DICKINSON'S

THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

MDCCCLXXIX.

VOL. V.

EDITED BY

DR. H. SINCLAIR PATERSON.

LONDON:
RICHARD D. DICKINSON, FARRINGDON STREET.
MDCCCLXXIX.

THE ETHICAL THEORY OF RHETORIC AND ELOQUENCE.

By Professor W. G. T. Shedd, D.D.

From "Literary Essays."

THE proper product of Rhetoric is Eloquence, and the purpose of a rhetorical education is to produce an eloquent thinker, and an eloquent writer or speaker. So far as it comes short of this, therefore, rhetoric comes short of its true end.

Hence it becomes important to inquire, first of all, into the essential nature of eloquence itself; and, particularly, to define it in such a manner as to detect all false products, and preclude all specious methods and models. For nothing exerts a more injurious influence upon the taste, the studies, and the mental habits of an educated man than a false idea of eloquence. All educated men desire to be eloquent, and at times make greater or less effort to be so. An eloquent man is, universally, an object of admiration and of imitation. The idea of eloquence is, consequently, one that exerts a highly formative and modifying influence upon both individual and national culture. When an educated man has been seized by this idea, when he has become possessed with the desire and the aim to influence public opinion by free and fluent speech, how wonderfully are all his thoughts, and feelings, and acquirements pressed into the service of it. If he has the true idea, he almost invariably becomes eloquent; if he has the false idea, he invariably becomes over-ornamented, and glittering, and degenerates into inflation, and bombast,—so energetic and influential is the idea itself, whether truly or falsely apprehended. It enters the mind with an interest and influence peculiar to itself, and works there with all the potency of a plastic principle. The thought of becoming a philosopher, or a poet, or an artist, or a man of science, when once formed, indeed exerts a controlling influence upon the whole intellectual life; but the thought of becoming an eloquent man, a man who "wields at will the fierce democracie and shakes the arsenal," exerts an overmastering influence, so that the mind either becomes the most passionate of the passionate, or else the feeblest of the feeble, according to the truth or falsity of its idea of eloquence, and its ideal of an orator.

I. In proceeding to discuss *the true nature and essential properties of eloquence*, it is deserving of notice that nearly as many definitions have been given of eloquence as of poetry, and so far as a perfectly exhaustive definition is concerned, with about the same success. Perhaps no one definition that shall include all the essential qualities of what are strictly *vital* products of the human mind can be given. We must be content to reach the inward nature of poetry, and of eloquence, by approximations; by several definitions, each of which contemplates some particular aspect of the subject, and specifies some peculiar characteristic omitted by the others. The more mechanical and common products of the human understanding may often be clearly comprehended in a single conception, and fully defined in one statement; but its rarer,

richer, and more living productions, such as poetry and eloquence, being more mysterious in their origin, are more difficult of comprehension, and consequently of definition. We may lay it down as a general rule that in proportion as a product takes its origin in the more salient, impulsive, and original agencies of the mind; in proportion as it is less the work of mere experience and trial, like a product of useful art, or of mere memory and classification, like a manual of science; in proportion as its nature is living, and its origin is fresh, will it be more difficult to bring it within the limits of a concise and full definition. Like the definition of life itself, the definition of poetry and eloquence must be an approximation only.

Socrates, according to Cicero,* was wont to say that all men speak eloquently when they have a thorough knowledge of their subject. The duty and office of rhetoric, and hence of eloquence, according to Bacon† is to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will. Style, says Buffon—by which he means an eloquent style—is the man himself: a definition corresponding with the remark of Pascal, that a simple and natural style, the eloquence of nature, enchants us for the reason that while we are looking for an author we find a man. Eloquence, says D'Alembert,‡ is the ability to cause a sentiment with which the mind is deeply penetrated to pass with rapidity into the souls of others, and imprint itself there with force and energy. Eloquence, says Campbell,§ adopting the definition of Quintilian, is that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end, and the end of discourse is to move the will.

If we examine these definitions we shall find that they all pre-suppose a common nature and properties in eloquence, and are all of them approximate definitions of it. Neither of them is sufficient of itself to exhaust the subject; perhaps all of them together are insufficient; but they all look one way, and give the mind of the inquirer one general direction. They all teach or imply that *truth* is the substance and principle of all genuine eloquence—*truth clearly perceived, deeply felt, and strongly expressed.* Men are eloquent in proportion as they thoroughly know their subject, says Socrates. Eloquence is truth all aglow and practically effective in a human soul; it is reason in the forms of the imagination in order to influence the will, says Bacon. It is the co-operation of the understanding with the imagination and the passions, in order to carry the will, say Quintilian and Campbell. Eloquence is truth felt and transferred to others; it is the transfer of the orator's consciousness into the auditor's consciousness, says D'Alembert.

All these definitions teach that actual verity is the substance of eloquence, and that through the transformation which it undergoes by passing through an earnest and eloquent mind its final effect is to carry the whole man, head, heart and will, along with it. This *capture* of men's minds, this mental *movement* in speaker and hearers, this *streaming* of thought and feeling to an outward end, seems to be inseparably connected, in all these definitions, with eloquence as different from other forms of discourse. While in the essay, the historical narrative, or the philosophical disquisition, the thought more or less moves in a circle, returning back upon itself, and thus forming a wider expanse, in the oration, the thought is ever rushing onward in a deep, narrow channel, like a river to the main. We are speaking, of course, of an ideal or perfect oration; and bearing this in mind, we may say that in proportion as the mind of the orator is improgressive in its action, it ceases to be eloquent in its action and influence. A mind

* *De Oratore*, I. 14.

† *Advancement of Learning*, Book II.

‡ *Reflections sur l'élocution oratoire.*

§ *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Book I. Chap. I.

that is continually eddying; that is inclined to *dwell* long, either upon a particular thought, or upon the expression of it, either upon a bright idea, or a beautiful figure; must break up this habit, and overcome this disposition, before it can create that strong rushing current, that overwhelming, overbearing torrent in a discourse, which under the name of δεινότης the Greeks regarded as the height of eloquence. By this term, which was applied particularly to the eloquence of Demosthenes, the Greeks intended to denote that overpowering *vehemence*, in the exercise of the mental powers, which results from a clear consciousness of the truth and the right, united with a glowing fiery interest for it. This vehemence of soul, this onward sweeping rush in a channel which the mind has worn into a subject, and which it is continually wearing deeper, is preclusive of all retrograde movements, and of all stationary attitudes. Even if the subject calls in a great amount of argumentative or explanatory matter, this *current* draws it all into its own volume, so that it accelerates rather than impedes its mighty flow. "In his oration for the crown," remarks one,* "Demosthenes must have had as cumbrous a satchel as any bearer of the green bag in our courts of law. He brings forward a great mass of testimonies, written and oral laws of Athens, decrees of foreign towns and of the Amphictyonic council, and records of history, all exhibited and discussed with the utmost force and clearness. But through the whole process there is an undercurrent and moving power of passion and eloquence that carries us forward to a final and unavoidable result. It is as though we were embarked upon a mighty river. All is animation and energy around, and we gaze with a momentary reverie upon the deep and transparent waters beneath. But even while we admire, the current grows deeper and deeper, and we are unconsciously hurried onward with increasing and irresistible power."

