

Musgrave
THE

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PRINCETON
REVIEW.

By ~~Whom~~, all things; for ~~Whom~~, all things.

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THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN FRANCE.

HUMAN prophecies are sufficiently vain, and never more so than when attempting to cast the political horoscope of so mercurial a people as the French. It would baffle the profoundest statesmanship of Europe to foretell what is to happen to the French Government and nation when President MacMahon's term of office shall expire ; or, indeed, what may occur at any moment during the remainder of his incumbency. That lively French writer, M. Edmond About, draws this graphic picture : " To anybody who knows a little about centralization—that formidable machine, with its driving shafts and bands, its sharp, thickly-set, angry teeth and cogs—the French people will seem like a workman caught by his blouse, whirled up, shaken, dashed round to every corner of the building, and saved by miracle after one eternal minute of agony. He finds himself standing upright on his feet, intact in every limb, and as sound as ever he was. The accident which ninety times out of a hundred would have killed him, or at least torn and crushed him (and surely any other man but a Frenchman) has only taken, God knows why, a small piece out of his breeches. This is what we are to-day."

The 16th of May and the 14th of October, 1877, are days which index some of the most important events in the annals of modern France. Upon the former, the President, supported by the Senate and instigated by the Ultramontanists, dissolved the Chamber of Deputies and ordered a new election. Upon the latter, the people made their emphatic response to the President's call. The five intervening months between the dissolution and election were of not greater anxiety to France than of watchful interest to the other nations of Europe and to the

whole civilized world. The forces brought into conflict, and the means employed by the government to determine the political complexion of the new Chamber, plainly evinced that the civil and religious liberties of the people were thrown into the balance ; and whether a Republican government should be maintained, or Monarchy or Imperialism should supersede it, was the question of the hour.

It has been charged that it was the settled purpose of the Marshal-President, during the period immediately preceding the dismissal of the Simon Ministry and the dissolution of the Chamber, to overthrow the Republic, and that these were the preliminary measures deliberately chosen for this purpose. However this may be, it is clear that the means employed by the agents of the government to prevent the free expression of the will of the people during the canvass and the election were well adapted to reach this end. But the trial by ballot frustrated the hopes of all classes of reactionists and established the Republic on firmer foundations than ever, and nothing has since occurred to disturb this happy consummation ; so that the present outlook seems to be wholly favorable to the permanency of the guarantee given in October. These events are too recent to require at this point any thing more than a bare mention.

But while the posture of affairs, at this writing, gives the friends of civil and religious liberty a strong ground of hope for France, the future must, for a considerable time, be filled with uncertainty. An important crisis must occur in 1880, even if all should continue tranquil till then ; and, what is especially noteworthy, there are circumstances which conspire against settled order among the French people which are scarcely found in any other nation of Europe. These claim prior attention in any just estimate of the facts of the present or in any proper attempt to forecast the probabilities of the future.

CHRONIC DYNASTIC CONTENTIONS IN FRANCE.

One of the chief obstacles to political progress, or to any hopeful stability in French affairs, and one with which no other nation of Europe is at present troubled, is that there are several

claimants to the throne, or to the supreme rule. Each is sustained by men of rank and influence, among whom are mingled those who hold on to the shadow of nobility, whether the old or the new, while the substance has long since departed, and each has also a considerable following among the people. First in order is the Old Bourbon dynasty, the Legitimists, represented by Comte de Chambord, claiming the title of Henry V. ; then the Imperialists, represented by the young prince, Louis Napoleon ; after him the Constitutional Monarchists, the Orleans dynasty, whose representative is the Comte de Paris ; and finally the present party in power, the Republicans, under President MacMahon.

Any one of the three dynasties would not hesitate to overthrow the Republic and re-erect the throne, without much scruple about the means to be used, were there a fair probability of succeeding and of consolidating their power ; and the Roman Catholic priesthood, at the head of their bigoted followers, would eagerly throw their influence in favor of any one of the three, believing that their ultimate objects could be more easily attained under either form of Monarchy or by Imperialism, than under the Republic. The first choice of the clerical party is the Comte de Chambord, and next to him the Prince Imperial. They could even put up with the Orleans dynasty, if they could also count upon a Senate and Chamber of Deputies inimical to the Republican principle. But so long as the Republic stands, through which the will of the people can have free expression, the hopes of the Ultramontanists will be unattainable, and their ultimate purposes, which they seek to accomplish through restored monarchy, must be held in abeyance.

It is a most instructive fact, in contemplating the history of the French people, that, from the Revolution of 1789 to the establishment of the present Republic in 1870, a period of about eighty years, there have been no less than twelve formal and more or less violent and radical changes in the supreme government of the nation.¹

¹ Numerically stated, these twelve revolutions are as follows : (1) That which began in 1789, dethroned Louis XVI. in 1793, and brought in the rule of Danton and Robespierre ; (2) The overthrow of the Terrorists and the establishment of the Directory, in 1795 ; (3) The subversion of the Directory, in 1799, by Napoleon,

It is quite remarkable, also, and without any parallel in European history, that no ruler of France during this long stretch of years—no king, no emperor, no president, nor any ruler in any form or by any authority during the Robespiercean Reign of Terror—beginning with the dethronement of Louis XVI. in 1793, and coming down to the election of President MacMahon, has been permitted to remain undisturbed, and without encountering the waves of revolutionary turbulence; and no king has been allowed to close his reign in peace, with the single exception of Louis XVIII. He alone peacefully laid down the sceptre at the command of death, to be succeeded by his brother, Charles X.; and yet Louis was no exception to the rule of revolution, for even he, in order to give completeness to

and the inauguration of the Tri-Consulate under Napoleon, conjointly with Sièyes and Roger Ducos; (4) The New Constitution of 1800, which vested in Napoleon the sole executive power as Consul; (5) The establishment of the Empire and the proclamation of Napoleon as Emperor, in 1804, and his coronation by the Pope; (6) The overthrow of the Empire and Napoleon's retirement to Elba, with the restoration of the Bourbons under Louis XVIII., in May, 1814; (7) The return of Napoleon to imperial authority and the flight of Louis, in March, 1815; (8) The defeat at Waterloo and the banishment of Napoleon to St. Helena, with the reinstatement of Louis upon the throne in 1815; (9) The dethronement of Charles X., the immediate successor of Louis, and the assumption of the throne by Louis Philippe, in July, 1830; (10) The abdication of Louis Philippe in February, 1848, and the establishment of the Lamartine Republic; (11) The overthrow of the republic by Louis Napoleon, in December, 1851, and his assumption as Emperor, with the ratification of the Empire and his imperial authority by a *plébiscite*, in December, 1852; (12) The fall of the Empire after the capture of the Emperor at Sedan, in September, 1870, the flight of the Empress Regent, and the proclamation of the Republic in the form of "The Provisional Government of Defence," followed by the Provisional Government turning its powers over to the "First National Assembly of the French Republic," in February, 1871, which elected M. Thiers as President. In this enumeration of a dozen revolutions for the supreme rule, are barely noted the changes which were actually accomplished. Several other attempts at the subversion of the established government, issuing in blood and carnage, though unsuccessful, have been passed without mention. The three most noted in later times are: first, the attempt made by the Red Republicans, in June, 1848, after the complete establishment of the Republic, and which was "only put down after great slaughter;" the second, when the far more terrible atrocities of the Commune were perpetrated, in the spring of 1871, and which came near resulting in the sack of Paris; and, finally, the third, within little more than a twelvemonth when President MacMahon aimed to subvert republican rule and assume dictatorial powers in his own person, or prepare the way for a king or an emperor.

the picture, must be driven from the throne on the return of Napoleon from Elba, though able to assume it again. Nor can the rule of President Thiers be adduced as a fair exception. His displacement by the election of Marshal MacMahon, though bloodless and without open violence, was but a preliminary step, in the designs of the Monarchists and Imperialists, with the Ultramontanists behind them, ultimately to work the subversion of the Republic, and bring the foes of the people into power.

Now can any nation of Europe present a parallel to such a record as this? Is any one of them, besides France, seriously threatened, at this moment, by several compact dynasties (or even one), each with its ambitious aspirant, eagerly watching and studiously plotting to overthrow the established government and lay the foundation of his own power upon its ruins?

