for treason, felony, or heresy, he very commonly became what the Germans call *vogelfrei*, "free as a bird," and might be struck down like any other piece of game. When the modern age dawned, opinions began to vary. Luther, for instance, says that when a prince becomes a tyrant, he loses his rights of sovereignty, yet he does not allow private subjects to put him to death, unless under very urgent stress of necessity. Melanchthon maintains that any one may kill an endeavoring usurper, but that, if he has obtained possession of the government, still more, of course, if he reigns by due succession, he cannot be lawfully slain unless he is guilty of some gross act of tyranny. Thus, so long as Henry VIII. of England contented himself with murdering Catholics, or obscure Protestants, Melanchthon found no occasion to counsel his assassination, but when he learns that Henry has beheaded so illustrious and zealous a Protestant as Thomas Cromwell, and is also about to divorce his fourth wife, a German princess, Melanchthon breaks out into an ardent aspiration that God would inspire some brave soul with courage to strike down the English Nero. "There can be no more acceptable sacrifice to God," says he, "than the slaughter of a tyrant."

Calvin does not advise that Roman Catholic sovereigns shall be murdered; he only insists that they shall be dethroned. The Jesuits agreed in general with the Reformers, yet with more cautious restrictions on the right of tyrannicide, except the demo-

cratic Spanish Jesuit, Mariana, who is fully abreast of Melanchthon, and even ahead.

Of course, by the time that the seventeenth century was well under way, all moralists of both churches began to perceive that these barbarous methods of the Middle Ages must be suppressed in the interests of social order. This altered tone of feeling is clearly apparent in Bellarmine, who died in 1621. He utterly condemns the murder of a prince on religious grounds, and does not appear to admit it on any other. It is also reflected in the treatise of a learned young Jesuit (the reference I have unfortunately mislaid) written about 1615, in which he remarks that the question whether Rome has power to depose an heretical monarch has become an idle one, inasmuch as every dynasty then reigning in Europe, Protestant or Catholic, was undoubtedly legitimate, and no attempt of Rome was to be feared to evacuate its claims. In this expectation time has shown that he was right.

It may be said that, if Rome had her old power, she would use it in her old way. This is as much as to say, that if the Middle Ages returned, the Middle Ages would return. I think we may all allow so much. It must be remembered that the old power of the papacy rested on the state of men's minds. In the depths of the Middle Ages, when an edict of Rome jarred on the general feeling, and was left to execute itself, it fell flat. She had few soldiers of her own, and when the kings refused her theirs, she had to submit to the force of facts. Leo X. proclaimed an interdict in Spain, but, as no one regarded it, he was fain to pocket his dignity, and withdraw it. In the future, as in the past, Rome will be able to control the physical force of the world just so far as she is able to control the hearts and thoughts of men. Formerly she had no rival; now she has many. It is doubtless hard for her to abate the arrogance of her mediæval tone, but she is slowly learning the lesson, and, once learned, she will not be permitted to forget it. As Doctor Roswell D. Hitchcock has said, there is good hope even yet, that she may become the honored leader of a great company of purified and rejuvenated churches. The fulness of Christ was not exhausted in Luther and Calvin. But she is not likely ever again to become the leader of the Anglo-Saxon

race. The very significance of Jesuitism in its palmy days may be said to lie in a protracted effort to reduce the free, soaring energies of Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon Christianity within the shattered Latin shell which they burst three hundred and seventy-six years ago. I wish the worthy fathers joy of their attempt. They brought back half of Germany, and yet, even these, as Herman Grimm says, are esteemed in Italy only a less aggravated species of heretics. I have no doubt that they have done a great deal of good, as well as a great deal of harm, in pursuing their plans. Their ultimate goal, according to their friend, *The Catholic Review*, remains, on a moderate estimate, so far as present appearances warrant one, about one hundred thousand years ahead. If the aged city of the Tiber finds herself, at the end of that period, sufficiently active to attempt a renewal of any of her mediæval performances, I think we may safely leave the three-thousand-three-hundred-and-thirty-third generation of our posterity to look after their own affairs, not at all denying, however, that it may be the part of prudence to examine the coal-cellar every night. If we do not find a lurking Jesuit, we are not unlikely to find a lurking anarchist, and he surely ought to serve the purposes of a wholesome panic just as well.

The real relations of the *Societas Jesu* to the state, the church, and the world may, at least, receive some light, if we cannot say that they are exactly expressed, by the fact that, according to Reusch, there have been a few Jesuits, down to our own generation, who have defended the condemnation of Galileo, and, like a learned Protestant clergyman of Germany, and, indeed, like John Wesley himself, have anticipated the time when the church should be redeemed from the pernicious and unscriptural error of Copernicanism. Their brethren smile at them, and leave them in peace. In the next generation they will be remembered as a curious survival. So almost every mediæval notion, so far as I know, has been maintained by the Jesuits, in a modernized shape, as long as the general atmosphere of Christendom would allow it, and has then been, slowly, it may be, and reluctantly, but certainly, abandoned. Around this central stream of gradual progress have played side-currents of swifter progress (as, for in-

stance, an early aversion to witchcraft trials), and others of angry reaction, both, however, slowly melting into the general course. Formerly the Society was so instinct with the general social spirit, that it had a broad and free sweep in the world. Since its dissolution and restoration, it is said by an English writer once belonging to it that it has become timid before general society, and confines itself more entirely to its own church, of course not neglecting practical labors of conversion and proselytism in heathendom and the Orient. In this country, at least, there are evident signs that it is receding from the lead of its own church. The learned Catholic bishop, Hefele, says, that it has succeeded in turning Christianity into a hollow show wherever it controls. Such a victory means death to the victors. It is a little hazardous to forecast the future, but the recent election of a new General near the Biscayan village of Loyola, instead of at Rome, may not impossibly suggest that in a few generations it will finally withdraw altogether within its native peninsula, to die peaceably and decently on the spot where, in the first glimmering thought of its founder, it received its origin. If that comes to pass, it will gradually come to be remembered as a remarkable phenomenon of reäction, partly beneficent, largely portentous, "a great community of commonplace men," like the Roman Republic before it, exaggerating the instrumentalities of religion in the form of a weakening pietism to the injury of ethical purity and robustness; developing individuality skilfully up to a certain point, starving it out, for the most part, in its grander growths; capable of many intrigues, charged with a great many more in which its share was small; stimulating indirectly, it may be, to some great crimes, but very probably itself not guilty of one of them; vindicating itself with great formal, but not so much substantial, cogency against responsibility for some of the scandalous ethics of some of its writers, on the ground of a large liberty of opinion incontestably allowed to its members, but against which, we should think, it might have protected itself by a more energetic protest, if it had been greatly displeased; never an instigator, at least since its earlier years, of revolts against any state, Catholic or Protestant, but acting like a slow infiltration of gritty

sand into the easy workings of the civic organism. In short, we think it will be remembered as having been what Peter Damiani (though in another sense) called one of its favorite saints, Gregory VII., a *Sanctus Sathanas*. We doubt whether now it is doing very much harm, or very much good, in the world, and whenever its time comes to leave it, we can afford to wish it a not unfriendly farewell. If, on the other hand, which is far from impossible, the Roman See, stimulated by the Jesuits, shall brace itself, under a reäctionary pope, and behind a breastwork of mediæval pretensions, to check the good and evil of a greater age, we shall be best prepared to overcome this murderous folly in proportion as we have divested ourselves of the coarse mediæval weapons of wilful ignorance and malevolent misrepresentation. As a leading Roman Catholic journal declares: Passionate Protestantism is disagreeable, but candid Protestantism is impregnable. We can afford to possess our souls in patience and equity until Jesuitism, its ways, its works, its principles, its methods, have faded out of both sides of Christendom; and then the acknowledgment of all good things wrought by the one Lord in the one Spirit, throughout his church, will open the way for a true reunion, in which no good thing secured on either side shall be lost.

Charles C. Starbuck.

Andover, Mass.

III. THE WAY OF PEACE.

The union of all Christians in one organic whole is the hobby of extreme liberals and extreme high churchmen. Perhaps no more visionary scheme has ever been broached by sensible men. For ourselves, we eschew hobbies altogether. But if we had one, we would prefer a cordial understanding and a warm fraternal feeling among all who believe in the common Saviour. We regard the idea of one organization of free Christians, coëxtensive with the world, as a wild dream, which a few sober moments will suffice to dissipate. If it were prelatical, no building would hold the assembled bishops. If it were governed by a representative body, where could they deliberate? To our apprehension, the scheme would be impracticable without a Pope or a Grand Lama.

This objection will, of course, be met with a disclaimer. We will be told that an actual assembly is not contemplated. Nothing but a league of churches reduced to one pattern is desired. It does not seem to have reached the brain of these agitators of union, that this is not union at all, but mere uniformity. An army of soldiers in various array may be one, if the command is one. A million of men in similar dress, but under different commanders, and aiming at different objects, would not be a unit in any proper sense.

The abolition of sects, and the reduction of all Christians under one type, is the true name of this pretentious scheme. It is conformity, and not union, and the great objection to it lies in this: That similarity in externals may exist along with great diversity of views. Men of all sorts of religious principles may be gathered under a single banner. They may look alike, and, in many things, act alike, but if they were asked a vital question in religion, they would give very different responses.

In respect to the essentials of Christianity, every intelligent reader may know that the large evangelical denominations in the United States are nearer together than the parties that make up the Church of England. Immediately before Mr. Wesley's day,

that church was in a very low spiritual condition, very indifferent to doctrine, but firmly united. The bond seems quite strong yet, but great doctrinal dissension has sprung up, and differences that would destroy any American sect now divide it into a number of parties that are mutually repulsive.

But the proposed organic union would not even secure that apparent oneness. Ecclesiastical bodies separated by oceans and by the equator may be alike, but cannot be one. But that which is urged in America is uniformity in a few particulars, with endless diversity in others. Except in those few points, all the existing provisions for actual unity are to be sacrificed, and we are to be contented with likeness in one or two features dictated by one party. A union that actually promotes diversity, and destroys nearly all the ties now existing, would be the beginning of Bedlam.

In a discourse delivered in Trinity Church, New York, Doctor Morgan Dix, referring to this subject, gently but wisely rebuked the reckless clamor of some of his brethren. Allowing for the usual tone of his class towards other Protestants, his words are timely and judicious. Seldom has an authority of such eminence in his circle used such language. He says: "There is no good reason why our bishops should have jurisdiction over any congregations or aggregations of people who are not in need of this church. Such bodies have a right to exist; and friendly relations might be established with them, and *communion in holy things might be maintained.*" This looks like religion and business.

Common sense, as well as true Christianity, assures us that a recognition of other sects as legitimate and valid, and friendly relations and intercommunion between all who hold a common saving faith, are the real spiritual union needed by Protestant Christians. Common sense ought to satisfy the historic episcopate, after vainly expending libraries of learned labor, and acquiring centuries of unfavorable experience, that the theory for which they chiefly contend has no prospect of gaining popular assent. The world has outlived the "legitimate" succession of kings. There is not a throne in Europe to which anybody recognizes a divine title independent of the people. And, with equal truth, it may be said that the "legitimate" succession of diocesan bishops

as rulers over any portion of the church, by virtue of descent from the apostles, is a superstition which the robust understanding of free communities can no longer tolerate.

Aware of the hopelessness of the effort to convince the majority of Protestants, the hierarchy in the United States and England recently offered their quadrilateral scheme for the actual acceptance by other bodies, without conviction, of their episcopate, evidently hoping that, in course of time, the theory would be gradually adopted. It now appears to be realized, as Dr. Dix admits, that the scheme cannot succeed; and the hierarchy is plainly advised of a far more reasonable and fraternal policy. When we consider the relative numbers of the parties, and that the theory of the apostolic succession is repudiated by all Protestants except a part of the Episcopal, English-speaking body, in Britain and the United States, the practical necessity of some less repulsive scheme of union should begin to be felt.

Never before has the Christian church more profoundly yearned for a healing of its divisions, and a limitation of its controversies. Extremists may clamor as they please for unification, on the basis of theories which many centuries of argumentation have failed to establish; but the general sentiment of intelligent Christians, the world over, calls for a union of hearts and hands on the basis of loyalty to our common Lord. This is the test reïterated by Saint John, the last of the apostles, in his epistles. No one can read them carefully without perceiving that the bond of union is *love* to a divine Christ, and to all his people. This involves a profound regard for his word and sacraments, but does not exact any acceptance of theories which necessarily divide and distract his people.

In view of the imperative obligation resting upon all Christians to "keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace," we stand amazed at the persistence of small minorities, from age to age, in divisive principles which cannot be deduced from the word of God without violent constraint. In our own day, those conditions of unity which rest upon uninspired tradition, and antagonize the tenor of the sacred canon, appear so grotesque and unreasonable, that one cannot avoid a certain repugnance to naming them. It

is beneath the dignity of argument to entertain the inquiry, whether the true under-shepherds and sheep of Jesus Christ have, for centuries, occupied the open field, in full sight of the fold, and averse to enter its precincts. Using another illustration, it is a severe tax upon most understandings to believe, on the strength of a theory, that in the army of the Lord a vast majority of the officers are serving without valid commissions, and that the ranks are filled with soldiers illegally enrolled. Is it credible that, at the Reformation, the great bulk of the Protestants, escaping under the influence of an open Bible from papal tyranny, committed the crime of schism, whilst those of England alone remained loyal to the true apostolical succession? Was the English Reformation so free from court influence and political management as to secure a purer exercise of consciences than was enjoyed in other countries?

The high-church theory, in fact, forces its advocates into countless absurdities which reason long ago grew weary of refuting. One of the most glaring was exhibited at the triennial convention at Baltimore, in October. It was gravely debated by the two parties, whether or not the Mexican mission is a lawful undertaking. In plain terms, it was warmly urged by some of the bishops that courtesy towards the sister Church of Rome in Mexico forbids a Protestant Episcopal mission for the conversion of the people. Thus, we find that party, even in the American church, distinctly recognizing the territorial claims of the Church of Rome to ecclesiastical sovereignty over kingdoms and republics alike. There is no mistaking of the assumption underlying the shameful position. The Roman hierarchy in Mexico has *exclusive* right to occupy the soil! Protestant missions among the benighted masses of its population, generally quite as ignorant of the gospel as the Chinese, are an unwarranted intrusion upon territory belonging, by the divine appointment, to the Roman Catholic Church!

It does not appear that this ascription of sacred territorial sovereignty to the pope, within the limits so jealously guarded by the "Monroe doctrine" of the American government, was sustained by the House of Bishops. But it was not condemned. A grand opportunity was presented for that body to declare its Pro-

testant principles, but it was not embraced. The public is left in doubt how far in the backward road towards Rome they have proceeded. We think it is due to the public that this question should be solved. The attention of our vast Protestant non-episcopal majority in the United States has been urgently called to a proposition for union with the Protestant Episcopal Church; and now, at the same time, we find the body that makes the offer divided indistinctly on its relations to the papacy. The American people are not allowed to know the numerical proportion of sound Protestants and virtual Romanists which it embraces.

We have a profound conviction that in all this our brethren of that church, both in England and America, especially in the lay membership, are misrepresented by the hierarchy. They are Protestant to the core, and if the restraints of an inherited conventionalism were removed, and the heart of the church could express its sentiments, it would speak out unequivocally. The intermediate position could not be maintained for a day, if the people of that communion were once aroused to assert themselves.

The English throne is Protestant by the settlement of the house of Hanover. No feature of the British constitution is more rigid. The English *people* would not return to the papacy to save the hierarchy or the peerage. But surely the American feeling on the subject cannot be less distinct. We are positively sure that an overwhelming majority of the membership in the American Episcopal Church would, if allowed a free expression, and formally summoned to utter it, place themselves clearly in the Protestant ranks. We draw the line explicitly between the *people* of that communion and the hierarchy. In the face of all appearances, our confidence in their fidelity to the principles of the Reformation remains unshaken. They are probably not aware of the situation. They do not realize the significance of the policy of the high-church party in the clerical ranks. It is hidden from their eyes that they are virtually committed by an equivocal policy, not only to ecclesiastical complications of a dangerous character, but to principles at war with our national institutions. How many of the upper house agree with Bishop Paret in regarding the territorial rights of the Roman Church in Mexico as para-

mount to the claims of the gospel, remains unknown. But we Protestants and American citizens *ought* to know whether the territory of the United States also belongs of divine right to a prelatical body. This is claimed at Rome by right of discovery. But even if her claim be ignored, her English heirs may hold that no Protestant denomination not subject to their sway is justifiable in occupying this domain. A recent writer of this class, in *The Church Union*, in so many words declares that all baptized persons rightfully belong to the jurisdiction of the bishops of his church. Lay baptism is recognized as valid, and the claim, therefore, amounts to a proclamation of *rebellion* against most of the Protestants of the United States. But this would be childish indeed, if we could be assured authoritatively that the claimants are few and insignificant. The attitude of the church is, unfortunately, such as to warrant the impression that *aggression* upon other Protestants is the studied policy of the ruling class.

The attitude to which we refer is two-fold. It consists of *non-recognition* towards Protestants whose religious principles are to a great extent approved, and *recognition* towards Roman Catholics whose religious principles were largely repudiated in the English Reformation. Now, we maintain that this attitude is necessarily aggressive in the wrong direction. It offers fraternal relations formally with a party that is the professed object of spiritual abhorrence; and it presents a hostile, repulsive front towards another party with which the hearts of the people are bound by the ties of a common faith.

Intelligent Episcopalians will excuse us for restiveness under such circumstances. As true Protestants and free Americans, the great body of them are placed in a false position of antagonism to their own dearest principles. They are made to appear unbrotherly and arrogant towards their fellow-Christians of other Protestant communions around them, and in ecclesiastical sympathy with that corrupt church which their fathers renounced at the stake. But, in addition to all this, they are committed, to some extent, to affiliation with a system directly hostile to our democratic institutions. The Romish hierarchy is the deadliest enemy of political freedom known to the civilized world. It is the great de-

fender of *prerogative* against popular rights wherever it wears an honest face. A Protestant denomination that quarrels with its natural allies, and leans towards the Roman system, is out of harmony with the traditions of the American people.

Doctor Dix has evidently found the way of peace. His words may be contrasted with those of Bishop Doane at the laying of the corner-stone of the Cathedral of Saint John the Divine. The latter laid emphasis upon the notion, far more fanciful than scriptural, that the stone work of that edifice symbolized the historic episcopate as the corner-stone of Christian unity. This conceit is the very point at which the party lines of that church diverge, the one leading towards Rome, and the other towards Geneva. A narrow tenet, rejected by at least twenty to one of the Protestants of our time, and absolutely devoid of scriptural support, is gravely announced on this impressive occasion as the basis of that harmony which it has, more conspicuously than all other causes, tended to destroy! We do not exaggerate. The dogma referred to has no following in continental Europe. Little more than half a million of Americans, all told, adhere to it, even nominally, in the United States. That number would cover all the high-church party in this hemisphere, except Catholics. There are doubtless forty-five millions in this Union who repudiate it. In Great Britain nearly half the Protestants are actually arrayed against it, and the other half is divided between its advocates and its opposers in a proportion not yet determined. We hazard the opinion that less than one in twenty of all Protestants would sustain Bishop Doane's proposition as a scriptural doctrine.

But we are just as positive on another point: That the scriptural warrant for such a dogma is fading continually out of the mind of the church, as a mere conceit of a mediæval party that cannot live out of the narrow circle of old English tradition. Episcopacy may survive, as a human institution, and possibly be adopted, here and there, in various nations, as they are evangelized; but the doctrine that visible and united Christianity cannot exist without it, is doomed to die, precisely as the divine legitimacy of the Stuarts and the Bourbons has disappeared from the sphere of European politics. Nothing can be more foreign to our Ameri-

can mode of thought than the assumption of a right, in church or state, to rule a community by a close corporation divinely commissioned. This is the favorite doctrine of the party represented by Bishop Doane. We believe a free vote of his denomination would at this hour bury it out of sight forever.

We turn, therefore, with hope to the significant discourse of the venerable rector of Trinity Church. Two timely concessions are made by him just after the adjournment of the triennial convention of 1892. The failure of the quadrilateral overture to other Protestant bodies had been recognized, and this fact seems to have suggested to Dr. Dix the pacific tone which it breathes. He distinctly admits the corporate authority of other denominations, and approves of coöperation and intercommunion with them. We incline to the opinion, not only that this policy is strictly in accordance with the letter and spirit of the gospel, but that the American Episcopal Church would lose nothing by its adoption.

The hierarchy, in their desperate attempt to secure their end, have ceased to insist upon most of the peculiar features of their system, and have reduced their *ultimatum* to four points, of which Bishop Doane proclaims the historic episcopate to be the chief corner-stone. Actual union is shown to be impossible. Actual assimilation is no longer demanded, except in those four points, and, of those, three are subordinated to one, which is the principle of monarchy by divine right in the church of God. This is emphasized as necessary to a visible organism. But the idea of visibility is urged with an earnestness altogether unwarranted by the Scriptures. There must be unity, and that unity must be visible. All this is explicitly taught by our Lord and his apostles. But that the kingdom of Christ is visibly one in its subjection to a close spiritual corporation, imposed upon it for all time, is a proposition of unspeakable extravagance. The Bible gives it no countenance, and plain sense declares that the *body* is visible in the same manner with the head. Christ is no longer seen in the flesh, and yet he has promised to manifest himself to his people. What right have we to assume that the church is manifested in any different sense? If Christians everywhere recognized one

another, and exhibited to one another the true graces of the Spirit, their oneness in Christ would be manifest, and in that sense visible, to all observers. "One flock and one shepherd" constitute Christian unity, but the one shepherd is conceded to be the spiritually present Christ, and the great multitude of his disciples, loving and tending one another for his sake, must be the flock. This literal rendering in the Revised Version commends itself to all scholars, and to the heart of the church. True Christians visibly constitute one flock under the one shepherd, not by virtue of subjection to a hierarchy, but by spiritual recognition and harmony. The more they "speak the same things," and are "perfected together in the same mind and the same judgment," the more manifest will their unity be. Subjection to one prelatic order utterly fails to secure this end, as the distracted state of the Church of England at this day abundantly shows.

The many millions of Protestant Christians, waiting from age to age for some sign of yielding the claim of supremacy on the part of the comparative handful who distinctly hold to the historic episcopate, would greatly rejoice to find the views of Doctor Dix generally embraced by his clerical brethren. The relative number which they represent may be small, but in most other respects their isolation has always inspired regret rather than contempt. The sovereign airs of the pope, looking down from the Vatican upon all human governments as inferior upstarts, may well excite derision. But the Church of England and her daughters have a recognized standing that commands our veneration and regard. Every evangelical body respects the validity of her orders. The heart of Protestantism beats with fraternal affection for her membership. We are grieved at her attitude, on account of its interruption of Christian charity. We complain of it as the persistent error of our brethren, who constantly refuse to meet us on purely scriptural ground. When a high authority among them uses such language of conciliation as we have quoted from Doctor Dix, we must be excused for an expression of relief and hope.

The way of peace in the Christian dispensation is the plainest of all duties to a Bible-reading people. Civilized nations have long learned the wisdom of mutual respect and forbearance, and

Christian denominations ought not to be behind them. It would be contrary to the sentiment of the entire Christian world to limit saving faith to any one sect, or to consign to perdition large bodies of sincere followers of Christ. But nothing could be more inconsistent than to unite with this broad charity the dogma of an exclusive churchmanship, by which a line is drawn that throws out of fellowship the great mass of credible disciples of the common Lord. A patriotic army would lose a great deal of its order and efficiency if a single division should adopt a banner inscribed with reproach and insult towards the rest. How weak such a force would be in the presence of the enemy! But the high-church party in the Anglican communion marches continually under a flag that declares the orders and sacraments of other Protestant bodies invalid. To reconcile this assumption with a good standing in the sight of heaven, enjoyed equally within and without the line, we find impossible. If personal salvation is not affected by one's relation to the church, the justification of an exclusive posture is undertaken in vain.

If there is abundant salvation outside of prelatic churches, it becomes a patent folly to stand loftily aloof from the rest of the Christian world. Non-conformists are either within the covenant of mercy, or not. Those who believe they are not are bound to lay aside all conventionalism, and labor night and day for their conversion. That this zeal is wanting, all observers are aware, and the conclusion is unavoidable that the theory of the exclusive party has survived the spirit that gave it birth.

Let us suppose the views and sentiments of the rector of Trinity to be adopted by his church, and the Baptists to abandon their position on intercommunion. It is obvious that the aspect of the Protestant cause would be far more hopeful. The various denominations that hold substantially the same faith would then be free to treat one another with Christian courtesy and consideration. They would occupy the same communities without jealousy or interference. A small population would not necessarily be cut up into little dependent congregations, but cheerfully united under one organization. Modes of government and worship would be no longer regarded as vital, but be entertained as fair questions

to be determined in the light of the Scriptures, in subordination to the great principles in which all agree.

We do not indicate a state of perfect harmony, but one of better understanding, and more general recognition of the relative importance of fundamental truths. We do not propose a fusion of all evangelical denominations into one, but a general acknowledgment by all that the church is one, as the necessary result of the union of its members with Christ by faith. We do not expect all denominational effort to be abandoned, but the discussion of such questions to be conducted in a fraternal spirit, all having the same supreme aim, to conform the churches as closely as possible to the will of God as revealed in his word. There is nothing in the scheme to prevent the evangelical ministers of a locality, where the spirit of the gospel admits of several, meeting in brotherly conference, as is often done now, and advising one another on points of practical interest. Every impulse of the Christian heart, by the summary logic of love, would lead the Saviour's true disciples to share together at convenient times the emblems of his death.

Our sincere appreciation of the Protestant Episcopal Church is the motive that prompts this faithful protest and earnest entreaty. Between Protestantism and Romanism we are like a legislative body in which a single member holds the balance of power. His own party friends would triumph if he would yield. It sometimes happens that the obstruction is due to unreasonable persistence in error by an individual otherwise estimable. Great principles are under consideration, and vast interests are at stake, and yet the one man keeps all in jeopardy by extreme tenacity of purpose.

The question is sometimes asked, Why does not the majority break the deadlock by conceding the demands of the small minority? It is urged that the principles of Protestants generally are more flexible than those of the Anglican Church, and might be yielded at a lighter sacrifice. The suggestion is easily answered. The principles of the Reformation which justified separation from Rome cannot be defended by a body that makes the historic episcopate coördinate with the Bible and the sacraments.

Were all Protestants to adopt that dogma, they would drift inevitably into the bosom of the papacy. If the hierarchy is of sacramental importance and sanctity, the old church has claims and prerogatives superior to any others. The Reformation was a revolt against a priestly combination which coerced the faith of the people. The emancipated conscience of Christendom cannot safely return to the edge of the vortex from which it has been delivered.

It is a great mistake to suppose that a principle is to be estimated by the tenacity of its adherents. The conscientious opposition of those who reject the historic episcopate is quite as respectable and sacred as the obstinate bigotry that affirms it. Protestantism is a protest against certain positive sacerdotal pretensions that have for ages been advanced by the historic episcopate of Rome, and the Anglican claim sustains the validity of that order by which those pretensions are still urged, whilst the validity of all other Protestant orders is ignored. The followers of Luther, Calvin, Knox, and Wesley oppose the assumption of a divine prelatic authority derived from Rome, *on principle*, and this principle is just as sacred in their eyes as its opposite. The negation of a preposterous claim is no less a duty than is a positive requirement. Americans hold that their rejection of monarchy is entitled to a loyal devotion as honest and earnest as ever bound the subject to his sovereign; and we Protestants maintain our rejection of a priestly order usurping a paramount authority over the church, as a necessary part of our loyalty to our Divine Master. If prelatic supremacy be a sacred dogma, the freedom of Christians is another, and the conflict bids fair to be interminable.

But the prelatic theory is not a scriptural doctrine. Its advocates know that it mainly rests upon *tradition*. The peace for which we plead is a scriptural requirement of infinitely greater importance than human inventions. It may be realized by renouncing excessive confidence in tradition, and consenting to refer all such questions to the infallible tribunal of the word of God. If the Scripture is not decisive, no exclusive hypothesis that destroys the peace of the church can be successfully defended.

James A. Waddell.

IV. THE BOOK OF ESTHER.

The various literary and ethical and religious characteristics of the Book of Esther, and the history of opinions regarding it, in the Jewish and in the Christian church, give it, in some respects at least, a position quite unique, and accordingly invite our study.

The story of the book is, briefly, as follows: The Persian king, Ahasuerus, makes a magnificent feast, first for all his princes and nobles, and then for all the inhabitants of Susa. The king orders Vashti, the queen, to appear in public. She refuses, and is deposed from her position as queen. It being necessary to choose a new queen, fair young virgins are brought in from all parts of the empire, that from them the king may make his choice. The result is, that Esther, a beautiful Jewish maiden, the adopted daughter of Mordecai, is chosen. Mordecai subsequently reveals a conspiracy against the king, and thus saves the king's life. He refuses, moreover, to give the customary obeisance to Haman, the king's favorite. Haman, in revenge, plots to slay the whole Jewish race throughout the empire. Having been obliged by the command of the king to be an involuntary instrument in conferring high honor upon Mordecai, his passion of revenge becomes still deeper. Esther, however, skilfully using her charms and power as the king's favorite, obtains what is virtually a complete reversal of the destructive decree. Haman is hanged upon the gallows which he had prepared for Mordecai. The Jews, under the encouragement of a royal decree, fall upon their enemies, and slay them. The festival of Purim is instituted to commemorate this glorious deliverance.

The literary art with which the story is told is very apparent. It is manifest both in the skill with which the characters of the chief *dramatis personæ* are drawn, and in the conduct and development of the action or narrative.

Ahasuerus (in profane history known as Xerxes, 485–465 B. C., the invader of Greece, 480 B. C.) is the typical capricious, irresponsible, sensual, oriental despot. The way in which he exalts

and puts down favorites, indulges his appetites, yields to the charms of a woman, and permits or instigates extensive slaughter among his people, is thoroughly in keeping with the character of such sovereigns in general, and with what we know, from other sources, of this monarch in particular. (Cf. Herodotus, vii. 35, 37; ix. 107 *et seq.;* Strabo, xiv. 634.)

Haman is a satanic mixture of ambition, revenge, hatred, and cruelty. First, clever, cool, and calculating, he is, later on, carried away by the vehemence of his passion. Not one man alone, but a whole people or race, is needed to satiate his wrath.

Mordecai is a remarkable character. He is representative of a class for which the Jewish race is famous, of which Joseph and Daniel are examples in ancient, and Lord Beaconsfield in modern times, all men who, from the humblest beginnings, have won for themselves distinction and honor and power at a foreign court.

Read between the lines in this story of Mordecai, and you will see, moreover, a number of characteristics which are often combined in the representatives of his race: A tender family feeling, and the cultivation of a pure, affectionate home life; an exalted personal piety of the grim, stern, Old Testament sort; high, calm, and strong and strength-giving faith in God, and faith in the mission and destiny of his people as assured in the purposes of God; a passionate and perfectly unbending devotion to the religious principles and traditions of the fathers; and withal shrewdness and ability of the highest order in his dealings with men at large, and in the management of worldly affairs. Truly, he is a grand character.

Esther, finally, full of grace and charm and courtesy, knows how to use her charms to the best advantage; with some natural misgivings at the start as to the result of her undertaking, but gathering strength, decision, and passion as she proceeds, she shows herself a true daughter of her people.

The way, moreover, in which the plot (if we may so call it) of the story, the development, and the *denouement*, are brought out, and the way in which the interest of the reader is sustained through all the changing scenes, in the use of fear, suspense, climax, solution, and satisfaction, are masterful. The story opens

with a vivid description of oriental magnificence and splendor. The power of contrast is used most effectively in describing the humble Jewish maiden elevated to nearly the loftiest position in the empire, on the one hand, and in the exaltation and subsequent degradation of Haman, on the other hand. The adherence of Mordecai to the religious scruples of his fathers threatens to involve his whole race in the direst calamity. At the very last moment, when all seems to be lost, deliverance is wrought through an apparently most trivial circumstance, a wakeful night of the king. The deliverance is as complete and absolute as it is unexpected. The claims of the Jews to be the peculiar favorites of God, the chosen nation, the objects of his most fostering care, with a lofty mission for all ages and for all nations, are once more fully vindicated. The destruction destined for them is turned upon their enemies. God's people are delivered. Human passions are controlled. Wicked designs are frustrated. The sinners are punished. Haman himself, the arch-instigator of the purposed destruction, is hanged upon the very same gallows which he had prepared with special care for Mordecai as the chief object of his wrath. This but caps the climax of the series of events in which previously he had served as the unwilling, but helpless and efficient agent in Mordecai's exaltation.

Remember, moreover, that Mordecai was of the tribe of Benjamin, a descendant of the family of Saul, the first king of Israel, and that Haman, the Agagite, was doubtless a representative of the royal line of Agag, the king of Amalek against whom Saul waged a fierce, but somewhat incomplete, warfare, and you will see here another, and a most effective, characteristic touch. Saul evidently did not go far enough in his slaughter of Agag and the Amalekites. The descendants of some royal scion of that tribe, spared by him, many centuries after come within an ace of destroying the whole Jewish race. That omission of Saul, that lack of thoroughness on his part, severely rebuked as it was at the time by Samuel, comes to cost them dear. At the critical moment, however, Providence interposes. Mordecai, the fellow-clansman of Saul, in procuring the destruction of Haman, the Agagite, finishes the work which Saul had left unfinished.

The genealogical and family records must be fully and accurately kept. The family and tribal feeling must make its influence predominant in every department of life, even in religion. The family is a unit, extending latitudinally, so to speak, and embracing every living member of the clan or race; and longitudinally, reaching backward and forward, it binds the past, the present, and the future in a mysterious bond. The sins of the fathers are charged against them with unerring accuracy, and visited upon the children. Circumstances which seem trivial at the time will vitally affect the history and course of events many centuries later. These are some of the latent ideas, some of the subterranean currents of thought, as we may term them, obscurely present in this Book of Esther.

There are a few obvious facts in connection with the Book of Esther, which are of such a kind as to suggest and induce a closer study of its phenomena. These facts are as follows: The name of God is not once mentioned in it. It is nowhere quoted or referred to in the New Testament. Many have questioned its right to a place in the canon, the voice of tradition not seeming to be absolutely unanimous. In modern times its tone and spirit have been severely criticised on ethical grounds, and doubts have been thrown on its historical accuracy and the trustworthiness of its statements in several particulars.

We may, accordingly, frame our statement of the critical problems of the Book of Esther as follows: What are the religious and theological conceptions of this book? What is its place in the history of revelation, and in the history of the development of God's kingdom upon earth? What is its place in the canon, and how can that place be vindicated? What can be said as to its historical accuracy, in the light of recent criticisms upon that accuracy?

Although the name of God is not mentioned in this book, and although it is nowhere quoted by Christ or the apostles, yet its high religious and spiritual tone and purpose and aim are strikingly manifest.

Two explanations have been given of the omission of the name of God. One is, that it was the result of a fear, especially preva-

lent in later Jewish times, that the sacred name of God might be profaned by too frequent use, by any use except that in the most solemn religious services, and especially by its use in Gentile mouths, as this book from the nature of its contents might be supposed to find frequent Gentile readers. Another reason assigned is that it was desired that the festival of the Purim, of the occasion and institution of which this book gives an account, and at which it was destined to be read, was desired to be as joyful, light-hearted, and hilarious as possible, and hence the too great solemnity connected with the name of God was to be avoided. Both of these explanations are inadequate. We shall see subsequently that the omission of the name of God must be explained on other grounds.

However this may be, the whole book, as already noted in the description of the character of Mordecai, is intensely religious. But the religiousness and piety are of the Old Testament lofty, but narrow, national and particular character. It is the piety which regards the nation, the Jewish race, as the special and peculiar favorite of heaven. God watches over them with the most intense, and minute, and loving care. It is the piety that expresses itself in the words of the one hundred and thirty-seventh Psalm: "O daughter of Babylon, who art to be destroyed; happy shall he be, that rewardeth thee as thou hast served us. Happy shall he be, that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones." We are ready to concede that there are limitations in piety of this sort when considered from a modern, New Testament, Christian point of view, but we are not ready to concede that such limitations are incompatible with a true and real possession of the Spirit of the Lord, or with the rightfulness of the place of such a piety in the historical development of the kingdom of God upon earth. If only the historical situation, the necessary individual and racial limitations, and the law of development are kept in view, all becomes plain.

The religious and theological conceptions of the book, and its place in the history of revelation, will become further manifest if we consider the aim and purpose of its composition, and the significance of the events which it records.

The aim of the book is simply and obviously that of recording and publishing and preserving the memory of the wonderful deliverance which God wrought for his people. This knowledge must serve to keep alive the traditions of the nation. It will deepen and strengthen the confidence of the people in God, and in their own future as assured in the purposes of God. At any future time when the might of the oppressor waxes wanton against the despised, oppressed Jews, whether it be the might of Spain in the fifteenth, or the might of Russia in the nineteenth, century, then the memory of this deliverance from the wrath of Haman will serve to cheer and to sustain.

But there is a peculiarity about this deliverance which must still be noted, and which is of the highest importance. It is not like the deliverance under Moses from the tyranny of Pharaoh, or the deliverance under Hezekiah and Isaiah from the army of Sennacherib, or even like the restoration under Zerubbabel from the Babylonian exile. All these deliverances had been foretold and mediated and brought about by or in connection with prophetic activity. Yes, we may say that God in a manner spoke to the people and visibly wrought salvation out of heaven in their presence. Thus the restoration under Cyrus had been distinctly foretold by both Isaiah and Jeremiah. And in the royal proclamation, issued no doubt under the influence of instruction received from those who were familiar with these prophecies, Cyrus says: "The Lord God of heaven hath charged me to build him a house at Jerusalem." But in the deliverance under Mordecai and Esther there is no prophet of the Lord. There is no visible or audible sign whatever that the Lord is working for his people. His voice is not heard. His eye is not seen. His hand is concealed. In so far the work of deliverance is entirely on a level with all the ordinary administration of his providence. Yet the deliverance is most signal. There could be no mistake about it. It was certainly from the Lord.

Now, what was the significance of all this? Remember the circumstances of the time and you will see. Prophetic activity was about to cease from Israel. So far as Judaism, as a distinct development, and henceforth destined to move on in its own sepa-

rate channel, was concerned, it was about to cease forever. The prophetic activity of Christ and the apostles belongs to a new and distinct era. In such a juncture the pious people,—those of them who realized the situation, and no doubt some of them did,—must have felt as though they were embarking on an unknown sea, without compass, rudder, or helmsman. At this critical juncture God accomplishes a wonderful deliverance for his people without the intervention of any prophet, simply in the ordinary ruling and guiding of his providence. That signal, unmistakable lesson must be recorded that it may teach the nation, the race, for all time to come, that, even though no prophet speaks to them, still God himself watches over them and will keep them safe. Hence this history was committed to writing. Hence it was given a place in the sacred canon.

We find, then, in this book something more than a general exhibition and proof of an all-ruling providence. It teaches a special lesson to Judaism, namely, that God continues his care over the chosen people even after the dispensation of prophets has ceased. It teaches that this protection is thenceforth to be administered by an unseen hand, apart from the ministration of prophets, apart from specific revelations, visions, and miracles, simply in the ordinary course of Divine providence. And this abstraction, elimination, or withdrawing of all prophetic elements from the history of these events is carried so far, that even the name of God is not mentioned. God is left to be present by unmistakable inference rather than by explicit mention.

A mother who teaches her child to walk will first support the child by her hand. The time comes, however, when the child must take the first few steps alone. The hand of the mother is still there, even though it is not felt.

A student of art who has made himself familiar with the style of a certain painter by studying the pictures which he knows to have been painted by that artist, will find it a good test of his proficiency as an art-critic, if, when confronted by an unmarked production of the same artist, he is, nevertheless, able to assign it as his work.

So God wishes the Jews to recognize the work of his provi-

dence, even though no prophet speaks in the name of the Lord.

This lesson, moreover, was intended directly and primarily for Judaism, as henceforth to constitute a distinct chapter in the history of the development of God's kingdom upon earth. For with all their short-comings, with all their fearful sins, the Jews have never ceased to be part of that kingdom. The promises unto the fathers, the covenant with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, have never been annulled. And this lesson, as intended primarily for Judaism, bears only indirectly and inferentially upon Christianity. Hence it is that this book is nowhere quoted or referred to in the New Testament. There was no occasion to quote it. It contained no type, no immediate application, no prophecy for Christianity. But Judaism is to draw instruction, strength, and consolation from this book. For a high and far-reaching purpose, God has spared, and is now sparing, the Jews. That purpose is still in the future. The deliverance under Mordecai is only the first and most typical of a series of deliverances, extending all through subsequent history. Again and again has this strange people been brought to the very brink of destruction. Again and again it has been rescued from this destruction by the unseen hand of God. And still this history is going on. And it will go on until the purposes of God are accomplished, "until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in, and so all Israel shall be saved."

Before leaving this part of my subject, namely, the religious and theological conceptions of this book, and its place in the history of the development of God's kingdom upon earth, I may remark that this book, in the respects now under consideration, sustains peculiar relations to two other books of the Old Testament, namely, the Book of Jonah and the Book of Job. We may say that, in one respect, it is the antipode to the Book of Jonah; in another respect, to the Book of Job.

The Book of Jonah represents the prophet of the Lord as going forth, much against his will, but under the direction of Jehovah, on the first and only foreign missionary expedition recorded in the Old Testament. At a time when Israel herself was repeatedly falling into apostasy, and refusing to listen to the prophets

of the Lord, God seemed to wish, humanly and reverently speaking, to shame them into submission and obedience by showing them how a foreign, heathen nation, with none of the Israelites' marvellous advantages, was, nevertheless, ready to yield, and to yield at once and thoroughly, to the first distinct effort that was made to convince them of their sins, and to remind them of their impending judgment if these sins were continued. If the Ninevites repented in sackcloth and ashes, under the preaching of one prophet, continued for only a short time, how much the more ought Israel to repent and to obey the voice of the Lord, to whom the Lord had sent many prophets during a long succession of ages?

Moreover, in the Book of Jonah, the horizon is widened. Israel, as typified in the prophet, is seen in her true light, as the great conserver of the knowledge and worship of the one true God, the religious teacher of the nations. The nations, as typified in Nineveh, are represented as learning their lesson from Israel. That is one aspect of the relation of Israel and the nations.

The other and opposite aspect is presented in the Book of Esther. The nations combine in hostile fury against the Israelites, or Jews, and aim to oppress and destroy them. God, however, interposes, and rescues them.

Both of these aspects, these two opposite poles, as we may call them, have been presented again and again in subsequent times. The relation of the Jews to the other nations and races of the world is the standing enigma and paradox of history. The nations owe a debt to the Jews which they can never repay. We have learnt from them, humanly speaking, the knowledge of the true God, and our relations to him. We have learnt from them the divine moral and spiritual ideals of holiness and righteousness of character. Yet this knowledge has been most unwillingly imparted, just as Jonah was unwilling to go on his mission. On the other hand, the history of the relation of Jews and Gentiles has been one long chapter of outrages, persecutions, extortions, and massacres, compared with which the ferocity of Haman, the Agagite, seems kind.

Israel as the recipient of a divine revelation, the ethical and

spiritual and religious teacher of mankind—such is the lesson of the Book of Jonah. The Jew hated and despised, and persecuted and cruelly maltreated at the hands of those Gentiles who owe to him their moral and spiritual light; the Jew constantly rescued from dire destruction only by the direct interposition of an unseen, but special, providence—this is the picture presented to us in the Book of Esther. The two books are complementary. Together they give us a complete prefigurement and anticipation of the career of the Jewish race.

From another point of view the Book of Esther touches vitally, but, in a sense, antithetically, the Book of Job. The Book of Job presents an extreme example of the divine permission of evil to fall upon the pious, either from Satan or from satanic men. Such permission may take place for good and sufficient reasons, and without infringing in the least upon the divine power and justice and lovingkindness, and without affecting the true and highest welfare of those who suffer such evils.

In the Book of Esther, on the other hand, the calamity is impending, but it is not allowed to be executed. God shows that he can, if need be, if in his wisdom he thinks best, arrest and frustrate the designs of the wicked against his children, even when they are on the eve of accomplishment.

For our part, we are glad that both these sides of the providence of God are presented in Scripture.

We must now briefly survey the testimony of the church as to the place of the Book of Esther in the canon, before passing on to the last division of our subject, the consideration of modern attacks and criticisms that have been made upon it.

In the Septuagint translation, the Book of Esther appears with sundry additions which do not add to its value. Philo does not quote it in his acknowledged writings, but that counts nothing against it, for neither does he quote Nehemiah, Ruth, Chronicles, Ezekiel, Lamentations, Daniel, Ecclesiastes, or Canticles.

In the New Testament it is not quoted, but this has already been explained. Josephus makes use of the book, and retells the whole story in his own way.

There are some who maintain that the canonicity of the Book

of Esther was disputed in the time of our Lord, but others, more rightly, refer the traditions solely to opposition to the introduction of a new feast. Mention will be made of this further on in the course of this paper. But at any rate, whatever opposition there may have been to it at one time, ultimately it was received as canonical. The Talmudic passages quoted as bearing on this matter are: Jerusalem Talmud, Megillith lxx. 4; compare Midrash, Ruth, xlv. 3; Megilla 7ª. Maimonides is reported to have said that in the time of the Messiah all the sacred writings would perish, except the Torah and Esther.

In the accepted Jewish canon it has, at present, a place in the third division, the Writings (*the Kethubim, Hagiographa*). It is one of the five Megilloth, or rolls, which are read publicly at certain sacred seasons, the "Song of Songs" at Passover, "Ruth" at Pentecost, "Lamentations" on the 9th of Ab (the day on which Jerusalem was destroyed), "Ecclesiastes" at the feast of the Tabernacles, "Esther" at the feast of the Purim.

We need not be disturbed by the fact, that, in the New Testament church, occasional doubts have been expressed as to the canonicity of the Book of Esther. Thus Melito of Sardis (see Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* iv. 26) omits to mention it in his account of the canon. This may have been purely accidental. Athanasius seems to reckon it among the deutero-canonical or apocryphal writings of the Old Testament (see Athanasius, in *Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers*, American Ed., Vol. IV., p. 552). Luther had a strong feeling against it, but this was pure subjective criticism.

The character of the book, as containing a lesson specifically for Judaism, made it liable to be misunderstood in Christian circles. The judgment of the church at large, however, as voiced in the favorable testimony of Josephus, Cyrill, Origen, and Augustine, the Council of Laodicea, Epiphanius, and Jerome, has received it as canonical. Such testimony easily outweighs the unfavorable testimony of Gregory of Nazianzum, Melito, Junilius, Leontius, and Nicephorus.

One peculiarity about its place in the canon is, that it is often grouped with the books of Tobith and Judith to form a sort of triad. So in Athanasius, in the passage referred to, and in the

lists of the Codex Alexandrinus, and Codex Vaticanus. (See *Diestel, Geschichte des Alten Testaments, in der Christliche Kirche*, Jena, 1869.)

In modern times, as a matter of course, the book has received a generous share of doubt and denial. As to its historical truthfulness, some have accepted it entirely just as it stands. Others have accepted the substance, as more or less true, with some additions and perversions. Others have rejected it *in totum*. The spirit and tone of the book have also been severely criticised. Some have failed to find any religion or piety in it, only a bitter, national pride, and hatred and resentment against other nationalities.

A modern writer says: "The facts that the divine name does not appear in it (the Book of Esther), that no ascription of its rescue to Jehovah is anywhere made, and that the intention of the author is plainly not so much to exalt a delivering providence as to commend the extra-biblical feast of Purim, all evince the low moral and religious tone of this writing. And when, to these ethical difficulties, we add the historical, and take into account the history of its canonizing, we can only regard the Book of Esther as standing upon the outermost limits, if not wholly outside, of Sacred Scripture." (G. T. Ladd, *Doctrine of Sacred Scripture*, Vol. I., p. 465.)

We trust that a careful and unbiased consideration of the exposition of the spirit, aim, and tone of the book, and of the place which it occupies in the history of the development of God's kingdom, which has already been given in this article, will be sufficient to show how unfounded such a criticism is, and how completely it misses a correct understanding of the scope of this book. As to the "narrow Jewish spirit of revenge and persecution" which the book is said to evince, such criticism forgets that a royal decree had gone forth that the Jews were to be massacred, that this decree could not possibly be directly rescinded, and that the only way out of the difficulty and danger was by a counter-decree, permitting and encouraging the Jews to arm themselves in self-defence and be the first to attack.

The following points have been raised against it on historical

grounds: It is said that Esther cannot have been the queen of Ahasuerus, or Xerxes. According to Herodotus (vii. 114; ix. 112), his queen during these years was Amestris, a superstitious and cruel woman, who cannot possibly be identified with Esther. But there is nothing to forbid the supposition that Esther, as one of the royal harem, and Amestris (assuming that the chronology of Herodotus is correct) were both queens at the same time, but in different senses, and with a different degree of rank and power and favor. It is not true, as has been alleged, that the position of Esther leaves no room for the collateral or superior position of Amestris. This also disposes of the objection that the king was limited, in the choice of a queen, to one of the seven noble families of Persia.

Another objection is found in the supposed artificiality of the story. It seems to read as a romance rather than as a history. The incidents at each stage seem laid so as to prepare the way for the next, which duly follows without hitch or interruption. The climax of difficulty and danger for the Jews is reached, from which, by an unexpected turn of events, they are suddenly released. Such criticism, however, is purely subjective. It would apply with equal force against many other historical narratives. Truth is often stranger than fiction. We cannot build any arguments upon such appearances. Besides, the incidents in the Book of Esther were so ordered, and the events recorded, because they were typical. That is, they were to contain a lesson for all time to come.

The criticisms of Lagarde are well known. (See *Purim, ein Beitrag zur Gesch. der Rel.* 1887.) He denies the existence of any old Persian word *pur* for lot. He would derive the Jewish festival, with its name *Purim*, from an old Persian feast in honor of the dead, called *Fordigan*, and held during the last ten days of the year. That the Jews, at a time of the deepening and strengthening of their Jewish religious exclusiveness, should have taken and adopted from a foreign nationality, from those who were hated as enemies and oppressors, such a religious feast, would seem to me absolutely improbable, even if there were no other difficulties in the way of this supposition.

The dates of the two feasts are different. Purim is held during two days; the feast of the dead during ten. The characters of the two feasts are not known to have any resemblance to each other. The alleged similarity of names, *Fordigan* and *Purim*, is not close enough to warrant any supposition of kinship. This criticism, accordingly, falls to the ground.

On the other hand, in favor of the historical truthfulness of the book, the following points may be noted:

The knowledge of the conditions of the Persian empire and court is minute and accurate. The foreign names mentioned have been confirmed as good Persians forms. (*Oppert Annales de la Philosophie Chretienne*, 1864.) The account of the character of Xerxes is confirmed by what we know of him from other sources. (See *Herodotus*, Books VII. and IX.) The geographical and chronological details tally. Herodotus mentions both Indians and Ethiopians as forming part of the army of Xerxes. The interval between the deposition of Vashti (third year) and the choice of Esther (seventh year) was the time of the Grecian expedition. Extensive massacres have, unfortunately, never been unfamiliar in history. The existence of the Purim festival itself is, finally, as certain a corroboration of the truthfulness of the narrative, as the Fourth-of-July celebrations among us give evidence of the signing of the Declaration of Independence on that day.

There are some writers who gravely maintain that the very aim and purpose of the Book of Esther was to give an account of the origin of the Purim festival, and to commend its observance. This is about as sensible as it would be to say that the aim of John Fiske in writing his *War of Independence* was to give an account of the origin of our Fourth-of-July celebrations. The aim of the book is not to give an account of the commemorative feast, but rather to give an account of the deliverance which the feast commemorates. That the feast does exist, however, and that it is connected by an unbroken, unquestioned tradition with the events here recorded, is strong proof of the truthfulness of the record.

It was called *Purim*, as is alleged, from the Persian word

pur, the equivalent of the Hebrew *gorâl*, or lot, because Haman used the lot to determine the day on which the massacre was to be made. No Persian word *pur*, lot, has been found, but the Neo-Persian *bâra*, time, *pâra*, piece, and *behr*, portion, are compared. The deliverance, and consequently its subsequent commemorative feast, took place on the 14th and 15th of Adar. The Talmudic tract, *Megilla*, treats of this feast. It mentions that its introduction met with opposition on the part of the Jews in Palestine. This was natural. They lived in what they considered the metropolis, the headquarters of Judaism, and how could these men on the frontier, these backwoodsmen, presume to impose upon them the novelty of a new feast! Eighty-five elders, and among them more than thirty so-called prophets, protested against it. But the feast had come to stay. In 2 Macc. xv. 36, it is mentioned as the day of Mordecai. Some have found a reference to it in the feast of the Jews mentioned in John v. 1. But others regard this as improbable. With the decision of this matter, however, is connected an important chronological question touching the life of our Lord. Josephus testifies to its existence in his time. (Arch. xi. 6, 13.)

We sum up in the following conclusions: There is no good reason for doubting the historical truthfulness of the book. That there are many good reasons for accepting that historical truthfulness. Individuals have, at times, questioned its place in the canon, but the judgment of the church at large has accepted it. Its religious spirit and aim, moreover, are, in a sense, unique. It teaches the continued care and watchfulness of God over his chosen covenant people, even after the dispensation of the prophets had ceased. It teaches that the protection of God, so far as Judaism is concerned, is thenceforth to be administered by an unseen hand, apart from the ministration of prophets, apart from specific revelations and signs, simply in the ordinary course of his providence. Hence the name of God is not even mentioned. It is meant to convey this lesson primarily to Judaism, as a distinct chapter or division of the kingdom of God upon earth. Hence it is not quoted in the New Testament.

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V. VOLUNTARY SOCIETIES AND THE CHURCH.

The July number of The Presbyterian Quarterly for 1892 gave a plain indication that the question in regard to the relation between the church and the societies had not been settled satisfactorily by the action of the General Assembly some months before. The societies are still working on their former basis; some of the larger aggregations of these societies are still operating, although the multiplication of these unions has been, apparently, arrested. There is still a feeling of uneasiness in many minds, and it will probably continue to exist as long as these anomalies remain. The following paper, which was sent up to the Assembly by the Presbytery of Lexington, at the time when the presbyteries were required to send up their views, may possibly contribute to throw some light on the subject. The author of the paper has taken the liberty to add a few paragraphs which tend to make the positions taken a little more clear, but which in no way impair the authority of the piece as endowed with the *imprimatur* of that large and enterprising presbytery.

The General Assembly having sent down a requisition upon the presbyteries to send up papers containing a regular formulation of their views on the subject of societies for Christian work, in the church and out of it, the Presbytery of Lexington would send up the following answer to the demand. The issue is then divided into two branches, each of which requires a separate consideration.

I. Societies within the Church.

1. It is not disputed that the church is the only divinely appointed organization for doing the work of spreading the gospel. No other body can lawfully ordain ministers, exhibit the sacraments, and officially proclaim the terms of salvation. If any outside body or voluntary organization has any right to engage in Christian work, as it will be seen they have, it is only a right to do such parts of Christian work as will not trench on the commission of the church. This question, however, belongs to the second is-

sue, societies out of the church; the question now relates to the work of the church, whether it is to be done by the church itself, properly organized for action, or by societies within the church, but not a part of it. Two things must be clearly distinguished in settling this question: One is, the necessity for a special organization of each particular congregation in order to do its work; and the other is, the real character of societies which are now existing in the church.

In reference to the first of these, the necessity of a special organization of every particular congregation, we have no hesitation in saying that it is indispensable—just as fully indispensable as it is for the church, considered as a whole, or considered in any other of its parts. The church, acting in its larger combinations, as presbyteries or synods, or as a whole in its General Assemblies, must have a special organization, regulated by law, before it can do any work. The general organization of any particular congregation, the general organization of the session and the board of deacons, is not enough to enable them to do their work; a special organization of each is necessary. It is not enough that elders are regularly elected, ordained, and installed; they are then duly empowered to work; but they must meet and be constituted according to law; they must have their officers appointed; they must have their rules and order of business; and they must bring this special organization into operation every time they meet, before they can do any business. This is equally true of the board of deacons. It is equally true of any part of the members of the church when they meet to do the work of any of the existing societies, whose proper relation to the church is now in question. It is, therefore, equally true of all the private members of every church, if they all are ever to be engaged in combined work in the church, and as members of the church. Just here, in all probability, is one reason why so many members of the church are doing so little in the Master's service. There is no special organization of the private members of the church similar to the special organizations which are found necessary in every other part of the church. They are received into the communion of the church; they are thus identified with the general organization of

the church; that is considered sufficient; and they are then left to themselves to do their work. They are generally willing to work, but they hardly know what work to do, or how to do it. It is evident that a great increase of efficiency would result if they came at once under a special organization which would instruct them, and point out work for them to do.

Now, it is evident that such a special organization of the private members of the church may be accomplished by organizing sections of the church into distinct companies of workers, or by organizing the whole number into one body. This would be a question of expediency, not of principle; in either case it would be the church organized for action. Supposing a church organized by sections, as affording a closer resemblance to the societies now in question, the following peculiarities would appear: Each of these organized sections might be called a society, but it would be a society of the church, a society in the church, and of it, and thus be strongly distinguished from a society in the church, but not of it. It would be the church itself organized for action. Furthermore, this special organization would be ordered by the lawful authorities of the church, and remain under their control. These specially organized members would not pass from under the government of the church by reason of their special organization. The session could regulate their work so far, at least, as to prevent any unlawful methods of work. Their reports could be systematically required, and full knowledge of the nature, efficiency, and success of the work done could be ascertained. It is obvious that such organized sections of a given congregation may be just as efficient as the societies which now exist, and yet not be subject to the objection of having an organization distinct from the church, and no part of its organic life. If, then, it is really the law of Christ that his church itself should do his work, an organization of the body of every congregation is as necessary to do its share of the work as it is of any other part of the church, and it has no more right to throw it off on organizations outside of the church than any church court or board has the right to do the same thing. Another important result may be legitimate from this necessity of a special organization of the members

of the church. If the sessions are empowered "to concert the best measures for promoting the spiritual interests of the church and congregation," and are thus bound to try and develop the full energy of the church, the direction of these special organizations is properly theirs, and they may assign every member of the church to his proper place. If any member should then refuse to work, the fault will be his own, and the government of the church will be free from all complicity in his unfaithfulness. But while every session may have the authority to order these special organizations, under the authority to "concert measures," it is unquestionable that the policy would be greatly promoted in many ways by a provision in the constitution requiring the private members of the church to come under a special organization for work, and defining how it should be done. The want of such an organization is probably the greatest defect in our system, and is responsible for the existence of these anomalous societies. The conclusion is unquestionably sound, that the capability of the church itself, in its private members, to receive a special organization for united and regular work, supersedes all necessity for societies in the church, but not of it. A provision in the fundamental law can be easily made.

2. The second thing to be clearly apprehended in settling the issuesent down by the Assembly is, the real nature of the societies now existing, and concerning which this question has been raised. They are beyond doubt societies in the church, but not of it. They are not the creatures of ecclesiastical authority, but voluntary organizations. They are not legally under the government of the church. All their affairs are conducted under their own organization by their own organs, and on their own responsibility. The very nature of the societies determines them as no part of the organization of the church. Suppose some of the members of a particular church should unite to form a temperance society, and another part an anti-gambling society, another a reading society, and yet another an agricultural club. It is obvious that every one of these associations, though composed exclusively of members of the church, and, therefore, in a sense within the boundaries of the church, is entirely distinct from

the church itself. Neither is any part of the organization of the church. Neither is appointed by any authority of the church. Neither is under the government of the church, or at all responsible to any authority of the church. The church cannot, in any consistent or legal way, take any control of them, even if offered to it. Now, a society may be thus formed of members of the church for the promotion of Home or Foreign Missions, but it would be in its nature exactly the same as those we have just supposed. It would be no more a part of the organization of the church than a society for Home or Foreign Missions formed by persons not connected with that congregation at all. It would be a voluntary society in the bosom of the church. More than fifty years ago the Presbyterian Church was torn with convulsions by this question of voluntary societies and a true ecclesiastical action, and it was settled forever, as was supposed, so far as our church is concerned. The question now in issue involves the same principle under a different form. It is just here that exceptions have been properly taken to the societies now existing in the church. The anomalous character of these bodies has been, strongly proved; and the defect on that side of the question is that they have suggested no remedy apparently but the destruction of the societies. On the other hand, the practical usefulness of these societies, and the noble work they have done has been strongly shown; and the defect on that side of the discussion has been, that no attempt even has been effectively made to vindicate the legal and constitutional relation of these societies to the church. As long as this remains unsettled there will be a growing opposition to them. All can be remedied without injury to the societies or any disturbance of their work, by simply altering their relation to the church. Let them come under the control of the government of the church: they will then form something like one of those special organizations of the church which are necessary to do this part of its work. Let them come under the law, and the constitutional and divinely ordered government of the church. Hereafter, if any members of any church wish to form a working society let them petition the session to be so constituted in a regular way; or, what would be better still, let the sessions seek to have the whole

church under their care specially organized for work, in sections or as a whole, and assign every member to a place where all perplexity about what work to do will be settled for them. The efficient and valuable work done by the societies, as now constituted, proves what can be done by similar organizations in a right relation to the church.

