

THE
OLD AND NEW SCHOOLS:

AN EXHIBIT OF THE MOST IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES
IN THEIR DOCTRINES AND CHURCH POLITY.

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## P R E F A C E .

THE following Chapters were published at the time of the unhappy division of the Presbyterian Church, in a series of numbers, in the *Protestant and Herald*, of which paper the author was then an editor. They were designed to give a brief, but satisfactory answer to the question so often asked—*What are the differences between the Old and New Schools?* The re-publication of them has been repeatedly desired within the last few years. Very recently, a number of the students of the Cincinnati Theological Seminary have desired the author to consent to the publication of them in the present form; and the propriety of complying with this request is the more manifest, since the New School Synod of New York and New Jersey have, within the last twelve months, published “A History of the Division of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.”

Not for the purpose of awakening anew the old controversy, but of furnishing information on a most important subject, which many desire and need, the work is now issued in its present form. The author rejoices to believe that very many who were, for a time, misled by the plausible errors of the New Divinity, have been undeceived, and that the tendency, even in the New School body, is toward the old foundations—“the form of sound words,” continues in the Westminster Confession of Faith. While we rejoice in this tendency, we cannot consent to have our Church bear the reproach, so often cast upon her, of having been the guilty cause of the schism, and of having adopted unconstitutional measures in order to deprive men of their dearest rights. Most sincerely do we believe, after the most careful observations we have been able to

make upon the results, that the Old School did not over-estimate the danger which, in 1837-'38, threatened the Presbyterian Church, from the prevalence of doctrinal errors and of anti-Presbyterian principles of ecclesiastical polity. It is a fact, that not a few of those who stood prominent in opposing the Old School, at that time, are now avowedly Congregationalists. It is a fact, that our New School brethren are now turning, as fast as possible, to Ecclesiastical Boards, which they once so warmly opposed. It is a fact, that the Plan of Union, which was so prominent a theme of discussion at the time of the Division, has been repudiated by the Congregationalists, as injurious in its tendencies. It is a fact, that between the Old School and the Congregationalists there is entire harmony, whilst between the New School and the Congregationalists there is controversy and growing alienation. It is a fact, not denied, that since the Division the Old School Church has made much more rapid progress than the New School—thus affording an instructive comment upon the oft-repeated charge against the former, of holding to a *dead orthodoxy*. It is a fact that ours is now the most united, homogeneous Church in the world; whilst Abolitionism, Congregationalism and errors in Theology continue to agitate the New School. These facts require no comment. They demonstrate the wisdom and the justice of the course pursued by the Old School in the unhappy controversy which resulted in the Division of the Presbyterian Church. We rejoice to hope and believe, that in years to come the two bodies will approach nearer together than now—not by the departure of the Old School from the doctrines they have held, but by the gradual purgation which the other body is undergoing, by which its heterogeneous elements are passing off, and leaving the true Presbyterian element.

# THE OLD AND NEW SCHOOLS.

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## CHAPTER I.

SINCE the commencement of the unhappy difficulties in our church, the question has often been asked, *What is the precise difference between the two parties called the Old and New Schools?* And notwithstanding all that has been said and written on the subject for several years past, very many of the most intelligent members of our Church do not yet understand the *doctrinal* differences of the parties. It may be questioned whether, in the discussions to which our difficulties have given rise, too great prominence has not been given to the *measures* pursued, or proper to be pursued, for the purpose of restoring peace and purity to the Church, instead of keeping distinctly before the minds of the people the evils which created the necessity of decisive measures. However that may be, it is certainly important that all should now distinctly understand the differences between the two parties, by which the Church has been so painfully agitated, and at length divided. For,

1st. It is obviously impossible that such a schism should exist in any Church without great sin somewhere. No duty is more frequently urged upon Christians in the word of God, than that they "endeavor to

keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace"—that they be "of one accord, of one mind." It is well known, that our brethren of the New School represent the Old School as the guilty authors of all the discord, contention and difficulty by which the Church has been agitated, and which have caused the division which has recently taken place. They represent themselves as sound Presbyterians, real Confession-of-Faith men, who are persecuted, oppressed, and deprived of their rights, for no other reason than that they choose to teach the doctrines of our standards in their own *improved* phraseology, and reject certain philosophical speculations which human wisdom has added to the word of God. They represent to the world, that the Old School men, in their ambitious desire to deprive them of their rights, have in the most reckless manner trampled under foot the Constitution of our Church, which they profess to love, and by which they are most solemnly pledged to be governed. Oppressors, tyrants, revolutionists, &c.—are, therefore, the names by which, in the New School papers, they are distinguished. If the charges of the brethren of the New School are true, we should certainly be very unwilling to stand connected with them; for it is impossible that the blessing of God can attend men of such a spirit, and who have done mischief so incalculably great to his Church. But, on the other hand, the brethren of the Old School solemnly declare their conviction, after long and careful examination, that the other party had introduced and fostered in the Church such errors and irregularities that they were compelled, as faithful ministers of Jesus Christ, as watchmen on the walls of Zion, to take decisive steps, however painful the duty, in order to save

the church. If their representation be true, their general course must be commended, though there may be a difference of opinion in regard to some of the measures which they deemed it proper to adopt. It should be remembered, however, that it requires more wisdom and grace than most good men possess, to act wisely in *every* step at such a crisis. We who have acted with the Old School, and who adhere to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, consider it due to the cause of Christ, to the church to which we belong, and to ourselves, to have the points of difference between us and our seceding brethren fully understood.

2d. Our church is now divided; and it is not probable, perhaps not possible, that the parties shall be again united. It now becomes the duty of each member of the church to decide for himself to which of the parties he will adhere. A decision so important, when regarded in its effect upon the usefulness and happiness of the individual, or in its bearing on the cause of Christ, should be made *understandingly*. No truly pious man would be willing to connect himself and his family with a denomination holding dangerous errors, or that have, by departing from "the form of sound words," created a schism in a branch of Christ's church. It is our purpose, for the information of those of our readers who desire it, to answer as briefly and satisfactorily as possible, the question proposed in the commencement of this article.

The question before us, let it be remarked, is a question as to *matter of fact*. Had our brethren of the New School introduced and fostered in our church errors and irregularities of dangerous tendency? If they had, the Old School were bound, as they regarded

the welfare of the church and the salvation of their own souls, to take decisive steps to prevent their spread. For if it is a duty to "maintain the unity of the Spirit in the bonds of peace," it is no less a duty "earnestly to contend for the faith once delivered to the saints." This question must, of course, be decided by reference to the publications and public acts of the New School. Before entering directly upon the investigation, however, we desire to present a few considerations, which may throw light upon the subject.

1st. It is a well known fact, the great majority of the most aged and venerable ministers in our church belong to the Old School Assembly—such men as the venerable Dr. Green, perhaps the oldest minister in the church, the venerable Drs. Alexander and Miller, of Princeton, Dr. Baxter, of Virginia, and many others. These are men "whose praise is in all the churches"—men who "have borne the burden and heat of the day" in building up the Presbyterian church in the United States. Now if we are to credit the statements of the New School, one of two things is true of these excellent men. They are extremely ignorant of the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church, and of the doctrines of our standards, and therefore, have ignorantly charged their brethren with departures from the latter, and blindly trampled under foot the plainest principles of the former; or they have in their declining years become surprisingly ambitious, and have *falsely* charged their brethren with holding dangerous error, and in order to oppress them have recklessly pulled down the Constitution which they have so long loved and consistently maintained! The one or the other of these things must be true; or the charges made by the New

School are false. We will not ask whether either is *credible*; but we may with propriety ask, whether either should be believed without a careful examination of the subject? Let it be remembered, that if it is a sin falsely to charge brethren with maintaining dangerous errors, it is no less a sin to condemn and villify pious and conscientious men for doing a duty which their master has imposed upon them. *Examine before you decide.*

Take in connection with these remarks a *fact*, which, if we mistake not, is confirmed by the past history of the church in every age. It is this—the history of the church presents no instance in which a very large proportion of the wisest and best men in the church have believed, without sufficient grounds, that dangerous error had become extensively prevalent among its ministers and members. On the contrary, error has generally made considerable progress before Zion's watchmen have given the alarm. It is true, that in some instances, good men have attached undue importance to minor differences amongst brethren. Doubtless an error of this kind caused the division which occurred at an early period of our history between the Synods of Philadelphia and New York. But this is very different from an error in regard to a *matter of fact*. Every one must admit that the errors charged upon the New School are of a very serious character. The question, then, regards simply the *fact*—do they really hold and teach these errors? If it is true, that all this time our church is free from dangerous error, and the great body of the church, including many of the wisest and best men in it, have become alarmed without cause, it is certainly something new under the sun.

2d. It has never been common for men, who have gradually slidden into error, and who still desire to retain their standing in the church, to acknowledge that their departures from her standards are of a serious character. They are much more likely to represent their differences from the church as merely *verbal*, or as relating to some philosophical speculations of no practical importance. Rev. Albert Barnes, of Philadelphia, for example, maintains that the doctrine of *Imputation* is a mere philosophical speculation, and that though he rejects it, he is still a sound Presbyterian. But the Old School, so far from regarding that doctrine as a speculation, consider it one of the very *pillars* of the Presbyterian system; and they believe that no man who denies it, can be a Presbyterian. Our New School brethren may have convinced themselves, that their views do not so far vary from the Confession of Faith but that they can, with a clear conscience, adopt it as containing "the system of doctrine" taught in the Scriptures; but the Old School believe that they have rejected some of the most precious truths embraced in our creed; and we can not safely condemn their course until we have carefully examined this subject.

3d. Nothing is more common than for men in error, when opposed by the orthodox, to appeal to the sympathies of the public. They frequently profess great liberality, and represent themselves as persecuted and oppressed by their brethren. With the uninformed, and with those who are indifferent or opposed to the truth, such appeals are likely to be successful. Yet such appeals are expedients to which truth, conscious of its own strength, is far less likely to resort. It is easy to declaim about oppression, persecution, revolu-

tion, and the like ; but the reflecting mind will still examine the merits of the case. And after all the odium attempted to be cast upon Christ's faithful servants as *heresy-hunters*, it will be found that generally their fault has been, that they have allowed error to spread too far before they have taken decisive measures to arrest its progress ; and of all the faults of the Old School this, if we do not greatly err, will be found on examination to be the greatest.

Now, it is a fact which ought to be known, that our New School brethren were the very first to declare the existence of very important doctrinal differences in the Presbyterian Church. As early as 1823, when the church enjoyed profound peace, Dr. Beman preached four sermons on the Atonement, which were published in 1825. In these sermons he made the following charges against the doctrines then and now held by the Old School : That it involves "a transfer of character" between Christ and his people, "which is inconsistent with reason and Scripture ;" that "it destroys all mercy in God the Father ;" that if it be true, "then there is no grace in their (sinners) restoration to the favor of God ;" that on such principles "the atonement would bring no accession of happiness to the universe ;" and that this view of the atonement "annihilates every particle of benevolence in the Gospel." Of course he presented a view of this great doctrine essentially different from that which he was opposing. Those sermons, it is worthy of remark, have been recently republished with a preface by Dr. Cox.

The first information we ever had concerning the differences between the old and new theology, was obtained from Rev. Gideon Blackburn, D. D., a zealous

advocate of the latter, in 1827, when we were studying theology with him. Far from regarding the differences as of trivial importance, he earnestly guarded his students against what he considered the serious errors of the Princeton Divinity, and cherished the hope of seeing the theology of the Presbyterian Church revolutionized.

In 1832, Dr. Duffield, now of Detroit, published his book on Regeneration, in which he charged "the old Calvinistic writers," such as Witsius, Charnock, Turretin, Owen, Edwards, with teaching the doctrine of *physical regeneration*, and urged against their views the following objections: That if they be true, "then is there little or no grace in the transaction;" that "then are not the graces, repentance, love, &c., the *immediate* fruits of the Spirit;" that it exerts a deleterious influence "on personal piety," impairing alike "the Christian's consolations and activity;" that "the injurious consequences that practically result from this error are almost endless; but nowhere are they more mischievous than in destroying the sense of moral obligation, which would urge the unconverted sinner to *immediate* repentance." In the preface he makes penitent acknowledgment of his errors in preaching to his people this old mischievous philosophy.

In 1837, the New School committee on the state of the church, among whom were Drs. Beman and Peters, stated, "that difference of view in relation to important points of church policy and action, as well as theological opinion are found to exist"—rendering the division of the church "of vital importance to the best interests of the Redeemer's kingdom." Minutes, p. 432.

In 1840, Dr. Cox, one of the ablest men in the ranks of the New School, wrote his celebrated "Hexagon," in which he professed to treat chiefly of "the theological differences" between the Old and New Schools. "These," he said, "have exerted an uncomputed, and often unknown, influence" in causing the schism. He adds—"I think I know them; and say solemnly as my full conviction, not only that the reformed party (Old School) consult their interest in keeping their views under the veil of ambiguity, or in the back ground, invisible in all their demonstrations, but that were their true views, or the offensive and erroneous, yet pervading parts of them, thoroughly known in this community, that day would be truth's jubilee and their discomfiture. It is only by passing for what they are not, that their views maintain their present sickly existence."

Now it is very pleasant indeed to us old divinity men, after having been so repeatedly charged with holding grievous errors during almost thirty years, to have our orthodoxy certified, as it now is, by the very party who preferred the charges; but what shall we say of the consistency of our New School brethren? Was Dr. Beman ignorant of the great subject he was discussing, when he represented the differences on the atonement as so very important? Why, then, has a new edition of those sermons been so recently published with a commendatory preface by Dr. Cox? And how was it with Dr. Duffield? Was he misinformed? And how happened the New School in 1837, and Dr. Cox in 1840, to consider the differences so very important? Do not our brethren owe it to the public and to themselves to give some explanation of their flatly contra-

dictory assertions on this subject? Can they expect to enjoy public confidence if they do not explain?

If there are, as the New School committee and others affirm, differences of view not only in relation to *important points* of church policy, but also in relation to important points of *theological opinion*—so important as to make a division of the church necessary, there must of necessity be important errors—important departures from the doctrines of the word of God and our standards. Such being the case, who, we ask, have acted most consistently with the character and responsibility of ministers of Christ; those who have cried “peace, peace, when there was no peace,” and labored to quiet the apprehensions of the church as groundless, or those who have sounded the alarm and labored to purify the church?

Which party, we may with propriety inquire, have so far abandoned the doctrines of our Confession of Faith, as to make this division necessary? This question may be satisfactorily answered by proposing another—who are they that have opposed a strict adherence to creeds, and claimed the right to adopt them “for substance of doctrine?” The Old School are not even charged, so far as we know, with abandoning the *doctrines* of our standards. We may, then, consider it as fairly acknowledged by the New School, notwithstanding all they have said and still say to the contrary, that they have, in important theological points, departed from the doctrines of our Confession of Faith. Our present object is to show what those points are.

It may be proper to remark: 1st. It is not our purpose to present all the shades of difference between the Old and New Schools. The most important points

only will occupy our attention. These, however, will be sufficient, if we do not greatly err, to satisfy the candid and unprejudiced that the differences, far from being unimportant, relate to the very foundation of the Christian's faith. 2d. We do not expect to be able so to present the doctrines of our New School brethren, as to escape, in every instance, the charge of misrepresentation. Indeed there can be no doubt, that they are far from being agreed among themselves in the details of their faith. Some have departed much further than others from the doctrines and order of the Presbyterian church; while some really sound men, unwilling to believe the party as unsound as they are, and regarding them, therefore, as oppressed, or at least harshly treated, have remained with them. In presenting their doctrines, however, we shall use the publications of a few leading men of the party, taking it for granted that they give a correct exhibition of New Schoolism.

One of the publications which we shall use, is, 'Notes on the Epistle to the Romans,' by Rev. Albert Barnes, of Philadelphia. We know that this work gives a fair exhibition of the doctrines of the New School. 1st. Because when Mr. Barnes was suspended from the ministry by the Synod of Philadelphia for errors contained in it, his appeal was sustained, and he restored to the ministry by the General Assembly of 1836, in which that party had a majority. And they not only restored him, but refused to pass the slightest censure upon his book. 2d. The leading men of the New School then identified themselves with Mr. Barnes, declaring that his condemnation would be a virtual condemnation of more than a thousand ministers in the church. In proof of this, we quote the following re-

marks of Dr. Skinner, a leading New School man, contained in his speech in the Assembly, on the trial of Mr. Barnes, as reported in the New York Observer of September 10, 1836. He says: "I am the more pleased, Mr. Moderator, that Mr. Barnes has been enabled to maintain such exemplary moderation under his severe discipline, because of the *representative* character in which, as suffering under the charges of heresy, he is universally regarded. Sir, this trial is not a trial of Mr. Barnes as an individual; it is virtually a trial of a thousand ministers of the Gospel, and of a large number of the members of this body. \* \* \* \* Sir, I am virtually identified with Mr. Barnes, and so are perhaps a majority of the members of this Assembly. \* \* \* \* His condemnation as a heretic condemns more than a thousand of his brethren in the ministry. He stands the representative of a large class of the ministers of God. He is, sir, a fair representative of that class." Similar avowals were made by other prominent men of the party. Such declarations, made in a New School Assembly, by leading New School men, certainly authorize the conclusion that the doctrines of Mr. Barnes, as contained in his Notes on the Romans, are the doctrines of the party. In ascertaining their doctrines, we shall also use the sermons of Beman on the Atonement, and Rev. Geo. Duffield's book on Regeneration, both of whom are known to be leading men of the party, and the former of whom has been one of the most prominent men in bringing about the division of our church.