An eloquent mind, then, is a mind under motion. It is a mind moving forward, under the influence of clear knowledge and deep feeling, with constantly accelerated motion, and constantly-increasing momentum, to a final end, which is always a practical one. Eloquence itself, then, is thought with an impulse in it, thought with a drift and rush in it. Eloquence is, as we instinctively denominate it, a *flood*.*

Without dwelling longer upon these definitions, and others that have been given of eloquence, we proceed now to a consideration of that particular one upon which Theremin founds his rhetorical system. Eloquence, says Theremin, is a *virtue*. This definition differs from the others that have been quoted, more in appearance than in

* *Marsh's Remains: Tract on Eloquence.*

*"Hazlitt," says De Quincey, "was not eloquent, because he was *discontinuous*. No man can be eloquent whose thoughts are abrupt, insulated, and (to borrow an impressive word from Coleridge) non-sequacious. Eloquence resides not in separate or fractional ideas, but in the relation of manifold ideas, and in the mode of their evolution from each other. It is not enough that the ideas should be many, and their relations coherent; the main condition lies in the *key* of the evolution, in the *law* of the succession. The elements are nothing without the atmosphere that moulds and the dynamic forces that combine. Now, Hazlitt's brilliancy is seen chiefly in separate splinterings of phrase or image which throw upon the eye a vitreous scintillation for a moment, but spread no deep suffusions of colour, and distribute no masses of mighty shadow. A flash, a solitary flash, and all is gone." This remark of De Quincey applies with force to an American writer whose rhetorical care and effort are unquestionably great, but misapplied. Emerson, much more than Hazlitt, is discontinuous and fractional. His literary work is a mosaic, and not a growth. It illustrates the remark of Buffon, that "it is from the fear of losing isolated fugitive thoughts, and from the desire of introducing, everywhere, striking traits, that there are so many compositions formed of inlaid work, and so few that are founded at a single cast. Nothing is more opposed to warmth of style."

reality. It does not, as its author remarks, differ essentially from the definition given by the elder Cato, and handed down to us with approbation by Quintilian; and it coincides with the general doctrine taught by the more profound writers upon eloquence, in all ages,—all of whom have recognised the moral element as the essential one in this species of intellectual products. Stated, however, in this brief and epigrammatic form, eloquence seems to become identical with morality, and the author in one place actually speaks of rhetoric as a part of morals.* By this, however, it is conceived, he did not mean to imply that eloquence is merely and only a moral virtue, and is sufficiently defined when it is put into the list of virtues, along with temperance, or honesty, or veracity. Perhaps the real meaning of the author would be precisely expressed by saying that eloquence is an *intellectual* virtue. It has a common origin with the moral virtues, in the resolute action of the moral force or character of the man, and, so far as the point of *ultimate origin* is concerned, may therefore be denominated virtuous, or of the nature of virtue. The theory of Theremin is, that all true eloquence springs from integrity and strength of character; that the principle and the power by which the several faculties of the mind concerned in the production of eloquence are actuated and guided is the voluntary principle and power, and hence that the product, in its *ultimate* and *essential* nature, must be moral. Let us explain in detail, that the theory may be understood. In the production of an eloquent oration, the understanding and the imagination are employed. By the first-mentioned faculty, truth simple and abstract is presented to the understanding of the hearer. By the second, this same truth is taken out of this abstract and intellectual form, and put into an imaginative form for the imagination of the hearer. Now, it is plain that the excellence of the oration depends upon the presence in it of some power or principle that shall swallow up into the unity of its own life all these separate processes of the understanding and imagination, and thereby become that vehement and terrible energy which, we have seen, according to the Greek definition, is the reality and vitality of eloquence. The unity of the oration, moreover, depends upon the proportionate and harmonious exercise of these diverse faculties. Any excess in the functions of the understanding, *e.g.*, will be to the injury of those of the imagination. The oration in this case must either lose its unity, or else give up its oratorical character and pretentions, and be converted into a philosophic esssay. And any excess in the action of the imagination will unduly repress that of the understanding, and convert the oration into a poem.

Now, that power by which each of these faculties is to be concentrated and governed, so that there shall be an even force and a just proportion in their co-working, is the *will* of the orator. He is to repress an undue tendency to ratiocination, by moral determination. He is to repress an undue poetic tendency, by moral determination. And let it not be thought that only a slight and feeble exercise of the self-controlling power is needed in the origination of this so-styled virtue of eloquence, that but little moral energy and stern force of character is required in order to the highest eloquence. How often does it happen that the oration degenerates (for in this reference it is degeneration) into the abstract essay, or the over-ornamented prose-poem, solely because there was not enough of moral strength, not enough of will, in the orator to compel all his acquisitions, and all his tendencies, into subservience of that practical end, the actuation of his hearers, which is the ultimate end of eloquence. Oftentimes as much self-control is needed to mortify a strong logical propensity, in order that it may not damage or destroy

* Book I., Chap. xiv.

a rhetorical process, as is needed in order to mortify a lust of the flesh. And still more often as much force of character is needed to restrain a luxuriant imagination, in order that it may not clog and stop the onward movement of the oration by excessive illustration and ornament, as is needed in order to restrain an animal passion. In short, that vanity, that self-feeling, which would draw off the orator from the *practical end* of his discourse to the undue display of his logic, if his mind is predominantly philosophic, or to an undue employment of the poetic element, if his nature is predominantly imaginative, requires for its conquest and extirpation precisely the same *kind* of moral force, force of will, that is needed in the suppression of vice, or in the formation of any of the strictly so-called virtues.

Now it is in this reference that eloquence is styled a virtue. So far as the principle from which it proceeds, and the impulse by which it is impelled, are concerned, eloquence is ethical, rather than philosophic or æsthetic. It is the position of Theremin that eloquence is more strictly of the nature of virtue than of the nature of science, or of the nature of art. Its essential quality and properties, he contends, are more properly ethical than scientific or artistic. Neither a scientific nor an artistic talent can become the living fountain of eloquence. Only a moral force can. Although both a philosophic and an artistic process properly and necessarily enter into that complex mental action of which eloquence is the product, yet neither of them is the *fundamental* process. We must look for this in the moral process which springs out of the character of the orator, which involves his earnestness, his sincerity, his honesty of conviction, his consciousness of the truth, and his love for it. These moral elements must first exist, or there can be no eloquence. In the same sense, then, that the orator, according to Cato and Quintilian, is a *good* man, is eloquence a virtue. Not that every good man is eloquent, or that every virtue is *ipso facto* eloquence (though we often say of the virtues, as they shine out in human character, that they are eloquent); but no man is eloquent who is destitute of moral force of character, and no discourse is eloquent that is not pervaded with a moral earnestness that is higher than any mere scientific talent or æsthetic feeling.

The truth which there is in Theremin's definition may be seen again by considering the difference between an oration and a product of fine art. According to the theory of Theremin, eloquence is not strictly a fine art. It is no more one of the fine arts because it contains an æsthetic element, than it is one of the sciences because it contains a philosophic element. It is taken out of the department of mere and pure art by the *practical and outward end* which it has in view. For if there is anything settled in the theory of art, it is that an æsthetic product has no practical end out of itself. Art, as such, has no utility or morality. Its productions exist for themselves, and not for any object other than themselves. We must not go beyond them, and look for a practical or beneficial influence exerted by them upon the minds of men, in order to decide whether they are excellent in their kind or not. Hence art cannot become religion, or even morality. If a painting or a statue is beautiful, we cannot deny its *artistic* excellence. Whether it is useful, or whether it is moral, are questions for philosophy and religion, but not for art. The artist, unlike the philanthropist, or the orator, works for his own gratification solely. His work has no end but the embodiment of a beautiful idea. As an artist *merely*, he is indifferent to the practical effects that may result. The work of art is addressed solely to the æsthetic sense. If it were addressed to the cognitive powers, solely, it would be a scientific work. If it were addressed to

the moral or religious nature, solely, it would be a religious work.

