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INTRODUCTORY.

The articles in this number of the REVIEW have been contributed by young men in the Church. All of the contributors are alumni of Union Seminary in Virginia. Rev. O. E. Buchholz graduated in 1914 and has since been pastor of the Overbrook Presbyterian church in Richmond. He has continued to study in the Seminary along post-graduate lines. It is refreshing to look at the General Assembly through the clear eyes of this young man.

Rev. Wm. T. Hanzsche belonged to the class of 1916. After leaving Union Seminary he did special work in Princeton University and Princeton Seminary. He then pursued post-graduate work at the University of Chicago.

Rev. J. J. Murray graduated in 1913 and then spent a year in post-graduate work in Glasgow under such men as Dr. James Denny, Principal T. M. Lindsay and Dr. W. M. Clow. Mr. Murray is just now entering upon his work as chaplain in the United States Army.

Rev. S. K. Phillips graduated at Union in 1910. He is a son of the late Dr. A. L. Phillips, who was superintendent of Sunday-school and Young People's Work in the Southern Presbyterian Church for so many years. Mr. Phillips is now engaged in religious work among our soldiers.

Rev. Herbert S. Turner graduated in 1917 and has done post-graduate work in Union Seminary as Hoge Fellow and in the University of Chicago. Mr. Turner is now supplying the First Presbyterian church, Durham, N. C.

*CHINA SINCE THE REVOLUTION.

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The subject breaks up naturally into four divisions: Political, Moral and Social, Educational, Religious.

I. First then as to the *Political* issue. Perhaps it may help to ask ourselves a few questions:

1. In the light of all that has developed since, was the revolution a good thing and was China ready to become a republic?

2. Why was the republican form so easily and quickly erected, and why has so long an interval elapsed without gaining the substance of republican government?

3. Was Yuan Shih Kai sincerely convinced that a return to monarchical forms was best for the nation and really desired by its people?

4. With so weak a central government how has relatively good order obtained locally throughout most of the provinces, and what basis for democracy is there in Chinese institutions and character?

5. What is China's place in world-politics and the attitude of the other nations to her present plight?

6. Is the pessimism of most Chinese regarding their country's future justified by the facts?

When the outbreak occurred at Wuchang the cities of the Yangtse Valley and then those further south, with the exception of Nanking, one by one declared for the republic, usually

*This paper was originally written for a Conference of Missionaries in China, but is intensely interesting to every one who is interested in missions and in the spread of the gospel.—Editor.

without a struggle, over night. How easy it seemed, and how delighted the people were at the new democratic order? We Americans, often with an enthusiasm in inverse proportion to our years and discretion, heartily welcomed the new-born sister republic. As one of the enthusiasts I have been asking myself whether we were swept away by unthinking emotion and whether it was not all a ridiculous fiasco. For in these six years we have had two counter revolutions, two monarchical attempts, four provisional or acting presidents, endless plottings, over one hundred political assassinations, a series of parliamentary farces, shameless bribery, widespread disorder and constant civil strife, a foreign menace against which the nation seems impotent, no real president, no constitution, no suffrage, no popular democratic privileges, no assurance of stable government in the future. In the face, however, of such an arraignment, it must be remembered that China has averaged a dynastic revolution about every 200 years, that the Manchu dynasty was doomed, that China was in a powerful ferment under new ideas and influences pouring in from abroad. The outbreak came eight months earlier than planned, and should have begun in the south, each province revolting and effecting its own reorganization before the next one declared itself. But even if Dr. Swen had been able to put through this program of Federal States to be ultimately reunited, it is doubtful whether the result would have been materially different. The forces at work are too elemental. The difficulties are inherent. Self-government cannot be given to any people, it must be won. Are the Chinese winning theirs? There is a small nucleus of genuine patriots. Despite all that may be said to the contrary, I have always believed that Dr. Swen is one. And there was gathered around him a little group of idealists, serving without pay or fame and at great risk, devoted to him and sharing his purpose. True, these men have one by one dropped out of politics discouraged, but the point is that China is producing the type now, as she often has before in her long history. There is an intense, if often crude and unsteady, patriotism among the students. Yet this class,

and especially those returning from abroad have been—there are notable exceptions—the most disappointing single element in the situation. They have had such splendid opportunities for both knowing of a higher order and struggling to realize it. Official squeeze seems more rampant and shameless than under the old regime, when there was a certain *Kwei-chu* in such matters. A secretary in Feng Kuo Chang's *yamen* was calling on me when I remarked that I heard he had paid \$1,000,000 for the vice-presidency. He replied, "Oh, no, it was only \$800,000." But, as we have seen in Russia, conditions might be, and in fact as far as the government deserves, ought to be infinitely worse. It is hard therefore to make sweeping generalizations. Wm. James, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, begins one chapter by remarking that the theorizing mind ever tends to an over-simplification of its materials. On the whole then, in this admittedly complex muddle can we not affirm that the ideal and form of democratic institutions is an earnest of their gradual attainment, even though the way lie through many disturbed and disillusioned years; that fifty years of the present republican ferment are better than a cycle of the old stagnant Cathay? Can we not hold to a sobered and chastened but resolute optimism?

