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Art. I.—PRESIDENT WILLARD'S BODY OF DIVINITY.*

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When Jonathan Edwards, the great light of New England theology, was but four years old and known only within the walls of his father's house in Connecticut, a prattling child, New England was suddenly dismayed by the extinction of another great light which during a whole generation had shone almost without a rival in her theological firmament. It is not unworthy of notice that Samuel Willard, the great

* "*A Complete Body of Divinity in two hundred and fifty expository lectures on the Assembly's shorter catechism: by the Reverend and Learned* Samuel Willard, M.A., late Pastor of the South Church in Boston and Vice-President of Harvard College, Cambridge, in New England. Prefaced by the Pastors of the same church. Heb. xiii. 7, Remember them who have spoken to you the word of God: whose faith follow considering the end of their conversation. Heb. xi. 4, By faith he obtained witness that he was righteous, God testifying of his gifts: and by it he being dead yet speaketh. 2 Tim. i. 13, Hold fast the form of sound words which thou hast heard of me in faith and love which is in Christ Jesus. Boston, New England. Printed by B. Green & S. Kneeland for B. Eliot & D. Henchman, and sold at their shops. MD.CCXXVI."

theologian of the more strictly Puritan period of our history, who, more than all others, was instrumental in completely unfolding, and presenting in the most systematic form the views of his own and the preceding generation, should have passed off the stage just at the time when new issues were beginning to be made up, and a new statement and defence of the peculiar doctrines of our faith on the eve of being required and provided for.

From the beginning there had been, in that part of the country, the most vigorous theological activity. New England was cradled in theology. Not only her leading divines, her Cottons, Hookers, Nortons, Shepards and Mathers, labored with all their great powers and learning to elucidate and defend its principles; but the body of the people, the fathers and mothers, the civilians and yeomen of the country were exercised to an intense degree, in distinguishing between truth and error, and guarding the sanctity of the one and rooting-up the minutest fibres of the other.

Samuel Willard was eminently fitted, both by his abilities and his position, to be a successful champion of New England Theology. Born at Concord, Jan. 31, 1639-40, ten years after the settlement of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, of which his father, Major Simon Willard—"a sage patriot in our Israel, whose wisdom assigned him a seat at the council board and his military skill and martial spirit entitled him to a chief place in the field," was among the earliest settlers, he was graduated at Harvard College in the class of 1659 at the age of nineteen, and four years later settled in the ministry at Groton, about thirty miles from Boston, then a frontier town. In this retired spot he might have remained comparatively unknown had not one of those mysterious providences, by which God often brings about his wise designs, subjected the little settlement to complete destruction by an Indian massacre, about thirteen years after he commenced his pastoral labors. "His Lord did not design," says his eulogist, "to bury him in obscurity but to place him in a more eminent station which he was qualified for. The providence which occasioned his removal was an awful judgment upon the whole land, yet was

evidently a mercy in this respect that it made way for the translation of this bright star to a more conspicuous orb where his influence was more extensive and beneficial." He was installed as colleague with the Rev. Thomas Thatcher, the first pastor of the Old South Church in Boston, on the 10th of April, 1678, where he labored with eminent success till his decease, September 12, 1707, a period of nearly thirty years.

Mr. Willard commenced his ministry in Boston at a time of great religious declension. The great worldly prosperity of the community, the mingling of politics with religion from the beginning, and "the prostituting of the mysteries of our holy religion to mere secular views and advantages," are mentioned as among its chief causes. Vigorous measures were presently after undertaken by the leading men of the Church to bring about a reform. A synod was convened under the authority of the General Court to discuss the questions: "What are the provoking evils of New England?" and "What is to be done that these evils may be reformed?" and the Churches were solemnly admonished to "a return to the ancient strictness in admitting persons to the Lord's Supper, a faithful attention to church discipline and the observance by the churches of seasons of special humiliation and prayer accompanied with a renewal of their covenant." "Very remarkable was the blessing of God on the churches which conformed to this admonition, not only by a great advancement of holiness but also by a great addition of converts to their holy fellowship." The additions to Mr. Willard's church in six months were nearly as many, it is said, as they had been in the two preceeding years.

Mr. Willard is described by his junior colleague and successor, Rev. Ebenezer Pemberton, as "a great man, a profound divine, a very considerable scholar and a heavenly Christian —a star of the first magnitude—an elder son among many brethren." His capacities seemed to his admiring contemporaries of so high an order, as to furnish "an undeniable confutation of the doctrine of the equality of souls." Distinguished for a "native modesty," which his advancing years only confirmed, "he always affected that learning which was least for

pomp and ostentation and most for service." Divinity was his favorite study. He was "a judicious textuary," an "adept in systematic divinity," a "champion in controversy," an "excellent casuist," a wise and skilful "guide to the young aspirant to the holy office," and withal no less "eminent in the graces of Christ." "All the virtues of the divine nature and life," says his eulogist, "were visible in his holy walk, which discovered his soul to be a living temple of the Lord Jehovah, where his throne was prepared, his image set up, and his Spirit dwelt." "His zeal was what became an apostle, though flaming in the cause of Christ, yet guided by love and prudence. No pretence would make him transgress his own line, and from the duties of his own post none could move him. His spirit was truly pacific, and could sacrifice every thing for peace," except "truth and holiness." "No man had a deeper sense of the poverty, impotence and depravity of human nature, nor a clearer view of the fulness of that provision made in Christ for the sinner's righteousness and sanctification." "His discourses were all elaborate, acute and judicious, smelt of the lamp and had nothing mean in them;" and "his common sermons might have been pronounced before an assembly of the greatest divines." "The articles of faith he opened and confirmed, the duties of holiness he explained and enforced with the most powerful arguments, and with an address suited to melt the rocky heart." He is described as one "who applied himself to wounded consciences with great skill, faithfulness and tenderness;" one who "searched their wounds to the bottom, and made application of terror or comfort as their state called for and as became a wise, tender and faithful physician." His public prayers, it is said, were "always pertinent, animated with the spirit of devotion and evincing an uncommon compass of thought."