The stability of the British throne has scarcely been disturbed since the days of the Stuarts and the accession of the House of Brunswick, more than a century and a half ago. The imperial *régime* in Austria, in the line of the Hapsburgs, among the oldest reigning families in Europe, is still maintained in the person of Francis Joseph. That empire has occasionally been seriously troubled by race contentions; among the most noted in later times being the Magyar-Kossuth revolt when the democratic upheaval shook all the thrones of Europe, but at no period of Austrian history has internal tranquillity been more marked than now. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Portugal, and other of the smaller states of Europe, possess stable governments, and internal quietness prevails. Great changes, indeed, have occurred in Germany within a few years, in the extinguishment of several petty as well as semi-independent states; but the ruling power in Prussia, now swayed over United Germany, though lately advanced from a kingly to an imperial *rôle*, is regularly descended from the Hohenzollern family, dating its origin in the early part of the ninth century. Great changes have also occurred in the South of Europe. Several small states have been incorporated into United Italy, so long the fond vision of Mazzini and Garibaldi, although not realized in the form which they would have chosen. In this Italian union the "States of the Church" have been absorbed

and the temporal power of the pope is no more. Spain, it is true, has been somewhat torn by intestine commotions, amidst contentions for the throne and abortive attempts to establish a republic; but these troubles appear to be quelled, and the young King Alfonso has entered upon his reign with fair hopes of assured peace at home as well as in the "Pearl of the Antilles."

France stands substantially alone among European nations as having been in the throes of political convulsion for nearly a century, with almost no furlough; and, although we have hope from the present that the future has a brighter prospect, it is yet too soon to affirm that France has passed the dead point of danger. There can be no well-grounded confidence in assured political stability in France until the crisis which must come in 1880 shall have been reached, when the direct question will present itself: Shall the Republic be perpetuated, and in what form and manner; or shall the will of the nation be disregarded, and priestly craft and kingly pretensions be allowed to supplant it?

RACE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE NATIONS.

Another feature of French affairs which stands in open and significant contrast to the condition of many other European nations, and which ought naturally to contribute to internal peace, is, that France contains, for the most part, a homogeneous people, speaking a common language, and largely possessing the same religion. On the other hand, several other nations, whose internal tranquillity contrasts strongly and most favorably with France, are made up of peoples of different races, speaking different languages, with dissimilar manners and customs, and separated into rival religious sects.

For illustration we have merely to observe the theatre of the recent Russo-Turkish war. The prime difficulty of the Eastern Question, the long-standing trouble to all Europe—that indeed which makes it a question at all, and one which so persistently baffles all attempts at satisfactory and permanent settlement—lies mainly in diversities of race, language, and religion, along with the varying and conflicting habits, manners, and customs, which such diversities always imply, among the numerous peoples inhabiting the several provinces of European Turkey, the

chief scene of the contest. The same is also observed, only in a somewhat less degree, in the eastern section of the theatre of war, Armenia, and other portions of Asia Minor. Indeed, nearly all the former wars between Russia and Turkey, as well as between Turkey and several other European nations, covering the period from the Mohammedan invasion of Europe, hundreds of years ago, and embracing the more recent Crimean war and the late contest between Russia and Turkey, had their origin mainly—when we search for the radical underlying cause—in these manifold diversities of race, language, and religion. This is the real key to the solution of the vital difficulty at the present moment.

Lord Derby, who resigned his place in the British Cabinet in April last, mentions this race-conflict as lying at the bottom of the long-standing troubles in Western Turkey. In his speech in the House of Lords, on the eighth of April, he incidentally touches upon this race-question as follows :

“ Grant that we should be more fortunate—that we were successful, and obliged Russia to give back nearly all she had taken. What then? You will not have gained the greater part of your object. You will not have destroyed Russian influence, or substituted English influence, because Russian influence in that country which is now to be called Bulgaria rests only in a slight degree upon military success ; it rests on what you cannot take away—identity of race, community of religion, similarity of religion, traditional historic sympathies, and the common hatred which has been felt against the common foe. These are reasons which you cannot take away : they will continue while a Russian soldier is left in Bulgaria—they would continue even after Russian soldiers had left, and English soldiers taken their place. If, therefore, we were fortunate, and established English and Austrian authority over those large populations in European Turkey, I say you are fighting for a shadow, and even that shadow you will not obtain. In the next place, situated as Austria is, she would hesitate before embarking on any thing which might be regarded as a rash policy, and would hardly come to a rupture with Russia unless she were previously assured of the support, or at least the neutrality, of Germany. Her population, too, is divided into a great many races, and, in fact, Austria is a country which a single unsuccessful campaign might not impossibly break up. Then you have to look to the internal divisions of the Empire. No doubt the Magyars have strong sympathies with Turkey, but a directly opposite view is taken by the Slavs. Then you have the Austro-Germans, who want only peace. With two independent nations pulling different ways, with an army which could not be trusted to fight against the Slavs,” etc., etc.

The illustrations of the same kind, found in Austria and Germany, greatly strengthen the view taken. The internal disturbances of the Austrian empire have grown far less out of the wish of the old Bohemian and Hungarian provinces to regain their ancient regal independence, on mere political grounds, than out of the natural diversities of race, language, and religion existing in those provinces. The same thing may also be seen in Germany. If the desire to consolidate the whole Germanic race into one empire, with other races eliminated, were realized, the map of Central and Eastern Europe would have to be materially reconstructed. On this principle, the rich and fertile provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, vibrating like a pendulum between France and Germany, now belonging to the one and now to the other, would be completely disorganized. As to Alsace, German never ceased to be the language of the people, but all newspapers were, during the whole period of the French possession, printed in both languages. In respect to Lorraine, the inhabitants are of German origin, but speak the French language, with the exception of the district lying between Metz and the Vosges, which is called German Lorraine. So, also, the Austrian Empire would be seriously dismembered if obliged to relinquish her German peoples. It would be still further dismembered on the formation of all the Slavonic peoples into a distinct government; and somewhat further, again, with the complete breaking up of the Turkish Empire in Europe, in the purpose to form a separate nation of all the Greek provinces.

It is the intermingling of so many distinct races in the same nation, with the conflicting interests which this intermingling causes, which so largely lies at the bottom of existing alienations and forms the germinal causes of war. When these races, moreover, are obliged to encounter, on the one side, the bigotry, hatred, and utterly irreconcilable hostility of Mohammedanism—no matter what may be arrayed against it—the world beholds these elements of contention in their boldest relief, ready to be fanned into the flame of war on the slightest provocation.

One of the wise provisions, therefore, of the Treaty of San Stefano, presented as the preliminary basis of peace between Russia and Turkey, was that which fixed a short term of years

for the Mohammedan population to withdraw from Bulgaria ; thus opening the way for a more homogeneous population in the future, within the territory of that province. The road to permanent peace, in this commendable purpose of the Czar, lies in the separation of these alien races.

Prince Gortschakoff, in his elaborate reply to the equally elaborate despatch of Lord Salisbury, published in the early part of April last, speaks of these race-differences as largely shaping the Treaty of San Stefano, and as constituting some of the grave difficulties in the way of an arrangement satisfactory to the European nations immediately concerned. Lord Salisbury, remarking upon " the articles erecting the New Bulgaria," as constituting " a strong Slav State, under the auspices and control of Russia," says :

" It will be so constituted as to merge in the dominant Slav majority a considerable mass of population which is Greek in race and sympathy, and which views with alarm the prospect of absorption into a community alien to it not only in nationality, but in political tendency and in religious allegiance. The territorial severance from Constantinople of the Greek, Albanian, and Slavonic provinces which are still left under the Government of the Porte will cause their administration to be attended with constant difficulty, and even embarrassment."

Prince Gortschakoff makes answer to these criticisms of Lord Salisbury, in the course of which he says :

" The delimitation of the State of Bulgaria was indicated only in general terms. The sole fixed principle laid down is that of the majority of the population, and certainly it is difficult to imagine one more equitable or more rational. It meets the objections deduced from the difference of race of the minority, the interests of which have, moreover, been guaranteed by express stipulations ; but the application of that principle has been reserved for the Mixed Commission, the local investigators of which can alone dispel all the uncertainty surrounding these disputed questions." Speaking of some " new arrangements," the prince specifies among others, " the abolition of the tithes, and their replacement by a more normal impost ; the abolition of the farming of the taxes, the principal source of abuses ; and, finally, the right assigned to the Christians in mixed localities to challenge during the elections such Mussulmans as are known to have been guilty of acts of fanatical persecution against the Christians." Then in regard to Epirus and Thessaly, the prince speaks as follows : " The assertion that the Treaty of San Stefano would extend Russian influence beyond the limits of Bulgaria by stipulating for improved institutions in Epirus and Thessaly occasions surprise. If Russia had made no stipulations in favor of these provinces she would have

been accused of sacrificing the Greeks to the Slavs. If she had stipulated for the vassal autonomy that is censured in the case of Bulgaria, she would have been accused of entirely destroying the Ottoman Empire and of establishing Russian influence there. The Imperial Cabinet has always understood the mission assigned to it by history as protector of the Christians in the East, without regard to race or sect."