It is true, indeed, that a work of art may make a moral impression, and as matter of fact the highest works in this department invariably do. It is true that the Apollo may elevate the soul of the beholder, and the Madonna may soften and humanise it, but neither of them, *as works of art*, owed their origin to any such practical and moral aim. Fine art is its own end. It is self-sufficing, self-included, and irreferent. If it has ever contributed to the intellectual or moral improvement of man, this was a happy accident, and not a predetermined and foreseen result.

But that morality which thus stands in no inward and necessary connection with art constitutes the very essential principle of eloquence. The oration, unlike a painting or a statue, aims to exert a moral influence upon a moral agent. It seeks to work a change, more or less deep and extensive, in the state of man's active powers, employing his cognitive and imaginative faculties as mere means and media. The orator cannot, like the artist, isolate himself from all outward circumstances, and find the goal of his efforts in the serene and complacent embodiment of his idea in a form of beauty, without troubling himself in the least about the influence he may exert. The orator is a man of moral influence, and of moral impression, upon moral agents, or he is nothing. If, then, the term virtue denotes, generally, a product of the *will*, and not of the intellect merely, or the imagination merely, is not eloquence a virtue? If that agency of the soul be virtuous, or of the nature of virtue, which has an outward aim; the aim, viz., to exert a legitimate influence upon the character and actions of men; is not eloquence a virtue? Is not this earnest, moral, and practical product of the human mind much more properly denominated a virtue than an art?

To place the definition given by Theremin in another aspect, we may say that eloquence is a virtue of the intellect as *modified* by the will. When the understanding merely follows its own structure and laws; when its action is *constitutional* merely, and unmodified by any reference to an auditor, or to an outward impression upon other minds; the product is logic, and this action of the understanding is scientific. When the imagination merely follows its own nature and law, the product is poetry, or some other work of fine art, and this action of the imagination is æsthetic. In both of these instances, the intellectual faculty is left to the guidance and impulse of its own mechanism. The will exercises no modifying influence in either case, and consequently there is no moral element, nothing virtuous or of the nature of virtue, in these species of intellectual activity. It is true that the subject matter of both philosophy and art may be moral, but the mental process itself cannot be so characterised. It is a purely constitutional process, not deriving its quality in the least from the voluntary power, from the *character* of the individual, or even being in the least modified by it. The process in the one case is purely logical or scientific, and in the other purely artistic.

But eloquence has a different origin from either science or art. It results, not from the isolated action of a particular faculty, like the understanding, or the imagination, but from the interpenetration and co-operation of these intellectual powers, under the sway and actuation of the voluntary force. The *degree* in which each faculty shall work, as we have already remarked, is fixed by the self-determination of the orator, and the acme of eloquence is seen in the rush, in one resistless volume, of all the cognitive and imaginative powers in the unity of the moral will. The combined action of these powers, in this instance, unlike their isolated action in the production of the

philosophic essay, or the poem, is moral, and therefore of the nature of virtue. The will interpenetrates the logical and imaginative processes in the mind of the orator, and thus renders them ethical. Eloquence, in this aspect, is seen to be the virtuous action of the human *intellect*, as distinguished from that virtuous action of the isolated human will, to which the term "virtue" is more strictly and commonly applied. There is voluntary action in both cases, and hence the epithet "virtuous" belongs to both; but in the case of a virtue, commonly so called, the action is confined to the will itself, while in the case of eloquence it is action of the will *in* and *by* the powers of understanding and imagination. The virtue of patience, *e.g.*, is the product of the isolated action of the will, just as logic is the product of the isolated action of the understanding. Patience is the product of the will operating upon *itself*, subduing its own restiveness, and therefore is simply a particular habit of the will. But the virtue of eloquence is the product of the will as it operates upon, and in, other mental faculties, for the purpose of exerting an influence upon the will of others. Eloquence is reason and imagination wrought into a living synthesis by the vitality of a will, by the force of a strong, deep, and earnest *character*.

There is less difficulty, therefore, in understanding this definition of Theremin, and in adopting it, if we do not take the term "virtue" in its more limited and common signification, but in its widest sense, as denoting a product into which the moral strength of the individual, his force of character, enters as the fundamental quality. And such we suppose to be the essential nature of eloquence. If we are required to locate it, we think there are fewer objections to placing it within the province of practical ethics, than in that of abstract science, or in that of æsthetic art. As Theremin affirms, that theory will be most successful, will explain most phenomena and exert the most beneficial influence upon the student, which assumes that the practical and moral element in eloquence is the fundamental and dominating one, and that the philosophic and æsthetic elements are subsidiary to this. We know that the ancients, from whom it is not generally safe to differ upon subjects like the one which we are considering, regarded eloquence as one of the fine arts, and assigned it a place in the list along with poetry, and painting, and sculpture; and the modern world has generally acquiesced in their classification. And yet the rhetorical treatises of Aristotle, of Longinus, of Cicero, and of Quintilian contain much that is irreconcilable with this theory. Unconsciously, the doctrine that eloquence is at bottom neither speculatively philosophic, nor imaginatively æsthetic, but practically moral, creeps into these treatises, and exerts a modifying influence throughout. And it is the merit of Theremin, as it seems to us, that he has *systematised* this ethical view of eloquence; that he has organised these materials scattered here and there through all the best treatises on the subject, and wrought them into the unity of a consistent theory. Instead of defining eloquence to be a fine art, and then, under the instinct and impulse of good sense and sound feeling beating off and away from the definition, until it is perfectly apparent that there has been a mistake in the outset, and that eloquence has received a wrong *location*, this author affirms distinctly that it is not a fine art, but that it is (for want of a better term) a virtue. Starting with this position as the basis of his theory, he is not troubled, as were the ancient rhetoricians, by a conflict between his theory and its detailed unfolding and application. He is not *compelled* to those statements respecting the necessity of character, of integrity and sincerity and earnestness, in the orator, the necessity of

subjecting everything in the oration to a practical outward end, and of subordinating philosophy and art themselves to the moral purposes of eloquence, which are irreconcilable with the definition that makes eloquence a fine art. On the contrary, these statements, which suggest themselves so unconsciously and spontaneously as actually to over-ride the false theory that has been assumed by the rhetorician, are merely *corroborations* of the ethical theory of eloquence. As they grow out of it, so they return back into it; like vigorous shoots which by inarching are made to contribute to the vigour and strength of the parent stock.