An amusing anecdote, illustrative of his power as a pulpit orator is related in a sketch of the history of the town of Eastham published in the eighth volume, first series, of the Massachusetts' Historical Society's collections, and has been often repeated of late. A sermon of his son-in-law, Rev. Mr. Treat, of Eastham, had been severely handled by the "nice critics"

of the Old South congregation, in whose pulpit it was delivered, as in every way quite beneath the patience of a Boston audience. Mr. Willard, well aware that the deficiency of the sermon was not in its matter but only in the manner of delivery, borrowed and repeated it to the same congregation only a few weeks after. Whereupon, the people were charmed, and the same "nice critics," without discovering its identity, pronounced it excellent, and placed it in eulogistic contrast with the very "contemptible" performance on the same subject, of his less eloquent brother. His firmness and good judgment coupled with Christian meekness, were signally evinced in the contest with Sir Edmund Andross, who, coming into the colony with almost unlimited powers in the latter part of the year 1686, undertook to obtrude Episcopacy upon the Puritan congregation of the Old South, and went so far as to take forcible possession of its house of worship for that purpose. Still more was his wisdom manifested, in his prudent but decided course during the famous witchcraft delusion; "that dark and mysterious season when we were assaulted from the invisible world." Precisely what part he took seems not clear. Some complained of him afterwards as not sufficiently strenuous in his opposition to the fanatical procedures. But the best of judges have commended not only his prudence but his zeal and courage, and his colleague speaks of him as "signally instrumental in discovering the cheats and delusions of Satan which did threaten to stain our land with blood and deluge it with all manner of woes."

In the year 1701, Mr. Willard was chosen to the virtual Presidency of Harvard College on the resignation of Dr. Increase Mather, who had held that post with eminent ability for many years previous. His office was styled a Vice-Presidency, because the corporation had resolved not to dispense with residence on the part of its President, and Mr. Willard would not consent to leave his people at Boston. "His duties," says Mr. Quincy, "were not less arduous than those of his predecessors and his fulfilment of them equally punctual, laborious and successful." His colleague speaks of "laborious and elaborate commentaries made in the school of the prophets

upon several whole books of the divine oracles," which "remain as a lasting monument of his skill" in this department of science. "Many circumstances," says Mr. Quincy, "united to render Willard, in the state of the religious and political parties of the time, far more acceptable than Mather. Both possessed the confidence of the prevailing Calvinistic sect; for they were equally learned and sound in the articles of faith by that sect deemed fundamental. But their writings and demeanor exhibited a remarkable contrast." Willard seems to have been in Mr. Quincy's esteem the favorite of the party of progress, and if so, a review of his writings will give us a pretty fair estimate of the point to which theological progress had then reached and the direction in which it was setting.

He was a voluminous writer. A list of forty-four books and pamphlets published by him is appended to his principal publication, showing a considerable range of study and reflection in religious matters. But his great work, to which his chief strength was directed, and by which he is chiefly to be remembered by posterity, is his Body of Divinity—a remarkable monument of industry and learning, and a worthy record of that orthodoxy in which New England was trained and to which she steadily adhered, at least during the whole of the first century of her history. It was the first folio volume on divinity ever issued from the press in this country, and, as its editors have naïvely observed, had to wait eighteen years after its author's decease for the country to grow large and strong enough for so great an undertaking. The title is: "A complete Body of Divinity in two hundred and fifty expository lectures on the Assembly's shorter Catechism; wherein the doctrines of the Christian religion are unfolded, their truth confirmed, their excellence displayed, their usefulness improved, contrary vices and errors refuted and exposed, objections answered, controversies settled, cases of conscience resolved and a great light thereby reflected on the present age." How the characteristic "modesty" of the author would have regarded so high sounding a title is scarcely an open question. But the editors were addressing a community with whom it was recommendation enough to say of say of any new publication: "'Tis

Mr. Willard's," and the acquiescence of his contemporaries and posterity in such a title, shows the high estimation in which they held the production.

The history of this extensive work is given in the preface. Having gone through with an explication of the catechism to the children, and in that way "methodized the subject;" or, as he expressed it in his introduction, "having once glancingly gone over it for the help of young ones more especially," he commenced, in January, 1687–8, a series of more elaborate discourses. They were delivered monthly on Tuesday afternoons, and drew together to hear them "the most knowing and judicious persons both from town and college." After his decease, a very general and strong desire was expressed to have them in print; and what is remarkable, that desire increased rather than diminished through a period of eighteen years. "Hardly any book," say the editors, "has been more passionately wished for." A list of between five and six hundred subscribers, including the most eminent clergymen, civilians and merchants of the country, some of whom became responsible for as many as eighteen copies, evinces the eagerness with which the undertaking was welcomed. The volume was issued in the year 1726, one year previous to the ordination of Jonathan Edwards at Northampton; and we notice with interest in the list of subscribers the name of "Timothy Edwards of Windsor," the father of the illustrious President.

Of course we cannot within the compass of a single article, do any justice to a folio of more than nine hundred double columned and closely printed pages, on subjects many of which are among the most profound in the compass of human thought; but it may not be amiss to state, as briefly as possible, the position of the author on some of the most prominent points, especially as we may regard it, no doubt, as that of his contemporaries and successors in the ranks of orthodoxy, at least up to the time when the great Arminian defection required a new discussion of many points, and a restatement of others not before subjected to so rigorous an examination.

The exposition commences, according to the order of the Catechism, with the chief end of man. "The great thing,"

he says, "which all rational and immortal creatures have mostly to be inquisitive about, is happiness. The substance of this inquiry may be reduced to two heads: What is happiness, and how may it be obtained?"

As to the first, "it is a maxim in logic, *Finis et bonum convertuntur.* The end and the good of a thing are one and the same." "True happiness doth properly consist in two things; well-doing and well-being. Well-doing belongs to man's felicity, because his happiness is in attaining his end, and that is mainly in glorifying God, which is by eupraxy or well-doing." In another place he says: "The *formal* happiness of a rational being consists in eupraxy." As to the chief end of man, the catechism makes two parts of it, viz., to glorify God, and to enjoy him for ever. But these, he says, are to be taken subordinately not distributively. Our object now is a "definition" and "strictly speaking the last end can be but one." Man's chief and last end is to glorify God; "the other is immediately subordinate or what is *next* to the last." "It is man's duty to seek his own good, which consists in his enjoying of God; but he is to do *it in and for* the glory of God, and so from thence all his seeking of it is to take its measures." Practically however and in God's plan, the two things are inseparable. God says to us: "Do you take care for my honor and I will secure your felicity."