## CHAPTER II.

### IMPUTATION.

The first difference we shall examine briefly, regards the doctrine of IMPUTATION. This doctrine relates, 1st. To Adam's relation to his posterity, and the effect of his first sin upon them. 2d. To the connection between Christ and believers, and the manner in which they are justified by him. In relation to the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity the Confession of Faith teaches—"They (our first parents) being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation." Ch. vi: Sec. 3.

Again—"The covenant being made with *Adam*, as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him."—*Larger Catechism*.

Here the reader will observe, 1st. The Confession expressly declares, that the covenant (commonly called the *covenant of works*) was made with Adam as a *public person*, not for himself only, but for his posterity, and that the guilt of his first sin was imputed to them. It is proper here to remark, that the word *guilt*, as used by theologians, signifies *liability or exposedness to punishment*. The doctrine of our standards, therefore, is—that Adam's posterity are exposed to punishment for his sin, as if they had committed it. 2d. It teaches, that in consequence of this imputation

of his sin to them, they inherit a corrupt nature, and are exposed to all the evil consequences resulting from it. Now let us compare with this the doctrine of the New School, as explained by Rev. Albert Barnes, their acknowledged representative.

We think it important, first, to notice his contradictory statements of the doctrine of Imputation. Commenting on Romans v: 14, he says: "The doctrine of Imputation has been that infants were personally guilty of Adam's sin: that *they* 'sinned *in* him;' that there was a *personal identity* constituted between them and Adam, (see Edwards on original sin) and that therefore *his* sin was *theirs*, as really and truly as if committed by themselves." And he further says, "if the doctrine of Imputation be true, it is certain that they (Adam's posterity) not only *had* sinned after the similitude of his transgression, but had *sinned the very identical sin*. It was precisely like him; it was the very thing itself; and they were answerable for that very sin as their own." This is one statement of the doctrine. In his comments on verse 19, he gives a different and contradictory one. "Various attempts," says he, "have been made to explain this, (the sinning of Adam's posterity). The most common has been that Adam was the representative of the race; that he was a covenant head, and that his sin was *imputed* to his posterity, and that they were held liable to punishment for it as if they had committed it themselves." In the first statement he makes the doctrine involve in it the absurdity that Adam's posterity so existed in him and with him, that they actually committed his first sin as truly as did Adam himself; and upon this supposition he opposes it. But in the last

statement he makes Adam the representative or covenant head of his race, that his sin is imputed to them, and they are held liable to punishment *as if they had committed it*. This view of the doctrine, which he says is "the most common," is the correct one, and it involves not the absurdity of *personal identity* between Adam and his posterity.

The word *impute* signifies, to ascribe something to those concerned, and to treat them accordingly. It is used, 1st. In reference to one's own acts. To impute a man's sins to him, is to charge them upon him, and treat him according to their demerit—to punish him. Thus Shemei said to David—"Let not my Lord impute iniquity unto me, neither do thou remember that which thy servant did perversely the day that my Lord the King went out of Jerusalem." Paul the Apostle says: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin,"—that is, "whose sin is covered." Rom. iv. 7, 8. To impute sin, therefore, is to punish it; not to impute, is to pardon. 2d. Imputation is used in regard to acts not properly ours. The acts of one man are imputed to another, when they are so ascribed to him that he is held responsible for them, or is treated as if they were his own. Thus Paul says to Philemon—"If he (Onesimus) hath wronged thee, or oweth thee ought, put that on mine account"—that is, according to the Greek, *impute it to me*—hold me responsible for it. When, therefore, we say that the guilt of Adam's first sin was imputed to his posterity, the meaning is, not that there was between them and him such personal identity as that they really committed the same act, which is grossly absurd, but simply that God treats them as if they had committed it—they suffer all the

consequences of his sin. This is precisely the doctrine of the Confession of Faith; and in this sense they "sinned in him and fell with him." This, too, as we shall presently see, is the doctrine of the Bible.

This doctrine, Mr. Barnes, and with him the New School, deny. Indeed, one principal object, of which Mr. B. never seems to lose sight in his "Notes on the Romans," is to oppose and refute that doctrine. In his remarks on Rom. v: 14, he says—"A comparison is also instituted between Adam and Christ in 1 Cor. xv: 22, 45. The reason is, not that Adam was the *representative or federal head* of the human race, about which the apostle says nothing, and which is not even implied, but that he was the first of the race; he was the fountain, the head, the father; and the consequences of that first act introducing sin into the world, could be seen every where. The words, *representative and federal head*, are never applied to Adam in the Bible. The reason is, that the word *representative* implies an idea which could not have existed in the case—the consent of those who are represented. Besides, (mark this) the Bible does not teach they acted in him or by him; or that he acted *for* them. No passage has ever yet been found that stated this doctrine." Again, with equal clearness he denies the doctrine in his remarks on verse 15th. "Nor have we a right," says he, "to *assume* that this teaches the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity." Mark the reasons he gives: "For [1] the apostle says nothing of it. [2] That doctrine is nothing but an effort to explain the *manner* of an event which the apostle Paul did not think it proper to attempt to explain. [3] That doctrine is, in fact, no explanation. It is introducing an

additional difficulty. For to say that I am guilty of the sin of another in which I had no agency, is no *explanation*, but is involving me in an additional difficulty, still more perplexing to ascertain how such a doctrine can possibly be just." Once more, remarking on verse 19th, he says—"In regard to this important and much contested passage of the New Testament, we may make the following remarks: [1] Nothing is said here of the doctrine of representation. It is not assumed that Adam was the representative of his race, nor is that language used in regard to him in the Bible. [2] Nothing is said of a *covenant* with him. No where in the Scriptures is the word *covenant* applied to any transaction with Adam. [3] All that is established here is the simple *fact* that Adam sinned, and that this made it certain that all his posterity would be sinners. Beyond this the language of the apostle does not go; and all else that has been said of this, is the result of mere philosophical speculation." In this immediate connection he illustrates the effect of Adam's sin upon his posterity by the effect of the conduct of a drunkard or a murderer upon his family. Then, after giving the statement of the doctrine of imputation, which we have noticed as correct, he says: "But to this, there are great and insuperable objections. [1] There is not one word of it in the Bible. Neither the terms representative, covenant, or impute, are *ever* applied to the transaction in the Scriptures. [2] It is a mere philosophical theory; an introduction of a speculation into theology, with an attempt to explain what the Bible has left unexplained. [3] It explains nothing. [4] It adds another difficulty to the subject. It not only *explains* nothing, removes no perplexity, but

compels us at once to ask the question, how can this be just? How can it be right to charge the sins of the guilty on those who had no participation in them? How *could* millions be responsible for the sins of one who acted long before they had an existence, and of whose act they had no consciousness, and in which they had no participation?"

Can any one for a moment doubt, after reading these declarations of Mr. Barnes, that he wholly rejects the doctrine of imputation, as taught in our Confession of Faith? If he does not, then language has no meaning. We rely not for our proof upon a few unguarded expressions of doubtful import. In language as plain and as definite as can be used, and in various forms of expression, he repeatedly condemns and argues against the doctrine as unscriptural, as a mere philosophical theory, and as *unjust*. After reading the language of Mr. B. as already quoted, one can not but be astonished at the following declaration of the New School party in the General Assembly of 1836: "In respect to the fifth charge, Mr. Barnes no where denies, much less 'sneers' at the idea that Adam was the covenant and the federal head of his posterity. On the contrary, though he employs not these terms, he does, in other language, teach the same truths which are taught by this 'phraseology.'" When Mr. B. says, "The words *representative* and *federal head* are never applied to Adam in the Bible," are we to suppose that he is merely objecting to those words, whilst he still believes the DOCTRINE they are employed to express? This would be trifling. The word TRINITY is no where applied to God in the Bible, but who that believes the DOCTRINE

would contend merely about the word? But Mr. B. does not allow us so to understand him. For he immediately makes the following sweeping declaration, which leaves not a shred of the doctrine: "BESIDES THE BIBLE DOES NOT TEACH THAT THEY (ADAM'S POSTERITY) ACTED IN HIM, OR BY HIM; OR THAT HE ACTED FOR THEM." Again, as we have seen, after stating the doctrine of imputation, he declares, "THERE IS NOT ONE WORD OF IT IN THE BIBLE."

True, the New School, after acknowledging Mr. Barnes as their REPRESENTATIVE, say that, "they do not make themselves responsible for all the phraseology of Mr. Barnes; some of which is not sufficiently guarded, and is liable to be misunderstood." But it is proper to remark:

1st. That the language of Mr. B. on this subject is perfectly clear, and cannot be misunderstood.

2d. Mr. B. is a correct writer, and when writing his Notes on the Romans, he knew that the church was agitated to the center on the very doctrine in question; and he knew that precisely on that point, as well as others, his orthodoxy was strongly suspected. He had, therefore, every motive to use cautious phraseology, and to make himself understood. It will not do, then, to attempt to cover up his errors under the lame apology of phraseology "not sufficiently guarded."

If Mr. B.'s assertion, that this doctrine is not taught in the Bible, were true, it would certainly have been his duty to renounce it; but how could he adopt at his ordination a creed which so clearly teaches it? It may be profitable, before closing this article, briefly to advert to a few passages of Scripture in which the doc-

trine is taught. The Confession of Faith, as we have seen, teaches that the guilt of Adam's first sin is imputed to his posterity; and that consequently they are exposed to all the consequences of it. What evil consequences resulted to Adam?

He became **MORTAL**. "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Gen. ii: 17. "Sin entered into the world, and death by sin." Rom. v: 12. St. Paul, speaking of temporal death, says, "In Adam all die." 1 Cor. xv: 22. It will not be disputed that Adam's race come into the world **MORTAL**—exposed, as he was after his fall, to sickness, pain and death.

2. He became "dead in sin"—totally depraved. This will not be denied. So David says, "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me." Ps. li: 5. The Saviour said, "That which is born of the flesh, is flesh." John iii: 6. And from this fact he argued that all must be born of the Spirit.

3. Adam, by the fall, became exposed to eternal death—the penalty of God's violated law. "The wages of sin is death." Rom. vi: 25. So Paul the apostle says—his posterity are "BY NATURE CHILDREN OF WRATH." Eph. ii: 3. Again—"Through the offense of one, many are dead;" and "by the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation." Rom. v: 14, 18. The Scriptures, therefore, abundantly teach that Adam's posterity are exposed to the punishment due to his sin, even before they commit any sin of their own; and this is precisely what is meant by the imputation of the guilt of his sin.

But it may be asked, is this doctrine one of very considerable importance to the Christian system?

We answer, it is one of the most important links in the golden chain of sound doctrine; and that it is so, we hope to convince our readers.

We have proved, as we think, to the satisfaction of every candid and unprejudiced mind, that Mr. Barnes rejects the doctrine of the imputation of the guilt of Adam's sin to his posterity, as taught in our standards. It is unnecessary to quote any other New School writer, since the New School Assembly of 1836, not only declared him orthodox, but acknowledged him as their representative in doctrine. We may, therefore, fairly conclude that the denial of this doctrine constitutes one of the prominent features of New Schoolism. Our object at present is to show the *importance* of the doctrine in the Christian system. That the Old School have not attached undue importance to it, will be manifest from the fact, that the rejection of it leads necessarily to the rejection of several other very important doctrines of the Gospel. And

1st. They who reject this doctrine must, in order to be consistent, reject also the doctrine of *original sin*. By original sin is meant that total depravity of heart which we inherit from Adam, as a consequence of the imputation of the guilt of his sin to us. "They (our first parents) being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation. From this *original corruption*, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions." Con. of Faith, Ch. vi: sec. 3 and 4. Again—"The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consisteth in the guilt of *Adam's* first sin, the want of

that righteousness wherein he was created, and the corruption of his nature, whereby he is utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all that is spiritually good, &c.—which is commonly called *original sin*, and from which do proceed all actual transgressions.” Here the reader will perceive, that the native depravity of the heart, or original sin, is declared to be a consequence of the imputation of the guilt of Adam’s sin. But Mr. Barnes and the New School deny that Adam was the representative or covenant head of his race, and that the guilt of his sin is imputed to them. Consequently, if they are consistent, they must deny that they inherit from him a corrupt nature. Observe the principle avowed by Mr. Barnes. “How can it be right,” he asks, “to charge the sins of the guilty on those who had no participation in them?” How *could* millions be responsible for the sins of one who acted long before they had an existence, and of whose act they had no consciousness, and in which they had no participation?” This amounts to a strong affirmation that it would be unjust in God to charge the guilt of Adam’s sin to his posterity. Adopt this principle, and to what does it necessarily lead? Just to this—that they can not be justly subjected to any evil on account of his sin. For if they may justly suffer *at all* in consequence of his sin, how much may they suffer? If they may justly bear any part of the penalty due to his sin; how can it be proved that they may not be treated in all respects as if they had committed it? On this principle they can not inherit his depraved nature, for this is the greatest of all evils, and the cause of all others. On this point Mr. Barnes appears to us to contradict himself. In one place he says, “Men are undoubtedly affected by the sin of Adam.

as, e. g. by being born with a corrupt disposition, with loss of righteousness." In another he says, "All that is established here is the simple *fact* that Adam sinned, and that this made it certain that all his posterity would be sinners. Beyond this the language of the apostle does not go; and all else that has been said of this is the result of mere philosophical speculation." Again—"The simple fact in regard to Adam is, that he sinned; and that such is the organization of the great society of which he was the head and father, that his sin has secured it as a certain result that all the race will be sinners also. *How* this is, the Bible has not explained." Here he says nothing of a corrupt nature, but accounts for the certainty that Adam's posterity will sin simply from the *organization* of human society. He illustrates his meaning, as we have before remarked, by the effect of the conduct of the drunkard and the murderer upon their families, and closes his explanation, if it may be so called, in the following language: "Such is the fact; the great law or constitution on which society is organized, and such being *now* the universal fact, we are not to be surprised that the same thing occurred in the *primary organization* of society, with Adam at its head, and that we see there the first and most striking exemplification of the great law on which society is formed." p. 128. Now this language, if it means any thing, teaches us, that the conduct of Adam affected his descendents precisely on the same principle that the conduct of a drunkard or a murderer affects his children. This is "the great law or constitution on which society is organized." This principle excludes the idea of a depraved nature, or original sin; for we know that the conduct of the

drunkard or murderer can not affect the moral nature of his infant offspring. The truth is, according to this doctrine, all begin to sin merely by *imitation* or the *force of example*.

The doctrine of original sin is wholly rejected by Rev. Geo. Duffield, a prominent New School man, in his book on Regeneration. He objects to the term as ambiguous. But who does not know that when a word or phrase is carefully defined as this is in our standards, and by theological writers, it is liable to no such objection. He gives painful evidence, however, that it is not the *phraseology*, but the *doctrine* to which he objects. Speaking of the infant, he says: "It has no *personal* sin; for it has not morally acted. Its physical nature can not be accounted sinful, for that would be to change the very meaning of terms. Properly speaking, therefore, we can predicate of it neither sin nor holiness, personally considered." Again he says: "With the instincts operating, sensations experienced, and nothing more than passions or feeling developed, the infant has not yet actually become a moral agent, and, consequently, possesses no moral character. It has not risen above the level of a mere animal." p. 397. According to this doctrine there is no such thing as original sin. The infant has no moral character—is a mere animal. Mr. Duffield is one of those who maintain that all sin consists in *acts* or *choices*; and since infants are incapable of these, they are neither holy nor unholy. What, then, becomes of the doctrine of the Confession of Faith, that "the same death in sin and corrupted nature are conveyed to all their (our first parents') posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation?" Thus far our New School

brethren are consistent with themselves, if not with truth.

But if, as Mr. D. maintains, the minds of infants are free from all inclination to sin, it would seem probable that *some* at least, when they rise above "the mere animal" and become moral agents, would be obedient to God's law. Here we see the gross inconsistency of the New School; for, although they reject the doctrine of imputation as unjust, they still admit that Adam's sin, in some way or other, made it certain that his posterity will sin as soon as capable of moral action. "*How this is,*" says Mr. Barnes, "the Bible has not explained." As we have already shown, however, he accounts for it, not on the ground of any representative or covenant relation which Adam sustained to them, but as an effect of what he calls "the great law or constitution on which society is organized"—the same law by which the drunkard and the murderer bring trouble upon their families. To this Pelagius, if he were alive, could not object. Mr. Duffield attempts more particularly to explain *how* it become certain that all will sin. He says, "they inherit a constitutional nature, which has been subjected, by virtue of the constitution of God, to a forfeiture of those privileges and immunities, which would have ensued or been prolonged, on the obedience of our great primogenitor"—that "the circumstances and condition of the human race are very different now from what they would have been had not Satan seduced our first parents from their allegiance to God"—that "in consequence of the sin of Adam, men come into existence under the influence of causes and circumstances which render it *morally certain* that they universally will

sin as soon as they are capable of moral agency." pp. 302, 303, 306. Here the reader will observe, the certainty that all will sin is made to arise, not from any native depravity, but wholly from the operation of the *causes* and *circumstances* attending their situation in this world. These circumstances and causes are thus detailed—" Yet it (the infant) is placed in a rebellious world, subject to the influence of ignorance, with very limited and imperfect experience, and liable to the strong impulses of appetite and passion, so that the moral certainty is as strong as any thing can be, that the very susceptibilities of its nature being at the earliest moment excited by sinful and forbidden objects, &c.—there shall take place those acts, of which alone we can legitimately and intelligibly predicate moral depravity." p. 379.