Other illustrations to the same effect might be given among existing European peoples. It seems to be the natural order, and that which conduces to the greatest internal harmony and prosperity in a nation, that its population should be substantially one in race, language, and religion, so far as this is practicable ; and it contributes still further to this end where there is no marked dissimilarity in social habits, manners, and customs. The good which comes from laudable rivalry among races, where there is competition from opposite and conflicting interests, may better be realized in separate nationalities, side by side, than by mingling hostile races in the same nation and under the restrictions of the same laws.

Now turn to France. Notwithstanding these great diversities of race-interest in Central and Eastern Europe (which, when leading to internal conflicts, have for the most part sought to secure local reforms), we find there far less of violent war upon the supreme rule than in France. This foremost state of Western Europe is the country, of all others, of incessant revolutions to subvert the supreme authority, without regard to what party, for the nonce, may be in power ; while at the same time it is, for the most part, not subject to the diversities so widely spread through the Central and Eastern European nations. Instead of being divided by race, religion, and language, its 38,000,000 of people are substantially one. Its homogeneity, in regard to these radical and vital elements, is more striking than that of almost any nation under the sun. The people of the United States are far more diversified in these respects. The English, the Irish, the Welsh, the Scotch, in the British Isles, are farther apart. And yet France is emphatically the land of revolutions. Paris, the most brilliant capital of Europe, is the city of barricades. This sunny land, with its homogeneity, is at perpetual strife concerning its rulers. What is the solution ? It is not found, as already observed, in different race-interests, or diversities of language, for these scarcely exist.

The French language is the language of the French nation. No account need be taken of the *patois* of the provinces. The difference between this and Parisian French is not greater than the differences in speech which mark a well-bred citizen of London and an inhabitant of Yorkshire or Northumberland; or than may be heard in the American Congress when listening to a colloquy between an educated "Southron" and a cultured member from New York or New England. Nor need regard be had to the partial prevalence of the German tongue in the Rhenish provinces of France, nor to the Italian in districts on her southern border. Substantially, the people throughout France speak the French language and are of the French stock. It is the same in great part in regard to religion. The people of France are, practically, and especially for political influence and power, possessed of a common religion. The Roman Catholic population is over ninety-four per centum of the whole.¹

Nevertheless, in the face of the fact that the French nation is made up of a homogeneous people, in these vital elements, which should insure compactness, internal harmony, and peace; removed thus from many of the causes which naturally tend to strife within other nations—France has stood for a hundred years, and stands to-day, the most disturbed nation in Europe. With its 38,000,000 of genuine loyal Frenchmen, every one, and with its unparalleled resources, its eminence in the arts and some of the sciences without a rival, its almost incomparable productiveness in agriculture, unsurpassed and even unequalled in certain lines of manufactures, with its world-wide military prowess and renown—all of which ought to conspire to national

¹ The best authorities give the following statistics: Population of France, 38,000,000. Divisions as to religion: Roman Catholics, 35,734,667; Jews (including Algeria), 185,000; Protestants (embracing the Reformed, Lutheran, Anabaptists, etc.) 1,561,250. At the beginning of the Revolution of 1789, the annual revenues of the Church amounted to 150,000,000 of livres, and its debts to 133,000,000. In 1873, the state appropriated for the maintenance of religion—to the Roman Catholics, 51,500,000 of francs; to Protestants, 1,400,000; to Jews, 273,000; to Mohammedans in Algeria, 500,000. In 1789, the state seized for itself the funds of the Church and assumed the responsibility of maintaining public worship. This responsibility has since been recognized under all the changes which the National Government has undergone. Besides the sums annually named in the "budget" to maintain religion, the departments are charged with special annual subsidies, which amounted in 1868 to upward of 717,000 francs. Of late years these have considerably increased.

solidity, pride, and glory—France stands to-day the most unsettled nation of the world, in regard to that in which all classes of the people are supremely interested—the stability of the National Government.

There are, most clearly, reasons for this peculiar characteristic of the French people which deserve the most profound consideration, whether or not they can be readily and satisfactorily determined. In some respects they appear to lie upon the very surface of their every-day national life, while in others they elude the grasp of the ablest writers on political philosophy.

Before attempting, however, to solve the problem, it may be profitable to look at the French nation in some other important matters, as regards its relation to the other nations of Europe.

FRANCE AS A MILITARY POWER.

No nation of Europe has any important standing among those that rule in Continental affairs, unless it rank high as a military power; at least, no nation, without this qualification, can be classed among the "Great Powers." The doctrine of ancient Sparta, deeming every man but made for the state, and developing the whole body of the people into a condition of the greatest military efficiency as the state's highest aim, is the common national sentiment of Europe. This has never been more emphatically true than at the present moment. No advance which has been made within a few years, in the peaceful arbitrament of international questions, has had the effect to lessen the attention which transatlantic nations have given to studying the art of war and improving its implements and appliances. The first general order, in European affairs, is large and well-appointed armies.¹

It is, however, comparatively a recent thing that the principle has been adopted and enforced among European nations to consider every man a soldier, unless for special reasons personally disqualified, and (with the rigidity now enforced) to

¹ Sir Garnet Wolseley, of the British army, in a late number of the *Nineteenth Century*, speaking of the military spirit of Europe, in regard "to the wants and requirements of the army," says: "Its interests and welfare are recognized as the first national consideration; the rights of the individual are regarded as of secondary importance."

require him, within a given period, to spend a certain term of years in actual service in the army. Professor Goldwin Smith lays to the charge of Napoleon "the portentous development of the military system under which the world now groans," by reason of the wars which he prosecuted, with very little intermission, for some twenty years. But it was not till since the Franco-Prussian war, terminating in the capture of Paris in 1871, that France began to take those measures for the reorganization of her military system which would put her armies upon something like the same basis of efficiency which had been attained by the armies of Prussia. Nor, again, had Prussia even taken the incipient steps for developing the system which now places her at the head of the military powers of Europe until within about the decade ending in 1859.

Sir Garnet Wolseley, one of the best English authorities in military affairs, holding a prominent position in the English army, writing within the last year, says : "The army of Prussia, which is now the admiration of the world, had not, in 1846, shown any sign of its coming greatness. As a military power Prussia had been crushed by Napoleon at Jena, and was forced to accede to stipulations which the conqueror believed would prevent her again, at least in his time, from appearing on the battle-fields of Europe." But notwithstanding Napoleon's belief, "Jena was avenged at Waterloo;" and yet, "from 1815 to 1849, and even to 1859, such was the fate in a great measure of the Prussian army, that it made a feeble figure in European contests." Although Prussia turned out an army that invaded Bohemia in 1866, and moved with such celerity and power against the Austrian armies as to astonish all Europe, yet, says Sir Garnet Wolseley, "most of us can remember how humble was the rôle played by that country during the Crimean War; and many can recollect, a little further back still, the stormy epoch of 1848, when the Imperial crown of Germany was offered to Prussia's king by the Revolutionary Diet. Why was it refused?" "Austria's demeanor was not to be mistaken. She would not permit it, and by a strong army massed along the frontier of Prussia said to the latter, 'Accept that crown, which I claim as mine by right, at your peril.' The king could not accept the challenge, *because his army was unfit for war.*" "The great reforms that changed the whole character of the

Prussian military forces, converting them from a *Landwehr* into an army, began in 1859."

Previous to the trial of strength between France and Germany in 1870-71, the former, in the common judgment of the world, would have been regarded as the first military power in Europe. It was the prevalent sentiment, judged by the usual organs of public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, that the French armies would have an easy, or at least a triumphant, march into Berlin. That Paris would be besieged, the government be made to flee, the vast population of the gay capital be completely encompassed by the German armies, so that no communication with the outer world could be had except by balloons and carrier-pigeons, and that this population would be reduced to the starvation point, and thus a capitulation be enforced, within so short a period—these marvels were not anticipated by the most sagacious of those who make military matters a study.

The details of this remarkable campaign, from the declaration of war by the French Emperor to his capture at Sedan, the surrender of his capital and the establishment of the Republic, have too recently occurred and are too well impressed upon the public mind to need any thing more than a reference to them here. This reference, with the recall of the memorable campaign of Prussia against Austria, only four years before—when within six weeks of the outbreak of the war to the final battle of Sadowa, the Prussian armies had crushed the power of Austria, and, with no other opponent, could have easily entered Vienna—is simply to indicate more vividly the present tendencies of the military spirit among the several nations of Europe.

Since these victorious campaigns by Prussia, though in some instances beginning a little earlier, the whole system of the military organization and equipment of the European armies has been revolutionized, together with vast advances made in improving all the appliances of war. This is most emphatically true of France. She remembers, with keenness of anguish, her humiliation by Prussia, single-handed, in 1870-71, and she is straining every nerve in preparing to avenge it.