The question here comes up, "Whether a man ought willingly to be damned, so God's glory may be promoted by it?" The reply is: "A willingness to be damned is inconsistent with a true desire that God may be glorified; because it separateth those things which God hath made inseparable." "It is," says he, "an ensnaring trial that is put upon the children of God, when this is offered as a rule to prove their sincerity by. He that insatiably desires to be saved and yet resolves to be saved in no other way but that wherein God may be glorified, certainly is the man whose ends are rightly fixed."

The question, how this happiness is to be obtained, is referred to the second question of the Catechism: "What rule hath God given to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy him?" Man was not made or created happy. "That he was

strictly speaking neither happy nor miserable, in his first state, is undeniable, if we do but acknowledge his happiness to consist in attaining his chief end, and his misery in losing it." Nor is happiness a blessing which God was bound, irrespective of his own engagements, to bestow upon man either with conditions or without them. Man was created with a capacity for happiness, and happiness was offered him upon conditions in a covenant way. These conditions were a "medium between a state of innocence and a state of felicity." Being a free agent, and so capable of choice, God chose to deal with him as such, and man was made at first a *probationer* for happiness. He must achieve it for himself under the conditions, and since he needed a rule to direct him, God gave him the Holy Scriptures, the only one at once adequate and infallible.

Twenty-six pages are occupied with discussing the necessity, authority, and general contents of the holy Scriptures, and nearly sixty more, with the Being and Attributes of God; all which topics are treated with the profoundest reverence, and a considerable degree of acuteness and learning.

After stating several methods of classifying the Divine attributes, and expressing his preference for that which makes two classes, viz., "such as shine forth by themselves, considering God as the absolute first being; and such as appear in his works of efficiency;" he selects for the present discussion as most in harmony with the Catechism, the following three-fold classification, viz, 1. A *genus* analogically ascribed to him: He is a spirit. 2. Divine *qualities* negatively expressed, which are three: He is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable. 3. Divine *powers* and *virtues*, which are six: wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. The *wisdom* of God is considered theoretically and practically—scientia simplicis intelligentiæ and scientia visionis—God's perfect knowledge of himself, and the knowledge which appears in contriving and ordering all future things after the best manner; the latter answering to what the Scripture calls "the *manifold* wisdom of God." His definition of God's *holiness* is: "God bound for himself and his own glory as his last end"—a feature in the Divine character which he insists upon with as much explicitness, if not with as much

ability and copiousness of argument, as Edwards does in his treatise on "God's last end in Creation." *Justice*, he says, "may be considered either as it is essential in him, and that is nothing but the rectitude of his nature; or as it is relative to the creature." There is a two-fold justice which we attribute to God: sovereign justice, which is nothing else but his absolute liberty and authority over the works of his hands, and relative justice, which is exerted in his proceeding according to the *rule* constituted between him and the reasonable creature. Relative justice he divides into commutative and distributive. Commutative justice is observed in dealings of traffic between man and man, and there is no room for it between God and the creature. "Distributive justice consists in the rewarding or punishing persons according to law. Human reason can have no conception of it without a preconception of a law on which it is built." "It is true, where absolute authority hath a prerogative, its administration must needs be just, and God's sovereignty is his absolute justice; but we must distinguish between the attributes of Lordship and justice; for he intended the display of this as well as that in his transactions with his creatures." "Distributive justice is either rewarding or revenging."

The doctrine of the Trinity is discussed briefly but with discrimination, in four pages. "It is," he says, "one of the great mysteries of religion, and above the comprehension of the human understanding. It is merely an article of faith, and we must rest in the discoveries which the Scriptures give us about it." "In the divine nature there are certain *subsistences*." "The word subsistence is used in Hebrews 1: 3, and is translated, *person*. It signifies a *standing under*. The essence of God *stands under* a different respect to itself." "These subsistences are distinguished, as a *relation in* a being is distinguished from the being *itself*." His definition of a person is: "An individual subsistence of a rational being"—taken, no doubt, from the well-known definition of Boëthius, of which it seems to have been intended as a translation: "*Substantia individua rationalis naturæ*." "That thing which is endowed with reason and is an individual, is a person. A beast is an

individual without reason. The soul hath reason, but is not an individual." "A divine person differs from a created in three respects. 1. Every created person hath a distinct essence; but all the divine persons have one and the same essence. 2. One created person hath not his in-being in another, whereas these have. 3. One created person proceeds from another in time; but though here be an eternal order, yet there is no priority of time or nature. They were all of them together in the same eternity." "The essence and subsistence go together to constitute a divine person." But while the essence is one and common to all, the persons are three. They differ in their order in the divine nature, in their personal properties and in their manner of working. He concludes: "The doctrine of the Trinity shows us the sufficiency of God for our happiness, not only as we are creatures but as we are sinners. As he is God, all those oceans of goodness are in him that can fill the most enlarged desires of our souls, and make them run over. As he is three persons, he is suitable to bring poor apostate man to the enjoyment of communion with him, in these unexhaustible treasures of goodness."

Thus far what our author denominates the *all-sufficiency* of God. He next passes to what he calls his *all-efficiency*. His decrees and their execution in the works of creation and providence, including the whole subject of sin and redemption, come under the latter division.