The truthfulness of the ethical theory of eloquence is still farther evinced, and illustrated, by a consideration of its influence upon the orator. Here its excellence and value appear in plain view. Here is the place of its triumph. For even if an opponent should be able to make a stand, while discusssing the nature of the theory itself, and to raise objections that are forcible, and difficult to remove, yet when its practical application and practical influence come into consideration, the defender of the theory may speak with boldness and confidence. He really has the entire history of the department in his favour. All those forcible and impressive statements, in ancient and modern treatises upon rhetoric, which lay emphasis upon the moral element in eloquence, and in the orator himself,—statements that fall glowing from the mind of the theorist, when, having for a moment left his speculative theory behind him, he speaks more from the common feeling, and the common sentiment, of mankind at large upon this subject,—all such statements, we say, come thronging in upon the mind, when it is considering the practical influence of the theory in question. The advocate of the ethical theory feels that all these statements legitimately belong to *him*, and to him alone; that they are but the practical and informal enunciation of his own speculative and formal theory. When he hears Quintilian define the orator to be "an *upright* man who understands speaking," he thinks he hears a concrete annunciation of the abstract position that "eloquence is a virtue," and believes that, in the establishment of his theory, he has only applied an affirmation to oratory itself, which long ago was applied to the orator. Supported thus, as he is, by the spontaneous and unbiassed opinions of theorisers themselves, he is the more confident in his belief that the actual application of the ethical theory of eloquence will only serve to verify it, and its practical influence to recommend it, in the very highest degree.

1. The influence of the ethical theory of eloquence is most excellent, in the first place, upon *the studies of the orator.*

It is the natural tendency of that theory of eloquence which defines it to be a fine art strictly, to isolate oratory from the real sciences, and the solid acquirements of the orator. The eye is too intently fixed upon form, and the secondary properties of discourse, because it is assumed that the *ultimate* end of eloquence, like that of any other fine art, is beauty. The studies of the orator, consequently, will take their main direction from this theory, and he will bestow undue attention upon those departments of human knowledge, and those species of literature, which have more affinity with the idea of the Beautiful, than with the ideas of the True and the Good. These higher ideas will be made to take a secondary place in his mind, and his culture will be characterised more and more by superficiality, and lack of vigorous strength. He will become more and more interested in works of art, and the lighter forms of literature, and less and less interested in science, philosophy, and theology.

But the natural tendency of that theory of eloquence which regards it as essentially

moral rather than æsthetic; which sets up for it an outward and practical end, and does not for an instant allow it an *artistic* indifference in respect to an outward and practical impression; which connects eloquence far more with the ideas of the true and the good than with the idea of the beautiful,—the natural tendency, and strong direct influence, of *such* a theory of eloquence is to promote the graver and higher studies in the orator. The more profound and central powers of the mind will be continually exercised, and thus the foundation for a powerful and impressive mental activity will be laid. Such an orator, like Pericles of old, will study and meditate upon the dark problems of philosophy and religion, and while like the patron of Phidias and the decorator of Athens, he will not by any means be indifferent to beauty and to art in their proper place, he will yet derive that commanding and overwhelming eloquence, that Olympian power attributed to the great Grecian, from these loftier themes, these more profound departments of human inquiry and effort.*

2. Again, the influence of that theory of eloquence which regards it as ethical rather than either scientific or æsthetic, is most excellent, in respect to *the models of the orator.*

The general influence of the ethical theory of eloquence upon the *taste* is to render it strict and pure. The orator whose mind has been moulded by it, naturally selects models from the very highest range of oratory, and thereby feels the very choicest influence of the department. His models, consequently, are few in number, but they are such as can never be outgrown and left behind in his onward progress. A single model like Demosthenes contains, for the mind that is prepared for it by a strict and high theory of Eloquence, more educational power than myriads of inferior models. Such a model is a standard and permanent one. But in order that the first-class models may be apprehended and appreciated, a severe taste must have been engendered in the student. He must have been so disciplined by a high theory that he has acquired an indifference towards second-rate productions, and a positive disrelish for those more glaring and showy qualities which are found in works that are for a day only, and not for all time. He must have attained such an intellectual temper, such a style and tone of literary culture, as can find pleasure only in those calmer, grander, and loftier efforts which do not so much strike and startle by their brilliancy, as develope and stir the human soul by their depth, fervour, and power.

Now, the theory in question tends directly to the production of such an intellectual taste in the orator. It is a high and austere theory. It is a theory which checks extravagance and prunes luxuriance by subjecting the whole oratorical process to the restraints of ethics. It subordinates the beauty of poetry, and even the truth of philosophy, to the practical ends of morality. If there is any danger in the theory, it is in the direction of severity and intense truthfulness. If there is any error in the theory, it is upon the safe side. It cannot be denied that the entire influence of it is to induce such mental habits, such mental tastes, and such a mental tone as both prepare the student for a genial appreciation of the highest models, and a free and original reproduction

* *Soc.* I should say that Pericles was the most accomplished of rhetoricians. *Phædr.* What of that? *Soc.* All the higher arts require much discussion and lofty contemplation of nature; this is the source of sublimity and perfect comprehensive power. And this, as I think, was the quality which, in addition to his natural gifts, Pericles acquired from his happening to know Anaxagoras. He was imbued with the higher philosophy, and attained the knowledge of mind and matter, which was the favourite theme of Anaxagoras, and from hence he drew what was applicable to the orator's art.—Plato's Phædrus, 269-70.

of them. The mind that has been developed and trained by the ethical theory of eloquence will prefer Demosthenes to Æschines, Cicero to Hortensius, Massillon to Bossuet, Mirabeau to Lamartine, Burke and Fox to Sheridan and Phillips.

But the excellence of the influence exerted by the theory in question, in rendering the taste pure and strict, is seen more particularly in reference to current productions, and current styles and schools. The principal danger to which the rhetorician or the orator is exposed arises from the influence of contemporaneous rhetoric and contemporaneous eloquence. Dazzling and brilliant but superficial and transitory products always have their day; and during their day, minds that have not been highly trained are taken captive by them. Such minds become copyists and mannerists; and copyists and mannerists never are, and never can be, eloquent. But a pure taste, and a genuine relish for the excellences of those great masters and models which, like the sun, are always the same in all time, is an infallible preservative against this pernicious influence of contemporaries. There is a strength and reserve in that intellectual character which has been formed by high theories, by the contemplation of grand ideals, which no storm of popular applause, no fury of fashion, can overcome or exhaust. Such a mind is self-possessed and self-reliant. Such a mind is eagle-eyed and critical. Such a mind calmly stands the glare of false rhetoric and false eloquence, while the weak, unarmed eye of the half-educated is dazzled and blinks. This austere judgment, this clear, calm criticism, looks by and beyond all the showy and gaudy products that are temporarily bewitching the popular taste, to those serene, grand, and absolutely beautiful forms, the *Dii majores gentium*, in all the great literatures of the past and the present, and in them alone finds its models, and upon them alone expends its enthusiasm.

II. Having thus discussed the nature of eloquence, we proceed to consider *the general nature of rhetoric*, and *its position and influence in the system of liberal education.*

In passing to the consideration of that branch of discipline whose object it is to produce and promote eloquence, we are struck in the outset with the fact that it has ever been regarded an essential part of a symmetrical system of education. If we look into the ancient world, all culture seems to have culminated in rhetoric and oratory. The whole end and aim of study, even in other and higher departments, appears to have been to make the educated man a rhetorician—using the term in its best and technical signification. The goal had in the eye, during the whole of his education, by the young Athenian, or the young Roman, was the bema or the rostrum. It was thought that unless culture enabled the mind to give expression to itself, to reveal and embody its knowledge in a form that would impress and influence other minds, it was worthless. Hence even philosophy was made subservient to oratory, as in the example of Pericles, who studied under Anaxagoras, one of the most subtle of the Greek philosophers, in order to prepare himself for the practical life of a statesman and orator. The walks of the Academy and Lyceum led directly to the Agora and the Forum.