A distinguished American statesman, residing in Paris during the whole of General Grant's presidency (and the President's personal friend), embracing the period of the Franco-Prussian war and the subsequent six years, was asked by a leading Ameri-

can journalist whether France were preparing for a war with Germany. His reply was : " She is biding her time, but she is not losing a minute. She is using all her resources to put her army on the very best footing, and when the time shall come there will be such a clash of arms as the world has never seen."

It is now an interesting question, What actual military strength does France at this time possess, as the result of recent changes, and what will be her effective military power in the near future, when the system inaugurated in 1870 shall have been carried forward to completion? Sir Garnet Wolseley makes the following estimates, here given in totals, avoiding his numerous details. " On the first of January, 1878," says he, " the total strength of the active army of France will be seven hundred and nineteen thousand non-commissioned officers and men ; or adding the officers (26,499), the grand total will be, in round numbers, seven hundred and forty-five thousand of all ranks, not including the *gendarmerie*, or *Garde Républicaine*, which together amount to twenty-seven thousand men." He speaks, in addition, of a " reserve," which was " created by the law of 1872, but which will not be in existence in its complete form until the end of 1881," but of which, he says, " it may be safely assumed that the reserve actually available at this moment amounts fully to five hundred thousand soldiers, who have all been trained in the regular army." Further, of this reserve he says : " When it has reached its normal strength in 1886, it will consist of five hundred and ninety-four thousand men, allowance being made for all casualties." Again : " When this reserve has reached its normal strength in 1892, it will number six hundred and thirty-eight thousand men." The summing up is then as follows, for the year 1892 :

" Active army.....	719,000
Reserve of active army.....	520,000
Territorial army.....	594,000
Reserve of Territorial army.....	638,000
Total.....	2,471,000"

The foregoing figures furnish the ground for Sir Garnet's statement concerning French politics and French military affairs, that " the struggle for power by the several political

parties into which France is divided has not in any serious manner hindered military progress ;" that " the direction and management of army affairs have been kept distinct, and outside the realm of party faction ;" and also, " that whilst our attention has been mostly directed to the noisy struggles between those political factions who howl themselves hoarse at Versailles over questions of parliamentary procedure, the military direction, which politics have not been allowed to interfere with, has been steadily and seriously employed in creating a great and powerful army. That it does not yet equal that of Germany, and cannot fully do so for about another ten years, is without doubt ; but it is quite true, remembering the greatly increased power now possessed by the defence, that France has no reason to dread any German invasion in 1878, even supposing that those desirous of crushing her could succeed in uniting what is now known as Germany with that object in view." Such, then, is the condition of France as a military power.

PECULIAR CAUSES OF THE PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF FRANCE.

And now, to come back to the point reached before introducing the view of France as a military power, it becomes most important, in order intelligently to consider the real outlook for either the immediate or more remote future of France, to inquire, What are the latent and operative causes of the peculiar condition of France among the European nations, which have given this people such a remarkable history for a century past, and which present France to-day as the theatre of more internal turbulence and partisan contention, aimed by several powerful factions to subvert the supreme government, than are found in any other nation in Europe ? At first blush it would seem that this ought to be a problem of easy solution ; and yet sagacious men are by no means agreed in judgment upon it.

Among recent writers, the views of Professor Goldwin Smith deserve attention. He has devoted some thoughts to this very theme. He apparently evinces some prejudice, quite common with a large class of Englishmen, when dealing with certain phases of French character and French politics, especially when touching any thing allied to the name Napoleon,

reminding one of the marked prejudices which pervade Sir Walter Scott's *Life of the great captain*. But, nevertheless, his observations are valuable.

Professor Smith, writing but a few months ago, and speaking of the struggles of France "to attain a settled form of constitutional government," says that "apparently she is farther from it now than she was in 1787." While this is "apparently" the situation, he indulges the "hope that it may not prove so in reality." He notes the causes or reasons for this, and it is to them that attention is now asked.¹

The first which he names is the cultivation of the military spirit and the predominance of the military power. Referring to the crisis of 1789-93, and the years immediately following, which dethroned and executed Louis XVI., brought in the reign of the Terrorists, who were in turn overthrown and a constitutional Republic formed, he says :

"It was by military violence, however, that the Constitution was at last overthrown, and its fall was the beginning of that supremacy of the army which unhappily has been from that hour, and still is, the fundamental fact of French politics. The hand which, at the bidding of traitors in the Directory, dealt the first blow, was that of Augereau, but the hand which planned it and dealt the final blow was that of Bonaparte. In estimating the result of the first experiment in republican government this must always be borne in mind."

After noting "the effects of Napoleon's career" as a "revelation of the weakness and meanness of human nature," he further speaks of this career "of evil" as evincing "the ascendancy given to the military spirit and the example of military usurpation." He regards "the military spirit" as further "excited by the flagitious writings of Thiers, weakly flattered by the House of Orleans, and which overturned the constitutional government of 1832." He charges to the same account the usurpation "by Napoleon's reputed nephew," which made him emperor, and to the same again, "with the influence of his priest-ridden wife," the final downfall of the empire in 1870-71. Then, coming to the crisis of 1877, the same military

¹ The quotations upon which comments are here made are from an article by Professor Goldwin Smith, in a late number of the *Contemporary Review*, entitled "Ninety Years' Agony of France."

ascendancy has the sole credit of threatening civil convulsion and attempting the overthrow of the Republic :

" But even now, France, after all her efforts and revolutions, is, to a fearful extent, at the mercy of a stupid and self-willed soldier, a third-rate master even of his own trade, totally devoid of political knowledge and of sympathy with political aspirations, but at the head of the army, and, as his language to the soldiery on the eve of the elections proved, sufficiently wanting in the true sense of honor to admit into his mind the thought of using the public force with which he is intrusted for the overthrow of public liberty." And finally he adds : " Two years hence, if not before, there will be another crisis ; and it is idle to conceal the unhappy and ignominious fact, that the decision will rest ultimately with the army and with those whom the army obeys. . . . How the army can be placed in safe hands is a problem of which it is impossible to suggest a complete and permanent solution. The reduction of its numbers by the definite adoption of a pacific policy is the only real security for the continuance of political liberty."

It would be worse than idle to overlook the patent fact that the military power has been a most important factor in the numerous revolutions in France for the last ninety years. But it is an equally palpable proposition, that the military power in any nation is never moved without a purpose ; never is handled for the attainment of a given end unless prompted by some idea behind it ; and whatever that idea or purpose may be, whether for enslaving or freeing a nation, or for maintaining its status, it is this underlying sentiment which must be held responsible, and not the mere fact of the ascendancy of the military power and that it has been successfully exerted. It is an equally palpable proposition, and illustrated in French history many times during the very period of ninety years upon which Professor Smith comments, that the military power was not used solely in the interest of usurpation and for the subversion of public liberty. Notably it was employed for securing and maintaining the liberties of the people as well as for overthrowing them. Napoleon was undoubtedly an ambitious usurper, but in dispersing the French Directory in 1799, he dispersed, in the persons of some of its leaders, as precious a set of villains as ever trod the soil of France. So, also, on his return from Elba he displaced the Bourbons under Louis XVIII., sending them, indeed, into a very brief retirement ; but still, whatever may be said of his own reign, Bourbonism then, as now, was but the

synonym for almost every thing which is hostile to the best interests of the people, and ever has been the avowed enemy of public liberty. And what but the French army put down the Red Republican rabble, whose true spirit cropped out in the scenes which soaked Paris with blood during the so-called "revolutionary era" ushered in during 1848? And what, again, but the army, under the wise statesmanship of M. Thiers, saved Paris from complete destruction during the terrific scenes of the reign of the Commune in the spring of 1871?