The Catechism uses a plural word: *decrees:* but this is proper only with respect to the *things decreed*, which are manifold. As an act of God, his decree is *one*, and that includes primarily his last end, which can be nothing else than his own glory; and secondarily all the means designed for its attainment, which are whatsoever comes to pass, whether in the natural world or the spiritual. It is a favorite maxim of the author, and one which governs his whole theory on this subject, that "*what is last in execution is first in intention.*" The decree of God is purely an act of his will, "an act of liberty." "If he had done all his works naturally or by necessity, a decree would have been superfluous." Yet it is not without a reason, "there was counsel in it," and it had reference in every respect, to the wisest and best end. The exist-

ence of such a decree is argued, first from God's *freedom* in action, which implies a purpose; and secondly from his omnipotence, which implies power beyond his actual efficiency. God is omniscient and omnipotent; but "he is not *omnivolent*." It can be only his decree which "makes a partition between things possible;" and by it, they "pass from possibility to futurition." His decree must be eternal, because time and all the things of time are contrived in it. It is universal, including all things and all their actions and changes. "It counts every drop of rain, hail and snow that shall fall, and every thought that comes into the mind of every creature." "It extends even to the arbitrary and contingent actions of reasonable creatures." "It concerns the effecting of things;" though, being an immanent act and not a transient one, it does not, of itself, effect them, or make any change in them. "It engageth God in constancy to the execution of all things just as they are determined." Yet it lays no forcible necessity on the creature, but only a certainty as to the event. Things shall be as they are determined, and yet the freedom of free agents is "no whit infringed by it, but ratified," because in it God "hath determined" that they "shall act freely."

The execution of the decree is properly a work of efficiency. "Efficiency is not an immanent act remaining in God, but transient, falling upon an external subject, and leaving an impression, in a change, upon that." It makes no change in God, "only adds a relation." The change is in the object, "which by it passes from not-being into being." God's efficiency extends to all things that exist and to "all *in* all things." "He drives the whole trade of the world, being the cause of all other causes, and the first mover of every thing that moves." "This is true of the free actions of the freest creatures," viz. angels and men, who are all "causes by counsel of their own actions." "They have a free will yet he doeth all here, too." "He hath a hand too about sin, though without sin." He uses sinful men for his own purposes, while they mean one thing and he another.

Fourteen pages are occupied with the creation of the world and the angelic orders, in which we find various learned dis-

quisitions sufficiently curious; and we then come to the creation of man.

Of the two parts of which man is constituted, "the soul," he says, "has the least matter and the most form." "It is materiated, else it would not stand separated without a miracle." "There is no pure act or form standing alone, that being a property incommunicable of the First Being." It is endowed with an understanding and a will, and so becomes a free agent. The terms employed by our author to designate a free agent are peculiar. In his nomenclature, such an agent is A CAUSE by COUNSEL, or a cause by counsel of his own actions. God is a cause by counsel. Angels are causes by counsel. Man also, both before and after the fall, is and must be a cause by counsel. "He can both propound to himself his own end, and make choice of the means leading to it. He can deliberate about it, and take that which likes himself, and leave that which is not grateful to him." None can compel or hinder him in his choice, whence it follows that all human actions are voluntary and deliberate. This is that "natural liberty" which neither the decrees nor the efficiency of God ever infringe. It is defined in another place as "a spontaneity, or liberty of choosing or refusing, which supposes an understanding to direct, and a will to reject or elect accordingly." This freedom is the foundation of all moral transactions with such creatures; though it "must always be considered in the subordination of a creature to the concurse or coöperation of God."

As to the image of God in which man is said to have been created, that, he says, was an "adjunct perfection," so called "because it was not essential to the nature, but separate from it, that remaining entire." It was an *imprinted* goodness or rectitude, "making him, in his manner and measure, fit to resemble and able to serve God." It gave him no claim. It secured him no happiness. It gave him simply the *habit* (habitus) of original righteousness and holiness, disposing him to make a right choice, and enabling him to bring forth the acts of true obedience, and so, under God's government, of promise, to attain to happiness. For happiness, as we have noticed be-

fore, belongs not to the head of *creation*, but of special government.

We pass over the doctrine of God's providence, as exercised towards his creatures generally, which occupies twenty pages, and come to that special act of his providence in which he lays the foundation for his special government over his human creatures.

This special government is that whereby God "guides his reasonable creatures to an everlasting state of happiness or misery, according to the tenor of the moral law." Its only proper subject is "the reasonable creature: such creatures as being causes by counsel, are capable of choosing their own actions." In the case of man, all this procedure took the form of a covenant; and, on this idea of a covenant, the whole subsequent course of God's dealing with him is predicated. He owed service to God as he is a creature; but God owed him nothing but what he should please freely to give him. That, he was pleased to promise him on conditions in his covenant. He gave him a law, annexed promises and threatenings, and gave him knowledge of his duties and liabilities. This was sufficient "to make a covenant between a being absolutely supreme and a being subject in all things." But, besides this, Adam consented to the covenant. His very silence, by not objecting to the terms, was a consent. And Eve's statement of the case to the serpent implies that both she and her husband had consented. It was in this way that man was put into a condition to win happiness. This covenant bound not man alone but God. By it he pledged himself to the fulfilment both of the promise and the threatening. Before it was a simple question of sovereignty. Now, sovereignty is limited so to speak by its own act, and God can neither bestow the reward nor remit the penalty, except in harmony with legal principles and in a judicial way. The trees of life and of knowledge were sacraments or seals of this covenant. "The tree of life was a sacrament whereby God sealed up a constant life of happiness in case of his obedience." "The tree of knowledge was a sacrament to confirm the threatening and witness to man the certainty of

his death in case of disobedience. It was also the special trial of his obedience." The tree of knowledge had nothing in its own nature to make it unlawful for man to use the fruit as common food; "but God, to show his sovereignty, did, by a positive law, lay a restraint upon man's liberty, to see if he would acknowledge his Sovereign." "The whole moral law was man's rule," but this was made "a special probation of him."

Among the causes of the apostacy of man are distinguished the blameless and the blameworthy. Among the former are to be reckoned the decree and providence of God. "God did certainly from all eternity foreordain the fall of man." "It was one of those media by which God would advance his justice and his grace in man." "Hence man's fall was unavoidable *in respect of the decree.*" But "God's decree did no violence to man's free will. They labor of a great mistake who suppose that every necessity puts a force upon the subject of it." "Man was a cause by counsel of his own actions, according to that decree; and acts as such, notwithstanding it, nay, it determined that he should so act." "The greatest difficulty" lies in "God's permissive providence, which was at work about man's fall." "This is not a mere suspension or cessation of divine acting, as Arminians and Jesuits dream, but hath an energy and efficacy," "and therefore we must allow it a causal influence into the very action by which man fell." But "we must distinguish here between cause of an *act*, and the cause of the *obliquity* of it." "The act belongs to efficiency, and can not be without the divine concurse; but the sinfulness is a deficiency moral in the act, and therefore belongs only to the creature." As to the influences needed to secure stability, God was under no obligation to give them. It was a matter of simple sovereignty, and Adam did not want these "till he was willing to want them." "He had influences which preserved the *habit* of grace in him till he put it away." Besides, "his liberty of will had an innate power of refusing the temptation as well as embracing it. It did not want its liberty to good, as it has done since the Fall."