Now observe the inconsistencies of New Schoolism. It denies the representative character of Adam, and maintains that it would be palpably unjust that his posterity should suffer for his sin; and yet it maintains that his posterity are placed, in consequence of his sin, under the operation of a certain "great law," of certain "causes and circumstances" which will infallibly result in their sinning, and consequently, in their ruin. In what respect is this doctrine more just than the doctrine of imputation as taught in our standards? Does it not most inconsistently maintain that Adam's posterity do suffer most grievously for his sin? What difference to us whether we inherit a depraved nature from Adam, or are placed, because of his sin, under circumstances which infallibly secure our ruin?

But by examining this doctrine a little more closely, we shall find that it wears a most forbidding aspect.

Mr. Barnes maintains, that it would be unjust to charge the sin of Adam upon his race; and yet he tells us, that at the very commencement of their existence they are brought under the operation of a "great law or constitution" which renders it certain that they will sin, and that this destructive influence arises from Adam's sin! Are infants, when first capable of moral action, prepared to resist the operation of this powerful cause? Is it not mockery to talk of voluntary sinning, when the ignorance and weakness of a child are compelled to meet such an overwhelming influence? But let us look at Mr. Duffield's circumstances and causes. He says, 1st. They are placed "in a rebellious world." He forgot that the question before him, and which he was trying to answer, was—*how came the world to be rebellious?* What mighty cause has turned the whole current of human affections and actions into the channel of iniquity? But can the infant avoid being placed in such a world? Is the fault his? 2d. They are "subject to the influence of ignorance." Can any one believe that the unavoidable ignorance of a child, just arrived at the age of accountability, is sinful? Or that he must perish in consequence of his innocent mistakes? 3d. They have "limited experience." Is lack of experience in a child sinful? If not, can errors, arising from that cause be regarded as sins? Surely not. 4th. They are "liable to the strong impulses of appetite and passion." Is a child worthy of punishment for indulging its natural appetites and passions, when it knows no better, and especially when those appetites and passions are not sinful? Now we ask, is the child responsible for being placed in a wic-

ked world, for its inexperience, or for its natural appetites and passions? It certainly is not. Is it not as unjust to require an unavoidably ignorant and inexperienced being to act with wisdom and experience, as to require him to do any other impossibility? The doctrine of Mr. Duffield amounts to this: Children, when they become moral agents, have no disposition to do wrong; but they have bad example, are ignorant and inexperienced; and, to use his own words, "under these disadvantages the moral being is called to decide whether the rational mind shall rise, and push its conquests over flesh and sense, aspiring after the joy of communion with God; or whether animal indulgence and passion shall detain it in bondage." And the poor creature is then condemned for an error which it could no more avoid than it could create a world? It would seem necessary only to state the doctrine to prove it false. If, as the New School maintain, Adam did not stand in his trial "as a public person," and as the representative of his race, but each must stand his own trial, justice seems obviously to require that they should be untrammelled by the previous conduct of any other being, and should be placed, as was Adam, under the most favorable circumstances. It appears to us more like mockery than justice, to suspend the eternal happiness of a rational creature upon his own obedience, and then in consequence of the rebellion of some other being, to place him in such a situation that his ruin is inevitable. This doctrine is too absurd to be long maintained. In this age of *improvement* it must soon give way to *increasing light*; and New Schoolism, more consistent with its own first princi-

ples, will deny that the sin of Adam had any such effect upon his posterity as to render their sinning certain. This will be *Pelagianism full grown*.

Our readers may wonder how conscientious men, thus boldly rejecting the doctrines of *Imputation* and *Original sin*, could adopt, and can still profess to adhere to a creed which teaches these doctrines, not only as clearly taught in the Bible, but as among the most important doctrines of the Christian system. They tell us they hold the *facts* taught in our standards, and only reject the *philosophy* attached to them. These doctrines are pronounced to be philosophical speculations, and as such are rejected. There is, if we mistake not, more deception than candor in this quibble. It is a fact, and not a speculation, that Adam's sin is imputed to his posterity. And it is a fact, that as a consequence of that imputation, they are born with a corrupt nature—a fact as clearly revealed in the Scriptures as any other. The Confession of Faith of our church states as an important *fact* that the guilt of Adam's sin is imputed to his posterity. It states as a Bible *fact*, that as a consequence of this they inherit a depraved nature. And it teaches as a Bible *fact*, that from that depraved nature, called original sin, "do proceed all actual transgressions." The New School deny these facts, and yet profess to be Confession-of-Faith-men. And let it be remarked, these are not facts of trifling importance. The man who embraces, and the man who rejects them, hold entirely different systems of theology.

In the next chapter we shall point out some other important truths so intimately connected with the doctrine of imputation, that the rejection of it is inconsistent with the belief of them.

We have proved, as we think, to the satisfaction of the unprejudiced reader, that the New School do reject the doctrine of *imputation* as taught in our standards, and as a consequence of this error, that they deny the doctrine of *original sin*. And although they speak of the certainty that all will sin, as in some way connected with Adam's sin, and are so far inconsistent with their own principles; yet they deny that Adam sustained to them a covenant or representative relation, or that they inherit from him a depraved nature. If these were the only errors of the New School, they are of such magnitude, as every intelligent Christian must perceive, as to require decisive steps to arrest their progress. But the rejection of imputation and original sin leads necessarily to other important errors. For,

If we deny these doctrines, we must, to be consistent, believe that infants dying in infancy are saved without regeneration or the atonement of Christ. Regeneration is the gracious work of the Holy Spirit renewing and purifying the hearts of those who are dead in sin. "And you hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and in sins." Eph. ii: 1. But Mr. Barnes, the acknowledged representative of the New School, tells us that all we know on this subject, is "the simple *fact* Adam sinned, and that this made it certain that all his posterity would be sinners"—that "all else that has been said of this, is the result of mere philosophical speculation"—that the certainty of their sinning arises, not from original sin, as our standards teach, but from "the great law or constitution on which society is organized." Mr. Duffield, with greater boldness, affirms that infants are neither holy nor unholy—that they have no moral character—that they have not risen above "the mere animal." If this be

true, how can they need or receive regeneration? The certainty that they will sin, we are told, depends upon the great law upon which society is organized, or, as Mr. D. says, upon the unpropitious circumstances in which they are placed in this world. But if they are removed by death from those unhappy circumstances, and placed in heaven "in circumstances (using Mr. D.'s words) so propitious to holiness;" what more is necessary to secure their future obedience? The soul must be depraved indeed that would sin in heaven. If then the mind of the infant is free from all inclination to sin, previous to its accountability; and if its character is to be determined by the circumstances in which it may be placed; it will certainly be holy, if removed to heaven. Accordingly, Mr. D. does not believe that infants are regenerated; but he says, "the Scriptures very clearly convey the idea, that there may be, and actually is, a *care* and *influence* of the Spirit of God, adapted to the infant mind, which will secure holiness (in the case of those dying in infancy) and that in the earliest developments of its constitutional capacities," p. 354. This care and influence is something altogether different from *regeneration*; for Mr. D. maintains that the holiness of the child Jesus was secured in the same way. Regeneration is the work of the Holy Spirit converting the *sinner* in this world; but the care and influence of the Spirit, of which he speaks, are designed to prevent the infant spirit in heaven from ever sinning. If this doctrine be true, we are unable to see the necessity of any such care; but however that may be, he and all who believe with him, certainly do deny that infants dying are regenerated. We need scarcely say that this is wholly inconsistent with our

Confession of Faith. As it teaches that infants inherit from Adam a depraved nature; so does it also teach that they are regenerated by the Holy Spirit. "Elect infants, dying in infancy, are *regenerated* and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when and how and where he pleaseth." C. X. S. 3. This, too, is the doctrine of the Bible. Every passage of Scripture proving the depravity of infants, shows the necessity of their regeneration. Christ proved that all men must be born again, because "that which is born of the flesh is flesh;" and of course all who are born of the flesh "must be born of the Spirit." Are infants born of the flesh? Certainly. Then they must be born of the Spirit. The doctrine of infant baptism should be to every Pede-baptist satisfactory evidence of infant depravity. Why are they baptized? Water in baptism is the emblem of *purification*, and when applied to infants, as well as to adults, it shows their need of the sanctifying influence of the Holy Spirit. This is one of the unanswerable arguments used by Augustine against Pelagius, the celebrated advocate of the doctrine we are now opposing.

Again—the rejection of the doctrines of imputation and original sin necessarily leads to the belief that infants, dying in infancy, are saved *independently of the atonement of Christ*. He was called *Jesus*, (Saviour,) "because he shall save his people *from their sins*."—He died for *sinners*; but the New School tell us, that infants have no sins. They maintain, that it would be unjust that they should suffer for Adam's sin, and that they have no depraved nature. Consequently, they cannot be condemned, until they reach the period of accountability and commit actual sin; and if they die

before that age, they cannot be lost. Accordingly Mr. Barnes says, "There is no evidence that they (Adam's posterity) participate in the direct and peculiar effect of sin, in eternal death, without being *personal* transgressors. There is no reason to believe that they are condemned to eternal death, or held to be guilty of his sin, without participation of their own, or without personal sin, any more than there is, that they are *approved* by the work of Christ, or held to be personally deserving, without embracing his offer and receiving him as a Saviour." Mr. Duffield thinks, that Adam's posterity are subjected by a divine constitution to the evil consequences of his sin; but he is of opinion that the sentence of God, "In the day thou eatest thou shalt surely die," includes only natural death and a forfeiture of the paradisaical life, "which Adam then possessed. See Book on Regeneration, pp. 304, 305. If this doctrine be true, infants are not exposed to eternal death. In what sense, then, can Christ be said to be their *Saviour*? He does not save them from *temporal* death; and if they are not exposed to eternal death, he cannot save them from that. Yet Mr. D., as if afraid to carry out his own principles, maintains that they are saved by *some kind* of connection with Christ!—Now examine the doctrine of our Confession of Faith on this subject. "The fall brought upon mankind the loss of communion with God, his displeasure and curse, so as we are by nature children of wrath, bond slaves to Satan, and justly liable to all punishments in this world and in that which is to come." *Larger Catechism*. This doctrine is consistent with the corresponding doctrine of our Standards, that elect infants are "regenerated and saved *by Christ*." We do not be-

lieve that a large part of the human race are to be saved without the blood of Christ, which "cleanseth from all sin," and the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit. John in his heavenly vision speaks of none before the throne, who had not "washed their raiment and made them white in the blood of the Lamb;" and who do not sing, "Unto him that loved us and washed us in his blood."

Once more—If the doctrines of imputation and original sin are not true, the *sufferings* of infants seem manifestly inconsistent with divine justice and benevolence. We cannot conceive of suffering in the government of a just and benevolent God, *except for sin*. That infants suffer and die, we know. In what light then are we to regard their sufferings? The Scriptures certainly teach us that temporal death is a consequence of sin, and that none die who are not some way chargeable with sin. Rom. v. 12. "Sin entered into the world and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." Mr. Barnes, commenting on this passage, says: "I understand it, therefore, as referring to the fact that *men sin in their own persons, sin themselves*, as indeed how can they sin in any other way?—and that therefore they die." But if it be true, as the apostle says, that death hath passed only on those who have sinned, or who are in some way chargeable with sin; how is it that infants die? Mr. B. understands that men sin in themselves—commit actual transgression—and therefore they die. But infants do not thus sin; and yet they die. Why do they die? Mr. B. Will not allow that it is just that they should suffer for Adam's sin. Our Standards teach, that the guilt of Adam's sin being imputed, they

are subject to all the evil consequences of it—death temporal, spiritual and eternal; and they are sustained by the declaration of Paul the Apostle, that “in Adam all die.” [1 Cor. xv: 22.] And again, “Through the offence of one many are dead.” Rom. v: 15. But if the doctrines of the New School be true, we see not how the sufferings and death of infants can be reconciled with the justice and benevolence of God. It will not do to refer their sufferings to “some great law or constitution,” for they assume the principle that it is not *right* that infants should be subjected to suffering for Adam’s sin; and if this principle be correct, they can never suffer until they become accountable and voluntarily sin. They are, therefore, as inconsistent with themselves, as they are with the facts in the case.

But if we admit that Adam in his trial stood as a *public person*, as the representative of his race, and consequently that his sin was, in the eye of the law, their sin; and that they suffer the evil consequences of it; all is plain. For then it is obvious that the infant needs regeneration as really as did our first parents after the fall—that the atonement of Christ is as necessary to secure its salvation, as to secure theirs—and that its sufferings are no less just than theirs were. And it is easy to see that this doctrine is reasonable, for in Adam, human nature was tried under circumstances the most favorable to perseverance in holiness. In the maturity of manhood, with a distinct knowledge of his duty and of the motives to obedience, and a heart altogether inclined to rectitude, exposed to the influence of no vicious example, in Paradise holding daily communion with God; every thing was favorable to his perseverance and confirmation in holiness. And could

it have been left to his posterity, correctly informed, whether they would suspend their happiness on his conduct, or stand their own probation under circumstances infinitely less favorable, the unanimous decision would doubtless have been in favor of the course Divine wisdom has pursued. But if we deny, as the New School do, that Adam was, in his trial, the federal head and representative of his race, it is impossible to account for the evils they suffer in consequence of his sin. If each one must stand his own probation, justice seems obviously to require, as before remarked, that he be permitted to enter upon it under the most favorable circumstances, wholly untrammelled by the conduct of any being who lived before him, and that he should be as free from suffering of every kind, until he sins, as Adam was before he fell.

We may now confidently appeal to every unprejudiced mind to decide, whether the errors of the New School, thus far exhibited, are of trivial importance.— They deny the covenant relation between Adam and his posterity and the imputation of the guilt of his sin to them. They reject the doctrine of original sin, or native depravity, and maintain that infants are neither holy nor unholy. They do away the necessity of their regeneration, and of the atonement of Christ in order to their salvation. The principles they avow, make the sufferings and death of infants inconsistent with divine justice and benevolence. Were not the Old School bound, as faithful ministers and officers of the Church of Christ, to take decisive steps to arrest the progress of these errors?

## CHAPTER III.

### ATONEMENT.

#### THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE OLD AND NEW SCHOOLS IN REGARD TO THE NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT AND OF JUSTIFICATION.

THE doctrine of *imputation* has reference not only to the connection between Adam in his trial and his posterity, and the effect of his sin upon them, but also to the connection between Christ and believers, and the manner in which they are justified in him. The rejection of it by the New School, therefore, creates a very important difference between them and the Old School in regard to the nature of the atonement and the doctrine of justification. These doctrines constitute the sole foundation of the Christian's hope. The doctrine of justification, which is based on the atonement of Christ, was justly regarded by Luther as the *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesie*—the article by which the Church stands or falls. Errors in regard to these doctrines are, therefore, peculiarly dangerous.

The atonement of Christ is designed to deliver his people from that condemnation in which by the fall and by their own sins they are involved, and to secure to them eternal life. Man having become a transgressor, one of three things must take place. He must suffer the penalty of the broken law; or, he must be pardoned, and the claims of the law be disregarded; or the demands of the law against him must be met by some other being in his behalf. God in infinite mercy de-

terminated to save some of the human race; but he could not, consistently with his justice or the safety of his kingdom, set aside the claims of his law. He therefore sent his beloved Son to satisfy the demands of justice for his people, "that he might be just and the justifier of him that believeth." Rom. iii: 26. Accordingly our Standards teach that "the Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, which he through the Eternal Spirit once offered up unto God, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father; and purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, for all those whom the Father hath given unto him;" [Ch. viii. Sec. v.] that "Christ by his obedience and death, did make a proper, real and full satisfaction to God's justice in the behalf of them that are justified." *Larger Catechism*. To prove that this doctrine is rejected by the New School, we shall refer to four sermons on the Atonement, by Dr. N. S. S. Beman, who is now one of the most prominent men of the party, and who has been one of the most active in causing their secession.

Dr. Beman repeatedly and unequivocally denies that Christ did make satisfaction to divine justice. That the reader may distinctly see the discrepancy of his views with the doctrine of our Standards, we remark—that to make satisfaction to Divine justice, and to suffer the penalty of the law, are phrases of precisely the same import. The law of God is "just," and it presents to us the claims of a just God. When it is perfectly obeyed, as in the case of holy angels, divine justice is exercised in conferring a suitable reward. When it is broken, as in the case of fallen angels, divine justice is exercised in the infliction of its penalty. In the

case of transgressors, therefore, justice can be satisfied only by the infliction of the full penalty of the law, either on them, or on a substitute. Now our Confession of Faith, as we have seen, declares that "Christ by his own obedience and death, did fully discharge the debt of all those that are justified, and did make a proper, real and full satisfaction to his Father's justice in their behalf," [Ch. xi. Sec. iii.]; that he did really and fully endure the penalty of the law, and satisfy its demands for his people.