By this simple method all difficulties will be removed, constitutional objections will be quieted, the societies saved, and the law of the King, which requires his church to do her work and not throw it upon organizations outside of herself, will be obeyed, to the advantage of all concerned. It will not be for his glory, for the good of the work, or the welfare of his servants to refuse to do it. Touching that branch of this question which relates to unions between the societies of different congregations reaching throughout the bounds of presbyteries, synods, and General Assemblies, the principle which lies at the basis of these societies will control this question also. If the societies are rightly constituted as societies of the church, they are already coëxistent parts of a common unity in the unity of the church at large; and all measures of mutual encouragement, help, and stimulus to activity are warranted by this common bond already created and existing without creating any new body. On the other hand, if they are merely societies in the church, but not of it, the voluntary principle which warrants the primary factors or units of a larger organization will warrant the formation of such a larger association. The church has no legal control over either; both are in their essence voluntary societies outside of the church and beyond its jurisdiction. But then as soon as these larger organizations begin to appear, the peril of the case, which was not suspected so long as the societies were confined to particular congregations, begins to emerge. A new consolidated body appears, lying alongside the church, absorbing the strength which ought to be exerted in the church itself, and taking the position of a body unknown to the constitution and law of the church. This new body is either a part of the church or a body outside of it. If construed as a part of the church, where is its warrant in the law? If not a part of the church—as it evidently is not—the church in none of

its courts has any jurisdiction by law over it. Not only are these wider organizations objectionable because they result in a body neither a part of the church, nor recognized in the constitution, but because they create the appearance of coördinate organizations with the church, and carry the implication that the organization of the church is insufficient and does not admit of accomplishing its end. A voluntary society truly auxiliary to the church may be tolerated, but a voluntary society which claims coördination with the church, and essays to do its work for it, is another matter. Yet these wider unions are the legitimate developments of the principle upon which the societies in the church, but not of it, are formed; and these objectionable wider combinations or unions only illustrate the falsity and danger of the principle. On the other hand, the true principle of special organizations of the church under rightful authority carries no such dangerous consequences. They create no outside body, for they all already constitute one body. They can exhort one another to good works without any peril to the church. They can do all the good which they desire to do without introducing a great voluntary organization into the bosom of the church with all the hazards attached to such policy. The law of the King, which requires his church to do the work assigned to it and not to throw it on any outside organization to do the work for it, is just as binding and just as important for the church at large as it is on and for every particular congregation. There is no aspect in which the work of the church can be contemplated in which it is lawful for the church to depute it to any other body. By the terms of the proposition it is the work of the church, and she must do it.

2. Societies out of the Church.

The second branch of the issue tendered by the General Assembly relates to the lawfulness of Christian work done by outside organizations, or voluntary associations. It is clear, on a very brief inspection of this question, that there are two distinct and opposite dangers to be avoided in the settlement of it: One is the danger of sanctioning the usurpation of the functions which our Lord has conferred exclusively upon the church by any merely

human association; the other is the danger of interfering with the right of association for all lawful purposes, which exists in all men under the broad sphere of civil society, free from all responsibility to the church. No transfer of the rights and duties of the church is lawful. No interference with the liberty of individuals and the right of association under the limits of the moral law is lawful. Even when the ends and purposes of an association are not sanctioned by moral law, the church is limited to a protest, and is not entitled to proceed to any coërcive measures. But for lawful purposes the right of association is perfect. Among these lawful purposes is the right to associate for various religious ends. The right to use those means of grace by which sinners are led to repentance is not conditioned on the grant of the church, or the power of the keys. The right to pray, to read the Bible, to attend preaching, to talk on the subject of religion, to encourage to repentance, have been granted to all lost sinners by the Master himself. There are certain of the means of grace, such as the sacraments and communion with the church, which are under the power of the keys, as now committed to the church; but these are the means of grace intended to sanctify the believer, not to convert the unconverted. While the church alone is empowered to ordain ministers, exhibit the sacraments, and establish the official preaching of the gospel, every private Christian, nay, every individual man, has the right to inquire or answer on the subject of religion, and to urge men to the obedience of the faith. Whosoever heareth is authorized to say, "Come." Any man is at full liberty to exercise this right in private or in public, to talk to one man or a thousand. Every man is at liberty to give his money to any object he chooses, under two limitations: First, that the object be lawful and right in itself; and second, that he shall have first provided for all the claims which duty has made obligatory upon him. What one may do, two, or ten, or any number, may do, but under the same limitations; consequently the liberty of association warrants the formation of societies outside of the church, for moral and religious purposes, under the limitations specified. Temperance societies, young men's Christian associations, missionary societies, tract and Bible societies, private mer-

cantile firms or larger voluntary societies for publishing religious books are all lawful. No such society becomes unlawful, except when it trenches upon the functions of the church, or hinders the full discharge of the duties of its members. No member of the church is under any general moral obligation to join any such association, for such an obligation would bind every member of the church to do it. If any moral obligation binds any particular individual to do it, that obligation is special and personal, growing out of the particular circumstances and relations of the individual, but it is not universal law, binding upon all. In truth, connection with these associations is, in general, merely a matter of liberty, not of obligation. This radical character of liberty underlies all action in these societies, even the duties which they determine, just because these duties may be abolished at will by quitting the society. The service of God's kingdom is obligatory in the highest sense of the term. It admits, now and then, of what are called free-will and thank-offerings; these are warranted as occasional things; but the regular and habitual discharge of Christian duties are what they are called,—duties, obligatory as such. All duties are, in one sense, required to be free-will offerings—that is, to be freely and heartily performed; but they are distinguished from free-will offerings proper, as these are not prescribed by law, but all duties are prescribed. A member of the church who is also a member of one of these voluntary societies ought to make conscience feel that he has fully discharged his duty as a member of the kingdom of God, before he devotes himself to the service of an association of men. All grants of money for the purposes of such a society ought to be such as he feels at liberty to give. All his gifts to the church ought to be such as he feely bound to give. All uses of personal influence are of the same character. The claims of the church are paramount. Only on the condition of recognizing this is a servant of Christ at liberty to join these subordinate associations at all. His servants ye are to whom ye obey; his servants ye are whose service ye perform. Christ has not yielded the claims of his kingdom to any voluntary association, no matter how lawful it may be. Duty to the kingdom must be discharged before the liberty of association comes into play. If it

be said that a man may owe duties as a member of these voluntary societies, the answer is clear: it is true that a man may owe duties as a member of a bank, or a mercantile firm; but these duties are the creatures of a voluntary action, and are terminable at will by quitting the association. Such duties are not to be equalled with those which are intrinsically obligatory under permanent relations to God, and are not terminable at will. All human associations, even for moral and religious ends, are subordinate, in the dignity and force of their claims, to the kingdom of God in the world, and ought to be so regarded by all loyal servants of the King.

The attitude of the church towards all these voluntary societies which are under the limits specified as lawful, should be an attitude of cordial good-will so long as these limits are observed. If they fall into error, or trespass on the domain of just ecclesiastical authority, the church can only testify against them; it can do no more. They are outside of the church, not under her authority, nor subject to her restraint. As a rule there is no need for these societies in any church whose own organization is efficient for carrying on the work of sending out the gospel. In the system of independency they are essentially necessary; for that system is organically too weak to execute the apostolic commission. It must go out of itself to find a combination strong enough for that purpose; or it may be in the case of a church in its organization competent, but where the spirit of religion is so paralyzed as to prevent active propagation of the gospel, a voluntary association of its more devoted members may be proper as a temporary expedient. But as a general rule we hold it to be a reliable conclusion from the principles of the kingdom, that when the aims of these societies are coincident with the aims of the church, they ought to be nothing more than auxiliaries to the church. So far as they have other aims the church has nothing to do with them.

In view of these various considerations, the Presbytery of Lexington recommended to the General Assembly:

First, To counsel all the existing societies to form proper relations to the church by coming under its government, and thus to avoid censure and hindrance to usefulness arising from their present anomalous relations.

Second, To discourage the formation of these societies beyond the bounds of particular congregations, as tending to the development of a body unknown to the constitution.

Third, To encourage the special organization of all our churches for Christian work under the direction of the sessions.

Fourth, To express a cordial good-will towards all societies for moral and religious purposes, so long as they stand within their proper sphere and observe the limits within which their action is lawful.—*Paper of Lexington Presbytery.*

The logical and practical conclusion from the principles here advocated is a provision in the fundamental law for a special organization of each particular church, either as a whole when small, or by sections when large enough to make it expedient. Into this one or into one of these sections let every member of the church be assigned by order of session as soon as received into the fellowship of the church.

C. R. Vaughan.

VI. NOTES.

GENERATION AND REGENERATION.

The life which we live in the flesh by faith in the Son of God, and which in its perfection we are to live after the flesh shall have perished, even eternally in the incorruptible bodies that shall be—this highest, deathless life is chiefly revealed to us in Holy Scripture by analogy with the natural life which animates these perishable bodies. The grammatical terms that declare and express the one are employed to reveal the other. A study of some of these terms in their primary psychical, and in their higher spiritual application and import is what is here proposed.

Limiting our present study to the New Testament, the terms which will be chiefly considered are γεννάω and τίκτω, with their derivatives and cognates.

Both of these terms relate to the production of human beings, not by creation, as in the case of the first human pair, by an act of God with which no creature's agency concurs and coöperates, but by procreation, the evolution of a race, of which every individual after the first pair is produced, by divine power indeed, but with and by means of the cooperation of a pair of human beings. For all this he thoughfully provided in the beginning, when he made man, and made him male and female.

This duality of the manhood, as God made it, is strikingly analogous to the trinity of the Godhead, of which it is the image; and the communication of natural life by the joint potencies of man, male and female, is most fit to be taken, as God in his word has taken it to illustrate his own communication of spiritual life.

In the usage of the New Testament, the word γεννάω is ordinarily applied to the masculine human agency in procreation. It is best translated by our English word *beget*, as throughout Matt. i.—"Abraham begat Isaac: Isaac begat Jacob," etc.

As, however, the masculine agency can be effective only in conjunction with the feminine, the word γεννάω is sometimes applied to the latter

(Luke i. 57), "Now Elizabeth's time was fulfilled that she should be delivered (τοῦ τεκεῖν); and she brought forth (ἐγέννησεν) a son."

On the other hand, the word τικτω is applied distinctively to the feminine agency, and never, I think, to the masculine. Yet the conjunction of this feminine agency with the masculine, and their mutual dependence, are significantly intimated by the fact that a derivative of τίκτω (τέκνον) is used to express the relation of the child to either parent. It is πατρὸς τέκνον as well as μητρὸς τέκνον.

It has not been favorable to the clearest and most discriminating thought, that, in translating these terms in the passages of the New Testament, which treat of the genesis of spiritual life, we have reversed the order of the original Scriptures, and have most commonly applied to the agency of God in communicating spiritual life the terms which are proper for the feminine agency in the communication of natural life. Not only so, but of those terms expressing the feminine agency we have taken, for this high use, not a term (generate) which may properly be applied to the whole protracted agency of the mother through the months of gestation, nor a term (conception) which marks the beginning of that agency, but a word (birth) which denotes the completion of that agency and of the whole process of *generating* in the emergence of the offspring from the body of the mother to begin its separate life.

In the phrases "*born* again," "*born* of God," "*born* of the Spirit," the word *born* does not translate a participle of τίκτω, but of γεννάω (John i. 13; John iii. 6–8; 1 John iii. 9; iv. 7; v. 1–18.) In these cases *begotten* would be a more accurate rendering than *born*. In 1 Peter i. 3, the verb is thus properly translated, "The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who . . . . *begat* us again," etc. In other places it is evident that the revisers of our English version were aware of the infelicity, but they too timidly put the proper rendering in the margin, instead of inserting it in the text.

We cannot justify this on grounds of taste or of delicacy, and we maintain that something much more serious than any question of taste or of delicacy is involved in this, even a question of accurate and adequate theologizing.

We have an English word, of Greek origin, which is much better for this theological use, and to which the most fastidious cannot make the same objection which possibly some may make to the word *beget*. It is the word *generate*. To *generate* is not only to cause something to begin to be, but to determine of what *kind* (genus) it shall be. No

word applicable to physical forces and laws is more expressive or more accurate than the word *generate*, and if we will hold our minds to it, we shall find that the word *regenerate*, in its application to spirit, is as expressive and as accurate as a word can well be.

The true import of the word *regeneration* has been not a little obscured by the substitution for it of the words *new birth* and the phrase *born again*. The thought would be more accurately expressed if we spoke of being *begotten* again, *begotten* of God. This more accurate expression would react to produce more accurate thinking; for it is not more true that language is the product and expression of thought than that it is the moulder and modifier of thought. It is not more true that we say what we think than that, very largely, we are led to think whatever we allow ourselves to say. The customary misuse, or at least, undiscriminating use of the terms of *generation* to express and to guide our thinking on *regeneration*, has produced much obscurity, and helped the prevalence of some more or less hurtful errors.

When we speak of *birth*, we advert to an event of deep, tender, solemn interest in our domestic experience; but it is an *event* of which we are competent witnesses, which presents itself palpably, obtrudes itself irresistibly upon human observation. No fact in human experience is more capable of being reliably attested than that a child has been born of a woman and is alive. The beginning of the extra-uterine life is a fact cognizable by sense. We fix reliably the place and the date of it, and make record of both. From that time onward the living creature is visible, tangible, measurable. We handle it, fondle it, nurse it, rear it. It is continually and increasingly a fact and a factor in our home life which cannot be ignored.

In our meditative moments, no doubt, we look deeper and higher than this bundle of facts and potencies. We solemnly recognize the invisible spirit that inhabits and energizes them. Then the mystery awes us. The little child leads us far away from the shaggy and howling wildness of animalism, into that secret silence of the mind in which we find heaven and God. Meditating on the mystery of the infant's being in its relation to our own, helps us to accept the attested mysteries of the Godhead without expecting to solve or to fathom them.

When "the mother feels, for the first time, her firstborn's breath," its life is a mystery, but how much more mysterious and awful is that life at its actual beginning, discernible only to God!

"My frame was not hidden from thee,
When I was made in secret
And curiously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth.
Thine eye did see my imperfect substance,
And in thy book all my members were written,
Which day by day were fashioned,
When as yet there was none of them."

"As thou knowest not the way of the Spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child; even so thou knowest not the work of God who doeth all."

When the theopneustic terms, written by men who "spake from God, being moved by the Holy Spirit," do so evidently refer to that invisible, impalpable, inscrutable work of God wrought in sacred secrecy in the very holy of holies of the divine Spirit's fleshly temple—how is it that in our discoursing of God's impartation of spiritual life, we have neglected those theopneustic terms, and substituted for them terms properly applicable only to the completed product of that divine fashioning of our imperfect substance, and the bringing it forth to human observation?

We will indicate, with utmost brevity, only a few of the practical uses of the more exact thinking and speaking which it is the object of this paper to recommend.

1. It would reclaim for serious and reverent thought that important, mysterious, and marvellous part of our earthly life, its fœtal period, which our modern excess of refinement practically consigns to irreverent and indelicate thought. The solemn, godly, yet perfectly frank style of allusion and description which is found in the Holy Scriptures gives no countenance to this.

2. It would make our application of these terms of natural generation to spiritual regeneration more just, instructive, and regulative of our thinking. We should cease to expect the beginning of the spiritual life to be a phenomenon as patent to observation as the sudden emergence of a human babe from the darkness in which it has been slowly and patiently generated, and we shall learn to think of it as analogous rather to the *beginning* of a process which no eye can discern but his who wrote all our members in his book when as yet there was none of them. We shall be willing to preach the word as the farmer sows his seed, not expecting to see it germinate, nor imagining that he can help it germinate by his clumsy manipulation. Serious attention to the word, hushing a congregation to silence and revealing itself in solemn, earnest faces, will be accepted as evidence that the

seed of the word has found lodgment where we may trust it to the quickening energy of the divine Spirit, and whence it will not return void.

3. It would tend to restore our faith in the reliable efficacy, for spiritual regeneration, of the patient, persistent brooding of wise and faithful pastoral love—a faith which, we fear, is greatly weakened by over-confidence in less quiet, less persistent, more startling, and overmuch lauded appliances, the type of which is not the patiently brooding hen, but the patent incubator, from which huge flocks of unmothered chickens are sent forth screaming together.

4. It would tend to a better recognition and more faithful use of the divine provision for spiritual regeneration of infants. We speak not now of "infants dying in infancy." These are taken away from our arms and care, and, although not from our love, yet altogether from our responsibility. We would leave them trustfully to him who gave and has taken them. Would that our creeds would leave them thus without either affirmative or negative dogmas, none of which are so clearly deduced from Scripture as we rightly insist that all ecclesiastical dogmas should be.

We speak of the regeneration of infants as God's sweet gift to the parental faith in which they are begotten and born, wholly irrespective of his decree as to the length of their earthly lives—whether a fraction of an hour or the whole of a century. We speak of that regeneration *in* infancy, so early that the whole conscious and responsible life is a regenerate life,—a life in which there has been no year, no month, no hour of impenitence. We seriously maintain that a better study and use of the terms chiefly considered in this paper, and a better regulation of our thinking by means of them in such more accurate use, would greatly help believing parents to generate, to nurture, and to rear their offspring in a faith which assures their salvation, not as a rescue by conversion from a career of impenitent sin, of long or of short duration, but as a setting of life right toward God and in God from its very beginning. This, we believe, is the true, scriptural race redemption.

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THE ORIGIN OF THE SEPTUAGINT.

That the date of this venerable version is an important factor in the critical problems of the Old Testament is well known to all who are in touch with the current literary and textual discussions. That its ori-

gin is involved in deep obscurity is equally well demonstrated and familiar. For the letter of Aristeas reveals its fraudulent character on its very face, while the later embellishment of the story as to the seventy-two cells, the seventy-two translators, the seventy-two days, is no more trustworthy than the Talmudic tradition which asserts that its completion was accompanied by tremendous portents and disastrous consequences to Israel. Neither can much credence be put in the testimony of Aristobulus as recorded in Eusebius's *Praeparatio Evangelica;* while Clement only reproduces the current tradition And yet there are grains of truth in the tradition itself, and what is reliable may be summed up in the statement in which all scholars would concur:

(1), The LXX. owes it existence to the desire of the Greek-speaking Jews in Egypt to possess the Old Testament in what was now their vernacular; (2), The translation was made by men of varying ability, at different times, extending over a century or more, and beginning with the Pentateuch; (3), The greater part, if not the whole, of the version, was executed at Alexandria. Fresh light on the date and origin of this version is plainly desirable, and should be welcomed, however much it might militate against our traditional beliefs, however much it might serve to corroborate the views of the Higher Criticism in regard to the close of the canon and the existence of Maccabean psalms.

More direct external evidence seems out of the question, though certainly not beyond the range of possibilities; but Prof. H. Graetz, of Breslau, had discovered, before called up higher, some internal evidence of great value, which evidence it is the purpose of this paper to present, together with some material gleaned from another source, without, however, indicating, on the writer's part, more than a general acceptance of the results so reached. Dr. Graetz's view is that the LXX. was made neither in the days of Ptolemy I., surnamed Soter, nor in the days of Ptolemy II., called Philadelphus, but in the time of Ptolemy VI., called also Philometor. That is, the earliest portions of the version were executed at least a hundred years later than claimed by the current tradition. This view is supported mainly by inferences hinging upon verbal criticisms.

1. As is well known one of the main differences that divided the Pharisees and Sadducees turned on the date of the Feast of Pentecost, and arose from diverse interpretations of the text of the law which regulated the date of said feast. That law is Leviticus xxiii. 15, and reads:

וּסְפַרְתֶּם לָכֶם מִמָּחֳרַת הַשַּׁבָּת מִיּוֹם הֲבִיאֲכֶם אֶת־עֹמֶר הַתְּנוּפָה שֶׁבַע שַׁבָּתוֹת תְּמִימֹת תִּהְיֶינָה

What is meant by מִמָּחֳרַת הַשַּׁבָּת? The Sadducees understood it to mean that the counting was to be made from the day after the Sabbath of the Passover, and that, therefore, the Feast of Pentecost being exactly seven weeks after, ought always to fall on a Sabbath. The Pharisees, however, understood the word "Sabbath" in the law to mean the first day of the Passover, whatever day in the week it might be. Pentecost, therefore, being exactly seven weeks afterwards, might come on any day of the week. The expression מִמָּחֳרַת הַשַּׁבָּת is unambiguous and clear enough, and the Revised Version gives an exact translation: "Ye shall count unto you from the morrow after the Sabbath, from the day that ye brought the sheaf of the wave offering; seven Sabbaths shall there be complete." When, however, we turn to the LXX. text, we find no literal rendering, but a remarkable divergence from the Hebrew. That version has *τῇ ἐπαύριον τῆς πρώτης* in verse 11 and *τῆς ἐπαύριον τῶν σαββάτων* in verse 15. Nor is there much doubt in regard to the genuineness of the reading. Origen, indeed, had noticed a variant *τοῦ σαββάτου* or *μετὰ τὸ σαββάτον* in verse 11, and this reading is reflected in a small group of existing cursives. But these MSS. probably were influenced by recensional tendencies, and the most valuable and early witnesses, A, B, F,[1] agree in the present lection. Moreover, the Pentateuch at least was used in the worship of the Alexandrian *προσευχαί*, and it is not conceivable that the original reading which favored the Sadducees in a matter of so great importance should have been altered out of love to Pharisaism. A translation which has been in use some time is not readily changed for a rendering directly opposite, especially when opposed by so large and influential a body as the sect of the Sadducees.

[1] A in the textual criticism of the Old Testament in Greek is the well known Codex Alexandrinus; B is the Codex Vaticanus, 1209; F, however, is neither the Codex Borcelianus, nor the Graeco-Latin Codex Augiensis, but the Codex Ambrosianus, bought in Corcyra by Cardinal F. Borromeo. See further, PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY, Vol. V., p. 306–'7, and the introduction to Dr. Henry B. Swete's "Old Testament in Greek," Vol. I, 1887. And, by the way, the writer takes this opportunity to withdraw the statement made in the QUARTERLY as to MS. F. Further research has entirely convinced him of the recensional characteristics of that MS.; only he does not yet admit the original character of B., but agrees with the conclusion of Lagarde (*Septuaginta Studien*, 1891, p. 72), that in Judges, at least, A exhibits the preferable text.

who were the people's party of Judaism. Because, therefore, the translation *τῇ ἐπαύριον τῆς πρώτης* does violence to the exact meaning of מִמָּחֳרַת הַשַּׁבָּת it seems to be the original meaning. What then? The LXX. distinctly favors the erroneous interpretation of the Pharisees, and accentuates their antagonism toward the Sadducees. It must, therefore, have been made after the antagonism between Pharisees and Sadducees in reference to the date of Pentecost became pronounced. And since that antagonism arose out of the Maccabean wars, the work cannot have been executed before the days of Jonathan Maccabeaus, 161–143, B. C.

2. *Βασιλεύς* is the exact equivalent of the Hebrew מֶלֶךְ and as a general thing מֶלֶךְ and מַמְלָכָה are rendered by *βασιλεύς* and *βασιλεία* respectively as is right. And such, without exception, is the usage in reference to nations outside of Israel, as Moab, Edom, Sodom, etc, who were antagonistic to Israel and uninfluenced by its Messianic and political hopes. But there are certain classes of passages in which מֶלֶךְ is not represented by *βασιλεύς*, but by *ἄρχων*, and that in plain defiance of the literal and historic signification. These are:

Gen. xvii. 6: מְלָכִים מִמֶּךָּ יֵצֵאוּ = *βασιλεῖς ἐκ σοῦ ἐξελεύσονται.*

Gen. xvii. 16: מַלְכֵי עַמִּים מִמֶּנָּה = *βασιλεῖς ἐθνῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔσονται.*

Gen. xxxv. 11: מְלָכִים מֵחֲלָצֶיךָ יֵצֵאוּ = *βασιλεῖς ἐκτῆς ὀσφύος σου ἐξελεύσονται.*

Gen. xxxvi. 31: מֶלֶךְ־מָלַךְ לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל = *πρότου βασιλεῦσαι βασιλέα ἐν Ἰερουσαλήμ.*

II. Num. xxiii. 21: וּתְרוּעַת מֶלֶךְ בּוֹ = *τὰ ἐνδοξα ἀρχόντων ἐν αὐτῷ.*

Deut. xxviii. 36: וְאֶת־מַלְכְּךָ = *ἀπαγάγοι . . . καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας σού.*

Deut. xxxiii. 5: וַיְהִי בִישֻׁרוּן מֶלֶךְ = *καὶ ἔσται ἐν τῷ ἠγαπημένῳ ἄρχων.*

Under this head comes the important law of the kingdom, Deut. xvii. 14–20.

Deut. xvii. 14: אָשִׂימָה עָלַי מֶלֶךְ כְּכָל־הַגּוֹיִם = *καταστήσω ἐπ' ἐμαυτὸν ἄρχοντα καθὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔθνη.*

Deut. xvii. 15: שׂוֹם תָּשִׂים עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ = *καθιστῶν καταστήσεις ἐπὶ σεαυτὸν ἄρκοντα.*

Deut. xvii. 15: מִקֶּרֶב אַחֶיךָ תָּשִׂים עָלֶיךָ מֶלֶךְ = *ἐκ τῶν ἀδελφῶν σου παταστήσεις ἐπι σεαυτὸν ἄρκοντα.*

Deut. xvii. 18: וְהָיָה כְשִׁבְתּוֹ עַל כִּסֵּא מַמְלַכְתּוֹ = *καὶ ὅταν καθίσῃ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρκῆς αὐτοῦ.*

Deut. xvii. 20: עַל־מַמְלַכְתּוֹ = *ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρκῆς.*

III. Gen. xlix. 20: וְהוּא יִתֵּן מַעֲדַנֵּי־מֶלֶךְ = *καὶ αὐτος δώσει τροφὴν ἄρκουσιν.*

With the exception of those passages already mentioned, in which reference is had to the rulers of nations, other than Israel, where מֶלֶךְ is *always* rendered by *βασιλεύς* and מַמְלָכָה by *βασιλεία*, the citations above made cover all the translations of מֶלֶךְ and מַמְלָכָה in the Septuagint Pentateuch. They show, too, that *βασιλεύς* and *ἄρκων* are not used promiscuously and synonymously in this version of the Pentateuch as they seem to be in Sirach xlvi. 13, but rather that their employment was dictated by a fastidious deliberation which scrupulously avoided *βασιλεύς* wherever it might rouse suspicion, and retained it wherever offence was inconceivable. For class I. has to do with the Israelitish kingdom as a historic fact or else deals with prophecies, which, when this version was made, had already received an exhaustive fulfilment in the line of Abraham. But Israel even in exile clung to its laws and customs—yea, verily, clings to them yet—with a devotion unequalled among all the nations of the earth. For Israel, the laws of Moses were not repealed by national overthrow, nor did they cease to be obligatory. Along with this devotion to their own laws and customs, too, Israel hated the foreign yoke as a very curse of God, and the very first good opportunity was the occasion in those days for renewed attempts to regain that national independence the people so loved. Israel's sullen insubordination must have been known in the higher Egyptian circles. Under these circumstances, therefore, we need not be surprised that *ἄρκων* is used as the equivalent of מֶלֶךְ in those passages where the state of affairs described or enjoined is such as every Jew would gladly have restored. Indeed, when we consider Israel's position, we would be surprised did not

translators who had these people's interest at heart seek to soften expressions which might arouse suspicion. The Authorized Version and Revised Version translators have done similar things without laboring under such pressure, and the Septuagint translators were thus careful to use *βασιλεύς* in reference to past historic facts, but *ἄρχων* where the state of affairs described was a possible future contingency. That this was actually the case is further shown by the use of *ἐν Ἰερουσαλήμ* for לְבֵנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל in Gen. xxxvi. 31, and more particularly in Gen. xlix. 20, which has been marked III. Here was a dubious case, and while *βασιλεύς* might not have been misinterpreted or misunderstood, still *ἄρχων* was the safest; and it is always best to err on that side. Thus the Septuagint Version, like all things else, is the resultant of certain factors, one of which it is hereby probable was the desire to avoid displeasing the reigning prince in any way. But who was this reigning prince? Ptolemy Philadelphus was a great collector of books, and might, therefore, be interested in the sacred books and customs of Israel, but "if there is any historic reality in the alleged interest taken by an Egyptian king in the translation of the law-book sacred to the Israelites, this can only be Ptolemy Philometor, who showed extraordinary favor to the Israelites living in Egypt. Israelitish generals and Israelitish troops helped him to fight against his hostile brother." And it was in the reign of Philometor that Onias founded the temple at Onion, in Egypt, which tended to increase the importance of the Jewish colonies, and to separate the Alexandrian from the Palestinian school. It is, therefore, probable that this king, who was the best and most tolerant of all the Ptolemies, was the one whose encouragement led to the translation of this most ancient version. The date of this king, too, 174–146 B. C., tallies well with that gained from our former observations as to the day of the Passover, viz.: 161–143 B. C.

3. So far, in my own statement, the theory of Professor Graetz. This theory gains confirmation in some particulars from recent finds made in Egypt; and by those same discoveries the Egyptian or Alexandrian origin is put beyond the shadow of a doubt.

W. M. Flinders Petrie is an indefatigable explorer who never leaves a stone unturned in the search for fresh light on the old questions. And Flinders Petrie has made what might almost be called the fortunate discovery that when you find nothing inside an Egyptian coffin you still have the coffin to work upon. For in Egypt wood was very scarce, and every stick of timber was needed for fruit or shade. None

was available in any shape for coffins. And, hence, under the influence of that necessity which is always the fruitful mother of inventions, the coffin-makers proceeded to make their coffins and mould them to fit the human form, by "laying together strips of paper either simply or with glue, and then covering the surface on both sides with a coat of Nile mud, upon which they printed designs and figures." The paper used in the preparation of these coffins was the ordinary writing paper made from the papyrus reed. More than that, it was paper that had actually been written upon and thrown aside as no longer of any value. And there we have it to-day, covered with writing in "every variety of hand, from the large, round hand of the youth writing to his father, to the shorthand notes of the clerk on the back of an old account." To separate, decipher, and sort these layers of written papyri is a task of no small magnitude; for the layers must be washed clear of mud, and to do that without effacing the writing is well-nigh impossible. Besides, where glue was used, the whole texture is riddled by worms which have gone in search of the glue and reduced the papyrus almost to powder. Yet Prof. J. P. Mahaffy, of Dublin, has sorted and deciphered the first instalment of the "Petrie Papyri," and his work lies before the public in Cunningham Memoir, No. 8.

Now, we are not specially interested in the literature of these precious papyri; for the vast majority of them are portions of household accounts, wills, and private correspondence. The only valuable scraps of literature are some pages of Plato's Phædo and the long-lost Antiope of Euripides. The dialect in which they are written, however, is the "mixed or common Greek dialect of later times, when the conquests of Alexander had made all Greek culture of one kind and type. But in the vocabulary we find a far closer likeness to the Greek of the Septuagint than to that of any other work" which might be named. Words occur in these papyri found nowhere else except in the version of the LXX. Moreover, such large specimens of this writing are dated in the reigns of the second and third Ptolemies (B. C. 274–225), that we can tell with tolerable certainty whether any new undated document belongs to this period. What then? The Septuagint is of Egyptian origin; and when we say Egyptian we might have said Alexandrian, for Alexandria was *the* place where such work would be done if done at all. So much is certain. This discovery does not, however, furnish a definite date for that translation. It might have been made in 274 B. C., or it may not have been made until much later times, for we must not forget the remarkable likeness to the simpler portions of

the New Testament. Mahaffy declares that he has "hunted with anxious care for the smallest trace of any such book, but in vain." And yet, on the ordinary hypothesis, the Pentateuch of that version had been in circulation sixty years at the time of the latest dated fragment! The truth is these documents only furnish us with the terminus *a quo*; later research must determine the terminus *ad quem* and the exact period of composition. The discovery of a coffin made in 130 B. C. would go far towards settling the question of the exact date. Meanwhile, the linguistic phenomena seem to permit, and the internal evidence seems to require, the translation of this venerable version at or about 150 B. C.

In conclusion, the writer desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to *The Sunday-School Times* and *The Expository Times* for material aid in the composition of this article.

R. B. Woodworth.
Duffields, W. Va.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1893.

Macon is a beautiful Southern city. Robed in fresh summer verdure, with broad, well-shaded, albeit dusty streets, ample lawns, and wide expanses of green, noble public buildings, and many elegant private mansions on commanding grassy eminences, lovely views of woodland, crest and river and undulating horizons, Macon presented a most attractive place for the meeting of the Assembly.

Everything that generous and thoughtful consideration could suggest, was done for the comfort and welfare of their guests; every convenience was provided, every wish anticipated. The courteous and accomplished pastor of the First Church, with a corps of efficient assistants, met, on incoming trains, the members of the Assembly, and delightful provision was made for their entertainment. The culture and hospitality of charming homes made each one's stay most enjoyable and memorable. The delicate compliment of high musical culture was paid the Assembly, in the unusual and delightful courtesy extended by the congregation to attend the rendition by the Macon Musical Association of Sir J. Stainer's Oratorio of "The Crucifixion." It was a rare pleasure, and the impression made was solemn and affecting. The ever-melting story of Calvary was told in fitting song, and its inimitable pathos and majesty were most tenderly and vividly illustrated.

The commissioners were generally enrolled, when the opening sermon was preached by the Rev. S. A. King, D. D., of Waco, Texas, the

Moderator of the preceding Assembly. His text was Matthew xxviii. 20: "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." His theme was Christ's presence with his church. This implies a continuous church and a perpetual ministry. It means more than omnipresence. He is present as friend, helper, Saviour. Here is explicit statement of his divinity. This is not the promise of the Comforter, but of the real and constant presence of our risen and reigning Lord, which we need to lay hold on by faith. He is present in days of trial and days of toil—as with the church of old, so with our Southern Church, here and now as well as in the past. Then followed interesting reminiscence of the Assembly of 1865 held in this church, and rapid and telling sketching of the progress of the church in the lapse of years. This is Dr. King's thirteenth Assembly, which shows the esteem in which he is deservedly held. I was surprised at two things: that he read his discourse, and that it was so perfect in its diction; its finish being as elegant as the satin surface and soft sheen of a polished pearl.

After the sermon, and the tender prayer that "constituted" the Assembly, and the reading of the roll, came that expectant hush, when the organization would be effected. No one could predict where or whom the lightning would strike. The names of three brethren, well known, honored and beloved in the church, each of whom would have graced the Moderator's chair, and all of whom it would have been a pleasure thus to reward, were placed in nomination. They heard their own praises sounded, whether they recognized the portraiture. Fortunately, the names were not announced till the close of the nominating speeches, and the revelation of their extraordinary fitness came to them doubtless with all the delight of surprise. One of these in withdrawing his name for reasons that seemed good to the Assembly, nominated "one every way worthy—that father of ministers and missionaries, Judge James W. Lapsley," who was chosen on the third ballot. Thus this Assembly signalized its first claim to remembrance, in departing from usage and tradition, and choosing as its presiding officer a ruling elder. He made an admirable "presiding elder," as he was denominated by a city paper. However excellently the other nominees might have filled the Moderator's chair, it was conceded that Moderator Lapsley filled it worthily. He was eminently courteous and considerate, recognizing the most obscure or the most tedious (alas, that some must be so recorded!) with the same readiness and urbanity with which he greeted others better known or more influential.

He repeatedly placed others in the chair and took quite an active part in the deliberations of the Assembly on the report of the Standing Committee of Foreign Missions.

The devotional spirit of the Assembly, a precious heritage I am told from the Assembly of 1891, was a delightful feature. The daily sessions were of course opened and closed with prayer. The morning *sederunt* closed with a half-hour spent in devotional exercises, in which prayers were fervent and brief, and the singing hearty and inspiring Four evenings, not including Sundays, sermons were preached with messages of salvation, strength, and cheer. One evening was given to that gospel in song, "The Crucifixion." More than once the Assembly laid aside its business to engage in special prayer for specific objects.

It was well that there was thus a spirit of prayer, and of dependence on divine guidance. The eyes of the church were turned anxiously towards this Assembly. It was composed largely of men comparatively unknown. Many were commissioners for the first time, and many more represented their presbyteries for the second time only. Only one was present who had ever been Moderator, Dr. King. Two of the Secretaries of Executive Committees were commissioners. Few were there who would be termed "fathers." They were all "brethren," some younger than others. The crown of glory was not, however, missing. But they were men in whom their Presbyteries had confidence—men of toil, of thought, of convictions, and of earnest consecration—men not afraid to contend earnestly (and to speak repeatedly), nor afraid to keep silence and vote hard.

And then there were grave questions to engage the attention of the body—questions, let us be thankful, not of heresy, but of administration, not divisive and disturbing, but of serious inquiry, and affecting ways of usefulness and progress. The Assembly at one time seemed quite ready for any unexpected action, and there promised to be an upheaval and reälignment of the working forces. But beyond the rumbling of premonition there was no earthquake, and such counsels prevailed and changes were made as will likely obviate recurrence.

The Assembly was generous in extending "the privileges of the floor." Besides the secretaries and the pastor of the church, it was allowed to address the Assembly to Rev. Dr. Kerr, to Rev. Dr. Hoge, and to Rev. T. R. Sampson on matters connected with the business of the body. The courtesy seemed eminently proper, was duly appreciated and in no sense taken advantage of or abused by these honored

brethren. The Assembly heard them not only with pleasure, but with profit, their timely speeches helping the court to reach its own conclusions. And perhaps in no other way could the same light have been thrown on the subjects illuminated by them. But it is to be considered whether or not it may not be a precedent, unsafe and fettering as well as embarrassing.

The Assembly was favored with addresses from others who were not members of the body. Among the earliest of these was Rev. Dr. McLean, one of the secretaries of the American Bible Society, who made a brief and luminous statement as to the work of that noble institution. As the General Assembly has made the Bible Society one of its "causes," and assigned a collection, and a column in the Statistical Reports therefor, it was eminently fitting that such a representation should be made. It happened that Dr. Murkland, of Baltimore, was temporarily occupying the Moderator's chair, and with that charming affluence of thought and illustration and mellifluous felicitousness of expression for which he is so justly and widely known, he responded in a speech so admirable in sentiment and so beautiful in utterance that the Assembly was enchanted. By the way, a remark of Dr. McLean that he believed President Cleveland would close the doors of the Columbian Exposition by force of arms if necessary, evoked applause, which Dr. Murkland, Moderator *pro tempore*, promptly checked. "No force of arms," said an indignant ex-Confederate near the writer, "by force of law, not of arms."

The Seamen's Bethel at New Orleans, rich in sacred associations with the life-work of Dr. Witherspoon, and the cause of the sailor, was presented in a clear and interesting address by the chaplain, Rev. R. E. Steele, of New Orleans.

A very interesting episode was the reception of two representatives of the Reformed Churches among the French. The Assembly was indebted to the thoughtful courtesy of Rev. Dr. Murkland (a member of the Assembly who was always alert, vigilant, and heard with attention) for their presence; and the invitation to them to attend the sessions of our Assembly and to be heard by us was given upon his motion. They were welcomed in fitting speech by Moderator Lapsley, and as they spoke were listened to with evident interest by the Assembly. M. Fred. Neckar represented the Evangelical Society of Geneva, and Rev. E. J. Dupuy, pastor of the Reformed Church in Paris, represented the Reformed Church of France. Our French visitors seemed delighted with their reception, and with Macon.

The representatives who bore to the Assembly tidings from the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance in Toronto, were men honored among us, Judge Cothran and Professor Beattie, and worthy representatives of our own church and of the Alliance as well. They were given an hour on Wednesday morning, both speaking and testifying to the advantages of the Alliance for our own church and for the cause of Christ. If our blood or our banner be bluer, as Judge Cothran argued, so much the greater reason why we should continue with our brethren. As a distinguished minister of our church has well phrased it, "We do not want to belong to a hermit church." The Assembly made adequate provision for meeting in the future our proportion of the expenses of the Alliance.

These matters of courtesy being noted in these chronicles, I will pass on to the various actions of the Assemby, some of them of grave importance, marking, we think, healthful progress.

In the earlier part of the session, when time was not pressing, and every one wanted to speak, two matters were considered at length, being reports of *ad interim* committees. The one was the Hymn Book, and the other the Directory of Worship. The report of the *ad interim* committee on the Hymn Book disclosed the fact that, no provision having been made for their meeting, their consultation had been carried on by correspondence. The result of their conference is expressed in this recommendation:

"The committee, therefore, would recommend that the General Assembly direct the Committee of Publication to accept the proposition of the Rev. R. P. Kerr, D. D., to transfer the publication and entire business of *Hymns of the Ages* to that committee. That he be paid for the stereotype plates and copyrights their actual cost; and also a royalty of ten per cent. on the tune edition; that the name be changed to *Presbyterian Hymn Book*; and that the Committee of Publication be authorized to arrange all the necessary details of the transactions."

Dr. Kerr himself was heard, and made an exceedingly favorable impression by his frank and modest and manly bearing, his generous offer, and his story of the book in question. There was restlessness in the church, and dissatisfaction, as was evidenced by the repeated overtures for hymn book revision, to which the Assemby responded negatively; that with the counsel of others, and at their solicitation, he had prepared the *Hymns of the Ages*, basing it upon our own *Psalms and Hymns*, and following the form of words endeared by long association; he had enriched it with the best hymns and tunes to be found in English collections; he had sought to produce a book that could

become known and loved, brief in compass, attractive as a book, containing all the old precious hymns, the old tested tunes, together with the best later ones, that would be used in Christian praise, and at a cost that would enable all our churches and families to be supplied.

It was argued by those who advocated the report of the committee, that here was a book that suited our church, prepared by one of us, aided by the counsel of brethren, thus constituting as truly a representative committee as any appointed by the Assembly; that it adhered to the traditions of our church and perpetuated the long loved favorites; that practically we were without a hymn book in the multiplicity of all grades used in our churches; that the book itself was admirable as to hymns, tunes, taste, and mechanism; that it was most reasonable in price; and that an *ad interim* committee, representing all the synods, after a year's consideration, recommended its adoption.

On the other hand, it was argued, that the *ad interim* committee had held no meeting and that its conference by correspondence was confessedly unsatisfactory; that the book itself was open to criticism, in the newness and adaptations of some of its hymns and tunes; that a cheap book was not what was wanted, but the best book; that it was an important and vital matter about which it would be wise to go slowly; that we were under business contract with the publishers of Dr. C. S. Robinson's book, *Psalms and Hymns and Spiritual Songs;* that many wanted a larger volume, a repertory to enrich and express their spiritual life; and that the business proposition was not so favorable to the church as it seemed.

The result was that an intermediate course was taken. It was not adopted as the "Presbyterian Hymn Book" or "the authorized Praise Book of the Church" (to use the phrase of Dr. Green's resolution which did not come before the Assembly), but the Assembly expressed "its cordial approval and endorsement" of the book, and "heartily commends it to the favorable consideration of all our churches." And the Committee of Publication was authorized to make arrangements with Dr. Kerr for the sale of the book. It expressed the hope that a word edition would be issued.

In the judgment of the writer this action, while satisfactory to Dr. Kerr, and to the Assembly, for it passed with great unanimity, but complicates the situation. Almost every one thinks he can make a hymn book or edit a newspaper. He is sure he can give good counsel thereanent. So we have another hymn book "approved," even "endorsed." In other days, hymn books were "appointed to be used in the

churches,' or as in Scotch expression "ordained to be used in the churches." Now we "approve" and "commend." We are afraid to "*appoint*" and "*ordain.*" The consequence is, that each congregation obeys its own sweet will; and individual hymn books of all types and grades, from *Triumphant Songs* for the "tuney," to *Laudes Domini* for the "toney," are found in our churches. I, for one, wish to see an authorized praise book for our churches, as other communions have for theirs. I do not undervalue the book of 1867, the precious old *Psalms and Hymns*, but the church at large does not use it. Who knows a Presbyterian Church from the book of praise that is used?

The *Directory of Worship* came before the Assembly by report from an *ad interim* committee. This report was truly a revision, and not a reconstruction, as former proposed revisions have been. It was admirably printed, so that every change suggested by the committee could be at once noted, and a copy was in the hands of every commissioner. Watchful eyes followed the reading of the report by the chairman, Rev. Dr. Green. The new matter introduced was largely such as was called for because of the absence in the present *Directory* of what may *direct* in certain departments of worship (in changed aspects of church life), which have grown into prominence since the adoption of the one now in use notably the Sunday-school and the prayer-meeting. Those who are devoted to our present *Directory*, its fulness and sonorousness, will be pleased with the revision, which has been strictly conservative. Those who critized former revisions, (which seemed never to have satisfied the presbyteries) because of their baldness and sententiousness, will mark with pleasure the richness and literary finish that characterize this. The changes in the report of the committee were not numerous or radical. Presbyterians want a Directory not a Liturgy. The Optional Forms for Marriage and Burial were directed to be put in an Appendix. The book, thus revised, is sent down to presbyteries for adoption or rejection. Let us hope that at length our Book of Church Order is near completion. For so many weary years the church has been engaged in this work of revision that the end is hailed with delight.

Among the earlier acts of the Assembly was the acceptance of the care and oversight of the "Assembly's Home and School" for orphans of ministers' and children of missionaries, at Fredericksburg, Va. All the details had been carefully wrought out, the legal status examined and defined, the proposals were thoroughly and patiently considered by an able committee, of which Dr. Murkland was chairman, and the

Assembly accepted the trust and bestowed its hearty benediction. To the loving heart, untiring zeal, and well-directed and intelligent energy of the Rev. A. Pierce Saunders is so happy a consummation due.

The Assembly plunged into business earnestly. On Thursday the reports of Executive Committees were read and referrred. On Friday the reports of *ad interim* committees, of which there were four, were read and appropriately referred, or at once considered and acted on.

After a good-humored contest, the Assembly decided that the next Assembly be held in Nashville. The contest was, according to a local paper, between Greenville, S. C., with strawberries and cream, Norfolk, Va., with oysters and sea-pleasures, and Nashville, Tenn., with race-horses. It is needless to say the horses won the race. Seriously, however, the Assembly has met in the State of Tennessee four times (the next meeting being the fifth), in the State of Virginia two times, and in no other State save Texas and Louisiana has it met less frequently. It has never met in Florida. It has met in the Synod of Nashville three times, and in the Synod of Virginia four. But let it be remembered, the Synod of Nashville numbers 11,831, the Synod of Virginia 34,224. It met west of the Mississippi in 1887 and in 1892. It met in Houston in 1885, and in Vicksburg in 1884. In ten years the extreme West and South has had the Assembly four times, the East once, to-wit, in Baltimore in 1888, for Asheville is nearer the centre than the east, and the centre four times not including Asheville. Let us rally on the centre, brethren, but let us not forget the wings, where the centrifugal force is strongest.

Of the standing committees, the first to make report was the Committee on Publication, Rev. Dr. Hooper, chairman. It was plain sailing. The business had been well managed, the assets had increased, and though sales had not been quite so great, the year had been of average prosperity. Resolutions of approval and the reappointment of officers and committee were in order. To emphasize the beneficent work of this Executive Committee, it was ordered by report of the Committee of Bills and Overtures in response to overtures sent by different presbyteries, that the column assigned in statistical reports to contributions for "publication," be designated "publication and colportage."

True to its historic renown, the Presbyterian Church in the United States, by its Assembly, affirmed the sanctity of the Sabbath, and demanded a stricter observance of the holy day. In many ways it was

emphasized. The very first act after organization was to send a telegraphic dispatch to Chicago, protesting against the opening of the gates of the Columbian Exposition on that day. In half-inch capitals it was published: "Will not go to the Big Fair," because of the resolution introduced by Rev. F. D. Hunt, of Charlotte, N. C., and almost unanimously passed by the Assembly, urging the church members, if the Fair be opened on Sundays, to protest in a practical way by not attending the Exposition at all. The same argument would keep church members from riding on railroads or street cars. By overture from the Presbytery at Memphis, the evils connected with the Sunday newspaper were brought to the attention of the Assembly. The response of the Committee on Bills and Overtures reaffirmed the action of the Assembly of 1886, p. 52. This was not enough for Dr. N. M. Woods, who, at a subsequent *sederunt* introduced a paper, and without reflecting on the Committee of Bills and Overtures, thought they did not go far enough, and that there was need of specification. So the following action was also taken:

"Whereas, Former General Assemblies have in emphatic terms condemned Sunday papers as a great evil in our land, without distinctly singling out the various phases thereof, and

"Whereas, It is unquestionably true that multitudes of our church members take and read and advertise in these papers on the Lord's day, and many of our churches have their services advertised in them, and many of our ministers furnish notices of religious services on the Sabbath which they are aware will be prepared for the press on Sabbath evening for the Monday papers; therefore be it

"*Resolved*, 1. That this Assembly solemnly declares that all of the above-mentioned acts are wholly inconsistent with our position as avowed friends of Sabbath observance, and, if unchecked, will inevitably result in lowering more and more the Christian sentiment of our people on that vital question.

"2. That we do most earnestly and affectionately warn all of our church officers and members against all complicity in the evils referred to, and entreat them to refuse to countenance or patronize Sunday papers as the only consistent course for Christian people who profess to regard the Lord's day as one great bulwark of our holy religion."

A strong paper, too, was presented as the report of the Assembly's Permanent Committee on the Sabbath. The obvious increase of crime, and the financial embarrassment, especially in railroad circles, were attributed to disregard of God's law on the Sabbath. The writer did not hear this paper, and only knows from the report of the special committee to which it was referred that this was its testimony.

With reference to these various acts of the Assembly I am reminded of what is attributed to that eccentric though wise statesman, John Randolph of Roanoke, when a resolution was introduced into Congress. "Mr. Speaker," he cried, with his penetrating voice, "the time for resolution is past. What we need is action." The testimony of our church is already clear, specific, outspoken. Now for action.

Evidence of the aggressive nature of this Assembly is seen in the pronounced action taken with reference to colored evangelization. The standing committee, Rev. Dr. Dodge, reported. I am sorry I have no copy of the report before me. From memory I write that there had not been the progress that was hoped or desired. The present conduct of the Institute at Tuskaloosa was discontinued. Its management was transferred to the Executive Committee of Colored Evangelization, and when it can be done without sacrifice, the Institute itself will be removed to Birmingham. There had been some advance in actual evangelistic work among the colored people; but there was sad lack of funds. Rev. A. L. Phillips made what might be called a "ringing" address. It was also stinging and stirring. Dr. Dodge also punctuated his report and let in light. There has been woeful apathy on the part of the church. It is to be hoped with a reorganization of the work it can be more effectually done. But nothing can be done without the support of the church, the prayers and the gifts of God's people. Most of us must hang our heads and say, "we are verily guilty concerning our brother," and we take a livelier interest in the mission on the Congo than we do in seeking to reach the African race at our doors.

The Standing Committee of Education had as its chairman, Dr. J. A. Wallace, President of King College, a strong and courageous man. The report commended the work and diligence of the committee. It revealed the fact that assistance was given the last year to the largest number of candidates in the history of the committee's work, and that more than $5,000 in pledges to assisted candidates were still due to them. To meet this deficit, a call for "free-will offerings" was authorized, but no week of self-denial, no special Lent. A call was made too for $30,000 to carry forward this work. The committee made no nomination for secretary, while recommending other members of the Executive Committee. Rev. Dr. E. M. Richardson was almost unanimously chosen. The name of the committee was changed in response to overtures to "Education for the Ministry."

The two most serious questions that came before the Assembly,

awakening the most earnest discussion and at times grave solicitude, were the subjects of Home Missions and Foreign Missions. They were both considered, not only by the committees to which the reports of the Executive Committees were entrusted, with great care, but the Assembly itself gave ample time and much thought to them both.

The report of the Standing Committee of Home Miscions was made by Rev. Dr. Cozby, of South Carolina. To this committee had been roferred the report of the *ad interim* committee on coöperation in home missionary work, and it was along the lines of this that the battle raged. On most of the points reported the committee were at one. The work of the Assembly's Executive Committee was approved. The manifold departments of the Home Mission work were noted, the urgent need for increased contributions to each of them was emphasized, and some specifications of adjustment of claims and assignment of service (as among the Mexicans in Texas) were made with unanimity. It was debated whether it were wise to continue the publication of the *Home Missionary* at a pecuniary loss to the cause, and on this both majority and minority reports were made. But the Assembly assumed that the loss was countervailed by the information disseminated, the receipts published, and the quickening of conscience and increase of contributions in its monthly issue. And so it was determined to continue it. At the time of the appointment of the Executive Committee, Rev. Dr. J. N. Craig, who had been for ten years secretary, while willing still to serve the church if called to fill the post to which he had been consecutively elected so many years, gave the Assembly an unembarrassed opportunity to select another to the position, retiring from the house to leave them unfettered. But he was again elected without criticism or opposition. This act of Dr. Craig disarmed antagonism, if any existed, and won him friends.

As to coöporation in Home Mission work, the different views of the Assembly may best be seen in the two reports themselves appended:

"Your committee, having carefully considered the report of the *ad interim* committee on coöperation, the annual report of the Assembly's Executive Committee, and the overture from the Presbytery of Eastern Texas, recommend that the following be adopted as the Assembly's future method of conducting home missionary work, viz.:

"1. The Assembly urges upon all its synods and presbyteries to prosecute the work of home missions within their own bounds to the extent of their ability, and reserves for the use of these courts for their own work the months of February, June, and August.

"2. The General Assembly appoints two annual collections for Assembly's home missions, including the causes now known as Sustenta-

tion, Evangelistic, and Church Erection, to be taken in the months of January and September, and urges upon all its synods and presbyteries to secure these collections from all their churches at these times, or at such other time as may be most convenient.

"3. The Assembly's committee is also instructed, other things being equal, to apply its funds to the development of the work in the weaker portions of the church which lie in the southern, southwestern, and western portions of our territory, including the Indian Territory, and in regions beyond.

"4. Any parts of the present manual in conflict with the above are hereby repealed, and the Assembly's Executive Committee is instructed to prepare a new manual to be submitted to the next Assembly.

"This plan of work shall go into operation on the first of January, 1894, and the Assembly's Executive Committee is instructed to prepare an explanatory letter to the presbyteries and synods, fully explaining the nature and intent of the plan now adopted, that the same may be fully before those bodies at their next regular meetings; and since the Assembly is convinced that the very life of our church in the territory covered by the weaker presbyteries and synods depends upon aid to be given by the stronger presbyteries and synods, the Assembly expresses the hope that there will be entire harmony of action throughout its bounds upon the plan here presented."

MINORITY REPORT.

"Your committee, after carefully considering the report of the *ad interim* committee, and the statements made by representatives of the synod's committees of North Carolina and Memphis, propose to the Assembly the following action: As involving the minimum of change, as harmonizing synodical with Assembly evangelistic work, as protecting the rights of presbyteries, and as providing for the urgent need of frontier work in missionary synods; be it resolved,

"1. That synods and presbyteries be urged, as many as possible, to do the evangelistic work within their own bounds. To this end the month of June is left vacant for a collection for this purpose.

"2. That the presbyteries engaged in the presbyterial or synodical evangelistic work are enjoined to require of all their churches one annual collection during September, this collection to be sent to the central treasury and applied by central committee to the extension of our church outside the bounds of our regularly constituted presbyteries, and in the Indian Territory, Texas, Florida, and Arkansas.

"3. That the two collections for Sustentation, and the one for Church Erection, be continued in the same months as heretofore, and the money sent to the central treasury.

"The presbyteries are directed to have at least 20 per cent. of their contributions at the disposal of the Assembly's committee.

"4. The Invalid collection shall be unchanged.

"Your committee make no recommendation touching the suggestion in the *ad interim* committee's report, looking to the appointment of a special committee to consider and revise paragraph 84."

The minority report was ably advocated by Rev. Dr. Cozby, Rev. G. L. Bitzer, and incidentally by Rev. Dr. King. It was defended as (1), "involving the minimum of change; as (2), harmonizing synodical with Assembly evangelistic work; as (3), protecting the rights of presbyteries; and (4), providing for the urgent need of frontier work in missionary synods." It was argued if the majority report prevailed, that instead of having one church and Assembly, we would have thirteen provincial synods; that the sympathy of the whole with one weak or wounded member would be lessened; that the strong synods and presbyteries could take care of their work, and the weaker ones would suffer; that the church was unprepared for so great, so radical a change as was proposed by the majority report; and special assault was made on the phrase "other things being equal" in paragraph three of that report as allowing the stronger presbyteries to do as now, draw all they send to the Assembly's treasury. On the other hand, attention was called to the fact how many presbyteries and synods under our present system failed to "coöperate" with the Assembly's plan; that already great effort was made by synods, and great work accomplished thereby, thus showing the need of such evangelistic movement; that the Assembly's committee would be better prepared to do true Home Mission work with two unfettered collections, not liable to be drawn out; that it quickened missionary zeal, as in Foreign Missions, when congregations were called on thus to extend the church in desolate and unoccupied regions, besides utilizing the fervor awakened by immediate needs in their own presbyteries and synods; and that it simplified the conception of Home Missions, inasmuch as it was almost impossible to draw the line between Evangelistic work and Sustentation work. The majority report was lucidly and strongly advocated by Dr. Hoge, of North Carolina, who spoke by request, explaining the operation of the plan in the Synod of North Carolina, and by Rev. T. W. Raymond. The Assembly adopted this report.

Allow me to add that much interest was manifested in this discussion as to the best ways of doing the Lord's work. That was the sole inquiry, which is the best. Though earnestly opposed, there was hearty acquiescence in the result. There was ozone in the thought of "foreign, domestic missions," as it was termed, and of planting the blue banner of our Southern church in the regions beyond. I heard of New Mexico, Arizona, Oklahoma, and it sent a thrill through the Assembly not unlike the planting of a mission in Korea or the opening of Cuba.

Rev. Dr. Cannon was chairman of the Standing Committee of Foreign Missions. After days of anxiety, prayer, and thought, he presented on behalf of the committee a unanimous report, every word of which was like a stone in a massive edifice, needful, polished, and fitted to its place. There was a sense of relief and thanksgiving, that men so able (for it was a specially able committee), so consecrated, from so widely scattered parts of the church, and with so different views, presented a unanimous report. Dr. Cannon himself with great clearness and cogency explained its meaning, or defended its decisions. The report was amended in some very important particulars. There was manifestly, however, no partisan zeal to carry a point or to sustain the report in its entirety.

After a review of the report of the Executive Committee, and enumerating causes of congratulation in the increase in the force of missionary laborers, the successful and diligent prosecution of the work, the increase in number of contributing churches, societies, and schools, and in the circulation of *The Missionary*, and in the large number of consecrated men and women who now ask to be sent out as missionaries, and naming as a matter of grave regret the decrease in contributions, and of deep sorrow the death of two noble workers, the report submitted the following recommendations:

1. Approving the conclusions reached in conference between representatives of the Northern Board and our committee with reference to harmony and coöperation in mission work.

2. Declining, because the way is not clear at present, to establish a school at Tsing Kiang Pu in response to overture of Greenbrier Presbytery.

3. Declining to yield the title of church property at Volos to the "Free Evangelical Church in Greece and Macedonia."

This action of the committee was opposed by Rev. Dr. Murkland, but on the statements of Rev. T. R. Sampson (who spoke by request) and Rev. A. P. Saunders, explaining the legal status, and the need for the "Free Church" itself that the title should be as now vested, the Assembly sustained the committee.

4. Recommending appropriate and sympathetic action in response to memorial from Chinese mission in New Orleans, touching the Chinese Exclusion Act.

5. Recommending the appointment of an *ad interim* committee to investigate and report to the next Assembly—"first, as to the expediency of such independent action on the part of presbyteries" (refer-

ring to an "observed tendency toward independent action" . . . "in appointing and sustaining missionaries in foreign fields" specified in the preamble to the recommendation); "second, as to whether any modifications or changes are advisable in the present method of administration in this part of the church's work, and what amendments should, in their judgment, be made in the present manual."

This recommendation was stricken out because (presumably) of the implied condemnation of presbyteries in the phrase "observed tendency toward independent action," and the following was substituted:

"Inasmuch as questions have been raised in the church in regard to the expediency of transferring certain functions now exercised by the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions from that committee to the presbyteries and church sessions, and inasmuch as a presbytery connected with the General Assembly has already exercised functions which, according to the manual of Foreign Missions, belong to this Executive Committee, we recommend that this Assembly appoint an *ad interim* committee of five to investigate the entire matter and report to the next General Assembly—first, as to the expediency of transferring any functions from the Executive Committee to the presbyteries or church sessions; second, as to whether any modifications or changes are advisible in the present method of administration in part of the church's work, and what amendments should, in their judgment, be made in the present manual."

6. Calling for increased self-denial and liberality.

On this resolution Dr. Murkland, expressing reluctance in speaking again but feeling impelled so to do by his sense of duty, called attention to the falling off in contributions of $2,500, but practically of $20,000, inasmuch as the increase last year was about $18,000, and the rate of increase and interest in the work warranted a like increase for this year, and then he noted that the expenses of management had increased from $6,000 a few years ago to nearly $16,000. Dr. Murkland's intense nature, and his eloquent comment reaching almost the height of indignation, produced a profound impression. Dr. Houston's response was calm and quiet. He showed that there were unusual expenses this year, and that the work had grown greatly in the past few years, but admitted that the expenses were excessive.

7. Recommending a deliverance looking to the ordination of an unordained missionary in a foreign field, without returning to his home presbytery, by a commission of ministers and elders of different presbyteries.

This awakened discussion likewise, but Dr. Cannon's clear state-

ment of its reasonable conformity to the *spirit* of our book convinced the Assembly.

8. In response to the letter of Dr. Houston asking leave to resign, the committee recommended "that the Assembly lay upon him a solemn call to hold the position another year, if he can do so without violence to his own convictions and without any present change in the church's policy."