The question whether God is the author of sin, he answers in the negative in the most explicit and indignant manner.

"It is blasphemy to charge God as the Author of sin." "It would be a contradiction to assert him to be the Author of what is so contrary to him. As well may light be the author of darkness as the holy God of this filthiness." "Man fell by the abuse of his free will."

We pass to the question, how sin and its consequences were disseminated. Here two things come under consideration. 1. Our union with the first Adam. 2. Our communion with him in his transgression.

Our *union* to Adam, says our author, "is necessarily the foundation on which this affair depends." "This union is the being of all mankind in Adam, descending from him lineally, as from the first, by mediation of the next parents." "The individual angels were all created at once in their natural perfection, and therefore each made his own choice, voluntarily; but man was made one at the first, and to be multiplied by propagation, and in that one we were all comprehended and transacted for." "The soul is not traduced or derived from the parents, but immediately created by God himself." Still, "the soul and body are united by generation," and hence "natural generation is the bond of our union with Adam." "Before we had our actual existence, we were virtually" in him; and "when we actually *be*, we are *actually* in him." We are in him "as the rose is virtually in the bush," "as every branch that springs out is in the tree." Hence it is, that when God made his special covenant with man, he made it with Adam, and not for himself only, but for the entire whole of which he was the head. He was a public person, and stood rightfully as the representative of the unity.

Our *communion* with Adam "follows upon our union, as being the end of it." It implies that the entire race "share with him in this transgression; that they have a participation *in that sin*." But Adam's sin extended to none but his posterity. "If all the world had not been, some way *in* him, they could not have been made sinners *by* him, and if they had not been so," that is, made sinners by him, "they could not have been subjected to sin;" that is, to the corruption of *original* sin, as will appear presently, "and death on his account."

"Now this communion appears in two particulars; 1. The imputation of Adam's transgression to them. 2. A real communication of the transgression;" that is, with respect to its consequences.

The *imputation* of Adam's sin is restricted to "that one singular act of Adam's disobedience." The word signifies "the setting of a thing to one's score," or as applied to the present case, the charging him with it as a breach of the covenant. Adam sinned and all sinned in him, and so his sin is charged to their account. It "was in the first place imputed to Adam himself. God laid it to his particular charge as the prime and personal offender." "But it did not rest here." It is also that of his posterity in the full merit of it, as a breach of the covenant. Hence the same sin is imputed likewise to them. Only that one act was so imputed, because it was only in that one act that the conditions of the covenant in which, as a public person, he stood for the whole, were broken.

"Concerning the *real* communication," the author reasons thus; "as we all sinned in Adam, so we all fell with him; and this also ariseth from our union with him." "The unhappy things which Adam communicated to his posterity are his guilt and his punishment."

"Guilt is a relation which a person bears to the law." It is "a court phrase." It implies that there is a law, that there is a sanction put into it in the way of threatening, and that the person has in some way fallen under that sanction. It is not sin itself; it is not the penalty. "It is something which intervenes between the fault and the recompense." "It looks back to sin and forward to punishment." "It is an obligation lying upon a person to undergo a penalty for a breach of some law." And "it always presumes that the punishment" to be inflicted "is *deserved*." Now the guilt of Adam's first sin, besides attaching itself to him who did the act is "derived from him to his posterity." "We must distinguish here as to its derivation and its determination." "Guilt is always personal." "It may derive from one common source and original, but it always determines in individuals." The guilt in question is derived from Adam through the imputation of his first

sin. "The equity of this follows from our union to the first Adam," "because we all had our in-being in him and God transacted with the whole kind in one head."

Adam's sin communicated also to his posterity the punishment due to it. "This must needs follow upon the former, for if guilt be an obligation to suffer a penalty, this penalty must needs be the effect of the antecedent guilt." "Punishment," he says, "is properly that evil which is inflicted on a transgressor, righteously, according to the merit of his transgressions." It is essential to it that it be merited, to the full extent of it, on the part of the transgressor. The punishment which was communicated from Adam to his posterity includes two things, viz. *sin* and *death*.

Sin is a part of the punishment consequent upon the first sin, only in the case of what is called original sin. Our author distinguishes carefully between "the guilt of the first sin adhering to us," and "original sin dwelling in us." He confines the term original sin, (differing in that from many other Calvinistic writers, though agreeing with the Catechism,) to the corruption of *nature*, or what Edwards calls "the corruption of the heart as it *remains* a confirmed *principle*, and appears in its consequent operations," which, says that eminent writer, "is a *distinct* and *additional* guilt"—that is, distinct from, and additional to the guilt of the first sin, which is ours as well as Adam's by real participation. "Original sin," says our author, is "the defilement that hath corrupted man's nature, whereby he is not only inclined but necessitated to sin." "It was not the same individual corruption of nature," which Adam experienced himself, "but one like it." "Adam's depravation was personal. The original sin in one man is not the original sin in another, though it be in all respects of the same nature or kind." This depravation, as it exists in us, is properly to be regarded as a *punishment;* because, in the first place it is a very great evil, and in the second, it is fallen upon us for the offence of our first parents, righteously imputed to us as our own. "God's punishing sin with sin is," he says, "very frequent, and consistent with his holiness and justice." So he delivers men up to sin for their own personal offences. And

"so he may punish men with a sinful nature upon the supposition of a guilt preceding, which all have contracted in Adam." This depravation includes the "utter loss of those habits of sanctification infused into man's nature at the first;" "an utter impotency to that which is truly good;" "an utter awerseness to that which is spiritually good," "and a violent propenseness to all which is evil." It is *truly sin*, as well as the source of all actual sin; it deserves all the penalties of sin, it must be repented of and carried to the fountain of Christ's blood no less than our actual transgressions.