Dr. Beman first notices and opposes the doctrine held by some, that "Christ did, in a strict and literal sense, suffer the penalty of the law as the substitute of his people." p. 33. That is—that Christ suffered as much as all the elect, if lost, would have suffered; and that if another were added to the number of the elect, he must have suffered more. And he rejects, as unworthy of investigation, that view of the atonement which maintains "that Christ suffered the penalty of the law for his people, and yet he did not suffer it in nature and degree." p. 47. That is, that Christ, though he endured the penalty of the law, did not suffer as much as all the elect, if lost, would have suffered; and that his sufferings were not of the same kind precisely which they would have endured. They, for example, would have suffered the pangs of a guilty conscience, which he of course could not have endured. This view, which is so unceremoniously rejected, is precisely that presented in the Confession of Faith. It declares, that he fully satisfied the demands of the law; but it does not teach, either that he felt the pangs of a guilty conscience, or that he suffered as much as his people, if lost, would have suffered. And we may ask, Where has the law

of God specified any particular *quantum* of sufferings as essential to its penalty? The fact that the sinner must have suffered eternally for his crimes, certainly does not prove that an infinitely more exalted being might not expiate them in a limited period. Again we ask, Where has the law specified the pangs of a guilty conscience as essential to its penalty? That the lost sinner endures such sufferings, is admitted; but it remains to be proved, that the demands of divine justice cannot be met by sufferings of a different kind. Divine justice required such sufferings as would "magnify the law and make it honorable;" and such were the sufferings of Christ. The divinity of Christ connected with his human nature, as our Standards correctly say, "gives worth and efficacy to his sufferings, obedience and intercession."

Dr. Beman, however, rejects from the atonement all idea of satisfaction to divine justice, in the proper sense of the term. He says, "The idea that Christ so took the legal place of the sinner, and that the iniquities of his people were so imputed to him that the law required his death, and justice demanded the release of those for whom he expired, appears to us unscriptural and absurd." Again, he asserts that "the penal demand (of the law) can never be extinguished"—that Christ suffered, "not on legal principles, but by express stipulation or covenant with the Father"—that "those sufferings which he endured as a holy being, were intended, in the case of all those who are finally saved, as a substitute for the infliction of the penalty of the law." "We say," says he, "a substitute for the infliction of the penalty; of the penalty itself, if it be executed at all, must fall upon the sinner, and upon no one else."

pp. 34, 35, 36. Again he says, "The penalty of the law, in the case of those who believe and are saved, is not to be inflicted"—that if the penalty has been endured, "so that justice has no further claim," then "grace and pardon are out of the question." "As to imputation," says he, "we do deny that the sins of men, or of any of our race, were transferred to Christ, that they became his sins, or were so reckoned to him, that he sustained their legal responsibilities," pp. 38, 40, 51. Here the reader will remark, Dr. B. most unequivocally denies, that Christ by his sufferings satisfied the demands of the law, and asserts that he suffered "not on legal principles," and that the penalty, in the case of those who are saved, is never to be inflicted. In regard to imputation, while no one maintains the monstrous absurdity, that the sins of men were so *transferred* to Christ that they became his sins; our Standards, and if we do not egregiously err, the Bible, teach that the sins of his people were so imputed to him, "that he sustained their legal responsibilities."

But although Dr. B. denies that Christ satisfied divine justice, properly so called; he finds a kind of justice which he did satisfy. He divides justice into three kinds, viz: commutative, distributive, and general or public justice. Commutative justice, which regards commercial transactions, such as the payment of debts, he concludes, can have nothing to do with the subject. "Distributive justice," he tells us, "respects the moral character and conduct of creatures, and consists in rewarding or punishing them according to their merit or ill desert." Was this satisfied by the atonement? No—he says, "We conclude, then, that distributive justice, or justice in its common and appro-

prate sense, in relation to rewards and punishments, was not satisfied by the atonement made by Jesus Christ. The moral law, when violated, has but one demand, and that demand is the death of the transgressor. But in the Gospel, of which the atonement is an essential part, the principles of distributive justice are overruled and set aside." pp. 61, 64.

The third kind of justice mentioned, viz., public or general justice, he thinks, was satisfied by the atonement. What is public or general justice? We give his own definition: "It has no direct reference to law, but embraces those principles of virtue and benevolence by which we are bound to govern our conduct, and by which God himself governs the universe." p. 63. There are some strange things in this definition. 1st. There is *justice*, and of course *injustice*, without law. Can there be any other justice than that which is required by that law which is "holy and just"—or injustice, which is not a violation of that law? 2d. There are principles of virtue and benevolence which "have no direct reference to law." Are there other principles of virtue than those embraced in that law which is "perfect"—"holy?" And are there principles of benevolence different from those required by the *law of love*? For "love is the fulfilling of the law." 3d. We are *bound* to govern our conduct by certain principles having no direct reference to law! We had supposed that the law of God was a perfect rule of conduct; but it seems, we are bound to govern our conduct by other principles having no direct reference to it. Pray, what do those principles require us to do? And since we are "*bound*" to regulate our conduct by them, shall we sin if we refuse to do this? For "sin

is the transgression of the law." 1 John iii: 4. But here we find sins which have no direct reference to law, and which are, of course, no transgression of law! Then by what law shall we be convinced of these sins? For "by the law is the knowledge of sin." Rom. iii: 20. And, then, will men be punished for disregarding these principles of virtue and benevolence, which have no direct reference to law? For "sin is not imputed when there is no law." Rom. v: 13. Perhaps, however, our minds may be easy on this subject, for "where there is no law there is no transgression." Rom. iv: 15. Then in these principles of virtue and benevolence which constitute public justice, we have *obligation without law, and violation of obligation without sin!!!*

4th. The atonement appears most singularly in this view of the subject. The holy and just law of God has been broken by men. Justice demands satisfaction by the infliction of the penalty. But instead of meeting the just demands of the law, Christ dies, we are told, to satisfy certain "principles of virtue and benevolence," which have no direct reference to law! Where in the word of God do we find any such principles? What claim have they upon us? If they have claims, they not only have reference to law, but are themselves a law. If they have no claims, they can demand no satisfaction, and consequently the death of Christ could not satisfy public justice. But if men are bound to govern their conduct by the principles of public justice, and have failed to do it; how could Christ, on Dr. B.'s principles, satisfy for them? He contends, that since the moral law has claims on men, and not on Christ, that he cannot satisfy the demands against them.

How, then, can he satisfy the demands of public justice, seeing that its claims are against men, and not against him? Besides, he contends that the sufferings of Christ were a *substitute* for the infliction of the penalty of God's law. But how, we ask, can satisfaction to *general* justice be a substitute for satisfaction to *distributive* justice?

The truth is, there is no such justice. It is the mere figment of a mind laboring to cover the deformity of a dangerous error. Its absurdities are as glaring as those of the doctrine of *transubstantiation*. And if there is no such thing as public justice—a thing of which we read nothing in the word of God—what becomes of the atonement of Christ, according to New School theology? It is utterly destroyed; and Christ died to satisfy *nothing*.

Dr. Beman comes to the conclusion, however, that by this satisfaction, where no satisfaction was demanded, "the legal obstacle to man's salvation was removed;" and yet in the very next page he declares, that "the law has the same demand upon him, (the sinner,) and utters the same denunciation of wrath against him," as before Christ died! What, then, we ask, becomes of God's violated law? Why, says he "the whole legal system has been suspended, at least for the present, in order to make way for one of a different character." The law of God is "suspended," and the demands of justice "set aside" and utterly disregarded! Is this the way to "magnify the law and make it honorable?" The law of God, like the Pope of Rome in these days of his weakness, stands brandishing its anathemas in vain against those who have trampled it under foot! Is this the Bible view of the atonement?

The atonement, as thus exhibited by Dr. Beman, does not accomplish the purposes for which he himself says it is designed. It was necessary, he tells us, 1st. *As an expression of God's regard for the moral law.* But how did the sufferings of Christ show his regard for the moral law? By satisfying its demands? No; for he says, they are not, and never will be satisfied, but are "set aside." And who ever before heard of expressing regard for a law by suspending its operation, or setting aside its claims? When the operation of a law is suspended, is not this equivalent to a repeal of the law, for the time being?

2d. The atonement, he says, was necessary, "in order to evince the divine determination to punish sin, or to execute the penalty of the law." p. 15. But may we not inquire, how sufferings inflicted on a *holy* being, no way charged with sin, can show God's determination to punish *sin*? It is much easier to see how it might evince his determination to punish *holiness*. Nor can we conceive how God could evince his determination to execute the penalty of the law by refusing to do it, and setting aside its claims—the very thing done, according to this doctrine, by the sufferings of Christ. It is much easier to see how such a course might prove his determination *not* to execute its penalty?

3d. The atonement was necessary, according to Dr. B., in order to make a suitable impression on the universe. If sinners had been saved without an atonement, he thinks angels "could have no evidence that God will punish the sinner by inflicting the penalty of the law." And pray what evidence have angels now since the claims of the law have been set aside, that God will execute its penalty, or punish the sinner?

These three purposes, (which, by the way, are one,) are not accomplished by the atonement, as exhibited by Dr. Beman. But if Christ did endure for his people the penalty of the law, we can see how his sufferings are an expression of the highest regard of God for his law, and of his fixed determination to execute its penalty.

Mr. Barnes also denies that Christ endured "the precise penalty of the law." [Notes p. 87.] Of course he did not make "a proper, real and full satisfaction to his Father's justice," as our Confession of Faith teaches.

The candid reader, we doubt not, is satisfied that the New School, if fairly represented by Dr. Beman and Mr. Barnes, are very essentially at variance with our Standards on this important subject. We expect to show that their views are equally inconsistent with the doctrine of the Bible.

We have now briefly examined the New School doctrine of the atonement, particularly as set forth by Dr. Beman. We discovered that Dr. Beman denies that Christ endured the penalty of the law for his people, or that he made any satisfaction whatever to divine justice, in the proper sense of the term; that he asserts that "the law, or justice, that is, distributive justice, as expressed in the law, has received no satisfaction at all;" that the sufferings of Christ merely satisfied what he calls "public or general justice"—a species of justice which, as we discovered, has no existence; that "the principles of distributive justice are overruled and set aside." No one of our readers, we presume, can entertain a doubt that this doctrine is wholly irreconcilable with that of our Standards.

Before entering upon the enquiry whether the doctrine

of our standards or that of the New School is sustained by the Scriptures, we think it proper to notice the doctrine as stated and defended by Rev. Abel Pearson in his "Analysis of the Principles of the Divine Government." This work, whatever may be its real merits, is rendered important by the recommendations of such men as Rev. T. H. Skinner, D. D., Rev. James Patterson, Rev. Isaac Anderson, D. D., Professor of Theology in the Western and Southern Theological Seminary. Mr. Pearson's views of the atonement are somewhat different from those of Dr. Beman, and are held by many in the West, who adhere to the New School secession.

Mr. Pearson sets out with the principle that God has always intended to display his character to the highest advantage, "*by bringing out the greatest amount of holiness and happiness in the created universe.*" p. 115. This is the great object. He determines to accomplish it in the best manner, "by adopting a most complete system of *governmental principles*," and governing the universe accordingly.—The law constitutes one part of these principles, and the Gospel the other. These are the first principles.

Mr. P. agrees with Dr. Beman in denying that the sufferings of Christ were *legal*, or that he endured the penalty of the law, or satisfied divine justice for his people. "They were not inflicted on him by the Divine Being in any of his official capacities, *nor according to any legal process.*" p. 118. Again on page 129, we find the following question and answer: "N. But were not Christ's sufferings the penalty of the divine law? A. No, for that would suppose him to have undergone a legal process, and that sentence of condem

nation had been pronounced against him by the Judge, while it was acknowledged that he was holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, and made higher than the heavens." He even denies that God could justly accept of Christ as the substitute of his people. "N. But might not that innocent person freely offer himself? A. Yes, he might, if he thought proper, freely offer himself; but no righteous judge could, in his official capacity, freely or even unfreely take him, and no righteous governor either could, in his official capacity, freely or unfreely execute him." p. 131.

Then what, according to Mr. P., is the nature of the atonement? The reader will remember that in order to secure the end of government, "it is necessary that all innocent subjects should have the highest happiness, of which their natures are susceptible." So says Mr. P. Well, how is this to be accomplished? Let him answer: "Now, to secure this highest happiness, it is needful that they feel the highest confidence in that government under which they live." Very well. Now how is this *highest confidence* to be secured? Let him answer again: "To secure this highest confidence they must be convinced of two important particulars, that the law is good, and that it shall be maintained, so as to secure the grand end of government." Well, in regard to the first point—how shall they be fully convinced that *the law is good*? Mr. Pearson describes two methods. 1st. "They should study and examine it, under the most favorable circumstances." This, he says, will convince them that "the law is holy, just, and good, *so far as they understand it.*" "But," says he, "it is impossible for any created being to understand that law in all its various bearings down through

eternity; for they know not what some far off future day might possibly bring forth." That is—so far as they can understand it, the law appears perfectly good; but they cannot be certain that some future day may not bring to light some hidden principle of injustice! How shall this doubt be removed, so as to give them the highest confidence that God has made a good law? Mr. Pearson shall answer again: "They need, therefore, the certain opinion of some one, whom they know to be well qualified, and a perfect judge of all its bearings, in order to their arriving at this fullest, highest confidence in the government. The Divine Redeemer, the Son, is this well qualified and perfect judge."

Now, how are they to obtain an expression of the opinion of the Redeemer? "Why," says Mr. P., "all rational creatures have his certain opinion on it. For if he had not thought the law to be holy, just, and good, he never would have come under it. He never would have rendered obedience to it, in such awfully trying, uninviting circumstances." Here we get at the precise nature of the atonement, as held by Mr. Pearson. Christ *obeyed* the law, he tells us, *in order fully to convince holy beings that he considered it a good law*. His sufferings were not a satisfaction to divine justice, but were designed to give weight to the opinion he had expressed by his obedience in favor of the law! "It is the obedience of the Son," says he, "gives this testimony in favor of the law, and the peculiar suffering circumstances in which he rendered that obedience, constitutes the obedience a more unsuspecting and honorable testimony in favor of the law." pp. 120-122.

But there is another thing, of which, according to Mr. P., holy beings must be convinced, viz: "That it

(the law) shall be maintained, so as to secure the grand end of government." How are they to be convinced of this? "The obedient sufferings of the Son," says Mr. P., "give evidence of this second particular, equally satisfactory, and complete and convincing. The sufferings of the Son give testimony in favor of the Governor's character, and the Son's obedience renders his sufferings a more honorable testimony in favor of the Governor's character." Now, it would seem, all that was necessary to complete the work, was for God the Father to express his opinion of the law. So Mr. P. says—"Now that the Father did regard the law in the same light in which the Son did, is evident from his having sent his Son to honor it." p. 122, 123. Here we have what Mr. P. and those who agree with him, consider the whole of the atonement of Christ. In regard to it, we remark—

1st. It bears little or no resemblance to the doctrine of our standards, which declare that "Christ by his obedience and death, did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to God's justice in the behalf of them that are justified."

2d. It represents the character of holy beings in a most unlovely aspect, and exceedingly degrades the character of God. Here are holy beings whom God has created in his own likeness, and whom he sustains and blesses. He gives them a law by which they are to be governed. So far as they can understand, it is a good law; but they have not confidence in the Eternal God—they fear there is something behind the curtain, which "some far off future day" may develope. This apprehension mars their peace; and in order to convince them that

God has not made a bad law, they must have the *opinion* of the Son. He knows all about it. But as they cannot confide in his veracity, if he should solemnly declare his good opinion of the law of God, he must, in order to satisfy them, come into the world and *obey* it. Nor is even this sufficient to remove their unbelief; but in order to give "a more unsuspecting and honorable testimony," he must obey it under "suffering circumstances!" Then Christ, having proved to their satisfaction that he really considers the law of God a good one, must, by his "obedient sufferings," prove to them that the character of the Father is good, and that he will sustain his government so as to secure their happiness! And finally, the Father must prove, by sending his Son to honor the law, that he has the same opinion of it as that expressed by the Son. Is it true, that holy creatures have so little confidence in their Creator? And above all, is it possible that the Sovereign of the Universe would thus stoop to establish his own character and that of the law?

3d. If the principles here laid down are true, the atonement would really have been necessary, if there had been no sin in the universe. For Mr. P. asserts, that in order to enjoy perfect happiness, holy creatures must be fully convinced that the law is good; and as no creature could decide this point, they must have the opinion of a competent Judge. Again—they must be certain that God would faithfully maintain his government; and this certainty could be secured only by the "obedient sufferings" of Christ. Really, according to this doctrine, the obedience and sufferings of Christ, instead of being a satisfaction to divine justice, were

merely an effort on the part of God to establish his own character and that of his law !

4th. We see not how the obedience and sufferings of Christ could prove that God would sustain a law, the just claims of which he sets aside whenever he saves a sinner ?

Such are some of the wild speculations of the New School theology, endorsed by several leading men of the party. Let us now briefly examine the Scripture doctrine, And

1st. The Scriptures teach, contrary to the New School, that the sufferings of Christ were *strictly legal*. That they were *voluntary* on his part, we maintain with no less zeal than do our opponents ; but we also believe, that he voluntarily placed himself under the law, as the substitute of his people. Gal. iv: 4, 5. "But when the fullness of time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, *made under the law*, to redeem them that were under the law." To be under the law, is to be under obligations to meet its requisitions. The expression is so used in Rom. iii: 19. "Now we know, that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are *under the law*." All men are under the law, and, being transgressors, are under the curse. Gal. iii: 10. To redeem his people from that curse, Christ placed himself under the law, thus obligating himself to obey the law and meet its demands against them.