Why Yuan Shih Kai attempted to put over the monarchy would no longer have any practical interest for us were it not for whatever insight the episode may furnish into Chinese conditions and tendencies. Dr. Swen told some of us in Nanking that a year and half before the Wuchang outbreak Yuan had sent an emissary to him to propose that they join forces. It would be interesting to speculate on what might have happened had the visionary idealist with his western inspired enthusiasms and the almost uncannily clever administrator with his practical knowledge of Chinese affairs combined to work together with mutual confidence for a sane and securely maintained program of reform. But Dr. Swen, despite his great refusal in Yuan's favor, never trusted him, and soon after his fine-spirited, if somewhat unavoidable retirement, began to suspect Yuan of monarchical ambitions, and to promote or

approve the successive counterplate which lasted until Yuan's death. Personally, I feel convinced that Yuan, so far from being gifted with almost clairvoyant powers of political prognostication, was ever an astute and rather public-spirited opportunist. He had always questioned the wisdom of a Chinese republic, created by the fiat of a few foreign educated youths, but made the best he could out of the situation for all concerned. His first intention on becoming president was to play the game squarely. He once remarked to his old friend, Dr. H. H. Lowry, of Peking, that he had learned from the career of George Washington that it was a nobler ambition to go down into history as the first president of a free republic than as the founder of a new dynasty. This, like many other similar utterances, may have been camouflage, but I believe his shift of purpose was a complex of genuine conviction after losing all patience with an impossible parliament and other pretended republican forms, combined with a father's natural desire to gratify a brilliant and insistently ambitious son, his own personal love of pomp and power, anxiety over the succession, and perhaps chiefly the machinations of the *Chou An Hwei* who deceived him into thinking there really was a popular demand for a monarchy as the only permanent assurance of law and order. (Interview with President Wilson.) The significance of the whole movement lies in the evidence it afforded of a quite general reaction from the naive glee of having a republic, and of a more general but hitherto latent conservative dissatisfaction with the recent innovations. Even loyal old Chang Hsun was duped into a similar belief by his more clever but far less straightforward fellow-conspirators. Incidentally, the man who now sits as president of the republic, after straddling the fence as long as he dared, had decided to declare for the monarchy on the day after Yuan died. It is one of the many humors of recent Chinese history that Yuan left the world just in time to enable his friend Feng Kuo-chang to suppress his monarchist principles and sacrifice these for the good of the people by allowing them to make him president. The last few days the Chinese papers have been discussing an adjust-

ment conceivable only to the Chinese mind, to make Suen Tung, the little Manchu ex-emperor, hereditary president.

There is, however, another and very important side to all this. What foiled Yuan, despite all his resources and abilities, was public opinion. This was a mingled dislike of Yuan individually, attachment to the republican idea, and moral disapprobation of Yuan's method. It reveals a trait of Chinese character, existing long before Mencius, and fostered by the advice of that sage, as to rebelling against tyrants who have exhausted the will of heaven. Any similar attempts will have this popular will to reckon with, as will any foreign powers who make efforts to coerce this sovereign people. Thus the Yunnan revolt on Christmas Day in becoming a national holiday enshrines an inherent principle of Chinese life. In fact, we have here the explanation of the strange phenomenon of relatively well-ordered local government in the midst of dissension, impotence and even anarchy in Peking. China has ever been a paradox of despotism and democracy. There has always been a large measure of local self-government, through the gentry and district elders. The rise of the Chambers of Commerce and other commercial organizations, the effective policing of the great cities, the law-abiding temperament of the nation at large are added guarantees. The most dangerous political discovery of this popular power is the much abused readiness to declare independence of any person or movement that is unacceptable to the parties concerned. Thus certain provinces, the navy, army officers, political clubs, etc., have announced their independence from time to time, finding it a delightfully effective, safe and simple process, while not realizing that it cuts at the vitals and basic principles of democratic institutions. If it were possible to think any longer of China as a self-contained and isolated country, we might hope that some strong man would soon emerge—as so often in the past—who could, by his dominant personality, reconcile or reduce to submission the warring factions and found a new dynasty. But that time has now passed for China, as for all the other nations, never to return.