In the whole discussion of this exceedingly intricate and mysterious subject, we find in our author a remarkable degree of acuteness, discrimination and exactness of statement. The whole scheme, if we rightly understand it, may be stated in outline, in the logical order of its parts somewhat as follows. There is first: A real in-being of the whole race in the first man constituting a true union; second: A covenant founded upon this union, (not creating it,) made with its head, and embracing in its conditions and engagements all who belong to the race; third: A breach of that covenant on the part of the entire race, by a sin, which in virtue of the union, truly belonged, and was therefore imputable to the whole, though committed personally only by the head; fourth: The imputation of that sin by the Divine covenanting party, as a true and full breach of the covenant, first to Adam himself and then to all his descendants;—an imputation not arbitrary, but founded on a preëxisting reality; not *making* his sin ours, but only recognizing it as such to the intent in view—a *righteous* imputation, as our author denominates it; fifth: Guilt, or liability to punishment, liability to evil inflicted justly as the reward of sin, and that evil including the full penalty due to all sin in all its parts; sixth: The actual infliction of that penalty in the case of all who are not saved from it by redemption, in the twofold form of hopeless depravity of nature, and hopeless misery, or death temporal and eternal. He agrees with Edwards in making the *real* the foundation of the *legal*, though he does not discriminate as nicely in regard to the nature of our real participation in the first sin, nor does he affirm, as Edwards

does, that the *depravity* of that *act* attaches to the posterity as well as the progenitor. He agrees with Edwards and differs from the Princeton divines in making the first sin, in and of itself, the immediate ground of punishment *to the full extent of the deserts of sin*, not only to the actual, personal offender but to all the individual persons to whom it belonged in virtue of their union with him. Indeed the correspondence between Edwards and Willard in several particulars, is worthy of notice, as showing a much less abrupt deflection in the chain of New England theology in the article in question, at the time of Edwards, than some persons have been accustomed to suppose.

We come now to the great subject of Redemption. For want of space we shall be obliged to content ourselves with a few short notices of the positions assumed, though the subject occupies, in the volume before us, more than three hundred pages. "We are here led by the hand," our author observes, "from the sorrowful and heart-breaking consideration of man's inexpressible infelicity, by his apostacy, to the pleasant and soul-refreshing contemplation of his *anastasy* or restitution."

"The original or leading cause of this restitution is God's mere good pleasure;"—that is, His sovereignty. "Not that he acted in it without reason." It was not only an act of his will, but "there was in it the *counsel* of his will." But he was free, that is, under no obligation whatsoever. The end of it was simply the promotion of his own glory.

The first step in the logical order is the choice of the subjects of restitution. "And here we are led to the contemplation of those mysterious doctrines of election and reprobation; the one of which supposeth the other." Predestination includes both. God did not intend actually to save all. Therefore he must have made a distinction, determining whom he would save and whom he would leave. In the salvation of the one he designed to glorify his mercy, and in the punishment of the other to glorify and display his justice, both acts being means for the attainment of his last end.

Here our author assumes explicitly and emphatically the supralapsarian position. "Predestination," he says, "doth not consider the existence of the creature by creation, as the sub-

lapsarians suppose, because creation comes within the compass of the decree as a *medium*. Nor yet doth it suppose the prevision of the corrupt mass of mankind in the apostacy which those also plead, for then God should have intended to make man before he intended what to do with him." The principle which determines the order of sequence in this whole matter is in the maxim already referred to: "*What is last in the order of execution is first in intention.*" God from the beginning "appointed all his creatures to the end to which they certainly arrive at last," and then appointed the means through which that end was to be reached. Hence, election is, in the logical order, before atonement; and atonement, though sufficient for all, and laying a foundation for the offer of salvation to all, is, strictly speaking, limited to the elect. "Election is absolute not hypothetical." "It is personal and definite"—so is the opposite. "Election is no act of mercy, nor is reprobation an act of justice." "Election is no act of rewarding men's goodness, nor reprobation of punishing men's sinfulness." "Election is not an act of blessing, nor reprobation of cursing." "God's love was not the cause of election, nor his hatred of reprobation. He did not elect his own people because he loved them, but he loved them *in electing them.*" "Reprobation is no cause of the sin for which the sinner is damned. It did not take away the liberty of the creature. He was still a cause by counsel. Men sin of choice, with as much liberty as if there was no decree. God made no man on purpose to damn him. He made some for the glory of his justice, which will triumph in their damnation." But "men do not die because they are reprobated, but because they sinned."

In respect to the covenant which secured the salvation of God's chosen, our author differs from the Catechism. He supposes two covenants, which he distinguishes as the covenants of Redemption and of Reconciliation, otherwise distinguished as the covenants of redemption and of grace. The one was made from eternity, the other in time. The one was made *for* us, the other *with* us. In the one Christ is considered as a Divine Person, in the other as the God-Man. In the one he becomes a Surety, in the other he stands as Mediator. The

covenant called the covenant of grace in the Catechism is, he says, evidently the former, in which the Persons of the Trinity are the contracting parties, and the engagement is certainly to bring all the elect to eternal glory.

The execution of this covenant could only be through a Redeemer, and Christ as our Redeemer undertakes to carry it into effect. To be a suitable Redeemer he must be at once God and Man. Hence the necessity of the Incarnation. Here the author proposes to consider four points, viz.: "1. The Person assuming our nature; 2. The nature which was assumed; 3. The assumption itself; where we are to observe the distinction and union of the two natures; 4. The communion between them." "The Person assuming our nature was the Eternal God," "not the Godhead, or Divine essence absolutely considered," but the Son of God, as a Person, "the second Person of the blessed Trinity." The nature assumed was the human; "a true, real, substantial humanity," differing from ours only "in the special manner of its subsisting." "It was a human *nature* and not a human *person* that the Son of God assumed." "He is himself," that is, as he was from eternity, "a complete person, and hence receives no personal perfections by the assumption of the human nature." The humanity of Christ is not a person by *itself*, "not this or that man," but "hath its entire subsistence in the Son of God." Hence, the incarnation is not God's taking a man into union with himself, but God's *becoming* man by assuming to himself a human nature, consisting, as do all complete human natures, of a "true body and a reasonable soul." In the unity of this person, each nature remains unchanged, and without the least mixture or confusion. "The Godhead is not changed into the Manhood, nor is the Manhood transformed into the Deity." Nor are the two so combined as to "form a new being." The properties of the two are not transferred one to another, and the actions of the two remain distinct. Yet there is a *communion* between them. The actions of both coöperate for the same end, and are properly ascribed to the same person, and hence all Christ's mediatorial acts are properly said to be "*theandrical*." So the properties of each nature are attributed to the whole Person, and

that whether the name by which the person is designated be derived from one nature or the other. *God* is said to have purchased the Church with *his own blood.*