That the sufferings of Christ we strictly *legal*, is further proved by the fact that they are termed *obedience*. Obedience of necessity implies the existence of a law which is *obeyed*. Rom. v: 19. "For as by the disobedience, of one, many were made sinners ; so by the

obedience of one, shall many be made righteous." Have the sufferings of Christ nothing to do in justifying sinners—making them righteous? Certainly; for "without the shedding of blood there is no remission." And "the blood of Christ cleanseth us from all sin." 1 John i: 7. Then the shedding of blood was an essential part of that *obedience* by which he shall make many righteous. Again—Phil. ii: 8, "And being found in fashion as a man, he (Christ) humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." Here we learn that his death on the cross was part of his *obedience*. What law did he obey? The same, to be sure, under which he placed himself; and that was the same which his people had transgressed, and from the curse of which he redeemed them.

2d. The Scriptures teach, in opposition to the New School, that the sufferings of Christ were a satisfaction to divine justice for his people. They must have been so, if they were legal, or in obedience to the law; since the law had no claims on him, except as the substitute of sinners. Whatever obedience he rendered, therefore, and whatever sufferings he endured, were on their behalf. We adduce a very few passages, confirming the doctrines of our standards. Peter the Apostle thus speaks of the sufferings of Christ: "Who his own self bear our sins in his body on the tree." 1 Peter ii: 24. What is the meaning of the expression *to bear sins*? When used in reference to one's own sins, it signifies to bear the punishment due to them—the penalty of the violated law. Thus, in Levit. v: 1—"And if a soul sin, and hear the voice of swearing, and is a witness—if he do not utter it, then shall he *bear his iniquity*." In Ezekl. xviii: 20, is a passage which settles beyond

dispute, the meaning of the phrase in question: "The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son." No one, we presume, will deny, that the meaning of this passage is—that the son shall not endure the punishment due his father's sins, &c. When, therefore, it is said, that Christ bear our sins in his own body on the tree, the only possible meaning is, that he endured the penalty due our sins—the penalty of the law. Precisely of the same import is the following passage in Isaiah liii: 6—"All we, like sheep, have gone astray—and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." In what sense did the Lord lay our iniquities on him?

The same doctrine is confirmed by Gal. iii. 13—"Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, *being made a curse for us.*" If this doctrine be true, we can see the force of the reasoning of Paul in Rom. iii: 31—"Do we, then, make void the law through faith? God forbid: Yea, we establish the law." How does the doctrine of justification by faith in Christ *establish* the law? By suspending its operation and setting aside its claims, as Dr. Beman says; or by proving it good, and then setting it aside, as Mr. Pearson teaches? Surely not. Who ever heard of *establishing* a law by suspending its operation and setting aside its claims? The law is established, we apprehend, by the full satisfaction rendered to its just claims by the believer's substitute. But if the doctrine of the New School be true, the law is not *established*, but *superseded* by the Gospel.

We might easily multiply passages of Scripture proving most clearly the doctrine of our Confession of Faith;

- but as it is rather our purpose to point out the difference between the Old and New Schools, than to defend the views of the former, we shall desist. Every Presbyterian minister did, at his ordination, solemnly declare his belief in "the system of doctrine" taught in our Confession of Faith. When, therefore, we prove that the New School have so essentially departed from those doctrines, we prove that the Old School have a right to be—nay, are bound to be—dissatisfied.

## CHAPTER IV.

### JUSTIFICATION.

#### THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES ON THE SUBJECT OF JUSTIFICATION.

No more important question ever occupied the human mind, than, *how men are to be justified before God*. The atonement of Christ, as both the Old and N. School admit, lays the only foundation for their justification. Of course a difference in regard to the atonement, must produce a corresponding difference in the doctrine of justification. That the reader may distinctly see the difference between the two Schools, we will, first, state the doctrine as contained in our Standards, and as held by the Old School.

To justify a man, is literally to declare or pronounce him just or righteous. Thus God says, "Keep thee far from a false matter," &c., "for I will not justify the wicked." Exd. xxiii: 7. Again—"If there be a controversy between men, and they come into judgment, that the judges may judge them; then they shall *justify* the righteous and condemn the wicked." Deut. xxv: 1. Again—"Wisdom is justified of her children." Matth. xi: 19. In these and a multitude of other passages, the word *justify* manifestly signifies, to pronounce or declare one to be just or righteous. Justification, therefore, implies of necessity, the existence of a law by which the individual is judged, and according to which the judge declares him just. If, for example, a man be charged with theft, he must be tried by the law which

relates to that crime. If the charge be not proved, the law justifies him—declares him righteous; it has no claims against him. But if he be found guilty, he cannot be justified until he completely satisfies the demands of the violated law. He may be *pardoned*—go unpunished; but he cannot be *justified*, because the law declares him guilty. All men are transgressors of God's law; and therefore the Scriptures declare, that “by deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight.” And since it is impossible that the sinner should satisfy the demands of the law against him, it is equally impossible that he should ever be justified, unless the claims of the law be satisfied for him by another. For, let it be remembered, justification is a *sentence of the law* declaring the individual just or righteous; just as *condemnation* is a sentence of the law pronouncing him unjust. Accordingly the Confession of Faith teaches, “That those whom God effectually calleth, he also freely justifieth—by pardoning their sins, and by accounting and accepting their persons as righteous: not for anything wrought in them, but for Christ's sake alone: not by imputing faith itself, the act of believing, or any other evangelical obedience to them, as their righteousness; *but by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ to them, they receiving and resting on him and his righteousness by faith.*” Ch. xi: Sec. 1. The reader will observe, that the meritorious ground of justification is here stated to be, 1st, the *obedience*, and 2d, the *satisfaction* of Christ, imputed to the believer. As the guilt of Adam's sin was imputed to his posterity, so that they are exposed to the legal consequences of it, as if they had committed it; so the perfect obedience and satisfaction rendered to the brok-

en law by Jesus Christ are imputed to believers; so that they are regarded by the law as righteous, and are justified. For however unworthy they are in their own persons, yet since the great Legislator and Judge has accepted his Son as their *substitute*, they do, in the eye of the law, what he does for them. Thus Paul says, "I through the law am dead to the law, that I might live unto God. I am crucified with Christ."—Gal. ii: 19, 20. That is—the law has executed its penalty on my substitute, so that I, in the eye of the law, endured its penalty, and am, so far as it is concerned, dead. So in Rom. vii: 1, 4, the connection between men and the law of God, is illustrated by that of a husband and wife. If the husband be dead, the wife is no longer bound to him by the law of marriage, "Wherefore my brethren," says Paul, "ye also are become dead to the law by the body of Christ." That is, Christ your substitute has borne your sins in his own body on the tree, so that in the eye of the law you are dead; or, as he changes the figure, the law is dead, and you are connected with Christ.

The sinner becomes interested in the mediation of Christ *by faith*, by which, as our Standards say, he receives and rests upon him and his righteousness for justification. So that while the obedience and sufferings of Christ, satisfying divine justice, are the *meritorious* cause of his justification; faith becomes the *instrumental* cause. And since the perfect righteousness of Christ is imputed to the believer, the law regards him as a perfectly righteous man. "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them that are in Christ."—Rom. viii: 1.

This doctrine the New School must reject; for since

they deny that Christ obeyed the law, and satisfied divine justice for his people, they cannot, of course, rely for justification upon such satisfaction. Justification, according to their views, cannot be the sentence of God's law, declaring the believer just; because he is a transgressor, and the demands of the law against him have not been satisfied. And Dr. Beman asserts, that "the law has the same demand upon him, and utters the same denunciation of wrath against him." "The law, or justice, that is distributive justice, has received no satisfaction at all." *Sermons on atonement* p. 65. By justification, therefore, they can understand nothing more than *mere pardon*. A simple illustration will show the difference between *justification* and *pardon*. A man is charged with the crime of *murder*. If on trial he is found not guilty, he is justified—the law declares him just. If the charge is proved, the law condemns him to death; but the governor may set aside the sentence of the law, and *pardon* him. When a man is justified, the law acquits him. When he is pardoned, the claims of the law are set aside. In this improper sense of mere pardon the New School use the word *justification*. Accordingly Dr. Beman, as we before remarked, maintains that "in the Gospel, of which the atonement is an essential part, the principles of distributive justice, are *overruled or set aside*." "This," says he, "is a sovereign act of God as the moral governor." p. 63. A *sovereign act*, that is, an act not according to law, but above law. As the New School deny the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity; so do they deny that Christ's righteousness is imputed to believers. Mr. Barnes, commenting on Rom. iv: 5, says: "But if the doctrine of the Scrip-

tures was, that the entire righteousness of Christ was set over to them, was really and truly theirs, and was *transferred* to them in any sense, with what propriety could the Apostle say that God justified the ungodly? If they have all the righteousness of Christ as their own, as really and truly theirs as if they had wrought it out themselves, they are not ungodly. They are eminently pure, and have a claim, not of grace, but of debt, to the very highest rewards of heaven. *Notes.* The following illustration may show the force of this reasoning. A benevolent man finds a poor beggar entirely destitute of clothing, and exposed to the wintry blast; and pitying his wretched condition, gives him an excellent suit of clothes. He meets Mr. Barnes, and informs him that he has *clothed the naked*. "Clothed the naked," exclaims Mr. B.; "why, you say, you gave him an excellent suit of clothes. Now, if you *transferred* your clothes to him, as really and truly his, with what propriety do you call him naked? On the contrary, he is well clad; and no thanks to you for it." A man of common sense would be amazed at such logic from a sane mind. The illustration is precisely in point. God finds the sinner in a moral sense naked, and exposed to his wrath. He sends his Son to take the sinner's place, obey the law, and satisfy its demands against him. This righteousness of Christ he imputes to the believing sinner, clothes him with the "wedding garment," and treats him as a righteous man. Thus he justifies the *ungodly*. The ungodly! says Mr. B.; how can he be ungodly, if God has imputed to him Christ's righteousness? That is, how can he be naked, if God has clothed him?

But whatever may be thought of Mr. Barnes' logic,

it is evident that he has directly assailed the doctrine of our Confession of Faith, which, as we have seen, teaches that God justifies believers "by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ to them." If the righteousness of Christ is imputed to the believer, it is, for the purpose of justification, truly *his*; and though, viewed in himself, and with reference to his previous conduct, he is most unworthy; yet clothed in the justifying righteousness of Christ, he is, in the eye of the law, perfectly righteous.

We design not to go extensively into the Scripture arguments in favor of our Standards. Every argument we adduced, when examining the nature of the atonement, to prove that Christ obeyed the law and endured its penalty for his people, proves with equal clearness that his obedience and satisfaction to divine justice constitute the meritorious ground of the believer's justification; or, in other words, that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to believers. We can now see, in a single point, the difference between the Old and New Schools on this subject.—The Old School maintain, with our Standards, that when God justifies a believer, the claims of the law in regard to him are fully met. The New School maintain, contrary to the Confession of Faith, that in the justification of believers the claims of the law in regard to them are *set aside*.

It may be proper, before dismissing this subject, to examine an objection to the doctrine of justification as now presented, urged with an air of triumph by the New School. They object, that if Christ fully satisfied the demands of the law for his people, and if his perfect righteousness is imputed to them, there is no *grace*

in their justification ; they have the right to *demand* it at the hands of God. " If they have all the righteousness of Christ as their own," says Mr. Barnes, " as really and truly theirs *as if* they had wrought it out themselves, they are *not* ungodly. They are eminently pure, and have a claim, *not of grace, but of debt*, to the very highest rewards of heaven." Dr. Beman illustrates his objection in this way: " Your neighbor becomes indebted to you in a large amount, which he is utterly unable to pay. You resort to legal coercion—institute a legal prosecution, and eventually lodge him in prison. A third person, actuated by benevolence, inquires into the affair ; is touched with pity for the tenant of the jail—becomes his legal surety—pays the whole demand, and restores him to personal freedom. Now we ask, on what principle is that man permitted to cross the threshold of his prison ? Must he come to your feet and beg to be released ; or may he boldly demand liberation on the principles of the law ?" This forbidding illustration he thus applies: " Man had violated the law of God, and, as a transgressor, was exposed to the penalty. This penalty, according to the scheme now under consideration, the lawgiver is determined to enforce. The whole race are about to perish, when Christ suffers the exact penalty of the law for a certain part of these offenders ; discharges the whole moral demand against them ; and those for whom he thus suffered, are liberated from the curse, and restored to the favor and affection of God." Having thus represented the doctrine, he declares that if Christ did suffer the penalty of the law for his people, and their debt is paid, " grace and pardon are out of the question." pp. 39, 40, 41.

The best answer to this cavil, (for so we are compelled to regard it,) is found in our Confession of Faith, a work for which Dr. Beman and the New School profess a very high regard. "Though Christ, by his obedience and death, did fully discharge the debt of all those that are justified, and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to his Father's justice in their behalf; yet, inasmuch as he was given by the Father for them, and his obedience and satisfaction accepted in their stead, and both freely, not for anything in them, their justification is only of free grace; that both the exact justice and rich grace of God, might be glorified in the justification of sinners." *Ch. ii: Sec. 3.* The reader will remark, that Dr. Beman and Mr. Barnes maintain, that if Christ endured the exact penalty of the law, and fully discharged the debt of his people, there is no *grace* in their restoration to God's favor, but they have the right to *demand* it. The Confession of Faith asserts, that Christ did fully discharge the debts of those that are justified, and did completely satisfy the demands of justice; and yet their justification is only of grace. Here is a flat contradiction between them and the Confession of Faith. Then let us look at the reasons by which the Confession of Faith proves justification to be of grace. They are the following: 1st. *Christ was given by the Father for them.* "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son." 2d. God accepted his obedience and satisfaction, when he might have required it of them. 3d. The faith which unites them to Christ, as the Larger Catechism says, is the gift of God.

Now, instead of the cruel and inexorable creditor represented by Dr. Beman, what do we see? We see

a God of boundless mercy, but of inflexible justice, pitying a ruined world, but still regarding his own honor and his violated law, in his infinite mercy sending his own Son to be their Saviour, and in his inflexible justice exclaiming, "Awake, O sword, against my shepherd, against the man that is my fellow." We hear the Son, with equal compassion for the lost, exclaim, "Behold I come to do thy will," and with no less regard for his holy law, saying, as he meekly bows to the stroke of justice, "Thy will be done." And we behold the same exalted being following up the sinner in his wayward course, and imparting that faith without which he must still perish. And are we to be told that if God himself, instead of sending men to hell, found a ransom, and if his own beloved Son discharged their debt, enduring for them the penalty of the violated law, there is no grace in their salvation, but that they have the right insolently to *demand* "the very highest rewards of heaven?" Alas! for the profanity of such declarations.

In the justification of the sinner, according to the doctrine of our Standards, the exact justice and rich grace of God are glorified. "Mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other." According to the New School, his mercy is displayed *at the expense of his justice.* ♦

## CHAPTER V.

### REGENERATION.

#### THE DIFFERENCES ON THE DOCTRINE OF REGENERATION.

We have now examined the points of difference between the two parties into which our Church has been divided, in regard to the doctrine of *imputation*, and, as connected with it, the doctrines of *original sin*, the *atonement* and *justification*. And we have ascertained that, so far from being merely *verbal*, or of trifling importance, as they have been represented, the differences are of the most serious character. If our object were merely to justify the Old School in adopting vigorous measures to arrest the progress of dangerous errors in our Church, we might safely now close our remarks. But as it is our purpose to present all the most important differences, we proceed to examine the views of the parties on the doctrine of *regeneration*—a doctrine which lies at the foundation of the Christian system. For “except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of heaven.” Jno. iii: 3.

The necessity of regeneration arises from man's depravity. And as the character of the remedy is determined by the nature of the disease, if we would understand the nature of regeneration, the *remedy*, we must inquire into the nature of human depravity, the *disease*. On this subject our Confession of Faith teaches, “That by this sin (eating the forbidden fruit) they (our first parents) fell from their original righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and

wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body"—that "they being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation"—that "from this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions." *Ch. vi: Sec. 2, 3, 4.* See also *Ch. ix: Sec. 3.*

Here the reader will observe, the Confession of Faith speaks of *original sin*—a corrupted nature, and of *actual transgressions* as proceeding from that corruption. The former is the *cause*, the latter the *effect*. Now, if original sin, or a corrupted nature, be the cause or source "from which do proceed all actual transgressions," *regeneration* is, of course, the removal, in part, of that cause, and the implantation of a holy principle or nature, from which shall proceed all actual obedience. Our Confession of Faith treats this doctrine under the head of "Effectual calling," as follows: "All those whom God has predestinated unto life, and those only, he is pleased, in his appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by his word and spirit, out of that state of sin and death, in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly, to understand the things of God, taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them a heart of flesh, renewing their wills, and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good, and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ; yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace." *Ch. x: Sec. 1.* In effectual calling, as

here exhibited, there are three things included. 1st. The mind is enlightened, 2d. The heart of stone is taken away, and a heart of flesh given. 3d. The will is renewed and inclined to that which is good.

Whatever variety there may be in the views of the New School in regard to this important doctrine, they, as a body, certainly differ widely from the views which our Standards give. For as they deny, as we have seen, that Adam's posterity inherit from him a depraved nature; so they also deny that there is any such thing as a "corrupted nature," distinct from *voluntary acts*. In other words, they maintain that all moral corruption consists of voluntary acts or choices, and, of course, that there can be no sin but in *actual transgression*. Mr. Duffield, whom we have had occasion before to quote as a prominent New School man, seems to assume, that depravity must either be *physical*, (in the very essence of the mind,) or consist wholly of *acts or choices*. Consequently, when Dr. Owen and the old Calvinists speak of original or indwelling sin "as a *principle*, or something which has the efficiency of *cause*, and which *exists in men anterior to any acts performed by them*;" he charges them with teaching the doctrine of "physical depravity." As he maintains that infants "possess no moral character"—"have not risen above the mere animal;" so he supposes that they begin to sin in consequence of the temptations arising from unfavorable circumstances, which render it morally certain "that there shall take place those *acts*, of which alone we can legitimately and intelligibly predicate moral depravity." *Book on Regeneration*. p. 379. Here, as in many other places in his book, he as-

serts that *moral depravity* consists wholly in *acts*, as distinct from a corrupt nature.