In Grecian and Roman education, consequently, rhetoric occupied a high position. It was not only a distinct department, but one of great influence. General rhetorical power, the ability to express and impress, was regarded as the last and highest accomplishment of the educated citizen. And the same holds true, to a considerable extent, of the system of education in vogue in the modern world. If rhetoric, within the last hundred years, has somewhat sunk down from its former "pride of place," it is mainly because of the false view that has

been taken of its essential nature, and the false method in which it has been taught. During the two centuries that succeeded the revival of learning, however, its claims were never higher, or more willingly allowed. The minuteness of detail, and, we may add, the comprehensiveness on the whole of outline, exhibited by the rhetorical treatises composed two hundred years ago, are ample evidence that then, at least, there was no disposition to undervalue this branch of discipline. Indeed, the over-estimate which came to be put upon it, together with the dry and mechanical method into which the somewhat formal, and yet substantially sound rhetoric of Aristotle had degenerated, contributed to that reaction which followed, and which for the last hundred years has led to an under-estimate of the whole department. Yet rhetoric is still honoured in that system of instruction by which the modern mind is being educated. Rhetoric is still one branch of human learning, one department of instruction; and whenever it is pursued in the spirit, and by the method, which its own real nature and distinguishing characteristics prescribe, it is still found to minister to the sound and vigorous development of the mind.

In discriminating the distinctive nature of rhetoric, and in assigning it its position in the curriculum of discipline it is necessary in the first place to direct attention to that generic classification of the sciences which so greatly assists the investigator in locating any particular one of them.

Human knowledge may be divided into two grand divisions which very exactly and conveniently distinguish the immense variety that enters into this great sum total. Knowledge is either material or formal. A *material* department of knowledge is one in which the matter is primary, and the form is secondary. A *formal* department is one in which the form is primary, and the matter secondary. The material sciences have also been termed *real* sciences, to denote that in them the reality or substance of human knowledge is to be found. For the formal sciences are not independent, and self-sufficient. They have no positive character, no substantial contents of their own, such as the material or real sciences have. They derive all the interest and worth they possess from their connection with these latter. They exist only for these latter; because the form exists only for the substance, the manner for the matter.*

Take those portions of the general department of philosophy which go under the names of physics and ethics, as examples of branches of *material* or *real* knowledge, and consider what they contain. Here we have no hollow and empty divisions which must be filled up from other divisions in order that they may have solidity; no mere *form* of knowledge, to be filled up with knowledge itself. Natural and moral philosophy have each substantial contents of their own. The nature and operations of the human mind, and of the divine mind so far as it is cognizable by man, and the laws and principles of the material world,—these and such like are the subject matter of these two subdivisions of real science. In whatever direction the moral or natural philosopher advances, he meets with real entities and essences; he is occupied with substantial verities. Truth itself, fact itself, and thought itself, is the staple and substance of his

* "All rational knowledge is either *material*, and contemplates some one object, or *formal*, and is occupied merely with the forms of the understanding, and of the reason itself,—with the universal laws of thinking, generally, without regard to the objects of thought. Formal philosophy is denominated *logic*; but material philosophy, which has to do with determinate objects, and the laws and principles to which they are subjected, is twofold. For these laws are either laws of *nature* or of *spirit*. The science of the first is denominated *physics*, that of the latter is *ethics*, the former is also termed the doctrine of nature, the latter the doctrine of morals."—*Kant's Practical Reason (Vorrede).*

investigations. The *form* is for him an altogether secondary thing; the *matter* is everything. He does not ask, "*how* is it?" but "*what* is it?"

But take again the department of logic, and we have a branch of *formal* knowledge. The logician establishes no one particular truth, but merely shows how any truth may be established. He does not exhibit the actual contents of the human mind, its ideas, sentiments, and beliefs, but only those laws of mental activity in accordance with which these contents are *formed*. It is not the province of logic to exhibit thought itself, but only the process of thinking. Logic generates no fountain of living waters; it merely indicates the channel in which they must flow, if they flow at all. In investigating, such departments as physics and psychology, we are occupied with the *real*,—with facts and truths that are matters of actual consciousness, or actual intuition; with the contents of our own minds. But in studying such a subject as logic, we are occupied with the *formal*—with the mere abstract notions and forms of the understanding; with the ways in which, rather than the things which, it perceives.

To see the distinction in question still more clearly, compare an entire department like fine art with an entire department like science or religion. The end and aim of art is to embody some idea in a form suited to express it. With the nature and origin of this idea it does not concern itself. It takes it as it finds it, and leaves the analysis and investigation of its interior structure to the philosopher or the theologian. The artist may, it is true, contemplate this subject matter of his art philosophically, or theologically, but only in subordination to the purposes of his profession; only in order to be able to clothe the idea in a more beautiful form. He does not, like the votary of the *real* sciences, rest in the subject matter, being satisfied with having unfolded and developed the truth in his own mind; he cannot rest until he has given expression to it in an outward embodiment. Hence we say that fine art is *formal* in its nature and character. It subordinates everything to this its ultimate and constituent end. For it, the material is secondary.

In reference then to this general division of the various departments of human knowledge and inquiry, rhetoric is a formal department. It is the science of form, so far as human discourse is concerned. It is an "organic" art, as Milton* terms it; an art which furnishes the organ or instrument for communicating thought most effectively to other minds. Rhetoric, strictly speaking, is not to supply the matter, the thought itself, but is to put the material when supplied into as appropriate and fine forms as possible. The thought itself of the rhetorician must be drawn from deeper fountains than those of rhetoric. If by thorough collegiate and professional training, he has not first filled his mind with the materials for discourse, rhetorical training and preparation will only disclose his emptiness. From the *material* departments of human knowledge, from the *real* sciences, he must have first acquired a profound and comprehensive culture, before he is qualified to become a rhetorician.†

* Tract on Education.

† Lord Bacon remarks that it was an error in the educational course of his time, "that scholars in universities come *too soon* and *too unripe* to logic and rhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children and novices; for these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of sciences, being the art of arts; the one for judgment, the other for ornament; and they be the rules and directions how to set forth and dispose matter; and, therefore, for minds *empty and unfraught with matter*, and which have not gathered that which Cicero calleth 'sylva' and 'supellex,' stuff and variety, to begin with those arts (as if one should learn to weigh, or to measure, or to paint the wind), doth work but this effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great and universal, is almost made contemptible, and is degenerated into childish sophistry and ridiculous affectation."—*Advancement of Learning*. Book I.

Rhetorical discipline being thus formal in its nature pre-supposes on the part of the student a preparation for it. It postulates a full mind and a full heart. It takes the individual at that point in his course of education when the materials have been originated by other methods of discipline, when they are in a stir and fermentation, struggling for utterance, and demanding an outflow, and teaches him *delivery*—teaches him the method of embodying these conscious and living contents of his mind, in rounded and symmetrical forms. If, therefore, Plato had reason for writing over the door of his academy, "let no one who is not a geometrician enter here," the rhetorician has equal reason for inscribing upon the rostrum, "let no one ascend here who is not a scholar and a thinker."