It was fifty years last year since Anson Burlingame, as head of China's first diplomatic mission abroad, announced in response to a welcome in New York City that China was ready to take upon her ancient civilization the graft of that from the West. But along with the gentle rustic figure of grafting, we must place that of a swirling international vortex into which China has been rapidly, roughly and ruthlessly dragged. It is scarcely pertinent to review the long series of outrages China has suffered at the hands of these same civilized nations of the West, nor to philosophise as to the right or wrong, the wisdom or folly, of these aggrandisements against a proud-but defenseless nation. Questions of international equity and the use of force in exploiting weaker countries will look differently after the present war. Germany and Japan are not without their precedents in the course they have more frankly and fully adopted. Meanwhile try as I have, I cannot get away from the conviction that as to China's future the supreme issue is Japan. I am reluctantly convinced that for several years past Japan has been determined to get control of China not merely for commercial but also for political and military advantages; that to achieve this end Japan has been and is now fostering every occasion for civil strife, instigating the central government to policies which she knew would arouse opposition in the south while secretly aiding and inflaming the disaffected provinces; that she has been covering China with an elaborate spy system learned in Germany as is the case with many of her other activities; that she aims to enrich herself from China's market and gain military power with which to enter upon wars of aggression, if need be, to advance her colonizing schemes not in Asia, but across the Pacific. I am not condemning Japan for such a program, but simply stating what seems to me to be facts of observation. Still less can we deny that she has both learned the process and felt herself driven to such a course by the conduct of European nations in Asia, ever coming closer to her own domain. Hudson Maxim in his book, *Defenseless America*, tells of a Japanese diplomat who, in referring to the Monroe Doctrine for Asia, said that the only dif-

ference between America and Japan was that the latter was preparing to enforce her doctrine. When Dr. Speer was in Nanking two years ago he said that nothing on this trip to the Orient frightened him so much as the present attitude of foreigners, including missionaries, to Japan. Now, I wish to guard against any comments or insinuations unworthy of our common calling. On the other hand, there is nothing of more practical interest in the question before us this evening, both as missionaries and as citizens of our two nations, than to form some opinion on this supremely important subject. Japan's assertions count for nothing. I can refer you to pages of official documents and authoritative utterances regarding Korea and Manchuria in which Japan has, to use a diplomatic euphemism, felt it necessary to act contrary to previous explicit declarations. The same is proving true now in Shantung and elsewhere. The reading of the true history of the attempt to compel China's acceptance in secret of the notorious Twenty-one Demands is an astounding revelation. It happened that I found myself seated at dinner in New York City one evening in January, 1915, next to Dr. Sidney Gulick, the apostle of friendly relations between America and Japan. Learning that I was a China missionary he at once began to impress on me the views which he has with the worthiest motives been spreading. I asked if there were any grounds for uneasiness on China's part, and he assured me from direct sources of information that there could be none. A few days later President Yuan parried Japan's effort by publishing to the world the true text of the demands, which had already been in the possession of Mr. Hicki, the Japanese minister to Peking, for over three months. Japan's publicity bureau is said to be the most perfect in the world. But without arguing the case further, assuming this menace to be real, what of the outlook? To my mind it turns chiefly on a question of American statesmanship. If America realizes the gravity of the consequences, not only for the Hay policy of the open door and China's integrity, but also for her own peace and that of the Pacific basin, all will be well. Her immense military developments for the present war will leave

her empowered for ends not now contemplated. The Lansing Ishii Treaty has given her the right to inquire of Japan as to any violation of the compact, and she now has the strength to enforce the keeping of its terms. If she remains indifferent or unaware of what is happening in China, it may be too late not only to do her duty by China and keep her pledges, but even to avert a disastrous war herself. The revelations of German world-politics are now obvious to us all, yet how unbelievable they seemed before the war came and for many months after. The prophets of evil were ignored or ridiculed. But as with the present war, a failure to grasp the situation may lead to a world-wide conflict. China will be the disturbing influence in international relationships in the immediate future. World-issues now centre around the Pacific as in ancient times they centered around the Mediterranean, and have until the present around the Atlantic. The road to the world-peace of the twentieth century lies through China. The most active and determined element of discord is Japan. The main hope of restraining Japan's predatory ambition is America, strongly supported—may we not confidently expect?—by England. The uncertainty lies in the attitude of the administration that happens to be in power at the time, and in the knowledge of the real issue which the American public may possess. The Japanese propaganda and special missions, like the recent one handled by Viscount Ishii, are very effective. This is where Americans resident in China can serve both their native land and the one of their adoption. We need not be jingoes or anti-Japanese to make such resolutions. Perhaps more than any other single influence, China missionaries secured Japan's withdrawal of the obnoxious Section V of the Twenty-one Demands, by making representations to the American government, which in turn remonstrated quietly but firmly with the Tokyo government. (Interview with Mr. Bryan.) By "watchful waiting" and similar services to our State Department in the future, we Americans in the Orient, whether missionaries or others, may aid in preventing a Japanese aggression in China which would prove as foolish, as futile and as fatal as Ger-

many's present attempt. But our home government must realize that written treaties alone assure nothing in such affairs. "It is an interesting reflection that no other nation has its independence and integrity assured by so many treaties, founded on sound principles of law and equity, and subscribed to by so many powers, as China has. Yet no nation is in a more precarious and insecure position, in respect to its independence and territorial integrity, than China is today."