In accordance with this doctrine, Mr. Duffield, as we have seen, does not believe that infants, dying in infancy, are *regenerated*, but that there is "a *care and influence* of the Spirit, adapted to the infant mind," by which it is prevented from ever sinning. And since in the case of adults he denies that there is any such thing as a depraved nature, their regeneration must be something very different from the doctrine of our Standards. In regard to effectual calling as taught by them, he says: "This description was evidently influenced by the particular views, in mental science, entertained by the framers of that 'form of sound words.'" And he deprecates the idea, that "in adopting the language of these divines as a Confession of Faith, our consciences are bound to adopt the philosophy involved in it." He thinks "a man may entertain very different, and more correct views of the nature of the human mind, and mental operations generally, and yet hold the same facts with the Catechists." pp. 443-45. We have had occasion once before, to notice this sophistry about rejecting the *philosophy* and receiving the *facts* of our Standards. It is a *fact* and not a *philosophical speculation*, that men possess "a corrupted nature," and regeneration removes, in part, that corruption, and implants a holy principle or nature. Let those whose superior knowledge of mental science prevents their adoption of the doctrines of our Standards, form a new creed, with *better* philosophy, or *no* philosophy, as they may prefer, and not disturb those who still regard the old philosophy as Scriptural.

Regeneration, according to Mr. Duffield, consists in "spiritual illumination" and the "Moral Suasion of the Spirit." "Spiritual illumination," he says, "consists in the experimental and feeling sense of the truth, which is connected with its vivid and interested perception. The sensibilities of the heart are roused, and brought into blissful action by divine things. They appropriately and pleasurably affect the man, and that gives a vigor, and intensity, and vividness to his perception of them, which the dull, systematic, scientific, philosophical views of the doctrinal Christian or rationalist in religion ever want." p. 469. The *effects* of this illumination are thus described: "But when spiritual illumination takes place, the feelings of the heart have undergone a change, Instead of hatred and irritation, they are love and delight. The sensibilities of the soul are differently excited, and the very objects which once irritated, disgusted, tormented, now please, refresh and satisfy." Now we inquire, what is the special agency of the Spirit in this work? "It is," says Mr. D., "in eliciting and exciting the feelings of the heart appropriate to the character of the objects and truths, presented to the mind, and thus securing those vivid perceptions and that interested attention, without which there can be no influential or abiding knowledge." In reply to the question, "How the Spirit elicits and excites the feelings, appropriate to the character of any spiritual object or truth?" Mr. Duffield, while he professes not to know the *precise mode* of His agency, illustrates his view of the subject thus: "He that understands somewhat of the human heart, can operate upon another's sensibilities, whose character he knows, by such a presentation of objects, and by such appeals and

exhibitions of motives, as to produce an high degree of excitement, and both influence his conduct and shape his character. His success depends upon his knowledge of character," &c. "Should we, then," says he, "deny to the Spirit of God, who searcheth the hearts and trieth the reins of the children of men, what we concede to a worm of the dust?" Thus far Mr. D. speaks of the work of the Spirit as nothing more than the exciting of the feelings or sensibilities of the soul—an operation of the same *kind* as that by which one man excites the feelings of another; and the success of the Holy Spirit arises from his perfect acquaintance with the mind and its susceptibilities! This, however, one would suppose, is entirely sufficient, without what he calls "the moral suasion of the Spirit," if, as he says, it produces in the mind "love and delight" instead of "hatred and irritation" toward God and spiritual things; for "he that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God." John 3.

But let us very briefly examine his doctrine of *moral suasion*. In this he includes, 1st. The *truth*—the word of God—which is adapted to the conversion of men. 2d. The skillful presentation of the truth, so as to produce the desired effect. This he illustrates thus: "One man may better understand the character of him whom he addresses than another, and from his knowledge of that character, and interests, &c., be able to make his appeals in such a way, and sustain them by such motives, as to produce the very excitement, and rouse into action the very feelings requisite to sway the will into a compliance with his demands." To apply this illustration, he remarks, "Were we then to say that the Spirit of God, who knoweth perfectly what is in the

breast of man, can so arrange providential circumstances, and, at the same time, so cause truth specially adapted to the mood of mind which they have produced, to be presented, and to rouse into action the constitutional capacities and susceptibilities, and thus secure the compliance of the will with his solicitations, we should maintain a special and direct agency of His, superadded to that of his mere objective strivings, or the mere presentation of truth to the mind." 3d. But Mr. D. speaks still of another influence which "mind exerts on mind." "There is," says he, "a sort of sympathy between human spirits which may be touched to produce designed emotion, with as much certainty as we can strike the chords of music, to secure the very sounds desired. What, in these things, we concede to man, must be attributed, in infinitely greater degree, to that Spirit who searcheth the heart, and trieth the reins of the children of men." 4th. Finally, he admits, "that the Almighty Spirit, which formed us at first, is able to rouse our different capacities into action, in some way peculiar to himself, so as to produce exactly the result he designs; yet so as neither to do violence to any principle of our nature, nor be the efficient Author of our volitions, or of any positive creation within us, having causal power over such volitions." Here we have a fair view of Mr. D.'s doctrine of regeneration. There is in it no *change of heart*, no taking away the stony heart, no renewing the will; but the work of the Holy Spirit is merely to excite the feelings, arrest the attention, arrange circumstances, present the truth, and rouse into action the capacities of the mind. He defines regeneration to be "the commencement of a

change in the character of our voluntary exercises." See pp. 480-85.

Rev. A. Pearson, whose book we have before noticed, makes sin to consist in the wrong "volitions and nolitions" of the mind; and he maintains the revolting doctrine, that God is equally the cause of the sinful, as of the holy, choices it makes. "He (God) is the first cause of morally evil volitions, on the same principle that he is the first cause of morally good ones." *Analysis* p. 74. But passing this—as he makes sin to consist of volitions and nolitions, he defines regeneration thus: "That particular thing done by the Divine Spirit is the production of the next succeeding *exercise* of heart *in the view of its proper and most appropriate object.*" p. 213. The doctrine of the New School on this point, then, amounts to this. That as man has no depraved nature anterior to, and the cause of actual transgression; so in regeneration there is no such thing as a change of nature or disposition; that sin consists wholly in voluntary acts, and that the Spirit in regeneration simply presents truth to the mind, excites its attention, and in some way or other rouses its capacities into action! Or, in fewer words, in regeneration the Holy Spirit induces the mind to put forth a good volition; or, as Mr. Pearson gravely maintains, the first exercise the production of which is regeneration, "is strictly a nolition." In regard to this doctrine we remark—

1. It is wholly irreconcilable with that of our Standards, which teach that man has a "corrupted nature," "an original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil;" that from this depravity

“do proceed all actual transgressions;” and that in regeneration that corruption is, in part, removed, and a new heart or disposition given.

2. If this doctrine be true, a man is regenerated as often as he has a good volition or choice; for if regeneration be merely the production “of the next succeeding exercise of heart,” the one succeeding that must be produced in the same way, and so on *ad finitum*. So that every man has just as many regenerations as good choices in his life!

3. This doctrine makes all sin to arise from a kind of mental torpor, and from *mistaken views* of the divine character and of the word of God. For if there is no such torpor, why is it necessary that the Spirit rouse the sensibilities of the heart, and our different capacities into action? And if the enmity of the heart against God does not arise from mistaken views, how is it possible that the most skillful presentation of truth to the mind, even when its feelings are most excited, can secure its love and obedience?

4. This doctrine is contrary alike to the principles of sound philosophy, and to the teaching of Revelation.

We have examined briefly the difference between the Old and New Schools in regard to the doctrine of *regeneration*, and have ascertained that our Confession of Faith teaches that Adam’s posterity inherited from him a corrupted nature, from which proceed all actual transgressions; and that in regeneration the Holy Spirit enlightens the mind, takes away the stony heart, gives a new heart, renews the will, and thus inclines and enables the sinner to believe and obey the Gospel. We perceived that the New School, if correctly represented by Mr. Duffield and Mr. Pearson, (of which we

have no doubt,) assert that there is no such thing as a corrupted nature, and that all sin is *actual*, or consists in voluntary choices; and that regeneration is merely "the commencement of a change in the character of our voluntary exercises;" and that the work of the Holy Spirit is, to excite the feelings, awaken the attention, present the truth, and rouse the energies of the mind.

We asserted, and we now proceed to prove, that the doctrine of the New School is contradictory to the principles of sound philosophy (or common sense) and to the word of God; both of which concur in teaching us, that there is in every moral agent what may be called a *moral nature*, distinct from the *acts* and *choices* of the mind, which imparts to them their peculiar moral character. There is a *reason* or *cause* for the fact, that angels love God perfectly, and unrenewed men hate him; that the former delight to obey his law, and the latter trample it under foot. It is a first principle of philosophy, and even of common sense, that every *effect* has an adequate *cause*. When we see two rational beings under the government of the same God, subject to the same law, entertain opposite views, and pursue opposite courses; common sense requires us to ascribe their conduct to causes as opposite in their nature as are the effects—as opposite as sin and holiness. And it is perfectly manifest that the cause of the rebellion of wicked men against God, exists in *themselves*; for, 1st. To say that God, by his efficient operation, makes them sinners, would be blasphemy. Nor, 2d. Can temptations from any source be the cause. Mr. Duffield asks—"If Eve was led into sin, though characteristically holy, and destitute of any *innate propensity*

to sin, where is the necessity for supposing that the sins of her progeny are to be referred to such a cause?" "She," he remarks, "influenced Adam to sin, and there was no such cause in his nature." We answer—it is easy to see how a holy being may transgress through temptation; but if Adam and Eve had commenced their existence with sinning, and if every imagination of the thoughts of their hearts, under every circumstance had been only evil continually; we must have ascribed their conduct to a corresponding cause. So long as they uniformly obeyed God, their obedience was ascribable only to the fact that they were created *in the image of God*. When, after they fell, they uniformly rebelled; their disobedience afforded sad evidence of a change in their nature. It is an admitted fact that all their posterity, so soon as they can exhibit their moral feelings, sin continually under all possible circumstances. The temptations to which they are exposed, cannot account for this universal propensity to sin; for many are placed from earliest infancy under the influence of religious instruction and example, so that if their hearts were not by nature "fully set in them to do evil," there would be something, at least, of obedience to God's law. The temptations to which they are exposed, certainly derive their peculiar power from the depravity of their hearts. "Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin." James i: 14, 15.

The truth is, everything animate and inanimate has its *nature*. To give a simple illustration of this truth—one tree bears *sweet* fruit; another *bitter* fruit. Now, in order to change the character of the first, what must

be done? The Saviour says, "Make the tree good, and the fruit will be good." There must be a change in the nature of the tree. What that nature is precisely, the philosopher cannot explain; nor can he analyze the tree, and discover it; but common sense compels him to believe, that there is in the tree some cause why the fruit is as it is, and not otherwise. And this cause, whatever it is, must be changed before the tree will bear a different kind of fruit. As this illustration is used by the Saviour, it will not be denied that it is in point. He was warning his disciples against false prophets, and he gave them this principle: "By their fruits ye shall know them. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit." Matth. vii: 15, 20. As we know nothing of the nature of the tree, except that it is the cause why the fruit is bitter and not sweet; so of what we call a *corrupted nature* we know nothing, save that it is the cause whence do proceed all actual transgressions. But that the sinner possesses such a nature, our common sense no more allows us to doubt, than that the tree possesses a certain nature adapted to the production of a certain kind of fruit. Indeed, we know nothing of the mind itself, but its properties. If you ask a philosopher to give you a definition of mind, he can only tell you, it is a substance which thinks, feels, and determines. Of the *intimate nature* of mind we know nothing, and this is equally true of matter. Then if we know nothing of the physical nature of mind, except that it is adapted to produce thought, feeling and choice, it is reasonable to suppose that we can know nothing of its *moral nature*, except that it gives

a certain character, good or bad, to moral conduct. But it is as rational to deny that the mind possesses a physical nature adapted to thinking, feeling and choosing, as to deny that it possesses a moral nature adapted to give character to its exercises.

Precisely so, unless we egregiously err, the Scriptures teach. What means such language as the following: "A good man out of the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth good things: and an evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things." Matth. xi: 35. The good and evil things are evidently the good and bad *works* or *acts* of men; and these are declared to proceed from a good or bad source, called *the treasure of the heart*. The same truth is taught in the following passage: "A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes." Ezekl. xxxvi: 26, 27. Here the stony heart is the corrupt source from which proceed actual transgressions; and the gift of a new heart is followed by obedience to the statutes of the Lord. David believed that he had a corrupted nature, and therefore prayed, "Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a right spirit within me." Ps. li: 10. Paul the Apostle says, "They that are in the flesh cannot please God." Rom. vii: 8. By the expression "in the flesh," he certainly does not mean simply the fact that they commit actual sin; for this would make him gravely say, that they who commit sin against God, cannot, in so doing, please him! The obvious meaning is, they whose hearts or natures

are unrenewed, cannot render acceptable service to God. We might multiply quotations from the Scriptures in proof of this doctrine, but we deem it unnecessary.—Common sense, unbiased by false philosophy, concurs with the Scriptures in teaching, not that the tree is good *because* its fruit is good, but that the fruit is good *because* the tree is good—not that men are good because their choices and acts are right, but that their choices and acts are right *because* they are good. In a word, sound philosophy and the Scriptures teach, that there is in every moral agent a moral nature, distinct from his acts, and which give to them their character, or which causes him to act as he does.

This doctrine throws much light, not only upon the necessity, but upon the *nature* of regeneration. For if there is in man what our Standards call *original sin*, or a *corrupted nature*, regeneration, which is the beginning of sanctification in the heart, and the cause of the first obedience in life, must be the removal by the Holy Spirit of this corrupted nature, at least in part, and the implantation of a new nature or disposition, which will lead to obedience to God's law. This doctrine is confirmed by such passages of the Scripture as the following: "Therefore if any man be in Christ Jesus, he is a new creature, old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new." 2 Cor. v: 17. "We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works." Eph. ii: 10. There is in regeneration, as we learn from these passages, a *new creation*, not indeed of any *physical faculty*, but of a *new heart*, or *moral disposition*; so that the regenerated man is in his moral character as really a new creature, as he would be in

his physical character, if the natural powers of his mind were radically changed. The consequence of this change is the performance of *good works*.

But it is objected that if men sin only as prompted by a depraved nature, they are no more worthy of blame than is the lion or any other animal for following the impulses of his nature. To this we reply—

1st. That whilst our common sense, as well as the word of God, teaches us to ascribe the good or bad acts of men to a cause within them; every man's *consciousness* compels him to feel that all his moral conduct is *voluntary*. All the freedom of which we conceive in a moral agent is, that he acts as he chooses, or as prompted by his own feelings or inclination; and this is all that is necessary to constitute him, in the fullest sense, an *accountable being*. We do not inquire, in order to determine whether a man is responsible for his conduct, whence he derived the feelings by which it is prompted. All that we desire to know is, simply that he acted *voluntarily*, that is, without *compulsion*.

2d. Every man's experience teaches him, that he has no power to command his affections, or directly to change their character. If any one doubts it, let him select an object which he cordially hates, and determine to love it. He can as easily create a world, as thus by a volition or determination change his hatred into love. Or let him reverse the experiment, and determine to dislike the object of his warmest affections, and the result will be the same. We have only an *indirect* control over the feelings and affections of the mind. That is, we may turn our attention to such considerations as are adapted to produce the desired feelings. But if there is in the mind a deep-rooted aversion to the ob-

jects brought before it, and a strong attachment to those of an opposite character; the attention of the the mind to the former, will not beget love for them. A wayward son may weep at the recollection of the long-forgotten and ill-repaid kindness of an affectionate parent; and a man who has, under a mistaken impression, entertained unkind feelings towards another, may, by discovering his mistake, become reconciled; but when enmity exists towards any object *in its own nature*, no fair presentation of it to the mind will ever change the feelings.

And here we may perceive the absurdity of the doctrine of *moral suasion*. It takes for granted that the sinner, if he could only have the truth fairly presented to his mind, and his attention drawn to it, would love it—especially if his “capacities” were roused to the subject. But the *truth* is the very object of his enmity. “The carnal mind is *enmity to God*.” It hates God, his law and his Gospel. Hence the mere exhibition of the divine character, the pure and spiritual law and the humbling Gospel, cannot induce him to love them. Indeed, the more clearly the truth is exhibited, the stronger will be his enmity, simply because it is enmity to *the truth itself*.

That the truth is adapted to awaken in every pure mind affections in accordance with the law of God, is certainly true; but it is equally true, that in an unholy mind feelings of an opposite character will be excited. In the minds of angels and of “just men made perfect,” divine truth elicits love supreme, adoration, praise and obedience. In the minds of devils it elicits hatred, blasphemy and rebellion. There is a similar difference in the effects produced by revealed truth up-

on the minds of saints and sinners on earth. That the difference is not more striking, is owing to the imperfect sanctification of the former and the divine restraints upon the latter. We are far, however, from denying that in regeneration the Holy Spirit operates in connection with the truth; for "of his own will begat he us with the word of truth." But we do deny that the clearest and most vivid presentation of the truth, can alone turn the sinner to God. The Holy Spirit must work in him to "will and to do." And we deny that the will can change the affections, so that by a simple determination of mind it may love what it now hates.