The interest and the feeling of the Assembly grew more intense. Grave fears were felt that Dr. Houston's retirement would (as the committee expressed it) "seriously endanger" the work. He himself in response to direct inquiry had heard nothing that led him to change his views. There were many who felt that he could not with the same zeal and efficiency carry on the work with the views he now held and published. The recommendation of the committee was substituted by a resolution introduced by Rev. J. G. Snedecor acquiescing in his resignation, expressing deep regret at this step, and rejoicing that he lays down this work to take a higher and nobler one.

9. Urging reduction in expenses, and directing the Executive Committee to consider and report to the next Assembly concerning the desirability of reüniting the office of Assistant Secretary and Treasurer.

On this resolution, Mr. Rankin, the Assistant Secretary, by request, spoke. He deprecated the proposed action of uniting the offices of Secretary and Treasurer, so dissimilar in scope and service and demanding such different order of capabilities. There was full work for every man employed. There had been very great increase in the literary and clerical work connected with the magazine and the dissemination of the literature of the office. As to the expenses: explanation was offered in the salaries of a larger force, Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Treasurer, and clerical service. There had been a refurnishing of the office with what was needful—safe, desk, typewriters, book-cases for missionary files and literature. The Secretary's trip to Brazil, the salary of Mr. Lowry in the Synod of Georgia, the preparation and dissemination of the centennial number of *The Missionary*, these expenses were temporary, had all been unusual, and will not again recur.

The Assembly, however, was now enlisted in a retrenchment movement. The office of Assistant Secretary was abolished after the 1st of September next. A resolution was adopted expressing the high appreciation of the faithful and laborious services of Mr. Rankin as Assistant Secretary.

10. The last recommendation concerned the approval of the Minutes and the appointment of the Executive Committee. In the election of a Secretary, on motion of Dr. Murkland, the Assembly was led in special prayer by Dr. Cannon. With great unanimity Rev. Henry M. Woods was chosen Secretary. It was upon Judge Lapsley's nomination, his conviction (I cannot say information or assurance) that Mr. Woods would accept, and upon the hearty testimony of Dr. Houston, Rev. A. L. Phillips, Rev. J. G. Tanner, Rev. J. N. VanDevanter, and others that he was elected. He is a missionary, of missionary stock, and has had experience during Dr. Houston's absence in Brazil in the office. Mr. J. H. Kline was elected Treasurer *by the Assembly*, let it be noted, and thus the consideration of this great cause in this grave crisis came to a happy conclusion. There was intensity, but no acrimony. There was change, but no condemnation. It is believed the result of this earnest and protracted consideration proves satisfactory, allays criticism, unites dissonant views, and calls for the support of the whole church. This cause lies nearest the heart of the Bride as it does her adorable Lord, and evokes the warmest and tenderest interest.

It was at the heels of the meeting that the animated discussion sprang up concerning Young People's Societies, a subject so present, so living, and so vital, that it was felt that hasty action was not desirable. It was no fault of the committee to whom the *ad interim* report on this subject was entrusted. For the two prolonged discussions occasioned by the Home Mission and the Foreign Mission reports held the right of way, and their gravity could not be questioned. Two reports were presented, amendments added and many accepted, suggestions made, and the papers were referred to an *ad interim* committee to report to the next Assembly. This was neither the refuge of laziness nor of uncertainity. As Dr. White, the chairman, stated: "We are not fighting for victory, but for truth." The speeches awakened by this question, especially by the young men, and all the Assembly aligned itself "there or there abouts," were bright, and stirring and suggestive.

The two most important committees of the Assembly, at least so regarded, and the chairmanships looked upon as the highest posts of honor next to the Moderator's chair, are the Judicial Committee and the Committee of Bills and Overtures. Both time and space forbid extended comment on their work. There was one judicial case; it was found in order; a commission was duly appointed and organized; action was taken, reported, and after a brief and breezy debate, was sus-

tained as the decision of the Assembly. The case was as follows: Acting under the direction given by the General Assembly of 1892, p. 453, the Presbytery of Ouachita placed under the care of the Home Mission Committee of presbytery a young man, a candidate for the ministry, laboring before licensure. Against this action of presbytery authorizing as it were a candidate to preach before licensure, complaint was duly made to synod by members of the presbytery. The Synod of Arkansas sustained the complaint. Against this action of synod, the Presbytery appealed to the General Assembly, and the General Assembly sustained the appeal. Many of the oldest and some of the wisest and most influential members of the Assembly protested against this decision.

It is said that the Assembly cannot make law, that such a decision reverses the decree of the standards, that to allow such irregularity uncondemned, is to override all constitutional inhibition as well as break down the gap to the ministry still lower. The simple answer is, surely the presbytery may do what the General Assembly allows them to do, especially when that liberty is given in a deliverance on this very subject, and when that liberty is thus carefully guarded.

But that there is need for a careful study and settlement of this question of the preaching of unlicensed men, the General Assembly recognized in the appointment of an *ad interim* committee.

Of the Committee of Bills and Overtures I write briefly and feelingly. It is a hard worked committee. Twenty-nine overtures came before us, for I had the honor to serve on that committee, and they were as earnestly and carefully considered as time allowed. There was the usual *melangè*, additions to the statistical reports, changes in the sessional forms, suggestions as to names of committees, and questions as to interpretation of law. The inevitable queries reappeared about worldliness, dancing, card-playing, and Sabbath-breaking, and deliverances called for, and instructions desired as to proper sessional action. Sad, sad, that there is any need therefor. "Communion wine" bobbed up again, not so serenely either. And other matters were thus brought to the attention of the Assembly. The rest of the acts of this committee, their deeds, and their might and wisdom, are they not written in the chronicles of the honored clerks of the Assembly?

Other matters might be noted, especially the report on Theological Seminaries and on Foreign Correspondence, but I have gone over quite in detail most of the actions of the Assembly. I have not sought

to deliver *ex cathedra* opinions on the wisdom of their doings, but rather to put the reader in my place as an attentive and interested participant in all that was done.

Two things I beg to mention in conclusion. The appointment of committees, one of the Moderator's most difficult and delicate duties, involves a wide knowledge of the men of the Assembly, else well-known names or the title-bearers will be used too frequently, and made to do double duty as a punishment for fame. This may seem like a criticism of the Moderator, which is as far from my heart as from my purpose. It is a general remark I make, not a specific criticism. To illustrate what I mean: Dr. King was chairman of the Committee of Bills and Overtures, a position to which by custom as well as from distinguished service and ability, he was entitled. On the same committee were Rev. Dr. Green, who as chairman of the Committee of Foreign Correspondence, and Rev. Dr. Cozby, who as chairman of Committee of Home Missions, had their time and thoughts fully occupied with their onerous duties on their respective committees. The Committee on Bills and Overtures who therefore largely derived the benefit of the counsel of two of its wisest members. Other committees showed like reduplication. This is, perhaps, one of the afflictions of greatness, or of the esteem and confidence in which honored brethren are held.

The appointment of several *ad interim* committees shows the need of study, thought, and skilful consideration. I do not know whether, or how, such a thing may be feasible. But my limited experience leads me to think one peril of General Assemblies, as evinced by the appointment of such committees, is the newness, inexperience, and lack of acquaintance with fellow-members and the special duties of the body itself. If it were possible to have a half or even a third of the Assembly, as in one of the houses of legislation usually, holding position for two terms, the business would be greatly facilitated. Our presbyteries and synods have a permanent element in the ministry, which is to be found at each meeting, the same elders being less persistently in attendance. But the Assembly is composed of commissioners chosen every year, most of them new to each other, many of them new to the conduct of the business of the Assembly, and though many are men of experience and wide acquaintance, there is a measure of inefficiency because the mass are comparatively without the training of such a provision.

Absenteeism also cripples the usefulness of the Assembly during its

closing days, when its most important measures are adopted. There is need for conscientious attention to the very close. And all ought, if possible, to join in "the syllable and sentiment of the parting hymn."

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Norfolk, Va.

VIII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

Miley's Systematic Theology.

Systematic Theology. *By John Miley, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Systematic Theology in Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New Jersey.* Vol. I. 8vo., pp. xvi., 533. New York: Hunt & Eaton; Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe. 1892. $3.00.

The high quality of the "Biblical and Theological Library," now publishing by the Methodist Publication House, does honor to the great denomination which it represents. The latest issue in the series, Dr. Miley's *Systematic Theology*, is highly praised when it is recognized, as it must be, as worthy to stand in company with Dr. Bennett's *Christian Archæology*, and Dr. Terry's *Biblical Hermeneutics*. It is written with a direct lucidity which is the natural expression of adequate knowledge and clear thinking. It presents its subject in orderly arrangement, in clear definition and with argumentative force. And it is characterized throughout by candor, restraint, and modesty, while a quiet humor occasionally subtly colors a phrase. It is altogether a good book; and the reader of it is sure to rise up and gratefully praise it. If he be an Arminian, he ought to find it a rarely judicious and well-reasoned exposition of his form of faith. If he be a Calvinist, he ought to count it a privilege to be enabled to consider the points in which the two great systems differ, under the leading of so competent a guide, and with such an entire absence of theological rancor.

It is somewhat embarrassing to undertake the criticism of a half-finished book. In a case like the present, when the work is occupied with a well-known and well-compacted system, the end is indeed seen from the beginning. And yet there are individual ways of stating and defending, and indeed of conceiving, even the formative doctrines of a school of thought, which render it improper to anticipate their actual statement and exposition. In the present instance the embarrassment is increased by the further fact that a number of detailed discussions, underlying or expanding the treatment of matters embraced in the scheme of this first volume, have been postponed to appendices to appear at the close of the second volume. There we are to look for full expositions of the doctrines of inspiration and of angels; a study of Romans v. 12, *seq.*, seeking to justify the rejection of the doctrine of the federal headship of Adam which is thought by many of us to be taught in that text; and a historical review of the treatment of original sin by Arminian writers, which promises to be very interesting. The volume before us not only closes with anthropology, therefore, but does not give us the whole of the relevant material. Nevertheless, though with it alone before us we may not catch the proportion of doctrine as it lies in Dr. Miley's mind, we can scarcely fail to apprehend from his clear writing the elements of the doctrines which he presents.

In an introduction of some fifty pages, Dr. Miley gives us his view of the

nature, sources, scope, and method of Systematic Theology. We miss in this a satisfactory indication of the distribution of the disciplines in the theological encyclopœdia, and this has affected somewhat the contents of the volume. To our thinking, the great subject of "Theism," which Dr. Miley makes the first division of Systematic Theology, belongs to the preliminary discipline of Apologetics; and its treatment should either have been excluded from this treatise altogether or made very summary and included in the prologomena. This we say by way of mere formal criticism; for the actual treatment given to Theism commands our admiration, especially the defence of God as an intuition, which in its last analysis amounts to a defence of a religious nature as a fundamental element of the human constitution. On the other hand, we find in this introduction a luminous discussion of such topics as these: The nature of scientific treatment, which is especially good with reference to the scientific treatment of separate doctrines; the nature of the scientific basis of Christianity, including an admirable statement of the place of reason in theology; the right of systemization and the value of doctrine; and the method of systematizing, in the course of which there is a very severe criticism of the so-called "Christocentric" method, and a possibly too extreme statement of the difficulty, Dr. Miley would say the impossibility, of finding one unifying principle in theology. Under this view, he holds that the work of systematizing is constructive and must "proceed in a synthetic mode," *i. e.*, must seek only a logical order. He therefore follows the customary order of topics, beginning with theology and proceeding through anthopology, christology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology.

We have no criticism to offer upon the adoption of this general scheme; most schemes, under whatever name they are put forth, practically follow its order. But a criticism or two may be proper as to the distribution of the matter under these rubrics. We have already pointed out that "Theism" is out of place under the first section, and finds its true position in the previous discipline of Apologetics. We miss also under the first rubric (as is usual, indeed, in Arminian systems, but certainly unfortunate) any treatment of the plans or purposes of God. Dr. Miley perceives, no doubt, that God has not entered upon his works of creation and providence without a plan. He remarks incidentally (on p. 297): "Creation has a purpose and a plan. All things were created in the divine pleasure, and for the manifestation of the divine glory, to the end that men might know God and live to him as their supreme God." But he passes at once from the topic of the Trinity to that of Creation; and this is apt to leave the impression that God is simple activity, and that he is not even rational in his works. For a synthetic order we must have a discussion here of God's decree. We do not like, either, the line of division which is run between christology and Soteriology. Certainly if these rubrics are to be distinguished, the work of Christ must be subsumed along with his incarnation and person under the former, just as the work of God appears as creation and providence under the rubric of theology; otherwise the work of Christ and of the Spirit are confused under the rubric of Soteriology.

Dr. Miley distributes the sources of theology broadly into nature and revelation, and discriminates these sources at page 9 most fruitfully on the basis of "modes of knowledge." Knowledge acquired "in the use of human faculties" is natural; that immediately communicated by divine agency is revealed. In the one case "the *mode of acquisition* is purely human"; "the discovery of truth is

mediated by the use of our own faculties." In the other, "it is immediately given by the supernatural agency of God." He remarks justly that "our intuitions of truth are no exceptions," since intuition is a purely human mode of knowledge. The author remarks with justice: "It is important thus sharply to discriminate these two modes of truth, for only thus can we properly distinguish nature and revelation as sources of theology." For if we lay the stress on source or agency only without taking into account also the mode of knowledge, in our definitions, we may find ourselves helpless before the presently common pantheising conception of the world, which, by postulating immanent deity in all human thought, confounds the categories of reason and revelation. Readers of Dr. Whiton's recent little book, called *Gloria Patri*, will perceive how easy it is through such a conception to do practically away with the category of revelation altogether, by formally subsuming all the deliverances of reason under the category of revelation. We regret, therefore, to find Dr. Miley at a somewhat later point apparently deserting this ground. On page 11 we read that "the defining fact" of revelation lies no longer in mode of knowledge, but apparently solely in *agency*: "Religious truth communicated *through a supernatural agency of God* is a revelation." And, the way thus prepared, we read further that heathen men, feeling after God if haply they may find him, may receive a divine revelation through their human faculties: "According to the defining fact of revelation as above stated, any religious truth divinely given in such answer, *though not verified to the recipient as from God*, is yet a revelation." "And to this source," he continues, "we would trace the higher religious truths reached by heathen minds, rather than to unaided reason and the light of nature, or to tradition." But, according to the definition on page 9, the question whether they belong to the category of reason or revelation is not one of *source* merely, but of *mode of knowledge* as well, and specifically turns upon "whether the acquisition of truth is *in the use of human faculties.*" Dr. Miley appears to us to have stepped over the wall of his own just definition here into the preserve of the Quakers, with the effect of throwing himself helpless into the hands of the mystic rationalists. His doctrine of unrecognizable, but real, revelation to inquiring heathen, is indistinguishable from the logos-doctrine which Dr. Briggs recently announced in his defence before his presbytery; and would logically lead to the broad conception of religion, in which G. Ph. Chr. Kaizer so rejoiced when he commended his *Biblical Theology* to readers "who are observant students of mankind, and who, refusing to believe that any one church is in sole possession of salvation, are learning to find out and appreciate the honest worshippers of the divine in every age and clime, whose religion is neither Judaism, Christianity, Mohammedanism, nor Paganism, but religious Universalism, Catholicism in the true sense of the word, what our theologians call perfectible Christianity." On such a conception, in a word, there seems no imperative need for distinctive Christianity in the world.

We must hasten to add that when Dr. Miley comes to treat formally of "Mysticism" (page 16) he rejects the mystical path as a source of knowledge of religious truth altogether, thus, as it appears to us, reverting to his first and just position. He looks upon mysticism as "the doctrine of an immediate insight into truth"—this "immediate insight into truth being through some form of divine illumination," "the mind being divinely illuminated and lifted above its natural powers, and truth and God being immediately seen." Is not this just what he had

postulated for seeking heathen? Yet he criticises as follows: "There is a divine illumination which lifts the soul into a higher capacity for knowing God and truth; but there is no new revelation." "There are promises of divine inspiration, as the mode of higher revelations of truth, but definitely and exclusively to the chosen mediums of such inspiration and revelation," *i. e.*, to the prophets and apostles. We know not how these statements can be accorded with the former teaching of a not uncommon revelation to heathen seekers, unless we are to suppose that God is nearer to heathens than to Christians, and deals more intimately with them than with Christians. It is worth noting further in this same connection that in the section which deals with the moderm doctrine of "Christian Consciousness," Dr. Miley not only rejects it altogether as a source of Christian doctrine, but even goes to the unwarrantable extreme, as we think it, of refusing to allow "that certain facts of Christian experience witness to the truth of certain correlate tenets of doctrine" (page 18). He says (page 19): "No soul ever reached it," *i. e.*, Christian consciousness, "or ever can reach it, through reason or the light of nature. Its essential preconditon is knowledge of Christian truth." And we may note, by the way, the skill and success with which Dr. Miley treats in general the whole matter of the relation of reason and feeling. We should particularly like to quote a fine passage on page 40 as to the value of feeling in religion and its relation to reason (cf. also pages 48, 49).

The topics which fall under the head of Theology proper are treated with sufficient fulness and great logical power along with considerable self-restraint. The term "attribute" is confined to too narrow a sense, being limited to those constitutive of personality; but the distinction between these "personal attributes" and all others is sound and fruitful. The first of these "personal attributes"—the divine intellect—is discussed under the caption of Omniscience, the perplexities presented by which under the constitutive Arminian principle of "Freedom" are not disguised (page 189 *et seq.*). Among these perplexities Dr. Miley does not include, however, the divine foreknowledge of free actions. This he explains under the category of *scientia media* (page 189), and defends not only powerfully, but quite unanswerably against the arguments of Dr. McCabe (page 181, *et seq.*). We cannot think, however, that he has followed his own arguments to their legitimate end. These arguments not only involve the Calvinistic doctrine of the certainty of free actions (as distinguished from necessity (page 183)), but also distinctly imply predestination. For example, it is argued by way of a *reductio ad absurdum*, that the difficulties asserted to stand in the way of God's foreknowing the free acts of men, press equally upon his foreknowledge of his own free acts. "If future free volitions are unknowable because free, or unknowable for any other reason, then such volitions of God are as completely beyond the reach of his prescience as the future volitions of men." This is acute and will prove very difficult to answer. It will require an even more acute logic, however, to distinguish between God's foreknowledge of his future choices and his fore-intention to make those choices, which is just Calvinistic predestination; and as it will be difficult to disentangle the future choices of God from those of his creatures with which they are woven in the actual web of life, it will be exceedingly difficult to deny these creature choices also a place in the one comprehensive plan, already foreknown in all its parts in eternity, and therefore fore-intended or predestinated. Again, the objection that it would be inconsistent with the divine goodness to create souls whose rejection of salvation is certainly foreknown, is justly set aside with the re-

mark that nescience will not obviate the objection, inasmuch as it presses almost equally against the creation of souls with the known possibility of their loss, and quite equally against the continuance of the race after the experienced fact of such numerous losses. But surely the bottom is not reached thus. For, if God creates souls which he foreknows will certainly be lost, he must, in this sense, create them with the intention that they will be lost, and this is the whole content of the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination in the case, of that *decretum horribile* to which men seem so ineradicably to object, but which is as surely a truth of reason as it is of Scripture.

The real difficulty here, Dr. Miley finds in the very existence of moral evil under the government of God; and when he comes to speak of the origin of evil, he allows that a complete theodicy is unattainable to human knowledge (p. 429 *et seq.*). We cannot consent to stop, however, at the point at which he elects to stay his efforts to discover one. In this matter, as elsewhere, he appears to act upon a principle which is naturally very attractive to minds of analytical power, the principle of *divide et impera.* The danger is that in the analysis, the essence of the question may slip out between the joints. This is what happens here. Dr. Miley shows in turn: (1), that the creation of moral beings is permissible; (2), that a probationary ecomomy is permissible; and (3), that therefore the fall which was contemplated as a possibility in the probationary economy is permissible. Excellent, we say. But we still ask, for Dr. Miley fully accepts the doctrine of the divine fore-knowledge as we have seen, how was it consistent with God's holiness and goodness that he should create these moral beings, and put them in a probationary economy, knowing beforehand, not that they might *possibly* fall, *but that they certainly would fall?* The only tenable ground here is the Calvinistic ground that such action on God's part, of course, involves his creation of man with the intention in this sense that he would fall; and the only possible direction in which to look for a theodicy is in that of an end great and glorious enough to justify the incidental evil arising from this cause. John Wesley saw this; but Dr. Miley rejects Wesley's suggestion out of hand, and with it all similar and better ones (for there are better ones), with the remark that it involves the implication that sin could have been prevented consistently with human freedom, which cannot be true, he adds, since in that case "the fall itself must have been completely within the disposition of Divine Providence" (page 439). But certainly this implication is true—even on the basis of natural religion; and a single question would seem to uncover the fallacy of Dr. Miley's opposite assertion. What required God to create just those free-agents whom he foreknew would fall? Why could he not confine himself to creating such as he foreknew would stand, in their probation? Or shall we say that while he foreknew that some angels would stand and others fall, it was impossible for him to create a *human* free-agent whom he could foreknow would stand? In that case, we must say, either that *human* free action cannot be foreknown, which is contrary to Dr. Miley's doctrine; or else that all possible human beings would certainly fall, which would seem to carry back their fall to necessity of nature. Thus, even on Dr. Miley's own ground it would seem that we must recognize the fall as "completely within the disposition of Divine Providence," and must allow that God made man thus and not otherwise, and placed him in these conditions and not others, knowing that he would fall, and, in that sense, intending him to fall; and that is but to say that the permission of the fall entered into God's

eternal plan, and must be justified by the ultimate end in view. We may be able to assign this end or we may not; but we must believe that it exists, and that it will be sufficiently glorious to justify the incidental evil arising in the course of its prosecution.

In these remarks on the origin of evil, we have, of course, passed out of the domain of Theology into that of Anthropology, leaving much behind which we should have liked to speak of. It is in the Anthropology of the volume, of course, that the Calvinistic reader will find most which seems to him open to question; and this all the more that Dr. Miley occupies here the extremest Arminian ground. We find much here in the way of careful statement and candid treatment to admire, and we willingly bear our witness to the fairness with which the Augustinian positions are stated. Dr. Miley divides the great question of original sin into the three of whether there is such a thing as native depravity, whether it is penal and whether it is guilty. Only the first of these does he answer affirmatively. His doctrine is that all men are natively depraved, and out of that depravity will certainly commit actual sin; but that this depravity comes to them only through the law of nature that "like begets like," and is in no sense penalty; and that, because they are born with it and do not themselves produce it, they cannot be held responsible for it, and it is, therefore, as our New England brethren have learned to call it, an "uncondemnable vitiosity." Of course we shall not commit the folly of attempting to refute this, as it seems to us, very refutable position, in the course of a brief notice. Let us only remark briefly that it passes the comprehension of our Calvinistically warped mind to understand how so careful a thinker can, on the one hand, hang the whole weight of depravity on a "law of nature," and on the other, deny the condemnability of a state of depravity which inevitably produces sin in every action into which it issues.

As to the former matter, what is a "law of nature" but a generalized *fact?* and what *explanation* of a fact can be found in simply generalizing it? Even the foolish king was not satisfied when asking how the apple got into the dumpling, to be told that all dumplings have apples in them. To point to the law of nature that "like begets like" as the explanation of universal depravity can mean nothing more than to subsume this fact as a specific case under the general law of heredity. The mind immediately wants to know, then, why it is Adam's depravity, and not that perhaps greatly increased (or, perhaps, it may be the greatly lessened) depravity of his nearer ancestry, that one inherits—a matter by no means explained by Dr. Miley's brief remarks on it. And the mind further wants to know who made this a law of nature, and what right it has to be a law of nature; it wants to know whether this law of nature is not a cruel injustice, under the grinding working of which man has nothing to do but to curse God and die. As long as it is true that "no theory could consent to a purely arbitrary implication of the race in the Adamic sin," so long will it be true that we must have an explanation of how it is just and right for man to inherit Adam's depravity, if we would justify the ways of God with man. To say that all that was threatened to Adam for sin—physical death and its precedent weaknesses and pains, and spiritual death or depravity, with its tendency to sin inevitably issuing in actual sinning—has been brought upon mankind simply on the basis of a "law of nature," so that all the race is brought through the mediation of depravity into actual sin and guilt without possibility of escape, on the sole basis of a "law of nature," is just no explanation at all. It is simply to deify a phrase.

As to the demerit of native depravity, we recognize indeed the truth of Dr. Miley's contention that Arminianism cannot stand with its admission; but this seems to us as Calvinists only a refutation of Arminianism. Its denial involves, of course, a denial of ethical character to all merely subjective states. We had thought early in the volume that Dr. Miley could escape this extreme, when we read: "So much have our subjective states to do with our judgments. But we are responsible for these states, and therefore for the judgments which they so much influence" (page 42). But when Adam's primitive holiness fell to be discussed (page 409), our illusion was dissipated. It seems that Adam's holiness was "simply a quality of Adam's nature," and as such possessed no proper ethical element. It "was simply a subjective state and tendency in harmony with his moral relations and duties"; "but such a state, however real and excellent, and however pleasing to the divine mind, could not have any true ethical quality, or in any proper sense be accounted meritorious or rewardable." In like manner, our native depravity is only a subjective quality, and though non-excellent and displeasing to God, has no ethical quality. This seems to us most remarkable. Here is a depravity which originally arose in personal action and which is apparently the same in us as in Adam, which is the spring of all our actual sins, and yet which is itself, however hideous, non-condemnable. The theory which requires such a view is in antagonism with the deepest convictions of the human mind. If God looks upon Adam and finds him with a subjective quality "excellent" and "pleasing to the divine mind," how should he not show him his pleasure? And if God looks upon us and finds us with a subjective quality non-excellent, and displeasing to his holiness, how should he not show us his displeasure? Must we look upon God as the most *unnatural* being in the universe? as a being whose action is entirely divorced from his immanent choice? No wonder our Arminian brethren are continually telling us Calvinists that their God is not our God.

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CAMPBELL'S THE PURITAN IN HOLLAND, ETC.

THE PURITAN IN HOLLAND, ENGLAND, AND AMERICA. An Introduction to American History. *By Douglas Campbell, A. M., LL. B., Member of the American Historical Association.* Third Edition. Revised and Corrected. In two Volumes. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1893.

Whether we agree with all the conclusions of the author or not, it is impossible not to recognize in this work a most delightful and valuable contribution to the history of modern civilization. It is truly a magnificent work, worthy of the handsome dress in which it is presented to us by the publishers; the fruit of wide and varied reading and thinking, admirably arranged, and elegantly expressed.

By the Puritans is meant that class which was the product of the Calvinistic Reformation in the sixteenth century, which played so grand and determining a part in the histories of the Netherlands, England, and America, and consequently in the history of the whole modern world. If they have been and have done what this writer claims for them, and as we believe justly, it is impossible to exaggerate their importance. We hope that one effect of this book will be to correct some of the unjust prejudices too commonly entertained against this noble class of people, and to conciliate towards them that respect which is their due, but which has been too long withheld from them, except by those who are in sympathy with their reli-

gious views. In proof of these widespread prejudices we have an extract from a leading literary journal of England, of a comparatively recent date, in which the following estimate of their character is given: "The savage brutality of the American Puritans, truthfully told, would afford one of the most significant and profitable lessons that history could teach. Champions of liberty, but merciless and unprincipled tyrants, . . . whining over the ferocity of the Indian, yet outdoing that ferocity a hundred-fold, . . the ancestors of the Revolutionary and of the Civil War might be held up as examples of the power of a Calvinistic religion and a bigoted republicanism to demoralize fair average specimens of a race, which, under better influences, has shown itself the least cruel, least treacherous, least tyrannical of the master races of the world." In other words, Calvinistic doctrines and republican principles converted the gentle, honorable, and freedom-loving Englishman, in the New World, into a savage more merciless than an inquisitor, and more treacherous than an American Indian.

In order to understand the scope and character of this work, we must bear in mind that it does not propose to discuss the religious doctrines of the Puritans, or to give their religious history, but to set forth their political principles, and their history as the representatives of a peculiar type of civilization. It is difficult to ascertain what the religious views of the author are, though some of his incidental remarks lead us to suspect that he does not hold to those doctrines which distinguish Calvinism from other systems of theology. But the author has a more specific purpose than even this limitation would imply. His theme is the influence of the Puritans in laying the foundations of the American Republic, with its peculiar social and political institutions. "This," he says in his conclusion, "is a work of limited scope. It is intended primarily as an introduction to American history. I have attempted to trace the two main streams of civilization which affected the early settlers of New England and the Middle States of the American Union, and afterwards worked into the South; the one derived from the Netherland Republic, the other, from monarchical England—countries originally peopled by men of substantially the same blood, but developed under different institutions. To do this has necessitated a somewhat extended examination into the comparative conditions of these two countries at the time when the American colonies were taking form, and an investigation of the causes which produced those conditions."

It is not necessary to read far, however, for one to discover that there is a still more specific purpose in the mind of the writer, which is to prove that American civilization is derived not from England, as has been commonly supposed, but from Holland. The book is a history, but a history written as an argument. The discovery of this naturally awakens something of a prejudice in the mind of the reader, which is not entirely removed until the validity of the argument appears beyond a doubt, and the proposition is satisfactorily established.

Because 1. Any attempt to reverse the traditional interpretation of the facts of history is likely to be viewed with suspicion. There is nothing in which we delight more than to feel that our opinions are settled, and we do not like to have them disturbed even to have them corrected. And especially is this true when our national and hereditary partialities are closely identified with our established opinions. It seems to us then like both a public and a personal wrong to question their correctness. If we have been accustomed to take pride in the thought that the glory of English achievements on flood and field have been trans-

mitted to us as members of the English race, that the literature of Chaucer and Spencer and Shakespeare and Milton is as truly ours as if we breathed the air of old England, and that we are not less honored by those higher exploits of Christian heroism by which Christianity and civilization have been carried round the globe by Englishmen, it is not surprising that we almost resent the effort to rob us of the pleasing delusion, if delusion it be. Besides, the presumption is always in favor of those views of history which have been uniformly held by the historians and scholars who have long been accepted as authorities. The burden of proof rests upon him who undertakes to reverse their decisions.

Because 2. A history written to support a theory is liable to the suspicion that it will lack the judicial impartiality without which we cannot have perfect confidence in its accuracy. A lawyer who relates a series of incidents as a part of the evidence by which the case of his client is sustained, may tell nothing untrue, but his narrative makes a very different impression from the narrative of the same incidents told by one who has no such object in view. Things that favor his side he brings prominently forward, he dwells upon, he places in a strong light; those that make against him he places in the background or omits altogether. He does not intend to deceive, he does not intend to sacrifice the truth, he only intends to make the best showing for his client and to win his case. No one who is familiar with English history can fail to notice how different the same events appear, how different their historical significance, when told by a Whig and by a Tory historian. On the pages of Hume, Charles the First is a martyr; on the pages of Macaulay he is a criminal. If this is the case under the unconscious bias of political opinion, how much more likely is it to be so when the object for which the history is written is to establish some particular proposition. We cannot but think, therefore, that while none will doubt the accuracy of Mr. Campbell's facts, either in his sketch of the history of Holland or of England, the reader's estimate of the justness of his comparison of the two, and also of his conclusions, will be affected by the considerations we have suggested.

The position taken that the American people are not substantially of English origin, do not belong strictly to the English race, is directly contrary to the received opinion. "Most American authors, and all Englishmen who have written of America," the author admits, "set out with the theory that the people of the United States are an English race, and that their institutions, when not original, are derived from England. These assumptions underlie all American histories, and they have come to be so generally accepted that to question them seems almost to savor of temerity. Perhaps, however, the temerity is only seeming." "America is no longer on her knees, she has risen, and begins to look around her. No wonder if she should now call in question some of the traditions about her pedigree. For the average Englishman who thinks of the Americans as a pure English race there is great excuse. Of their country, until within the past few years he knew comparatively nothing, except that the English language was spoken here, and that at one time some of the States were British colonies. But with Americans the case is quite different. Many of them have visited Canada and Nova Scotia, which are settled by a race almost wholly British in its origin. No one can see these Canadians without being struck at once with the contrast between them and the men he meets at home. Still more of our people have within the past few years travelled in England. Certainly, no intelligent American can remain there long, talk with

peasant, farmer, and country squire, listen to the conversation in cars, hotels, and shops, experiment with a humorous story on a party of Englishmen, go beneath the mere surface of dress and language, and study the people as he does those of the Continent, and then believe that we are of the same race except as members of the same Aryan division of the human family, with the same human nature." In other words, though we speak the English language and our literature is exclusively English, yet almost from the beginning the foreign element in our population has been so large as to destroy our race identity. That may be partially true of our present population, owing to the vast immigration from all countries which has been pouring in on us ever since the Revolution. There were also continental elements mixed in with the colonists before the Revolution, but that they were sufficiently numerous to adulterate the blood, to change the characteristic traits, and to mould the sentiments of the people in any large degree at the time when our national character was forming and our national institutions were being founded, the author has not succeeded in demonstrating, and we do not think is true. There were Dutch in New York and part of New Jersey, for these colonies were originally settled by the Dutch. There were Germans in Pennsylvania, and Huguenots in South Carolina. But the New England States were settled almost wholly by the English. There were some Scotch-Irish, but they were Anglo-Saxon in blood and in their constitutional traits. In Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, the great mass of the people were of the English stock. One conclusive evidence of the preponderance of the English race is the preservation of the English language in its purity. Our author thinks we may give too much weight to this consideration when we come to deal with historical questions, but we think not. The Franks, a Teutonic race, conquered Gaul in the fifth century; but that the race which they found there were not exterminated, or lost their identity, and were not materially affected by the settlement among them of the conquerors, is shown by the fact that the language of the French is not German, but Latin and Gallic. And to-day, there are no two nations in Europe more unlike in their national traits than the French and German. The same is true of England. The Normans conquered it in the eleventh century, but the continuance of the Anglo-Saxon tongue as the basis of the English language is a sufficient evidence that the people are mainly of the Anglo-Saxon stock. The argument holds good in the present case. The survival of the English language is a conclusive evidence of the English origin of our ancestors. And there seems to us to be sufficient evidence that the national English traits of character are still found in a large measure in the American people, in spite of the immense foreign immigration pouring in upon us for more than a century. These traits have been preserved partly by direct intercourse with the old country, and especially by the fact that our literature is almost exclusively English, except so far as it is of home production. This native, hereditary character constitutes the basis of our civilization, the warp into which many threads of varied hue and quality have been interwoven.

If the American people do not derive their origin from the English race, much less, it is argued, are they indebted to the English for their institutions. "Turning now from the question of race to that of institutions, a subject which some may think much more important, we reach a simpler field. Here is no room for conjecture or mere opinion. We have the institutions of the two countries before us; they can be compared by any one acquainted with them both, and the result

speaks for itself. Instead of those of the United States being derived from England, it is a curious fact that, while we have in the main English social customs and traits of character, we have scarcely a legal or political institution of importance which is of English origin, and but few which have come to us by the way of England." The first of these institutions mentioned is the church. In England the church and state are united. The church is the subject of the state. It is what is called the Erastian system of church polity. The bishops are appointed by the crown, the congregations have no voice in the election of their pastors, and the revenues of the church are derived from a tax levied indiscriminately upon all. It is wonderful how such an unscriptural enormity could have been tolerated so long. The doctrinal articles of the Church of England are thoroughly orthodox, but its polity is, if possible, worse than that of the papacy. The head of the Church of Rome is at least an ecclesiastic, but the head of the Anglican Church is a layman, who may be a heretic or an infidel. The entire separation of church and state is one of the most glorious distinctions of the American Republic. We are proud to feel that ours is the first nation on the globe to recognize the principle of perfect religious equality. But we are not to ascribe this feature of our system to the repudiation of peculiarly English ideas, for the union of church and state was not peculiar to England. In some form or other it prevailed all over Europe, even in Presbyterian Scotland and Holland. It was the error of the age, and not of one people only. It is still a European error, which we have reason to hope will eventually disappear before the spreading light of the truth, in England as soon as elsewhere. Moreover, there has always been a large proportion of the English people, especially since the days of the Commonwealth, opposed to the union of church and state. Our author admits that several of the American colonies established churches supported by the state, but that the Revolution, which severed the relations between the colonies and the mother country, soon put an end to these establishments. The fact is, that the separation of church and state in the settlement of the government of the United States was an irresistible necessity. The circumstances rendered such a union an impossibility. Many, no doubt, who would have been willing to have a state church if their own denomination had been selected to hold that position, would have none because they could not have their own. The existence of so many denominations side by side taught them a lesson of religious liberty and equality. We do not think, therefore, that the adoption of the voluntary church system by our revolutionary forefathers is an evidence of their want of sympathy with English ideas, or of the un-English character of our civilization.

Again, the principle of human equality, which lies at the foundation of our whole social and political system, we are told, is not derived from England. There hereditary distinctions in society operate to the great disadvantage of the mass of the people. "Here all men are created free and equal." And yet it cannot be shown that this principle is derived from any other source. Certainly not from Roman law and society, as is intimated, for, while Rome was a Republic, it was an aristocratic Republic, where the haughty patricians and optimates scorned and used for their own advancement the commonalty. It was the sturdy independence of the English character which, under favoring circumstances, developed this form of society. The early English colonists were middle-class people to start with, and would naturally look with disfavor upon any attempt to introduce

among them a hereditary aristocracy. Historians have remarked that the Greek colonies were nearly all more democratic in their forms of government than the mother cities from which they came. It is the spirit of individual independence which leads to colonization, and people of such a spirit are naturally unwilling to take with them to their new settlements the factitious distinctions of society, by which they were oppressed at home.

Besides these fundamental principles in church and state by which the American Commonwealth is distinguished from the mother country, our author specifies a number of positive institutions, in which the difference is so great and so much to our advantage as to show that we are but little indebted to England for the character of our civilization; as, for instance, in the executive and legislative departments of our governments, in the vast improvement made in our judicial system, in the distribution of land in the abolition of primogeniture, in the facilities for popular education, in the introduction of the written ballot, in our written constitution, in the more general adoption of the principles of Roman law, and in our superior institutions for the relief of human suffering—all of which seem to us simply to show that in these respects, under favoring circumstances, the daughter has outstripped the mother, and not that she is any the less a daughter.

We have called attention to what we consider the one-sided view which the author takes of the relations of American civilization to that of England. We think those relations are closer and more direct than he represents them to be. But, notwithstanding this, the work is one of surpassing interest and value to the student of history, especially of American history, going back as it does, to unfold the causes which have made our country what it is. The larger part of these volumes is employed in the exhibition of the state of the Netherlands and of England at the time of the Reformation, their mutual relations, especially the influence of the one upon the other, and thus the direct and indirect influence of the Republic of Holland in giving shape to our American institutions. No doubt at that time civilization in the Netherlands was much further advanced than in England, though we cannot but think that in the picture of the latter country the shading is too sombre. Not that the facts told are not all true, but other facts are left untold which would somewhat relieve the darkness.

We Americans have been disposed to underrate the character and influence of the Dutch. This is mainly the result of ignorance. We have not known what they were and what they have done. Some of us, as Campbell remarks, have formed our ideas of the early Dutch colonists in America from Irving's *Knickerbocker's History of New York*, in which the grave burghers of New Amsterdam are so amusingly caricatured. It has remained for Motley's charming volumes to make the inhabitants of Holland known to us as a nation of soldiers, statesmen, patriots, martyrs, and heroes. One of the chief benefits resulting from the attractive work which we are now considering, will be to correct this error, and to convince us that, in the sixteenth century, they were perhaps the foremost nation in Europe, in all the elements of a high Christian civilization. It is well remarked, that the nature of their country determined in large measure the national character of the people of the Netherlands. Holland (Hollowland) was a low, marshy country at the mouths of the three rivers that pour their floods into the North Sea. The people had to win their soil from the ocean, and to defend it against the waves by perpetual toil and watchfulness. If they were to live there at all, they

must live by might and main, and the result would be a race of strong and energetic men. Their proximity to the sea developed a spirit of commercial enterprise, while the necessity of defending their landward frontiers, without the aid of natural barriers, gave them a martial character not common to a people devoted to the peaceful pursuits of agriculture and commerce.

Two distinct races have inhabited the Netherlands from the earliest times, and still exhibit the peculiar traits of their separate nationalities; in the South, now Belgium, a Celtic race, in the North, now Holland, a Teutonic race. It is wonderful how long these two races may live side by side and not thoroughly amalgamate. The Celtic, Irish, Welsh, and Highland Scotch, while living in close contact with the English, still speak their native languages, and preserve their national traits of character. There is another remarkable fact, that no great Celtic or Latin race permanently adopted the Protestant religion at the time of the Reformation. It did not reach the Irish at all; it failed in France after a most promising beginning; it was thoroughly crushed out in Spain and Italy. It was only among the Teutonic races that it took a strong and lasting hold, and to this is due the fact that they lead and almost rule the world. So, while there were many converts to Protestantism in the Celtic Netherlands at first, the people finally yielded to Catholic oppression, and the movement came to an end. It was in the northern provinces that the true doctrine took so deep a root that the whole power of Spain could not extirpate it. There Puritanism obtained—the Calvinistic doctrine and character, which, as Froude says, "in one or other of its many forms, has borne ever an inflexible front to illusion and mendacity, and has preferred rather to be ground to powder like flint than to bend before violence or melt under enervating temptation." There, consequently, our subject centres; and it is in the forces which the historian so eloquently characterizes, as well as in local influences and hereditary traits, that we may find the secret of their heroic endurance in defence of their convictions and their liberties.

As the comparison of England and Holland is the special point to which our attention is directed in these volumes, it is interesting to note that the Teutonic Netherlanders and the English were originally from the same stock. The people who lived along the coast between the mouth of the Rhine and the mouth of the Elbe were all Low Dutch, and these were the conquerors of Britain in the fifth century. Among these were the Frisians, who now constitute a part of the population of Holland. It is also a noteworthy fact that Christianity was introduced into Friesland by English missionaries. Mr. Campbell is in error in saying that "the real conversion of England came from Ireland." It came from Rome. It is true that the Culdees, Scotch missionaries, who came originally from Ireland, planted missions in Northumbria. But the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms as a whole received the Christian religion from Kent, where Augustine and his forty Roman monks landed A. D. 597. Very naturally, the English when converted themselves desired to carry the gospel back to their brethren on the continent; and in the seventh and eighth centuries zealous missionaries, such as Wilfrid, Willibrord, and Boniface crossed over into Frisia, where eventually Boniface lost his life.

The early development of Dutch civilization compared with the tardy growth of the English can easily be accounted for. The insular situation of the English, while it saved them from hostile invasions, at the same time cut them off, to a considerable extent, from the influence of the older and more enlightened states. But

the Dutch were in close contact, politically and commercially, with the foremost nations of the continent, such as France, Italy, and Germany. They were actively engaged in the Crusades, with all their awakening influences. "Godfrey de Bouillon was a Flemish knight." They were a commercial and maritime people. Their cities were members of the Hauseatic League. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries they were ahead of most other European states, far ahead of England in commerce, agriculture, manufactures, and art. In the early part of the sixteenth century, in the Netherlands as a whole, comprising about twenty-five thousand square miles—about the size of South Carolina—there were three millions of people, "the most industrious, the most prosperous, perhaps the most intelligent under the sun," according to Motley's statement. There were two hundred and eight walled cities, one hundred and fifty chartered towns, and sixty-three hundred villages. "It was their boast that common laborers, even the fishermen who dwelt in the huts of Friesland, could read and write, and discuss the interpretation of Scripture." (Fisher's *Reformation.*) Into this wealthy and enlightened country the Protestant doctrines found entrance from Germany and France. As might have been expected, they met with a hearty reception. The sovereign of the Netherlands at that time was Charles V., Emperor of Germany and King of Spain. He was an intense bigot and a remorseless tyrant. The work of religious persecution, which the lack of power alone hindered him from doing in Germany, he carried on without restraint in the Netherlands. "Grotius, who was well informed upon such subjects, says that a hundred thousand heretics were put to death in the Netherlands under the edicts of Charles V. According to Motley, the number has never been placed at a lower mark than fifty thousand. If even this latter computation is correct, the victims of the Inquisition in the Netherlands before the days of Philip II. probably exceeded in number all those who have suffered death under its judgments in all the other countries of Europe combined, from the days of the Reformation until the present time." When we consider how contracted was the territory in which this holocaust of victims was offered up, the enormity of the crime and the consequent suffering are inconceivable. Philip II., Charles's successor, undertook to carry out the same policy, and devoted all the energies of his narrow, obstinate, and treacherous nature to the extermination of Protestantism in the Netherlands. Then began a conflict which has no parallel in the history of the world. In 1567 the Duke of Alva, a skilful and iron-hearted soldier, a fit servant of such a master, and a suitable agent for such a work, is sent into the Netherlands with a body of Spanish soldiers, to crush out every spark of civil and religious liberty. The Council of Blood is established. Eighteen hundred persons, some of the highest in the land, suffer death by its summary proceedings in three months. Many despairing of liberty and even of life flee the country, until an embargo is laid on all vessels, and escape is made almost impossible. At this juncture, William, Prince of Orange, comes forward as the champion of his country's freedom; one of those patriotic and heroic characters who, like Washington, stands out on the page of history with monumental grandeur. But the tide of war seems to be adverse to the patriots. Defeat follows defeat, and massacre follows massacre, until the southern provinces, ten in number, abandon the contest in despair, and submit to the Spanish yoke. The seven northern provinces, binding themselves together by what is known as the Treaty of Utrecht, continue the struggle. In 1581 they issue their Declaration of Inde-

pendence, and the Dutch Republic is launched upon its stormy career, destined after many reverses, much suffering, and many heroic exploits to establish its freedom. As the seat of enlightened civil and religious liberty, of learning, of the fine arts, of the industrial arts, of commercial enterprise and prosperity, the little Republic was an example to the world. All this was the work of the Dutch Puritans.

To understand the history and character of the English Puritans, we must keep in mind some of the peculiarities of the Reformation in England distinguishing it from the corresponding movement in Holland. The English Reformation originated with the civil authorities, and was at first a purely political movement. In Holland it originated with the people, was a purely religious movement, and took on something of a political complexion only when the persecuted people rose up in defence of their lives, their liberties, and their religion. Henry VIII., from real or pretended scruples of conscience, desired a divorce from his wife, Catherine of Arragon. As the Pope refused to grant it, he removed his kingdom from under the papal jurisdiction, and proclaimed himself the supreme head of the English Church. The great mass of his people were attached to the Catholic faith, as he was himself. It was not proposed to abandon that faith. It was to be a Catholic Church with an Anglican pope, and he the king. There were changes, of course, but Henry's creed as expressed in the six articles was Catholic to the core. Those who denied any of the articles of this creed were burned, and those who denied his supremacy were beheaded. Those who conducted the administration during the reign of Edward VI. adopted a Protestant creed, but retained Romish forms to some extent. Mary found no difficulty, so indifferent were the people, in taking the kingdom back to Rome, and Elizabeth found just as little difficulty in restoring the state of things established by Edward. Elizabeth herself was not more than half a Protestant, and Campbell thinks that up to the time of the Spanish Armada she indulged the hope of reconciling her kingdom to the Catholic Church, and that this hope explains many of the inconsistencies of her policy which have so much puzzled historians. It was during her reign that English Puritanism arose. There were many earnest souls to whom this half-Catholic and half-Protestant system was unsatisfactory. To them many of the forms which had been brought over from the old church were objectionable as the symbols of unscriptural doctrines and superstitions. They regarded the reformation as incomplete and sought to perfect it. They did not propose to separate from the established church, but to preserve it and bring it nearer to the scriptural model. Although generally preferring the Presbyterian form of church government, they were not unwilling to allow a modified form of episcopacy, regarded as a *jure humano* institution. In this they agreed with Calvin himself. "The man whose figure stands out most boldly on the historic page, as marking this new departure, was Thomas Cartwright, Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge. He entered that University in 1550; during the Marian persecution he left it to study law in London, and returning on the accession of Elizabeth, had been made a fellow. Sickened for a time with English theology, he went over to Geneva in 1564 and drank in the air of pure Calvinism. Returning to Cambridge, which inclined to Puritanism, he had been made professor of divinity. He was now, although but thirty-five years of age, a profound scholar, and what was more, a man of genius; narrow-minded in some directions, but with the ability, within his limitations, to see straight and think clear, and with the courage to express his convictions." Cartwright's name

is not known and honored among Presbyterians as it deserves to be. He held that the names presbyters and bishops designated the same officers, that each church should be governed by its minister and elders, subject to the opinions of the other churches with which it communicated. This doctrine of church polity was maintained not in theory only. An effort was made to introduce it into the church by organizing presbyteries. But this effort was soon put down with a strong hand. Coercion, however, could not crush out the principles which it prevented their carrying into practical effect. "It is estimated by Neal that at the accession of James there were fifteen hundred Puritan ministers" in the Church of England. The Westminster Assembly in 1643, which drew up the Confession and Catechisms, was composed of ministers of this class and laymen of kindred sentiments. At the restoration of the Stuart family two thousand pastors resigned their livings rather than take the oath of conformity. The Independents are sometimes confounded with the Puritans, but they were originally no part of that great body, which, as the Long Parliament, laid the foundations of English liberty. The Independents originated with Robert Browne during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, were bitterly persecuted by the government of church and state, and in order to enjoy freedom of worship retired to Holland. Browne eventually abandoned his principles and went back to the Episcopal Church, but his congregation, protected by the government of Holland, lived and thrived. Their form of church polity was that which is known in this country as the Congregational. Each congregation is independent of all others, and its affairs are administered by the members as a whole, and not by elders appointed for the purpose. These were the people who came over in the *Mayflower* and laid the foundations of New England. Many of the colonists who followed them directly from England were in sympathy with the Presbyterian Puritans, but adopted the Independent system on reaching America. The political principles of these two classes of Puritans differed as widely as their views of church polity. The Presbyterians favored a constitutional monarchy. They were both progressive and conservative. They would strip the king of his despotic power and make him the ruler of a free Christian commonwealth. When they had vindicated their principles in his defeat, they endeavored to treat with him on terms honorable both to him and to the state. They had no part in his trial and execution. If it was just they deserve no credit for it, and if it was a crime the guilt was not theirs. If they had been successful in their purposes they would have established a parliamentary government such as that under which England has flourished and led the world since the revolution of 1688. The Independents, on the other hand, leaned towards democracy. At one blow they destroyed monarchy and aristocracy. They would have established a government similar to that of the United States of America. But England was not ripe for such a radical revolution. They ran into fanaticism, and were saved from anarchy by the despotic, though wholesome rule, of Oliver Cromwell.

Now, English Puritanism and Dutch Puritanism met like two great streams, and poured their united floods of influence upon the shores of the New World in the formation of the character of the American people, and the institutions, civil and religious, for which the United States are distinguished. It is contended, however, by Mr. Campbell, that English Puritanism is indebted for many of its features, indeed for most of its excellencies, especially those which have been reproduced in this country, to the Dutch. We cannot, however, dwell

upon the induction of facts by which he makes this apparent. Suffice it to say that the two nations sustained the most intimate commercial relations to each other through many generations, both before, during, and after the period of the Reformation; that large colonies of Dutch manufacturers were encouraged to settle in England, and almost exclusively occupied whole districts; that many fled thither from the Netherlands to escape the persecutions of Charles V. and Philip II.; that thousands of English soldiers were maintained in Holland to assist in the defence of liberty and the Protestant religion, and that refugees from the persecutions of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth found an asylum in Holland and were protected and even favored by the government. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that each exerted an influence upon the other, and that the English adopted many of the republican notions then prevalent in the Netherlands. It will not be forgotten that the company which came over in the *Mayflower* set sail from Holland, where they had lived as an organized congregation for many years. It is natural to suppose they brought with them principles which they imbibed there, though it may not be easy for us to point them out.

Our author does justice to the Scotch and Scotch-Irish, for the valuable contribution which they made to the population of the colonies, for their gallantry in defence of our rights at the time of the Revolution, and for their wise statesmanship in the construction of the government, as well as for their great energy and ability ever since in all the departments of public and private life. Perhaps we cannot better close this article than by quoting a few paragraphs relating to this point, so interesting to many of our readers as Presbyterians and members of this noble race. "Let us now see what manner of men they, *i. e.*, the Scotch-Irish, were, where they settled, and how their influence was exerted on this side of the Atlantic. In the first place, it should be noticed that they were not socially poor peasants, such as Ireland has contributed to America in later days. Among them were wealthy yeomen, and in their ranks were the most intelligent of Irish manufacturers. Nor were they children of ignorance. Although their schools had been closed by law, they had all found means of private instruction in the common branches, while those desiring a higher education—and they were very numerous—had made their way to the Presbyterian Universities of Edinburgh and Glasgow. When they came to America, these Scotch-Irishmen were not only among the most industrious and virtuous, but they were, as a whole, like the early settlers of New England, probably the best educated of the English-speaking race. In the field of education, the debt of America to these immigrants can hardly be exaggerated. Not only did they give life and character to Princeton College, and found the institution now known as the College of Washington and Lee, in Virginia, but they gave her free-school system to New Jersey and Kentucky, and for nearly a century before the Revolution they conducted most of the classical schools south of the province of New York. It was in these schools that the fathers of the Revolution in the South, almost without exception, received their education. On the 20th of May, 1775, the Scotch-Irish settlers of Mecklenburg, in North Carolina, first asserted the doctrine that the Americans were 'a free and independent people.' In the next year the Declaration of Independence was adopted, and of its fifty-five historic signers, fourteen are said to have been Irish, Scotch, or Scotch-Irish, by birth or descent."

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Sidgwick's Distinction, etc.

Distinction and the Criticism of Beliefs. *By Alfred Sidgwick.* 12mo, pp. 279. London: Longmans, Green & Co. And New York: 15 East Sixteenth Street. 1892.

The reader of a book is entitled to ask, What is its purpose? What is the end sought by the writer? These questions the author must be allowed the right to answer. Accordingly, as far as a brief notice like this will premit, we will let the author explain his design in writing this work. We give a few citations:

"The object of this book is not complacently to put forward a recondite system of certainties, but to raise and discuss from an ordinary point of view some questions which seem to me interesting, many-sided, and hard to answer. The faith in which it is written is that, so far as people generally dislike philosophy, it is rather the name than the thing itself that they dislike—the name, with its supposed pretensions of superiority. From modesty alone many people hide from themselves their own philosophical inclinations, and start with a prejudice against any writer who confesses such inclinations openly. Perhaps no complete defence is possible. However, the truth remains (and the charitable reader will see it) that I do not think there is at present room for anything like authority in treating these questions. They present to me, therefore, not a chance of playing the oracle, but at most a chance of joining others in their own pursuit of truth."

"Distinction, and especially rough distinction, is the central subject of this book. Ambiguity, in its most effective and troublesome form, arises out of the 'real' roughness of distinctions that are drawn by language as if they were perfectly sharp."

"First, then, an attempt is made to discover the part that is actually played by ambiguity (or rough distinction) in confusing our judgment." "Secondly, in the process of getting to understand exactly the error that rough distinction creates, we shall find it necessary to discuss the excuses that may fairly be made sometimes for vagueness." "Lastly, the question of questions in philosophy, the question at what point doubt comes to an end, is altered suggestively for us if we admit the truth of the views here taken."

"By a 'rough' distinction we shall mean, as is usually meant, a distinction where the contrasted notions even at their sharpest (A and non-A) cannot be applied with perfect exactness to actual cases; where the actual cases cannot always be classed with strict right as either the one or the other, but where a certain proportion of them belong to a doubtful borderland."

"Another convenient phrase for roughness of distinction is 'unreal distinctness.' As this name is meant to suggest, it is by contrast with (what are taken for) realities that words are seen to imply unduly abrupt distinctions; the discontinuity of language is noticed only so far as we think we see the real continuity of nature. And this phrase 'unreal distinctness' will often be used in the following pages for the fault to which names and distinctions are so liable."

These are but brief and meagre extracts from the author's explanatory statements as to the "object" of his book, but they are as many as can here be furnished. They "can be of little service"—to use his own language—"except as a memorandum after the subject has been thoroughly discussed." If the reader of this notice wishes to understand them, he must read the book. Whether he will be the wiser after having done so, we cannot venture to conjecture. We have had

a hard time in the effort to compass that end. But likely that was due to the fact that, like William the Weaver, we are slow of understanding. The work proves the author to be possessed of acute intelligence, and of learning in philosophy, logic, and science. Much of what he says is valuable and deserving of serious consideration, not only as evincing the necessity of clear distinctions and of accurate definitions, but as pointing out what are clear distinctions and accurate definitions. As we are not sure that we have thoroughly possessed ourselves of the drift and meaning of the author, perhaps through lack of sufficient study of his work, and as we deprecate doing him any injustice, we will limit what we have to say to a few suggestions. We shall regret if they shall be fairly chargeable with irrelevancy or injustice:

1. The author's "borderland theory," which plays so important a part in his work, traverses, according to his own admission, the Laws of Thought. This seems to be the result of one of his favorite positions – namely, that no abstract law or principle is of any validity unless it can be proved applicable to some concrete case. Take, for instance, the abstract law of thought which is known as the law of contradiction. A is not non-A. Here the asserted contradictories are A and non-A. An apparently real distinction is drawn between them, a distinction having the sharpness of contradiction. But the principle of the continuity of nature being admitted, a continuity which knows no real breaks or gaps, there is a borderland between A and non-A in which they so shade into each other that it is not possible to tell where A ends and non-A begins. There is room for doubt whether the distinction amounting to contradiction holds between them. This, we suggest, is a radical challenge of universal belief, and the proofs behoove to be as convincing as the position is singular. As the author is very tolerant of doubt, he would allow us to express here a two-fold doubt: first, whether if his principle of the continuity of nature were conceded, it would be susceptible of so universal an application as he gives it. Let it be supposed that a physical fact A cannot be altogether discriminated from another physical fact non-A to which it *seems* to be contradictory, because there is a borderland between them which each occupies and in which both touch each other—does this hold of intellectual, æsthetical, and moral facts? Does intellectual truth shade gradually into intellectual error in consequence of a borderland in which they come together and coalesce? Is this the case with existence and non-existence? Is it the case with beauty and ugliness? Is it the case with duty and crime, holiness and sin? Is it true of the infinite and finite? In this Utopia of reconciliation, the author's borderland, the great principle of the continuity of nature acting as the genius of harmony introduces infinite opposites to each other, and presides at a universal osculation.

Secondly, may there not be doubt in regard to the author's principle itself of the "seamless" continuity of nature? Some writers who with the author belong to the school of evolution contend for the saltatory function of nature, a function which, they think, was performed when by an extraordinary leap the chasm between the inorganic and the organic was cleared. Which of these hypotheses are we to credit, that of the irrefragable continuity of nature, or that by which tremendous jumps are supposed to be accomplished? Were we shut up to a choice between these alternatives, we might find ourselves in the condition of Buridan's ass; but we may be allowed to doubt whether either must be elected, for the reason that they may be only apparent contradictories, and may gradually shade into unity in the borderland betwixt them!

2. The author overestimates the office of doubt. That it has a most important office to discharge, no philosophic mind would be disposed to deny. But it has its metes and bounds. There is really no difficulty in recognizing certain ultimate and indubitable standards of intellectual belief and moral action. The author is too nice in his dissections. His right to doubt, pushed to the extent which he claims for it, would threaten the removal of all authority as well divine as human. While he does not profess to be a universal skeptic, but concedes that possibly truth may be found, the practical result of his theory would be Pyrrhonism. Doubt is good enough in its place, but too much of it is worse than superstition. One would rather "hear old Triton blow his horn again" than doubt all the conclusions of philosophy and all the dogmas of religion. The Agnostic is the most unsatisfactory blank in existence.

3. But while the author thus insists upon the right to doubt, while he abjures oracular utterance, and objects to dogma as though he had been personally hurt by it, he has his dogmas too. He is sufficiently dogmatic in affirming the unbroken continuity of nature and the doctrine of evolution. But upon his own principle that where doubt is fairly possible it cannot be refused, but ought to meet consideration, his dogmatic certainty upon these points should have some abatement. We have seen that some of his own school of thinking more than doubt the continuity of nature—a principle which he applies to the undermining of the laws of thought themselves. Some hesitation would seem to be required in the maintenance of a dogma in regard to which doubts so grave have been expressed. And as the Bible asserts miracles, and miracles are inconsistent with the hypothesis of the absolute continuity of nature, at least the force of doubt might be conceded to its position by one who attaches so great importance to doubt.

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ROYCE'S THE SPIRIT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

THE SPIRIT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. *By Josiah Royce, Ph. D.* Pp. xv. 519. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. Boston and New York. 1892.

The general purpose of this essay, as stated by the author, is three-fold:

1. To give personal characterizations of some of the more noteworthy modern thinkers.

2. To suggest, as clearly as may be possible without technical details, something of the nature of their various attitudes towards the great concerns and issues of humanity.

3. To illustrate in the light of such a study certain significant spiritual problems of our own day.

Passing by Descartes and Leibnitz and others, the names selected for presentation and discussion are Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. The spiritual problems of our own day which the author attempts to illustrate in the light of this study are, (1), Nature and Evolution; (2), Reality and Idealism; (3), Physical Law and Freedom; (4), Optimism, Pessimism, and the Moral Order.