But passing the foregoing considerations, the obvious question arises, on the basis laid down by Professor Smith, Why has the "military spirit" been so disastrous to France above all other examples? All the chief nations of Europe are military nations as well as France. They have been so during all their history; they are pre-eminently so to-day. The cultivation of "the military spirit" and the practical development of its power are the conditions of their existence. This is becoming more and more the case as time rolls on. The armies of Europe, in this present year of grace, are far larger than they ever were before, and these armies are peculiarly fostered and are constantly increasing in numbers and efficiency. Nor is France, even now, in this regard, the equal of some of them. Russia and Germany lead her in this *rôle*.¹

¹ General Emory Upton, of the United States Army, who was commissioned by the United States Government to visit Europe and Asia, on a tour of military inspection, in his official report on "The Armies of Asia and Europe" gives the following figures in totals, showing the present war strength, in officers and men, of the armies of Russia, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and England: Russia, 1,807,950; France, 1,730,000; Germany, 1,340,908; Austria, 1,043,351; Italy, 886,722; England, 228,624. Speaking of England, General Upton says: "The basis of the English system rests on voluntary enlistment, carrying with it in time of war the payment of large bounties." (Page 252.) He also makes this comparison respecting the infantry force of the several countries named, which will be of interest in the present condition of European complications: "The force of British infantry, available for aggressive purposes, adding 20,000 drawn from the Mediterranean and India, would approximate 100,000 men, and in this number would be included the greater part of the reserve recently created. In contrast with this force, the infantry of the great Continental powers, organized on the expansive principle, can be raised, in round numbers, to the following war footing: Austria, 545,000; France, 700,000; Germany, 495,000; Russia, 674,000." (Page 269.) Sir Garnet Wolseley makes a much better showing for England, in an article on "England as a Military Power," in a late number of the *Nineteenth*

But yet this is the incontestable fact, that while France has been rent and torn by revolution upon revolution for a hundred years, and while there is even now abroad over the whole civilized world a greater or less feverish anxiety that a movement may occur at any moment to subvert the supreme authority and inaugurate another rule—by, perhaps, the Marshal-President being induced to resolve upon a *coup d'état* to overthrow the constantly strengthening republican power—France stands solitary and alone, upon the European continent, looking back upon such a history and confronted with such a danger. The dynastic factions, rival and contending within her borders, are not completely put to flight by the later decisive triumphs of republicanism ; they are neither dismayed nor disheartened ; but believing their rights founded upon the divine commission and to be realized in the accomplishment of the divine purpose, they are but biding their time and waiting the fitting opportunity to assert them. No other nation in Europe is in a condition parallel to this.

Professor Smith, it is true, presents other reasons for the “agony” which France has endured for ninety years, but “the fatal ascendancy of the military spirit” is the chief. “Another adverse force,” he declares, “against which free institutions have to contend in France, too often noted to need more than recognition in its place, is the tendency derived from the old *régime*, but handed on in an intensified form by the Bonapartes, to administrative centralization.”

Mr. Henry Thomas Buckle also takes much the same view of this power of “centralization.” Speaking of what occurred in the fourteenth century, he says : “But in that same century, in France, the protective spirit assumed a new form ; the power of the aristocracy was, in a great measure, succeeded by the power of the crown ; and there began that tendency to centralization, which, having been pushed still further, first under Louis XIV., and afterward under Napoleon, has become the bane of the French people.”¹

Century. He says : “Were war declared to-morrow about four hundred thousand drilled men would fall into line, if required, supported by three hundred and seventy-two field guns, manned and horsed by the Royal Artillery ;” and he puts down the total of all arms of the service at “414,000 men.”

¹ Introduction to History of Civilization in England, p. 450.

Unquestionably this power of "centralization" is great. That "Paris is France" long since passed into a proverb which is still true in more senses than the political. In politics the government is France, whether its seat be Paris or Versailles ; but this is becoming less true every decade. The political power, under present tendencies, is extending to other large cities, to the provinces, and to the whole body of the people. But allowing what we may to "centralization," it fails to account for the solitary position of France, in the aspect mentioned, among European nations. Centralization rules in Germany, in Austria, and an autocracy rules in Russia ; and yet these empires continue to possess stable governments. "Administrative centralization" no more satisfactorily accounts for the present dynastic watchings and contentions for the French throne, nor for the revolutions which have so often upset it, than does "the ascendancy of the military spirit."

"Divided sovereignty" is another of Professor Smith's reasons to account for the troubles of France. Under this head many of his observations display sound political philosophy, and are of great value ; but this as a reason for the peculiar history and present perils of France, though having a degree of pertinency to past times, is no more satisfactory as a full solution than the others. "The framers of the French Constitution of 1789," says he, "attempted to divide the sovereign power, leaving a portion of it in the king, and vesting the remainder in the representatives of the people. The inevitable result was collision, and soon a conflict which, though neither party knew it, was essentially internecine. The weaker, that is to say, the monarchy, fell ;" and then came "foreign intervention, adding to the fury of the conflict ;" followed by the "reign of violence and terror, and after the terror, military dictatorship and despotism. The same fatal situation was reproduced under the restored monarchy." The professor finds again "the same fatal situation" in the reign of Charles X., who "made a desperate effort to cut the knot and render himself sovereign." Under Louis Philippe, "what power he retained was retained not of right, but by personal influence and corruption." Coming down to the present time, he says, "Now again comes a nominal Republic, but unfortunately there is still a king, and the hopeless problem of carrying on government with a divided sovereignty presents

itself afresh. The marshal, having the command of the army, and being supported by those who desire a return to monarchy, struggles for the sovereign power ; and the question of the late election was whether that power should belong to him and the ministers of his personal choice, or to the nation."

It seems sufficiently easy to test the value of this "divided sovereignty" as the theory which accounts for the peculiar troubles of France, by a reference to recent and well-known facts. If this is the potent factor in these troubles, why did things move on so successfully during the illustrious presidency of M. Thiers ? The sovereignty was lodged then just where it is now ; but the friends of the Republic had no fear of its overthrow while M. Thiers was in power, so far as the President was concerned. This fact is all the more noteworthy when it is remembered that the whole history of this illustrious statesman shows that his sympathies were, on principle, with constitutional monarchy, rather than with republican government. His course during his service in the cabinet of Louis Philippe shows this plainly, and it is also shown elsewhere.¹ But yet M. Thiers was the spontaneous choice of the better spirit of the nation after the Second Empire fell. Just so long as he retained power the Republic was deemed secure ; while his administrative tact, energy, and unexampled success, in putting down the Commune, making peace with Germany, and paying off the enormous war indemnity which Germany imposed, and within a period which astonished the world, combine to enroll his name among the highest benefactors of France.

If "divided sovereignty" has been the essence of peril, from 1787 downward to 1877—and it was the same under President Thiers as it is now under Marshal MacMahon—or if this was even a prominent factor in the case, why were the three eagle-eyed dynasties, equally hating the Republic, without any one of them seriously expecting to succeed it, agreed in removing M. Thiers and choosing Marshal MacMahon ? It is not enough to say that Marshal MacMahon is what M. Thiers was not—a soldier—and that it was to bring the military power again into ascend-

¹ Odilon-Barrot speaks of the sympathies of M. Thiers, in this regard, when sought to take office under the Second Empire : "All the monarchical chiefs, Molé, Thiers, Berryer, Montalembert, the Duc de Broglie," etc.—*Memoirs of Odilon-Barrot*, p. 181.

ancy that the change was made. There was something behind this change which Professor Smith does not hint at, which evidently inspired it ; but a notice of this, for the purpose now in hand, must be deferred to a later point in this article.

One remaining element of danger which Professor Smith names to account for the perplexities of France, operating before in her history, but especially pregnant with evil now, and closely allied to and growing out of this "divided sovereignty" is the "power of dissolution" of the Chamber of Deputies, possessed by the President and Senate, and to be exercised at their discretion. It was the exercise of this power in May of last year, in dismissing the Simon Ministry and dissolving the Chamber, which brought on the crisis, from the sad effects of which the nation has not yet fully recovered.

A sufficient answer to this "dissolution" theory is found in two things. First, this power is possessed by the British Government, and is held to be a valuable feature of the British Constitution ; as well as possessed, also, by other European governments where constitutional legislative assemblies are established. The British House of Commons, at the discretion of the sovereign, may be dissolved and an election ordered, whenever the Ministry are outvoted. Or, as another expedient, the Ministry may be changed and the Commons remain, if the sovereign so elect. It is true that Professor Smith holds this British "power of dissolution," as in the case of France, to be an evil, as it is one of the conflicting elements of a "divided sovereignty." It may indeed be abused, as any other power may be ; but whether it be an evil or not, it is valued as a conservative safeguard in England, and is occasionally exercised, though not as often in later times, as a change in the Ministry is resorted to. But be all this as it may, a dissolution of the House of Commons never convulses England as the late dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies shook France. The former occasions no greater excitement than does a presidential election in the United States, while the latter, as seen but a twelvemonth ago, threatened to precipitate a revolution. "Dissolution," therefore, goes not one whit toward solving the riddle. Why, forsooth, should this prerogative inevitably be either a red-hot iron or a drawn sword in the hand of the Marshal-President of France, and at the same moment prove a harmless wand when wielded

by the Queen of England? Ah! it is something behind the Marshal-President which shakes the ground all over the French nation when he pronounces the word. The second thing which reveals the insufficiency of this theory of "dissolution" is, most plainly, that no danger was apprehended from it so long as M. Thiers was in power. In fact, no one dreamed that he would exercise it, or that there would be the least occasion for its exercise. Just so long as he continued President, the mass of the nation, except the plotters, were satisfied; the country was regaining its wonted prosperity, the German war indemnity had been paid, and France, so lately prostrate at the feet of Germany, was rapidly rising to her former dignity and power.