In the execution of his office of Redeemer, assumed in the covenant of redemption, Christ, having become man, comes into special relations to those whom he has undertaken to redeem. These relations are presented in the Catechism under the conception of a three-fold office of prophet, priest, and king, all of which, however, says our author, are included in the single office of Mediator. This office has special relation to the covenant of Reconciliation or of Grace. "The Mediation of Christ may be reduced," he says, "to three heads: Reconciliation, Suretyship, and Intercession." "In the first he brings God and man to a treaty; in the second he strikes up an everlasting covenant between them; in the third he preserves this covenant inviolable." "It is not essential to a covenant that there should be a surety." But God provided a surety in the covenant into which he entered with man, both because he wished to assure our confidence in him, on the one hand, and obviate the liability to failure arising out of man's impotence, on the other. This covenant is founded upon *conditions* which *we* must perform; and without superior aid we are unable to perform them. Hence the need of a surety. There is a suretyship belonging to the covenant of *Redemption.* In that Christ becomes a surety "catachrestically, or by way of exchange," "He takes our bonds, and gives his own in their room," and so becomes himself the contracting party. But in the covenant of grace he becomes a surety, not *for* us, but *with us.* The promise being made to us upon conditions, Christ is our surety that we, not *he*, shall perform the conditions, that is, that we shall repent, believe, obey, and persevere.

Passing on to the three-fold office of prophet, priest, and king, we can notice only what our author says, under the second; and that with special reference to the doctrine of *satisfaction*, or, as it is called, in the modern nomenclature, the atonement. The satisfaction in which Christ made reconciliation for us "was given," he says, "to the justice of God;" not his sovereign, but his relative, his "rewarding and avenging

justice." "There is a two-fold obedience ascribed to Christ in the Scripture, though the Catechism refers only to one part of it." Both his active and his passive obedience have a part in the work of redemption. "However, the greatly celebrated business of satisfaction is set forth in Christ's *passive* obedience wherein he made a sacrifice for sin." The sacrifice was made "according to the human nature," "for the Divine could not suffer." But, "in virtue of the hypostatical union, what was done in the human *nature* was done by the Divine *Person*, and that gave value to the sacrifice." It was an act of mercy and sovereignty both, on God's part, to pardon sinners on the ground of such a sacrifice; but the mercy and sovereignty were exercised in *providing* the substitute. That substitute having been accepted, and the conditions fulfilled, Christ, in his intercession, wherein he presents his merits before the Father as the ground of salvation for his people, "doth not plead mercy, but justice." He has made a full satisfaction for his people. And "though we ourselves deserve not the benefit, but it is made over to us of mere grace, yet, as we are in him who hath purchased it for us, it is ours in justice"—justice not to us personally, but to us considered as in him.

We pass then to the *application* of redemption. In order to our partaking of the benefits of what Christ has purchased, it is necessary that it be applied to us individually, "for the wholesomest food will not nourish the body except it be eaten." The application in question is made to us by the Holy Spirit, in the work denominated *Effectual Calling*, otherwise called regeneration or conversion.

The result which the Spirit accomplishes in this work is a true *union* between the individual soul and Christ. In the case of the fall, our participation in the consequences of Adam's sin, was grounded in our union with Adam. So our participation in the redemption purchased by Christ, if we partake of it at all, must be grounded in our union to him. "The doctrine of this union," says our author, "is very mysterious, and most abstruse, next to that of the hypostatical union of the two natures in the person of Christ." "It is a mystical conjunction between Christ and the believer, whereby they are brought

into the nearest relations to each other." It is spiritual, "real, and not imaginary, but not that which our senses are to be admitted judges of." We must not think that the Person of Christ dwells in us as it doth in his own humanity. But it is "a union by which our whole spiritual life is *fountained* in him and derives from him." It is formed by the Spirit, and "the uniting act on our part is *faith*, whereby we consent to, and believe in, and so embrace Christ as our own."

"The work of the Spirit in this matter is called *effectual calling*, because it is a voice of God speaking to the soul of a sinner, inviting and alluring him to come over to the Lord Jesus Christ, and accept of him; giving us to understand that the Spirit of God in the work of application, treats with men as reasonable creatures, and causes by counsel, not carrying them by violent compulsion but winning them by arguments." "Effectual calling," he says, "compriseth in it the whole work of conversion. But divines usually restrain it to the working of saving faith in us, upon which the afore-mentioned union is made." "There is something *habitually* wrought *in* the man," and "there is something done *actually*, *by* the man in the exerting of the powers so created in him." The former comes under the head of *passive* conversion, the latter of *active*. "The *act* of faith doth necessarily presuppose the *habit* of faith, or the power of believing. The habit of faith or power of believing, is one of the graces which are wrought in conversion." "There is no coöperation of the man with the Spirit in the producing of the *habit* of faith," nor have means "any *efficiency* in the production of it, as by moral suasion." But means are *used* by the Spirit, "not only to excite faith, in the called, to its operations, but also for the begetting of faith in the elect." "The whole body of sanctifying graces are at once regenerated in passive conversion." Yet "there is an operation of the man himself in the acting of these graces." The Spirit helps us to believe, to repent, to pray; "but it is not *He* that believes, repents, and prays, but *we*."