It is somewhat difficult to give in brief compass a perfectly fair and impartial estimate of this book, not only because the subject-matter, the philosophical opinions presented, analyzed, and discussed are complicated and abstruse so that a

brief summary is apt to misrepresent them and do them injustice, but also because in his work the author combines the functions of expounder and chronicler on the one hand, and of teacher and inculcator on the other hand, and it is difficult completely to separate the two. As the work of the chronicler it contains much that is interesting and instructive. As the work of the teacher and inculcator it contains much that is mischievous and dangerous. No man can be a mere impartial chronicler of philosphy. Unconsciously, perhaps, but powerfully, his personal bias will shape the chronicle he constructs. After giving a very favorable, imaginative, attractive, and insinuating picture of a sort of composite scheme of pantheism and agnosticism, it is in vain that our author puts in the caveat, "I am a mere chronicler; I am not now defending [this doctrine], but only expounding it" (page 145). That which he afterwards avowedly defends is not so very different from that which he here professedly only expounds.

In the first period of modern philosophy, as presented in these pages, there are three main ideas: Nature is a mechanism; human reason is competent to grasp the truth of nature; and since nature's truth is essentially mathematical, geometry is the model science whose precision and necessity philosophy must imitate (page 41).

Spinoza is a representative thinker of this period. His philosophy is traced to a religious experience, an experience very similar to that which is made familiar to us in the book called *Imitation of Christ*. This religious experience is described as "the interest of the baffled and disappointed soul in coming into the presence of some external truth, some reality that is perfect, that lacks our weakness, that is victorious even though we fail, that is good even though we are worthless"; and as such it is contrasted with another and simpler type of religious life in which the moral being seeks to find some authority that may guide him in the conduct of his life. This analysis contains much that is profoundly suggestive.

The period from Spinoza to Kant, containing the work of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, is characterized as the period of the rediscovery of the inner life. The attention of the philosopher is turned from the objective theorizing characteristic of Descartes and Spinoza to a critical analysis of the powers of the human mind. It is further marked by a growing skepticism.

Kant concedes all the boldest demands of this skepticism. Things in themselves, or things as they really are, are of necessity unknown to us. We can know in a theoretical sense only the things that appear to our senses, that is, the phenomena of the world of show. Neither common sense, nor science, nor theology can with theoretical assurance carry us beyond the world as it seems to our human powers of observation and experience. Space and time are shown to be mere forms of our human sense-consciousness and to have no relation to things in themselves. Kant postulates the existence of a real unknowable world without us, but it exists neither in space nor in time.

If we cannot really know the external world or things in themselves at all, it necessarily follows that our own understanding is the source for us of all knowable, rational truth. Our active understanding in thinking, or constructing our ideas of the world, regards all observed facts as conforming to laws. In this way it proves itself sane. It preserves the unity of self-consciousness.

Yet, ignorant as we are of all absolute truth, confined as we are for all theoretical knowledge to the seeming world of sense and understanding in space and time, we are still morally bound to postulate that the real world of things in them-

selves is a divine moral order; that is, we are bound to act as if such a real and absolute moral order were known to us to exist.

Fichte went a step further than Kant. Kant, while denying that we can really know the external world, or things as they really are, still postulates that there is such an external world, and further, a world of a divine moral order. Fichte denies the existence of any "things in themselves," or any things beyond consciousness. The world exists only in so far as we recognize it. The world is just what we make it. But if this is so, and if we are moral beings, knowing moral distinctions, then it follows that we are under a tremendous moral responsibility to make, by our conceptions, the very best world which it is possible to make. All this that we perceive, this that is present to our consciousness, is the stuff, the material, the opportunity for our duty, made manifest to our senses.

And further, by a sort of reasoning by analogy, just as each man individually constructs his own world, and the world exists for him only by his conception of the world, so it is inferred that there must be some Supreme and Infinite Spirit, Reason, God, who has, by his conception of the world, constructed the world or universe for himself. This Supreme, Infinite Reason uses even our conscious lives and wills as part of its own life. We are a part of God.

Hegel's doctrine is presented from the point of view of an analysis of the fundamental paradox of consciouness:

"We seem to know something, say a note of music, just as it is present. But as we try to tell it, it has gone. I cannot say, 'I know.' I must always say, 'I just knew.' But what was it I just knew? Is it already past and gone? Then how can I be knowing it at all? One sees this endless paradox of consciousness, this eternal flight of myself from myself." Hence the conclusion: "I know myself only in so far as I am known or may be known by another than my present or momentary self." Hence the doctrine of a "deeper self," a sort of all-embracing self. The universal, deeper, real self is the organic total of all the facts of consciousness which exist not, save as related to one another or to this universal.

In regard to Schopenhauer and pessimism it is strikingly said (page 231): "The best man is the one who can see the truth of pessimism, can absorb and transcend that truth, and can be nevertheless an optimist, not by virtue of his failure to recognize the evil of life, but by virtue of his readiness to take part in the struggle against this evil."

The substance of Schopenhauer's philosophy is briefly stated in three propositions:

1. The world has existence only as we see it.

2. What facts we are to see can be learned only from experience, and cannot be found *a priori* through any absurd transcendental deductions of the so-called essence of any absolute spirit.

3. The deepest ground, however, for all these seen facts, and for the community of our various visible worlds, is the common and single world-will, which, expressed in all of us equally, forces us to see alike, but does so simply because this is the particular caprice that it happens to have, so that it embodies itself for us and in us as just this show-world rather than any other, because such is its fashion of willing.

The doctrine of evolution had the way prepared for its discovery and acceptance by two opposite tendencies. On the one hand, it was the result of all

foregoing idealistic philosophy to conceive of the higher human life as one vast and connected growth from lower to higher conditions. Man is physically dependent for his whole civilization and culture upon the former generations of men. On the other hand, this doctrine of evolution was the offspring of the dread of the extravagances of the idealistic period, the product of a hard-learned lesson in caution, the desire to study carefully the facts and the phenomena of the visible world rather than to speculate and theorize about the absolute and what-not. A patient devotion to facts, a rigid self-control as to romantic interpretations, became the dominating spirit.

We are thus brought to the second part of this essay, entitled "Suggestions of Doctrine." The author leaves the role of the mere chronicler. He expounds and teaches views of his own.

The difficulties in the way of a true scientific conception of the origin of our visible, astronomical universe, or cosmology, are strikingly pointed out. Particular attention is paid to the views of Professor W. K. Clifford. According to this view, this world is a world of endlessly consolidating matter. Everywhere we see the law of degradation of energy. Higher forms of energy, such as the energy of position and the energy of motion, are transformed and pass into the lower forms of energy, as, for instance, heat. Heat radiates into space and is lost. The particles of matter, at first infinitely removed from each other, have been approaching each other and consolidating during the infinite ages. Just now they have reached that stage when evolution is possible. The time is coming, however, when the force of evolution will be spent.

Such a conception of the universe is shown to be not unlike the old Indian conception of the world resting on the back of an elephant, and the elephant on a tortoise. Only the series of supports must be conceived as continued, as pushed out and down indefinitely.

As to his own philosophical position, our author avows himself to be a synthetic idealist. The idealism of Berkeley, which he accepts as in a sense the foundation of his own views, he calls analytic idealism.

The essence of analytic idealism is that it holds that, in case the real world is to be knowable at all, it must be, in its deepest nature, a world of ideas; that is, of facts which can only exist for minds. In other words, the knowable world *is* only in so far as beings with minds actually know it to be.

Synthetic idealism adds to this the conception of an infinite self or world-self, conceiving in its consciousness and thereby constructing the world in its essence and in its phenomena. In the consciousness, of this infinite or world-self all our experiences are somehow embraced. This, it will be observed, is not unlike the doctrine of Hegel.

"Flee where we will, then, the net of the larger self ensnares us. We are lost and imprisoned in the thickets of its tangled labyrinth. The moments are not at all in themselves, for as moments they have no meaning; they exist only in relation to the beyond. The larger self alone is, and they are, by reason of it, organic parts of it. They perish but it remains; they have truth or error only in its overshadowing presence" (p. 379).

This self is a unit.

"There is but one self, organically, reflectively, consciously inclusive of all the selves, and so of all truth. I have called this self, logos, problem-solver, all-

knower. This self infinitely and reflectively transcends our consciousness, and therefore, since it includes us, it is at the very least a person, and more definitely conscious than we are."

But is not this going dangerously near to the boundary-line of pantheism, pure and simple?

Yet when approaching, from this idealistic point of view, some of the practical problems of life, such as law and freedom and sin, our author uses words which might well be pondered by some of our "liberal" theologians.

"All popular religious faith usually begins by assuring a man after far too light and easy a fashion that everything will be well in this world for those who do God's will, [but does not St. Paul tell us that all things work together for good to them that love God?]—and that the moral order secures at once the triumph of the good cause and the joy of all who serve the cause with a pure heart. Just at the present moment, curiously enough, despite all the skepticism of the day, such easy religious optimism as this chances to be in great popular favor; and for all my idealism, I regret this popularity of optimism. During these controversies concerning creed-revisions and other forms of religious progress which have been before the public during the past few years, I have noticed not only that it has been customary to frown upon all attempts to defend stern old dogmas, such as the depravity of man and the universal condemnation of all our race in its unsaved condition, but that the reason given as an axiomatic justification for this disapproval has usually been a very optimistic reason. People who pretend at other times to be very agnostic, become here of a sudden very confident. It would be melancholy, they say, to live in a world where the heathen had not as fair a chance for salvation as anybody else. It would be atrocious if the consequences of sin were to prove too grave. If we cannot reconcile a given supposition with the mercy of God, then the supposition must be false. And all this reasoning when more fully analyzed, usually proves to mean, in the minds of those who use it, a sense that, if there is any spiritual order in this universe, it must be an order that does not permit very may ills, and that above all, does reward quickly all good efforts. Thus reasoning, the religious optimist of the day finds his comfort in the assurance of the kindliness of God, of the early triumph of morality, and of the general peacefulness of the universe; an assurance, I say, which on the whole I cannot share. I believe, indeed, that all the evil is part of a good order. I believe in the supremacy of the spiritual; and yet often during these popular controversies of recent years, I have found myself, as a relatively dispassionate metaphysical observer, sympathizing rather with the advocates of the sterner old creeds, not, to be sure, because I have accepted the sometimes irrational form which tradition had given to this or that dogma, but because I regretted the loss of moral rigidity which our fathers knew how to conceive as the very essence of the truly spiritual."

Even sin, however, is a part of the moral order; but it is a part by being condemned and punished.

"In God, so we say to the wilful sinner, you are a part of a good will which bears just such organic relation to your sinfulness as, in a good man, his virtue bears to the evil impulse that forms a part of his goodness [namely, by being overcome and subdued, by throwing it into bolder relief, by making it positive and emphatic through struggle with temptation]. *The hatred and condemnation of just*

your life and character makes God holy. Whatever we are, we are indeed a part of God's perfection. But the question is what sort of part? Are we there to be scorned, despised, condemned by the organic self whose perfection will be vindicated in such case through the very courage and emphasis of its scorn and hatred for us? If so, whatever our sin, it is part of the moral order; only the moral order exists by conquering us, and we live only to be despised by the very self that includes us. God's holiness we then assist, but only as the evil impulse serves the saint's triumphant higher self. God's glory we then, in our way, also serve, but only as vessels of his wrath. But do we ourselves choose the good? Then once more we enter into the divine order, but this time as vessels of honor; as ministers of the good; as servants, and not as enemies; as co-workers, and not as rebels; as beloved, and not as scorned" (page 461).

Placing ourselves for the moment on the ground of natural theology, or pure theism, we must concede that this is finely and powerfully said. We may not like the road along which these conclusions are reached. We may not accept the conclusions themselves without some reservations. They need correction and supplementing, just as any system of pure theism and natural theology must be corrected and supplemented by Christian revelation. But there is here certainly much that is fine and suggestive. Still, it may be well to remember the caution of wise old Laocoon: "*Quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*"

Let us see; leaving the perfection of the Almighty out of consideration altogether, as being too high for us, shall we say that the virtue—the present conceded holiness of character—which, say a St. Peter has, having passed through the agonies of temptation and defeat and sin, is so much higher than the holiness of a Michael or a Gabriel, who never, so far as we know, have known what temptation and defeat are? And does not Dr. Royce fall into a two-fold error, on the one hand conceiving the perfection of the Deity under anthropomorphic limitations; and, on the other hand, confusing two ideas: sin conceived as a necessary part of a good moral order, and sin—moral evil—conquered and overruled by God for his own glory?

To say that "whatever we are," *e. i.*, even as sinners, as unholy, "we are a part of God's perfection," is either a mere figure of speech or else it is a philosophical conclusion or dictum. As a mere figure of speech we can let it stand, in a sense accept it, but it is not philosophy. As a philosophical conclusion it must be repudiated, because it does not maintain the necessary distinction between God and the sinner as distinct entities, separate personalities.

It is one thing to say that the hatred and condemnation of unholiness and unrighteousness of life and character is an essential part or element of God's perfection in holiness, meaning thereby that because God is holy he must hate and condemn all unholiness. "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men."

It is quite another thing to say, in a metaphysical and transcendental sense, springing from the doctrine of the "larger self" of "synthetic idealism," that the wilful sinner even is part of a good will which bears organic relation to the sinfulness of the sinner.

Modern philosophy, as depicted in these pages, has woven a gigantic web. Into this web idealistic, pantheistic, and agnostic elements have entered in about equal proportions. There are four things which are perfectly plain to one who will carefully study the spirit of modern philosophy as here presented:

First, It has ended in pessimism. This is highly significant. Schopenhauer is the last great representative speculative philosopher. His name is inseparably associated with pessimism. The world is only a world of show. And it is a most highly capricious show.

Second, Sober-thinking men have become convinced of the futility of idealistic, speculative philosophy. Psychology has been revolutioned by this conviction.

Idealism, the philosophy of the "absolute" or "universal self," is helpless when confronted with the realities of the world and of life. The "Post-Kantian" development has been repudiated in Germany. The battle-cry, the popular philosophic watch-word in Germany a few years since, was "Back to Kant."

Third, The premises of Kant result in agnosticism, theological and metaphysical. As the exponent of a common sense, realistic philosophy, teaching that we are endowed with the power of intuition, or directly and intuitively coming in contact with and being cognizant of the great realities of the spiritual and material world, Dr. McCosh is perfectly consistent in making war upon Kant as the prince of agnostics. No thorough-going pupil of Kant believes in the possibility of revelation. His God must forever remain the unknown God.

Fourth, Though the Post-Kantian idealism has largely been repudiated, much of it lingers, and imparts to such theistic notions as have been retained the form, the color, the spirit of pantheism.

An unknowable God, but a God who, as the "larger self," somehow embraces our lower, individual, subordinate selves, in whom all our contradictory experiences and problems are combined and solved, is the God of modern philosophy.

Dr. Royce's fascinating style and suggestive reflections, for which we thank him, cannot make us blind to the fact that his "synthetic idealism," what he teaches as our instructor, as well as what he narrates as chronicler and expounder, leads logically to pantheism. He must, perforce, admit that idealism stands helpless when confronted with the actual world; that it has failed to construct the world *a priori* in such a manner that it tallies with the world of scientific observation, and that its wild extravagances are repudiated by the sober caution of experience. Idealism and pantheism, however, are just as helpless when confronted with the realities of the spiritual world. As realists and Christian theists we do not deny the half-truths on which idealism and pantheism are founded. But we simply refuse to put up with these half-truths as though they were the whole truth.

Abel H. Huizinga.

New Paltz, N. Y.

VIII. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE PSALMS. *By A. Maclaren, D. D.* Vol. I. Psalms i.-xxxviii. Crown 8vo, pp. 385. $1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1893.

THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. *By the Rev. G. T. Stokes, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Dublin*, and *Vicar of All-Saints, Blackrock.* Vol. II. Acts vii. 58–xxviii. Crown 8vo, pp. xvi., 480. $1.50. The same publishers.

THE EPISTLES TO THE THESSALONIANS. *By the Rev. John Denny, B. D.* Crown 8vo, pp. viii., 404. $1.50. The same publishers.

THE EPISTLE TO THE PHILIPPIANS. *By Robert Rainy, D. D., Principal of New College, Edinburgh.* Crown 8vo, pp. viii., 368. $1.50. The same publishers.

These volumes are a continuation of *The Expositor's Bible*, a series which we have had frequent occasion to commend in these pages. The series is regularly appearing, and maintaining itself with great uniformity in strength and attractiveness. It will be, when completed, one of the standard works of its kind. It is not intended to be an exhaustive commentary upon the entire Scriptures, in every chapter and verse, but a series of expositions of the salient features of each book. Each volume is complete in itself, and may be bought separately, but subscribers to a year's series of six volumes, or to the entire series, are given special and most favorable terms.

In *The Psalms*, the author, Dr. Maclaren, considers the first thirty-eight in their order. Holding that the deepest and most precious elements in the Psalms are very slightly affected by the answers to the questions of date and authorship, he has left these questions all but untouched, and devoted himself to the exposition of their contents. This he has done in the eminently practical, spiritual manner characteristic of all his writings.

The volume on *The Acts* is a continuation of the author's exposition, begun in the first volume, which was published some months ago. The leading features of his work were noticed then. The present volume, like the first, is written from the standpoint of a "churchman," and discusses many questions not only from that standpoint and coloring, but also in an application to local questions, particularly in the Irish branch of the "church," which somewhat mars the otherwise good features of the work. He avows his position, but at the same time admits that in the apostolic age the terms "bishops" and "presbyters" were used interchangeably.

The Epistles to the Thessalonians, topically treated by the author, are well presented in their meaning and purpose, and the eschatological questions presented in them are carefully and cautiously handled. The author emphasizes the fact that these epistles are silent upon such questions as the nature of the life beyond the

second advent of Christ, except that it is in close and unbroken union with the Lord.

Principal Rainy's exposition of *The Epistle to the Philippians* is given under the following suggestive titles: The Salutation; The Apostle's Mind About the Philippians; How the Philippians Should Think of Paul at Rome; The Choice Between Living and Dying; Undaunted and United Steadfastness; The Mind of Christ; Working and Shining; Timothy and Epaphroditus; No Confidence in the Flesh; The Knowledge of Christ; TheRighteousness of Faith; Resurrection; Life and Daily Dying; The Christian Life a Race; Enemies of the Cross; Our City and Our Coming King; Peace and Joy; The Things to fix Upon; Gifts and Sacrifices. Few books offer such opportunity for pure, direct exposition as this epistle. It was not occasioned, as were most of the others, by the abounding of certain evils or prevalence of errors, to be dealt with polemically. It did not deal with recondite things or mysticism, or seek to lead those to whom it was addressed to thoughts to which they were averse. It was the fullest expression of the apostle's heart and life, in relation to a people of whom he had only happy reports, and among whom the power of the gospel was making itself felt. Dr. Rainy has grasped the spirit of the book and set it forth most admirably throughout.

The Biblical Illustrator; or Anecdotes, Similes, Emblems, Illustrations, Expository, Scientific, Geographical, Historical and Homiletic, Gathered from a Wide Range of Home and Foreigh Literature, on the Verses of the Bible. *By Rev. Joseph D. Exell, M. A.* 2 Timothy, pp. 384. Titus, pp. 219. Philemon, pp. 90. Cloth, net $2.00. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1893.

The series of which this volume is a part has been already described in our pages. We note again, however, its value, and the fact that the several volumes, while intended to cover the entire Bible, are entirely separate and distinct, and can be purchased singly. The sub-title explains clearly the purpose and scope of the work. The volume before us contains, in addition to the material suggested in the title, a concise introduction to each epistle illustrated. In the consideration of 2 Timothy, the arguments for Paul's authorship, the object and contents of the epistle, and the place of writing are very briefly considered, as there is usually so little question of them. The introduction to Titus is fuller, covering the life of Titus, the life of Paul after the first imprisonment at Rome, the proofs of a visit to Crete, the genuineness of the epistle, the place and time of its composition, the condition of the Cretan Church, and the purpose and contents of the epistle. The principal facts of this introduction are contributed by Dr. A. Plummer, and Dr. Oswald Dykes. In the introduction to Philemon, besides the usual matter considered, there is a paragraph bearing upon the relation of this epistle to the question of slavery, in which the author takes a most conservative position on the subject, noting that Paul does not ask Philemon to liberate Onesimus, that Onesimus was a slave in Philemon's house when the latter was the recognized Christian friend and host of Paul, that this, and the silence of the rest of the New Testament, implies that the apostles did not forbid their converts to hold slaves, and that there were strong reasons for not granting a liberty for which slaves were not prepared and which would have loosened the frame-work of society.

Map of Egypt and Sinai: The Route of the Israelites. From new material. *By Professor H. S. Osborn, LL. D., Author of "Palestine, Past and Present"; "Egypt in the Light of Modern Discoveries"; "Class Book of Biblical History and Geography."* Size, 5 ft. by 5 ft. $5.00. Oxford, Ohio: Oxford Map Publishers. 1893.

The series of maps prepared by Dr. Osborn has been found by the writer, after constant use in the class-room in biblical instruction, to be the best that has ever been published. In clearness, accuracy, and the adaptation of the latest discoveries, they are unsurpassed. The map of Palestine, in particular, is indispensable in class-room work. To this series the compiler has just added the *Map of Egypt and Sinai.* As with the others, so here we find first of all a most pleasing and artistic piece of work, upon a scale large enough to give great clearness and distinctness, and the outlines given in such bold relief as to be most helpful to the student. It gives the most recent, and, as the author views it, the correct line, in general, of the route of the Israelites, since the positive discovery of Pithom *in Succoth.* Succoth is represented, properly we think, as a district, and not a place. Dr. Osborn has exercised great care in giving the correct location, not only of biblical places, but of all the ancient Egyptian and the Greek cities, and the Notes upon the map will enable any one to trace them to their place. All the discoveries of any importance, including the locations of mummy pits and tombs, have been indicated.

The Sermon Bible. 2 Corinthians. Philippians. Sm. 8vo, pp. 367. $1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1893.

This is the tenth volume in the series already described in our pages. Each volume is complete in itself, contains a large number of outlines and references, and is supplied with blank pages for notes. The outlines, which we cannot recommend for use, especially by young preachers, not because those here given are objectionable, but upon general principles, are not nearly so valuable as are the thousands of references contained in the book to theological treatises, commentaries, biographies, histories, etc.

A Vocabulary of New Testament Words: Classified According to Roots, with Statistics of Usage by Authors. *Prepared by Ozora Stearns Davis.* Hartford Seminary Press. 1893. Price, 50 cents.

This pamphlet of 32 pages is the fruit of much painstaking labor, and is calculated to be highly useful to the student of the New Testament in the original language. It was prepared at the suggestion of Professor Jacobus, of Hartford Seminary, and goes forth with his commendation. It seeks to arrange in a suggestive, and, at the same time, scientific way all nouns, adjectives, and verbs used more than ten times in the New Testament, in order that the student, in memorizing them, may be aided in his sight-reading of the New Testament. The words are grouped under their roots with the characteristic meaning of each appended in a table of English equivalents. Under each word there is a numerical tabulation, showing the frequency of usage by the various New Testament writers, thus aiding the student in estimating the literary character of each separate author. It would have been better had Mr. Davis made a separate column for Peter and Jude in his synopsis, instead of confusing them in a single group. A work on this order

would be of much greater value if it were extended beyond words occurring ten times, and made to exhibit the frequency of usage by the various inspired writers of words occurring less often, even down to ἅπαξ λεγόμενα. It is with pleasure, therefore, that we note that Professor Jacobus and Mr. Davis will, in the near future, prepare and print just such an extended series of word studies, with the additional feature that attention will be paid to the historical development of the words and to synonyms.

The Check Book of the Bank of Faith. Being Precious Promises Arranged for Daily Use. With brief experimental comments. *By C. H. Spurgeon.* 12mo, pp. 370. $1.50. New York: American Tract Society. 1893.

A second edition of a book noticed by us a few years ago, and not differing from it. The right of publication has been transferred from Messrs. Armstrong & Son to the publishers above named. The book is one of the very best of its class. The daily readings, composed of some promise from the word and short comments upon it, are excellent in every way.

The Gospel Ministry. *By Rev. J. B. Shearer, D. D., LL. D.* 16mo, 26 pp. Richmond, Va.: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1893.

A well written and eloquent treatise on the dignity and glory of the gospel ministry. The glory of the office is set forth in the titles given it in the Scripture, in its nature and work, in the character it requires of those who fill it, and in its rewards both here and hereafter. The subject of the call to the ministry is not considered. The monograph is an admirable supplement to Dr. Dabney's treatise on the latter subject, and with it should be placed in the hands of every young man in the church.

Life and Letters of Samuel Norvell Lapsley, Missionary to the Congo Valley, West Africa. 8vo, pp. 242. Richmond, Va.: Whittet & Shepperson. 1893.

Few books that we have read surpass this in thrilling interest. It is difficult to lay it down till one has read the whole pathetic story of the young hero, who left a home of rare refinement and privileges, and devoted himself, mind and heart and life, to the cause of Christ in Congo land, as the first Presbyterian missionary to Darkest Africa. The story of Lapsley's life is given in his own letters and diary, and is full of incidents which he little thought when recording them would show how complete was his consecration to the work which he took up, and how well adapted he was to it. His death, untimely though it seemed to all his friends, has not been in vain. The mission he planted has rapidly multiplied, and by his death he has quickened the interest of the whole church in missionary work in Africa. The volume which tells of his life and work and death is destined to spread and intensify this interest.

The Pillar in the Night. *By J. R. McDuff, D. D., Author of "Morning and Night Watches," "Bow in the Cloud," etc.* 12mo, pp. 336. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1893.

A handy volume, beautifully written and beautifully printed. It is designed to be a companion to the author's *Bow in the Cloud*, and addresses itself to the

same class, the afflicted and sorrowing. It is composed of a series of meditations, thirty-one in number, so as to be used one for each day of the month. The meditations are independent, and not consecutive. Those who have long known and received comfort from the author's other devotional books will eagerly seek this, and will find it characterized by the same sweetness of thought and comforting application of the gospel of Christ.

ADDRESSES. *By Professor Henry Drummond, F. R. S. E., F. G. S.* With a brief sketch of the author, by Rev. W. J. Dawson. 12mo, pp. 138. 75 cents. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1892.

In this handy volume are gathered six of the already widely-known and read addresses of Professor Drummond, viz.: "Love, the Supreme Gift, the Greatest Thing in the World;" "The Perfect Life, the Greatest Need of the World;" "Dealing with Doubt;" "Preparing for Learning;" "The Study of the Bible;" "First; a Talk with Boys."

SUN, MOON, AND STARS: Astronomy for Beginners. *By Agnes Giberne, Author of "The World's Foundations," The Ocean of Air," etc.* With a preface by the Rev. C. Pritchard, M. A., F. R. S. New and Revised Edition. 12mo., pp. 334. $1.25. New York: American Tract Society. 1892.

Agnes Giberne has made her name a household word by her fine treatises for young people on subjects usually regarded as beyond them. Her *Father Alden*, as well as other books, have been long and favorably known. The volume before us is from the twentieth edition, and embodies many changes and additions which bring the information contained in the book up to date.

KOREA FROM ITS CAPITAL: With a Chapter on Missions. *By the Rev. George W. Gilmore, A. M.* 12mo, pp. 328. $1.25. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work. 1892.

As the Southern Presbyterian Church is just now entering upon a new mission and sending some of her choicest workers to Korea, this book would be a most timely volume to all who would know the field. It is not a history of the people of Korea, which the students will find in Dr. Griffis's *Corea, the Hermit Nation*, so much as an account of the present conditions of life there—the country, government, language, domestic life, attire and adornment, religion, resources, etc. It is just such a book as one would wish to read who would understand the present needs of that secluded people, and who would sympathize with those who have gone to them to carry the gospel of Christ.

MARRIED LIFE: A Blessing to the Truly Married. *Arranged by Mrs. Dora E. W. Spratt.* 16mo, 64 pp. Price, 75 cents. Philadelphia: Benjamin Griffith, 1420 Chestnut street.

This little book consists of a collection of passages, poetical and prose, from a wide range of authors, bearing upon the blessings of married life. The book is divided into six portions, with an ornamental sub-title page prefacing each and suited to the pages following. It is meant for a wedding souvenir. Mrs. Spratt has done her work well, and the publishers have brought out the volume in a very

attractive style. The paper is first-class and the typography and binding all that one could wish. Pastors will find it equal, if not superior, to anything of the kind now in the market, and a very convenient volume to put into the hands of newly married couples where it is desired to give more than the ordinary marriage certificate.

Far Out on the Prairies. *By the Author of "Drew Drake and His Nets."* 12mo, pp. 320. $1.15. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sunday-school Work. 1892.

A pleasant story of Western life, well adapted to a place in Sabbath-school and children's libraries.

THE

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I. ILLOGICAL METHODS IN BIBLICAL CRITICISM.[1]

I SHALL scarcely be expected, on an occasion like this, to speak on any other theme than Old Testament Criticism. When, eleven years ago, I was inducted into a similar chair in another institution, the discussion of this subject, in its present peculiar aspects, had just begun in this country; to-day it is the question of questions in the theological world. The movement, at once a sign and a fruit of the times, has passed far beyond its incipient stages. Its literature is already large. Even single phases of the subject have come to occupy no inconsiderable place in current thought. It is to one of these phases of the general theme that I shall invite your attention at this time. It especially concerns the style of reasoning adopted by those who advocate the newer views of the Bible. Is this reasoning in harmony with the accepted rules of logic? Can the critics of this class vindicate their often asserted claim to be scientific? On the answer to this question really depends the value of the conclusions reached.

Mr. Gladstone, not long since, speaking of modern criticism of the Bible, while confessing that he was no expert, gave this excellent advice. He said: "We must be on our guard against drawing warmth of affection into the field as having the force of argument. We should rather endeavor to defend the Scriptures upon the same principles of evidence and reasonableness governing our mental processes in other matters. When the arguments of specialists point to negative conclusions, we should beware of haste. We should reserve our judgment, even if yielding provisional as-

[1] Inaugural Address, May 3, 1893.

sent, until we know the specialists have said their last word, and we have had an opportunity to compare their results with the wider considerations belonging to the fields of history, philosophy, and religion at large." Mr. Gladstone, it is well known, though a liberal in English politics, is a conservative in matters affecting the Bible. Still we have reason to suppose that this advice of his, though given to the laity, would be acceptable to biblical scholars generally.

Certain it is, that Christianity and its true friends are the friends of free inquiry. It is he who doeth evil who hateth the light and cometh not to the light. The Christian man in the very act of becoming so ceases, in purpose at least, to be self-willed and opinionated. He begins from that very point of time to cultivate the open mind as a primary virtue. A loyal subject of the Master of truth, he consciously binds himself, at whatever cost to himself, to be a man of truth in speech and act. Naturally, then, biblical criticism has no terrors for the intelligent Christian disciple. He welcomes all right methods of investigating the Scriptures, inductive or deductive. He freely submits to all tests of belief imposed by a true scholarship. He feels bound to add to his faith and virtue knowledge. He is sure that nothing could well be more opposed to the Bible than to bring sophistical or unintelligent reasoning to the defence of the Bible. To the degree, accordingly, that he is true to the fundamental principles of his faith and life, he will discard the apologetic which does not square with the rules of logic.

And what is sound law for him in these matters he can only regard as good law for others. Accepting for himself the principles of reasoning "governing our mental processes in other matters," he expects others to be guided by them. When, consequently, "the arguments of specialists point to negative conclusions," he makes it his first business not to adopt the conclusions, but to examine the arguments. No proclaimed *consensus* of critics either overawes or unduly hurries him. He waits for the *dissensus* of critics. He reserves his judgment till the final word has been spoken, and, as is highly commendable in matters of this importance, "opportunity given to compare the results attained with

the wider considerations belonging to the fields of history, philosophy, and religion." In short, while ready to prove all things, he does not forget, meantime, to hold fast to that which has been hitherto accredited as good.

Let us note now a few characteristic examples of the kind of reasoning used in defence of current theories of Old Testament criticism. It is a matter of first consequence to determine whether it is really scientific; or whether the terms of science have been used to bolster up what is fallacious in method and so false in result. We will first inquire as to the point of view from which Israel's history and institutions are treated. Logic has very strict laws as to what is assumed before the reasoning really begins. There is, on the one hand, what is known as the old, or "traditional" view of Israel. It is no worse for the name "traditional," although in our day, undoubtedly, some degree of odium attaches to the epithet. What is meant by it—at least, what can only properly be meant by it—is the view which has been commonly held, handed down as correct, until recent times.

This traditional view has not only been the universal one in the church until now, but it is by all acknowledged to be, exteriorly considered, the biblical view. It was originally derived from the Bible; it is the account which the Bible here actually gives of itself. Biblical writers follow a certain consecutive order of events in Israelitish history; refer the origin of the peculiar people and of its institutions, civil and religious, to the immediate supernatural intervention of God before, during, and after the exodus. They represent that the prophets, men of God in a peculiar sense, came after the giving of the law, enforcing its claims. The Babylonian exile was the result and punishment of trangressions long indulged and often rebuked, culminating in the return of a remnant of the people wholly purged from idolatry. This, in brief, is the scheme of Israel's history presented in the Bible. It is definite, clearly intelligible, and, it must be confessed, fairly consistent with itself. It is to be observed, that it is no mere matter of opinion, but of plain record. Indeed, it rests solidly down on a mass of veritable documents, some of them public, juridical acts, the very names of the chief actors, and the archive itself in which the re-

cords were sacredly kept, the ark of God being referred to by name (Deut. xxxi. 25, 26). It is the view of their own history which, as far as we know, was, without exception, adopted by the Jewish people. It was received from them unchanged by the Christian church. On the ground of its being transmitted, it has been named, as also nicknamed, "traditional." But its chief characteristic and recommendation is not that it has come down to us from the past, but that it is *prima facie* biblical, and, to outward appearance, historical.

Over against this position is what is known as the critical view. Our critics do not deny that the scheme of Israel's history, just described and hitherto accepted, is fairly deduced from the Bible. They do not dispute the genuineness or purity of the so-called tradition, from the day it took final shape to our own. What they claim is that the scheme presented by biblical writers and their successors is mistaken. It does not represent, they say, the true development. It is really the product of a late, post-exilic working over of the ancient records. Israel's religion did not arise in this way, they hold, for the simple reason that no religion ever did so arise. It sprang up, and was evolved naturally. Starting with the most primitive ideas of God, and the crudest forms of worship, at the exodus, or earlier, it progressed gradually from them, through the prophets of the eighth and ninth centuries, to the hights of cultus-development shown in Leviticus, and the purest monotheism at the time of the Babylonian exile, a thousand years later. Such being the case, it becomes necessary, it is held, to reädjust the matter of the Old Testament to suit the facts. The documents, which have been manipulated mostly by a priestly class in their own interests, must be reworked, faced about, and allowed to tell their original story.

This is the broad and startling assumption with which our critics begin. The fallacy it involves as an assumption may be obscured by calling it a working hypothesis, but it is something very different from that, it is an a-priorism of the first magnitude. And it certainly does not lack boldness, or the elements of radical and even revolutionary change. A bright Frenchman defined a literary critic as one who rips open the doll in order to get at the saw-

dust there is in it. In other words, he characterized such criticism as ruthless. This sort of literary criticism, too, it may be said at first glance, is ruthless.

Let us see, however, what the position taken involves logically. There are different values to be attached to the various particulars of literary criticism. Questions concerning the time when a document arose, the point where, or even its authorship, often take a subordinate place in the inquiry. The question of the credibility, the honesty of a work under examination, can only have one place, and that the first. What have our critics done with this primary question of the honesty of the Bible? They have assumed that it has been settled in the negative; or, more exactly, they have, as a rule, quietly ignored it altogether as a question to be seriously discussed. Assuming, in the face of Christianity, that no religion ever arose as Israel's religion is represented as doing, they are compelled to assume that the biblical account of the matter is false; and by a third they follow up this assumption, that while the Bible cannot be trusted in all particulars, it has elements of historical truth of which they, as discovers, are also the proper interpreters. Each one of these assumptions is a logical *coup d'état.* They can never be reconciled with those "principles of reasonableness governing our mental processes in other matters."

It is true, no doubt, if one might assume that Israel's religion arose like those of the heathen about it, and, hence, that the biblical history of it has been colored to suit a preconception, that our critics' theory of the matter would fairly account for many of the phenomena, besides being consistent with the modern theory of evolution. One may not assume the one thing or the other. To be scientific one can only assume as a premise what has been proven to be true, or is mutually admitted to be so by the parties in debate. Here the old party, and the one that is really in possession of the goods, lays strenuous and unabated claim to the very thing which the new assumes, without discussion, to be false. It claims that the account which the Bible gives of itself is true; that Israel's religion did not arise like other religions about it; and that while this view of the subject is both simpler and more natural

than the other, it also accounts better for the sum of the phe nomena involved.

It may be asked, Are all adherents of the newer views to be classed together? Is there not a Driver school as well as one of Kuenen and Wellhausen? Yes; there are those who adopt essentially the theory of the latter scholars concerning Israel's history, who disclaim attacking the inspiration of the Scriptures, and deny that they would rob them of the element of the supernatural. But they are still in debt to the Christian world for an explanation. In what sense do they use these significant terms? The vital point, after all, is whether there is a second way of reaching Wellhausen's conclusions not open to the logical difficulties he encounters. There are two antagonistic views of the history of redemption as recorded in the Old Testament—the Bible's own, and that championed by our critics of the current analysis; and by all of them. It is here that the line is to be strictly drawn, and minor differences are of little account. If the face of the record of the Pentateuch and subsequent historical books be true, the scheme of every school of analysts and readjusters, now before the public, is palpably and confessedly false.[1]

There is another case where our critics build not a little on a disputed, and so an unscientific assumption. It was said of some one that he became a believer, not by denying his unbelief, but

[1] Professor Driver's position, in his own language, is this: "Two principles, once recognized [that is, according to him, two axioms once admitted], will be found to solve nearly all the difficulties which, upon the traditional view of the historical books of the Old Testament, are insuperable, viz.: (1), that in many parts of these books we have before us *traditions*, in which the original representation has been insensibly modified, and sometimes (especially in the later books) colored by the associations of the age in which the author recording it lived; (2), that some freedom was used by ancient historians in placing speeches or discourses in the mouths of historical characters." [1] It is on the basis of these very mildly stated, but most far-reaching presuppositions that Professor Driver and every English and American colleague of his, as far as I know, discusses the subject. He does not seek to justify the position to any considerable extent—he assumes it. He does not even deem the statement he makes concerning it of sufficient importance to justify his placing it in the body of his work. It is consigned to a foot-note. How wide open it throws the door, to every sort of textual emendation demanded by the theory, it is easy to see.

[1] *Introduction*, Preface, p. xiii.

by following it out. There is no surer way of checking the prevalent epidemic of German rationalistic criticism of the Bible than critically to follow it up, through its methods, to its conclusions. It is assumed that the absence of definite historical reference, in times immediately subsequent to the supposed establishment of an institution, is sufficient evidence of its non-existence. Put in syllogistic form, and applied to the matter before us, the argument would run thus: If the laws concerning the priesthood and public worship, found in the middle books of the Pentateuch, arose with Moses, as alleged, and not at the Exile, they would be referred to in the intervening periods. They are not so referred to; hence, they did not arise with Moses. Our critics argue the minor premise with considerable zeal, though with but indifferent success. Their opponents have clearly shown that there is sufficient reference in the subsequent periods to the institutions named, to substantiate historically their origin with Moses, even from the view-point of the critic. Not to mention others who have treated the subject less directly, there have been three scholarly works written on the *Law in the Prophets*,[1] two by Englishmen and one by a German. They one and all maintain by a sober appeal to texts, and, beyond reasonable objection, that the prophets from the ninth century downward show acquaintance with all the essential elements of the Pentateuchal institutions, laws, and history. They make it evident that the moral attitude and mighty work of these prophets cannot be properly explained on any other ground.

Meantime, the major premise of their syllogism, passing as an axiom with our critics, has been too much overlooked. It is demonstrably untrue, applied generally, or biblically, that institutions, if existing, will always be named in the succeeding periods. No institution was more central or dominant in what is claimed to be the earliest code of the Pentateuch than the Sabbath (Ex. xx. 8–11). Our critics acknowledge that the code of Deuteronomy (chapters xii.–xxvi.) is secondary, and was largely based upon the first. But to the Sabbath the code of Deuteronomy

[1] Bredenkamp, *Gesetz u. Propheten* (1881); Watson, *The Law and the Prophets* (1884); Leathes, *The Law in the Prophets* (1891). Robertson's book, *The Early Religion of Israel* (1892), falls also in this category.

makes not the slightest allusion. Again, in the same earliest code, provision is made for the Feast of Weeks, known in Christian times as Pentecost. It was one of the three great original pilgrimage festivals of Israel (Ex. xxiii. 16). Our critics admit its primitive origin. At the same time, they are compelled to admit that no historical book of the Old Testament makes reference to it before 2 Chronicles (viii. 13), a work appearing after the Exile. What is more, the Book of Ezekiel, whose last eight chapters deal exclusively with the Israelitish cultus, has not a word to say about it.

And there is a still more remarkable case. It is that of the great Day of Atonement. Its solemn rites are central and in the nature of a climax in the Levitical legislation and what is technically known as the Priests' Code. All the other ritual observances of the sacred year lead straight up to it. And yet there is not the first allusion in any prophetical or historical book of the Bible to the observance of these rites, not alone before the Exile, but at any period whatever. The first notice of any celebration of the kind is in the time of John Hyrcanus, B. C. 135; and the second, in the time of Herod, A. D. 37. So that if the argument of our critics prove anything, it proves quite too much.

It is not to be forgotten that the Levitical laws in general, about which there is claimed to be silence, like the one just noted, relate to priestly and exclusively ritual observances. Little could be expected concerning them in the historical and prophetical books, especially when it is considered that these books are few in number, of meagre contents, and the former almost purely annalistic. Hence, while there is no lack of readiness on the part of conservative scholars to discuss the matter of the recognition of alleged Mosaic institutions in the pre-exilic books, and while there can be no question about the result of such discussion, they repudiate, at the outset, the proposed axiom that there *must* be mention if there be existence. Accordingly, with their favorite syllogism lame in its best leg, it will not be expected that our critics will be excessively dogmatic, much less abusive, at this point.

But we are not yet at the end of the illogical assumptions of this form of criticism. There is another of this sort. We find

Israel, it is said, during and after the period of the Judges addicted to worship in high places, wholly apart from tabernacle or temple. This is forbidden in laws purporting to come from Moses. It would have been impossible, if such laws had really existed from this early period. Then a special effort is made to show to what a vast extent infractions of alleged Mosaic laws took place. On this particular the whole emphasis is expended to the almost total obscuration of the other premise, which is clearly fallacious. The postulate is not true, that if a supposed law is not kept that fact is sufficient evidence of its non-existence. To the infractions of a law and exceptional departures from it in periods of partial suspension or lapse, one cannot be permitted, unchallenged, to give the force of a law.

Our critics ignore at the start, as we have seen, a very important consideration. The representation of the Bible is that the laws concerned were revelations from heaven. They were meant, not for one period, but for the whole life of Israel as a people. Hence, they were, to a certain degree, and for the Israel that then was, of an ideal character. Partial and temporary defections were not, therefore, remarkable. Even from the viewpoint of our critics, that these laws were man-made, arose out of the circumstances of their times, we might still challenge the correctness of the assumption. It is not an axiom on which we can build that, if alleged laws are not kept, they are only alleged and not real. Let it be applied to laws of our own. Do the common practice of gambling and the grossest forms of licentiousness among us prove the lack of law, or, much rather, the lack of a dominant public sentiment in favor of the enforcement of law? Is there no law in Chicago against the opening of saloons on Sunday? Is there no Maine law in Maine? Portland is in Maine. Take a still nearer and fairer example: Could Christianity itself prove its own existence by this rule? There have been long ages when its sole representative was a corrupt, time-serving church. There have been defections as gross as any that marked the history of Israel. There have been pretended vicegerents of Jesus Christ who were more notorious offenders against law and morals than Jeroboam, the son of Nebat, who made Israel to sin. Shall we

demand of Judaism, a thousand years before Christ, what we cannot of Christianity?

We subscribe implicitly to the biblical record of facts. For nearly a thousand years idolatry was almost always rampant in Israel. Stranger anomalies even sprang up in anomalous times. There was a whole century after the capture of the ark at Shiloh when no legalized sanctuary existed. Is it so wonderful that Samuel sacrificed at Mizpeh and elsewhere? Let us be reasonable. Israel treated its law, which the Scriptures assure us it had, just as it might have been expected to do. It gave to it but a partial and half-hearted recognition. It never ceased to feel the strength of its own inveterate, antagonistic customs, and the fascination of false systems obtruding themselves on every hand. That it had no ideal, can never be justly inferred from its failure to reach it. The whole trend of historical and prophetical utterance plainly requires the postulate of what the Bible asserts to be fact, a lofty legal standard by which, at least inwardly, the people of Israel ever measured itself.

So far, I have given examples of only one form of fallacy in the reasoning of our critics—that of illogical assumption. They are examples only, though of a striking character. The list is practically exhaustless. In their argument from language and style, from alleged duplicate accounts and the use of the divine names, unproved and unprovable postulates, tacitly or openly assumed, vitiate most of the conclusions reached.

It is time, however, to call attention to another particular in which this criticism fails to meet proper scientific tests. A recent writer favorable to it says: "If its (the) results are revolutionary in theology, the revolution will be simply the substitution of an *inductive* method [*inductive* italicized] for the *a priori* methods of dogmatics."[1]

Logical experts assure us that every branch of study which can at all claim the character of a science requires two things, (1), a correct ascertainment of the data from which one is to reason; and (2), correctness in the process of deducing conclusions from them.[2] Hitherto we have considered mostly the incorrectness of our

[1] Bacon, *Genesis of Genesis*, p. 27. [2] Whately's *Logic*, p. 278.

critics' methods of deducing conclusions through illogical assumptions. Only incidentally have we noticed that there are classes of biblical statements, mostly those relating to its supernatural origin, of which they refuse to take account. They are simply so much dust on their balances and nothing more. But there are numerous other equally explicit statements of the Bible which they fail to treat with scientific candor. They are concerned to argue, as we have seen, that no positive evidence exists in the intermediate books of the Old Testament of the Mosaic origin of the Levitical laws. But, apparently, there is no small amount of such evidence; it is at least so regarded by other biblical critics.

What do the critics of this class, who claim to be governed by scientific principles, do with it? They take the most unscientific methods to get rid of and silence it. Could there be a more direct confession of judgment? Mr. Joseph Jefferson, in a lecture at New Haven, last year, on the origin of Shakespeare's plays, remarked that argument is something extremely potent. It was once proved by an ingenious writer that Napoleon never existed; but the gentleman forgot to prove that Napoleon did not die. Surely, if he died, he must have lived. So our critics claim that there is no evidence of the existence of large portions of the Pentateuch until exilic or post-exilic times, many hundred years after Moses. But they have forgotten to explain, if that be true, why they are so zealous to eliminate by the cruelest kind of dislocation and mutilation, a good deal of evidence that seems to be of that character.

Such expressions found in the historical books as "The Book of the Law of Moses" (2 Kings xiv. 6), as "Thou spakest by the hand of thy servant Moses" (I Kings ii. 3), they simply mark with a *dele*, as though they were proof-readers instead of scientific investigators. Of the narrative in Samuel (1 Samuel vii. 3, ff.), where Israel, in response to the prophet's appeal, is said to have put away Baalim and Ashtaroth to serve the Lord only,—because it is out of harmony with the current theory, one of its most noted leaders bluntly says that there is not a word of truth in it.[1] A forced exegesis is called in to evade the reference to

[1] Wellhausen, *Geschichte*, I., p. 243. Cf. also 1 Samuel vi. 15; 2 Samuel xv. 24; 1 Kings viii. 3, 4, etc.

the sin offering in Psalm xl. 6, where the rendering of our Revised Version is: "Burnt-offering and sin-offering hast thou not required"; and to Pentateuchal laws in Hosea (viii. 12): "Though I write for him my law in ten thousand precepts, they are counted as a strange thing." The prophet Joel speaks of the meat offering and drink-offering as being cut off from the house of the Lord (i. 9, 14), that is, shows acquaintance with the laws of Leviticus; knows of and uses the supposed priestly term for congregation (ii. 16, cf. Exodus xix. 10, 22), and so on. Accordingly, and for this reason, as it would appear, the prophet Joel, who hitherto has stood near the head of the prophets of the ninth century, must march and take his place among the very latest of the Bible.

It has been customary to date the Book of Malachi at the interval between the two visits of Nehemiah to the court of Persia (*cir.* B. C. 435). But it will appear, even to a cursory reader, that this date of the book is out of harmony with the theory that the Priests' code arose in B. C. 444. Hence, our critics find it necessary to move the date up before Ezra's time; notwithstanding that it brings the book into direct conflict with the situation which it clearly presupposes (with Ezra vi. 9, and vii. 20 cf. Nehemiah x. 32, 33).[1]

Words scarcely suffice for some of our critics to characterize the untrustworthiness of the Books of Chronicles, which throughout claim for every period of Jewish history the institutions that they say did not arise till after the Exile.[2] And the school of Driver here stands alongside that of Wellhausen to give its nod of assent. This scholar writes: "A new mode of viewing the past history of his nation began to prevail [with the Chronicler]; preëxilic Judaism was pictured as already in possession of the institutions, and governed, at least in its greater and better men, by the ideas and principles which were dominant at a later day. . . . The past in a word was idealized, and its history (when necessary) re-written accordingly."[3] No wonder that a bishop of

[1] See also the discussion of the subject in Kirkpatrick's *The Doctrine of the Prophets*, pp. 496-498.

[2] Cf. Wellhausen, *Geschichte*, I., pp. 177-237.

[3] *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, p. 500.

the Church of England, who has recently written on the Books of Chronicles,[1] exclaims: "My friends, my reason rises up in revolt at the claims of this unreasonable criticism."

The climax thus far in this process of dislocating or deleting unsatisfactory evidence in the biblical books has been reached by Professor Cheyne, a colleague of Driver. In a recent work[2] he re-dates the whole Psalter, with the partial exception of Ps. xviii., after the return from Babylon, and much of it a great deal after. It was for the second temple, that of Zerubbabel, not for that of Solomon, that the Psalter was made. He has gone so far that some of the most advanced German adherents of the criticism refuse to follow him.[3] No Psalms from David! None from the period of Isaiah! The whole wonderful book relegated to a barren age of which the little that we know makes it clear that whatever else it was, it was not literary and was not spiritual. So complete a somersault in critical opinion can only be accounted for by an exigency.[4] It is the same that disclosed itself in Joel. It was found impossible to reverse the order of Israelitish history, admitting no regulative norm of holy living and aspiration such as the Mosaic institutions offer, and leave the Psalms with their present titles and immemorial dates. Let the truth be known; it is a theory which has to be accommodated at every hazard. It is the men who blazon the claim that they are scientific investigators of the Bible, who thus put the theory first, and would modify to no small extent the facts to suit it.

Once more we are obliged to charge the mass of those who take the new view of the Bible as doing so on the basis of hearsay, or the supposed dictum of scholars, which is the last remove from being logical. I know this will be a distasteful charge. It has long been applied as a stigma to the other man. It is in no spirit of retaliation that I use it here; it expresses a fact. I urge it in the interests of strictly scientific investigation. Those called

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[1] Lord A. C. Hervey, *The Books of Chronicles, etc.*, London, 1892, p. 174.

[2] *The Origin and Religious Contents of the Psalter, etc.*, London, 1891.

[3] Cf. Budde, *Theolog. Literaturzeitung*, No. 10, 1892.

[4] Note how completely the tables are turned on our critics by Hayman in the April number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1893.

"traditionalists" are said to make their appeal to the authority of the church, rather than to facts. No doubt this is true to a considerable extent. I care not to dispute it. It could not well be otherwise. At the same time it must be confessed that the church is pretty good authority. If it be a tradition that has been followed, it is one held, till now, to use a technical expression, *semper*, *ab omnibus*, *ubique*, always, by all men, everywhere. One might be pardoned for fancying, without much personal investigation, that there is much truth in a view which has shown such persistence and such universality.

What, however, is to be said of the great proportion of the votaries of the new scheme? They seem to show an equal deference to authority less universal and quite as likely to be fallible. Is it, in fact, a change for the better to accept the authority of certain modern critics, mainly European, who, as a rule, look at the Bible from a very different view-point from ourselves, in place of the so-called "tradition," the authority of the Bible and of the church? Is it a sign of strength or of weakness to be ready to transfer one's loyalty to mighty truths at what time one hears the sound of the "cornet, flute, harp, sackbut, psaltery, and dulcimer, and all kinds of music"? In place of authority with a big "A," as one has expressed it, it is "authority" with a little "a."

After considerable study given to the problems of biblical criticism, especially those of the Pentateuch, I must say that they are exceedingly complex. They appeal largely to technical scholarship. I feel sure that all specialists would agree that the number of persons who are capable of pronouncing opinions upon them, founded on extensive and accurate knowledge, is exceedingly small. By far the greater number, accordingly, of those who have adopted the new views, have done so at second hand, because they have understood that they were advocated by scholars, and based on facts scientifically gathered. In the nature of the case, nothing else would be possible if there be any such number of adherents as is claimed. Indeed, this is the exact tenor of the appeal by which a wide-awake and wide-spread propagandism is being carried on. The consensus of critics, it is said, is in this direction. Biblical criticism is a science. Its masters have the best right to give

us the results of their investigations, and it is our privilege to hearken and to follow. "There is always a reasonable presumption," writes a prominent educator, in a religious journal, "that an increasing consensus of specialists in any given field is due to an accumulation of evidence which is adequate to prove the views agreed upon."[1] Hence, he goes on to argue, we must adjust ourselves to these new theories, though they do lead to a "very considerable modification of present views." Now, what is this but the very quintessence of traditionalism in a new quarter? For the old traditionalism, a new one has sprung up.

Neither, of course, is, in itself considered, to be commended. The best way is, where it is possible, to investigate for one's self; to make up the mind only after a personal study of the facts. When this is not possible, or only to a limited degree possible, the wise way is to move cautiously and slowly in accepting ready-made opinions. The likelihood is, that, like other things ready-made, they will not last long. "Believe not every spirit, but prove the spirits, whether they are of God," is the divine rule. It is no sufficient recommendation of a theory that it is new, or that it is widely or even brilliantly supported. It must first be shown that it is truer and better than the old which it would supplant. Wait a bit—wait, at least, until good reasons are given aside from the plea of scholarly support. I say it advisedly, the reasons for this great change of front towards the Bible, which you are asked to make, are not, and have never been, in the hands of the people. They are not, to any great extent, in the hands of the ministers; they cannot even be stated intelligibly by more than a limited number of our theological professors themselves.

Finally, there is found in our critics' reasoning the defect known as the "fallacy of objections." It consists in an attempt to show that there are serious objections inhering in a certain scheme or system. It is expected to be inferred that the system is false, and will be rejected. To be logical, it should be shown that the alternative system is faultless, or, at least, has fewer faults. Much has been made of the difficulties of the common view of the origin and structure of the Old Testament. It is frankly to be confessed

[1] *The Congregationalist*, March 3, 1892.

that it is not as simple and clear as it might be. Nobody holds that it leaves no unsolved problems in Israelitish history and laws. In the nature of things, how can it be possible to explain everything clearly? The aim of the Bible was practical. The things that are revealed belong to us and to our children, "that we may do all the words of this law." Of its practical aim the Bible did not fail. This aim, as related to the contemporaries of biblical writers, was consistent with a good deal of reserve on subjects concerning which we now have a theoretical interest. Some of them will be cleared up, doubtless, when the ripe fruits of biblical archæology and geography, philology and chronology have been gathered in. The old objection that the age of Moses was too barbarous to admit of the practice of literary composition is heard no more. The proverb once current that "the pen is mightier than the sword," is likely soon to be supplanted by another: "The explorer's spade is mightier than the critic's pen."

The facts of the Tell-el-Amarna tablets weigh a good deal more than the conjectures of even a German professor. Melchizedek was never a myth, and is no longer a marvel. Not so very long ago secular history knew nothing of the Sargon of the Book of Isaiah; or the Belshazzar of the Book of Daniel. Has it no secret niche, where we shall some day spell out the name of "Darius the Mede," and many another present enigma? In a church of one of the Danish islands, it was the custom of the men in walking toward the altar and coming back again, to bow at a certain point, toward the side of the aisle on which the women sat. No one could tell why. A short time since, a layer of plaster was removed from the wall on that side, and a picture of the Virgin Mary was brought to light. That had been the original cause of the reverential custom. For four hundred years it was kept up, long after its significance had been forgotten. If such a thing could happen in the green tree of modern Denmark, what might not be expected in the dry one of ancient Palestine? Must every custom show its certain law, and every law its literal following?

Meantime, what of this other scheme which is offered us? Is it absolutely free from difficulties? Has it no historical problems to be solved? Are our critics inwardly entangled and circumscribed

by no prepossessions? The great prophets, it is said, arose before the Mosaic law. What arose before the prophets and reforming kings, like Hezekiah, to furnish a moral reason for their existence? A result has a cause. Somebody, and a very influential somebody, was behind the supposed universal movement to *represent* the development of Israel as different from what it actually was; who? Let the complot be unearthed. Solomon's temple, we are told, arose without sound of hammer or axe; we are not told that it arose without workman.[1] How are we to harmonize the apparent spirit of biblical writers, who spare not the follies of the most revered patriarch, or the moral lapses of a Moses or a David, with this alleged duplicity?

How shall we explain the orderly development of Messianic prophecy in biblical books as they now appear, if they have been subjected to these disturbances? Are they, too, a priestly fabrication? How is it that the Jewish leaders and people, who were not actively in the movement to reconstruct the national history in the interests of a coterie of priests, tamely submitted to it; and that we find not one trace of a contrary view in the tradition? What new historical evidence has come to light to show that the period of the Babylonian exile was fittest for literary monuments and suits best the climax of ecclesiastical evolution?

Does this scheme bring the Bible into closer consistency with

[1] Cf. Andrew Lang (Longman's *Mag.*, September, 1892) on a similar theory concerning the Odyssey. "It is the work, as it stands, of a botcher, or patcher, a miserable journeyman poet, who lived about 650 B. C. He took three older epics, which again were based on older lays. He cut them about, docked beginnings and endings, added Book I., and a great deal of other nonsense of his own, dragged in bits of the ancient poems, all out of place, and by his tailor-craft, scissors, and patches, this snip stuck and stitched together our *Odyssey*. Why he did it, what he had to get for it, nobody knows. He was living in an age when poets like Arctinus, Engammon, Agias, and others were making epics of their own, now lost. Others were turning to lyric effusions. There can have been no great reading public, and where was an audience for the whole *Oydssey?* Why did a patchwork come to be accepted as inspired, while the works of Arctinus perished? How was Greece, how was all the world deluded into accepting a wretched piece of tailor-craft as an epic? Who paid the tailor? He got no renown; nobody ever heard his name mentioned, and I fail to see how he could get any solid reward. It was as if Mr. Tupper's continuation of *Christabel* were to be accepted as a solid part of the original, and the whole assigned to Chaucer."

itself; for example: the New Testament with the Old? Does it foster a reverence for sacred characters and things? Is it a marvel of simplicity, so "that he may run who readeth it?" Are the critics agreed among themselves, even on the weightiest questions of the order and age of documents? Who shall tell us now how much of the Old Testament is really trustworthy? The critics? Which school of critics? This is at once the most practical and the most difficult problem this sort of criticism has to solve, as recently shown by a Scotch professor in an English journal.[1] If one by literary device can dispose of "Mosaism," so called, and historical Judaism, what shall be said of Christianity and its Lord? Be sure the camp will move that way. Even the present lull in the combat is ominous. The latest journals from Europe bring us notice, in fact, of an effort to apply the current methods of Pentateuchal criticism to the Book of Acts. It is no *jeu d'esprit*, like Professor Mead's *Romans Dissected*, but a veritable attempt to apportion this book between two unknown writers, one of whom, it is said, carries his partiality for the miraculous to the verge of absurdity, and, in other respects, shows that his history is a manufactured article.[2] So it is not a question of avoiding difficulties in going from the old to the new, but of multiplying them tenfold.

Let me not be misunderstood. I have had no intention in the foregoing remarks to disparage a proper biblical criticism. The very admission of difficulties is a summons to it. I have not even meant to represent the current, imported sort as wholly bad. There is much that is admirable and worthy of imitation in it. We acknowledge and applaud the scholarship of not a few of our critics. Biblical science is much indebted to them in other departments. We admire their zeal here, and can, in some measure, understand their wish to bring all phenomena under the simple law of a natural evolution. They have done an immense deal in awakening and keeping alive an interest in the historical and literary problems of the Bible. Their declared aim is good in going

[1] *The Expository Times*, April, 1893, pp. 296–299.

[2] See notice of the works of Spitta and Manen in Nos. 11, 12 of the *Theologisches Literateurblatt*, 1893.

in wholly for truth, whithersoever it may lead; in putting the emphasis on the inductive, as compared with the deductive and dogmatic methods of investigation; in seeking to apply the principles of science to the problems of theology, the queen of the sciences.

In many things our critics take the proper attitude and are to be commended. A principal fault we find in them is that they are so often untrue to their own professed principles. It might almost be said of them as was said of certain others: "Whatsoever they bid you, these do and observe; but do not after their works, for they say and do not." What is needed is an equal scholarship and zeal properly directed; induction in fact as well as in form, reasoning from established principles to a really necessary conclusion; not a whit less downrightness, but more reverence and more humility. Its secrets can never be won from the Bible by stratagem, nor wrested from it by sheer strength alone. To those who attempt it, its reply will ever be that of the Master: "Neither tell I you by what authority I do these things."