It is of great importance here to observe the fact, that although rhetoric is a formal department of knowledge, it must not be isolated from the real sciences, either in theory or practice. This has been the error in this department for the last century. That part of rhetoric which is termed invention—that part which treats of the supply of thought—has been greatly neglected in modern treatises, so that the whole art has been converted into a collection of rules relating to style, or elocution,* merely. Owing partly to the intrinsic nature of rhetoric as an art, and partly to the excessively popular character which science and scientific statements have assumed in the present age, rhetoric has become superficial in its character and influence, so that the term "rhetorical" is the synonyme of shallow and showy. Dissevered from logic, or the necessary laws of thought, it has become dissevered from the seat of life, and has degenerated into a mere set of maxims respecting the structure of sentences, and the garnish of expression.* The rhetorician has been too much occupied with the externals of his subject. No grand and vital eloquence can originate on a theory which in this manner separates the form from the matter, the style from the thought. As in the natural world there is no growth and no fruit, except as the living principle and the outward form constitute a unity and identity of existence, so in the intellectual world the idea and the form in which it is manifested must inhere in each other, and interpenetrate each other, in order to real excellence of any kind. The student cannot therefore well cultivate thinking by itself, isolated from the expression of his thoughts, neither can he cultivate the expression of thought isolated from the process of thinking. Both processes, the philosophical and the rhetorical, must proceed *pari passu*, and simultaneously, and the result be a unity that is neither wholly formal nor wholly material in its nature. An oration considered as a rhetorical product does not consist of thought alone, any more than of expression alone. It is thought *and* expression, matter *and* form, in one common identity. Pure thought, alone and by itself, exists only in the conscious mind. Pure form, alone and by itself, exists nowhere. It is a mere notion or abstraction of the understanding, to which there is no objective correspondent. A *mere* form is a ghost, and a ghost possesses neither being nor reality.

Now, by virtue of this intercommunication of rhetoric with all the solid material branches of knowledge, it stands midway between the pure sciences and the practical arts. It is neither wholly speculative nor wholly practical. It is a most intimate and thorough mingling of these two qualities. Rhetoric

* The term is employed in the sense of Quintilian and Cicero.

* This is illustrated in the almost total neglect of the study of *topics* or *common places*. How very much was made of these, in the ancient rhetoric, for the purpose of opening and exhausting themes is apparent from Aristotle's list of topics, and Cicero's compendium of them, in his *Topica*.

serves, therefore, as a bond of connection between the more abstract branches, and the plain practical knowledge of common life. It is the mediator between the recondite theories of the philosopher, and the simple, spontaneous thinking of the uneducated man. What indeed is the orator, or the discourser generally, but a man who stands midway between the schools and the market-place, and interprets the one to the other; a man whose function it is to give such an expression to the lore of the learned world, as will impress and influence the unlearned world? The orator, the discourser generally, is a middle-man, who brings these two great halves, the lettered and the unlettered, together, and thus contributes to that collision of mind with mind, which is the life and soul of human literature, and of human history. For it is this *communication* of thought, which is ever going on, that keeps the world alive and stirring. Mere pure thinking, that never found an utterance of itself, by tongue or pen, even if such a thing could be, would leave the world as dull and motionless as it found it. It is the *expressed* thought, the *written* or the *vocalised* idea, that stirs and impels the general mind.

Having, in this brief manner, directed attention to the distinction between the formal and real sciences, and having assigned to rhetoric its place among the former, at the same time also observing its vital connection with the latter, we proceed to specify some of the advantages of this method of contemplating the general subject.

1. In the first place, upon this method, the department obtains an accurate definition, and is confined to its own just limits.

There was once a time when rhetoric was made to include vastly more than properly belongs to it; when indeed it was more like an encyclopædia of all arts and sciences, than a limited and specific branch of knowledge. Rhetoric, at one time, was almost as comprehensive a term as philosophy is at the present day. The effect of this was to distract the mind by a multiplicity of topics, and to preclude that singleness of aim and unity of pursuit which is the foundation of all good discourse. Such a variety and complexity as is exhibited by some of the elder treatises upon rhetoric is destructive of all distinctness, neatness, and elegance of form. A style formed by such an instrument must be in the highest degree loose, rambling, and unrhetorical. As matter of fact, the composition which was the fruit of such rhetorical training is generally devoid, not merely of true grace and ornament, but of the more necessary qualities of good writing, perspicuity, and vivacity. Sentences are constructed in the most clumsy manner; involved, parenthetic, and incomplete to the last degree; while the general style of the whole is heavy, dragging, and dull.

The defect in these treatises is the lack of a close and clear definition in the outset, of the nature of the art itself. It was really regarded as a *material* branch of knowledge; and hence it was the duty of the rhetorician to give positive instruction upon nearly all subjects. Inasmuch as the orator needs all the knowledge he can possibly obtain; inasmuch as eloquence can successfully employ a greater amount of information than any other department, not excepting even that of history; it was supposed to be the business of rhetoric, and of the rhetorician, to furnish it all. Hence the department, as we have remarked, became virtually an encyclopædia; not merely *a* material science, but all material science in one mass; the *omne scibile* itself. But such, we have seen, is not its nature. It is strictly, and really, a *formal* science. Its final end is simply to express, to communicate, to embody; and the more rigorously this is held to be the essential character of rhetoric, the finer will be the forms and styles of composition that come into existence. No sharply-drawn outlines,

no distinct definitions, no clean and clear developments, no round and full statements, can originate from a rhetoric that is unlimited and undefined in its own nature. If rhetoric includes everything, and is to furnish everything, then discourse will contain everything, and be full of everything. If, on the other hand, the term is strictly defined, and the eye of the student is kept steadily directed to the production of a pure and noble *form*, for the materials with which his mind has been stored by other sciences and other disciplines, then there will arise "a form and combination indeed," a style and manner fit to be a model.

2. In the second place, this view of the nature and relative position of the department of rhetoric protects it from a lifeless formality.

No branch of human knowledge is so liable to a dead formalism as rhetoric. By its very definition it is obliged to make the form, in distinction from the substance, the appropriate and final end of its investigations and instructions. It is not surprising, consequently, that this formal and formalising tendency should become too strong in the course of time, and that rhetoric should become a feeble and artificial department, instead of a vigorous and creative one. Human nature is hypocritical. Its tendency is to the form rather than to the substance; to the show rather than to the reality. This characteristic is not confined to the moral side of man's nature. It enters very largely into his intellectual being. Indeed, the effects of the apostasy are as plainly to be seen in the human intellect as in the human heart. What is this formality, this lack of sincerity and genuineness, in our mental processes, but the effect of a corruption that has vitiated the mind, as well as the heart? If we closely examine ourselves, we shall find an absence of veracity, of integrity, of godly simplicity and sincerity, to be as marked and evident in our intellectual, as in our moral condition. The whole *head* is sick.

Now, when a department of human knowledge, by its very intrinsic nature and vocation, falls in with corrupt tendency of man's nature, it is no wonder that its history should be marked by degeneracy; that it should constantly grow more and more formal, and ungenuine, in its own nature and influence. When the theoretic definition harmonises with the practical bent, when high abstract science is in unison with the actual tendency of man's nature, it is not surprising that the development, unchecked and unmodified by other agencies, should be in the highest degree false and fatal. If the blind lead the blind, both fall into the ditch.

The history of rhetoric, and we may add of the whole department of fine art, proves and illustrates the truth of this remark. We find in every nation which had an eloquence and an art, one period of fresh powerful talent and activity in these departments, and then long periods of feeble, formal, and lifeless efforts. The form constantly encroached upon the idea, until it crowded it out. The distinction between formal and real science becomes a division, and a separation, so that each was pursued alone by itself, to the great injury of the former, and to the death and destruction of the latter. Compare, *e.g.*, the eloquence of Demosthenes with the oratory of the Sophists. The former proceeds from thought, from truth, as the principle of all eloquence, form and style being moulded and determined by it. The latter starts from form and style itself, which is continually subjected to a repetition of touches and re-touches, without any inward moulding, any living formation.