It is surprising that so close an observer as Professor Smith should scarcely name, when attempting to account for "the ninety years' agony of France," a cause which, possibly, more than any other single one, lies at the bottom of this perpetual agony. There are, in truth, many causes which enter into the solution, but that now referred to, in its special relation to the others, is believed to be among the chief of those which have continually disturbed and even now threaten the tranquillity of the French nation.

THE REAL CAUSES OF THE TROUBLES OF FRANCE.

All of the causes which concern the question in hand deserve mature thought. It cannot be expected, however, that full justice can be done, within the limits of a review article, to a subject so deeply philosophical, and which demands such an extended examination of the subtle agencies which conspire to develop national characteristics. A few hints only can be offered within the space allotted to this paper.

That omnivorous reader and industrious collector of facts, Mr. Henry Thomas Buckle, in the introduction to his work on the "History of Civilization in England," postulates the physical agencies of external nature as among the most powerful causes—almost, indeed, the sole causes—which combine to form the character of nations. Mr. Buckle's generalizations are founded upon a wide induction of particulars, running through most of the civilizations of past times, and, within certain limits, possess a positive value; but he pushes his theories respecting

the power of external nature over man to an unwarranted extreme, ignoring the force of certain moral influences, the direct result of positive institutions, which are adapted and designed to shape the life of the people of all nations, without regard to the zone of the earth which they inhabit or the physical agencies by which they are surrounded. Had Mr. Buckle lived to complete the elaborate work he marked out for himself, some of his views might possibly have been modified by further research, or on more mature reflection. This, however, is not the place to canvass his speculations. They are referred to now merely for the purpose of indicating, from a close analogy with a certain element of truth in them, what may be regarded as one cause of the prominent characteristics of the French people ; and this may furnish a little aid in the solution of the problem of the remarkable history of that people for a century past.

If there be even a modicum of truth in Mr. Buckle's positions—and much more than this is granted—then may it not be fairly assumed, that if our researches in human physiology were as extensive and accurate as is our knowledge of the more palpable phenomena of the external world which have so great an influence in developing national characteristics, and if our physiological researches were pursued with the same end in view which Mr. Buckle has had before him in determining the influence of “food, climate,” etc., upon man, might we not find something in French blood which would at least partially explain the marvellous phenomena of French history and the present characteristics of the French people ?

Such a hint, however, cannot be pursued. It is merely thrown out for consideration. Some writers have made much of this in shaping the character and course of nations ; and the deduction here involved may hold a close relation to, and may even be an incidental resultant of, the principles elaborated by Mr. Buckle.

If this theory may be deemed worthy of acceptance, it may be applied with peculiar force to France. Is there a people on the face of the earth so mercurial in temperament, so versatile, so volatile, so elastic ; possessing traits so opposite, so irreconcilably contradictory and repugnant ; so willing to pass through the terrific fires of blood and carnage which their incessant *émeutes* and revolutions have exhibited, and at the same moment make

a jest of them ; so ready to mourn and to dance at the same instant ; so apt at mingling the grave and the gay, upon occasions fitting and unfitting ; exhibiting in their social life a blandness and politeness of manner which becomes a model for the nations, and under it cherishing principles of social immorality, and practising without concealment vices which shock mankind ; mingling, in public affairs, Socialism, Communism, Republicanism, Imperialism, Clericalism, and all possible forms of political organization and action ; chaining the world to their car of fashion, and ruling it with a rod of iron ; presenting before all nations, in their gay capital, in the Exposition of the World's Industry and the Arts of Peace, a spectacle which cannot be equalled by any nation in Europe, and at the same moment nursing a military spirit and developing a military power which may soon astound the world by the clash of arms ?

M. Edmond About, as quoted at the opening of this article, in painting the effect of French "centralization," gives a picture of the French people which may be hung up in any national gallery of Europe, and if a search for a parallel were made, it would be a search made in vain. The "accident" which he so graphically pictures would, "ninety times out of a hundred," have killed any other man ; but it "has only taken, God knows why, a small piece out of a Frenchman's breeches."

The recent work of Victor Hugo, "The History of a Crime : the Testimony of an Eyewitness," gives a view of the people of Paris during the four days embracing the *coup d'état* of Louis Napoleon, in December, 1851, which fully sustains the point in hand. The tragic and the comic, the sublime and the ridiculous, the heroic and the cowardly, scenes of blood and slaughter, freely joined with scenes of festivity—all these drawn by the masterly hand of Victor Hugo, scenes in which he mingled and in which he was a prominent actor, present a picture of French real life which could not easily be paralleled anywhere else among men, and which may perhaps be properly charged to certain peculiarities of French blood.

As another illustration of some of the peculiarities of French character alluded to, nothing can be better, of its kind, than the account given by the late American Minister to France of what he witnessed in the Corps Legislatif, at its first sitting, immediately following some of the early battles and decisive

defeats of the French armies in the late Franco-Prussian war. This illustration is all the more valuable in that it is taken from an official document, furnished in the correspondence of the Hon. Elihu B. Washburne with the American Secretary of State, and recently published by the United States Senate, in answer to a call for the correspondence made upon the President.

Mr. Washburne's despatch is dated at Paris, August 12th, 1870. After stating that "this session of the Corps Legislatif was one of the most extraordinary which has been held since the Revolution of 1848, if not since the first Revolution," and after mentioning by name the several divisions of the body and describing their characteristics, he proceeds to say :

"The President having declared the session opened, he had only read the formal part of the proclamation convening the legislative bodies, reciting, 'By the Grace of God and the national will, Emperor of the French,' when many members of the Left broke out in furious exclamations, saying they did not want any more of that, and it was some time before the President could finish reading the document. After he had concluded he awarded the floor to Emile Ollivier, Minister of Justice, who mounted the tribune and commenced developing the reasons why the Chamber was called together. He had only said a few words when he was met with the most boisterous and insulting interruptions. A member of the Left having cried out that the country had been compromised, Jules Favre exclaimed, 'Yes; by the imbecility of its chief! Come down from the tribune! It is a shame!' . . . He then proposed a decree, providing for an Executive Committee of Fifteen Deputies, who should be invested with the full powers of government to repel foreign invasion. This proposition was received with yells of denunciation by the Right, who denounced it as revolutionary and unconstitutional, and the President so decided. After M. Jules Favre had concluded, Granier de Cassagnac, a member of the Extreme Right, rushed to the tribune, and his first words were to denounce the proposition of Favre as the commencement of revolution. He proceeded in a strain of bitter denunciation, amid the shouts, vociferations, and gestures of almost the entire Left. He accused them of hiding behind their privileges to destroy the Government of the Emperor, who was in the face of the enemy. Here came interruptions, calls to order, and threats. Thirty members of the Left were on their feet, yelling at Cassagnac and shaking their fists toward him, and he answered by shaking his fist at them; and all of this time the members of the Right were applauding Cassagnac, who finally wound up with the terrible threat that if he were a Minister he would send the members of the Left to a military tribunal before night. This was followed by one of the most terrific explosions ever witnessed in a legislative body. All the deputies of the Left jumped to their feet, and raised their voices in most indignant protest. And then rose up the deputies of the Right to drown the cries of the Left with their own vociferations.

Jules Simon descended into the arena in front of the tribune, gesticulating with vehemence, saying if they dared to send them to a Council of War they were ready to go; that if they wanted to shoot them they would find them ready. This added to the tumult. Nearly all the members were on their feet. The voice of Simon was heard above the din, 'If you want violence you shall have it.' At this moment Estancelin, under great excitement, cried out, 'The Minister of Foreign Affairs laughs.' Jules Ferry was heard in the uproar to say that it was not proper 'for a Minister who was attempting to negotiate a peace to ——,' and here his voice was lost in the tumult. Nearly the entire Left then started from their places and rushed to the area in front of the tribune, and up to the seats of the Ministers; Estancelin, Ferry, and old Garnier Pages in front. They shook their fists directly in the face of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Duc de Gramont, who sat fixed, without moving a muscle. Here the tumult reached its height. A hundred men were screaming at the top of their voices, and the President rang his bell furiously, but all to no effect. And then, as a signal that he had lost all control of the assembly, and, as a flag of distress, he covered himself by putting on his hat. The *huissiers* then rushed in and separated the contending parties, and, some minutes after, comparative quiet was restored."

Can it be supposed that any thing similar to this could occur in the British Parliament? Would the announcement, made in the House of Commons, that a French army had landed in England, threatening the capital, have stirred up that body to exhibit such scenes of folly? Could any thing similar to it be witnessed, under like circumstances, in the Reichstag at Berlin, or in the Reichsrath at Vienna?