Some one wrote in the London *Spectator* of Renan before his death: "He has pleasantness; he has, on many subjects, incisiveness of perception; but he has a *cork soul*, one so light that it does not perceive the weight of the topics he discusses." The topics presented in the Bible, from the first chapter of Genesis onward are weighty topics, the weightiest possible. The proposal to study them merely as literature, of which we hear so much in these days, is in danger of degenerating into an unworthy triviality. Can it ever be safely overlooked in our day any more than in Paul's, that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God"? Can quite common cause be made with those who do not earnestly pray while they zealously study?

Our religion, we have no hesitation in acknowledging, is, and must always remain, in an important sense, a book-religion. The spirit of the Bible can never be divorced from its letter. It has thus far sustained, and maintained, too, against all comers, a certain peculiar character apart from and above all other books. We have no fears that it will lose this character through any kind or degree of modern critical inquiry. Above all, one may await,

without disquietude, certainly without panic, the results of unreasonable and illogical attacks upon the Bible. "The day shall declare it."

> "The counterfeit may for a season
> Deceive the wide earth;
> But the lie waxing great comes to labor,
> And truth hath its birth."

Edwin Cone Bissell.

McCormick Seminary, Chicago.

II. THE TENET OF *JURE DIVINO* PRESBYTERIAN POLITY.[1]

By way way of introduction to our topic, let us name certain considerations which have induced us to fix upon some aspect of church polity for the present discussion.

These considerations have been as follows:

1. *The likelihood of church polity being under estimated in a chair constituted, as this one is, of church history and church polity.*

One of the greatest men who has ever occupied this chair asserted, substantially, in his inaugural address, that church history and the history of the world, which must be studied along with it, is nothing less than the "evolution of the eternal purpose of God, who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will"; that it gives a fulness, symmetry, and maturity of theological knowledge which no other discipline can give; that it equips us as we may not otherwise be equipped to fight every error springing within the church, without the church, or from the relations between the church and the world; that it furnishes us much of our most important knowledge with reference to institutions other than the church; and that it purifies our moral judgments. Now, the course of discipline that does this, or any considerable part of it, can only be held in low estimation by the ignorant or the stupid. And church polity, attached to the great course of church history, and confined to a brief treatment of three months, or less, tends to become despised, and that notwithstanding the historical treatment it gets as a part of church history. This probability of its under-estimation, on the part of the teacher, on the part of the student, on the part of the board, and, in fine, upon the part of the church at large, as a consequence, has had its influence in the choice of the subject.

[1] An inaugural address, delivered in Union Seminary, Virginia, May, 1893.

2. *The widespread and unjustifiable contempt for the mere forms of ecclesiastical government.*

This prevalent indifference to the form of church organization is due, no doubt, in considerable part, to that infidelity as to all distinctively religious truth which has found a lodging-place in so many minds of our day. To him who believes next to nothing, except the ethics which the Bible teaches, the diversities of creed and of polity seem altogether undesirable. He is in spirit much like the Deists of the eighteenth century. They tried to find in the simple truths of natural religion a substance of doctrine held in common by all contending parties. He wishes to see his fellows come together on two or three simple articles of creed, which a member of the Bramo-Somaj could subscribe, and a polity of indefinably small prescriptions.

But, it cannot be denied that many most sincere, as well as intelligent Christians, also make little of polity. These Christians have correctly judged that the polity of the church is not of the *essentiae* of the church. They have correctly judged that the Congregational, the Methodist, and the Presbyterian communions, though of three severally differing polities, are each a constituent part of the true visible church. But they have foolishly concluded that they may with equal propriety support, therefore, any one of the three polities. We judge with them that the polity of the church is not among its essential marks, and that a communion may be a true church, though it have a polity differing from our own. But we do not judge that it is, therefore, a matter of indifference to *have* a wrong polity or to support one. On the contrary, some marks non-essential to the *bare existence* of the church are of the highest importance to its well-being. Every essential mark of the horse is found in the raw-boned and misshapen animal that draws the ash-cart, as invariably as in the high-bred and proudly-stepping courser from Arabia. The steamboat that goes down in a little squall may be as really a steamboat as the noble vessel that rides in safety the most gigantic storm-billows of the Atlantic. Barnaby Rudge and Mr. Dick and Dominie Sampson have every essential mark of a man as certainly as Francis Bacon, as John Calvin, or as John Milton. And Benedict Arnold had every essential mark

of man found in unfallen "Adam, the goodliest man of men since born, his sons." But for all that, there is a big difference between horse and horse. And there is a big difference between what is essential to the *bare being* of a steamboat and what is essential to the being of a vessel able to stand the tossings of every angriest sea. And there is a big difference between man and man, between Barnaby Rudge and Plato, between Mr. Dick and Aristotle, between Dominie Sampson, *et id omne genus*, on the one hand, and Augustine, Calvin, Milton, on the other. The logical power of an Aristotle or a Sir William Hamilton, the speculative power of a Plato or an Emmanuel Kant, the psychological insight of a Thomas Reid, the theological acumen of a John Calvin, though they be not essential to the being of man, are qualities of exceeding value. And that logical accident which obtained in the first man, that "Truth, wisdom, sanctitude, severe and pure," and naught of which obtained in the despised Arnold, was, in spite of its not being of the *essentiae*, a property of indescribable importance. Likewise there is a difference between church and church, though each have the essential marks of the church, and so be a part of the church of Christ on earth. And among the marks non-essential to the bare existence of the church, but essential to her highest well-being, is, as we hope to show, the polity so unjustifiably in contempt.

3. *A certain misconception of the Bible teaching on the subject, and a consequent mistaken attitude toward unbiblical forms of polity.*

The misconception, and the mistaken attitude here referred to, obtain in some who hold personally the Presbyterian form of government. They believe that the Bible itself contains elements of several mutually conflicting, if not contradictory polities; and, therefore, that the diverse polities which as a matter of fact now exist are to be looked upon as entitled, severally, to a degree of favor. They tell us that in the Scriptures are norms and seeds of the Episcopal form of government, norms and seeds of the Presbyterial form of government, and norms and seeds of the Congregational; and that we should, therefore, regard with great charity any of these forms which we do not ourselves hold. These views are

again and again propounded by men of eminent position. *E. g.*, the Rev. Dr. E. D. Morris, of Lane Seminary, sets them forth in his work on *Ecclesiology;* some incidental remarks of Dr. F. L. Patton, of Princeton, in his article on "Preaching" in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, January, 1890, ground an inference that he is of the same belief; and a considerable party of the Presbyterian Church in Canada seems to hold the same view.[1]

But upon the supposition that this belief is false, that there are germs of but one sort of church polity in the New Testament, that there are norms for the development of only one kind of organism, every reverent servant of God should feel that the belief adverted to may be most pernicious to the church, dangerous to multitudes of immortal souls and detractive of the honor of God. And if a word can be said which shall disabuse any of respect for this and such beliefs, our time will not have been spent in vain.

4. *The belief that it is peculiarly one province of our age to wrestle with and develop the biblical doctrine of the church and for it to testify.*

Some of our profoundest, as well as most clear-headed thinkers, have been accustomed to look upon ecclesiology as one of the more obscure and undeveloped elements in Christian doctrine; and as an element toward the settlement of which our own age is responsible for the making of a contribution. Looking back over the history of the church, they remark a certain order in the church's development of the doctrines of sacred Scripture. They point out the facts that theology, or the science of God, had substantially its "full development during the controversies concerning the nature of the Godhead, which closed with the labors of Athanasius"; that anthropology, or the science of man as related to God, "during the Pelagian controversies, closing with the labors of Augustine"; that "after a thousand years of repose and silence in the church," was developed soteriology, or the science of salvation, "through the labors of Luther and Calvin," proclaiming salvation as by grace through faith; and that ecclesiology is left to be yet developed to completeness.

They ask whether the providences of God toward the American

[1] *Independent*, March 30, 1893.

Church, in freeing her from civil domination, and in placing her here in a position "to actualize fully and without hindrance her true nature and functions as a spiritual commonwealth," do not "seem to indicate that the time has fully come for the final development of the visible church as a governmental power on earth, yet a kingdom not of this world."[1]

They ask whether the many obtrusive tendencies of speculation, characteristic of our age—"socialistic, political, philosophical," inquiries "about the principle of fellowship, the principle upon which the church is constituted"—do not point in the same direction;[2] whether the claims of the "responsibility of the church for the bodily well-being of the masses"; whether the numerous societies without the church, within the church, or partly without and partly within the church, do not demand attention to polity; whether the relation of the church to its various evangelizing agencies does not cry out for it.

They ask whether the efforts which are being made for union between the churches do not urge a rescrutinizing of present polities and a restudying of the Scripture on the subject. Holding that God's people should work for unity of spirit, and struggle to an external embodiment of that unity, they yet protest that no branch of God's church should ever recede from a genuine biblical position; that while compromise is permissible in the transactions of the world, and may be in church *regulations*, it is never allowable in any matter upon which God has clearly revealed his will; that God's word as the individual denomination sees it, is the command of the Head of the church to it, however much obscured; and that for that denomination to do otherwise than walk by it, is for it to turn traitor, and rebel against its Head and Lord. Holding that the only external unity of the church that is not contemptible, results from a common understanding and a common adherence to God's word; and believing that the polity of the church has been outlined in the Scriptures and is a matter of moment, they affirm: If union, then union along the line marked

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[1] Robinson's *Church of God*, pp. 27, 28.

[2] Cf. Peck's *Ecclesiology*, pp. 9, 10.

out in the word of God. And they ask whether we should not re-examine polity, therefore, in view of the cry for union.

Now, considering that the most of these representations are made by Dr. Stuart Robinson, and Dr. Thomas E. Peck, and such *nomina venerabilia clara*, it is surely not aside from the mark, on such an occasion as this, to turn our thoughts on the true form of the church—a subject of at least proximate concern to our own time and people. These considerations, together with a growing appreciation of the kingdom of God on earth, a growing admiration for its beauty, an increasing delight in the contemplation of its development, and a deepening sense of our duty—every Christian's duty—to try to understand its divine ideal and to try to realize that ideal, have moved us to make the subject of thought on this occasion—THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TENET OF JURE DIVINO PRESBYTERIAN POLITY. Of course, every one understands that by the polity of a given church is meant its constitution, including its rules of discipline and a statement of its relation to the civil government.

It is equally familiar to all that the polities of the nominally Christian churches fall into two general classes, viz., government by priestly orders, and government by the church; and that there are two leading varieties in each of these two general classes of church government: that government by priestly orders may be prelatical or papal; and that government by the church may be of the independent or congregational type on the one hand, or of the presbyterial type on the other. It is a common-place, also, to say that the papacy is the exact analogue of the absolute monarchy among civil polities; that prelacy is the analogue of the limited monarchy; that congregationalism is ecclesiastical democracy; and that presbyterianism is the sacred counterpart of civil republicanism. It is a matter of common knowledge, too, that all these polities may be sub-divided on the ground of their relation to the state into *Ultramontane*, *Gallican*, and *Erastian*, but that speaking broadly, the papacy, as a whole, is ultramontane, claiming to be of right, supreme over all states, and to be entitled to their obedience; that prelacy has generally been erastian, making itself subordinate to the state and the servant thereof; and that the

tendency of churches governed by the people, *in persona*, or by representatives, while by no means universal, is more toward the complete separation of church and state.

Of the papacy we may more particularly observe that it claims: that Christ instituted a visible church on earth, with Peter and Peter's successors as his own vicegerents thereover; that he continued the apostolate in the prelates, to whom all the people were to be subject as the prelates themselves to the reigning vicegerent, the pope thus to be the head of the universal church; that the church was to have its seat and centre at Rome; and that the pope in his vicar's chair, within the City of the Seven Hills, the prelates in their sees, and the lower clergy in their several spheres were, and are, supplied with *ex opere operato* powers for the perpetuation and the edification of the church.

Of prelacy, we may add that it allied itself with the papacy in holding that "government is a function of the clergy viewed as a distinct order, rather than a prerogative of the people;" that it claims that the Episcopal polity is the only polity revealed in the Bible, and that Episcopal ordination is the only valid ordination, Episcopal "clergy" the only valid church officers.

Of Independency we may add, that the right of the people as such to *rule* is the fundamental principle; that all power, whether of *being* or *exercise*, is regarded as in the church members themselves; and, hence, that each worshipping assembly is considered as complete in itself and autonomous. They teach the parity of the ministry, and regard correctly the diaconate as an administrative and charitable as over against a judicial office.

And of the Presbyterians we may add: They hold that the power which Christ has bestowed upon the church inheres in the entire people, in private members as well as in office bearers; that the power of doctrine, government, discipline, and worship is committed to the whole church; but that this inherent power was never to be indiscriminately exercised; that the power, belonging indeed to the whole body, was to be exercised through the appropriate organs. They hold that the organs for the exercise of church government were to be chosen by the free, externally unconstrained volitions of the members of the church; that when chosen, these organs, however, are not their delegates, as the dele-

gates of a mob, nor an oligarchy of despots, but the representatives of the people, in the particular functional activities intended, responsible unto Christ, the King and Head of the church, and to his people through their and Christ's courts. Presbyterians strive to protect the liberty of the private member, and to prevent the representatives abusing the principles of election, of representation, or other essential feature of the system; and to that end clothe the private member with the right of appeal and protest when aggrieved. They hold that the representative has, in virtue of his being a member of the body of Christ and his call to his particular office, authority from Christ to perform the functions of his office, the authority to bear rule, say, if he is an elder unqualified by the property of teaching, and the authority to teach and to rule if his office is that of teaching elder. The power of the church as to its exercise is located in these representatives, these elders. Though dividing presbyters into two classes, they hold to the parity of the eldership *quoad* the functions to which any elders are elected in common. They hold to the parity of the ministry. They regard the diaconate as an administrative and charitable office under the oversight of the elders. They assert that the church of Christ is one; and, through a succession of church courts, sessions, presbyteries, and synods, and a General Assembly, attempt to give organic expression to its unity.

Such, in brief, are the typical forms of church polity. Postponing for a time the question as to which of these polities is the biblical and correct one, let us in the meantime contemplate,

The Importance of Church Polity.

The considerations advanced in our introductory remarks, though adduced for another purpose, would warrant the opinion of the probable importance of church polity; but that importance emerges when we remark:

1. *The effect which a church's polity has on its doctrine.*

Says a distinguished writer, already referred to, "Making all due allowance for exceptions arising out of the inconsistencies of individual minds, as a general rule it is found true that bodies of men (always more consistent, and more apt to be governed by the

necessities of an inexorable logic, than individual minds), if holding any special views in theology, have corresponding views, right or wrong, of the idea and nature of the church; and, *vice versa*, if peculiar views of the church, then also corresponding views of theology. Thus, a rationalistic theology is most commonly found in connection with an erastian or independent theory of the church.

"On the other hand, a prelatical theory of the church almost uniformly stands in connection with a theology of mere sacramentalism. A Calvinistic theology seldom remains long incorrupt, except as held in connection with a Presbyterian theory of the church."[1] Says a minister of note of our own day: "There is no necessary connection between government by chosen representation and the doctrines of grace; but the affinity between them is so close that given the one we naturally expect the other."[2]

It requires but a glance over the field of church history to see that if the foregoing representations err, they err by way of under-statement rather than over-statement of the general position affirmed. The affinity between certain doctrines and certain polities, and *vice versa*, appears so close, the sequence of change in doctrine, after change in polity, or *vice versa*, appears so uniform and of such a sort that our mind instinctively asks whether there is not a causal connection between them, and whether, on the removal of all causes opposing the consequent change, the sequence would not prove universal. To cite an instance or two: In the ante-Nicene period the church, in order that she might, as she supposed, promote her unity better, and so the more successfully withstand the world, determined to change the form of her organization by the elevation of her presiding presbyter-bishop, and the bestowment on him of the powers of a monarch at the cost of the parity of the ministry, and the concomitant deprivation of the people of the franchises which they had had as the citizens of a spiritual republic, and their reduction to the place and functions of minors. Naturally, and because of causal connection, upon this change of polity there followed certain marked changes in doctrine. The spiritual priesthood of the people was lost sight of. The tenet of the necessity of mediation between the *people* denuded of

[1] Robinson's *Church of God*, pp. 32, 33. [2] W. E. Moore, in Hay's *Presbyterians*.

their priesthood and treated as minors and their God emerged. This in turn led to a change in the whole conception of the gospel ministry, which was converted into a literal special priesthood, a go-between of God and his people. This doctrine of the priesthood was followed by an inevitable logic with a change in the doctrine of the sacraments so radical as to destroy them matter and form, substituting for the simple memorial and sacramental supper the awful unbloody repetition of Christ's sacrifice. Nor did the doctrines of soteriology, justification, and sanctification remain intact.

We have another example in the Church of England. Her Episcopal polity is a force, making logically for sacramentalism, for the phantasm of apostolical succession, and for the whole host of Rome's fooleries, so that as a matter of fact, she is of all Protestant churches the greatest bridge to Romanism. And we might cite instances *ad nauseam*. Just such sequences of change in doctrine, after change in polity, and *vice versa*, are a common characteristic of every part of the course of history. And mark you, they are neither accidental, nor mutually caused by some tertium, as the approaching sun causes the dispersion of darkness and occasions the crowing of cocks. We intuitively see that one's conception of polity must affect his conception of doctrine. He who conceives of the true polity as that in which the pope of Rome rules as the infallible vicar of Christ, the bishops as apostles, and the priest of every degree as clad with power to immolate and offer Christ and to grant judicial absolution, must draw his doctrines from a larger body of teaching than that which we esteem the sufficient as the infallible rule of faith and practice. He who adopts such a polity, if he has before received the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as the sum total of God's revealed truth, must change his doctrine, both as to the extent of God's infallible speaking and as to his meaning. Supposing he has been a Calvinist, he cannot any longer hold the Calvinistic view of the sacraments, after his adoption of the papal polity, if he is qualified by the slighest degree of logical consistency. And if, like Augustine, he has proximately Calvinistic views of sin and grace, it is only at the cost of contradicting his own views on the sacraments.

Of course a blessed capacity of inconsistency may protect the individual with a radically false polity from a radically false doctrine; but the logical consistency of great bodies and succeeding generations is attended by no such happy breaks, but is proverbial and uniform. Every body which changes its polity tends necessarily to change its creed. To specify: if there is an apparent exception to the rule that churches with a prelatical theory as to the church tend to become churches with a theology of sacramentalism, that apparent exception may be shown to be no real exception to the tendency. Investigation will disclose that the tendency is at work, but counteracted. The Church of England, for example, is steadied and held to a Protestant theology by the light, the example, and the love of the whole Protestant world besides. It would be as easy and quite as interesting to show that polity affects doctrine not only immediately but mediately through effect upon the worship. The worship of Rome—the mass, creature worship—with all its sensuous, spectacular features, is, in part, the fruit of the polity of Rome. And the worship of Rome has had an immense influence on the development of the dogmas of Rome. Oh, the falsehoods which this adulteress has adopted, first, into her worship, and subsequently transferred into creed!

Enough has been said to impress the truth that the effect which the polity of a church has on its doctrine is great, and hence that polity is a thing of importance—a truth which may be confirmed by remarking:

2. *The effect of a church's polity on its working capacity, viewed as an agency for the glorifying of God in the evangelization of sinners and the edification of saints.*

The very *raison d'être* of the church visible is the gathering and perfecting of God's saints, in what part soever of the world they happen to be. Accordingly our Lord with his parting breath gave that biggest command ever imposed on men: "Go ye, therefore, and disciple all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." The visible church is the great, the universal recruiting agency for the eternal armies of the Lord of Hosts.

It needs no argument to show that her efficiency in the work of drawing in recruits will be greatly affected by her organization. Without any organization she would be evidently inefficient. Every associated effort is by conception and of necessity, if commensurate results are to follow, organized effort. The more perfect the organization for the attainment of the end designed the greater the results. And there is, no doubt, a particular form of organization under which the church could do her most effective work of the kind indicated. Moreover, the church in another of her aspects may be likened to an army in conflict with foes of no common sort, and foes striving to wrest from them a crowd of miserable captives. As a matter of fact she wrestles "not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places." Seeing that organization is a matter of such immense moment in this every-day world of ours, that it often makes the difference between defeat and victory, that it often gives to the little band of organized troops superiority over great hordes of the unorganized, we cannot regard the victories of the Lord of Hosts, so far as human agency is to be used at all, as independent of organization. And in accord with what we should expect, we find that history shows that there is a connection between organization and the church's ingathering power. Dr. Fisher, the Yale historian, has said that it has been observed that most of the denominations which have had the largest growth are compact in their organization; that the Baptists, who stand third in point of numbers in the United States are an exception; but that their opinion upon the sacraments has served as a bond of union, and, to a certain extent, as a stimulus to activity.[1] The same author ascribes the slow growth of the Dutch Reformed Church—the body for which our own Zion has such strong affections, and which is surpassed by no other body of Christians, in respectability and Christian character, in the whole country—in part, to their failure, for so long a time, "in securing a united organization under a system of self-management."[2]

[1] Fisher's *History of the Christian Church*, p. 561.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 573.

This will suffice to make us see in the effect of a church's polity on its working capacity in gathering in the elect, the importance of church polity.

But, according to our Lord's great commission, the work of the church is not simply to gather in the elect, but to train them up. The church is to build up all the several members of the body of Christ to make them as large and perfect as possible. And it is easy to show that the effect of the church polity on the individual member must be great. To point to an analogy so close as to be practically demonstrative: Unquestionably one civil polity demands more of the citizen than another. One form of civil polity demands too much, and so proves impracticable. Another demands too little, and in that way fails to call forth that self-development of the individual which it should be the object of every government to seek. Another still demands enough of each to provoke and encourage his very best efforts; *i. e.*, one polity tends to make children of its men, weaklings of the strong. Another demands manhood of children. Another beckons each one for the present to the performance of the duties to which he is competent, promising to invite him higher in proportion as he enlarges his power.

An absolute monarchy expects few or none of the actions of a citizen from the so-called citizen. No matter how wise he may be, or how observant, he is not on that account expected to do more than his fellow who has only one-fourth his power. A democracy expects of every man, irrespective of his natural and acquired capacities, ability commensurate with the nicest functions of legislating and judicial activities. It expects the impossible. It is impracticable. Speedily it becomes mobocracy, one of the direst forms of tyranny. Republicanism, with a properly limited suffrage, expects of some individuals only the acts of minors; of others, acts to the performance of which the great mass of adult men is competent; and of others still the highest exercises of power of which they are, or can become, capable.

Now, the effect of a high demand, coupled with the possibility of ultimate attainment, is an uplifting force of the first moment. If one form of church polity be found to have it beyond others,

the matter of polity in the church appears a thing of no inconsiderable moment. For anything that gives enlargement and fulness of life, that begets growth in character, that refines the kind and increases the quantum of force in man as the servant of God, is, of all things, not to be despised.

And it is evident that some one form of church government must be better adapted to securing the two coördinate ends of the church's being, viz., gathering in the elect, and making them men of full stature in Christ Jesus, than any other form of church government. Give us a government at once compact, and yet elastic enough to allow sufficiently full play to individual action and development, and no other polity can approach it. As a matter of fact, history knows of one, and but one, such form of government.

3. *The effect on the political organization of the state.*

The forms of political organizations have ever since the apostolic age exercised an influence on the form of organization, in parts or in the whole, of the church. In the early post-apostolic history of the church, the form of the state impressed itself with resistless force on the entire church. The sublime spectacle of compactness and power exhibited in the empire appealed so strongly to the already secularized church that the church set itself to the work of sedulous imitation.

It is not less certain that the church under other forms has, at times, tended to occasion a corresponding change in political organizations, and even at times to provóke into being a civic organization after its own pattern. That certain forms of church organization are at virtual war with certain forms of state organization is everybody's belief. In response to one of the requests of the Millenary Petitioners, James I. cried out that "he had found they were aiming at a Scots' presbytery, 'which—(he says) agrees with monarchy as well as God and the devil;—(if I grant your petition) then Jack and Tom, Will and Dick, shall meet and at their pleasure censure both me and my council. Therefore, pray stay one seven years before you demand that of me, and if then you find me pursy and fat, and my wind-pipe stuffed, I will perhaps hearken unto you; for let that government be up, and I

am sure I shall be kept in breath; but till you find I grow lazy, pray let that alone.'"[1] The "wise fool" well and clearly perceived the suggestiveness of the form of the spiritual republic of Presbyterianism. Nor was his successor, Charles I., more friendly toward Presbyterianism, while the grandson, Charles II., said: Let the presbytery go; "it is not a religion for gentlemen,"[2] feeling that a religion of blindness and servility was the religion wanted to subserve the purpose of such gentlemen as himself. The silly Stuart kings were not too blindly silly to perceive that the organization of the church was going to affect that of the state. They had seen the analogon of the spiritual republic of the presbytery erect itself against all the power of Spain and the world, as the Republic of the Netherlands, and erect itself at the inspiration of a spiritual republic. And they had *felt* the power of the Scotch presbyteries—spiritual republics.

And one would not err, perhaps, were he to affirm that the persecution of all forms of dissent by the Russian government is dictated, in part at least, by a sense of danger to the Czar's despotism in any form of church government which is not likewise a despotism. The Czar can see all that James and the Charleses saw, and should see more. If the monarch of such wide domains can see a country so small, he may see in the constitution of New Zealand an instrument shaped as nearly "as possible after the model of government furnished in the polity of the Presbyterian church."[3] And if he cannot see New Zealand then he may turn his attention to our own country, and behold in it a system of government theoretically so exactly the analogue of the Presbyterian churches in the same country that one instinctively asks: Which one of these suggested the other? Our Czar knows, however, that the form in the church was not suggested by, but, on the contrary, suggested the other. *It* had existed long before, and had been in application in Europe for more than a single century immediately preceding the date of the Constitutional Convention of our country. It was being reëxamined and discussed with

[1] Neal's *History of the Puritans*, Vol. II., p. 16.

[2] Knight's *England*, Vol. IV., ch. 15, p. 253.

[3] Porteus, *Government and Kingdom of Christ*, p. 554.

a view of adoption by our American Presbyterians at the time of the Constitutional Convention. It was, therefore, in the mind of the whole public to a considerable extent. Moreover, in the convention to frame the Civil Constitution were at least a dozen men known to be thoroughly saturated with a knowledge of the Presbyterian polity. Hamilton, Madison, and Washington, the leaders of the convention, were students of that polity. During the sitting of the Constitutional Convention Hamilton, according to the testimony of Dr. McGill, kept the Presbyterian Form of Government lying on his study table. As there was no doubt as to which of these two forms of government suggested the other, if either was suggested, so there can be little less doubt that the Presbyterian form of government was one of the provocatives of our republican Constitution.

But if the form of polity in the church of God is so potent in its influence on the form of political organizations, surely the church cannot but esteem the polity worthy of great attention for this reason. Though directing her energies toward the individual man chiefly, can she forget her more general but hardly less potent influence?

4. *In the fact, that in the Scriptures God commends clearly and at no inconsiderable length a particular form of government for his church, and but one such form.*

For the present we merely *assert* that God has commended at length one and only one form of government for his church. At present we neither prove the correctness of our assertion, nor name the form which God has commended. We shall do both these things after a little. In the *interim* we wish the hearer tentatively accepting our assertion as true to look at the bearing of the fact asserted upon our immediate subject, which is, the importance of church polity. If God has commended one form of church polity, and commended that at length, may we not reason from his doing so to the importance of church polity? May we not reason from the length of his commendation? And may we not reason from the commendation of but a single form? God may commend in the Scriptures many things, and yet commend them in such a way as to show that he evidently considers them

as the fringes, the extremest trimmings of other things; *e. g.*, such is his commendation of the Oriental custom of foot-washing, and of the kiss of friendly salutation, the fringes of Christian love and humility. But he gives a largeness of space to other things, in his precious word, and speaks of them therein in such wise as clearly indicates that the subject-matter of teaching is of no small import. In the realm of doctrine no reverent Bible student can well doubt that original sin, that election, that distributive justice, that God's benevolence and his grace and mercy to sinners, are in the sight of the author of revelation important. Nor can he consistently conclude that church organization is unimportant, unless he rejects the pastoral epistles and mutilates with ruthless hand many other and among them the fairest portions of God's word from Genesis to Revelation. We do not believe that any man can read the word of God thoughtfully and with unbiased mind, and rise from the reading without regarding the form of the church's organization as a matter of large importance in God's eyes. And if he happens to be an advocate of the dictum that we have no authority in affairs ecclesiastical save in things commanded, that we are not the confidential advisers of the Lord Jesus, but his servants, he being our captain and king, too wise to need advice of us, then our reader cannot but regard church government as a thing to be esteemed as important by the church. If, according to the Scriptures, church government is important then it is important. And if we had failed to show that the effect which polity has on doctrine is great, and hence that polity is of great significance, if we had failed to convince the hearer that the connection between the church's polity and the efficient out-working of the church's great ends, if we had not made it plain that the great influence of the form of church organization on political organizations demanded our regarding church polity as of high consequence, and could yet, as we shall by and by, point you to a relatively full exhibition and endorsement of a church polity in the Scriptures, this last fact would settle the matter decisively and finally for every reverent reader of the Bible as God's inerrant book.

If we may anticipate our references to Scripture, we may infer that though the form of government be not of the essence of the

church, though a real branch of the church of God may exist without having the true polity, it is yet a logical accident of the greatest import. The polity which has the happiest effect on the development of doctrine, which ministers to the greatest working capacity of the church in its destined mission, which ennobles every political fabrication, influenced at all by it, in the highest degree, which develops the largest and rotundest manhood throughout all the provinces of its influence, which is the God-ordained polity, is a property (an accident) that approaches an attribute in importance.

The Bible Polity.

It will be remembered that in our introductory remarks we adverted to a class of Christians who believe that the Bible itself contains elements of several, mutually conflicting if not contradictory, polities. They are accustomed to argue this: from the *antagonistic varieties* in which church *governments* as a matter of fact do exist, and from the claim made by each of these varieties of government that itself is biblical, and it alone. These gentlemen eloquently declare that human meanness, powerful as it has shown itself in church history, and human weakness, powerful as it has shown itself in church history, and human ignorance, though indeed shutting down like black night on the true path of the church, all added together could not have, of themselves, brought forth these diversities of polity; they further assert that if there be added to human meanness, and weakness, and ignorance, other causes, natural, social, and political—mental tendencies in one, say, inclining him to monarchy, and in another inclining him to republicanism, social influences, general arrangements in society predisposing to corresponding arrangements in church organization, political influences which all admit to be forceful—all these causes are not sufficient to account for these diversities of polity. They tell us that the only sufficient explanation of the diversity is to be found in an apostolic *warrant* for a variety in the form of organization.

Over against this declaration we remark: It appears to have the ring of charity about it. It grants to the churches irrespect-

ively of their several forms of organization a divine warrant for each particular form; and it, of course, proceeds upon the view that all the forms are in themselves good. And it is well to be charitable; but it is well, also, to distinguish between charity and unloving indifference to truth and right and the ends of pure benevolence. In all the celestial predications made of charity by the inspired apostle, she is never said to have been tolerant of a lie or to have rejoiced in iniquity. And without contravening the spirit of charity many a sage has said that certain of these church governments are not of God but of the devil, not good in any respect, so far as they are peculiar, but all bad in spite of any good God may have made them the occasion of his working.

Moreover, the power of human wickedness, and weakness, and ignorance, under the influence of natural, social, and political suggestions and promptings is quite sufficient to account for the diversity of polities. Some of these are bad, as we have just affirmed. The papal polity, for example, is altogether bad. It is a gigantic, a Satanic despotism. It robs the people of their prescriptive and God-given rights. It reduces them to damning ignorance of saving truth. It substitutes a priesthood for a ministry, a government of the priesthood and for the priesthood instead of a government of the people, and, through their proper organs, by the people. It, by its carricature, slanders God and his eternal church. There is no need to hunt for good causes of the papacy. "The remains of depravity in the hearts of Christians, along with the cunning, malice, and continual efforts of Satan, are sufficient for that end."[1] Does an unclean thing come out of a clean? Nor are the papists able to show any Bible grounds for their polity. They, indeed, point to John i. 42; Matt. xvi. 17–19; Luke xxii. 31–32; John xxi. 15–17. They refer to other passages, but chiefly for corroborative evidence. The passages named are the ones most to their purpose. They find in these passages a certain primacy of honor for Peter, and transmute it into one of authority over the other apostles and the whole church. They do this in the teeth of the fact that they

[1] Porteus, *Government and Kingdom of Christ*, p. 285.

thus bring these passages into conflict with the rest of Scripture. And then, for even so their lie would not serve them as a support of their polity, they make the following utterly gratuitous assumptions: (1), That the privileges of Peter's primacy and supremacy are not personal, but official, hereditary, and transmissible; (2), That they were actually transferred to the bishops of Rome in succession; (3), And that the bishops of Rome have always enjoyed and exercised a universal jurisdiction over the Christian church.[1]

No one of these assumptions has ever been shown by proof to be anything more than an assumption. And it is safe to say that Omnipotence himself, though omniscient, can't prove all of them to be true. For while history, so far as man knows it, is absolutely silent as to any support for the first two assumptions, affording not a glimmer of a scintilla of proof, she says the third is false.

Our charitable friends would do well when about to engage in charitable remarks on forms of church government to investigate a little before making the remarks. Their lucubrations might then have the seasoning of sense, and a grain of the salt that makes for righteousness. This brief examination of the papal polity shows that from the bare existence of a given polity, and its claim of biblical support, there can be no concluding that it has warrant from the apostles or Christ.

In our approach to the Bible for its testimony on church polity we shall do well to lay aside any expectation of finding support for a polity because that polity exists. Let us turn to it, then, simply as inquirers, to learn to which, if to either, of the great generic forms of polity the Bible gives its easy and natural support.

In order to see the bearing of the biblical teaching, we must, of course, keep firmly in mind the distinctive traits of the several forms of government: The distinctive trait of Episcopacy, the tenet that there was and continueth unto this day a "distinct permanent order, higher in rank and power than presbyters, having sole authority to perform acts essential to the preservation and regulation of the church." The distinctive trait of Congregationalism, the tenets that power, not only power as to its being, but power viewed as to its exercise, power to rule, is the possession of

[1] Cf. Schaff's *History of the Christian Church*, Vol. I., pp. 153–'56.

the people; that there are two, and only two, kinds of officers in the New Testament ideal of the church, the teaching elder and the deacon; and that these officers are nothing more, as they are nothing less, than the delegates of the people, and that a single congregation is the only visible church known to the New Testament. The distinctive traits of Presbyterianism, the tenets that the Scriptures put all permanent church power for government and teaching in the hands of presbyters, that they recognize two classes of presbyters, that they require that these presbyters shall be organized into parliamentary assemblies for the purposes of rule; and that the unit of the church is to be embodied by a peculiar series of courts. With these distinctive traits in mind, let us remark:

1st. That the Bible puts all permanent church power into the hands of presbyters, for the purposes of government and teaching. To see that it does put the power into these hands, you will note that it identifies presbyters and bishops, as is evident from the following facts: (1), It makes them always appear as a plurality, or college, in one and the same congregation, even in small cities as Philippi. (2), It calls the same officers of the church of Ephesus, alternately, presbyters and bishops. (See Acts xx. 17, 28.) (3), It makes Paul send greetings to the "bishops" and "deacons" of Philippi, but omit to mention the presbyters, because they were bishops, as also the plural indicates, seeing several diocesan bishops would not be in so small a town had there been any such anachronisms. (4), "In the Pastoral Epistles, where Paul intends to give the qualifications for all church officers, he again mentions only two, bishops and deacons, but uses the term presbyter afterwards for bishop." (See 1 Tim. iii. 1-13; v. 17-19; Titus i. 5-7.) (5), Peter urges the "*presbyters*" to tend the flock of God, "*and to fulfil the office of bishops*" with disinterested devotion and without "lording it over the charge allotted to them." (See 1 Peter v. 1, 2.) This presentation of the New Testament argument for the identity of the bishop and the presbyter in New Testament times is substantially that of Dr. Schaff in his *Church History*, Vol. I. In it he is at one with the Latin father Jerome, and with Bishop J. B. Lightfoot, as well as with all trustworthy scholarship on the subject.

The different names suggested, indeed, somewhat different relations to the church, but they pointed out the very same individuals. The New Testament presbyter and the New Testament bishop were identical.

As another step in this argument, you will note that power was committed to the bishops, or presbyters; the *only sort of power in exercise* that the Scriptures ever impute to the church, except the power of electing their officers, lodged with the people, and the subordinate power of distribution lodged with the deacon, was vested neither in non-presbyterial officers, nor with the people, but with these presbyters. The passages cited to prove the identity of presbyters and bishops abundantly proved also that a lodgement of power of the kind specified was made with them. And the passages might be multiplied to satisfy every reasonable demand. In admissions to the church, in ordinations, in discipline of any form, even the most extreme, the power is seen to have been with the presbyter bishops. (See 1 Tim. v. 17, 19; Tit. iii. 10.)

Of course, there was power in the hands of the other officers of the apostolic times, but the Bible does not teach the continuance of any offices in the church save those of presbyters and deacons. There is not the slighest evidence of any sort that the Apostolate was continued, as the Episcopalians affirm, in the Episcopacy. Our brethren of the Episcopal Church may tell us that the Jewish hierarchy, with its three distinctive classes, high priests, priests, and Levites, was intended to typify the form of government which God designed for his church; that Christ organized his church during his own life in a way to preserve the three orders, he himself being the High Priest, the twelve being the priests, and the seventy the Levites; that upon his death he had the apostles moved up to fill the vacancy made by his ascension on high; the seventy moved up to fill those vacancies thus made by the elevation of the apostles; and that Christ then created the diaconate as a third body of the clergy; that the apostles chose others to the same office with themselves, *e. g.*, Paul, Timothy. They may tell us this, but there is not the slighest evidence in the Bible for the view. Nor can any of those who claim to be successors of the apostles show one of the distinctive signs of the apostles. Not one of them

witnessed the majesty of the Lord Jesus, as revealed on earth, and especially in his resurrection, which the apostles did (Acts i. 21, 22; 1 Cor. ix. 1; xv. 8; and 2 Pet. i. 16); not one of them bears a commission immediately from Christ himself (Luke vi. 13; Gal. i. 1); not one of them is endowed with the power of the Holy Ghost in such a way that he can work miracles (Heb. ii. 14; 2 Cor. xii. 11, 12), and confer the power of miracles on others, and can write and speak infallibly—make the exalted claim that his "gospel is not of man."

There is no evidence whatever that the Apostolate has been continued, any more than there is that the prophetical office has been continued, or the evangelist, if the latter is to be distinguished from the presbyter, save as to function chiefly exercised. We have no apostles and prophets to-day. We will have to reject, then, that form of church government which has for its distinctive tenet that there is a "distinct permanent order, higher in rank and power than presbyters, having sole authority to perform acts essential to the preservation and regulation of the church"—to reject it as UNBIBLICAL. The Bible grounds for its rejection might be made a thousand times stronger, but we have seen that the Bible puts permanent church power of government and teaching into the hands of presbyters for its exercise. It does not put that power anywhere else. The Bible, if it is to be our law-book, forces us to abandon the prelatical polity in favor of the presbyterian, on the *ubi* of power in exercise, as four-fifths of the best Christians and the best scholars in the world unite in saying; and it forces us to stand off from the congregational polity, too, which locates church power, not only as to its being but as to its exercise, in the people. For church power in exercise, save in the single case of election, appears in the New Testament always in officers, and as going to continue in presbyters and deacons alone.

2nd. The Scriptures recognize two classes of presbyters. In 1 Tim. v. 17, Paul writes: "Let the presbyters that rule well be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in word and doctrine." It needs no labored exegesis to show the applicability of this text to our purpose. It teaches that there were two classes of elders, one of which was marked by the pro-

perty of laboring in word and doctrine, while the other was not so marked, though equal as rulers. But both the Congregationalists and the Episcopalians refuse the office of ruling elder, which the Presbyterians receive and maintain.

3rd. The Scriptures teach that the presbyters shall rule as organized into parliamentary assemblies. When they teach the plurality of elders in a single congregation as in Phil. i. 1; Acts xiv. 23; Tit. i. 5, and teach as they do that these several rulers are of equal authority, they teach that there could be no decency and order in the exercise of their power except by agreement, that is, by an agreement of the majority. "There must have been deliberation, conference, interchange of views, and a vote which made the action that of the whole governing body,"[1] to adopt the language of one who has thought long on the subject in hand. And for an instance of the way in which New Testament elders ruled in concerns common to more than one church, we refer to the fifteenth chapter of Acts, the account of the proceedings of the council at Jerusalem. Again, in 1 Tim. iv. 14, Paul speaks of such a court, and calls it a presbytery.

Parliamentary courts, composed solely of presbyters, then, are of biblical warrant. There are no such courts in either congregationalism or in prelacy. They are a distinguishing feature of presbyterianism. And so far, presbyterianism appears to be the biblical polity. We might as easily show that the presbyterian method of bodying forth the unity of the church of God is the biblical method. But the limits of our time forbid. We claim, that the Bible facts adduced show that the other polities must be rejected, and that we have shown, at least, that the distinctive features of presbyterianism, as a polity, are biblical. We assert, further, that every essential feature of that polity is biblical; that the whole system, with the exception of the circumstantial details, is revealed in the word of God and bound on the conscience with the authority of law. We assert that presbyterianism not in erastian connection with the state, not in ultramontane connection with the state, but wholly independent, is biblical; and that such

[1] Dr. T. E. Peck's *Ecclesiology*, p. 180.

cannot be maintained for any other historic polity. Presbyterianism is the JURE DIVINO CHURCH POLITY.

Will you meditate for a moment, now, on the way in which history and experience vindicate the wisdom and beneficence of the Bible polity?

They demonstrate the wisdom of the presbyterian polity negatively, by showing the unwisdom of other polities, and positively, by exhibiting the blessings which have flowed from ours.

In establishing the importance of polity in the church, we brought out many facts, which, in addition to serving the purpose of the moment, were also so many historical proofs of our present point. In the historical effect of polity on doctrine, in the sequence of debased and corrupted doctrine on the change away from the New Testament polity to a prelatic polity in the ante-Nicene age, we had, though our attention was not called to it at the time, a proof of the superiority of presbyterianism to prelacy. Similarly we might have seen in the historical effect of the form of government on the development of the individual man into his roundest and fullest manhood a proof of the superiority of presbyterianism to any other sort of government. We saw in the effect of the organization of the church on the political organization of the state, a proof of the superiority of that spiritual republic which has turned out the pattern of the most advanced civil government on the globe, a proof of its superiority to any other polity whatsoever. We might, by specification of points of superiority and citation of historical facts, increase the strength of our proof indefinitely. But we content ourselves with pointing you to the facts that—

1. History and experience teach that prelacy obstructs the progress of God's kingdom; that this plan, supposed to be an improvement on God's, has never been attended with a blessing to the church, but with the moral degradation of people and clergy when looked at in the mass; that it has been attended by the empty temporal exaltation of the clergy and depression of the people; that it has been attended by the apostasy of the church almost universally. In whatever form it has existed, it has been accompanied by anti-biblical tendencies in doctrine and in life. In saying

these things we do not forget the noble fathers of the Nicene and middle ages. Nor do we forget the glorious men in the English Church. But there were grand men in the crowd that surrounded the crucified One on Golgotha.

2. History confirms Mr. James Moir Porteus, when he says: "Congregationalism frequently either excludes ministerial authority or yields servility to domination. The power of the pastor is often most urgently required to enforce discipline or to maintain truth and morality, when suddenly the semblance of it which he is allowed is put out of existence. Caprice, lax desire, delinquency, and 'purseocracy' unite in expelling the would-be reformer. Those on whose support he depends for the means of living no longer desire his presence or his efforts. He must depart. Authority in such cases there is none. Where this is not the case congregationalism frequently yields absolute power to one man. Isaac Taylor, the son, I believe, of a Congregational minister,[1] says—'considered in its relation to the pastors individually, the congregational system is, in one word, the people's polity, framed or adhered to, for the purpose of circumscribing clerical power within the narrowest possible limits, and of absolutely excluding any exertions of authority, such as the high English temper could not brook. The minister of the meeting-house or chapel is one against all. . . . Feeling that the prerogatives formally assigned to him are altogether insufficient for the free and beneficial discharge of his functions, no alternative is left to him, but either to succumb, and to sustain a mere mockery of authority, or to usurp (we must call it usurpation) such powers as he can, and by personal address, or by the force of his temper, or the momentum of his talents and character, to render himself absolute. Nothing tends so rapidly to despotism as pure democracy.'"[2]

The weakness of that polity for anything like judicial discipline has been conspicuous on every occasion. The people are never wise jurors before whom to bring cases for trial. Nor can they

[1] The father was, for a time, a Congregational minister. Later he entered the Church of England.

[2] See Porteus, *Government and Kingdom of Christ*, p 349.

hear the evidence that must in many of such cases be brought out without hurt to their own lives. The inter-connection, too, between the different congregations is so tenuous that a single congregation may go off unchecked into the extremest vagary.

Presbyterianism, on the other hand, maintaining the unity of the church through her system of courts, feels, as a whole, that which affects any part, and gives the proper attention to the need of that part; she maintains a legitimate authority through her rulers, among whom parity obtains, while she protects the liberty of the people through the representative feature of her system. No church can show so pure a creed; no church among true churches can show so great a growth. None can show a more sturdy and consecrated set of children of God.

Nor can we refrain from remarking on the homage involuntarily paid to this system by the other two great germinal systems, and especially by the Congregationalists—the only other form of polity which can approximate a favorable comparison with the presbyterian. We remark this homage in their elevation of the deacon to the place of the ruling elder, as an adviser and co-ruler with the pastor, and as his substitute to conduct prayer-meetings and other meetings for the purposes of instruction and worship. We see the same homage again in their appointing delegates to try cases for discipline. They know that the congregational system would work ill. They virtually forsake it. We see it again in their consociations, which are no longer clothed with simple advisory power. And the tendency at present is in some quarters to make the power of the association *formally* more than advisory. And in other ways this body pays homage to the polity of the Presbyterians.

And it should be affirmed that our polity is just the ideal of governments, as conceived by the world's greatest thinkers of modern times. "This is the very government," says Dr. Peck, "which in modern times, among free nations, has been considered the most perfect," or, to use the language of Milton, "the noblest, the manliest, the equalest, the justest government on earth—a government by representatives, not by the people in *propria per-*

sona, or by deputies; and these representatives not all of the same class, so that as the representative principle is itself a check on the democratic principle, the two classes of representatives constitute a check upon the evils incident to a representation by one class." There can be no doubt of it; history vindicates the biblical polity.

And now, will you briefly review with us the ground covered? We saw that, though polity might, indeed, be less than of the first moment, it *might* yet be important; that, though polity regarded as a mark of the true church might be denied a place among the *essentiae*, it might yet be a note of extraordinary moment. We saw, second, that it was a thing—a mark—of great importance. We saw, third, that polity of the presbyterian form was divinely enjoined in the Scriptures; that it is the *jure divino* form of church polity. And we have just seen, last of all, that it has been, in history, vindicated as the wisest and noblest and most beneficent polity known to man. And now, we pray God to make this idea of *jure divino presbyterianism* take hold of the hearts of our Zion. There is power in the belief of it for the furtherance of our Zion. Because the Presbyterians were relatively indifferent to polity in 1640–1650, and the Independents determined for it, because of this in considerable part, England was lost to the Presbyterians. Because the Presbyterian immigrants to New England, from 1630 on, were relatively indifferent to polity, and the Congregationalists keenly alive to it, New England was lost to Presbyterians. There is power in a great religious idea; the autocratic edicts of a Zeno, a Justinian, a Heraclius, fell back on themselves, and the world went on as it was carried by the idea. Even the dull Charles V., with a world-empire at his back, and Rome as his ally, felt the power of a great religious idea, though unable to understand it—felt it as he slunk away broken and cowed to his convent. Such an idea beheaded Charles I., and placed England at the feet of Cromwell. There is power even in a false religious idea, believed to be of God. The Baptist belief in *jure divino* (?) immersion as the only valid baptismal form, carries multitudes of the superficial with them. And if the Lord shall put into the minds and hearts of our people belief in the *jure divino* polity as a thing of

importance, giving them also the essentials of his saving truth, and a burning desire for the full salvation of souls; then we shall see a lengthening of the cords and strengthening of the stakes.

Then give thy people, Lord, hearts to love not only the servants of the bride of Christ, but her very form which makes her what she is in beauty; not only the material of the temple into which thy people are builded, but the manner of the building; not only the matter of the body of Christ, but the fashion thereof.

Make thy people so love thy church and so honor thee as to wish to edify thy church in thy way. Give them the holy daring to venture to work for thy church's progress, according to thy plans, so far as discovered, whether those plans can be seen to be best or not. Oh, may thy people trust thee as wise and able to lead thy hosts to victory, glorious and complete, without advice or amendment of thy plan by man. And give grace to all rulers who have to answer the question as to whether the form of our Zion may not be changed with profit—whatever the particular of the change—to go to the law and to the testimony, there to learn for the church the will of its sovereign as well as most gracious head. "To whom be glory forever and ever. Amen."

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III. SANCTIFICATION THE NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF JUSTIFICATION.

An Exposition of Romans vi. 1–4.

The doctrine of a free justification is the key-stone of the gospel. It has been rightly called the article of a standing or a falling church, for any system of theology which teaches it, even though it may contain doctrines inconsistent with it, is yet able to save; but any system which vitally corrupts this doctrine is an invention of the devil, and if consistently followed out in practice will lead to utter ruin. It is no wonder then that it has been the object of the most virulent attack on the part of Satan and his allies. No wonder that it has met the sternest opposition of the natural pride of man. Every trick of human ingenuity has been resorted to to make it appear monstrous or absurd. One of the favorite points of attack has been from the objection arising from the Antinomian abuse of the doctrine. "If," say they, "man be indeed justified by faith, where is the need of works at all on the part of the sinner? If Christ has truly furnished a perfect obedience, which has satisfied the law, both as to its penalty and precept, then why impose the obligations of the law upon the sinner to whom this righteousness is imputed? Why may he not give free rein to his lusts?" The objection is truly a plausible one. It may well puzzle a mere human intellect to answer such an objection. It has been urged with unwavering persistency for eighteen hundred years, and it is urged at this day with as much blatant effrontery as if no answer had ever been found to it. But as the doctrine came by revelation, so its guards and defences were revealed. The inspired apostle, in the sixth chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, anticipates this great objection of the ages to the gospel which he had just been preaching, and gives an answer to it which mere human wisdom could never have discovered. But there is, perhaps, no one passage of Scripture which

has been more generally misunderstood and perverted from its true meaning than this one.

We ask careful attention to an exposition of this passage, which is not original, which is not new, but which, nevertheless, seems to have escaped the majority of expositors. The proper understanding of the sixth chapter of Romans will furnish the key to many other misunderstood passages of Scripture, will remove many difficulties from the believer's mind, and will afford consolation under many discouragements.

It will be necessary to take a review of the apostle's previous argument, as briefly as perspicuity will permit. After a short and appropriate introduction he lays down the main proposition of the epistle, namely, the gospel is the power of God unto the salvation of every one that believeth—that is, it is the only plan which enables God to save the sinner consistently with his own attributes. Now to prove this he must make good these two propositions: (1), No man can be saved by his own righteousness; (2), The elect are saved by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, which the gospel reveals. He proves the first proposition, that no man can be saved by his own righteousness, in this way: To be saved by one's own righteousness, a perfect obedience to the law must be rendered. But all have sinned. He proves this latter in detail. He takes up first the case of the Gentiles, or the heathen. Now, all that was necessary to prove this charge against them was to mention notorious facts. He draws a picture of the corruptions then existing among the most polished of the heathen nations, which makes us sick with loathing as we look upon it. He then deprives them of the excuse of ignorance by showing them that although they had not the revealed law, yet they had the law written upon their hearts, and that even while they committed these abominations their consciences condemned them. Having thus proved his point in regard to the Gentiles, the apostle turns to the Jews. They flattered themselves that since they had possession of the law and the ordinances of circumcision, and were the seed of Abraham, therefore they could not but be saved. But the apostle startles them with the question, "Thou that makest thy boast of the law, through the breaking of

the law, dishonorest thou God?" He shows them that not the mere possession of the law, nor the hearing of it, but the doing of it, was necessary to justify them. But when this question was squarely put, the conscience of every man convicted him of breaking the very law in which he trusted, and so they were deprived of this stay. As to circumcision, that was a mere sign of the covenant. But if the covenant on their part was broken, of what use was the sign? As to their being children of Abraham, the apostle removes this stay by proving that Abraham was not justified by his works, nor by circumcision, but by faith. But if Abraham was justified by faith in imputed righteousness, then only those are his true children who are children by a like faith, and circumcision availed nothing except as it was a sign and seal of that faith. Thus the last stay of the Jews is taken away. "All have sinned, and come short of the glory of God." All the world is become guilty before God. Tribulation is to come upon every soul, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile. The apostle's conclusion is, that by the deeds of the law, that is, by his own righteousness, no man shall be justified.

But there is another righteousness by which the sinner may be justified. This is a righteousness which satisfies the law in every particular, which pays the penalty of sin, which furnishes a perfect obedience to the precept of the law, which makes it possible for God to be just and yet justify the sinner, which saves the sinner, not by lowering the demands of the law, and requiring an imperfect instead of a perfect righteousness, not by substituting instead of righteousness something that is not righteousness at all, but by giving the sinner a perfect righteousness, and making it as much his own as if he had wrought it out for himself. This is the satisfaction of Christ. Christ represented his seed in this work. He obeyed the law, and his obedience was imputed to his people; he suffered its penalty, and his suffering was imputed to them. The apostle concludes this argument in the fifth chapter of Romans, and closes it with the words, "Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound; that as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord." Now this hydra-headed monster, the

Antinomian argument, erects itself. But the reply is one which severs and sears every one of its many heads. The objection takes various forms. "Surely it is right," say some, "to give full scope to grace; but, if where sin abounds grace does much more abound, then we ought to let sin abound; we ought to abide in sin that grace may abound." Again, it is sometimes put in this form: The fear of punishment and the hope of reward are the only motives to urge us to obey the law; but if Christ has satisfied the law for the believer so that he has no punishment to fear, and he is sure of heaven through Christ's work, then there are no incentives to exertion, and you have opened the flood-gates to sin. Now this is indeed true where the fear of punishment is taken away in other way than through union with Christ. This is illustrated by the facts accompanying the sale of indulgences.

Again, the objection is stated in this way: The law demands of the sinner but one perfect entire obedience; it cannot in justice require more; but if Christ has furnished that obedience for him, then the law has no claim whatever upon him, and he is entitled to gratify his lusts to the full. These are only specimens of the many ingenious ways in which this argument has been pressed. To consider each in detail, and to give each its appropriate answer, would require more space than we have at our disposal; but they are all fully answered in this great argument of the sixth chapter of Romans, and a clear understanding of this will put into the hands of every Christian a weapon with which to meet all such attacks.

Now this argument of the apostle's is no mere exhortation based upon the inconsistency of the Christian profession with a life of sin; nor a mere begging of the question by assuming that which is not true, that sin has no more attraction for the believer; but an invincible proof, showing that, from the very nature and purpose of the plan of salvation, justification and sanctification, faith and works, are just as inseparable as God and holiness; that where justification has taken place, sanctification must follow. His argument in proof of this may be summed up thus: The justification of the believer is effected by his union with Christ; but, (1), this union is of such a nature that it must result in sanctifi-

cation; (2), this union is wrought by the Holy Spirit; and, (3), it is the divine purpose to effect sanctification, as well as justification by means of this union. Bearing this outline in mind, let us examine the passage in detail.

"What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?" Paul in these words anticipates the objection which we have already stated in full. The word which is here translated "continue" is the same word which is elsewhere translated "to abide." He repudiates this conclusion from his previous argument, with the earnest words translated "God forbid." "How shall we who died for sin, live any longer therein?" This is the sum of his reply, which he expands in the following verses. This reply may be stated in two leading propositions, in the expansion and proof of which lies the proper exegesis of the whole passage. I. The believer is freely justified from sin, because he has died for sin in union with Christ, both federal and spiritual. II. It is impossible for those who have thus died for sin to abide in sin.

I. The believer is justified from sin because he has died for sin in union with Christ, both federal and spiritual. I have translated this passage "died for sin," while in our English version it is "dead to sin." It remains then for us to justify this translation and the exegesis which it involves, because upon this the whole argument turns. There have been almost as many interpretations of this expression as there have been interpreters. Three leading ones only claim our attention at this time. The first is, that it means "dead to sin" by profession of renunciation of it in baptism. "We who have made a public profession of our faith by baptism, did in that act renounce our sins, promising that we would forsake them, and thereby we became dead to sin." This interpretation is worthless—1st. Because it entirely fails to answer the objection, "shall we continue in sin that grace might abound?" It only removes the objection one step back. It might be asked, why was it necessary to renounce sin? Should we not rather have continued in sin, that grace might have abounded? 2nd. It entirely fails to give any assurance that the believer will not abide in sin. It is a mere exhortation to consistency, but exhortation is not argument. 3rd. The inspired

original will not bear the translation, "dead to sin." The tense used is the aörist, or simple past tense, which can only be translated, "died." Other interpreters understand it in this way, that the believer is dead to sin in the sense that sin has no more power over him. When an anæsthetic is given to a patient, a severe operation may be performed without pain. He is as insensible to pain while under its influence as if he were dead; he is dead to pain. Now, in the same sense, say some, the Christian is dead to sin, and of course it would be folly to say that such a man could abide in sin. But this interpretation is no better than the other: 1st. It is a mere begging of the question. It is Paul's object to prove that sanctification is the necessary result of justification, but if this were his meaning he would be assuming without proof the very thing in dispute. 2nd. It is not true. Believers are not dead to the power of sin, as Paul so clearly testifies in his own case. 3rd. It is open to the same objection as the first interpretation, that the Greek original will not bear the translation, "dead to sin." The word means, "died."

What, then, is the meaning of the expression? Now, God says: "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." Die? For what? Die for his sins; die to pay the penalty of sin. We have all sinned; we must all, therefore, die. God's truth and justice require that this sentence be executed to the letter. Now there are two ways revealed in God's word in which this sentence may be executed: we must either die for our sins in our own persons, or in the person of some competent representative. Christ has died as the representative of his people. He was made a curse in their stead. Now the question arises, How did this death of Christ's become theirs? It must be made theirs in such a way that it may have the same effect subjectively upon themselves, and objectively upon their relations to God's law as if they had died for themselves. It must be theirs in such a way that it can be truly said that when he died they died. This is accomplished by their union with him. If we be legally and spiritually united to Christ, then it may be truly said that what he did we did. But we are so united to Christ; then when he died for sin, we died for sin, and this is what the apostle means when he says that we died for sin. That

this is the proper exegesis there is overwhelming evidence: 1st. In the first place notice the fact to which we have already referred, that the tense here used is the aörist, or simple past tense, which will not bear any other translation than "died." Our death to or for sin is represented, not as a present state, but as a past act in our lives. 2d. The translation, "died for sin, or on account of sin," is a perfectly legitimate use of the dative. 3d. The mistranslation in this verse has necessitated it in some of the succeeding passages, where the mistake it still more palpable. The seventh verse reads, "He that is dead, is freed from sin." Now the verb which is here translated "freed from" is never in the New Testament, and rarely in the Old, used in the sense "to be freed from." In the New Testament it always means "to be justified." But when we translate "he that died is justified from sin," we not only translate the Greek correctly, but the theological significance becomes clear. "He that died with Christ—representatively for sin, on account of sin, to the guilt of sin—is justified from sin." In the eighth verse again the aörist is again mistranslated: "If we be dead with him, we believe that we shall also live with him." It should be, "If we died with him, we shall also live with him." But when they came to the tenth verse it was impossible to keep up this mistranslation any longer, and they gave the proper translation for the tense, "For he who died, died unto sin once." But it is exactly the same expression, the same verb, the same tense, which has been hitherto translated "dead to sin." This verse, connected with what precedes, makes it certain that in whatever sense Christ died to sin, in the same sense those who had been baptized into union with Christ, and so into union with him in his death, died for sin. But Christ could not have died to sin by renunciation of it in baptism, because he never had any sin to renounce; he could not have died to the power of sin as the patient is dead to pain, because he was never alive to the power of sin in any such sense. There is but one way in which Christ could have died to sin, and that is to die for sin, to die for the imputed guilt of sin, to die to satisfy divine justice. And so there is but one way in which the sinner could have died with him, and that is to die for sin, on account of sin, to pay the penalty of sin, in order

that the sentence of death might be executed. 4th. That this is the proper translation is shown by the parallel passage in 2 Cor. v. 14, where the same verb and the same tense is used. Our version again has it, "For we thus judge that if one died for all, then were all dead." The Revised Version again has it correctly, "For we thus judge that if one died for all, then all died." On this passage, Dr. Hodge, who, in his *Commentary on Romans*, had opposed the exegesis we are advocating, concedes the point, apparently having reconsidered the subject. He says: "This is precisely the argument which he uses in Romans vi: 'Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?' Far from it," he says. "How shall we who have died on account of sin live any longer therein?" 5th. Again, this exegesis explains, and is confirmed by other passages in which our participation with Christ in his other representative acts is expressed by a similar usage. It is said that we were crucified with Christ, that we were raised with him, and that we live with him. "I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." "Buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye were raised with him. . . . . If ye then were raised with Christ, seek those things which are above, where Christ is, sitting on the right hand of God. For ye died, and your life is hid with Christ in God. When Christ who is our life shall appear," etc. These passages can be understood in no other way than that we did these things in Christ our representative. Now it may not be amiss to quote some authorities for this exegesis:

It is the exegesis of Haldane, of Shedd, of Chalmers, of Brown; and, as we have said, Dr. Hodge, who opposes it in his commentary on Romans, adopts it in his later commentary on Corinthians. Ellicott thus paraphrases the parallel passage in Galatians ii. 19: "I, through the law, owing to sin, was brought under its curse, but having undergone this, with and in the person of Christ, I died to the law, in the fullest and deepest sense—being both free from its claims, and having satisfied its curse." Perhaps the clearest expression of this our union with Christ in all his representative acts for us, will be found in Pusey on Hosea. Commenting on the passage: "After two days he will revive us, and the third day he will raise us up, and we shall live in his sight,"

he says, "The resurrection of Christ and our resurrection in him could not be more clearly foretold. . . . The apostle, in speaking of our resurrection in Christ, uses these self-same words of the prophet: 'God hath quickened us together with Christ, and raised us up, and made us sit together in heavenly places with Christ Jesus.' The apostle, like the prophet, speaks of that which took place in Christ our head, as having already taken place in us his members." Pusey further quotes from one of the fathers: "If we unhesitatingly believe in our hearts what we profess with our mouths, then *we* were crucified in Christ, *we* died, *we* were buried, *we* were also raised again on that very third day." Pusey adds: "What Christ our head did, he did not for himself, but for his redeemed, that the benefits of his life, death, resurrection, and ascension might redound to all. He did it for them; they partake of what he did."