> Like shadows on a stream, the forms of art
> Impress their character on the smooth surface,
> . . . . . but no soul
> Warmeth the inner frame.*

But the view that has been presented of the

* Schiller altered.

nature of rhetoric, and of its relation to the whole field of human knowledge and inquiry, is preclusive of this besetting bad tendency in the department. While recognising the essentially formal character of rhetoric, and thus giving it a distinct place in the circle of the sciences, and thereby confining it within its own limits, it at the same time directs attention to the deeper soil into which its roots must strike, and from which it must derive its nourishment and vigour. The rhetorical training of the student, on this method, is concurrent with all his other training, and becomes the medium of its communication to other minds. His general culture is benefited by his discipline in this direction, for the whole body of it is set in motion and action, by every effort to give form and expression to it.

The whole tendency of such a theory of rhetoric is to produce, in practice, masculine and vital discourse. The student is headed right by it, if we may use the term, and is taught to apply his best power to the evolution of truth, and the production of thought in his own mind, not surely to the neglect of the form in which it is to be expressed, but in order to the highest and most perfect elaboration of the form. Commencing with the matter, he proceeds to the form, which is to take shape and character, and all its qualities, from that primitive material for whose sake alone it has any existence at all. For, says Chaucer,

> Well may men knowen, but it be a fool,
> That every part deriveth from his hool.
> For Nature hath not taken his beginning
> Of no partie ne cantel of a thing,
> But of a thing that parfit is and stable
> Descending so, till it be corrumpable.*

The rhetorician is taught to be severe with himself, to forget himself in the theme, that he may exhibit it with that boldness and freedom of manner, that daring strength and grandeur of treatment, which is absolutely beyond the reach of him who is anxious respecting the impression he may make; who, in short, is tormented by too much consciousness of self, at a time when he should be absorbingly conscious of the theme.

According to the theory here presented, the oration, meaning by this every rounded and complete discourse, is the evolution of an idea that is the germ and principle of the whole composition. But nothing can be of greater benefit to the student, than, in the very beginning of his intellectual life, to be habituated to compose in the light and by the guidance, and under the impulse, of ideas; than to be enabled to discover those germinal truths which are pregnant with life, and which when embodied with freedom and power in a discourse, constitute the groundwork of the finest creations of the human mind. And apart from the benefit which is to be derived from this habit and ability, for the practical purposes of rhetoric, what a benefit is derived from it in respect to the private contemplations and enjoyment of the scholar! Supposing he does not need this ability, because he is never called upon to speak or write to his fellow-men (a supposition that is hardly to the credit of an educated man in this peculiar age), does he not need it, in order that his own mind may reach essential truth, and may, in its own reflections, follow the method and order of reason? In what a serene and constant illumination does that mind dwell, which is able in its meditations to find the fontal truth as it were by instinct, and to unfold it by its own light, and in accordance with its own structure!

By such a theory the student is introduced into the world of ideas, laws and principles, and is taught to begin with these, and from them to work out towards detail, elaboration, and ornament. It is a mysterious world, it is true, and it must be, from the very fact that it is the source and origin. But it is the very office-work of thinking to convert these

* Chaucer: *Knight's Tale.*

ideas into clear conceptions; to put these vast unlimited truths into definite and intelligible discourse; in fine, in the strict meaning of the term, to *develope* truth. He is the mystical and obscure discourser who leaves truth just as he finds it; who does not, by the aid of close thinking and a rigorous remorseless logic, compel the dark pregnant idea to yield up its secret; who does not force the contents out of the all-comprehending law or principle. And he is the clear and intelligible discourser, in the only high sense of the term; clear while solid, intelligible while weighty; who, not starting in light to make things light, starts in darkness and works his way out into high noon. In both the Pagan and Christian cosmogonies, creation emerged from old night.

Most certainly, the influence of such a theory of rhetoric is enlivening to the mind. Setting aside the fact, that it is the only one by the aid of which eloquence can come into existence, it is the only *working* theory, it is most certainly a great point gained, if an art, so often supposed to be at furthest remove from earnestness and vividness, which is regarded too commonly as the art by which the ornaments are furnished when the solid and real work has been done, is shown to have its native seat and source in both logic and ethics. The expression of thought by this theory becomes a sincere act, and the mind, while giving utterance to its reflections, is really contributing to the moral culture and development of the man. The productions of such a rhetoric are marked by that grave and conscientious character which is the natural fruit of simplicity and genuineness in the mental processes. The effect of the theory is seen even in the language employed. It is no longer stiff, stilted, and aloof from the thought, but pliant, vital, and consubstantial with it.

3. It is obvious in the third place that the view under consideration imparts an interest to the department of rhetoric which it is entirely destitute of upon any other theory.

For, as we have already remarked, no strictly formal department of knowledge is independent and self-subsistent. If we confine ourselves to a mere art, without respect to the more profound principles that lie under it, our minds soon become weary and spiritless. Such is the affinity between the human intellect and fundamental truth, such is the hungering after *substantial* knowledge and *real* science, that it cannot be permanently interested in any branch of inquiry, or of activity, that does not ultimately lead it down into these depths. Essential truth is the element and the aliment of a rational mind, and nothing short of this form of truth can long satisfy its wants. Unless, therefore, rhetorical discipline conducts the mind ultimately to these perennial fountains of stimulation and nourishment, it will soon become irksome in its nature, and wearisome in its influence. All this training in the art of composition will only serve to drink up the vigorous juices, and kill out the life of the mind.

If, on the contrary, rhetorical study and practice be grafted into the vigorous stock of a pre-existing culture, if the student come to it with a well-trained and fully-informed mind, the result of industry and fidelity in the academical, collegiate, and professional courses of instruction through which he has passed; then this part of his labour as an educated man will be the most interesting and congenial of all. We have, perhaps, experienced the exquisite pleasure which the intellect feels in the hour of vigorous creative production; the high-swelling enthusiasm of the mind, as it careers over a field of noble and lofty thought. We have, perhaps, experienced that enlargement and elevation of soul which accompanies the distinct intuition of principles, and a firm, masterly grasp of them. "The highest joy," says Schiller, "is the freedom of the mind in the

living play of all its powers;" and there is no sphere in which this play of the intellect is so full and so free, as that of authorship, as that of composition. None of the other processes in the course of education can compare with it for depth and heartiness of interest. The processes of memorising, of comparing, of judging, of analysing, of combining, and of close attention,—the processes that occur in the classical, mathematical, historical, and philosophical disciplines,—are each and all of them inferior in fresh living interest, to the process of original production. In these former instances the mind is somewhat passive, and but a portion of its power is in exercise. But in the act and process of original authorship the mind becomes a unit and unity, all its powers are concentrated into one, and the productive process is a most original and vital union of all the knowledge, all the feeling, all the imagination, and all the moral force of the man. The historian Niebuhr, speaking of the historian's vocation, remarks that he who calls past ages into being enjoys a bliss analogous to that of creating.* With equal truth, may we say of that mind which is able, in the conscious awakening of all its powers, to give full and satisfactory utterance to its thick-coming thoughts, that it enjoys the joy of a creator. If there is one bright particular hour in the life of the educated man, in the career of the scholar, it is that hour for which all other hours of student life were made—that hour in which he gives original and full *expression* to what has slowly been gendering within him. Now, what this bright hour is to the general life of the educated man, rhetorical discipline and practice is to the sum total of education. If pursued in the right method, and after the proper preparatory work has been done, it imparts an interest to general study and general culture, such as cannot exist without it. How dull and stupid is the life of a bookworm; of a mind which passes through all the stages of education, except that last and crowning one, by means of which it is put into *communication* with the great world of scholars and letters. Such a mind is always destitute of that most interesting and infallible sign of genuine culture, enthusiasm. It has done nothing for long years but *absorb*. Knowledge has had the same effect upon its inner fabric and structure, which the sweet rains of heaven have upon the rootless fallen pine. The noble shaft becomes struck with the sap-rot.