Passing the question of the peculiarities of French blood to account for the peculiarities of French character and history—whether the theory be worth much, little, or nothing—another phase of French life which unquestionably has had and now has much to do with the political trials of that people is this: While the several compact dynasties mentioned are still watching to clutch the sceptre, and while the adherents of monarchy have always been persistent, the power of the republican principle has been longer in action and more deeply seated in the French mind than among the people of any other great nation in Europe.

These forces being in constant operation, side by side, are always ready for an explosion; and that explosion is just as inevitable when certain elements are brought into contact, as an explosion will follow the contact of fire and gunpowder.

The French Revolution of 1789-93 was the uprising of a nation to deliver itself from insupportable oppression. Its aim was good, while some of its measures were unjustifiable and its atrocities diabolical. The causes which produced it had long been in operation.

From that early day to the present moment, the principles of Republicanism and Monarchy have ever been at open strife in France. The people have ever cherished their early love of liberty, while dynastic opposition has ever struggled to recover what it lost in the first open battle with the democratic spirit a century ago. At one moment Republicanism has triumphed, at another time Monarchy, as the numerous and almost incessant revolutions heretofore enumerated have succeeded each other.

Here, then, is one plain and palpable element of the case, which, in a slight degree, serves to solve the question of the "ninety years' agony of France ;"¹ and this peculiar aspect of things is found nowhere else in European history during this period.

Considered, then, purely as a political question, and as one of the prime causes of perpetual contention in France, these antagonistic forces stand thus : On one side are the several dynasties, each founding its claim upon divine right and hered-

¹ In reference to the contest between Republicanism and the dynasties of Imperialism and Monarchy, Professor Smith remarks : " We do not greatly fear Bonapartism, in itself, simply as a movement in favor of the restoration of a military despotism for the benefit of a discredited dynasty. What we fear is the implacable hostility of aristocracy to a Republic based upon equality." That touches a vital point. He continues, with great pertinency, referring to the three dynasties : " One and all they instinctively hate equality, and those hate it most bitterly whose nobility is of yesterday. You may demonstrate as clearly as you please that aristocracy has had its hour, that humanity is passing into another phase, that the best and most glorious part which a man who inherits the influence of aristocracy can play is to smooth the transition into a new era : some of the finer minds, and of those who can hope to maintain their position by their own character and intellect, will perhaps listen to you ; but the mass will obey the bias of class, cling to privilege, and constantly conspire against equality and any institutions by which equality is upheld. Their feelings toward the democratic masses are not those of mere political difference, but of hatred more bitter than that which is felt by a foreign enemy, and aggravated by contempt. The aristocratic conspiracy, for such at bottom it was, of De Broglie and Fortou has for the moment failed ; *but the attempt will be perpetually renewed*; and it will be fortunate indeed if the question between the Republic and the aristocracy is finally decided without adding another convulsion to the ninety years' agony of France."

itary prescription ; regarding it as their highest duty to assert and defend it, whatever may be the will of the people ; and on the other side are the opponents of all dynastic pretensions, however venerable for age or on whatever basis founded, holding the sentiment that in government the will of the people is the will of God. Each of these two antagonistic forces is persistent, and each is determined. These elements, in such a nation as France, must ever be in collision until the party of the people shall completely triumph over the party which opposes them—a result which is ultimately certain, and whose realization belongs, it is confidently believed, to the near future.

THE MOST POTENT CAUSE OF ALL.

And now comes into view an entirely distinct and special element of power, which, acting in close conjunction with Monarchy and Imperialism, has done more than any one single force to keep France at perpetual strife with herself ever since the upheaval of society in 1789, and which to-day is at the bottom of the perils which yet threaten that unhappy people. This is a “spiritual power” (so called), resting its claims, like the political, upon divine right, but assuming a superiority of rule over all peoples, all governments, all kings and princes ; putting the church above the state, and making the head of its hierarchy the special depositary of divine authority, investing him with divine prerogatives and clothing him with the panoply of absolute infallibility.

This spiritual despotism, which has played so prominent a part in French history within the last hundred years—to go no farther back ; which has been directly concerned in every change of government which France has experienced ; which instigated and stimulated the French President and Senate in their unattained purposes of the last twelvemonth ; which is still watching its opportunity when the crisis of 1880 shall arrive, and which, taken alone, is here regarded as the chief cause, on one side, of “the ninety years’ agony of France,”—is the factor in those troubles which is substantially overlooked by Professor Goldwin Smith in his elaborate and valuable paper upon this unparalleled chapter of history.¹

¹ Professor Smith, near the close of his article, does make the following incidental allusion to the cause here referred to, plainly showing, from the manner of his reference, that he deems it of trivial importance : “We do not greatly fear the

Ultramontanism and Republicanism are natural enemies, while Ultramontanism and Monarchy are as naturally, in principle at least, fast friends. The three dynasties now existing in France favor Ultramontanism because it opposes the rule of the people ; and Ultramontanism favors Monarchy or Imperialism for the same reason. One embodies despotism in the state, the other embodies despotism over both church and state. They mutually aid each other in the common purpose of opposing the will of the people in order to gain their own ends, while all lovers of liberty among the people must array themselves against both elements of this double despotism.

The operation of these two conflicting forces furnishes the true key to the door which opens upon the French Revolution of 1789-93, and it largely explains the revolutions which have followed it.

The initial causes which resulted in the upheaval of the political, social, and ecclesiastical fabric in France nearly one hundred years ago have substantially perpetuated themselves, and are at the bottom of the troubles of France to-day. That is to say, now as then, on the one side is Absolutism in the State, then, however, embodied in a single dynasty, but now, all the worse, embodied in three, determined, at all hazards, to rule France, and seeking alliance with every power in heaven and earth and under the earth, to gain its ends ; and alongside of this Secular Absolutism, part and parcel thereof, acting apparently in its behalf, but really using it as an instrument while acting for its own ultimate ends, stands a more fearful Spiritual Absolutism ; its official representatives and their adherents making ninety-four per centum of the whole population of the nation ; having access to the most sacred precincts of every household and claiming to rule every conscience ; solemnizing every marriage and officiating at every baptism and every burial ; insisting upon the right from God to make and dethrone princes, and to rule over all governments and people on the broad earth ; acknowledging allegiance to him alone who sits upon his throne in the seven-hilled city, clothed with divine prerogatives, infalli-

clericals since the catastrophe of Eugénie and her priests, and when Ultramontanism, in spite of its recent spasm of aggressive energy, is manifestly losing ground throughout educated Europe."

ble in wisdom and power, exalting himself "above all that is called God or that is worshipped, so that he as God sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God."

Who that looks upon this true but faintly-drawn picture does not see that its place in the national gallery is even more appropriate in 1878 than it was in 1789? The morals of French society to-day, in the circles which surround those in power and in the higher posts of the church, may, perhaps, be better than they were one hundred years ago;¹ but these are the mere incidents of the case. The main characteristics in all things that make up the essence of the situation are the same: Absolutism in the state linked with Absolutism in the church; the two, leagued in one, against the cause of the people, with the people knowing their rights and determined to assert them.

The essential feature of the situation which writers of the class of Professor Smith overlook, or greatly underweigh, is the very palpable fact, seen through every period of the ninety years' agony of France, and seen now, that any one of the dynasties mentioned, representing Monarchy or Imperialism, or all of the three combined, would be utterly impotent in their contest with Republicanism, the synonym of "hated equality," were it not for the Ultramontane element, the essence of the Spiritual Absolutism. Without its aid they are powerless. Incurring its hostility they would perish. As mere political forces, they are nothing in France to-day, whatever their prestige or however compact their organization, for the obvious reason, that, without the support of the priesthood, they cannot reach and control the people. But whenever able to draw to their aid that power which the hierarchy wield, they have hope. Should the priesthood change front, and throw their influence into the scale of Republicanism, instructing, as is their wont, the members of their flocks to vote for it, Imperialism and Monarchy would have no more hope in France than they have in the United States. They would instantly perish.

¹ And yet Pius IX. did not hesitate to bestow, quite recently, the "Golden Rose" upon ex-Queen Isabella, in "honor of her devotion to the Papacy"—a "royal lady" whose personal morals and those of her court were so openly and shamelessly dissolute, that the people of Madrid, where morality among princes and nobles has never been noted for its rigidity, could no longer tolerate her presence, but drove her from her throne and from the Spanish dominions.

Jonah's gourd would be too permanent a symbol of their life. This, of course, no one expects, under any emergency. Ultramontanism too well knows that established Republicanism would be its own death, while under Imperialism or Monarchy it has a little hope left ; hence it stands firmly by the dynasties.