We think we have put it beyond all possibility of doubt that the apostle means to say that we have died in union with Christ to satisfy the claims of the law, and to free us from the guilt of sin.

Now this union with Christ, in his justifying death for sin, has two aspects, the federal, or representative, and the spiritual, or vital. We say "two aspects," to guard against the error which might arise that there are two unions. It is one and the same union, but the terms, "federal and spiritual," express different effects and relations of this union. Our federal or representative union with Christ is sovereignly constituted by God the Father in election. The vital union is wrought by the Holy Spirit in regeneration. The federal union gives us the legal title to the acts of Christ as our representative. The vital puts us in actual possession of them. The federal is the ground of virtual justification, the spiritual is the ground of actual justification. The federal union is objective in its nature and effects; the spiritual is subjective in both. The federal puts us in the same position before the eyes of God the Judge, as if we had died for sin ourselves; the spiritual works the same subjective effects in us as if we had died for sin ourselves. The representative frees us from the legal guilt of sin; the spiritual frees us from the consciousness of guilt. The federal satisfies the law; the spiritual satisfies conscience. The fed-

eral reconciles God to man; the spiritual reconciles man to God. The federal is a satisfaction to the divine ethical nature; the spiritual is a satisfaction to the human ethical nature.

Now, that this union with Christ was not merely federal, or representative, but also spiritual, or vital, the apostle shows in these words, "Know ye not that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized into his death? Therefore, we are buried with him by baptism into death." In other words, "Know ye not that so many of us as were united to Christ by his Holy Spirit, were, by that same Spirit, united to him in his death? Therefore, we were buried with him, by that act of the Holy Spirit which united us to him in his death."

That the primary reference of the apostle is to the act of the Holy Spirit by which we became united to Christ, in other words, regeneration, and not to the external rite of baptism, remains to be proved. It is generally admitted that water baptism is the symbol of the baptism of the Holy Ghost. The words of John the Baptist settle this beyond dispute, "I indeed baptize you with water, . . . but there cometh one after me, . . . he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire." This is supported by numerous passages, one of which we shall presently quote. But granting that there is a baptism of the Holy Ghost, of which water baptism is but the sign, it may yet be questioned whether Paul's primary reference in this passage is to the Holy Ghost, and not to water baptism.

Now it is a very common figure of speech to put the sign for the thing signified. It is particularly so where two things are so closely connected that they are seldom, or never, spoken of separately. Where a visible ordinance invariably signifies a spiritual act, the name of the ordinance may be transferred to the act without danger of ambiguity. This is frequently the case in the scriptural use of the word "circumcised," both in the Old and the New Testaments. In Deut. xxx. 6, it is said, "The Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart and with all thy soul, that thou mayst live." This is paralleled by Deut. x. 16; Jer. iv. 4, etc. In this passage, clearly the primary reference is to the spiritual act signi-

fied by circumcision. Paul says in Col. ii. 11, "In whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in the putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ." And, again in Rom. ii. 28, 29, "Neither is that circumcision which is outward in the flesh; . . . but circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, not in the letter." And other parallel passages. Now since we not only find this usage of the word circumcision for the spiritual act which it signifies, but that Paul almost always uses it in this metonymic or spiritual sense, it is natural that we should expect him to use the word "baptism" in the same way. A few quotations will show that he does so use the word and, with few exceptions, in no other sense. The meaning of the word as he ordinarily uses it is the spiritual act of the Holy Ghost in regeneration, and only in one or two passages, where the context leaves no room for ambiguity, does he use it for the water rite. In Gal. iii. 27, he says: "For as many as were baptized into Christ, have put on Christ." He had been proving by one of the most profound and masterly arguments to be found in his writings, that the "seed," to whom the blessings of Abraham were promised, was not a distributive noun referring to individuals, but a collective noun referring to Christ, as the head of a spiritual body. To be of that seed then, and heirs of the promise, it was necessary to be one with Christ, to whom the promise referred. He sums up his argument in these words: "For ye are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as were baptized into Christ, have put on Christ. There is neither Greek nor Jew, . . . for ye are all one in Christ Jesus. But if of Christ, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise." It is plain that the union here spoken of is a spiritual union, consequently the act by which that union was constituted must have been a spiritual act; but that act was baptism, therefore the baptism spoken of must be the baptism of the Holy Ghost. To make it mean anything else would break an essential link in the chain of the apostle's argument.

Again, compare the parallel passage in Col. ii. 12, 13: "Buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye were raised with him, through the faith of the operation of God." This is immediately con-

nected with the passage already quoted, in which he had used the word circumcision in the metonymic sense, and in which he affirms the identity in spiritual meaning of baptism and circumcision. Therefore the word baptism must also be used in the metonymic sense. This is further shown thus: Faith is a spiritual thing, therefore the being raised through faith must have been a spiritual operation, or a spiritual union with Christ in his resurrection; but if spiritual union with him in his resurrection is meant, then the burial with him in baptism must be spiritual union with him in his burial; but if the burial is spiritual, then the baptism by which they became partakers of that burial must be spiritual. The meaning is that faith is the bond of that union wrought by the Holy Ghost in baptism or regeneration, by which we become partakers of Christ's death, burial, and resurrection.

If any doubt could remain as to what kind of baptism Paul refers to, it would be set at rest by the passage in 1 Cor. xii. 13: "For by one Spirit we are all baptized into one body." The body, of course, is Christ. The body then to which we become united is a spiritual body, the act by which we are so united is a spiritual act, that act is called baptism, and the Holy Ghost is the agent by whom that act is wrought. Now, if the rule to interpret Scripture by Scripture has any force at all, it has in this case to show in the parallel passages that the baptism to which Paul refers is, primarily, not the rite of water baptism, but the baptism of the Holy Ghost or regeneration.

This clearly, then, is the meaning of Paul in the sixth chapter of Romans: that we died with Christ, not only in the sense of being federally united to him in his death, but that by that act of the Holy Spirit, which is expressed by the word baptism, or, in other words, regeneration, we became also spiritually united to Christ in all his acts for our redemption. We died with Christ, we were buried with him, we were raised with him, not only legally, but spiritually; not only objectively, but subjectively. Not only are the *legal* effects of the death of Christ *imputed* to us, but the *subjective* effects of it are *inwrought* in us by the Holy Spirit. Precisely the same kind of experience is wrought in the soul of the believer by his spiritual union with Christ, as if he

had died for sin himself, had paid the entire penalty of the law, and had been discharged, forever free from its claims. This subjective effect of union with Christ in his atoning death may not necessarily be completed at the moment of regeneration, but we understand the Apostle Paul in this and other passages, to teach that, sooner or later, the Spirit, in his dealings with the soul he is sanctifying, will work into him an experience analogous to that through which Christ passed when he died for sin on the cross. Bear this in mind, for it will have an important part in the discussion of the apostle's second proposition, namely:

II. That it is impossible for those who have thus died for sin, that is, by their federal and spiritual union with Christ in his atoning death, to abide in sin.

Now, he does not say that it is impossible for the justified believer to *sin*, but to *abide in sin*. The word he uses denotes continuance or abiding in, entire surrender to sin, in contrast with that constant warfare with sin which marks the true Christian. It is such an abiding as is denoted by the objector, "Let us abide in sin, *in order that* grace may abound," that is, a deliberate, intentional abiding. He intends to show that such a state of mind and heart is simply impossible for those who have died for sin; that it is utterly inconsistent with the legal and spiritual effects of union with Christ in his death, and that the ultimate result of justification must be entire sanctification.

1. The first argument for this position, drawn from the passage before us, may be thus stated: The root of the power of sin is the guilt of sin; but he who has died for sin is justified, or free from the guilt of sin. The power of sin is, therefore, broken, and it becomes impossible for the believer to abide in sin. Guilt once removed, the "body of sin" is wounded unto death, and must soon be destroyed.

The root of sin is its guilt. Sin, of course, is an abstract term, by which we signify a certain state of the soul, and the actions and habits by which that state manifests itself. The psychology of sin then is the psychology of a sinful soul. The subject therefore has not only the difficulties of ordinary metaphysics, but is complicated with those painful, as well as perplexing features

which sin introduces. What pathology is to physiology, psychology of sin is to pure metaphysics. But sin has its laws, and they may be learned and reduced to science, by observation and induction as well as those of any other part of the psychical or physical nature. There are two sources from which the necessary facts may be drawn. From the experiences of the redeemed sinners who have passed through all the stages of indifference, conviction, remorse, repentance, and peace of conscience regained through the subjective effects of the atoning work of Christ; and from divine revelation of the facts of redemption. In the sixth and seventh chapters of Romans we have at once the facts from one of the most remarkable religious experiences in the history of redemption, showing the effect upon conscience of sin, of law, and the gospel; and an inspired exposition of those facts. From the study of these two chapters, and parallel passages of the word of God, comparing them with our own experience, and our observation of others, we can see why it is that it is impossible for those who have died under the curse of the law to atone for the guilt of sin, to abide in the power of it.

Now when we say that the guilt of sin is the root of its power, we do not mean to confound the two things, or to deny the distinction between guilt and power, but the word of God gives us the best of reasons for saying that the guilt of sin is the root from which has sprung the tree of its power which bears such deadly fruit. Such passages as the following would indicate that there is this relation between the guilt and the power of sin, even if they explain nothing of the nature of this connection: "For when we were in the flesh, the motions of sin, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death. . . . I had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law said, Thou shalt not covet." "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence. For without the law sin was dead, . . . but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died. And the commandment which was to life, I found to be unto death." (Rom. vii. 5–10.) "The strength of sin is the law." (1 Cor. xv. 56.) Says Thornwell, "It is guilt which seals the soul in impotence." Now the word

guilt has two meanings which we must distinguish here: the one objective, the other subjective; the first is the actual ill-desert of sin, the second is the consciousness of that ill-desert. Guilt in both these senses enslaves the sinner.

(1.) Guilt in its objective sense of actual ill-desert enslaves by breaking the soul's communion with God, the source of all spiritual life. Dr Thornwell leaves nothing to be said on this subject: "Personal holiness, according to the uniform teaching of the Scriptures, results from union with God; and union with God necessarily implies possession of his favor. Good works, proceeding as they do, from the love of God as their source, governed by his law as their rule, and directed to his glory as their end, cannot be conceived to exist among outcasts and aliens. Union with him is the only source of strength, purity, and peace. This is what the Scripture denominates *life*. Now what is the condition of an unpardoned sinner? His first transgression, upon the necessary principles of retributive justice, has doomed him to the curse. But to be under the curse, and at the same time enjoy the favor of God, are contradictory states. The curse implies something inconceivably stronger than the bare negation of favor. It fixes an illimitable chasm between the sinner and his judge. It effects that awful separation from God, that banishment from his presence, that aggregate of all that is terrible, which the Bible compendiously expresses by *death*. In this condition of wretchedness and of exile the dominion of sin must be unbroken and complete. Corruption riots on its victim. The curse which banishes from God, banishes from holiness. The unpardoned sinner, consequently, from the very nature of his state, is as incapable of aspiring to holiness as a corpse is incapable of the functions of life. It is his doom, like the serpent, to crawl upon his belly and lick the dust. The condemnation which sends him out, like Cain, from the presence of the Almighty, forever precludes the possibility of repentance, places him beyond the pale of communion with his Maker, beyond the reach of spiritual impulses, and leaves him to wither in the atmosphere of death. Such is the strength of the law to crush the victims of its penalty. All that are under the curse are dead—cut off from the fountain of life. The only

works they are competent to perform are *dead* works."[1] A single sin, then, is enough to break this union of the soul with its God. As, if a telegraph wire is broken or cut in but one place, the whole circuit is broken, so one sin by its guilt cuts off the soul from its union with God, the source of all spiritual life, and the soul becomes *dead*.

(2.) But this is not all that is meant by the enslaving power of guilt. Just as soon as the actual guilt of sin condemns the soul to banishment from the presence of God, the consciousness of that ill-desert, and of that hopeless banishment, will begin to work disastrous consequences in breaking down those natural restraints upon sin which remain to the sinner from the wreck of his fall. It will inevitably destroy self-respect. Self-respect is that within a man which deters him from committing a base act by the feeling that it is beneath him. It is something remaining of that sublime self-consciousness of the soul that it was created in the image of God. This feeling, though wounded, was not slain by the fall. It yet remains in the hearts of those who have not deliberately destroyed it, and repels the suggestion of an evil thing with the question, Am I a dog, that I should do this thing? But the consciousness of guilt will murder self-respect. When once a man has committed a base act, in spite of the protesting voice of his self-respect, it will never again protest against that same degree of guilt. It will never again say to a man, Thou art too noble for such a deed, for the consciousness of guilt will reply, Thou hast lowered thyself to the level of that deed by once committing it.

But even after self-respect has been long dead, there is another feeling strong within man's bosom, which may yet restrain him from excesses in sin—it is shame, or fear of public opinion. Though we may have ceased to think well of ourselves, we would have others to think well of us. Even though in the secrecy of our own hearts we may know that we have debased ourselves, we yet would hide the guilty secret from our friends and companions. Though we may not be able to meet our own eyes in the mirrors of our secret chambers, we would yet look into the eyes of our fellow-men with all the bearing of conscious innocence. There-

[1] Thornwell's *Collected Writings*, Vol. III., pp. 364–'65.

fore, men are restrained at least from committing their sins in public, and confine their shameful deeds to the dark. But as the sense of guilt destroyed self-respect, so it will destroy shame. The process is the same. A man may become hardened to the contempt expressed in the eyes of his fellow-men, as he has already grown hardened to self-contempt. He will cease to care what men think of his actions, as he has ceased to care what his own conscience says.

Again, the sense of guilt enslaves by the two-fold effect which it has upon conscience. The effect of sin upon the conscience seems to be analogous to that of a morbid appetite on the body. When a man first begins to acquire these habits, nature makes vehement protests in the pain and loathing which at first follows the indulgence. But as this protest of nature is repeatedly disregarded, she seems to acquiesce, and those things which once were poisons to the body it now seems to need and enjoy even more than the actual necessaries of life. But this silence of nature is deceptive. The time will come when she will call the transgressor to strict account. For every such indulgence, for every such violation of her laws, she will demand satisfaction to the full, in feeble health, in a shattered frame, in tortured nerves, and in a horrible death. So with the conscience. After that first keen pain which the wound of guilt causes, a numbness seems to ensue, and with successive blows upon this most sensitive part of man's nature, at last it seems to become utterly dead. Then the sinner may gratify his depraved appetites and enjoy his pleasures unalloyed by any warning pains. As long as he can keep conscience in this insensible condition, he can sin with delight. He almost realizes his idea of happiness while in this condition. He is a slave, but his slavery is one from which he has no longing to escape. He is willing to have his ears bored with an awl in sign of his eternal allegiance to this master. Like Anthony, in the lap of Cleopatra, he forgets honor, fame, ambition, his country, and his God. But conscience is not dead. It cannot be destroyed by any amount of guilt. The time will come in the history of every sinner when conscience will be fully aroused, and will take fearful vengeance. The time will come when the sinner's obli-

vion in the arms of lust will end, and thenceforward there remains for him nothing but an eternity of hopeless remorse. This remorse, so far from checking sin, will be a goad to the sinner. While conscience sleeps the sinner may sin with all the energy of delight, but when it awakens to a hopeless remorse, he sins with all the energy of despair. Thus it is as Paul says in Romans vii. 5, "The passions of sin, which are by the law stirred up, work in the soul to bring forth fruit unto death." It is a strange thing, and escapes our analysis, but it is nevertheless true, as our observation and experience will testify, that when the guilty soul comes in contact with the law in any way, it is aroused to a very frenzy of opposition. To a soul in such a condition, love of God is, of course, impossible, and a fierce hatred of him takes its place. Says Dr. Thornwell: "The dread of God's justice, arising from a sense of guilt, is the great ground of the sinner's hatred to God, and can only be removed by appeasing that justice, and assuring the sinner that he can be pardoned. . . . . It is idle to talk of his loving God while the weight of unpardoned guilt hangs over him. The terrors of the Lord encompass him about, and the horrors of the grave seize hold upon him. In the nature of things a vindictive deity cannot be the subject of delight to the fallen object of his vengeance. Terror and dread are not the native elements of love. We may quail beneath the fiery justice and uplifted arm of a menacing deity; we may tremble and shake at the awful exhibitions of an angry God when the heavens grow black with his wrath, and the firmament smokes with his displeasure. . . . . But exhibitions like this will only steel our hearts to deeper defiance and sterner hate. They cannot unbar the doors of our love. They may make us muster the energies of dark despair, and clinch our fists and nerve our souls to do battle with Omnipotence."[1] In the climax of this despair the soul will exclaim in the language which Milton attributes to Satan, "All good to me is lost; evil! be thou my good." Such are some of the effects of the sense of guilt upon the soul of the sinner. The analysis is, of course, incomplete. There is something in the sense of guilt which cannot be resolved or explained, but which acts as a goad

[1] Thornwell's *Collected Writings*, Vol. II., pp. 376–'77.

and loosens every restraint to a lost soul. But enough has been adduced to justify the assertion that the root of the power of sin is its guilt, and that if guilt can only be removed in some way sin will be wounded in its very vitals, and must sooner or later die.

Now suppose that this can be done? Suppose that the actual guilt of sin can be taken away, and the soul's union with God can be restored? This is precisely what is done by the believer's federal union with Christ in his atoning death. He has died for sin, he has paid its entire penalty, just as if he had suffered it himself. There is now no condemnation to him. The ground upon which an infinitely holy and just God was compelled to break his union with him is removed. The severed nerve is united again, the broken circuit is complete once more. By his federal union with Christ in his whole work, the believer becomes entitled to that grace of the Holy Spirit by which he may be restored to the image of God. Thus we see that the federal union of the believer with Christ in the objective features of his work, releases him from the guilt of sin in its objective sense, and to that extent he is freed from its slavery.

Now suppose that the sinner can be freed from sin in its subjective sense also, from his own fearful consciousness of ill-desert? Suppose that not only by a legal decision he is exempted from all future punishment of sin, but that he no longer deserves punishment? Suppose that not only is God satisfied, but that his own conscience is put at rest? Suppose that not only are his outward relations changed, but that there can be wrought into his soul the experience of one who has died for sin? Let us suppose, as Dr. Chalmers does, in his commentary on this passage, that the punishment of sin, while retaining all its terrible nature, was limited, and that the sinner can be conceived of as having only a limited amount of sin to atone for, so that we could imagine him as having paid the entire penalty of the law. All the vials of God's wrath are poured out upon him and he dies, dies for sin to satisfy divine justice. Now suppose that he could be brought back to life again, freed from all the claims of the law, and looked upon by the whole universe as one who has sinned indeed, but who has amply suffered for his sins. What sort of experience would that man

bring back with him from his grave? What effect would such an experience have upon his future life? Would he not come back with a realization of all the horror of the guilt of sin, of its enslaving power, of God's hatred of it, such as he could never have acquired in any other conceivable way? Would he not henceforth dread sin, hate it, shun it? Would not the thought of it bring back all the memories of the bitterness of death? Could he be deceived again by the specious disguises which it might assume, and the fair promises it might make? Now, why cannot such a thing be conceived of as taking place in the sinner himself, and thus all punishment be remedial in its nature? Simply because no sin can be conceived of as having a limited ill-desert, and because no sinner can be conceived of as having a limited amount of sin to atone for. No creature can be conceived as committing a certain amount of sin, and thenceforth being perfectly righteous. Even if single sins could be supposed to be limited in their desert of ill, before he could atone for one sin, he would have committed a thousand others. But suppose the sovereign wisdom of God should devise some plan by which the same effects might be brought about as we have above described? Now God has devised such a plan, and its effect upon the soul of the sinner transcends what we could suppose would be the effect of his own death for sin.

We have seen that the believer's union with Christ is not only federal, but spiritual; not only objective, but subjective. Now it seems to us that Paul, speaking from the profoundest depths of his own experience, and being divinely inspired to interpret that experience in explanation of the method of salvation, teaches, not only that the believer is federally united to Christ, so that his relations to the law become the same as if he had died himself; but also that, in this spiritual union, the Holy Spirit works into the soul of the believer some analogy of the experience of Christ in his death, burial, and resurrection. I am fully persuaded that, in a deeper sense than we ordinarily think, we are made partakers of his death, burial, and resurrection. As the human voice sets the diaphragm of the telephone to vibrating, and those vibrations excite an electric current, and this current in turn excites corres-

ponding vibrations in another instrument, reproducing with wonderful exactness the very tones of the far distant voice, so, in some mysterious way, which we can but faintly conceive of, the Spirit creates a vital union between the believer and Christ, through which the sufferings of Christ for sin seem to reproduce themselves in his soul. To illustrate my meaning further, let us make a supposition, which, of course, is not true of the physical body, but which may have some analogy in the spiritual sphere. Let us suppose that, in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, the communicant really fed upon the flesh and blood of Christ, and that the particles of Christ's body gradually replaced the corrupt particles of the sinner's body, until the one became the counterpart of the other, so that the very scars of the hands and feet and side of the one might be reproduced in the other. This, we know, is not true. But suppose that this outward feeding upon the elements were the type and means of a spiritual feeding of the believer upon the once suffering, but now risen, soul of Christ, until his soul became the counterpart of the nature of Christ, until, so to speak, the very scars of Christ's soul were reproduced in that of the believer. But this is no mere supposition; it is the very truth of God. We do not mean to say that it is this analogy to the death of Christ wrought into the soul that atones for sin. Let that be marked, lest a wrong inference be drawn. The death of Christ, as an objective fact, is that which atones for guilt in its objective sense. But we do mean to say that it is the subjective effects of union with Christ in his death which counteract the subjective effects of guilt.

What, then, are the effects of spiritual union with Christ in his death? First, he has acquired an apprehension of the justice of God and the guilt of sin, such as he could never have acquired in any other way, not even if he had suffered all the wrath of God for sin in his own person. For he has lain prone upon the earth with Jesus in the Garden, already tasting of the bitterness of the cup of wrath, and has cried in his agony, "If it be possible, let this cup pass from me." He has *felt* the vials of that wrath poured out, not upon himself, but upon the Son of God. With what amazement has he realized that the guilt of his sin is such that God could

not spare his only begotten Son, when it was laid upon him! The memory of that experience can never be effaced from his mind through all his life, or through eternity to come. He can never again sin as blindly as he once did.

"I saw one hanging on a tree,
In agonies and blood,
Who fixed his languid eyes on me,
As near his cross I stood.

"Sure, never till my latest breath
Can I forget that look;
It seemed to charge me with his death,
Though not a word he spoke."

Again, he has acquired such an apprehension of the holiness of God and the pollution of sin, as not even his own death for sin could have wrought in him. He has seen all his secret sins set in the light of God's countenance. He has seen all their pollution laid bare, and the pure light of God's holiness streaming down upon them. Oh, the withering agony of such an experience! Who can describe it? Who can tell of the groans of shame and self-contempt that rise from his breast as he sees that the holiness of God has compelled him to desert his Son for the guilt that was laid on him? Who can tell how that cry has pierced his soul, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me!"

Can the man who has passed through such an experience ever look upon sin again as he once did? Can he ever be deceived as to its true nature? His conscience is now awakened. He can never enjoy sin again. The memory of that scene on the cross will haunt him in the wildest revelry. The sweetness of the lust is gone forever. His once welcome slavery is now a hateful bondage, from which he longs to escape. He awakes from his oblivion in the arms of the enchantress, and now his whole soul regards her with loathing. But that is not all. Looking upon that cross he realizes the love which devised the plan by which he might thus die, and the love which has borne that awful load of guilt for him, and consented even to be abandoned of God for him; and as he realizes this, there comes upon him the spirit of grace and of supplications, and he looks upon him whom he has pierced, and

mourns for him as one that mourneth for his only son, and is in bitterness for him as one that is in bitterness for his first-born. At last his heart is broken.

But if the believer died with Christ, he was also raised with him. "If we be planted together in the likeness of his death, . . . also in that of his resurrection." Just as there are spiritual effects answering to the legal effects of Christ's death, so there are spiritual, answering to the legal, effects of his resurrection; and in the same manner as we were baptized into the one, so were we baptized into the other. In other words, the Holy Spirit has wrought into the believer the subjective likeness of the resurrection of Christ. He realizes now what it is to have paid the full penalty of his sin, and to stand vindicated before the world. His peace of conscience is restored. It is one of the strange, but undeniable effects of the gospel, that it not only releases from the fear of punishment, but gives peace to the conscience. This the mere legal transfer of penalty could not have done. But when the soul rises from its death for sin in union with Christ, and looks upon his scars brought back from that grave, he is delivered not only from fear, but from that debasing sense of guilt, with all its consequences. Though his conscience is made tender by this experience, it is healed of its wounds. It is faithful in its warnings, but its sting is gone. Self-respect and regard for the opinion of the good is restored. He realizes that not even the immaculate angels of heaven would spurn his presence now. Henceforth he knows that he has a new character to sustain, not his own, but the honor of him who has redeemed him, and given him his new life.

Now it is not meant to be said that these experiences are all wrought at once in the act of baptism or regeneration, nor that they are reproduced with the same distinctness in every case, nor that they are the same in degree; but that before the Spirit of God completes the sanctification of the sinner, he stamps upon his soul this likeness of his sufferings, death, burial, and resurrection. The union with Christ is completed at once in the act of baptism or regeneration, but not all the effects of that union are immediately manifest. In the new-born infant few can detect the likeness to the parent which becomes plain to the eyes of the most

careless observer as he develops into manhood; so, though the believer contains in himself potentially this likeness to Christ from his new birth, yet it only develops with his growth in sanctification. As the photographer's plate receives the exact image, which yet must be developed with chemicals before it becomes visible, so must this spiritual conformity to Christ in his work be developed by the subsequent dealings of the Holy Spirit. All the means of grace are instruments made use of by him for this purpose, but especially the Lord's Supper. As in that sacrament the believer feeds with his mouth upon the elements which are incorporated into his body and become a part of it, so he spiritually partakes of the human nature of Christ present in that sacrament, conveyed by the Holy Spirit. Thus in a sense he incorporates and is incorporated into that nature, not in the sense that he becomes one with Christ in essence, but in a sense far transcending all human conceptions and analogies, even that of the vine and its branches, of the head and its body or the body and its members, of the husband and the wife. Thus the communicant becomes partaker of the body that was broken and the blood that was shed for sin, and its likeness is reproduced in his own soul.

This seems to me to throw much light on the design of afflictions to the saint. Not that these afflictions are the likeness of the sufferings of Christ for us, or that they could have any beneficial effect of themselves; but that they are simply the means in the hands of the Holy Spirit of producing conformity to the sufferings of Christ. "He has chastened us that we might become partakers of his holiness." "That I may know him, and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made conformable unto his death." "Forasmuch, then, as Christ has suffered for us in the flesh, arm yourselves likewise with the same mind; for he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin; that he no longer should live the rest of his time in the flesh to the lusts of men, but to the will of God."

Much of what has just been said is tentative in its character, but enough has been established on grounds of reason and Scripture, to sustain the first argument in favor of the apostle's declation that it is impossible for those who have died in union with

Christ for sin, to live in it, viz.: That as the root of sin is its guilt, and as guilt both in its objective and subjective sense, with all its consequences, is removed by the federal and spiritual union with Christ in his death, burial and resurrection; therefore the tree of sin must die with all its deadly fruits. The "body of sin" is wounded in a vital part, and must be destroyed. It may seem to us a long time in dying. If the root of a plant be dug up when it is small, it will soon die, but when it is grown to a strong tree, even though we may destroy the root, there will be enough sap left in the body to give it the appearance of life for a long time. But it must die.

2. The apostle's second argument for the assertion that it is impossible for those who have died for sin in union with Christ to abide in it is, that the union with Christ in his death and resurrection which is necessary to justification implies a union with him in his risen life, wrought by the same agent, in the same act, namely, the Holy Spirit, in the act of baptism or regeneration, which must result ultimately in sanctification. Not only has the believer been baptized into the death of Christ, but into his life also. "If we die with him, we shall also live with him." "As many as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ." The believer's life henceforth is Christ's risen life. They have not only been quickened together with him, and raised up together with him, but also made to sit together with him in heavenly places. "I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless, I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me, for the life that I now live, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me." "When Christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall we also appear with him in glory." But if the believer be united to Christ in life in such a way that Christ's life is said to be his life, then his life must partake of the character of Christ's life. But Christ liveth unto God. "Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to have died unto sin in union with Christ, but to be alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord." The members must become partakers of the nature of the body. The wife must bring forth children which partake of the nature of the husband to whom she is united. "Wherefore, my brethren, ye also are become dead to the law by

the body of Christ; that ye should be married to another, even to him who is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God." The argument is irrefragable, if the believer be united to Christ in his death, he must be united to him in his life; since the same Holy Spirit who made him conformable to Christ in his death, spiritually as well as legally, is able also to make him conformable to Christ in his life, and since that life is a pure life, no more subject to death for sin, and consecrated to God, so must the believer's life be.

3. Now, last of all, it is the *divine purpose* in constituting this union with Christ, that it shall result not only in the justification, but the sanctification of the believer as well. "Therefore, we were buried with him by baptism into death, *in order that* like as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life." "For what the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh, *in order that* the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit" "We thus judge, that if One died for all, then all died; and he died for all *in order that* they which live (in him) should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them and rose again."

Now since it was the divine purpose in constituting this federal and spiritual union with Christ in death, burial, resurrection, and risen life, that it should result in the sanctification as well as the justification of the believer; and since the agent who wrought the union is almighty to carry out this purpose, and since the nature of this union is such as that it must destroy both the guilt and power of sin, with all its effects, both legal and spiritual, both subjective and objective, and create and nourish in the believer a life of holiness like that of Christ; the conclusion is irresistible, that it is impossible for those who have died for sin to abide in sin. Sanctification, therefore, must be the final result of justification. The Antinomian objection is thus completely answered, in whatever form it may present itself.

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IV. GOD'S METHOD IN DIVINE REVELATION.

The object of this essay is simply, by bringing together familiar facts in their natural relations, to endeavor, as far as possible, to account for the particular manner in which God has chosen to reveal himself to the world in the great scheme of human redemption.

The question has, no doubt, often presented itself to Bible readers, Why did not God, when he first made known his purpose to redeem our fallen race, give us a complete Bible, made by his own hand, as he wrote the law on the tables of stone at Sinai? For, no one doubts that when he made promise of the Seed of the woman, at the gate of Eden, he knew perfectly all the details of the plan of redemption, as subsequently revealed. Would it not, on first view, seem probable that, simultaneously with the establishment of a system of religion in the world, a book should be published, setting forth its principles, containing its constitution and laws, and showing the authority on which its claims rested? When Mohammed set up his stupendous system of imposture, he wrote the Koran; and with this in one hand and the sword in the other, he went forth offering the grim alternative between the two. The Book of Mormon, claiming a miraculous origin, was published to the world as the authority upon which the more modern imposture of Mormonism was founded. Why did not God give the Bible to the world when he established the religion that it reveals? And why should inspired *men* have been employed as vehicles of divine revelation, when God could as easily have communicated his will directly, without their intervention?

While we would not presume to be able to answer these questions exhaustively, or to comprehend fully all the reasons involved, yet, the devout study of God's way of working—even though but partially comprehended, and very imperfectly understood—not only yields a rich reward for the labor bestowed, but cannot fail to vindicate his transcendent wisdom and goodness, as manifested in the methods that he chooses.

In answer to the question, Why did not God give to the world a complete Bible when he made the first announcement of a Deliverer, it might be said, no doubt truly, that such a book, at the time, and under the circumstances, would have been, in a large measure, at least, unintelligible. Man needed a preliminary education. He required ages of training in the school of experience to show him his utter helplessness and indispensable need of an Almighty Saviour; and thus prepare him to understand and appreciate a *verbal* declaration of God's way of saving sinners. And it required a still more protracted course of instruction, through the use of types and symbols in various forms—in the rudimental principles of vicarious atonement for sin, before he was prepared to receive, understandingly or profitably, a verbal statement of the doctrine of salvation through the substitutional sacrifice and imputed righteousness of Christ. But we pass over this point, and others that naturally present themselves, without further remark, that we may have larger space to devote to the line of thought marked out for this short paper.

It needs no argument to prove that a revelation from God, in order to insure its acceptance as such, and, therefore, to subserve permanently the purposes of a divine revelation, must be so distinctly stamped with the seal of God as not only to evidence itself to those who are the immediate recipients of the communication, but it must contain in its very bosom, and carry with it down the ages, such permanent badges of its divine origin, as clearly to distinguish it from all merely human productions, and furnish to every generation to the end of time substantially the same convincing proofs of its divine authority. It cannot be confidently affirmed that this would all be true of the Bible if God had given it in the beginning. While our first parents themselves could have had no doubt of its divine source, and while their immediate descendants might have received it on their testimony without doubt or question, yet, after a few generations the fact would have become a mere tradition, to be first questioned, then doubted, then discredited; and we see no way in which it could have been conclusively proven. But the Bible, as God has given it to us, does unquestionably possess the essential characteristics above

mentioned by which it may be authenticated at any time or in any place. The evidence upon which its divine authorship is established is of a kind that is not weakened or obscured by lapse of time.

This result was secured by the method which God saw fit to adopt with reference to its communication. Several facts in this connection challenge special attention:

1. The long delay before a permanent written revelation was even commenced.

2. The equally surprising lapse of time between its commencement and its completion.

3. The large number of writers and their great variety in point of gifts, attainments, and circumstances.

4. The "sundry times" at which they were moved by the Holy Ghost to write the different parts of the book.

5. The employment of men, confessedly imperfect, as the vehicles of a perfect revelation.

These facts, under God, exercised a controlling influence in impressing upon the book thus produced, those distinguishing characteristics which so triumphantly vindicate its claims as "the Book of the Lord." We shall discuss them briefly without regard to distinct division or numerical order.

The first fact mentioned, the long delay in commencing the Bible, lifts it at once entirely out of the realm of human impostures. For it may be fairly assumed that every impostor has some selfish end in view—fame, fortune, position, power, or something else—which he hopes to gain by the successful outworking of his fraudulent scheme. But for this expectation he would have no motive to engage in it. Hence, he naturally desires to have it developed and matured with the least possible delay. No impostor would deliberately remit to future generations all the benefits of a system originated by himself. Mohammedanism was in its zenith during the lifetime of its author. Mormonism was brought to maturity in less than a score of years after its inception.

Widely different was God's mode of procedure. Twenty-five centuries devoted to the preparation of the world to receive the Bible, and fifteen centuries more to its production in God's own

chosen method—differing so widely from anything that man could have planned or conceived—cause it to stand out in majestic singularity and peerless grandeur; sublimely illustrating God's declaration: "My thoughts are not your thoughts; neither are your ways my ways"; and proclaiming it to be the work of him with whom "one day is as a thousand years and a thousand years as one day."

But we must be careful to guard against even the remotest suspicion that either the delay, or the slow progress in its revelation, was an indication of incompleteness or immaturity in the plan of redemption revealed in the Bible. In the mind of God, and for all the purposes of human salvation, that plan was not only complete, but absolutely perfect from the beginning. The delay in revealing it was not because God was not prepared to give it, but because man was not ready to receive it. When God made promise of the seed of the woman, redemption meant everything that it meant when Christ ascended in triumph to take his seat at God's right hand. As the "Lamb slain from the foundation of the world," his blood availed for Abel no less effectually than for the Apostle John, to whom it was given to finish and close up forever the book of Inspiration. No progress or development can be properly predicated of the plan of redemption, except in the sense of bringing it more clearly to human view. A painting, executed in the highest style of the art, of exceptional richness and beauty, exquisitely finished in its minutest details, is hung in a room but dimly lighted. Only its outlines and general proportions can be clearly discerned; and thus seen, it does not impress one as a strikingly handsome painting. But, as additional light is from time to time admitted into the room, its superior charms are by degrees brought more clearly into view, until, finally, under a full blaze of light, the beholder is enraptured with its transcendent beauty and grandeur. No change has been wrought upon the painting itself. It was as beautiful at the first as at the last. The change is simply in the additional light thrown upon it. So, divine inspiration and divine illumination have from time to time thrown increased light upon those mysteries of redemption, which from the beginning of the world have been hid in God (Eph. iii. 9); not enlarging, or in any manner changing, but simply bringing more clearly to hu-

man view God's eternally perfect and unchangeable plan of grace for saving fallen man.

The unity of the Bible, as a whole, cannot be accounted for on natural principles, when we consider the great variety of the sources from which it is compiled. If God had written it all with his own finger, this unity would be no marvel. But with so many different writers engaged upon its separate parts, under circumstances so widely variant, and at intervals of time so remote, that its different parts should so perfectly agree as to constitute a harmonious system of facts and doctrines, is itself a miracle as notable as any that it records. And after accepting the Bible with this miracle stamped upon its very face, there is no excuse for discrediting anything that it contains, on the ground that it is supernatural. Let us glance hastily at a few familiar facts confirmatory of these statements.

The Bible was written in sixty-six separate parts—thirty-nine in the Old and twenty-seven in the New Testament. These separate parts were written at different times, covering, in the aggregate, a little more than fifteen hundred years. The writers, about thirty-three in number, were men of various orders of natural gifts, and various kinds and degrees of mental culture. Some were comparatively learned, others illiterate. They lived in different localities and under different dispensations of the church. They were engaged in different secular callings, from the king on the throne to the humble fisherman. Their writings were in different languages, and embraced a wide range of subjects, including history, prophecy, biography, laws, proverbs, parables, sacred poetry, religious experience, doctrines, and practical duties. In the very nature of the case, must we not expect to find in these writings great contrariety in matters of opinion, and clashing in matters of fact? Under ordinary circumstances this would certainly be the case. Yet, when collected and compiled, instead of the confusion of tongues that might have been anticipated, one of the most prominent characteristics of the book which they form is its unity as a whole, with perfect consistency and harmony of statement in all its various parts. Its sublime facts, pure doctrines, and holy precepts, all circle round and centre in the one

grand theme of gospel salvation through Christ crucified. This we have said is a notable miracle, and we are not prepared to withdraw or modify the statement. For common observation and experience clearly prove that such a result would be impossible without a direct interposition of divine power. Take only two men, reared, if you please, in the same neighborhood, as nearly as possible under the same influences, and educated at the same institution of learning, and let them, without collusion, pre-concert, supervision, or the restraints of a creed previously adopted and thoroughly studied, write freely their respective views on moral and religious subjects, and the probabilities are more than a hundred to one that there would be such discrepancies between them that it would be impossible to harmonize their views as parts of one and the same moral or religious system.

The entire Koran is supposed to have been written by one man, and all within the space of about three years. Yet there were such inconsistencies and contradictions between some of the later portions and what had preceded, that it was found impossible to reconcile them. And when its author was appealed to on the subject, the only explanation that he vouchsafed was that God had a right to change his laws and modify the principles of his government whenever he thought proper.

In the ablest theological debate to which it was ever the privilege of the writer to listen, continuing through sixteen days, one of the disputants was more embarrassed by irreconcilable inconsistencies between different portions of his own writings, pointed out, from time to time, by his adroit opponent, than by anything else which he had to encounter in the discussion. Like Mohammed, he could not make a harmonious system even out of his own productions written at different times, although a man of ability and scholarship, and one who wrote with great care.

Our forefathers came to this country, moved by a common impulse. They were encompassed by common dangers, endured common hardships and had a common end in view. All the circumstances by which they were surrounded favored harmony of views and opinions on all questions pertaining to civil government. Yet, when they undertook to frame the Constitution of

the United States, they differed so widely as to some of its provisions that controversy waxed warm. Volumes were written in support of the theories of the respective parties; and it was at last found impossible for them to agree upon the provisions of that important instrument, except by compromise, each party yielding some things for the sake of securing others.

It is only by placing such facts as these alongside of those connected with the writing of the Bible, and noting the measureless contrast, that we can fully appreciate the irresistible strength of the arguments drawn from the latter in support of the divine inspiration of the Scriptures. We are not, however, pressing this view for the purpose of proving to our readers that the Bible is inspired. It is assumed that no one of them doubts it. We are only calling special attention to the particular character of this department of the proof, with the view of further illustrating our theme—God's method in Divine Revelation. In the first point which we noticed particularly—God's long delay before even commencing the work of giving his will to the world in permanent form—God appears simply as the Lord Jehovah, whose thoughts and ways are as far above ours as the heaven is higher than the earth; in whose sight a thousand years are but as yesterday; and who is, therefore, not impatient of results. In the point which we are now considering, however—the manner in which he chose to *communicate* his will—he appears in his benevolent condescension and loving interest in the welfare of our race. The process chosen seems, on first view, tedious and cumbersome, especially when we reflect how easily God could have communicated directly, or inspired one man to write the whole. We are compelled to believe that there were wise and good reasons for the particular mode selected. And when we begin devoutly to search for these reasons; when we reverently inquire why the Bible should have been so long in process of construction; and why such a variety of persons and characters should have participated, instrumentally, in furnishing its contents, no other explanation seems, in every aspect of the case, so plausible, none so obvious in fact, as that God intended, among other things, by this method to impress upon this book, ineffaceably, the evidences of his own "handiwork." That

he fashioned it in this particular mould expressly in order that it might be its own sufficient and perpetual witness. It was certainly of the greatest importance that a gospel which is for all lands, ages and generations, should carry with it wherever it goes self-evidencing marks of its divine source. No plan that could have been devised would more effectually have accomplished this result. Personal testimony fades into tradition and grows constantly weaker. But in this method the evidence is interwoven with the very structure of the Bible, securely attached to it as a conspicuous badge, inhering in it as a faithful ever-present witness, bearing a silent but constant testimony. No form of evidence could be more irresistibly conclusive. None is more easily apprehended. None appeals more readily or convincingly to the popular mind. None continues always and everywhere so entirely unchanged and unimpaired by lapse of time or change of circumstances. In the remotest islands of the sea, and in the latest generation of time its voice will be heard as distinctly as it is here and now.

But, besides this impregnable bulwark of evidence, there are other beneficent results due to the same causes, in whole or in part, which would well repay thorough study, if space permitted. But for the sake of brevity, we can refer only to a few of them, and to these but very briefly.

1. It was of the greatest practical importance to us that the Bible should contain a divinely inspired history of the church in the aggregate, as well as biograpical sketches of the lives of God's individual children, embracing a period sufficiently protracted to illustrate the principles of his government, the sacredness of the relations that he sustains to his people, his unchanging love for, and providential care over, his chosen ones, and his unfailing faithfulness to his covenant promises. Still more essential was it that we should have a divinely authenticated history of the life, sufferings, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ, the Saviour of the world. And inasmuch as history cannot be recorded *as* history until after the events have transpired, even if no other reason could be assigned, this would certainly have been an all-sufficient one for keeping the book of Inspiration so long open for addi-

tions to its contents. When we observe how large a proportion of the Bible is devoted to these histories and biographical sketches, and how many and how instructive and comforting the lessons derived from these sources, we need not be surprised at the delay which rendered their insertion in the Divine Record possible. Divested of its historical parts, the Bible would be the merest skeleton—in fact, no Bible at all.

2. Another very essential part of the book of Divine Inspiration consists of those inestimably precious and instructive records of religious experience in which it so richly abounds. In his consummate wisdom, God has provided for their incorporation into the Holy Oracles, in the most natural way possible. Along with its marvellous unity as a whole, and other distinguishing marks of its divinity, the Bible is characterized by almost endless variety of detail—diversity of styles, modes of thought, forms of expression, and numberless other things answering to the peculiar personal characteristics of the different writers.

From what we see to be actually true, we are authorized to say that God did not want uniformity of *manner* among the sacred writers, but just that sort of diversity and variety ordinarily found among uninspired writers. Hence, he did not inspire them all to write in the same style, but each in his own style. And to give this diversity the widest range, he chose men of every order of gifts and acquirements, and from every rank and station in life. It is not less certain that God chose every writer of the Bible, than that he inspired every thought and fact and doctrine that it contains; and not only that he chose them, but that, by his special providences, he gave them the training best adapted to fit them respectively for their particular work. This special training is clearly to be seen in a number of cases; notably, those of Moses, David, Solomon, Paul, and the writers of the four Gospels; and if the facts were as fully known, we should no doubt see that the same was true in every case. The first preparation, both in importance and in the order of time, and the one alike essential in every case, was that the sacred writers should be truly men of God—"vessels of mercy . . . prepared unto glory"—that they should have been subjects of a genuine religious experience. For

God did not use the sacred writers as mere automatons to utter abstractions in which they felt no interest and had no experience. When holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, they spake each through and in the light of his own individual experience. Hence, religious experience, as we gather it from the Bible, and as we find it in common life, is, in one respect, strikingly like the Bible itself—characterized by unity with diversity. Unity, in the fact that in every case alike a soul is delivered from the bondage of sin, and saved through the blood of the Lamb; diversity, as the inevitable result of great dissimilarity in personal traits, mental and moral, and an endless variety of circumstances. God had use for the peculiar personal characteristics of every one of the sacred writers. Representing, as they do, every order of mental gifts, and every grade of culture, every rank, position, and calling, every disposition and temperament; and all these under the modifying influence of an infinite variety of circumstances, and, although speaking "as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," yet, each speaking through the channels of his own experience, they show the practical influence of Christianity upon all classes of people, and under all circumstances. The Bible is, therefore, a rich store-house of religious experience, in which all may find something for instruction, comfort, and encouragement. And do we not find here another of the chief reasons why God chose to use men at all, and especially why he used so many in communicating his will? Had he given it from his own mouth, or by his own hand, while it would, of course, have been supremely excellent, still, it would not have been the utterances of human experience; nor have illustrated practically the influence of Christianity on the heart and life.

But "herein is a marvellous thing": that the Bible is a perfect book, and yet written by imperfect men. The rules of conduct and the standard of character upon which it insists, are absolutely faultless; and yet, its writers frequently and sometimes flagrantly violated those rules and fell short of that standard. What then? Is this an exception to the law that a stream can never rise higher than its source? By no means; but only a proof that the real is higher than the apparent source. While the Bible as a whole is

manifestly the book of God, yet, in writing it, man is something more than a mere amanuensis. His experiences are interwoven with the great facts and doctrines of redemption in a way that exhibits constantly the imperfections of man, while it illustrates gloriously the perfections of God. Nor is the least disposition manifested by the sacred writers to conceal, excuse, or palliate, much less to justify their sins and shortcomings. The naked facts are stated with the utmost frankness and ingenuousness, without explanation or apology. This is without parallel among profane writers; and shows clearly that these men spake, not as they were moved by their natural impulses, but "as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." We wonder, on first thought, that God should have used even the best and most faultless of an imperfect race, incapable of coming up to the rules which they themselves wrote, as the vehicles of a perfect revelation. But we are still more amazed to find among his chosen vessels for this purpose, men like David, Solomon, and Peter, upon whose characters are found dark stains and foul blots. But on more mature reflection we see that here, as everywhere else, "the foolishness of God is wiser than men." As the skilful artist uses the dark background, which possesses in itself no attractiveness, to bring out and set off more advantageously the beauties of the painting, as the diamond shines all the more brilliantly by contrast with the dross seen in the gold in which it is set, so the earthen vessel with its defects and blemishes serves, by contrast, to show more clearly the superior purity and preciousness of the gospel treasure; and our homage goes out to God its author, and not to the earthen vessel in which it is borne.

J. E. Spilman.

Flora, Ill.

V. THE CHURCH AND SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES.

Daniel Webster, in his famed forensic argument in the Girard will case, when confronted by able and learned counsel, uttered with complacent boldness these memorable words: "In what age, by what sect, where, when, by whom, has religious truth been excluded from the education of youth? Nowhere. Never! Everywhere, and at all times it has been regarded as essential. It is of the essence, the vitality of useful instruction."

John B. Minor, LL. D., of the University of Virginia, a man distinguished for his ripe scholarship, great learning, and high character, says: "It must be acknowledged to be one of the most remarkable phenomena of our perverted humanity, that among a Christian people, and in a Protestant land, such a discussion" (the secularization of the instruction of youth) "should not seem as absurd as to inquire whether school-rooms should be located under water or in darksome caverns! The Jew, the Mohammedan, the follower of Confucius, and of Brahma, each and all are careful to instruct the youth of their people in the tenets of the religions they profess, and are not content until, by direct and reiterated teaching, they have been made acquainted with at least the outline of the books which contain, as they believe, the revealed will of Deity. Whence comes it that Christians are so indifferent to a duty so obvious, and so obviously recognized by Jew and Pagan?"

These historic assertions are correct. The church has heretofore been the founder and supporter of schools. At different times the ecclesiastical organization has not been so. For here and there in the sweep of centuries nothing in the world was more unchristian than the church structure. Christianity consists in holding up Christ and teaching and living the life, individual and social, which is grounded on the things he taught, and fostered by vital union with him. When the ecclesiastical forces were most vitiated and malicious, the truth and life of Christianity were still existent, though now and then concealed in mountain fastnesses, awaiting the downfall of their oppressors. In periods

like these we would err were we to confound Christianity with contemporaneous ecclesiastical organizations; the church happened at times to be the very thing that needed christianizing. Though it be historically correct, then, that the church has repeatedly exerted meagre influence in behalf of Christian education, the fact remains, that the drift of Christian teaching and discipline has been toward the support of schools and the diffusion of learning.

The invariable attestation of the sacred Scriptures confirms this statement. That knowledge is a thing of great worth is emphasized everywhere. When knowledge is graded below love it is that knowledge which despises virtue. In both Testaments the worth of intelligence as the foundation of character, every Bible student knows, is insisted on with abounding repetition and great emphasis. And the knowledge thus highly appraised is not religious knowledge solely. The man of biblical history, most famed for his wisdom, and most praised for his pursuit of wisdom, was not preëminently a theologian, but a man who appears to have had the mastery of what could be learned in his time of the humanities. This wisdom of Solomon did not keep him from falling into depths of sensuality; but there is no hint in the story of his life, that his fall was the fruit of his learning; it was rather in spite of it. His wisdom is always commended and never censured.

But take a finer sight. Under the New Testament economy, where the church assumes her final form, her home is found where it was placed originally. See the apostolic references to Priscilla and Aquila, and "the church that is in their house"; to "Nymphas, and the church which is in his house"; to "the house of Chloe," "household of Stephanas," and "of Onesiphorus," and the like. But what was the declared purpose of God in ordaining the family, at the beginning, by the union of one man and one woman, in one flesh, for life? The answer given is, for "seeking a godly seed." Does this not imply the development of character by training, by the inculcation of true knowledge, all lines of which lead up to God as every ray of light to the sun?

At the time our Saviour was born, church Bible-schools were established institutions for younger children. In these schools

children memorized the Scriptures and were taught their meaning by interlocutory methods. Later, they were advanced to the synagogue schools, and taught there from the same text-book. These schools abounding among the people help us to understand more fully the great commission given by our Saviour: "Go ye, therefore, and make disciples (scholars) of all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and, lo! I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." Those who heard these words from the Saviour's lips could not surely have understood them to mean any other thing than that Bible-schools should be established everywhere as a foundation, as a part of the very form of the activities of the church. This would seem to have been their interpretation of it, for, accordingly, the child and childlike were gathered into schools with the Bible as their text-book, wheresoever churches were planted. And historians tell us that for centuries, beginning with the third, sacred and secular knowledge were communicated in concert, and that the portals of the schools bore the inscription, *Religioni et artibus sacra.*

Even in the ages of darkness, let it be written, however great the danger of being misunderstood, when the Bible was not in the hands of the people, the churches and monasteries kept alive what learning was left in the world. Throughout this period repeated decrees are known to have gone forth to the clergy ordering free tuition for the young.

One of the bishops of Charlemagne, Theodulph, instructed his clergy in the following language: "Let the elders establish schools in towns and villages, and if any of the faithful wish to intrust to them their children to be taught letters, let them not decline to receive and teach them, but with the utmost care instruct them. And when they thus teach, let them take from them no recompense for their service, nor accept anything from them, except what parents, in the exercise of charity, of their own accord may offer them." Charlemagne himself gave orders to establish schools throughout his dominions, "to teach children to read," and to require that "in every monastery some one teach psalms,

writing, arithmetic, and grammar." The interest of this powerful monarch in learning and schools is noteworthy when it is recalled that his own literary attainments extended no further than the art of reading, and historians have found reason for doubting his ability to write his own name. Learning and religion are so closely connected in his decree that he urges since good conduct is prescribed by a definite rule, so also must teaching and learning be systematically carried on, "that those who seek to please God by right living may not neglect to please him also by right speaking."

Says Dr. Trumbull: "It stands out most clearly in the ecclesiastical history of the middle ages, that where the Christian life was purest, in those times of general decline, was where the Bible-school idea was adhered to most closely as a means of religious instruction and training. Peculiarly was this the case with the Waldenses, the Albigenses, the Lollards or Wiclifites, the Bohemian Brethren or Hussites, and the Brethren of the Common Life. Not the pure liturgy, nor the faithful pulpit, but the divinely appointed Bible-school, in its more primitive elements, was the distinctive means of their preservation from the well-nigh universal defection."

Rev. William Meille, of Turin, in one of the most eloquent orations of the century, delivered in 1889, at Basiglia, where the gallant seven hundred exiled Vaudois returned to their fair valley, two hundred years ago, and before thousands of their descendants in assemblage to commemorate the event, when referring to the taunt that the Waldenses were "the people of the Bible," exclaimed in a sublime apostrophe to the Book: "Beloved Bible, precious inheritance of our fathers, and gift of God, thou wilt not be taken from us! We shall preserve thee intact; thy place is in our churches, *thy dwelling in our schools.*" The good earl of Shaftesbury, in one of his last addresses, spoken on behalf of the Waldensian church missions in Italy, said truly, it was a church whose purity of doctrine had never been changed, and whose antiquity brought it close to the church of the apostles.

The reformation of the sixteenth century was itself at once the effect and the cause of a great revival of learning. Erasmus, the

hero of the Renaissance, and Luther, the hero of the Reformation, were both apostles of the new education. The God-given right of private judgment and its exercise and perpetuity, implied the necessity of the universal diffusion of knowledge. Therefore, both Luther and Melanchthon labored zealously in behalf of schools and learning.

In the first Confession of Faith, and the first Book of Discipline (1561) of the Church of Scotland, education was very justly regarded as of the utmost importance, and deserving every possible encouragement. It was stated as imperatively necessary that there should be a school in every parish for the instruction of youth in the principles of religion, grammar, and the Latin tongue; and it was further proposed that a college should be established in every "notable town, . . . and that a fund should be provided for the education of the children of the poor. . . . To carry these important measures into effect, permanent funds were requisite, and for these they naturally looked to the patrimony of the church."

After the restoration of the Scotch church from prelatic usurpation, in 1638, the General Assembly "directed the presbyteries to see that schools were provided in every landward parish, and such support secured to schoolmasters as would render education easily accessible to the whole population of the kingdom."

So dear was this subject to the Christian heart of the Church of Scotland that a society was organized in the last century for the specific purpose of propagating Christian knowledge, and required to make reports to the Assembly.

The founders of New England were thoroughly imbued with Protestantism. Their principles, like those which had taken deep root in the popular heart of Scotland, were derived from John Calvin at Geneva, where he had maintained the training-school of the Protestant world. They did not and could not forget the corollary of Protestantism, the necessity of schools by the church, as they learned it from this great theologian. Their history shows on every page how great was the estimation they placed on schools and knowledge, and how close schools and knowledge were related in their minds to religion. Within thirty years of the land-

ing of the Pilgrims, education had been made compulsory in every colony except Rhode Island. The reason assigned for this decisive educational enforcement, as set forth in their law, was to intercept "that old deluder, Sathan," who seeks "to keep men from the use of the Scriptures by persuading them from the use of tongues."

The immigrants who came direct from Scotland, and settled on the sand hills of the section of North Carolina covered now by the Presbytery of Fayetteville, the largest presbytery in the Southern Presbyterian Church, gave expression to the teachings of John Calvin and John Knox, by insistence amid multitudinous self-denials and resplendent heroism, upon building, contemporaneously with their dwellings, houses of worship and by their side school-houses, and employing preachers of the gospel to preach in the one and teach in the other. The same thing was done by Scotch immigrants in other sections.

It would be surperfluous to trace the connection between the church and the school, especially that of New England and the educational work which extended to the other States of the Union. That popular education, as it exists in this country, is the offspring of the religious sentiment is matter of history. The same is true of all countries. There has never been a human government administered entirely apart from some form of religion. The civil institutes of the ancient world were informed by most effective religious beliefs. The state finds a necessity for this utilization. Let it be reiterated that religion everywhere and in all ages has had charge of and been relied on to conserve and disseminate learning.

A learned writer, in the *Repertory* of 1831, says: "The object of education, as mankind has always supposed, is to perfect the mind; to give to all the moral and intellectual powers their complete development; to place man on such ground that he can exercise control over all his faculties and bring them to bear with most effect on the various purposes for which they were designed. The mind is derived from God, and partakes of his nature; and it is brought towards the perfection of its nature as it is brought towards a likeness to God, its original Author. It is then the proper object of education to bring the soul to a likeness to God;

to impress upon imperfect man, both intellectually and morally, the perfect image of his Creator."

"Then, such being the object of education, if God has ever made a revelation of himself to man, surely one of the best means of accomplishing the object of education, one of the best means of bringing the mind to a conformity with its Author, must be a diligent study of this revelation, and a faithful application of its principles to all the intellectual and moral powers. This conclusion is perfectly natural; and, as a matter of fact, men in all ages have generally reasoned in this way. Every people which has had books, believed to be revelations from the Divinity, has always made the study of those books an essential part of elementary and liberal education, and often, indeed, to comprise the whole of it. Thus, the Hindoo youth is taught to study the Vedas, and the Mohammedan to read the Koran. Thus, the Hebrews were carefully instructed in the books of the law; and thus, too, have Christians been accustomed to study the Bible in obedience to divine command."

The Christian religion, the evident mother of education in our country, is exhibiting, we believe, a deplorable maternal neglect for her daughter, and the daughter is still more deplorably manifesting a disposition to desert her mother. This tendency must be arrested, and the scriptural mission and place of the church as an educator be re-emphasized.

The claim that education without religion will develop all the saving virtues needed in society, and the disposition to divorce education wholly from religion, have both been gaining strength. There are those, too, who maintain that the diffusion of science and literature will prove sufficient for the proper culture of the young. And it is said, furthermore, with emphasis, that the learning thus diffused not only may be, but must be, separated from everything that bears the semblance of religion.

Does not the "Thus saith the Lord" obligate men to educate their children, and to do it in the use of given means? Ought not all things to be done for Christ's sake? Yes. Then the training that does not base duty on Christianity is essentially immoral. Accordingly, Dr. Griffin, decades ago, said: "To educate the mind of

a bad man without correcting his morals is to put a sword into the hands of a maniac." John Locke wrote: "It is virtue, then, direct virtue, which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education . . . If virtue and a well-tempered soul be not got and settled so as to keep out ill and vicious habits, languages, and science, and all the other accomplishments of education will be to no purpose but to make the worse or more dangerous man." Dr. Francis Wayland wrote: "Intellectual cultivation may easily exist without the existence of virtue or love of right. In this case its only effect is to stimulate desire; and this, unrestrained by the love of right, must eventually overturn the social fabric which is at first erected."