The history of literature furnishes many examples of men whose knowledge only increased their sorrow, because it never found an efflux from their own minds into the world. Knowledge uncommunicated is something like remorse unconfessed. The mind not being allowed to go out of itself, and to direct its energies towards an object and end greater and worthier than itself, turns back upon itself, and becomes morbidly self-reflecting and self-conscious. A studious and reflecting man of this class is characterised by an excessive fastidiousness, which makes him dissatisfied with all that he does himself, or sees done by others; which re-

* "I have found," he says, in one of his letters, "my former experience irresistibly confirmed, that with me the body depends entirely on the mind, and that my indisposition almost always arises from some impediment to the free action of my mind, which seems to introduce disorder into all the functions of the bodily machine. When my mind is exerting itself freely and energetically upon a great subject, and I advance successfully from one point to another, displaying their mutual connection as I proceed, I either feel no physical inconveniences, or if they show themselves, they disappear again very quickly. No man can have a more vivid perception, that *creating* is the true essence of life, than I have derived from my internal experience. But if I am altogether restricted to a passive state of mind, the whole machine comes to a stop, and my inward discomfort brings on an unhealthy condition of body, of which I have an unmistakable outward sign, in the contrast between the free and strong circulation of the blood in the former state, and its irregularity in the latter."—*Life and Letters*, p. 179.

presses, and finally suppresses, all the buoyant and spirited activity of the intellect, leaving it sluggish as "the dull weed that rots by Lethe's wharf." The poet Gray is an example in point. In the instance of this in many respects highly interesting literary man, the acquisition of culture far outran the expression and communication of it. The scholar overlaid the author. Even the comparatively few attempts which this mind made to embody its thoughts were hampered by its excessive introspection. Had Gray thrown himself out with freedom and boldness upon the stream of original production, which might have been made to flow from his richly-endowed and richly-informed mind, he would have been stronger, greater, and happier as a literary man. Neither would his productions have lost that perfection of symmetry and elaborate hard finish which they exhibit; while at the same time they would have had breathed into them that warm breath of life which they do not now possess, and for the lack of which no mere art can ever compensate. Certain it is that a closer, warmer contact with the mind of his age, through a more daring and exuberant authorship on his part, would have imparted a spring and buoyancy to the literary character of Gray that would have rendered it a more influential and interesting one than it now is.

As an example of the freshening and invigorating influence of the constant and free communication of thought upon the intellect, take Sir Walter Scott. His mind was one of the healthiest, and most robust, that we meet with in the history of literature. It was also one of the happiest, the most free from morbid exercises and activities. Something was undoubtedly due to its native structure, but very much was owing to those habits of authorship which it early acquired, and long kept up. Suppose that Scott had immured himself in his library, had given free play to his acquisitive and antiquarian tendencies, without developing and using his originating and productive talent, can we suppose that his intellect would have been that warm, breezy, sunny spot that it always was? It is true that he finally broke his powers down, by attempting the Herculean task of rescuing the great publishing house with which he had become connected from bankruptcy; but this *dead lift* of the mental powers is not what we are speaking of. It is the moderate, and uniform, yet free and bold expression of the thoughts of an educated mind, in distinction from the dull, lethargic, uniform suppression of them, of which we are speaking, and for which we are pleading.

In this way, the ethical theory of rhetoric, while resulting in a practical and energetic eloquence, exerts a vivifying influence upon the entire culture of the student. It gives *employment* to the sum total of his acquisitions, instead of permitting it to remain idle in his mind. It *elaborates* and *uses*, for the purposes of popular instruction and impression, all the material with which the mind is filled, instead of allowing it to remain a lifeless mass, a *caput mortuum*, by itself. Mathematical, classical, historical, philosophical, and theological knowledge, instead of being held in the memory from a mere feeling of vanity, is set to work from a sense of duty. The rhetoric of the man has affinities with the scholarship of the man. It is homogeneous with it. It moulds it, and embodies it. For the rhetorician, upon this theory, and under this training, is not one in whom two distinct disciplines exist side by side, with no interpenetration. He is not at one time a dull sluggish recipient of knowledge, and at another a dull formal communicator of knowledge; discharging two functions which in him have no connection with each other. He is at all times a genial and vital receiver, and a genial vital communicator. It was once said of a famous jurist, that his knowledge had passed out of his memory into his

judgment. We may say of the genuine rhetorician, that his knowledge is continually passing out of his passive into his active nature. It enters into the circulation of the soul, and becomes vitalised by its living currents. The scholar and the orator are not separated from each other, but constitute one living personality.

But what an energy is imparted to culture, by a training that thus tasks to the utmost for acquisitions, and then vivifies those acquisitions to the utmost in order to popular oratorical impression! It is safe to say that the literature of a nation is vigorous and alive, only in proportion as it has oratorical elements in it; and that the very height of its living energy appears in its eloquence and oratory. What other portion of Greek literature throbs with such intense life as the speeches of Demosthenes? If there be any of the *vis vivida vitae* in Roman literature, that literature which, unlike all others, was born old, and never exhibits any of the morn and liquid dew of youth,—if there be any fresh vital force in Roman letters, is it not to be found in the orations of Cicero? And where, in the modern world, do the most vehement and passionate energies of the human intellect expatiate and career, if not in the vastly widened arena of political and sacred eloquence,—if not on that theatre where the active, practical interests of man for time and for eternity come up for discussion and decision?

FORCE, LAW, AND DESIGN—A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY FOR NON-PHILOSOPHICAL READERS.

By President Porter, D.D., LL.D.

(Princeton Review.)

FORCE, Law, and Design are words which in these days are often in the mouths of men. Sharp discussions, confident assertions, and grave conclusions turn upon the meaning and applications in which they are used. By some, force and purpose are held to be natural enemies, each bent on the destruction of the other. If law attempts to intervene, she runs the risk of being torn in pieces between the two. The questions concerning these terms are not new, though they seem new to us. In the schools of science they are as old or older than Socrates. Does blind force or intelligent purpose rule the universe? Are the laws of the universe self-poised and self-balancing tendencies, that hold one another in accidental equipoise; or are they simply the media by which the forces originated by the Creator's power manifest His thoughts, so that man may understand and obey them? In modern physics force and law are great words, as all instructed men know; deservedly great, as all candid men confess; so great and self-sufficing in the opinion of some as to hold no definite relations to purpose; while others hold that they indicate no design; others teach that they exclude all thought in nature and all belief in a thinker behind; others, that they are the more radiant with thought, just in proportion as they reveal new facts to the penetrating eye of science.

In these conflicts and uncertainties of opinion it may not be amiss to look these