But it should never be forgotten—and here is the vital essence of the whole case—that Ultramontanism acts for itself, first, last, and always ; that, in themselves considered, it cares not one whit what becomes of Imperialism or Monarchy, or any of the pretended emperors or kings who represent them. If it can use them for its own purposes, it will do so ; if it cannot, it will be indifferent to their fate. They may think they are using it, and so they are ; but the reverse is the more important fact. It uses them just as it essays to use every thing and everybody—simply and solely for its own purposes ; and centuries of history attest its wonderful success. Like the atmosphere, it is not seen, but everywhere felt. There is no effective social and political power known among men which is so nearly ubiquitous as the spirit of Jesuitism, the spirit which animates the whole body of the Roman Catholic Church, from him who is its head, claiming infallibility, down to the lowest order of the priesthood who occupy the confessional in every corner of the world.

These are the well-known conditions of this power which sustain and illustrate the proposition, heretofore announced, that Ultramontanism is, beyond all comparison, the one solitary force, if taken singly, which underlies the perils and dangers which now, as always before, beset France. The very nature of Romanism makes it so. The cardinal principle of the system is, that it is from God and cannot change.

If, now, the question be asked, why this Spiritual Absolutism, in the midst of so many European nations which are in popular and often in diplomatic parlance called “ The Catholic Powers,” has so long been and is now more disastrously demonstrative in France than anywhere else in Europe, the answer is by no means difficult. It is found in the grouping of the facts already noticed. France, beyond any of the Great Powers, and also beyond most of the smaller, is more compact and homogeneous in race, language, and religion ;¹ fewer of her

¹ The best authorities give the ratio between the Roman Catholics and the whole population of the leading States of Europe, respectively, as follows : In

people emigrate, in proportion to population, and none are so attached to the soil and cherish with more pride her glory and renown; no nation, owing to location and peculiar circumstances, was so early brought into contact with democratic principles, while among no people was loyalty to the crown more intense, and while, again, owing to the revolutions which these conflicting principles engendered, no other nation brought to the surface and perpetuated so many rival dynasties; and, finally, in no other European nation has the Roman Catholic Church, the embodiment of Spiritual Absolutism, holding sway over so large a per cent of the population, been represented by a hierarchy so intelligent, so enterprising, and so powerful, flattering and using those in authority as well as those behind the throne purely for its own ends, and directed in all this by the Sovereign Pontiff at Rome, he in turn stimulated by the Society of Jesus, whose influence is well-nigh omnipresent, and whose domination over pope, priests, and people is but little less than omnipotent.

No nation of Europe has been so subservient to the papal power, and no nation has served it so faithfully. When the advancing spirit of liberty in Italy, resulting from the general upheaval of 1848, drove Pius IX. from his throne, French soldiers restored him to it. While the same spirit, prompted by Garibaldi, still threatened, French soldiers stood guard around the Vatican. The pope flattered Napoleon III. as the eldest and most devoted son of the church, and the emperor, in turn, defended the papacy. Their interests were mutual. The emperor was rewarded for his service to the pope in the greater loyalty to the emperor diffused among the French people through the influence of the priesthood; and the pope, in turn, found his reward in the protection furnished him by French bayonets. This mutual support continued down to the opening of the Franco-German war, and perhaps might have continued still but for that event. Not until the French soldiers had been withdrawn from Rome, to be used against Germany,

France, ninety-four per centum; Italy, eighty-two; Austria, seventy-six; Great Britain, nineteen; Germany, fourteen; Russia, nine. The foregoing estimate is based upon the following totals of population, given in round numbers: France, 38,000,000; Italy, 26,700,000; Austria, 36,000,000; Great Britain, 31,800,000; Germany, 41,000,000; Russia, 75,000,000.

did the legions of Victor Emmanuel enter the Eternal City. But where, at that critical moment, were all the other "Catholic Powers"? Why did not Austria or Spain, or smaller states in sympathy with the papacy, strike even one blow for the church in whose interests, during the ages, their loyalty had been so signally illustrated? Why did they not all combine for this? Catholic France and Protestant Prussia were the only powers at war. The rest of Catholic Europe stood still and saw Pius IX. despoiled of his temporalities, deprived of his throne, the gates of Rome battered down by the armies of Sardinia, at that time scarcely a third-rate power in European politics, and the pope made a prisoner in his own palace.

Could any thing more palpably illustrate the fact that, among all the nations, France was really the only strong Catholic power in Europe? Could any thing more forcibly show the hold which the priesthood had upon the French nation? And so it is at this moment. While Spain and Austria, singly or combined, are impotent to aid the papacy, and while it is conceded that France is equally so, under republican rule, still it is to France alone that Ultramontanism looks for restoring to the papacy its rights and giving back to the church her ancient and God-given sway over the world. This it is which renders compact the clerical party among that homogeneous people. This it is which inspires the priesthood to oppose, to the death, republican rule. This it is which binds the hierarchy to favor the Comte de Chambord, or the Prince Imperial, or the Comte de Paris—they care not a farthing which—so that, through restored Monarchy or Imperialism as a means, this Spiritual Absolutism may gain its ultimate end. And these are the considerations, ramified and multiplied, which combine to show that, of all other causes, that which deeply underlies the present perils of France, and that which has been her standing trouble during her "ninety years' agony," is the spirit and determination of the Ultramontane party to regain, at every cost, their ancient prestige and power.

SO MUCH FOR THE PAST—WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

What, then, is to be the upshot of this still pending issue? What at this moment is the political outlook in France?

Which of these two opposing forces, Absolutism or Republicanism, is ultimately to triumph?

It is to prepare the way for an answer to these vital questions that an extended examination of the difficulties in the path has here been attempted. The spirit now working in Europe, the spread of the principle of constitutional government, the greater diffusion of intelligence, the advancement in education, the concessions made to the representatives of the people in many things heretofore regarded as the prerogatives of kings, the opening up of the means of a more free and rapid intercommunication between the people of the same nation and between those of one nation with another, together with the progress rapidly made in all the arts and sciences, combine to show that the reign of Absolutism, whether in church or state, is nearing its end, and that the rule of the People is fast approaching.

A most remarkable and significant fact, and without a parallel in the history of France—significant in its bearings in a political, social, and especially in a religious point of view—is seen in the present composition of President MacMahon's Cabinet. The men who compose it were selected in obedience to the demand of the Chamber of Deputies, as reflecting the sentiment of the people at large, and resulting from the long and severe struggle of the various parties to secure predominance in the Cabinet, after the election for the present Chamber held in October last. M. Gambetta, in his electioneering addresses, proved a true prophet in declaring that, if the Republicans should triumph when France had spoken at the ballot-box, the President would have "to submit or resign." He would not resign, but hoped to defeat the will of the people in the composition of his Cabinet. It is within the recollection of all who closely watched events, that the President made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain a Cabinet, owing to the opposition manifested in the Chamber. He finally chose "to submit," and therefore selected the present incumbents, with whom the Chamber of Deputies were satisfied. The number in the Cabinet is nine; and the significant fact is that five of them are Protestants. It is not supposed that they were chosen because of their well-known religious sentiments; but it is, nevertheless, a rather remarkable event in French history, and shows, unmis-

takably, the drift of public sentiment. The Catholic hierarchy were, of course, aroused, indignant, disgusted ; but can any thing more plainly show that they are impotent before the will of the people ? The positions, also, which this Protestant majority in the French Cabinet hold are noteworthy. M. Waddington is Minister of Foreign Affairs ; General Borel is Minister of War ; Admiral Pothuau is Minister of the Marine ; M. Léon Say is Minister of the Finances ; and M. De Freycinet is Minister of Public Works.

The principles of liberty and constitutional government are firmly rooted in Western and Central Europe, and they are spreading in all directions. Austria and Russia are feeling their force, the Ottoman Empire is crumbling before them, and their march is triumphantly onward. It is a progress which no human power can stop. What has already been accomplished among some of the leading Continental Powers, in adopting constitutional government, is quite a recent work. It is but twenty-eight years since Prussia, the leading state of United Germany, adopted a Constitution ; while Austria took the first step in this direction a little more than ten years ago. Under the liberal spirit and policy of the Emperor Alexander, Russia, the last of the European Powers to maintain Absolutism, will soon follow suit, and the power of the People will thenceforth be everywhere recognized.

It is scarcely to be believed that the opposite forces, already weakened and trembling, can long hold even their present sway in France. Spiritual Absolutism need not, however, be expected to make concessions. To do this is to disembowel itself. It will stand in its tracks and perish in the ditch. This is history ; this is prophecy ; and prophecy will again become history. It is but a question of time, possibly of months, possibly of years ; and it may be that it was settled for France last October ; or, if not, that it will be decided and forever settled when President MacMahon's term shall expire—two years hence. But its final settlement is undoubtedly near at hand. When it shall come it will be against Absolutism in both church and state, and in favor of the People. May God speed the day !

ROBERT L. STANTON.