Facts show that mere intellectual culture does not make men moral, obedient, useful. The history of Rome shows it. When the intellectual development of the empire was at its zenith its vices were deepest. The putridity of its abandoned morals was so black no one historian, even of its golden age, ever descended into particulars. We grace and strengthen this paper by borrowing from the eloquent address of Rev. Dr. Strickler, delivered during the dedicatory exercises of Agnes Scott Institute, a vivid portraiture of a Roman of the Augustan age "as substantially representative of a large class. He was very handsome—the admiration of the noblest maidens. He was remarkably graceful in all his movements, and excelled in athletic accomplishments. His speeches were greatly applauded. When he ascended the throne, as he afterwards did, his reign for a while eclipsed that of the worthiest who had preceded him. Indeed, the first five years of his reign were called the golden quinquennium of Roman history. He was saluted on the coins of the country as Apollo; as Hercules; as the saviour of the world. The poets declared that there was no God in the heavens that would not think it an honor to surrender to him his throne. In the extravagance of their laudation they assured him that if he did not place himself carefully on the very centre of Olympus the equilibrium of the universe would be destroyed. Victims were slain along his path, and altars were erected in his honor, as if he were divine. Here was the highest intellectual and æsthetic culture; and yet how far that may be re-

moved from moral excellence becomes plain when I tell you that the man was Nero; the man whom subsequent ages have never been able sufficiently to execrate; the man who fiddled while his own capitol was burning, himself believed to have been the incendiary; the man who sewed up multitudes of Christ's servants in sacks, covered them with pitch, set them on fire, and used them as torches to illuminate his pleasure gardens; the man who wrapped the best men and women of his empire in the skins of wild beasts, and threw them into the amphitheatre, where, in the presence of thousands of spectators, they were torn in pieces by famished dogs. Thus, there may be the highest development of the intellectual and æsthetic faculties—a development that expresses itself in eloquence and song, in painting and sculpture; and yet with it all, there may not be a particle of that moral excellence without which man is but like the tiger—a graceful and beautiful brute. Something more is needed, then, for true culture than mere intellectual development; it is necessary that this intellectual development shall be of the right character."

The leaders in the agitations that menace the foundations of existing social order and give ground for grave concern to empires and republics, the adroit agitators of anarchism, communism, and socialism, are men in large part of superior intellectual development.

In Germany, a country famed for its intellectual advancement, the emperor, during the current year, in view of threatened danger to the empire by the growth of anarchism, socialism, and communism, conceived it to be necessary to prepare and force the passage of what is called the "Elementary Educational Bill," for the express purpose of averting ruin by school training.

The proposition that moral deterioration and social disorder increase to the exact extent education is separated from religion, appears easily demonstrable by facts. We may here content ourselves by quoting from an unusually able and practical article by Rev. Dr. Gladden, to whom we have already been placed under obligations. He says: "Twenty-five years, or thirty years ago" (he wrote in 1886), "most of our schools were under Christian influences. No attempt was made to inculcate the dogmas of the

Christian religion, but the teachers were free to commend the precepts of the New Testament, in a direct practical way, to the consciences of the pupils; and some of us remember, not without gratitude, the impressions made upon our lives in the school-room by the instructors of our early days. All this has been rapidly changing, and, comtemporaneously, it is discovered that something is wrong with society. Grave dangers menace its peace; ugly evils infest its teeming populations. Pauperism is increasing. The number of those who lack either the power or the will to maintain themselves, and who are, therefore, thrown upon the care of the state, is growing faster than the population. The cure of this alarming evil is engaging the study of philanthropists in all our cities. Crime is increasing. The only State in the Union that carefully collects its moral statistics brings to light some startling facts respecting the increase of crime within the past thirty years. In 1850, there was one prisoner in Massachusetts to every eight hundred and four of the population; in 1880, there was one to every four hundred and eighty-seven. The ratio of the prisoners to the whole population nearly doubled in thirty years. But it may be said that this increase is due to the rapid growth of the foreign population. There would be some small comfort in this explanation if it were the true one, but it is not the true one. The native criminals are increasing faster than the foreign-born criminals. In 1850, there was one native prisoner to every one thousand two hundred and sixty-seven native citizens; in 1880, there was one native prisoner to every six hundred and fifteen native citizens. The ratio of native prisoners to the native population more than doubled in thirty years. And this, be it remembered, in Massachusetts, the State in which education of every kind, public and private, has been longer established, and is more munificently endowed and more thoroughly administered than in any other State in the Union. Massachusetts expends, through her public schools, for the tuition of every pupil enumerated in her school population, nearly sixteen dollars a year. Added to this public provision is the great army of universities, colleges, academies, and seminaries, amply endowed, far surpassing those of every other State in number and excellence. What education

can do to promote morality has been more thoroughly done for Massachusetts than for any other American State. Nevertheless, the statistics show an alarming increase of the vicious and dependent classes. There is no room for supposing that the case of Massachusetts is any worse than that of the younger commonwealths. Those who have had opportunities for observing the conditions of society east and west, will not be inclined to believe that the morals of the old Bay State are any lower than those of New York, or Ohio, or Illinois." If the other States would collect the facts as carefully, and publish them as fully, we should see similar conditions existing everywhere. The advanced sheets of the census of 1890 confirm, it is sad to say, this assertion.

Let it be conceded for the nonce that moral teaching may be effective without the Bible as authority. That from the knowledge of the experience of men and human nature, ample intelligence about the moral law and its sanctions can be obtained for the instruction of youth, to enable them to discharge the obligations of life rightly. This were of little worth, for the fact stares us in the face that the tendency of educational work in the American States is in disregard of this factor. The questions prescribed for the examination of teachers, the programmes for teachers' institutes, the school-books adopted, the gist of statutes, show that such teaching is almost wholly unrequired in State schools. To say the most that can be said, this moral training fills an insignificant place in the work now going on.

The study of the subject in the light of past and current history, in order to learn what should be done, necessitates the consideration of a group of facts. We throw them together and invite inspection. Crime and pauperism are increasing. Anarchism, socialism, and communism have not only gained foothold, but have exhibited such growth in some localities as to constitute already a menace to social order. Options, corners, freezings out, and watering stocks, under the guise of sound ethics, have sprung up in all our great marts of trade, and are touching with their evil influence almost if not every hamlet and home in the land. Many prodigious monopolies have been organized, and the temptations to abuse their great powers have been unsuccessfully

resisted in frequent instances until the peace and prosperity of many sections, if not the whole country, is jeopardized. The protective tariff, a tax levied by the general government, with the intent to so affect trade as to promote a portion of the industries of the country, appears to be having the effect of arraying class against class to the intensity of bitterness and blows, blight and bloodshed. Strained relations exist between capital and labor, and both are organized, and their antagonism is growing more belligerent. The church now, as heretofore, is the chief reliance of society to conserve learning and promote schools. The church, which was the parent of popular education in this country, is exhibiting in many places a waning interest in the influence it ought to exert, and at the founding of the American States did exert so magnificently in behalf of schools. The work of excluding the Bible from our schools has grown rapidly. Neglect of teaching the "natural moral law" and its sanctions in our educational institutions is growing. The church must look to schools of its own founding and fostering for the educational preparation of her young men to keep the ranks of her ministry filled. While all departments of study may have their value, Christianity occupies the very throne of truth, and all lower truths are her subjects and supporters.

The careful and candid student of current and past history and the Bible will not question these cold, dry facts. In the light of them let us inquire, in the little space that remains, into the responsibilities of the church.

"Go and make disciples (scholars) of all nations" is a command given the church by its Head. Says Paul to Timothy, "Preach the word." The Holy Spirit makes use of "the word" as his agency to quicken the dead into newness of life, and "the truth" to sanctify the "born again." How to feel and think, to speak and act, is to be learned by searching the Scriptures. The way of life is obedience to them. Every other way is a way of eternal destruction. Hence the disciples of Christ are scholars, and their text-book is the Bible, and their marching orders are to go and make the offer of this discipleship to all nations until every creature has heard it.

True education may be said to consist, as is contended, in the complete development of all our powers—physical, mental, moral, and spiritual—to the end that we shall be all and do all of which we are capable while we live. But the chief thing is the development of the spiritual, otherwise life becomes a merely truncated cone, wanting in that sole thing, godliness, which makes it really profitable in both worlds. Education is essentially the nurture of a spirit which is rational and moral, in which conscience is the guiding and mandatory faculty, and whose proper end, in this world as well as that which is to come, is moral. "But God is the only Lord of the conscience; the soul is his miniature; his will is the source of obligation to it; likeness to him is its perfection, and religion is the science of the soul's relation to its God." These facts, considered together as they must be, show that the study of God in his inspired revelation of himself and man's relation to him, is inseparable from all educational processes.

Hence, Dr. Charles Hodge writes: "It is a conceded point that children ought to be religiously educated; that not merely natural religion, but Christianity, and not merely Christianity in general, but in the definite form in which it has been revealed by God for the salvation of man, ought to be inculcated on the infant mind, so that the rising generation shall be imbued with the knowledge of divine truth. Secondly, It may be assumed as conceded that it is the duty of the church to impart this religious education. This is one of the most important parts of her vocation. She received her commission to teach; she is, by the will and authority of her author, an institute of education, established to communicate and preserve the knowledge of God, of Christ, of the way of salvation, and of the rule of duty. Thirdly, This is a duty which the church cannot devolve on others. She cannot throw the responsibility on the state, for it is the very work God has given her to do, and she might as well look to the state to preach the gospel as to make disciples of the nations by teaching them."

Schools there must be in order to education, and diversified studies therein must be pursued, but no department of knowledge can be studied with true profit save in the light of the interpretation which the Bible gives. With the Bible as the touch-stone,

the whole world outside of man, and inside of man, and the sweep of history, become true knowledge, and conducive to the betterment and salvation of man and the advancement of the kingdom of Christ. The things which it is the business of the science of schools to investigate were all made for Christ. They received in their first framing a Christward leaning; in some sort, an impression of spiritual facts to be afterwards realized in him. Thus there has been laid in the constitution of nature materials for that rich symbolism or visible teaching of God, which, under the interpreting light of Scripture, it should be the function of the schools and colleges to study. To illustrate: when the light diffused through space received a bodily home for us in the sun, there seems to have been present in the thought of God the ultimate gathering up of his omnipotent glory in one point, by the bodily appearing of Jesus Christ to be the spiritual light of the world. And when, under laws of organic life in animal or plant, many parts were knit together and sustained in corporate action by a force undiscoverable, resident in one part, yet penetrating the whole, he meant to foreshadow the mysterious conjunction of believing souls into one, even Jesus, through the life-giving Spirit who proceedeth from him.

The Scriptures are the ultimate test of all human thinking, the final interpreter of not only the facts of the soul-world, but also the world outside. Therefore, the church can find no stopping point for its efforts until it establishes and maintains institutions in which the Bible shall occupy this enthronement. The mission of the church in the world makes this imperative. Other agencies may be clothed with the civic authority and possessed of the power to do this in whole or in part, but this in no wise modifies the plain injunction laid on the church. Without it she fails to employ a mighty evangelizing agency which lies within her reach.

The sons and daughters of the church are under the tuition of the church, and the church is obligated to give them the only religious and moral training which will make them good citizens of Christ's kingdom. Without schools and colleges, with the Bible as a textbook, can this be done? Is ideal citizenship in the state, moreover, a possibility without it? The definition of all relations and

all the obligations imposed by all relationships is found in it and in it alone. The church must forge its way, therefore, the Bible in hand, into every place in the world, but especially into schools where the young are gathered to be educated.

As the learned president of Davidson College, Rev. Dr. Shearer, says: "The Bible must be taught as the unifying course of all sound learning. It is the universal book, written for all ages; it touches human thought and action at every point, personal, social, civil, political, moral, religious, and ecclesiastical. It contains the bill of rights for the race, and the constitution of all proper human institutions. All practical wisdom is there elucidated and commended. Folly, in every conceivable form, is exposed and rebuked. There you find the methods of providence and the key to history. The Bible solves all the great questions of the ages, the nature of God, and the mode of his essence, the doctrine of creation and the Creator, the origin of man and his relations to the universe of God, the fall and the redemption, and man in every possible historic relation. All the doctrines of natural religion are assumed or authoritatively stated, and the unity of all causes and forces in the purpose of God is fearlessly stated and vindicated."

Once more: at every point in life the will of man is the executive, and conscience the directive, faculty. These can be purified and enlightened only by the will of him who is revealed in the Bible. Can the church fill her mission, then, until she has exhausted her influence to place this text-book on the throne in every institution for the training of the young? As it is madness in the sea captain to increase the steam and quicken the speed of his vessel in storm and darkness with compass lost and pilot blind, so is it a monstrous disregard of obligations in the church to fail to insist with all her might in placing on the throne in every school where the young are trained the only book that contains a knowledge of the Way, the Truth, and the Life.

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VI. NOTES.

BISHOP SEYMOUR ON THE HISTORIC EPISCOPATE.

Some time ago, like many other Presbyterian ministers, I received through the post the first number of *The Church Unity Quarterly*. The only article which it contains is entitled, "The Historic Episcopate: a contribution towards church unity, by the Right Rev. George Franklin Seymour, S. T. D., LL. D., Bishop of Springfield." A preface states that the periodical was sent me by the Church Unity Society, which asks the recipient to kindly accept and prayerfully examine it, and assures him that it "is not written in the spirit of controversy, but with a sincere desire for closer union, and in Christian love." In the body of the article, too, the author tells his readers that it will be a "great comfort" for him to learn that what he has written "will be honored for its candor, and regarded as an effort to secure kindly attention by the spirit of love which it breathes." I am sorry to say that if I were called on to report to Bishop Seymour the effect on myself of a perusal of his treatise, I should have to withhold from his large, generous, Christian heart the consolation for which it so ardently yearns; and I fear, too, that his own clerical brethren, who are of a less exclusive and hierarchical stripe than himself, whom, in his loving phraseology, he characterizes as "going about with a bravado which ought to excite disgust," and as furnishing a "distressing example of disloyalty," would hardly admit that he has been very successful in accomplishing his professed aim of making "known the truth in such wise, that all who hear or read are fascinated by the witchery of that sweet charity" which he delights to portray and recommend, but which, like too many others, he finds it much easier to preach than to practice. The pamphlet is really written in the spirit of propagandism and sectarian narrowness. The strength of the Bishop's plea for what he calls the Historic Episcopate consists in his own repeated and emphatic assurance that he fully believes in it. Such reiterated declarations of his personal conviction might have the force of valid arguments on the weak and ignorant, though I have said to myself once and again, on reading his needless repetitions of his undoubting faith in the system

which he advocates, "the Bishop doth protest too much, methinks." I am, therefore, tempted to begin my criticism of his plea for the Historic Episcopate by making it evident that he is a guide whose ostentatious parade of confidence in his system is no guarantee of security to those whom he undertakes to lead. I will make manifest by a palmary example that he can be the victim of incredible delusion, even when he vaunts most exultingly the invincibility of his argument.

Let us consider how he makes out the certainty of the transmission of the grace of holy orders from the time of the apostles by tactual succession. A break in the continuity he labors to show to be utterly inconceivable, and manages to furnish what I venture to affirm to be one of the choicest specimens of demonstration which the age has produced. I give his words exactly (p. 20): "In Holy Scripture we learn that the apostles ordained many, by the laying on of hands, to coöperate with them while they lived, and succeed them when they were dead." [He does not think it needful to show that any whom the apostles ordained were higher than presbyters.] "The first of the apostolical canons, which undoubtedly is genuine and represents the mind of the apostles, enjoins that a bishop must be ordained by two or three bishops, and the General Council of Nice in its fourth canon, which has been the law of the universal church ever since, requires that three at least shall concur in an ordination. These provisions secure, I may say, absolutely against the possibility of failure. The three strands, united in every ordination of a bishop, multiply by three as we go back in time, until after a few removes from the present they become too numerous easily to count. This is the sum and substance of apostolical succession." I have found by actual calculation that the three strands of bishops, united in the ordination of every bishop, if we multiply them by three, as we go back in time, do become after a few removes from the present too numerous readily to count. Suppose that the average length of a bishop's service in office is twenty years. Then between the year 1892 and 1492, that is, in four hundred years, there would be twenty removes. Suppose, now, three bishops to ordain a bishop in the year 1892, then twenty years back, or at the first remove, there would be nine bishops; multiply these by three, and go on multiplying by three at each remove till the year of the discovery of America is reached, and you will find that there must have been then living more than 10,460,000,000 bishops. After twenty removes the bishops became "too numerous easily to count," as our author truly affirms. If we should go further backward, and keep multiplying by

three as directed, we should find that when we should reach the year of the Council of Nice, or 325, they would mount up high into the trillions or quadrillions. The Bishop has evidently thought long and deeply on this proof of the continuity of the apostolical succession in the episcopate. It is, I believe, an original argument of his; and he again presents it to our admiring contemplation in a paper on the Historic Episcopate in the *Church Review* for October, 1890, (pp. 50, 51). That article is a *réchauffé* of the one in *The Church Unity Quarterly*, and in it we find these words: "This gives me a living church, bound together in time as one by a network of innumerable strands, crossing and recrossing one another, until thought is confused in contemplating the greatness of the security which apostolic and Nicene canons give us to guard the continuity of holy orders. The succession is not the succession of links in a chain, to be counted one by one, nor, as our lineal descent, to be reckoned back by a multiple of two, but beyond this, the succession brings in at each remove an increase multiplied by three." *Risum teneatis, amici?*

Could the force of folly go further? Well might the Bishop say that "thought is confused by the greatness of the security which apostolic and Nicene canons," as he applies them, "give us to guard the continuity of holy orders"! It is a good thing to consider the consequences of our application of certain principles; and if they are found to issue in absurdity, we are bound to conclude that there must be something wrong with the principles, or in our application of them. But the Bishop carries recklessly his false assumptions to the most shocking results. If any one is slow to believe that he could have blundered so outrageously as to ask us to admit that there were at least 10,460,000,000 bishops in existence in 1492, I have only to request the doubter to take the trouble to make the calculation exactly according to the Bishop's instructions. Baron Munchausen must surely yield the palm for imaginative story-telling to the present bishop of Springfield, Illinois.

But what shall we say of Bishop Seymour's assertion that the first apostolical canon, enjoining the ordination of a bishop by two or three bishops, is "undoubtedly genuine, and represents the mind of the apostles"? Here we have to make mention of a disgraceful practice, too prevalent in the early Christian centuries—that of giving the name of the apostles, or of their contemporaries, to writings composed long after their death for the purpose of advancing hierarchical interests. The Apostolic Canons, to which Bishop Seymour, who would have us

honor his candor, ventures to appeal, as to an authentic work, are one of these forgeries, as every one who has any capacity for historical criticism can convince himself by even a superficial examination.

The second apostolic canon, which speaks of *other clergy* besides bishops, presbyters, and deacons, betrays an age later than the apostolic. Or, take the twenty-fifth canon: "A bishop, or presbyter, or deacon, who is taken in fornication, or perjury, or stealing, let him be deposed, but not excommunicated; for the Scripture says, Thou shalt not avenge twice for the same thing in affliction." The Scripture thus perverted to the undue mitigation of the penalty to be inflicted on a clerical offender is Nahum i. 9: "Affliction shall not rise up the second time."

The thirty-first apostolic canon runs: "If any bishop makes use of the rulers of this world, and by their means obtains a church, let him be deposed and excommunicated, and all that have communion with him." Who does not see that this canon must have originated when Christianity was the religion of the empire, and long after the age of the apostles? And if this canon were indeed apostolic, it would destroy the apostolic succession in England and other countries in which it has been customary to use the influence of worldly powers to attain elevation to the Episcopal bench. How are most Anglican bishops elected at the present day? In a way which excites the scorn and derision of unbelievers. Emerson's description of it I saw lately quoted with approbation in a Roman Catholic quarterly, the *Dublin Review* (July, 1891, p. 11, note): "The bishop is elected by the dean and prebends of the cathedral. The queen sends these gentlemen a *congé d'élire*, or leave to elect, but also sends them the name of the person whom they are to elect. They go into the cathedral, chant and pray, and beseech the Holy Ghost to assist them in their choice; and after these invocations, invariably find that the dictates of the Holy Ghost agree with the recommendation of the queen." It is a great tax on our credulity to be required to believe that men elected in this way are exclusively entrusted by God in England with the grace of holy orders, and that none but those on whom they lay their hands are true ministers of Jesus Christ.

The fiftieth apostolic canon directs that a bishop who does not perform the three immersions of the one initiation at baptism should be deposed. If this canon is apostolic, there is not a lawful bishop in the Episcopal Church in the United States. The best excuse for the

temerity of Bishop Seymour in appealing to the Apostolic Canons (so-called) is to say that he was "beguiled through simplicity."

It was only by degrees and after much struggling[1] that bishops succeeded in establishing their exclusive right to ordain. In opposition to Bishop Seymour's affirmation that the first of the apostolic canons was universally acted on, I might content myself with appealing to Bingham (*Antiq.* Book II., ch. xi., sec. v.), who says: "The church many times admitted of the ordination of bishops that were consecrated only by one or two bishops," and he proceeds to furnish instances of this practice. In Smith's *Dictionary of Christian Antiquities* (I., p. 224) such a pronounced high churchman as Mr. Haddan expressly teaches that the Welsh and early Irish and Scotch practice was to have only one consecrator. Here are exceptions to the rule of multiplying by three at every remove as we go backward, which, as we saw, leads to a stupendous result. Why, I could prove by such witnesses as Jerome, Ambrosiaster, and Eutychius, that even in the third century the bishop of the very important see of Alexandria received no Episcopal ordination, but was appointed solely by the presbyters of the city. And the validity of his Episcopal standing was not challenged. The twenty-ninth chapter of the sixth book of the *Church History of Eusebius*, relates how Fabianus, who afterward suffered martyrdom in the Decian persecution, was seized and without any delay (*amelletos*) seated on the Episcopal throne of the city of Rome by the excited multitude, who imagined they saw a sign from heaven, which rendered any human ceremony of ordination unnecessary. If there had been any Episcopal consecration in the case of Fabianus, Eusebius could not have so related the story of his obtaining the see of Rome.

[1] This is unmistakably intimated in *Apostolic Constitutions*, Book VIII., ch. xlvi., where we read "Many (or rather, the many, *hoi polloi*, the greater number) esteem this a subordinate matter, and dare to confound the orders, and to remove the ordination which belongs to each, snatching to themselves dignities which are not given to them, and allowing themselves tyrannically to give what they have not authority," etc. Language like this testifies that even at a comparatively late period, and after the three-fold order of the ministry had been constituted, great confusion and irregularity in the practice of ordination prevailed, the inferior clergy undertaking the functions of the higher. Alas for the theory of a continuity of the grace of holy orders, through an unbroken succession of bishops, when orders and their functions were very generally confounded and presbyters took upon them to ordain like bishops, and little importance was attached by most to this disregard of clerical distinctions! It was judged a *parergon*, a subordinate matter (as even the *Apostolic Constitutions* confess) to discriminate the functions of church officers.

We have seen that the "Apostolic Canons" which Bishop Seymour has the boldness to declare "undoubtedly genuine" are unquestionably spurious, as is admitted by every competent scholar. I will not dispute the genuineness of the fourth canon of the council of Nice, over which he has lost his wits. But every one should know that a canon enacted in the year 325 could bear only on the appointment of bishops in subsequent times. It could not affect ante-Nicene practice, which was notoriously not in accordance with that fourth canon. It strikingly evidences the uncritical spirit of our author when he assumes that the canons of the Nicene Council were the universally observed law of the church from that time onward. Was he not aware that the twentieth Nicene canon directs all Christians to *pray standing on Sundays* and the whole time between Easter and Pentecost? He will hardly pretend that this canon has been observed always, everywhere, and by all. The testimony to the early prevalence of this practice is very different from that to the necessity of "three strands" of bishops being united in the ordination of every bishop. Bishop Seymour has strangely forgotten to give any scriptural proof of the ordination or appointment by the apostles of any ecclesiastical officers besides presbyters (who were bishops) and deacons. We do not read in Scripture of the apostles ordaining any bishops in the modern sense.

Bishop Seymour's treatise is not of the nature of an irenicon. To call it "a contribution towards church union" is a strange misnomer. He makes no concession to his non-Episcopal brethren, but insists on their submitting unconditionally to Episcopacy. Where there is no bishop, in his sense of the term, there is no church. "I believe," he says, "that the sacraments are official acts, and depend ultimately upon the episcopate for their validity." He is careful to inform his brethren who are not under Episcopal government, that "the church cannot permit her children to recognize their ministries." He is at great pains to impress upon his readers that this is a matter of principle with him. "It is impossible" for him "to recognize" his non-Episcopal brethren "as *officially representing the divine Master as his ambassadors*, because they have not the credentials which can alone accredit them as coming from him." He exculpates himself from the charge of bigotry and exclusiveness in maintaining his doctrine of the church, in a passage which is too curious to be in anywise modified. "Moreover, in this view of our relations, namely, that Episcopacy is divine in its origin, and the only form of church government, so far as we know, appointed by God, we must be acquitted by our brethren of that

charge of which we so often hear, and which seems to give offence, that we 'unchurch them.' Whoever holds this belief as I do, cannot unchurch any one. It is simply impossible. The church in its organization is God's work, not man's. He must receive it as God gives it to man." Those who only think of the church under the aspects in which it is presented in Scripture will be puzzled to form any intelligible idea of what is intended by "receiving the church as God gives it to man." But in Bishop Seymour's nomenclature the word church is employed to denote an organized body of ecclesiastics.

But what are we to make of the Bishop's solemn affirmation that he does not "unchurch anyone," and that it is "simply impossible" for him to do this? What he says is true, and is not true. It is not true as an answer to the charge of unchurching non-Episcopal Christian bodies. He is not at liberty to give the term "unchurch" a meaning which it does not bear in the accusation which he professes to repel. He does not "unchurch," or deprive of the character or rights of a church, his non-Episcopal brethren, because he does not acknowledge that they have any such character or rights to be deprived of. But he ought to be aware that in the charge which he professes to repudiate, the sense of the word "unchurch" is "to refuse the name or character of a church to." (See *Century Dictionary.*) This is what he does to every Christian communion differently organized from his own. He refuses the name or character of a church to it. This he will not deny. If the Bishop were a clearer thinker than he is, if his thought were not liable to be "confused," he would deserve severe reprehension for unworthy quibbling, for "paltering with us in a double sense." I will allow a man after his own heart in the matter of church government to reprove his bigotry. Bishop Andrewes was accounted a very high churchman in his day. He held very different views from those of the early fathers of the Anglican Church.[1] But Bishop Andrewes

[1] The idea of maintaining the continuity of holy orders was far from the mind of Cranmer, the first Protestant Archbishop of Canterbury. The king's appointment, without any Episcopal consecration, was in his opinion sufficient to make a valid bishop. And the Elizabethan Primates Parker, Grindal, and Whitgift, in ordaining bishops had certainly no intention of communicating any grace of holy orders received by succession from the apostles; nor did the bishops whom they ordained think that such grace was imparted to them at consecration. Without intention on the part of the ordainers or the ordained how could the grace be imparted is an interesting question discussed by Gilbert Child in the *Contemporary Review* for November, 1892, in an article on The Present Position of the High Church Party in England. In his book, *Church and State Under the Tudors*, Mr. Child

has uttered words of scathing rebuke to men who treat non-Episcopal communities as Bishop Seymour does. Here is his language: "Though our government be by divine right, it follows not either that there is no salvation, or that a church cannot stand without it. He must needs be stone-blind, that sees not churches standing without it." I have such a regard for the urbanities of controversy that I could not bring myself to tell Bishop Seymour that he was stone-blind for not seeing churches standing without Epicopal government; but it may be useful for him to know that this is the judgment pronounced on him by so renowned an Anglican prelate as Dr. Launcelot Andrewes.

I can consider only very briefly Bishop Seymour's proof of the divine origin and sanction of Episcopacy. He comes, he tells us, to the New Testament expecting to find there three orders of ministers to correspond to the high priest, priests, and Levites under the Law of Moses. Of course he finds what he wished and expected to find. But he does not seem to know, what is evident to every one who investigates the matter, that the ministry of the church of the New Testament was not organized after the model of the ministry of the temple, but after the ministry of the synagogue. The apostles did not appoint over the church high priest, priests, and Levites, but elders, such as were in the synagogue. The name of priest (*hiereus*) is no appropriate designation of the Christian minister. The preacher of the gospel is contrasted with the priest who ministered at the Jewish altar, as when Paul writes to the Corinthians: "Know ye not that they which minister about sacred things eat of the things of the temple, and they which wait upon the altar have their portion with the altar? Even so the Lord ordained

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proves the doctrine of the necessity of Episcopal ordination to have been an afterthought in the English Church. "The idea of questioning foreign Protestant orders was looked upon by Bacon (fifty years after the separation from Rome) as not only a novelty, but also an outrageous novelty." How could men holding the view of the English Reformers of the Church of Rome think of being dependent on her for the grace of holy orders? The third part of the sermon *Against Peril of Idolatry*, in the Homilies appointed to be read in churches in the time of Queen Elizabeth, calls the Church of Rome "the idolatrous church," "not only an harlot (as the Scripture calleth her) but also a foul, filthy, old withered harlot," "the foulest and filthiest harlot that ever was seen," "the great strumpet of all strumpets, the mother of whoredom set forth by St. John in his Revelation, who by her glory provoked the princes of earth to commit whoredom with her." It is curious to note how pleadings on behalf of the continuity of holy orders, which the leaders of the High Church party in England have been forced to abandon, are still repeated in the *Church Review* of the United States. See Mr. Child's article above referred to.

that they which proclaim the gospel should live of the gospel." (1 Cor. ix. 13, 14.) Our only high priest is the Lord Jesus Christ, and it is an infringement on the rights of Christ's people for any party in the church to assume to itself an exclusive or a paramount title to that name of priesthood. Christ has made all his people priests unto God.

Bishop Seymour next seeks to prove a ministry of three orders in the church from the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. From the same doctrine the necessity of a trine immersion in baptism has been proved. "Looking," he writes, "with lowly reverence at the persons of the ever blessed Trinity in their revealed relations to mankind, and knowing that our Lord would appoint a ministry officially, as I believe, to represent himself to the end of the world, can I help anticipating that this ministry will be *threefold?*" "The eternal Father creates and rules; the eternal Son sacrifices and redeems, and the eternal Spirit sanctifies and teaches." Further, in the three offices of Christ our Prophet, Priest, and King, he finds a necessity for three orders of ministers. "Must there not be three?" he asks triumphantly. And as corresponding to the three persons of the Trinity, and Christ's three offices, he can thus describe the three orders which he professes to find in the New Testament: "It is the official prerogative of the apostle to rule; it is the characteristic privilege of the presbyter to celebrate the holy eucharist, and it is the special duty of the deacon to teach." To one who has read the sixth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles it seems passing strange that Bishop Seymour could so far misrepresent the office of a deacon as to make his special duty be to teach. The Bishop sets at defiance canon law, for which he professes such reverence. For at the close of the third book of the so-called *Apostolic Constitutions*, we read that the deacon is forbidden to meddle with teaching, which is a function of the presbyter. It is the official prerogative of the presbyter, according to the New Testament, to both rule and teach. (1 Tim. v. 17.) When Bishop Seymour describes the characteristic privilege of the presbyter to be to celebrate the holy eucharist, he makes this erroneous assertion with a view of finding in the presbyter's office something to correspond to the priesthood of Christ. It is obvious that he regards the celebration of the eucharist as a priestly offering of sacrifice, which is one of the worst heresies ever promulgated. I would refer the Bishop to the ninth and tenth chapters of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that he may see that the idea of offering Christ as a sacrifice for sin a second time must be abhorrent to every one who believes in the perfection of his atoning work. The apostles were, indeed,

rulers in the church; but ruling was certainly not their chief employment. They had more important work to fulfil. But by making the apostle rule, the presbyter offer, and the deacon teach, our author is able to affirm that the "three orders, the Episcopate, the Presbyterate, and the Diaconate, in ministering things spiritual, preserve the analogy of the law, the offices of Christ, and the persons of the blessed Trinity"! Bishop Seymour has no scruple about identifying the Episcopate with the Apostolate, and giving an utterly false account of the Presbyterate and the Diaconate, in order to draw out a fanciful analogy to which a sound thinker could not attribute the slightest weight as an argument.

Bishop Seymour tries to draw from the great commission which our Lord gave to the disciples ere he left the world a proof of Episcopacy. He has many irrelevant observations to make on this commission. He assumes that Christ in his parting words is engaged in defining clearly Episcopal government and jurisdiction. It would be a waste of time to expose all the erroneous remarks which he professedly founds on the last charge of our Lord to the disciples. But I would observe that the concluding promise of his perpetual presence is given by Christ to the apostles as the representatives not of ministers only, but of the church generally. And so thought Bishop Pearson, who, in his exposition of the creed, in the article of the Holy Catholic Church, in expounding the promise "I am with you alway, even to the end of the world," tells us that "it giveth not only an assurance of the continuity of the *church*, but also the cause of that continuance, which is the presence of Christ." And Pearson quotes Leo the Great as holding this view of the passage. But there is really not a word in the commission about the supposed prerogatives of a bishop. Baptizing and teaching are the only ministerial functions mentioned in it, and presbyters are permitted, at least in the present day, to baptize and to teach. If our Lord, as Bishop Seymour declares, "in this charter very plainly recognizes, and would have us recognize, the Apostolate as an office distinct from the men who bore that office," and if this office is permanent, then this office is continued in presbyters, for to them belongs the right both to baptize and teach — to do every thing mentioned in the charter. I do not read in the great commission anything about Episcopal ordination. It would follow, then, that presbyters, as confessedly authorized to teach and to baptize, can be properly regarded as the true successors of the apostles. The Apostle John in the beginning of his Second and Third Epistles calls himself an elder or

presbyter. I read, too, in the First Epistle of Peter (1 Peter v. 1) of the Apostle Peter calling himself a presbyter, a fellow-elder or co-presbyter of the elders or presbyters to whom he wrote. And these elders or presbyters whom he addressed had the spiritual charge of all the churches in the provinces of Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia. (1 Peter i. 1.) They exercised the oversight, or were bishops of all the Christians in this wide range of territory. These presbyter-bishops are the only bishops of the New Testament; and to them the right of ordination appertained; for the hands of the presbytery were laid on Timothy. (1 Tim. iv. 14.) At a later period, long after the apostolic age, presbyters were deprived of the authority to ordain, just as, for a time, they were forbidden to baptize. But the authority to baptize was restored to them. And why should they remain deprived of the authority to ordain?

Bishop Seymour admits that the names of presbyter and bishop were given to one and the same order of church officers in the New Testament. It is thus confessedly anti-scriptural to make bishops higher than presbyters. But he explains: "The second order is rich in having *two names* at first. We find them in the epistles. But in process of time the second order surrendered one of its alternative names to the first order, and its members were henceforth called bishops, instead of apostles, and the second order was restricted to the title presbyter." This is not the true genesis of Episcopacy, or Prelacy. An original *permanent* first order above presbyters is a pure invention. Jerome, the most learned of the fathers, writing towards the close of the fourth century, proves conclusively from Scripture the original identity of presbyters and bishops, and adds that "gradually, that the plants of dissension might be rooted up, all care was deferred to a single person. Therefore, as presbyters know that by the custom of the church they are subject to him who has been placed over them, so let bishops know that they are greater than presbyters rather by custom than by the truth of the Lord's appointment." (*Comment. in Titum*, i. 5.) The history of the church makes evident that Jerome gives the true origin of the rise of post-apostolic Episcopacy. St. Augustine agrees with Jerome in ascribing to the *custom* of the church of his time the superiority of the bishop over the presbyter. (*Epistles*, lxxxii. 33.) When Clement wrote his First Epistle to the Corinthians, there was no higher office in the church of Corinth than that of presbyter, and the same is true of the church at Philippi, when Polycarp wrote to it a letter. And Bishop Lightfoot confesses that when the lately discovered

Didache or *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* was written, "bishop still remained a synonym for presbyter, and the episcopal office, properly so-called, had not been constituted in the district in which he [the author] lived." (*The Expositor*, January, 1885, p. 7.) The apostles were all long dead when the *Didache* was composed, yet the only bishop known to the writer was the presbyter-bishop. Surely this fact is fatal to the theory of the apostolic succession of bishops as a higher order than presbyters. Here we detect a breach, a gap, in the continuity in the sub-apostolic age.

Bishop Lightfoot refutes the opinion hazarded by Theodoret and Bishop Seymour that the same officers in the church, who were first called apostles, came afterwards to be designated bishops. "If the two offices had been identical, the substitution of the one name for the other would have required some explanation. But, in fact, the functions of the apostle and the bishop differed widely. The apostle, like the prophet or evangelist, held no local office."[1] (Lightfoot on Philippians, p. 196.)

Bishop Seymour alleges that Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, Irenæus, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Cyprian, and others, testify to the doctrine for which he contends. Those who read the earliest of these writers for themselves will be able to judge of his accuracy. I have already alluded to the testimony regarding church government borne by the Epistles of Clement and Polycarp. The more I study Ignatius, the more thoroughly I am convinced that the bishop whom he extols so extravagantly, could not have been more than the pastor of a single congregation. How else could he have been consulted, as was required

[1] "If bishop was at first used as a synonym for presbyter, and afterwards came to designate the higher officer under whom the presbyter served, the Episcopate, properly so-called, would seem to have been developed from the subordinate office. In other words, the Episcopate was formed, not out of the apostolic order by localization, but out of the presbyterial by elevation; and the title, which was originally common to all, came at length to be appropriated to the chief among them." (Lightfoot on Philippians, p. 196.) Who so ignorant as not to know that a love of preëminence and of high sounding titles has distinguished the clergy as a body throughout the history of the church? To remit aught of their dignity and prerogative was foreign to their spirit. Keeping in view their inveterate inclination and tendency, we find it impossible to accept Bishop Seymour's theory that the highest order of the clergy were so humble that they gave up the title of apostle which they had the right to bear, and borrowed from the second order the more lowly name of bishops. Facts are all in favor of the theory that the Episcopate is a development of the Presbyterate as Lightfoot puts it, or, as I would prefer to say, a usurpation of authority over it.

by Ignatius, in regard to every marriage of the people under his charge? (Ep. to Polycarp, ch. 5.) Without the bishop they must neither baptize nor keep the love-feast (Ep. to the Smyrnaeans, ch.8). What do such instructions indicate? That the bishop of Ignatius had not a more extensive sphere to oversee than the ordinary Presbyterian pastor. And no higher can he be whom Justin Martyr speaks of as the *president* (*proestos*) at divine service.

Bishop Seymour asks the question: "Can it be that the eternal Son of God ordained a plan of government for his church, which, as regards its essential character, went out of sight and out of mind in less than three score years and ten?" This is a rhetorical question. I will not say that it has been framed deceitfully, but it involves a fallacy—the fallacy of interrogations, as logicians speak. It takes for granted what is not granted. I do not for a moment allow that the form of church government, which I see disclosed in the New Testament, went out of sight and out of mind in less than seventy years. On the contrary, I have furnished some evidence of its continued existence in its essential character in the second and third centuries, and of its having been kept in mind by such fathers as Jerome and Augustine long afterwards; and I could present testimony of its not having been lost sight of in later ages.[1] But anticipations of what the course of the church's history *must be*, man is not competent to make. One thing is plain, that a certain fixed form of church government is not absolutely essential to the being of the church; though in this matter, it is our duty and wisdom to seek to conform to the mind of Christ in so far as it can be ascertained. But we must correct our forecasts by facts. Who could have anticipated that the spiritual condition of the seven churches of Asia would so soon have become such as we find it depicted in the Book of the Revelation? Or who could have foreseen the rise and prevalence of the papacy with all its enormities? And

[1] "Even in the fourth and fifth centuries, when the independence and power of the Episcopate had reached its maximum, it was still customary for a bishop in writing to a presbyter to address him as 'fellow-presbyter,' thus bearing testimony to a *substantial identity of order*. Nor does it appear that this view was ever questioned until the era of the Reformation. In the Western church, at all events, it carried the sanction of the highest ecclesiastical authorities, and was maintained even by popes and councils" (Bishop Lightfoot, on The Christian Ministry, Commentary on Philippians, p. 230). He refers for proof to Gieseler i. p. 105 *et seq.* It is characteristic of some writers to be most emphatic and forceful in their asseverations when they are least worthy of trust. It is fair to state that in the above quotation from Lightfoot the italics are mine.

we must not forget that our Lord and his apostles did predict a great apostasy in the church, such a spread of false doctrine and superstition, and erroneous practice among professing Christians that the true faith would be in danger of disappearing. It is instructive to consider what took place under the Mosaic Dispensation. There prevailed such gross irregularities, such general defection from the regulations of the law, since the age of Joshua till the return from the Babylonian exile, that critics like Kuenen, Wellhausen and Robertson Smith have ventured to date the composition of the middle books of the Pentateuch about a thousand years after the time of Moses. They contend that they could not have been in existence earlier, because they were so completely ignored. This theory is utterly false. But what a state of matters must for long centuries have obtained in Israel when such a theory could be put forward with any show of probability! Who will assert that what happened under the law could not have a parallel under the gospel? God was faithful to his promise to be a God to the seed of Abraham, and never to forsake his chosen people. And *he*, too, has remained faithful who said that the gates of hell should not prevail against his church. But *a priori* calculations that the Lord of the church could never suffer confusion and misgovernment and error to reign in it, have their refutation in the stubborn facts of history.

Such a pamphlet as that of Bishop Seymour is no real contribution to church unity. Presbyterians can have no desire for closer union with men holding his views. Can two walk together except they be agreed? At the late General Convention, held in Baltimore, Bishop Seymour was one of those who would not sanction the sending of missionaries to enlighten the benighted idolatrous people of Mexico, who are perishing for lack of knowledge, because such a measure would be a violation of the principle of canon law forbidding intrusion into the sphere of other bishops who occupy a country! Union with such men, till their views on church principles are completely altered, we could not regard as a *desideratum*.

Bishop Seymour has his prototype in the days of the apostles. There was then a certain Diotrephes, who loved the preëminence, and would not receive even the Apostle John. It is of this Diotrephes, not of John, that he is the true successor. It is a great comfort to know that all bishops of the Protestant Episcopal church are not of one mind with him.

DUNLOP MOORE.

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THE NEW TESTAMENT THEOPNEUSTY.

Our English Version of 1611 translates 2 Tim. iii. 16 thus: "All Scripture (is) given by inspiration of God, and (is) profitable for doctrine," etc.

The Revised Version of 1881 translates it thus: "Every Scripture inspired of God (is) also profitable," etc.

This latter rendering evidently implies that there are some Scriptures not inspired of God. But as St. Paul had just commended the "Holy Scriptures" to Timothy he could not now intend to throw a doubt over any part of them.

Moreover, it exposes the whole of the Scriptures to the critical ingenuity of men to determine what part of them is *given from heaven* and what is *not* given, and this last might be found to be a very small part.

The rendering: "Every Scripture inspired of God," etc., violates the natural laws of interpretation.

1. By putting the conjunction "also" in a position which couples the fifteenth and sixteenth verses in a *catenation of predicates*, and makes St. Paul repeat the sentiment, making "wise unto salvation," by adding the superfluity, "profitable." For the "making wise" of the fifteenth verse was for *Timothy's* benefit; but the "profitable" of the sixteenth was for the benefit of the *people*.

2. It transfers the word "inspired" from the predicate, where it naturally belongs, to the subject, where it makes tautology. For St. Paul had just spoken of the *subject* as "Holy Scripture," a term fully the equivalent of "inspired."

Lastly, It robs the word "all" of its emphasis and gives it to "inspired," which could not have been St. Paul's intention. For he does not mean in the sixteenth verse to assert the *inspiration* simply of the Scriptures, which was virtually asserted already, but to assert of the *totality* of them that they possessed that God-given quality which would make them "profitable" sources of instruction to the people. *Πασα γραφη θεόπνευστος και ωφελιμος* evidently forbids the dismemberment of the predicate. For both the grammatical construction and the sense require the coupling of the last two qualifying terms under the predicate.

The body of writings which St. Paul calls Holy Scripture and says of them that they are "*all*" breathed of God, is the Old Testament which Timothy's mother and grandmother had taught him from childhood.

The body of writings which now compose the New Testament existed at that time in fragments, scattered among the new adherents of the faith. Some of them were then composing, as this Epistle to Timothy; some were not yet in existence; some were autographs; some copies. But nothing is said either in Scripture or in the traditions of the church of the *agency* by which these scattered manuscripts were authenticated and gathered into our present canon. It is evident that the books of the Old Testament were a slow aggregation through ages of the divine communications. The books of the New, a smaller body of writings and more fragmentary, must have been gathered into a compilation in the same way, but in shorter time.

By what law and by what authority were they selected from the mass of other pious writings which then existed? How was the fidelity of this selection secured so as to preserve the sacred communications and exclude spurious productions? Our Confession of Faith assumes the "singular care and providence of God" as the controlling agency. And this most rational assumption assigns the following reasons for its position: "The heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of the parts and the scope of the whole." But these considerations appeal to the human understanding and suppose no supernatural guidance. These considerations are, indeed, sufficient to give the Bible a supremacy over all other books. But these heavenly elements are not alike prevalent throughout the great compilation. Matters historical, geographical, civil, military, literary, exist which do not present these grand features; matters liable to the criticism of succeeding ages and which cannot, from their own *intrinsic* importance, be judged to have descended from above. The heavenly matter is found to be imbedded in a vast amount of secular matter, evidently the natural civilization of the age in which it was written. But this secular material is the necessary envelope through which the heavenly matter is conveyed and by which it is *utilized*. After inspiration ceased, our Bible, which had always existed in fragmentary writings in original autographs and copies innumerable, descending through ages of use, in numberless recensions, liable to mutilations and errors of translations, and exposed even to the effects of a superstitious reverence, could only be preserved in its integrity by the "singular care and providence of God."

We wish to show how this "singular care and providence of God" becomes a kind of secondary inspiration by endorsement of merely human material, and human material in such a stage of advancement

as then existed. For it is an injury to this subject to assert dogmatically that inspiration requires the exclusion of historical inaccuracies or faultless styles of composition. A revelation committed to and embedded in any human literature must be wrapped in an imperfect clothing, and must move along through the ages amid the fluctuations of language, art, and science, and while it must and will ever remain a complete revelation, it must be more and more thrown upon the critical learning and piety of men to develop its excellence and power. True it is that our Confession recognizes another agency for the conservation of the Scriptures in their integrity, by saying: "Nevertheless, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit." Yet both the agency and the inward work here spoken of are assumed to be a divine influence working, not supernaturally, but the common and natural influence of the Spirit, through all the ages and in all believers. For it is indeed the faith and piety of the regenerated that conserves the purity and entirety of our Scriptures rather than the critical ingenuity of the learned. The Spirit of God resides in the *coetus fidelium.* He is not now an outward agent giving truth by *inspiration* to a few supernaturally, but an indwelling power guiding naturally the whole body.

There was then a period of transition when inspiration passed into the more occluded form of *natural guidance.* First into councils and courts of the church. The first council of apostles and elders at Jerusalem prefaced their decision with these remarkable words: "It seemed good unto the Holy Ghost *and to us.*" Nothing *seems* good to the Holy Ghost, for that word implies an imperfect perception of what is good. It means, therefore, that they, in council, advised a policy for the churches which *to them* appeared to be expedient, and which they had in prayer submitted to the Holy Ghost, assuming the promise of Jesus: "He shall guide you into all truth." But this "seemed good unto us" *foreshadowed* the cessation of supernatural inspiration.

It is, therefore, both natural and necessary to suppose that subsequent councils of the church compiled the whole of the New Testament, selecting from the mass of other religious writings those which breathed an apostolic authority, which concurred in theological opinion, and which were most edifying and instructive to the people of God.

Thus the spirit retires more and more behind the natural powers of the sanctified, committing the development and growth of the church

from age to age, gradually, to the growing devotion and intelligence of her adherents; yet still dwelling in it to the "end of the world."

That it is needless to hold the inspiration of the Bible responsible for trifling inaccuracies of diction or historical imperfections, due to the ages in which they were written, appears from the perfect *spontaneity* with which the writers selected their subjects and the entirely natural manner in which they handled them. Thus one chooses to write a biography; another the succession of kings and their exploits; another to express his religious feelings; another exercises his taste in writing an epithalamium; another gathers the sententious sayings of the wise of his own and past ages, making some and gathering many more into a proverbial philosophy; another writes private epistles to friends and churches, seemingly not dreaming that he was writing for coming ages, all of which denotes all the ordinary varieties of taste among men, not merely in the selection of their subjects, but perfect spontaneity in composing in all cases where no indications of divine direction are given.

The Book of Proverbs is one of those rhetorical forms in which our great revelation embodies itself. Yet the proverb is, in its very conception, a product of human experience, a packed, sententious wordism, coming out of human observation and worn smooth by use. It would be an abuse of the subject of inspiration to say that it dictated the formation of proverbs. They are a natural growth. They constitute the natural wisdom of a people. Yet through them God speaks, putting his endorsement upon such of them as under his providential care found their way into the sacred canon. The Great Teacher picked up many a proverb from the streets, and burnished it with fresh brilliance and power by giving it a new and interesting situation among other grand thoughts. The New Testament epistles afford still stronger evidences of naturalness and freeness in their composition. The epistles of St. Paul especially overflow with tenderness, affectionateness, and anxious concern. In the rush of his emotions he rides over both rhetoric and logic. Logic there is, but it is rather a natural than artistic catenation of thought. In the fifth chapter of Romans he breaks his argument by a parenthesis six verses long, which might have been earlier introduced without violence to the reasoning. When he opens his Epistle to the Ephesians he does not take time to breathe until he has written fourteen long verses of laudation of the grace of God for our election and adoption and assured redemption, its seal as a purchased possession and property in heaven. He did

not make a period until he had poured out a whole system of theology, aggregated less by logic than by the rushing emotions of the man. His epistles are indeed "weighty and powerful" as the Corinthians testified, powerful with theology imbedded in joyful congratulations, affectionate compliments, and earnest appeals.

He writes what is now sacred Scripture, *currente calamo*, in a mood perfectly oblivious of elaborate diction or thought-out sentences. But this is the merit and power of the epistles that they were *private* communications to churches and individuals, and seemingly not dreaming of that position of awful power which they now occupy in the canon.

In this perfect unconsciousness of any divine influence, he uses the ordinary tact to catch men with a holy guile; thus, when the Thessalonian church became infected with cases of what is called in modern phrase, "free love," such as was practiced in heathen worship, under the supposed sanction of the divinity then worshipped, St. Paul at first piles up expressions of affectionate confidence in their piety, to prepare them for the following rebuke: "For this is the will of God, even your *sanctification*, that ye should abstain from fornication;" that no man should go beyond and defraud his brother of his marital rights, under the sanction of religious rhapsodies. He was endeavoring by the use of a moral tact, sanctified by its use and its place, "by all means to win some." Yet it was a momentary tangency from absolute truthfulness of speech. It is a pedantic righteousness to demand of all human speech an absolutely straightlaced morality. It would revolutionize all politeness in salutations, compliments, and epistolary correspondence. It would injure the subject of inspiration to assume its direction in these compositions anywhere except where the writer gives notice of such influence.

The Acts of the Apostles were written not earlier than A. D. 63. Yet, between Pentecost and the death of St. Paul, there come in twenty-five or thirty years of stirring events. By far the greater part of these events in early Christianity must have been swept from the memory of the writer, and even that portion of the history which contains the biography of St. Paul is evidently a brief, which gives only fragments of his speeches and sermons, and omits what were probably the grandest of his deliverances—his two defences before the court of Rome. He must have been indebted to the personal recollections of individuals, and churches where St. Paul had preached, for even that brief sketch of the most important matters. Its dedication to Theophilus, after the popular usage, the lapse of time between the events and their collec-

tion, and the natural current of the story, all seem to suggest that the inspiration of "superintendence," as it is called, need not be supposed; because, after this history was written, it was yet to be authenticated as genuine, and assigned a place in the canon by some council of the church acting under the "singular care and providence of God," in fulfillment of the promise: "Lo, I am with you alway."

All the rhetorical characteristics of the epistles, as private communications, with their personal salvations, tokens of individual attachment, their ardor, their gush of feeling, their hasty penning, their negligence of niceties of diction, indicate that the writers were not composing matter for future ages, or with a view to their incorporation into a book purporting to come from heaven. And yet, the very fact that these epistles were struck off in haste, and natural carelessness of style, gives them their value; not simply as making them more credible documents, but as giving to the world a living Christianity, pulsating in believing souls, and carrying more weight and power than finest logic, or most elaborate theology. The inspiration of these writings, therefore, does not consist in a divine oversight of the writers, but in a *divine selection* of documents, through the voice of religious assemblies and courts of the church.

The Hebrew and Greek languages, the original depositories of our revelation, are said in our Confession of Faith to have been "immediately inspired." And certainly the same merciful design which gave a revelation by inspiration would secure its purity down the ages. But when the autographs of prophets and apostles were worn out or lost, copies of the originals constituted the only word of God extant, and the process of transmission into various languages, would of necessity involve incomplete translations for the want of equivalent terms to express the thoughts given from heaven. Hence, along the course of time innumerable versions, recensions, editions, and translations. Through all these the "singular care of God" has given us his revelation in its integrity. But that integrity cannot consist in the forms of speech in which the truth was originally held, nor in the Hebrew and Greek languages in which the original authors wrote and spoke. Indeed, scarcely any of the quotations in the New from the Old Testament are exact. And this liberty taken by the writers of the New Testament indicates that the *substantive thought* rather than the form in which it was expressed, was considered the word of God. And transferring the word of God to the languages of all nations, must not only destroy original words, but treat as archaic and inappli-

cable much that is idiomatic and peculiar to a civilization long since extinct. The great religion has in fact long since taken its departure from *forms of worship* given from heaven, and imbedded itself in later civilizations. The transition from the Old to the New Testament was itself an extensive evolution, *giving notice* of others through which it must pass. The calyx of the old fell, the germ which it held appeared and grew into a more perfect development, without a "jot or tittle of the law" having failed. Language, therefore, which is simply a medium of communicating thought, and is in constant flux from age to age, could not be indissolubly tied to the subject of inspiration. Words and sentences were unquestionably theopneusted, and so grew sacred, venerable, and awful. Yet when the thought itself was fairly caught in the mind of many believers and in different countries, it was lodged in a new and more abiding form in the earth. It would neither be confined in archaic languages, nor lost in a multiplicity of dialects. The word secures a firmer hold on the earth and a mightier power by its translation into all languages.

Under the innumerable commutations which it has undergone, and must yet undergo, it would become a standing miracle along the ages, could it be proved that no inaccuracies had crept into the sacred writings. But these very inaccuracies are the most valuable offsetting to the sublime and awful things they contain. To assert, dogmatically, that inspiration brooks no human imperfections in sacred composition is to assert and no more.

We may unhesitatingly say, in opposition to all current skeptical thought that "*All* Scripture" is given by inspiration of God for the following reasons:

1. A revelation of the will of God to men cannot be held responsible for inaccuracies of human speech without a reconstruction of this medium of communication.

2. A revelation without those varieties of rhetorical diction which express our emotions in hyperboles, metaphors, and poetical machinery generally, would have made it unnatural and beyond the reach of our sympathies.

3. A revelation that could not go through all the fluctuations of art and science in different ages, and contain no evidences of extinct and extant civilizations in their changes, would not be a revelation for the *race* and *all time*.

D. E. Frierson.

Anderson, S. C.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN CANADA.

The General Assembly of the Canadian branch of the Presbyterian Church met in June last in Brantford, a prosperous little city in the heart of western Ontario. The population of this growing place is about 18,000, and there are two very flourishing Presbyterian churches in it, with a membership of about 1,200 in the two. It was the first time that the Assembly met in so small a place, and yet the commissioners, nearly 400 in number, were entertained in a manner which justly called forth high praise on every hand. Abundant hospitality in comfortable homes, every possible convenience at the place of meeting, an excursion on Saturday afternoon to the celebrated Bow Park farm, and a splendid reception at the Presbyterian Ladies' College the same night, together with many other courtesies, combined to make the sojourn of the members of Assembly exceedingly pleasant.

The Assembly is a large body, so large as to be almost unwieldy. The ratio of representation is one in four of the Presbyterial membership, and this gives about 200 ministers and 200 ruling elders as the strength of the Assembly. Several attempts have been made during recent years to reduce the representation to one in six or one in eight, but so far they have failed. Our own church, with a ratio of one in twenty-four, may have rather small a representation, but an onlooker of the Canadian Assembly could scarcely fail to feel that the body is too large for effective deliberative work. It is an advantage to have as many as possible of the ministers and ruling elders in attendance, for those who attend can scarcely fail to return to their several duties in the church stirred up to diligence and zeal; but the expense of a large body is heavy, and it is not always the best for effective legislation. Perhaps one in twelve would be a good ratio for both these churches, as their numerical strength is just about the same.

The opening sermon was preached by the retiring moderator, the Rev. W. Caven, D. D., the honored Principal of Knox College, Toronto. His subject was: "The Inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures," and the sermon gave no uncertain sound in regard to this most important subject. It was listened to with great attention, and gave the utmost satisfaction. The Rev. T. Sedgwick, D. D., of Nova Scotia, was unanimously elected moderator, and Rev. W. Reid, D. D., and Rev. R. Campbell, D. D., clerks of Assembly, were in their places. The moderator is one of the leading ministers of the eastern section of the

church, and is well known for his faithful service and conservative views. He proved a firm and careful guide to the business of the Assembly.

Most of the first day was taken up with routine matters of organization, appointment of committees, presentation of reports, and overtures and notices of motion. At night Home Missions engaged attention. The reports were presented by the conveners of the Eastern and Western sections respectively. The reports were very complete, and gave a full account of the work done in a mission field extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The field is simply immense in extent, and in the great northwest is rapidly expanding. During the year 404 ministers, divinity students, and catechists were employed for the whole or part of the time. Large and useful service is done by the candidates for the ministry, who work during vacation under the care of presbytery, and supply many a region which otherwise would be left destitute. The number of stations supplied more or less regularly during the year was 1168. Of these 712 are in the northwest and British Columbia. A large number of weak churches are also aided by means of the Home Mission Augmentation scheme, and the whole amount raised for Home Missions during the year was just about $120,000. On the whole the outlook is encouraging, but the field is so vast that many men and much money is needed to overtake the work to be done. The college at Winnipeg is making the experiment of holding a summer session for its theological classes, so that the students may have vacation in winter to labor in the mission field, when the students from the other seminaries withdraw to attend the usual winter session. This scheme gives good promise, although it has not yet been in operation long enough to discover how it will affect all the interests concerned.

The reports of the Foreign Mission Committee, together with several addresses by missionaries from the heathen field, made another exceedingly interesting night meeting. The interest rose almost to enthusiasm when the veteran missionary from the New Hebrides, Rev. Dr. Paton, arose as the last speaker, and stirred the vast congregation deeply with his simple and earnest words. Six leading centres are occupied by the Canadian Church in the foreign field. These are Central India, Formosa, Honan in China, New Hebrides, and Trinidad. This committee also conducts the work among the Indians of the northwest and British Columbia. Nearly $170,000 was expended on the work in all these fields. Mission work among the Jews at some point in Pal-

estine is instituted, and one missionary has been sent to explore the field and see where to locate this mission.

Another interesting sphere of missionary effort in which the Canadian Church is engaged is that among the French Roman Catholics in the Province of Quebec. The headquarters of this work are at Montreal, and the report of the committee showed that the work had been pushed with vigor during the year. By means of missionaries, catechists, colporteurs, and teachers in schools, much is done to bring the gospel in its simplicity and power to bear upon the French Romanists. Over $26,000 was expended in mission work proper, besides a considerable sum spent in the support of schools.

The reports from the theological schools and discussions thereon, took up most of a day. They were interesting, and showed satisfactory growth in this important department of church work. There are six points where theological education is conducted, viz.: Halifax, Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, Toronto, and Winnipeg. Most of these institutions are fairly well equipped for the work of preparing men for the ministry, and the supply of candidates is fairly well up to the demand. It is not easy to gather from the reports how much is spent in theological education, but it must be over $50,000 in all.

The question of the relation of these schools to the church, and of the appointment of professors, was discussed at length on the report of a committee appointed last year to consider this matter. Since the union of 1875, when four different bodies united to form the present Presbyterian Church in Canada, this question has been more or less discussed. The four churches entering into that union had their seminaries, and their custom as to the appointment of professors. There has been a growing desire to have some uniform plan of procedure in the United Church, and a committee was appointed last year to report this year in regard to this matter. The committee reported in substance that Seminary Boards are to make nominations, but that the General Assembly shall appoint the professors. As some legislation is necessary in order to carry this into effect, final action was deferred until next year. The mind of the Assembly was decidedly in favor of having the church exercise close supervision over the institutions which are to train the ministry for her service.

Another question which called forth earnest debate was that of Young People's Societies. A committee appointed last year presented a report which recommended the organization of such societies under the direction of the sessions of churches, and along the general lines

of the Christian Endeavor Societies. After earnest debate for several hours, this matter was laid over till next year, and the committee continued and enlarged. This is a difficult and important question with which all the churches are concerned, and the remarkable spread of the Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor everywhere presses the question of the interests of our young people upon the churches. That all such organizations should be under the control of our church courts may be assumed as the only sound principle upon which the solution of the problem should rest, but it is not yet perfectly plain what precise forms of organizations shall best meet the case. Too much machinery should be avoided, yet some orderly system is necessary for practical effectiveness.

Many other matters of much importance engaged the attention of the Assembly. The report on Sabbath-schools was very elaborate, that on Temperance was able, and took strong ground against this great evil, and the discussion on the State of Religion was earnest and timely. Sabbath Observance, Systematic Beneficence, and the Hymnal all received merited attention. For the support of Aged and Infirm Ministers, and the Widows and Orphans of Ministers, a large fund is being raised. Already almost $200,000 is subscribed, and the prospect is good for raising the whole sum aimed at in a few years.