The truth is, the *will* does not govern the *affections*, but, on the contrary, the affections govern the will.—That is, men uniformly choose to act in accordance with their feelings or affections. And if, at times, they are induced to resist one class of affections, it is only in order to gratify another and stronger class. For example, a man may be strongly inclined to murder another, but the stronger desire of life, which he might lose by such an act, may induce him to resist his angry passions. But it is a universal rule, that the conduct of men depends upon the state of their hearts—their affections. "Out of the fullness of the *heart* the mouth speaketh." And "a good man out of the good treasure of the *heart* bringeth forth good things," &c. The Christian's *faith* derives its efficiency in producing good works, mainly from that *love* which is an essential part of it; therefore it is said, "Faith worketh (or is made efficient) by love."

But the objecter may inquire, if the affections govern the conduct of men, and they have no direct or

efficient control of them, how can a man be held responsible for his sins? We answer, it is a principle of common sense, universally acknowledged and acted upon, that men are no less responsible for their feelings and affections, than for their actions. Indeed, the *feelings* impart to the external acts of men their peculiar moral character. If, for example, a man be charged with murder, and be put on trial before the civil tribunal, the mere fact that he killed a man, does not convict him of murder. He may have done it by accident, or in self-defence. But if it appear, that he was prompted to the act by *malicious feelings*, he is convicted of murder. What is it, in this case, that constitutes the crime? The feelings by which it was prompted. Indeed, men universally, in their intercourse, hold each other responsible for their affections or feelings, and for the actions growing out of them. And as the affections are the mainspring of human action, the law of God has laid its claims on them particularly. "*Love* is the fulfilling of the law." "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," &c. Hence also in regeneration the Holy Spirit gives a new *heart*, purifies the affections—"He that *loveth* is born of God."

It is, then, a universally admitted truth that men are responsible for their feelings or affections. In forming a judgment of conduct to which their affections prompt them, we do not inquire either how they came by them, or whether they can by a volition change them. We look simply at the fact, that they acted without compulsion, and according to their own inclinations.

As regeneration is the removal in part of our corrupted nature, and the restoration of God's image, so

*sanctification* is the continuation of this good work.— We are “strengthened with might in the inner man” by the Holy Spirit.

The errors of the New School in regard to regeneration, if we mistake not, are based upon these two false principles: 1st. That the mind can possess no such thing as a moral nature or disposition, distinct and anterior to its acts; and 2d. That men can, by determining to do so, change the character of their affections.— The first contradicts a first principle of sound philosophy; the second contradicts the experience of all men; and both contradict the plain teaching of the word of God.

## CHAPTER VI.

### ABILITY.

The question whether men are able, independent of divine grace, to obey the commands of God, has been much debated between the Old and New Schools. That there is an inability of some kind, which prevents their obedience, the Scriptures clearly teach, and both Schools admit. Our Saviour said, "No man *can* come to me, except the Father, which has sent me, draw him."—John vi: 44. Again—"Without me ye *can do nothing*." John xv: 5. The Apostle Paul says—"Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God." 7 Cor. iii: 5. The fact that the sinner is prevented from serving God by an inability of some kind being admitted by both the Old and New Schools, they differ only in regard to the *nature* of that inability. It is admitted that he cannot repent, believe, and obey God; but the question arises—*why* can he not obey? Does he labor under any difficulty which destroys or impairs his accountability to God, or which excuses or palliates his continuing to sin? That the want of ability in some cases, frees from obligation, is certain. No one, for example, would maintain that a man is bound to lift a mountain, no matter by whom he might be required to do it; for the obvious reason that he has not sufficient corporeal strength. Neither would any one blame an infant for not comprehending the principles of Natural Philosophy; for the equally clear reason, that the

faculties of his mind are not sufficiently developed. For a similar reason, no one believes that an infant or an idiot is bound to understand, believe, and obey the Gospel. In these and similar cases the inability is of such a nature as to destroy obligation. But the Scriptures speak of a kind of inability which neither destroys nor impairs obligation. For example, it is said, Joseph's brethren "hated him, and could not speak peaceably unto him." Gen. xxxvii: 4. Their inability to speak peaceably to him, arose from their hatred; which being itself sinful, did not impair their obligation to speak kindly to him. Since, then, it is obvious that there is a kind of inability which destroys obligation, and another kind which does not destroy or in the least impair it, it is important to understand the nature of man's inability to obey God.

But here we reach a point, on either side of which there is danger. For on the one hand, it is manifest that if we overvalue human ability, we shall in the same degree undervalue divine grace. No man will feel the necessity of asking of God more aid than he believes himself to need. And if he attempt that which is beyond his strength, depending upon his supposed ability, he must fail. In regard to this point, therefore, the admonition of Paul the Apostle is applicable: "For I say, through the grace given unto me, to every man that is among you, not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think." Rom. xii: 3. But if, on the other hand, we suppose ourselves to be more helpless than we are, we may expect God to do for us what he requires us to do for ourselves.

The New School are much attached to the distinction between what they call *natural* and *moral ability*

and *inability*. They maintain that men have the *natural ability* to obey God, but that they have not the *moral ability*. Dr. Beecher thus defines natural and moral inability: "By natural inability I understand, that which an agent, though ever so willing, cannot do from defect of capacity; and by moral inability, that which his capacity as an agent renders possible and makes obligatory, and which is prevented only by his now uncoerced choice, including in the term not only single consecutive volition, but that general abiding decision of the mind for God or against him—which constitutes holy or unholy character." *Beecher's Views.* pp. 113, 114. If by natural ability it is only meant, that the mind of man, though corrupted, possesses understanding, affections and will—the physical faculties with which it is created—no one disputes it. One would suppose from the zeal with which the New School urge this point, that the Old School really consider the unregenerate more than idiots—destitute of understanding, affections and will. It is admitted by all Old School men, so far as we know, that the natural faculties of the mind are necessary to constitute men moral agents and accountable beings. No one maintains that *idiots* are accountable. It is true, however, that some of the Old School have objected to the terms *natural* and *moral ability*, as inappropriate and calculated to mislead. It must, we think, be admitted even by the New School, that the natural faculties of the mind have suffered by the fall. The mind, in its present state of existence, is compelled to act through the bodily organs. The body, in consequence of the fall, became subject to disease, decay and death; and it is a fact familiar to every one that the operations of

the mind are seriously affected by the condition of the body. This is observable in the feebleness with which the mind acts, when the body is prostrated by disease ; in the mental derangement caused by sickness ; in the *second childhood* of old age. And since the body, even in its healthiest state, is feeble, compared with that of Adam before the fall, all the operations of the mind must be proportionately feeble. It is admitted, however, that the inability to obey God, of which the Scriptures speak, is not of this kind.

On this subject the Confession of Faith teaches, that by the "original corruption" which we inherit from Adam, "we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil"—that "man by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation ; so as a natural man, being altogether averse from that which is good and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto." Chap. vi: Sec. 4, and Chap. ix: Sec. 3. Our Standards, the reader will observe, here teach—1st. That the sinner's inability is caused by his original corruption ; and 2d. That being averse to all good and inclined to evil, he has lost all *ability of will* to any spiritual good. That our readers may distinctly understand the doctrine of our Standards on this subject, we remark: 1st. That in moral corruption there is not the slightest tendency to destroy those mental faculties which are essential to free moral agency and accountability. If there were, the more depraved the mind becomes the less accountable, and, therefore, the less sinful it would be ; and it might reach a degree of corruption which, by destroying free moral

agency, would destroy all accountability. Then it could commit no sin, because sin is the violation of obligation, and necessarily supposes accountability.—Corruption of nature does not destroy the *affections* of the mind; it only alienates them from proper objects, and fixes them upon forbidden ones. The carnal mind hates God, and loves the world. Neither does depravity destroy the understanding. The unrenewed mind can understand subjects not connected with spiritual things, quite as well as the greatest saint. So that the fact that a man is eminently skilled in the arts and sciences, does not prove him to be a saint. Yet in regard to revealed truth the understanding of the unrenewed mind is exceedingly blind. “The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.” 2 Cor. ii: 14.—This truth is further evinced by the fact that, although the Scriptures make the way of salvation so plain that “the way-faring men, though fools, shall not err therein,” we find in every age men of gigantic intellect and profound learning, making shipwreck of the faith—building their hopes for eternity upon the most palpable errors. We all know how powerfully the understanding is swayed by the feelings or inclinations of the heart. Hence no man who has an important case in a court of justice, would be willing to have it tried by a judge whose feelings he knew to be unfriendly toward him, however conscientious he might believe him. Every one knows how exceedingly difficult it is to convince a man even of the most palpable error, if his feelings have been strongly excited in favor of it. So the deep-rooted enmity of the unrenewed mind to

God, blinds the understanding and perverts the judgment. Therefore Paul says concerning the heathen:—"They became vain in their imaginations, (or foolish in their reasonings,) and their foolish heart was darkened." Rom. i: 21. "They did not like to retain God in their knowledge." Verse 28. So writing to the Ephesians, he says: "The Gentiles walk in the vanity of their mind, having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness (or hardness) of their heart." Chap. iv: 4, 17, 18. How are their understandings darkened? By the hardness of their heart—their depraved affections—for they "being past feeling, have given themselves over unto lasciviousness," &c. But what better evidence do we want of the blindness of men's understandings, than that furnished by the absurd and degraded doctrines and practices of the heathen world, and of many who have corrupted Christianity, to suit their own depraved dispositions?

Neither does any one imagine that moral corruption destroys the will. The sinner still chooses and refuses without compulsion. But our Standards say, "he hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation." That is, he is unable to will anything good. For the understanding being blinded by corrupt affections, and the will being under the control of the understanding and affections, cannot decide contrary to them. To illustrate this point—no man by a choice or determination of the will changes the convictions of his understanding. No man who believes, for example, the doctrine of *transubstantiation*, ever by a sovereign act of the will renounced that

belief. Yet many whose understandings have been so blinded as to admit the flimsy arguments in favor of it, have chosen to prostrate themselves before the consecrated wafer, as though it were Christ himself. In such cases the will is governed by the understanding in connection with those affections by which it has been blinded. Yet the affections, as every one knows, often determine the will contrary to the understanding and conscience. For the sake of present gratification, men are constantly doing that which they know to be not only wrong, but ultimately injurious to themselves. Hence we say, that the affections control the will. In other words, men never choose to act contrary to their strongest inclinations.

Again—it is not pretended by the Old School that moral corruption destroys the conscience. The sinner still hears its monitory voice, and is often restrained by it from grossly immoral acts; or is troubled by its reproaches, after they have been committed: Yet the decisions of conscience are very much under the control of the blinded understanding and perverted judgment, so that they never contradict it. If a man can be induced to believe that he ought to kill another, his conscience will never reproach him for the act until his belief is changed. Therefore Christ said to his disciples: “Yea, the time cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doeth God service.” John xvi: 2. And Paul says, “I verily thought with myself, that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth. Which thing I also did in Jerusalem: and many of the saints did I shut up in prison,” &c. Acts xxvi: 9, 10. But the conscience may

also become defiled by viscious indulgences, (Tit. i: 15,) or even seared as with a hot iron. (1 Timothy iv: 2.)

The minds of fallen men, therefore, possess every faculty which is necessary to constitute them free moral agents and accountable beings. As we have before remarked, the only freedom of which we can conceive in a moral agent is, that he acts in view of motives according to his own inclination, without coercion.—Such is the freedom which angels enjoy ; but with a pure heart, an enlightened understanding and a pure conscience, they choose to obey God. Depraved men, following the impulse of their corrupt affections, choose to disobey. Both act, without constraint, and are, therefore, free. Satan is as truly a free agent now, as when he was an angel of light.

2d. The inability of will, of which our Standards speak, arises from the corruption of nature—a depraved heart. In the previous chapter we showed that men have no direct control over their hearts or affections, so as by a mere volition or determination to change their nature. And yet it is a first principle universally admitted and acted upon, that men are responsible for their dispositions and affections. Indeed no action can be properly called good or bad, unless it is prompted by a good or bad disposition. And if the sinner's inability to do that which is good, in consequence of a corrupted nature, is inconsistent with free agency ; for the same reason the fact that God, in consequence of his infinite holiness, "cannot lie," is inconsistent with his free agency. It is true to say, that the inability of the unrenewed man to will that which is good or so to will as to perform it, arises from his

deep-rooted native aversion to holiness and his strong love of forbidden objects. But this aversion and love constitute his crime, and not his excuse.

But since the New School deny the existence of a corrupted nature, distinct from the acts of the mind, they of course deny the doctrine of our Standards, that "by this corruption we are indisposed, and disabled, and made opposite to all good," and "wholly inclined to evil." The only inability which they can consistently admit is a stubborn refusal of the sinner to obey God, for which there is no cause. And this accords precisely with Mr. Duffield's doctrine of regeneration, which we have already examined. We learned from him, that the work of the Holy Spirit is not to impart a new nature or disposition, but to present to the mind the truth, to arrange circumstances to suit the desired impression, to excite the attention, and to arouse into action the capacities of the mind. Of course the mind must possess such control over its own moral feelings, that if its energies can be brought to bear upon them, it can entirely change their nature. Accordingly, Mr. D. maintains that the moral character of the mind is wholly dependent on the will. "It is the fact, that the will is entrusted with the exhibition and display of that energy, which God imparts through his co-operating agency, that mainly demands attention." It is proper here to remark that Mr. D. supposes "the co-operating energy" of God to be as necessary to the production of bad choices as good ones. Again he says—"The strength or vigor of the human faculties, also, lies not in themselves, but depends on established modes of the Creator's agency. The exercise of them, however, is immediately dependent on the will of

man. Whatever, therefore, tends to prevent the will from calling them into exercise, may be said effectually to disable. It is, however, a moral inability, an inability arising out of considerations suggested to the mind, and inducements operating on the will, which will certainly, for the time being, prevent the exercise of the natural capacities." Book on Regeneration, pp. 313, 314. If we can understand this language at all, it means, that the affections of the mind are so directly under its control, that if only the will can be brought to act, it can effect in itself a moral renovation.

With the views of depravity and regeneration, advocated by the New School, it was to be expected that they would exalt human abilities, so as almost to make the operations of the Holy Spirit unnecessary; and to that their doctrines, we have no doubt, will finally lead. Indeed, if the doctrine of "moral suasion" be true, the work of the Spirit in regeneration is vastly different from what our Standards suppose it to be.—Nay more—if that doctrine be true, there is no such thing as regeneration, as the doctrine is taught there. Much more might be said upon this subject, but we deem it unnecessary. The difference between the parties can now be seen in a single point. The Old School believe that all men inherited from Adam a corrupted nature, whereby they are indisposed and disabled from doing what is good; that the sinner has no such control over his moral nature, that he can, by an act of the will entirely change it. The New School believe that men have no such corrupt nature, and consequently no such inability; that the only inability consists in the stubbornness of the will, which may be overcome

by "moral suasion"—that the sinner has the power, if he chooses, to convert himself. Both maintain that men are free agents; but, as will be seen from what we have said, they differ about what constitutes free agency.