Is the pathetic pessimism of thoughtful Chinese as to their country's outlook justifiable? There are, it seems to me, at least three strong grounds for optimism. One is the probable attitude of an American government loyal to its own Hay policy, reinforced by her present allies, and by her new military strength. Another is the reaction in Japan after the defeat of Prussian militarism, aided by a saner, nobler minority which may increasingly influence public sentiment. Lastly, we have the Chinese people to consider. Their government may be corrupt and their military strength negligible, but through the new nationalistic spirit, and by means of trade boycotts and other forms of resistance or timely exposures of secret demands, the vast population of China, proud, intelligent, and recklessly, fearlessly stubborn, when once aroused, are a potent force to be reckoned with.

II. I must not dare, after spending so much time on political aspects of our subject, to take up in detail moral, social and economic issues. We are all sufficiently aware that these are rapidly changing. Henry Drummond, when returning by way of the Orient from a scientific trip to Africa, made the following comment in his note-book: "China is an instance of arrested development; on a fair way to becoming a vertebrate, it has stopped short at a crustacean. The capacity for change seems almost non-existent." What would he say now? Our only question is whether the bewildering changes in clothes, customs, and everything else are evidencing of really advancing civilization, or merely an appropriation of the conveniences or an imitation of the conventions of western life. I wonder if we are prepared to agree that since the revolution there has

been steady deterioration in morals? Certainly there has been an increase in the use of foreign liquors, in gambling, in sexual vice and diseases, and divorce (almost unknown in old China), in the reading of injurious novels, and in the use of morphine to an alarming extent. With the impact of western life, China is losing her ancient ethical sanctions and is learning every novel and noxious vice from abroad. Social and economic conditions do not seem to be improving, despite many well-meant orations and organizations which usually illustrate the Chinese proverbs about having a beginning but not finish, a tiger's head but a snake's tail, etc. The new discussions and ideals are, however, true to China's glorious traditions, and only need to be vitalized by a genuine willingness for service to result in far-reaching reforms. The anti-opium crusade is an earnest of what China is capable of in this direction.

III. It is, however, in the New Education that I find most reason for hopefulness as to China's future. It is here that the Chinese temperament functions most naturally and to best advantage. Even before the Revolution there was abundant desire for progress. Between 1905-11, memorials, edicts and regulations regarding public education, fill twelve volumes. The ministry of education had an elaborate eight-year program (1909-16) which, if carried out through the provinces, would have given China a finished system comparing favorably with the best in other countries. Even in the brief period it was in effect, it was undoubtedly a potent factor in producing the Revolution. In 1905 there were 4,222 schools, and 102,767 students; in 1910 there were 52,348 schools, and 1,625,534 students. Since then, despite endless internal disturbances and financial stringency, there has been splendid progress. My limited observation in such centers as Peking, Hangchow and Nanking fills me with admiration of the plans of many of the promoters of the present school system. There is much serious, sacrificing devotion as well as skilled technical equipment among the teachers. The students study hard, with rigid tests, and excellent schedules. There are few busier or more enthusiastic workers, even among missionaries, than the returned

students in government schools. The chief problems are perhaps, financing universal education (in 1909 in Chihli 1 out of 40, in Szechuen 1 out of 50, children were in school, with some advance since then), school discipline, teacher training, relation to mission schools, development of moral character. If this last is the weakest spot, perhaps the strongest is the notable tendency to relate education to practical life. Perhaps we fail to realize how this is only a return to ancient standards of symmetrical physical, mental and moral culture, a fitting for life in all respects. What a stilted, useless caricature of this, education had faded into most of us remember to have seen. There remains the danger, unless vocational training is emphasized, of repeating the mistake of the Indian government where more students were given a literary education than the nation could absorb into its needs with the result that these highly educated, but unemployed, young men became the chief fomenters of political unrest in India. But on the whole, if there is any human hope for China it seems to me to lie in the New Education both for men and women.

IV. *Religious*. So much time has been consumed on the other phases of our subject and this one—both as regards the old Chinese religions, western agnostic tendencies, and the growth of the Christian movement—is so superlatively important that it would be impossible to deal with it in any adequate way and hope to keep your patience any longer.