The only incident which happened to mar the entire harmony of the Assembly was in connection with Professor Campbell, LL. D., who holds the chair of Apologetics and Church History in the seminary at Montreal. Last February the professor delivered a lecture at Queen's College, Kingston, taking as his subject, "The Perfect Book or the Perfect Father." At the time of its delivery the lecture caused some anxiety, and when its full text was published this anxiety deepened into alarm in the church. An overture from a presbytery in Ontario asked the Assembly to take cognizance of the matter. The Assembly heard the overture and its supporters, and decided that inasmuch as the Presbytery of Montreal of which Professor Campbell is a member had instituted proceedings in the case, the matter be left to that court for action. Since that time the presbytery has pursued the case with due diligence, and at meetings recently a libel was drawn up, found relevant, and ordered to be served on the professor, and the day appointed for the trial early in September. The libel consists of two main counts, as follows: First, "Holding and teaching a view of the Holy Scriptures which impugns and discredits them as the supreme

and infallible source of religious truth." Second, "Holding and teaching a view of God which sets him forth as one who does not smite either in the way of punishment or discipline, and who has nothing to do with the judging or punishing of the wicked." Both counts are supported at length by quotations from Scripture and the standards of the church, and the lecture is also quoted frequently to sustain the relevancy of the charges.

So far, the manner of conducting the case has been marked by an excellent spirit, in which kindness to a teacher of twenty years standing, and loyalty to the truth of God were finely blended. Should the same spirit prevail to the end of the case the cause of truth will be nobly served. At this stage, when we are not discussing the lecture formally, it is needless to express a definite opinion, but that the great majority of the Canadian Presbyterian Church is against the professor's views may be taken for granted. The sentiment of the Assembly was decided, and only two members of the Presbytery of Montreal voted against the relevancy of the libel.

This note will be closed with some statistics which are of interest when compared with those of our own church: Ministers, 1,100; membership, 183,525; pastoral charges and mission stations, 2,528; ruling elders, 6,364; Sabbath-school scholars, 140,730; contributions—pastoral support, $832,017, and for all congregational purposes, $1,653,216. This gives an average of nearly $9 to each member To the various mission schemes of the church, $295,475 was contributed apart from the income of the various colleges. The total contributions nearly reached the $2,000,000 point, a little less than last year, but more than double the sum given in 1875.

As represented by this Assembly, the Presbyterian Church in Canada is earnestly addressing itself to the work committed to its care in a wide territory, its equipment for work seems to be effective, its spirit hopeful and earnest; and, with the Master's blessing, it cannot fail to be crowned with success.

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VII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

Stearns' Present Day Theology.

Present Day Theology: A Popular Discussion of Leading Doctrines of the Christian Faith. *By Lewis French Stearns, Late Professor of Christian Theology in Bangor Theological Seminary.* With a Biographical Sketch by George L. Prentiss, Professor in Union Theological Seminary. Pp. xxiv., 568. $2.50. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1893.

From the prefixed biographical sketch we learn that Professor Stearns was an "heir, along several lines, to the oldest and best religious life of New England." He was the son of the Rev. Jonathan F. Stearns, pastor of the Federal Street Presbyterian Church, Newburyport, Mass. He was the nephew of the well-known and popular author of *Stepping Heavenward*; of Dr. George L. Prentiss, Professor in the Union Theological Seminary in the city of New York; of the Hon. S. S. Prentiss, the impassioned orator of Mississippi, and of President Stearns of Amherst College. He took his theological course at Berlin, Leipzig, Princeton, and Union Seminary in the city of New York. For a while he was a Presbyterian pastor, then professor of history and belles-lettres in Albion College at Albion, Mich. He finally turned from Presbyterianism to Congregationalism, when he accepted the chair of systematic theology in Bangor Seminary. He held this position for ten years, and up to the time of his death. When Dr. Shedd resigned, he was unanimously chosen to the chair of systematic theology in Union Seminary. This election he declined. He was the author of *Camp Out*, a novel, and of *The Evidences of Christian Experience*, a course of lectures delivered before the Union Seminary on the "Ely Foundation."

Present Day Theology is a posthumous volume made of lectures which were prepared for the class-room. The book is delightful reading. Its subject-matter, its rhetorical grace, its expository clearness, its evangelical spirit, its original attempts, its bold divergencies, unite to chain the reader's attention from beginning to end, while, if he be an old-line Calvinist, his mind is polemically out of alignment with that of the author, whom he will love in spite of all disagreement. Those agreeing with him in every position will be few. Those failing to be stimulated in heart and thought will be none. The early death of the author, in his forty-fifth year, adds a pathetic chapter to the volume.

Professor Stearns was an enthusiastic lover of *systematic* theology. He had strong confidence in its method. He believed that its power was solvent. He held, what is undoubtedly true, that many questions, started in other departments or by other methods, could be safely and soundly settled only by testing their alignment with the system of doctrine. The hypothesis which

will not articulate into the organism is false. The tailor discovers the "fit" of the garment by actually trying it on the customer. If it "draws" or "bags," its unsuitableness is manifest. So with theological theories and hypotheses. As long as New England's theology was severely systematic it was Calvinistic, but when it abandoned this method, its theological life was honey-combed with vagaries. Professor Stearns felt that the remedy was in a return to the study of systematic theology. Our age, theologically considered, is marked by the restless reopening and nervous re-debating of questions once regarded closed, and also by a contempt for dogmatic theology. Is there not a causal connection between the two things?

Professor Stearns must be classed as a modified Calvinist, so-called. "I am not an Arminian," he says, "but I am not a Calvinist in the sense in which I have supposed the Westminster Confession to be Calvinistic." When we learn from his lecture on the "Plan of God" and on "The Kingdom of God," that the author is a supralapsarian, and from his lectures on "The Redemptive Work of Christ," that the atonement was universal, we see that he is both a Calvinist and an Arminian—that his system attempts to mediate between these two contradictory conceptions of soteriology. It is fair to the author to say that his lectures are manifestly tentative. When he realised that he would die, he sent his manuscripts to his uncle, Dr. Prentiss, and left their publication to his discretion. Had Dr. Stearns lived, we do not believe the lectures would have been published as they now stand. There are positions taken which will not joint themselves into a logical system, and his mind was naturally logical and wide-searching. Professor Stearns would have been forced back from this mediatory position, which so much of our present day theology, under the force of a squeamish sentimentalism, is struggling to occupy. The volume before us is an able and conscientious effort to live between the upper and nether millstones.

The lectures are twenty-seven, with an appendix on The Present Direction of Theological Thought in the Congregational Churches. They span the whole field of theology, bibliology, soteriology, and eschatology. They present the author's *system*. We offer some adverse criticisms:

1. The system, like that of his distinguished preceptor, Dr. H. B. Smith, is *Christo-centric*. This is its first and hopeless embarrassment. It drives the author to the placing of the *origin* of sin in the plan, and inasmuch as the divine efficiency was implicated in the production of sin, the atonement was a divine necessity, and in all justice and fairness had to be universal. The Christo-centric idea is fascinating to the pious heart, but it is hopelessly untenable. It must be borne in mind that *Christ* and the *Son* are not absolutely coincident and interchangeable terms. Technically speaking the Son became Christ, and that after the fall, after the covenant of works was shattered and the covenant of grace had decreetally commenced. To make "the second Adam" the head of the covenant of works is to displace "the first Adam." In The Quarterly for January, 1892, Dr. Girardeau ably reviews and effectually overturns this principle.

2. Professor Stearns says: "If you wish to know whether a man is a theologian, turn to his Greek Testament, and if it opens of its own accord at the

fifth chapter of Romans, and you find the page worn and brown, you may safely set him down as a devotee of the sacred science." Precisely so; and that theory of the *Adamic union* which he may finally decide upon will tell you the *quality* of his theology. Our author rejects the realism of Augustine and Dr. Shedd and the federalism of the Westminster Confession and the Hodges. "What, then, is our doctrine of the connection between the transgression of Adam and the universal sinfulness of the race? It is simply this: As the result of Adam's sin, all men come into the world with a corrupt or disordered nature, inherited from their ancestors, which, in connection with the sinful influences of their surroundings, leads them all into sin. But this disordered nature is only the occasion of their sin, while the true cause is their free choice." "This nature is not in itself sin, nor is it sinful in any strict sense of the word." This is an unequivocal statement of the doctrine that the race's union with Adam was purely and solely *parental* in its character. Now the *Adamic union* is the same in kind under both covenants. That union under the covenant of grace could not be either *realistic* or *parental*. It could have been *federal;* and only of that kind. Consequently that was the nature of the union under the covenant of works. The *federal* idea will fly, like a weaver's shuttle, between the two covenants; no other will. The nature of this *Adamic union* will determine the doctrine of sin and redemption.

3. It is provoking in our author to say that the Scriptures are fallible "in matters which lay outside the scope and purpose of their inspiration." The assumption that there are any such "outside" matters is preposterous. He discards the doctrine of verbal inspiration because of the variations between the quotations in the New Testament and the original passages in the Old Testament. Such variations do not warrant nor in any way require the rejection of verbal inspiration. *The Spirit could have even dictated the exact words of the free quotation.*

R. A. Webb.

Clarksville, Tenn.

Bruce's "Apologetics."

Apologetics; or, Christianity Defensively Stated. *By Alexander Balmain Bruce, D. D., Professor of Apologetics and New Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1892. Pp. 522.

This treatise is the third in order of the *International Theological Library*, which is brought out under the editorship of Professors Briggs and Salmond. Driver's *Introduction* and Smyth's *Christian Ethics* have already been noticed in The Quarterly, and now Bruce's *Apologetics* lies before us.

Like all Professor Bruce's works, this is written with clearness and vigor. It is evidently written to interest the popular mind in the important topics which it discusses. It may also be safely said that this book reveals Professor Bruce's growing sympathy with the results of recent criticism, and with the conclusions of modern liberal theology.

In regard to the scope of the treatise, our author, in a brief *Preface*, says that "it is not an abstract treatise on apologetics in which all the traditional

common-places of the subject—*The Theistic Argument*, *Revelation*, *Inspiration*, *Miracles*, *Prophecy*, *The Canon*, *etc.*—are discussed without reference to present needs and trials of faith. It is an apologetic presentation of the Christian faith with reference to whatever in our intellectual environment makes faith difficult at the present time. The constituency to which it addresses itself consists neither of dogmatic believers for whose satisfaction it seeks to show how triumphantly their faith can at all possible points of assault be defended, nor of dogmatic unbelievers whom it strives to convince or confound, but of men whose sympathies are with Christianity, but whose faith is stifled or weakened by anti-Christian prejudices of varied nature and origin." This being the aim of our author he deals with what he calls "burning questions," and, of course, his treatise is an *apology* rather than a scientific system of *apologetics*. It may be described under its secondary title as Christianity defensively stated in relation to present day honest and inquiring skepticism.

With this lower aim before him, and with his work narrowed by his aim, it may be admitted that he has achieved a measure of success, for difficult and perplexing questions of faith are handled in an earnest and devout spirit, and in a frank and interesting manner. At times, perhaps, too much is conceded to the honest doubter, but at the present day to err on that side is to secure a hearing on the part of the doubter when otherwise he might refuse to listen. Still, the utmost care should be taken by the apologete to make no *vital* concession to doubt, for doing so may betray the interest of truth, and confirm the doubter rather than win him to the truth.

In this connection our author shows great readiness to accept the main results of modern criticism in regard to the sacred Scriptures and the religious system which they unfold. In our judgment the time to construct an apology for Christianity upon the assumed validity of the general results of advanced critical theories has not yet come, for the simple reason that no well-defined results are agreed upon by the critics. Criticism, lower and higher, has its place, and can render valuable service in the interests of faith; but the author who at the present juncture ventures to build an apologetical scheme on the basis of the assumed conclusions of one school of criticism, is taking his literary, critical, and theological life in his hands.

Viewing Professor Bruce's treatise from the standpoint of conservative criticism and Calvinistic theology, the charge may be fairly brought against it of being out of sympathy with both. Reconstructive criticism and remodeled theology have his kindest regards, and at times the older views are treated with scant respect. Rigid criticism might say that the treatise before us is an apology for advanced criticism and a new theology, rather than for the Christian system broadly considered. Its secondary title would then run thus: Christianity defensively stated from the standpoint of the results of modern criticism, and in the interests of a new theology.

The plan of the treatise is clear and definite, and the materials of discussion are arranged in a very orderly way. The work consists of four main parts. The *Introduction* has two chapters; Book I. discusses the *Theories of the Universe, Christian and anti-Christian;* Book II. treats of *The Historical Preparation for Christianity;* and Book III. deals with *The Christian Origins.*

The *Introduction* contains two well-compacted chapters. The first gives a brief but perspicuous historical sketch of apologetical discussion in New Testament and Patristic times, and of Free Thought in the last and in the present century. This chapter forms a suitable prelude to the subsequent discussions.

The second chapter seeks to answer the difficult question of the function and method of apologetics, and also to mark out its proper place in a theological curriculum. After explaining and criticising with discrimination various views, our author presents his own, which may be best understood from a few brief extracts: "The aim (of apologetics) is to secure for Christianity a fair hearing with conscious or implicit believers whose faith is stifled or weakened by anti-Christian prejudices of varied nature and origin. The purpose of apologetics, as thus conceived, is not so much scientific as practical. It is not designed to give theoretical instruction in a branch of theological knowledge, but rather to serve the purpose of a moral discipline, by dispossessing ingenuous truth-loving minds of opinions which tend to make faith difficult, presenting Christianity under aspects which they had not previously contemplated, suggesting explanations of difficulties which they had not before thought of, and so making it possible for them to be Christians with their whole heart and mind." (P. 42.)

For this end he says that "the first step obviously is to make sure that men know what Christianity really is," and to do this aright "we must not begin," he says, "with any ready-made idea of the Christian religion extracted from the creeds, or current in the churches, but, remembering that much prejudice against both creeds and churches exists in many minds which we should desire to influence, we must remount to the fountain head, and learn the nature of our faith from the records of Christ's life and teaching contained in the gospels." . . . "An honest endeavor to extract from these gospels a simple account of what Jesus was and taught might, without further trouble, win to hearty faith many whose alienation has its root in social grievances, rather than in science, or philosophy, or biblical criticism." He further admits that "there are prejudices arising out of philosophy, science, history, criticism, which cannot be so easily healed," and so the apologete must consider the "presuppositions of Christianity." These are two-fold, "speculative or philosophical and historical." As Christianity has a certain "theory of the universe," it is open to speculative objections which must be met; and as it has its facts, historical difficulties arise, and these are to be resolved. Book I. takes up the former, and Book II. the latter, lines of discussion. (P. 43.)

A single remark upon our author's views thus set forth is all we can make. We cannot resist the conviction that our author narrows the function of apologetics more than is expedient. This contraction of view appears chiefly in two particulars: First, The Epistles as well as the Gospels, the Old Testament as well as the New, contain primal elements which enter into the Christian system. Secondly, The apologete should be prepared, not only to commend Christianity to those who have doubts, but are favorably disposed towards it; but also to deal with the avowed opponents of the Christian system, and to ward off attacks of every kind made against it.

In Book I. *The Theories of the Universe* are discussed in seven chapters, as follows: *The Christian Facts*, *The Christian Theory of the Universe*, *The Pantheistic Theory*, *The Materialistic Theory*, *The Deistic Theory*, *Modern Speculative Theism*, and *Agnosticism*.

The treatment of the profound problems involved in the Christian philosophy of the universe is popular, rather than philosophical. The statement of the Christian Theory is good, and leaves little to be desired in such a brief presentation of it. Pantheism, Materialism, Deism, and Agnosticism are all described and criticised in a way which indicates that our author is acquainted with recent phases of anti-Christian speculation, and that he is able to estimate its significance with real insight.

The chapter on *Modern Speculative Theism* is somewhat disappointing. By this it is not meant that the treatment is entirely defective, but that the usage of the term *theism* by our author is not that which is generally found in writings upon that theme. By *speculative theism* our author denotes those views of the relation of God to the universe which emphasize his *immanency* in the world of nature and spirit, as opposed to the deistic view which puts his *transcendency* in the foreground. As against deism much that our author here says is effective; but, if the meaning of speculative theism here expounded be admitted without qualification, it will surely lead to semi-pantheistic conclusions. Our author virtually shows this, not only in this chapter, but also in the chapter on *The Christian Theory of the Universe*. In our judgment it is better to apply the term *theism* to the true view of God's relation to the universe, which asserts both his *immanence* and *transcendence*, and yet merges neither in the other, nor separates them too widely. This gives the true philosophy of the problem of the relation of God to the universe, and it affords the basis which revelation assumes as the rational foundation for the Christian system. Other theories may all be properly classed as deistic or pantheistic, according as transcendence or immanence dominates the theory, and there may be many shades of opinion under each of these two classes of theory. We think it well to keep the term theism close to this meaning, and our author could easily have so arranged his *usus* of terms as to have prevented confusion in the mind of the ordinary reader, when he criticises, as he properly does, speculative theism.

There are points in the chapters on pantheism and agnosticism to which we would like to refer, but our space entirely forbids. We pass at once to the second book of the treatise.

This brings us to what our author terms the historical preparation for Christianity. To its discussion ten carefully written chapters are devoted, as follows: *The Sources*, *The Religion of the Prophets*, *The Prophetic Idea of Israel's Vocation and History*, *Mosaism*, *Prophetism*, *Prophetic Optimism*, *Judaism*, *The Night of Legalism*, *The Old Testament Literature*, *The Defects of the Old Testament Religion and its Literature*.

In the limits of a brief review it is impossible to do anything like justice to the exceedingly important questions here raised by our author, and handled by him in his own interesting way.

The *sources* of the historical preparation for Christianity are the *Hebrew*

Scriptures. Here our author comes in contact with modern critical theories of these Scriptures and of the religious system which they contain, and we see at once his sympathy with some of these theories. His views, so far as they can be gathered, are not unlike those of Professor Driver. Still, it is exceedingly difficult to know when our author is expressing his own views, or simply expounding the views of the critics without approval or refutation.

As to the proper attitude of the apologete to these critical views of the authorship and dates of the Hebrew Scriptures, our author says, p. 171: "To this question it may be answered, first, that the apologist is not called upon to accept the results of modern criticism, or to constitute himself an advocate of its claims to scientific certainty. He is entitled to hold himself aloof from critical dogmatism, and to keep his personal opinions in a state of suspense." On p. 172 he adds: "He (the apologist) must adjust himself to the new situation. He must take into account opinions confidently advanced by others for which he declines to be personally responsible, to the extent at least of considering how far they are compatible or the reverse with the faith he is concerned to defend." And on p. 173, he further says, in indicating the starting point of his apologetic: "We must allow our method to be controlled by criticism, so far as to make our starting point what critics of greatest weight and authority regard as certain."

These three extracts clearly confirm what we have already said concerning our author's sympathy with advanced critical theories, and the construction of his apologetic upon the basis of the results of these theories. It is somewhat comforting to the conservative apologist to be assured that he is not in duty bound to accept the results of modern criticism, as our author says in the first extract above. The second extract must puzzle any apologist. What is the new situation to which he must adjust himself? Who is to be his guide to the new citadel of faith? Then, how far should an apologist allow himself to be affected by "the opinions of others, for which he declines to be responsible"? That the critical theories have to be taken into account, may be admitted, but until the apologist is ready to be responsible for these critical results, he cannot securely set up his apologetic in the "new situation." The previous question is as to the truth of these theories.

The third extract puts the apologist at the mercy of the critic, whereas the true view apologist is to be the judge of the critic, so far, at least, as the bearing of his methods and results upon faith are concerned. Such at least is our view.

Our author starts his apologetic, therefore, with the *Religion of the Prophets*, and discovers that it was *ethical monotheism*, and that Jehovah was not a mere national deity. He also shows that Israel was an *elect* people, not for their own sake as a nation merely, but for all nations. Here the relation of the pagan peoples to salvation is discussed, and liberal opinions advanced. The result of the *election* of Israel was "some light even for pagans," but "heathenism on the whole a failure," and "its failure a preparation to receive the true religion." (P. 207.)

Then follow discussions upon *Mosaism*, *Prophetism*, and *Judaism*, and throughout the same general attitude already noted towards advanced critical

conclusions is observed. We cannot follow our author as he carries forward his historical inquiry in the interests of his apologetic step by step, but must content ourselves with a few brief remarks on some salient points.

Throughout, Professor Bruce treats historical questions in a most interesting and penetrating manner. What he says often sheds light on the history of Israel, and corrects some one-sided views as to the relation between Israel and the other nations usually called *pagan*. Still, we note all through the critical *bias* by which he is affected, and his readiness to accept the results of criticism and rest thereon.

Then, too, in the order in which he presents the development of the contents of *Mosaism*, *Prophetism*, and *Judaism*, we see very clearly how far his apologetic is ruled by criticism. He is constantly toning down critical views, and showing how they may be accepted without detriment to faith. In his discussion and for his apologetic service, he does not accept the view that the complete legislation and elaborate ritual found in the middle books of the Pentateuch came from Moses. It was only matured after the exile. Mosaism was first, and here the Decalogue and *external* morality or righteousness were prominent. Then Prophetism followed and laid stress on *internal* morality or righteousness, and last came Judaism with the emphasis laid on ritual. To show our author's position on this important point a few quotations must be made: "The question as to the relation of Moses to ritual is not one which concerns the *existence* of ritual in the time of Moses, but only the *place* to be assigned to it in the Mosaic system." . . . "The hypothesis that the Deuteronomic and priestly codes are post-Mosaic does not necessarily mean that their true authors *invented* their contents and imputed them to Moses. It only means that religious customs, mostly ancient, though in some particulars new, were then reduced to written form, and ascribed to Moses not so much as author, but rather as authority." (P. 221.)

As to the Decalogue, our author says: "He (Moses) did not discover these laws, he did not need to discover them, or to have them revealed to him for the first time on Sinai; they were written on the hearts of all men, Egyptian and Israelite alike." (P. 222.) "While Moses set before the Israel of the Exodus the moral ideal, the prophets told the Israel of six centuries later how far short she came of realizing that ideal." (P. 232.) "With Moses, as with the prophets, morality was primary, ritual secondary." (P. 237.) "Judaism, apart altogether from critical questions, was distinct from Mosaism." (P. 262.) "The last eight chapters of Ezekiel's book of Prophecy appear to be a first sketch of a Levitical system, prepared by one who believed that it would serve the end which all the prophets had at heart. These chapters, so viewed, are one of the strongest proofs that the priestly legislation of the Pentateuch was not Mosaic." (P. 264.) Concerning Israel at the time of the exile, our author says: "The logic of their position might be put thus: One God, one sanctuary, and at the one sanctuary a carefully regulated service offered by a people scrupulously guarded against all uncleanness in all relations and actions of their lives." . . . "Thus men zealous for God's honor were forced on to the final stage in the logical process, one uniform, carefully constructed, strictly enforced system of worship." (P. 267.) "Thus far my aim has been to show

that Neo-Mosaism, as I have ventured to call the movement initiated by Ezekiel and consummated by Ezra, was a thing in which God-inspired men might have a part." (P. 270.) Much of a like nature might be quoted, but these passages must suffice. They show clearly that our author follows out consistently his position, that his "method is controlled by criticism." And we cannot but feel all through these chapters which deal with the Old Testament literature and religion, that the discussion is as much an apologetic for advanced criticism as for Christianity. This is our cardinal objection to our author's method all through. Criticism has its rights, and can render most useful service, but has the reconstructive theory of modern criticism been so securely established that a solid apologetic can be constructed on its basis, is the question to settle. We are inclined to think that the position taken by Professor Robertson in his *Early Religion of Israel* is the impregnable foundation for the apologete to take regarding the Old Testament literature and religion. It seems to be the view which the Scriptures themselves avow, which the plain man reading the Scripture finds there, which the New Testament writers assumed, and which we firmly believe criticism will finally rest in.

The discussion of the way in which the Messianic ideal of the royal man and the kingdom of grace was formed is interesting, but not new to those familiar with Professor Bruce's other writings. The chapter on the *Defects of the Old Testament Religion*, is well worth careful study, even though we may take issue with some of the views therein set forth.

In Book III. the Christian Origins are discussed in ten most readable chapters, as follows: *Jesus*, *Jesus as the Christ*, *Jesus as the Founder of the Kingdom of God*, *Jesus Risen*, *Jesus Lord*, *Paul*, *Primitive Christianity*, *The Synoptical Gospels*, *The Fourth Gospel*, *The Light of the World.*

On the whole, the discussions in this book are much more satisfactory than those of Book II. Few men are better qualified than Professor Bruce to give a judgment on New Testament questions. In the chapters above named we find substantially the same views concerning Jesus, the kingdom of God, and miracles as are set forth in our author's other writings, especially in *The Chief End of Revelation*, *The Kingdom of God*, and *The Miraculous Elements in the Gospel.* The discussions are always fresh and suggestive, and many modern naturalistic theories are carefully criticised.

The connection between Books II. and III. is somewhat vague. To make the Old Testament religion merely the historical preparation for Christianity, is to incur the danger of regarding all the elements of that old religion as superseded by Christianity. The old religion was a preparation for the new, but the new still retains elements of the old, so that Christianity is not simply the religion of the New Testament as Judaism was of the Old Testament; it is the religion of the Old *and* New Testaments, as they stand related to each other. This important point is often overlooked, and it is worth while to call attention to the weakness in the logical arrangement of the materials in the hands of our author.

The chapters on *Jesus*, and on *Jesus as the Christ* are well written, and it is clearly shown that Jesus was distinctly historical, that he was not an opportunist Messiah, and that he must have been conscious of his Messiahship.

In the chapter on *Jesus as the Founder of the Kingdom of God*, the kingly office of Christ is exalted above his priestly. Indeed, this trait marks our author's whole trend of thought. In this chapter, too, there is passing allusion to the evidential function of miracles. Our author's view is expressed in a single sentence on page 376: "Men do not now believe in Christ because of his miracles; they rather believe in miracles because they have first believed in Christ." With this position we cannot fully agree, for while it is true that miracles are revelations of love, they are also appealed to by Jesus and the apostles as marks of the divine nature of their mission.

The chapter on *Jesus Risen* is one of the best in the whole book. The various false theories of naturalism are criticised with much acuteness, and the historicity of the resurrection is confirmed most effectively.

In the chapter on *Jesus Lord* there are some suggestive remarks on the virgin birth, and on the sinlessness of Jesus, which are excellent.

The chapter on *Paul* is a good one also as against pure naturalism; but many apologists will be inclined to think that Professor Bruce scarcely does justice to Paul in regard to the large part he had in the development of the doctrines of the gospel which grew out of the mission, teaching, and death of Jesus. Dr. Bruce's dislike for the old doctrinal theology, and sympathy with the new ethical theology may have had something to do with the direction in which his thought moves concerning Paul.

The chapter on *Primitive Christianity* is an excellent one. The naturalistic theories of Baur, Weiss, Werthsächer, and Pfleiderer are stated and criticised with fine penetration, and the discussion brought up to date.

In two chapters the *Synoptical Gospels* and the *Fourth Gospel* are the subjects of consideration. The historicity of the three synoptical gospels, together with various problems arising in connection therewith, engage our author's careful attention. The Fourth Gospel in Professor Bruce's opinion affords the "hardest apologetic problem" which has to be faced. He shows that the *Logos* theory does not supply the key to the Gospel, and that its apostolic authorship is credible, but a measure of timidity marks the discussion at several points.

In the last chapter, on *The Light of the World*, the great question of the source of authority in religion is handled by our author. His view in general is that Christ, not reason, nor the church, not even the Scriptures, constitutes that authority. Our author's treatment of what really constitutes the ultimate authority in matters of religion is far too brief to be of much real service in the present state of the controversy upon this topic. He makes some good remarks in regard to the rationalistic theory, which exalts the authority of the individual reason to the seat of honor and power, but his exposition of the function of the church in this connection seems to us quite imperfect. Then, too, it is in our judgment a mistake to set the authority of Christ and of the Scriptures in opposition, as our author is in danger of doing. We all agree that Christ, as the king and head of his church, is its supreme lawgiver; but is it not true that he has given in the Scriptures the law of his kingdom, and that that law, as his voice to his subjects, is the authority to which they must bow? To say that Christ, apart from the Scriptures as his law, is the source of authority is to present a theory which is impracticable, for Christ is not now per-

sonally present to speak to men. But having given his word, he speaks by means of that, and by the aid of his Spirit, and hence the doctrine of the Confession of Faith, that the Scriptures are the supreme rule, and the Spirit, speaking in the Scriptures, is the supreme judge in matters of religion, is the true one. But this assumes, and does not contradict, the related doctrine that Christ is the head of his church. This is a large question, and we can do no more than point out the elements of confusion between Christ and the Scriptures, which our author's position, and the cry "back to Christ," introduces, unless it be very carefully considered.

But we must conclude. This treatise is one which well repays a careful perusal. We were in turn both pleased and pained, delighted and disappointed as we read it. As an apologetic of permanent value, it can scarcely be pronounced a success, but as an apology for the present distress it may serve its purpose.

FRANCIS R. BEATTIE.

Louisville.

OTTS'S "UNSETTLED QUESTIONS."

UNSETTLED QUESTIONS TOUCHING THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIANITY. A book for thoughtful young men. *By J. M. P. Otts, D. D., LL. D., Author of "The Fifth Gospel," etc.* New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. Pp. xii., 169. 1893.

At its annual commencement in 1892, Davidson College, illustrious in its history, in its faculties, in its alumni, and in its services to the church and education, took an important step forward. Through the generosity of one of her sons, himself accomplished in scholarship, prominent as an author, and able as a preacher, this institution was enabled to announce the endowment of a "Lectureship." It was highly fitting that the first course upon the new "foundation" should be delivered by the distinguished benefactor himself, and the authorities of the college did not only a courteous act, but an intrinsically meritorious one when they selected Dr. Otts, of Greensboro, Ala., at different times pastor of Presbyterian churches in Columbia, Tenn., Wilmington, Del., and Philadelphia, Penn., as their first lecturer. The volume before us is *The Davidson College Divinity Lectures for the Year 1893.* It is saying a great deal, and yet not too much, to say that the book is worthy both of its author and the institution in whose halls its lectures were delivered. All three—the college, the author, and the book—grade high in excellence. We feel like exclaiming, "Hail, Davidson! the whole church felicitates you; the whole church applauds the generosity of your benefactor! May the sons of other institutions emulate yours!"

We have a word to say to the publishers, or to whomsoever it ought to be said. The present volume is the first of a series; others are to follow as the years go by. We hope the series will be uniform in mechanical execution, and that each volume will be marked as it takes its place in the growing "set."

Dr. Otts has dedicated his book to his wife, to his eight sons, to Davidson College, and to "her numerous sons who are filling various positions of usefulness in church and state." This is considerate, but the partnership is too extensive to be exquisite in taste.

In the Preface, Dr. Otts tells us that the lectures were prepared for

"undergraduates," and for the "people at large." In further expounding his purpose, he says, "The position that this little volume aspires to fill, is that of a daysman or interpreter between the great philosophers and scientists and the common people. In a word, the work aims to be at once philosophical and popular, scientific, yet simple." The task proposed was difficult. It is easier to write philosophy for philosophers than for the "people at large." Dr. Otts has performed his task well.

The major part of the Preface is devoted to the defence of the title. A title that needs either exposition or defence is a blunder. Dr. Otts does not mean that the foundations of Christianity are unsettled. The very object of his lectures was to show the young men at Davidson that those foundations were settled, and that they could not be unsettled. Still, his title calls the foundations of Christianity *unsettled questions*. He characterizes the fundamental realities of the Christian religion as unsettled questions: (1), Because they are "incapable of mathematical demonstration"; (2), Because the friends of Christianity persist in debating them; and (3), Because the enemies of Christianity persist in questioning them. But the demonstration, if not mathematical, is of a kind just as good, and the exposition by friends, and the criticisms by enemies, do not keep the foundations of Christianity in a quiver of unsettlement. Defend it as he may, the title, on its face, is misleading, and costs Dr. Otts vantage ground. We would modestly suggest that in the next edition the author *dele* the negative "un," and leave the title *Settled Questions*.

In his *Prolegomena* Dr. Otts lays down "the basis of our argument." He is led to do this because, as Sir William Hamilton observes, "No difficulty emerges in theology which had not previously emerged in philosophy." This course on the part of our author is wise. Every writer ought to show his philosophical position. In all philosophy, whether for the porch or the market-place, the conclusions and the logical processes for reaching them depend upon the *theory of knowledge* which the reasoner may hold. If that theory is transcendental, transcendentalism must be the result. If that theory is empirical, empiricism must be the result. Dr. Otts clearly and strongly sets forth the doctrine of the Scotch school, otherwise known as the theory of common sense, as the basis of his argument. His philosophic basis is not an unsettled question. The ground under his feet is as steady as the rock of Gibraltar.

In his Introduction, which follows next, our author announces that the foundations of Christianity are four. We are reminded of the apocalyptic description of the heavenly Jerusalem, which "lieth four square, and the length is as large as the breadth." He inscribes the four foundations with four questions, and it is these same interrogation points about which we have complained. First foundation: *Is God an Eternal Person?* Second foundation: *Is Man an Immortal Soul?* Third foundation: *Is the Bible a Divine Revelation?* Fourth foundation: *Is Christ a Living Person?* We suppose, concerning these foundations, that Dr. Otts would say that "the length and breadth are equal"—each alike is fundamental to Christianity. The outline is certainly a beautiful one for a college course of divinity lectures, subsequently to be published for "the people at large."

In discussing the *first foundation*, the author does not, in our judgment, give sufficient prominence to the intuitive argument for the existence of God.

The anthropological argument gives "an intelligent person"; the cosmological argument gives "a rational person"; the ontological argument gives "a self-living spirit." Now add these results together, and we have an *intelligent, rational, self-living, spiritual person.* But such a person is not the God of nature, nor the God of the Bible. To have the idea of *that* God, the adjective *infinite* must be put into the foregoing list. Which argument introduces the word *infinite?* It is not possible to any pure thought-forgings. It is the gift of faith, a fundamental belief which the human soul cherishes in reliance upon the testimony of its own nature. Thus supplemented, the argument would be resistless.

In discussing the *second foundation*, we rejoice that Dr. Otts emphasizes the fact of man's creation. His formula is, "Man a created and immortal person." (Pp. 34, 75.) Suppose man were personalized and immortalized out of the brute creation by some subtle genesis of evolution—suppose the second foundation of Christianity sprang up spontaneously—it would be difficult, so ardently does the human mind love continuity and persistency of plan, not to hold the same hypothesis with reference to the third and fourth foundations. One foundation—the first—is self-existent; the other three were *laid.* Such a figure proves that our Christianity is not an evolution from heathen religions.

Our author's argument for immortality is striking, perhaps original, certainly ingenious. An outline of it will interest the reader: 1. Life is not an abstract entity: it always inheres in something. 2. The nature of the something determines the nature of the life. If the something be discerpible and perishable, the life is perishable. 3. Man lives. In him is a duality of substance: matter and spirit. Matter is perishable, hence physical life is perishable. Nobody ever heard of a defunct soul, a dissolvable spirit; hence soul-life is imperishable. 4. Consequently the physical sciences cannot prove immortality. 5. Hence that metaphysics which proves the existence of a soul, proves the immortality of the life which inheres in it. Physical life is the life of a mortal thing: psychical life is the life of an immortal thing. If psychical life can cease to be, the psychical substance can cease to exist. But as to extinct souls we are agnostic. At this point Dr. Otts needs the Bible to give assurance that there is no such thing as an extinct soul. Had time permitted he would have added the biblical factor. The argument is inconclusive without it. 6. Psychical life can give physical manifestations of itself only upon physical conditions, that is, through some bodily instrumentality. If, therefore, the psychical life is to give physical manifestations of itself after death, the old body must be raised, or a new body prepared. Here, again, revelation is needed to tell us that the psychical life will again manifest itself under physical conditions, and that those physical conditions will be the resurrection body in "the new heavens and the new earth." Resurrection is purely a doctrine of revelation.

Our limits are reached. We cannot follow our author in his discussion of the *third* and *fourth* foundations. His bibliology and christology are sound and strong. We trust the book will have a large circulation among "undergraduates" and "the people at large." The graduate and the specialist could be profited by it.

Clarksville, Tenn. R. A. Webb.

EXPOSITOR'S BIBLE.

EZRA, NEHEMIAH, AND ESTHER. *By Walter F. Adeny, A. M., Professor of New Testament Exegesis and Church History, New College, London.* Crown 8vo, pp. 404. $1.50. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1893.

THE BOOK OF JOSHUA. *By William Garden Blaikie, D. D., LL. D., New College, Edinburgh.* Crown 8vo, pp. viii., 416. $1.50. The same publishers. 1893.

THE FIRST BOOK OF KINGS. *By F. W. Farrar, D. D., F. R. S., Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; Archdeacon of Westminster.* Crown 8vo, pp. xii., 503. $1.50. The same publishers. 1893.

These three books are a continuation of the valuable series known as *The Expositor's Bible*, and are among the most notable of the more than thirty volumes that have now been issued in that series.

Professor Adeny kindly tells us in the Introduction that the main history recorded in the Books of EZRA and NEHEMIAH is fixed securely above the reach of adverse criticism. He then proceeds to argue that these books have one author, and that author the same as the author of the Chronicles, and then gives reasons, justified in his judgment by certain passages in Nehemiah, to show that the Chronicles belongs to a late period. This period he holds to be in the Grecian era, and later than the beginning of Alexander's career in the East. He tells us that "the date of the final editor is as late as this." From these points it can be seen that the Professor belongs to the school which delights in the historico-critical method, and stands ready to yield everything to its arrogant demands. Little wonder, then, need be felt when one looks for the author's view of the law as set forth in Ezra, and finds that he declares that "up to this time all the teachers of Israel had been toiling painfully in their almost hopeless efforts to induce the Jews to accept the unique faith of Jehovah"; that this faith had appeared in only the three forms of a popular, often degraded cult, a priestly tradition, the secret of the caste, and as a subject of prophetic instruction too large and free to be reached by the masses; that "clearly this [the law that Ezra brought forth] is no collection of trite precepts known and practiced by the people from antiquity"; that Ezra is not "a Justinian, codifying a system of legislation already recognized and adopted," but "the introducer of a law hitherto unpracticed and unknown"; that "it is clear that it was not practiced by the Jews before Ezra's day," and that "it bears evidence of its history in the several strata of which it is composed, and which must have been deposited successively." Outside of his dealing with these critical questions, and especially in defending the authenticity of the books and their historicity, the author may be read with profit and pleasure. He writes in a most pleasant style, and will be followed in his descriptions and unfolding of the text with great and deserved interest.

In dealing with ESTHER, Professor Adeny begins by stating some of the difficulties of the book, and remarking that even the most sober criticism is troubled at its contents. The general position which he takes as to the book is that it is not historical, but a religious romance. What else can we infer from sentences like these: "In these days of the theological novel we are scarcely

in a position to object to what may be thought to partake of the character of a romance, even if it is found in the Bible. . . . It is rather pleasing than otherwise to see that the compilers of the Jewish canon were not prevented by Providence from including a little anticipation of that work of the imagination which has blossomed so abundantly in the highest and best culture of our own day." The questions connected with the religious and moral relations of the book he deals with fairly and well, except, we think, when he comes to the accusation brought against the book because of the record of the responsible part taken by Mordecai and Esther in begging permission for the great slaughter described in the last pages of the book. Of that he simply says: "We turn with loathing from this gigantic horror, glad to take refuge in the hope that the author has dipped his brush in darker colors than the real events would warrant." Of the authorship, authenticity and purpose of the book, he has little to say.

Dr. Blaikie's JOSHUA breathes a different spirit. After setting forth the two methods of dealing with Old Testament history, he repudiates emphatically the naturalistic, and contends for that which is willing to admit the supernatural element. These pages of the introduction will be found most suggestive and valuable. The occurrences which he cites to sustain his position are well selected and ably presented. They are drawn mainly from Moses' career. Then, regarding the work of Joshua as a continuation of that of Moses, and his book as a continuation of the books of Moses, he shows that in the history of both men the divine arm is seen, and in the books of both a chapter of divine revelation. Entering upon the consideration of the book itself, he states the grounds upon which the advanced critics class that book with the Pentateuch, and ascribe it to the same mythical Jehovist and Elohist and other writers and redactors. Of this scheme he caustically remarks that it is "just too complete, too wonderfully finished, too clever by half. Allowing most cordially the remarkable ability and ingenuity of its authors, we can hardly be expected to concede to them the power of taking to pieces a book of such vast antiquity, putting it in a modern mincing machine, dividing it among so many supposed writers, and settling the exact parts of it written by each. Is there any ancient writing that might not yield a similar result if the same ingenuity were exercised upon it?" Of the evangelical character of the author's treatment of the contents and purpose of the book, one may readily judge by these closing words of the Introduction: "The spiritual lesson of this book then is, that in Jesus Christ there is rest for the pilgrim. . . . It is the echo of his own glorious words, 'Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.' Whosoever is weary—whether under the burden of care, or the sense of guilt, or the bitterness of disappointment, or the anguish of a broken heart, or the conviction that all is vanity—this message of the book to him is, 'There remaineth a rest to the people of God.'" The spirit of interpretation indicated in this paragraph is well sustained throughout the volume. According to the scheme of the series to which it belongs, the book is considered topically rather than in an expository manner.

The name of Canon Farrar as the author of the volume on FIRST KINGS is sufficient to warrant the expectation of every reader that this volume will be

characterized by brilliancy and beauty in its thought and diction. The facile writer is at his very best in these pages, and fills them with beauty and attractiveness. They are rich in description and suggestion, which will aid the student of this part of the word in the understanding of the events recorded and in their exposition. While we say this, however, we must except to the author's position, boldly taken and announced in his opening words, upon the most advanced ground of higher criticism. In the opening chapter, bearing the very title, "The Higher Criticism," he declares in the first paragraph that "Supreme as is the importance of this Book of God [the Bible], it was never meant to be the sole teacher of mankind. . . . In the Bible he revealed himself to all mankind by his messages to some of his servants. . . . They were not even an *indispensable* method." He exalts the present age for having revolutionized the mode of regarding Scripture. He declares, with the contemptuous spirit characteristic of the school of critics to which he belongs, and which certainly offsets the epithets which they accuse the conservatives of hurling against them, that "The fatal and wooden dogma of verbal dictation—a dogma which either destroys intelligent faith altogether, or introduces into Christian conduct some of the worst delusions of false religion—is dead and buried in every capable and well-taught mind." He glorifies criticism in every way. He holds that "as this divine inspiration did not make them [holy men of old] personally sinless in their actions, or infallible in their judgments, so neither does it exempt their messages from the limitation which attaches to all human conditions." Of the contents of the Books of Kings, he claims that they are composed of older materials, retouched, sometimes expanded, and set in a suitable frame-work, mostly by a single author, who writes throughout in the same characteristic phraseology, and judges the actions and character of the kings from the standpoint of later centuries. Of the chronology, he claims that the synchronisms between the reigns of the kings of Israel and Judah are computed by the compiler, or by some redactor, and only in round numbers; and that the numbers which the compiler adopts are sometimes so enormous as to be grossly improbable, though here due allowance must be made, especially as to dates, for possible errors of tradition and transcription. He pronounces the chronology, as it now stands, to be historically true in its general outlines, but in its details presenting data which are mutually irreconcilable, while the chronology is obviously artificial, and dominated by slight modifications of the round number forty. While asserting in the main the reliability of the record, he seems reluctant to accept the items as historical, and attributes them to an era subsequent to that in connection with which they are given. Leaving out these features, by which the careful student will not be led astray, the volume will be found richly suggestive and helpful.

VIII. RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

EZRA AND NEHEMIAH. Their Lives and Times. *By George Rawlinson, M. A., F. R. G. S., Corresponding Member of the Royal Academy of Turin, Late Camden Professor of Ancient History in the University of Oxford, Canon of Canterbury, etc.* 12mo, pp. x., 182. $1.00. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co.

GIDEON AND THE JUDGES. A Study. Historical and Practical. *By Rev. John Marshall Lang, D. D., Minister of the Barony Parish, Glasgow, Author of "The Last Supper of Our Lord," "Life—Is it Worth Living?" etc.* 12mo, pp. xii., 201. $1.00. The same publishers.

Two volumes in the publishers' "Men of the Bible" series. This series has already given us much that is valuable. It is especially rich in the presentation of the results of archæological investigation and research. The several authors are widely known for their ability and attainments in this line. The two volumes before us are typical.

Few students of ancient times and the development of history equal, and none surpass, Canon Rawlinson in respect to the extent and accuracy of his information or the philosophic application of it. In his EZRA AND NEHEMIAH these characteristics are marked. In the Preface he declares his disagreement with Kuenen's conclusion as to the late origin of the Mosaic law and the promulgation of it by Ezra and Nehemiah "for the first time." Ezra's birth and education, early relations with the Persian government, relations with Artaxerxes Longimanus, governorship of Judea, relations with Nehemiah, literary labors, later life, death and character, form the topics of the several chapters dealing with Ezra; while in Nehemiah our author considers Nehemiah's descent and probable birth-place, position at court, removal to Jerusalem, the material and religious condition of the Jewish people, reformations, recall to Persian court, legends of his life, character, and work.

Dr. Lang, in GIDEON AND THE JUDGES, as the title suggests, makes Gideon the central figure in the Book of Judges, and with less attention to the critical and literary study of the book than to its spiritual purposes, gives us the many practical lessons that are to be gathered from the book's record of the dark side of Israel's career. Both these volumes can be safely commended to our readers.

EZEKIEL. Introduction, *by Rev. T. Whitelaw, D. D.;* Exposition, *by Very Rev. E. H. Plumptre, D. D., Dean of Wells;* Homiletics, *by Rev. Professor W. F. Adeny, M. A.;* Homilies, *by Various Authors.* Vol. I., pp. xxxix., 403. Vol. II., vi., 490, 4to. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Limited. 1893.

These two portly volumes are the last issued in that most valuable series

which we have several times described, the *Pulpit Commentary*. The plan is the same as that pursued in the preceding volumes. The Introduction is in two parts, I., Ezekiel, the Prophet, and II., Ezekiel, the Book. In the first part the author considers the life of the prophet, his times, his mission, his character. In the second part, the arrangement and contents of the book, its composition, collection and canonicity, its style and literary characteristics, its principles of interpretation, and theological standpoints, are the topics considered. Following that is a somewhat full account of the literature connected with the book. In critical matters the author parts company with Gramberg, Hitzig, Ewald, and others, in considering the method of the book's composition, and with Jahn and Eichhorn as to the final collection or possible revision of the prophecies. The chief purpose of the commentary being homiletical, that feature of the rest of the volume is the one of special interest. The homiletic matter is, as in the preceding volumes, rich and suggestive, too helpful at times, perhaps, to the idle student or preacher, but none the less stimulating and suggestive to the earnest, conscientious sermon-maker.

The Resultant Greek Testament. *By Richard Francis Weymouth, D. Lit.* 8vo, pp. 644. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co. 1893.

As the title indicates, this is a work in which the results of a careful and laborious comparison of the texts of the New Testament are given us, in a text which, as the editor states, "represents as far as possible the consensus of the principal editors of the New Testament." In the upper corners and at the foot of the pages will be found the authorities for the readings. Thus each student may judge for himself as to the text given us by Dr. Weymouth. The special value of the book is in its labor-saving character.

Moses, the Servant of God. *By F. B. Meyer, B. A.* New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1893.

Mr. Meyer's books on the characters of the Old Testament and on practical themes drawn from the study of the word have prepared the public mind to expect anything to which his name is attached to be well worth reading. There will be no disappointment here. He gives us not merely an account of the great leader of Israel but a portrayal of his character as a man of faith, accomplishing the marvels wrought by him through that faith, an ideal or pattern for all who come after him. Critical questions are eschewed. The little book is of great practical value.

The Bible in the World's Education. *By Henry White Warren, S. T. D., one of the Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Author of "Recreations in Astronomy," etc.* 12mo, pp. 320. $1.00. New York: Hunt & Eaton. 1893.

This little volume embraces the first course of lectures on the Wycliffe foundation for teaching the English Bible in the University of Denver. As was said on a former page in reference to Dr. Otts and the Davidson College Lectureship, so here the founder of the lectureship is most appropriately called to

deliver the first course. The topics considered are: the Bible; why written; its ideals; its highest ideal realized; its prophecies and predictions; miraculous signs of great ideas; criticism, ligitimate and necessary; verbal felicities and intensities; its relation to college students and studies; its relation to the questions of to-day and to-morrow; will men outgrow it; its first great English translator—Wycliffe. The author's treatment of his subject is sound and evangelical. The work is scarcely characterized by unity, and there is nothing especially new presented, but at the same time there is a fervor in the lecturer that will interest and move the reader.

Verbum Dei. The Yale Lectures on Preaching, 1893. *By Robert F. Horton, M. A., Author of "Revelation and the Bible," etc.* London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1893.

Those who are familiar with Mr. Horton's previous writings, and with the views of inspiration for which he is somewhat widely known, will not be surprised to find this work, in which are embodied the Yale Lectures of 1893, very "broad." It is throughout depreciatory of the Bible. It maintains that the Bible is only *a* Bible; that it is not the sole revelation of God to man, and that there are other "fountains of authority." The lectures fall far below the mark of others in the same series.

The Gospel and its Earliest Interpretations. A Study of the Teaching of Jesus and its Doctrinal Transformation in the New Testament. *By Orello Cone, D. D.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1893.

Having no faith in inspiration, regarding the New Testament only as "literature," and holding to a rationalistic method of interpretation, the author maintains that there are different types of religious doctrine in the New Testament, as, for instance, the Jewish-Christian, the Pauline, the Deutero-Pauline, the Johannine, the anti-Gnostic, etc., all of which differ "from the religion of Jesus." He seeks to trace the transformation which he thus asserts, and in doing so presses hard upon the heels of the most pronounced school of rationalits. The book has little merit from any standpoint.

Calvinism—Pure and Mixed. A Defence of the Westminster Standards. *By William G. T. Shedd, D. D.* 8vo, pp. 'x., 169. $1.00. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1893.

This little work or collection of papers by the author, published from time to time in various periodicals, and gathered here in one volume, while written at different times has remarkable unity. The author himself here, as everywhere and always, clear and perspicuous, states that his object "is to define and defend the tenets of Calvinism in their original purity and self-consistence, as distinguished from proposed modifications of them for the purpose of an alleged improvement." One will readily see from these words that it is the late revision movement in the Northern Church which occasioned the papers here collected. The subjects which he specifically treats, as most prominent in the recent discussion, are preterition, common and special grace, origi-

nal sin, infant salvation, the "larger hope," and the inerrancy of the Scriptures. Few writers have ever handled these topics with as much clearness and force as Dr. Shedd, and it is refreshing to follow his thoughts and see the beauty and strength of the system which he upholds, and to hear his testimony against the latitudinarian tendency and influence which underlie all the recent attempts to revise our glorious creed.

REGENERATION. *By George Nye Boardman, Professor of Systematic Theology in Chicago Theological Seminary.* Pp. 126. Price, 75 cents. Fleming H. Revell Company, New York and Chicago. 1891.

This little volume, on a subject of ceaseless interest, contains six chapters and two appendices: "Every Man Must be Twice Born"; "Death in Life"; "The New Life"; "Regeneration a Fact"; "Conversion"; "Faith"; "The Justice of God in Requiring Holiness in Man." Such is the ground traversed by our author, who had a profound appreciation of the vital importance of the subject with which he dealt. His monograph on this topic is sound to the core; his expositions are clear; his arguments are strong, sometimes psychological in their nature, but generally biblical; his outlines are striking; some of his analyses are acute; the whole is pervaded by a spirit of evangelical devoutness. The style of the composition is frequently deficient in energy, rarely ever truly elegant, and at times is prolix. It is one of the best treatises on the subject that we ever read.

THE CHURCH AND HER DOCTRINE. *By Various Authors.* Pp. 309. $2.00. New York: The Christian Literature Company. 1892.

This volume is composed of eleven different lectures by eight different ministers of the Church of England. It proves to be delightful reading, and will grade higher from a literary point of view than the average volume of composite authorship. It deals with some of the most fascinating topics in theology. The positions taken are generally evangelical. The treatment of the subjects is in the main expository. Argumentative passages appear here and there—that is, passages that are formally argumentative. Of course the lectures proceed from the Episcopal theological view-point. That church, we should think, would be proud of them. Other denominations would find pleasure and profit, not only in their instructions, but also in the fact that they are a fresh statement of views from eminent and leading Anglican divines. The publishers must be praised. The print is simply luscious. Book-readers do bless the publishers who do not destroy their eyes.

Having made these general comments, we shall now give the table of contents, and attempt to indicate the *trend* of each lecture by a brief statement.

1. THE HOLY TRINITY. *By the Right Rev. W. Saumarez Smith, D. D., Bishop of Sydney.* The author discusses this doctrine from four aspects: Historical, Mystical, Intellectual, Practical. It is formularized from revealed facts and not from metaphysical speculation; it must be received by faith, though reason is permitted to exercise itself upon it within limits; it is precious for spiritual uses.

2. THE ONE OBLATION OF CHRIST. *By the same author.* The sacrificial theory of the atonement as a sin-offering is expounded and defended. Christ

is altar, victim, and priest combined. Besides him there is no other. Besides him there is no need for another.

3. The Incarnation. *By the Rev. C. H. Waller, M. A., Principal of St. John's Hall, Highbury.* The author considers the subject first as a *prophecy;* secondly, as a *fact*, and thirdly, as a *doctrine.* He waxes indignant at that doctrine of Kenosis which represents our Lord as no more accurate and no better informed than other men.

4. Justification. *By the Rev. Canon Hoare, M. A., Vicar of Holy Trinity, Tunbridge Wells.* Justification is more than forgiveness. It is acquittal. It is acquittal upon the ground of righteousness, not our natural righteousness, nor our grace-infused righteousness, but the imputed righteousness of Christ. It is bestowed by the grace of God and received by the faith of man.

5. The Two Sacraments. *By the same author.* He treats the sacraments under three heads: (1), Their ordination by Christ; (2), Their outward and visible signs; (3), Their inward grace. Under the second head, sacraments are *pledges* of God's mercy, *witnesses* of gospel facts, *badges* of discipleship. Under the third head, their grace is conveyed, not *ex opere operato*, not through a change in the elements, not by the Spirit's power transfused into the elements, not by any grace-transmitting power in the administrator, but by the spiritual qualifications of the recipient.

6. The Sufficiency of the Holy Scripture. *By the Rev. Canon Girdlestone, M. A., late Principal of Wycliffe Hall, Oxford.* The author frankly confesses that he has been affected by "the comparative method" of treating the Bible. He classifies its contents as *supernatural, historical, ethical,* and *theological.* He professes to accept the supernatural upon the authority of the Bible; he sits in judgment upon the other class of facts. The article is a temporizing surrender of Scripture.

7. The Divine Judgment. *By the Rev. Sir Emilius Laurie, Bart., B. D., late Vicar of St. John's, Paddington.* There are four formal arguments, briefly developed, for this doctrine: (1), From conscience; (2), From history; (3), From analogy; (4), From Scripture. He accepts the conclusion that the future judgment upon the wicked will be a finality.

8. The Communion of Saints. *By W. Pakenham Walsh, D. D., Bishop of Ossory.* "To belong to a great family, or to a great society, or to a great nation, is, if rightly viewed, a man's noblest birthright."

9. The Relation Between Doctrine and Life. *By the Rev. Canon H. C. G. Moule, M. A., Principal of Ridley Hall, Cambridge.* In the life of faith, doctrinal clearness and decision are a necessity, but that necessity creates another, the necessity of acquaintance with a divine person. This lecture is more sentimental than intellectual.

10. "I Come." *By the same author.* This is an exposition of four sayings of Jesus. The author treats them as: (1), The "I come" of incarnation; (2), The "I come" of glorification; (3), The "I come" of indwelling; (4), The "I come" of return.

11. The Church. *By the Rev. Henry Wall, D. D., Prebendary of St. Paul's Cathedral.* Of course this lecture occupies about one-third of the whole book. It is purely Episcopal in its conception and development.

THE LORD'S SUPPER. A Biblical Exposition of its Origin, Nature, and Use. *By Rev. J. P. Lilley, A. M.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1891.

The sub-title tells the author's plan in this succinct and clear treatise on the Lord's Supper. In the exposition of the origin he considers fully the meaning, character, and purpose of the Passover, and shows how it was merged into the Lord's Supper, and also traces the relation to the sacrament of the sacrificial rites by which the Covenant at Sinai was ratified, leading to the unfolding of the covenant idea that is embraced in the sacrament. After unfolding the nature and purpose of the Supper, he deals in the concluding chapters with such practical questions as the reception of communicants, the qualifications required, and the spirit in which the ordinance should be observed and its purposes maintained. The whole is written from the standpoint of the pastor, and is therefore practical, while it is evangelical and reverent.

THE BLOOD COVENANT. A Primitive Rite, and Its Bearings on Scripture. *By H. Clay Trumbull, author of "Kadesh-Barnea," "Friendship the Master Passion," etc.* Second edition, with a supplement. 8vo pp. x., 390. $2.00. Philadelphia: John D. Wattles. 1893.

Few works of the past ten years have attracted as much attention and been regarded with as general favor as that of Dr. Trumbull on *The Blood Covenant*, first published eight years ago. The wonderful research, philosophic thought, and scientific skill, displayed in the gathering and investigation of the materials, and in the induction from them, made it a marked book. It took its place at once amongst the most important treatises in the religious world. The present edition, issued after long delay caused by the author's desire to give fuller proofs in the direction of specific exceptions taken by eminent critics to certain positions in the original work, differs from the first chiefly in having with it a supplement containing a consideration of the exceptions taken by prominent thinkers to the author's proofs of the linkings of the primitive blood-covenant with the sacrifices of the Old Testament and of the New; as the vital union by substitute blood; as the blood making unity, and eating showing union; as the ethnic reachings after union with the divine. These and other points are fully considered. A full topical index, and a Scriptural index add greatly to the value of the book. As with the first edition, so here, we heartily commend this book as one of the indispensables to every thinking man's library.

THE EVOLUTION OF CHRISTIANITY. *By M. J. Savage.* Boston: George H. Ellis.

Issuing this book subsequently to Dr. Abbott's book bearing the same title, the author acquits himself of the charge of piracy in the name by telling us in the Preface that it was in type before Abbott's lectures were delivered. Its chapters are as follows: Old World Religions; Judaism and its Hopes; Conditions when Christianity was Born; Jesus, and What he Attempted; The Influence of the Christ Idea; The First Church and Paul; The Problem of the Trinity; The Church of Rome; Growth Away from Jesus; Protestant Revolution; Science and Christianity; Free Christianity. It is a radical book, by a

radical author. It depreciates Christ and the Bible, and Christianity. The only purpose one could have in reading it, and justification of such a use of precious time, is that one may see how the advocates of the radical views it maintains affect and maintain those views.

Palestine—Its Historical Geography. With Topographical Index and Maps. *By Rev. Archibald Henderson, D. D.* Second edition. Revised. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1893.

With the addition of much new matter to the first edition, and all his positions and views strengthened or determined by the most recent and reliable authorities, the author deals with the position, importance, physical features, natural history, early inhabitants, names of Palestine, etc. It is a useful and interesting work.

The Pastor in the Sick-Room. Three Lectures Delivered at the Princeton Theological Seminary, March, 1892. *By John D. Wells, D. D., Senior Pastor of South Third Street Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, New York.* 16mo, pp. 128. 50 cents. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-School Work. 1893.

Three practical lectures on practical themes. They are published at the request of the Professors who heard them. They are designed to help pastors in one of the most difficult and delicate departments of their work. The subjects of the several lectures are: The Difference Between the Sick-Bed and the Death-Bed; Salvation Possible, and in Many Cases Probable, on the Death-Bed; Wrong Treatment of the Sick and Dying; Right Treatment of the Same, and Uses that may be made of their Experience. The author comes to his discussion as a pastor. This is enough to show the nature of his treatment of the subject. The little book should be in the hands of all young pastors.

The Secret of Character Building. *By John B. DeMotte, A. M., Ph. D.* 12mo, pp. 130. $1.00. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1893.

Having heard the substance of this book in a lecture delivered by its author we feel a deeper interest in the contents than usual. It is first a study of the means by which we become aware of what exists external to ourselves, and then a consideration of the bearing of the facts touching these means upon that within us which is called character. In other words, it is an argument concerning the physical basis of habit. The argument is ingenious and forcible, and happily in this author's hands is constantly held away from a materialistic perversion, by a recognition of the office and work of the Holy Spirit above all other agents and means in the formation of character.

Erasmus, and Other Essays. *By Marcus Dods, D. D., Professor of Exegetical Theology, New College, Edinburgh.* Pp. viii., 376. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1892.

The well-known Edinburgh professor treats in these chapters of the life, character, and work of Erasmus, the Christian element in Plato, Hippolytus'

Homily Against Noetus, Clement of Alexandria and his Apologetic, Frederick Denison Maurice, Confucius, etc. The essays form a valuable series of studies.

Missionary Exercises.—For the use of Sunday-schools, Mission Bands, and Christian Endeavor Societies. *Arranged by the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society of the Presbyterian Church.* 12mo, pp. 192. Paper, 30 cents. Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school work, Philadelphia, 1893.

This is the third in a series of responsive readings, dialogues, recitations, translations of hymns, etc., for use in missionary meetings. The authors of these volumes have gathered a large amount of interesting material to enliven missionary meetings and to render them a source of pleasure and improvement, as well as a stimulus and help to missionary effort.

The volumes contain lists of subjects and references to missionary literature, directions for costumes and scenery to illustrate special missionary topics, a large amount of appropriate Scripture quotations arranged responsively and by topics, dialogues and dramatic selections, hints for games and diversions illustrative of some phase of missionary work, and many hymns and poetical selections.