The Spirit operates in this matter, both on the understanding and the will. He enlightens the one, he renews the other. About the matter of the *will*, our author says: "The Christian

world is full of unhappy disputes, occasioned by the eager patrons of Free will." "There are," he says, "two sorts of actions performed by the will, elicit and imperate. The elicit acts of the will are in choosing or rejecting the object before it." "These are performed inwardly by the will, and belong to its sovereignty in the man, by virtue whereof, he is a free agent." "The imperate acts of the will are those by which it puts its elections in execution, in which it *nextly* makes use of the affections by which it manages the whole man." Both these sorts of actions are requisite to actual believing on Christ. "The act of faith, which is exerted by the soul in its closing with Christ in effectual calling, consists both of an absolute choice made of Christ, and a going out of the whole soul to him as the object of trust and dependence." But, "there is a miserable impotency in the will of fallen man with respect to both these." "The will indeed, remains a will, and hath not lost its natural power; *it cannot be forced.*" "It retains its spontaneity." But "there are some things which a man cannot but choose and pursue, and others which he cannot but refuse and avoid, and yet he doth it with a full freedom or spontaneous acting therein." This is the case with fallen man in regard to things spiritual. He cannot but choose evil and refuse good. Hence his will needs to be renewed. "The viciousness of its nature carries it forth and holds it fast to the corrupt inclination or bias that is upon it." But the Spirit of God in effectual calling, "puts into the will an irrepressible spontaneity to make choice of Christ." "There is such an impression made upon it as carries it forth with the greatest freedom." Thereupon, "the soul accepts of the invitation," "receives and acquiesces in the testimony concerning Christ," "embraces the promises of the new covenant," "adventures itself on Christ, as a Saviour," "freely commits itself to him for safety," "and now it takes up its stand and rests here forever."

The subjects of justification, adoption and sanctification, benefits which the effectually called partake of in this life, are handled with marked ability in about forty pages of the book. They all belong to the head of that *communion* which

the soul has with Christ in virtue of its *union* with him already explained. And here, says the author: "let us observe that in a genetical method, the order of things is warily to be considered, for the avoiding of confusion and false principles drawn from a mistake" in regard to it. "Thus, some, placing sanctification before justification, have inferred our works to have a causal influence into our justification, which is a pernicious error." "Effectual calling must needs go before all these benefits; for though that also be a benefit and fruit of the covenant of Redemption, yet it is that, also, which brings us into the covenant of grace." "By justification," he says, "we understand an authoritative pronouncing a person to be righteous on a fair trial." "Justification is of the person. It is the *man* that is justified." It "makes a change in the man's *state*, not in his nature." "The fountain from which it proceeds is the free grace of God." It removes the threatening. It gives a title also to the reward of the covenant. God never pardons sin in any other way than that of justification. And that supposes that the *law* is satisfied. "God hath respect in it to a righteousness that answers the law according to which the judgment passes"—answers it not negatively alone but positively, repairing the breach which has brought upon us the curse, and fulfilling the requirement which was the condition of Blessedness. This doctrine of a two-fold fulfilment of the law on our account, by the Saviour, in order to complete justification, is essential to the fundamental principle of our author's whole system, that the dealings of God with man are all founded on his covenant, wherein Happiness or Blessedness is promised as a reward of obedience on the one hand, and eternal misery threatened as the penalty of the opposite. God is bound by his own engagements to see that that covenant is fulfilled on the part either of man himself or of the substitute. The satisfaction of Christ's death takes off the penalty, but leaves the sinner without claim. The righteousness of Christ's life fulfils the requirements of the law and secures all the positive blessings of his heavenly kingdom. This two-fold righteousness of Christ is "imputed" to the believer, not arbitrarily, but on the ground of our union with Christ. "*He* must be ours if his righteous-

ness be so. Hence it is *He himself* that is made unto us Righteousness."

Fifty pages are occupied with the benefits "which do either accompany or flow from" the foregoing, both in this life and the future, assurance, peace, joy, growth in grace, perseverance, the Christian's death, resurrection, and eternal glory.

We then pass to the second of the two grand branches of the Catechism, viz., *Human Duty.* Nearly two hundred pages are taken up with an exposition of the moral law, as exhibited in the ten commands; in which our author shows himself to be a casuist of no mean rank. Then the subjects of *inability* and the *degrees* of sin are cursorily handled; and the terms or conditions of salvation, Faith, Repentance, and the use of means —the Word, sacraments, and prayer, conclude the discussion.

But all this portion of the volume we are compelled by the length to which this article has already been extended, to pass in silence. Enough, however, as we think, has been presented, to give some just, if not adequate, conception of the character of this old Puritan theology, and furnish a land-mark by which to estimate the progress which has been made, or the deflections and retrogradations which have taken place in subsequent periods. We are strongly of the opinion that the dogmatic history of New England, at *any* of its marked periods, cannot well be understood without a thorough acquaintance with the old theology in which the churches were cradled. Our object has been, not to express our own views under the cover of another's writings, but to let the venerable author speak out his own with as much fulness as possible. Therefore we have forborne for the most part to make comments; and at the risk of being tedious to many, have tried to fit together, as far as practicable, his own forms of expression. All must agree, we think, in admiring the terseness, exactness, and discrimination of many of the statements, and, if we have succeeded at all in our endeavors to present it, the logical consistency of the system taken as a whole.

The grand defect, as it seems to us, of this and of most other early Calvinistic systems, is to be found in the almost exclusive manner in which the theory is developed from the *divine*

side, that is, from the position of the Divine Sovereignty. The Bible sustains the conclusions, on that side, to the full extent, perhaps, of the reasoning; but it gives us also a human side, which, though recognized in the systems of these writers, has by no means its appropriate prominence. It is so in some degree with the Catechism. It is so, we think, manifestly, with the author before us. While he admits, fully and distinctly, the free agency of man, and his duty to obey God, and fulfil, by his own acts of repentance and faith, the conditions of the covenant, so working out his own salvation, under a sense of his dependence, with fear and trembling, the truth on this side is so overlaid by the vastly larger development of the sovereignty of grace, as to sink it, to a great degree, out of view, and give to the system a one-sidedness which mars its beauty and impairs the effect of the truth.

But the extreme to which our modern divinity lamentably tends, is just the opposite. We want the truth full-orbed and complete in all its parts, just as the Bible has given it. And in these days, when free will and responsibility with many are made almost the whole of the Gospel, it is well for us to go back and hold converse with those old masters, who knew so well how to picture God as the first cause, and the last end of all things, and clothe the system of divinity with a truly divine glory and majesty. Their extreme, if extreme it must be called, will be far less detrimental to piety than that whose tendency is to make man every thing and the supreme God scarcely more than his helper.