## CHAPTER VII.

### MISSIONARY AND EDUCATION QUESTION. 7

We have now examined very briefly the prominent points of difference between the Old and New Schools; and although our remarks have been condensed as much as possible, they have proved, we think, to the satisfaction of the candid reader, that the differences are so important as to have very justly alarmed the orthodox for the purity of the Church, and to have required the most decisive measures to arrest the progress of dangerous error. If any who have seceded with the New School, deny holding the doctrines advocated by Barnes, Beman, Duffield and Pearson, we have only to reply—1st. That those men, especially the first three, have, for several years, been among the most prominent of the party; and their orthodoxy has never been by them called in question. 2d. When Mr. Barnes, after being suspended from the ministry by the Synod of Philadelphia, appealed to the General Assembly of 1836, Dr. Skinner and other leaders of the New School, declared him to be a “fair representative” of the party, and he was by their influence restored to the ministry, without even a censure on his book. They have, therefore, united in saying that, men teaching such errors as those in Mr. Barnes’ book, shall be retained as orthodox ministers in our Church. 3d. The New School Assembly fairly endorsed the Pelagian errors of Dr. Taylor and of the New Haven men. Dr. Taylor, in his statement respecting the state of religion in Con-

necticut, said: "I suppose, among ministers, there has never been less difference of theological opinion than there is to-day. I know we are considered, abroad, as differing widely, and there are men among us who think differently, but I give you this as my opinion.—What are called shades of difference are being considered of less importance among us." The New Assembly in their Narrative of the State of Religion, speaking of the East Windsor (orthodox) and New Haven Seminaries, express the ardent wish "that *shades* of difference in prevailing theological views" may soon be forgotten. Here is evidence most conclusive, that if the New School do not actually hold all the errors of the New Haven theology, they regard the difference between them and sound doctrine as a mere *shade* which should be forgotten as soon as possible. Yet they, in the Assembly of 1836, declared the errors charged upon Mr. Barnes, and known to be held by Dr. Taylor, and taught in the New Haven Seminary, such as were not "to be tolerated in our Church."—"Here," as the *Biblical Repertory* well remarks, "is the root of our troubles. A large portion of the Church believe that another portion is unsound in doctrine, and the inconsistency of their declarations has impaired confidence in their sincerity and candor. Hence has arisen a general feeling of insecurity. No man knows how far doctrines which he believes to be true and important are safe in the Church, should it fall under the control of this party. Their declaring one year that certain opinions are not to be tolerated, is found to be no security against their pronouncing them harmless the next. Their affirming in the General Assembly that they adopt the Confession of Faith, on all these

points, according to its most obvious interpretation, does not prevent their teaching, in their periodicals, that the Confession of Faith, as to some of these points, is erroneous."—*Repertory for July, 1838.*

We now pass to the consideration of the difference in regard to the *Missionary and Education question*. It will be recollected that the New School Committee on the State of the Church, in the General Assembly of 1837, admitted that "difference of view in relation to important points of *Church policy and action*, as well as theological opinions, are found to exist" in our Church. The Old and New Schools differ widely in regard to the proper method of conducting Home and Foreign Missions, as well as educating young men for the ministry. The latter were, perhaps to a single man, in favor of patronizing the American Home Missionary Society, and of entrusting the work of Foreign Missions entirely to the American Board of Foreign Missions, and their preferences are perhaps equally strong in favor of the Presbyterian Education Society, (so misnamed,) which is a branch of the American Education Society. The Old School, on the other hand, are strongly in favor of patronizing the General Assembly's Boards of Education and Home Missions, and having also a Board of Foreign Missions under the direction of the Assembly. For a number of years past, the two parties, though not without much unpleasant collision, patronized the Societies of their preference; and many contributed to the funds both of the *Voluntary* and the *Ecclesiastical* Boards; and for a length of time both were recommended by the General Assembly. The main objections to the Voluntary Boards were the following:

1st. They are not responsible for their proceedings to the ecclesiastical judicatories of our Church, and the Old School regarded the work of educating young men for the ministry and of sending the Gospel to the destitute, as too momentous to be committed to the hands of irresponsible Societies. They desired a safer guarantee that their funds would be employed for the spread of *the whole truth*. "The American Education Society," say the Assembly of 1837, "educates professedly Arminians as well as Calvinists—for it aids Methodists, Cumberland Presbyterians, and Lutherans." And however much good may be done by these denominations, Presbyterians prefer educating men for the ministry who will preach the whole truth, as they regard it.—Besides, as the same Assembly states, that Society "sustains beneficiaries at Oberlin and Yale, and other theological institutions where doctrines are taught diametrically opposed to our Standards." Is it strange that the Old School should object to place their donations in the hands of such a Society, and that they should be unwilling to have the education of our candidates for the ministry under their control?

The American Home Missionary Society, composed of different denominations of Christians, is equally irresponsible. If they should employ the funds placed in their hands in supporting Pelagian ministers, who can prevent it? Dr. Absalom Peters, until recently the Corresponding Secretary of that Board, is a thorough going New School man, and has throughout our struggle opposed every effort to prevent the spread of error. And who does not see the tremendous power possessed in the Church by a man who stands at the head of such an irresponsible association, and who has

almost exclusively the location of several hundred ministers in her bounds? It is a well known fact, that the very great majority of the ministers who have been sustained by that Society, have stood firmly in the ranks of the New School.

In our own Boards, we have a guarantee that our charitable funds will not be misapplied. "In regard to our own Board of Education," says the Assembly of 1837, "the Assembly has *required* it to submit, for the inspection of its members a detailed account of their candidates by name, their places of study, amount received, &c., &c." From the Board of Domestic and Foreign Missions, annual reports of their proceedings are also required. The General Assembly is composed of delegates from the Presbyteries, so that each Presbytery can ascertain from their commissioners what is done with the donations of the churches. Until the body of the Church, therefore, becomes corrupt, it is impossible that the money contributed for Education and Missions, can be, to any considerable extent, misapplied. Why, then, should we patronize irresponsible Boards, and let our own languish?

2d. The Old School conscientiously believe it to be the duty of the Presbyterian Church, *as a church*, a duty from which she dares not shrink, to educate her own sons for the ministry, and to send the Gospel to the destitute. "We believe," says the Assembly of 1837, "that if there be any departments of Christian effort to which the Church of Christ is bound, in her appropriate character, to direct her attention and her unwearied labors, they are those which relate to the training of her sons for the holy ministry, and sending the Gospel to those who have it not, and planting churches in the

dark and destitute portions of the earth. To be willing to commit either of these branches of her peculiar work to irresponsible hands, we are more and more persuaded, is unfaithfulness to the best interests of Zion, and adapted fatally to injure the cause of Gospel truth and Presbyterian order." They believe that the command, "Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature," is binding upon *the Church*, and that she has no right to commit it to other hands, and especially to those who may corrupt the doctrines of the Cross. Would it not be a sin in the Presbyterian Church to contribute funds to educate her sons at such institutions as Oberlin and New Haven, or to send men out to preach who had imbibed the errors inculcated in those institutions?

3d. To permit those voluntary associations to conduct for us the work of education and of missions, would be to give them a tremendous influence which might hereafter be wielded to the ruin of our Church. There is no more certain method of gaining influence, than by educating the young. The Roman clergy understand this, and are acting accordingly. But the American Education Society has a still stronger hold on the young men educated by them. They require them to give bond to repay in a short time the money they have received; so that our young ministers enter upon their labors trammelled with a debt to a foreign Society, by which they may be at any time pressed for payment; and thus the proverb may be exemplified—"The borrower is servant to the lender." Then with this doubt hanging over them, let them be dependent for support upon the Home Missionary Society; and who does not see the tremendous power possessed in our Church by these Societies, whilst the Church has

not the slightest control over them? It is vain to say, they will never abuse this power. We know something of human nature, and our bleeding Church can testify from experience.

"The system of our own Board," the Assembly of 1837 well remarks, "binds our young ministers only in the bonds of gratitude. If any one chooses to consider what he receives as a loan, and God puts it in his power afterwards to furnish an equal sum to aid others, it will be to his honor that he has done it freely; but if otherwise, he will never be compelled to shape his course in the ministry as may best enable him to raise money to pay a debt under which he groans, being burdened." And if our missionaries are sustained by the Church, they will thereby be more closely bound to her interests.

4th. It is wholly unnecessary to have two Boards operating in the same field for the same purpose; and it is impossible, as experience has proved, to prevent in such cases the most painful collisions. Such were the difficulties between the American Home Missionary Society and the General Assembly's Board of Domestic Missions, that several years ago the Assembly referred the subject to a Convention of Delegates from the Western Churches, to decide whether they preferred patronizing the Home Missionary Society or the Assembly's Board. The Convention met at Cincinnati, and a very large majority decided in favor of the Assembly's Board. Yet the Home Missionary Society continued its operations in our Churches. But,

5th. The most insuperable difficulty connected with this subject was the fact, that the friends of the Voluntary Boards could be satisfied with nothing less than

the entire destruction of the Boards of the Church. This determined opposition to our Boards was fully developed in the Gen. Assembly of 1836, in which the N. School had a majority. It was manifested by a most dishonorable attempt to place in the Board of Domestic Missions men who were known to be inimical to its very existence. The *Biblical Repertory*, speaking of this Assembly, says: "Of all the proceedings of the Home Missionary party in the last assembly, the attempt to place in the Board of Missions men known to be inimical to its very existence, is certainly one of the most dishonorable. And what renders the fact the more humiliating and the more alarming, is, that they were able to muster nearly their whole strength to accomplish this object. The votes in favor of the candidates unfriendly to the Board amounted to 125, while the vote against Dr. Miller's resolution (censuring Mr. Barnes' book) was but 122, and that against the formation of a Foreign Missionary Board only 111." Dr. Miller nominated, to fill the vacancies of the Board, the following individuals: Drs. Green, Alexander, Spring, Sprague, Phillips, and Snodgrass, with Messrs. Hunter, Weed, Crane, Johnston, W. Breckenridge, Musgrave, T. Hoge, ministers, and Messrs. D. Smith, M. Allen, George Douglass, Ananias Platt, G. T. Snowden, and Alexander Symington, laymen. These were friends of the Board; but the New School, in order to destroy its efficiency, nominated the following individuals: Rev. J. Patterson, G. Duffield, J. L. Grant, A. Judson, A. D. Eddy, S. Eaton, J. Ford, R. Adair, Dr. T. Skinner, and Rev. E. Cheever, ministers, and laymen of similar sentiments. That this was an attempt to cripple the Board was too manifest to be doubted;

and accordingly the correspondent of the *New York Observer*, not an Old School man certainly, said, that inasmuch as the Board had always been under the management of the Old School, "many who were on the other side disapproved of any attempt to interfere with its management." The votes, however, show, as the *Repertory* remarks—"that they were able to muster nearly their whole strength to accomplish the object."

The opposition of the New School to our Boards appeared further in the course they pursued in regard to the Western Foreign Missionary Society. The General Assembly of 1835 appointed a committee who were authorized to negotiate a transfer of that Society, then under the control of the Synod of Pittsburgh, to the Assembly. The committee effected the transfer; but the Assembly of 1836, in which the New School had a majority, refused to be bound by the acts of the previous Assembly, and therefore declined receiving the Society under their care. The Old School, as we have already remarked, regarded it as the solemn duty of the Presbyterian Church, as a Church, to engage in the work of sending the Gospel to the heathen. The New School were determined to oppose everything of the kind. It was perfectly manifest, therefore, that in proportion to the strength of the party would be the opposition which the Boards of the Church must encounter, until by the increase of their numbers they would be entirely prostrated, and the whole of the important work of education for the ministry and of missions be committed to the hands of irresponsible associations—some of them already decidedly in favor of the errors of New Schoolism. Under these circumstances, what was the duty of the Old School?

## CHAPTER VIII.

### ECCLESIASTICAL BOARDS.

#### NEW VIEWS IN CHURCH POLITY ADVANCED BY THE OPPOSERS OF ECCLESIASTICAL BOARDS.

The New School, as we have said, could be satisfied with nothing less than the entire destruction of ecclesiastical Boards and the committing of the whole work of education for the ministry and of missions to the *voluntary* (more properly called *irresponsible*) Boards. They made a united effort in the Assembly of 1836, as we showed, to destroy the efficiency of the Board of Missions, by placing in it men who were notoriously the zealous friends of the Home Missionary Society, and the equally zealous opposers of the Assembly's Board. They warmly opposed the formation of a Board of Foreign Missions, and refused to be bound by the acts of the preceding Assembly in regard the Western Foreign Missionary Society. We now proceed to notice a few of the *new principles* which were urged against ecclesiastical Boards.

1st. The first we notice was urged particularly against the appointment of a Board of Foreign Missions, viz: That this mode of conducting missions is *sectarian*. This objection was warmly urged by Dr. T. Skinner, one of the most prominent men of the party. He said in the Assembly of 1836, "I have another reason, and a higher, for thinking this inexpedient. It has been said we have no conscience on the subject. We

are accused of factious opposition to a measure touching which our conscience is wholly indifferent, while that of our brethren is not. Now I here declare that nothing but conscience induces me, at least, to raise one word in opposition to the new plan. It is, I can assure the brethren, a matter of conscience in my case. I would not do the least thing whatever to hinder the proposition before the Assembly from being adopted, if I could obtain the approbation of my conscience in suffering it to proceed. I will state the grounds of my conviction respecting this matter. I believe the proper mode of propagating the religion of Jesus Christ is altogether anti-sectarian in its character. I believe that the faith we carry to the heathen should not be that in which evangelical denominations differ from each other, but that in which they unite—the common faith in which they all agree. I do not underrate those peculiarities of sentiment and order which make us Presbyterian, as a denomination; I know that they are in themselves important; but in comparison with God's system of truth for the saving of the souls of men, these things are nothingness itself. \* \* \*

Now I do think that the measure proposed is altogether a sectarian measure. It proposes a mode of action, in regard to the carrying on of the work of Foreign Missions in which none but Presbyterians can concur. It is a very proper plan indeed, if the object to be effected is to spread among the heathen a Presbyterian religion. But I believe the religion we are to spread among them should not be a Presbyterian religion, but the common faith of the Gospel which saves the souls of men." See *New York Observer* for July 16, 1836.

Does it not appear most singular for a Presbyterian

minister to make a distinction between the Presbyterian religion and "God's system of truth for the saving of the souls of men?" Such language manifestly implies, that the peculiar doctrines of the Presbyterian Church are no part of God's system of truth, and, of course, are false. Yet he seems to disclaim this belief. But if he believes the peculiar doctrines of our Church to be true, he certainly maintains that it is wrong to send to the heathen those parts of divine truth which any evangelical denomination, properly recognized as Christians, disbelieves. Where, we ask, has God authorized us to withhold from the heathen any part of his word, because some pious people may reject it? But if he means that a Society should be formed, which would send out Methodists, Baptists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, &c., &c.—throwing them altogether, each to preach his own doctrines, and organize churches on his own plan, who does not see that endless confusion and contention must grow out of such a procedure? The truth is, so long as Christians differ about important points of faith and order, it is far better that there should be different organizations, suited to their different views. If you wish to preserve friendship between families differing in their modes of conducting domestic affairs, keep them in separate apartments.

The point, however, to which we want the reader's attention, is the fact that Dr. Skinner and others felt *conscientiously* bound to oppose the organization of any Board which would send "a Presbyterian religion" to the heathen; whilst the Old School felt conscientiously bound to send Presbyterians to them, because they believed it to be "God's system of truth." How could two parties act together, who were conscien-

tiously opposed to each other's views on a subject of such vast importance? Mr Frost, a New School man, tells how he would have the thing to work. He remarked: "It is said that they (the Old School) are bound in conscience in this matter. That their consciences are concerned in this ecclesiastical organization. Both sides are bound in conscience. If by conscience they mean to say, that should the majority decide against them, they cannot submit, *why then they must go off. There is no other course left for them.*" See the *Presbyterian* for July 23, 1836. The Old School thus learned that the New School would, to the extent of their influence, prevent the Presbyterian Church from entering upon the great work in which her Saviour commands her to go forward, and that they must leave the Church, or give up this work to irresponsible associations. We say nothing against the American Board of Foreign Missions. It has done, and is doing, incalculable good, and so are many other Missionary Boards; but they do not suit the views of Presbyterians. The New School majority in the Assembly of 1836, took the same ground defended by Dr. Skinner, viz: "That whatever advantages or disadvantages may have resulted from the divisions of the Church in numerous denominations, with conflicting opinions, it cannot be our duty, as Christians, to perpetuate and extend these divisions by incorporating them in our arrangements to spread the Gospel in heathen lands." (See Minutes.) That is, it is not our duty to organize such a Board as will send to the heathen what every Presbyterian believes to be *the whole truth!*

2d. Another objection urged against the appointment of a Board of Foreign Missions was, "that by

conducting all her concerns ecclesiastically, the judicatories of the Church would be loaded with an amount of property and of secular business which would endanger her spirituality." This objection is urged by Dr. Peters in his *Plea for Voluntary Associations*.—To this objection, brought forward in the Assembly of 1836, the venerable Dr. Hogewell replied in the following language: "But I ask, how is it more dangerous to Christian men in their character as a Church, than in their personal individual character as Christians engaged in voluntary associations? Are they not the same men? Have they not the same heart? Are they not exposed to the same temptation in both cases? Besides, the General Assembly is changing its members every year. These funds do not remain in the same hands, but in voluntary associations the case is different; the management is usually confided to the same individuals, for sometimes a long succession of years, &c. \* \* \* But I cannot see how the collection and application of money to carry on the missionary work of Jesus Christ should have the least tendency to corruption.—I should think it manifest that members of voluntary associations, who handle money for a course of years, would, if there be danger in the case, be much more exposed to it. But I can see no danger in either case, nor do I believe that any whatever exists." *New York Observer*, July 9, 1835. This is an unanswerable reply to this strange objection.

3d. The New School object to ecclesiastical Boards, on the ground that they are *less efficient* than voluntary associations. But why should they be? Why could not a Board appointed by the General Assembly act as efficiently, as if appointed in a different way?

*Facts*, however, show beyond debate, that the objection is unfounded. The Moravians, for example, conduct their missions ecclesiastically, and the world has never seen, since the apostolic age, greater efficiency and success in the work, than the history of their missions exhibits. The efficiency of our own Boards for several years past, is a clear refutation of the objection. So also is the efficiency of the Missionary Boards of several other denominations.

4th. But the most startling position assumed by the New School on this subject, was the denial that the General Assembly had the *constitutional right* to appoint a Board of Missions! In the Assembly of '36, Judge Stevens, a New School man of considerable eminence, said: "Beyond a question, all the members of the Church of Christ are bound, in some way, to preach the Gospel. But the question is, whether this General Assembly, as such, possesses the right of embarking in missions, either as an inherent right, or as conferred upon it by the constitution? If it does, then I ask where was this right before the General Assembly had an existence, when there was nothing but Synods? \*

\* \* Now I hold the truth of this position which was argued by brother Jessup, viz: That it is the duty of those who claim this right for the Assembly to show us their authority. \* \* But it is said that if we deny the power of the Assembly to form such a Board as is proposed, then we deny at the same time the legitimate authority of the Board for Domestic Missions. Well, and suppose we do. It is a bad argument, that one breach of the constitution warrants another. I do not believe they had authority to form such a Board, and if the question had been duly exam-

ined, I think the Assembly would never have attempted such a measure until the Presbyteries clothed them with the requisite authority." See *New York Observer* of July 9, 1836. The same objection was urged by others. The reader will observe the bearing of the objection. If it be well founded, it sweeps away not only the Board of Foreign Missions, but the Boards of Education and Domestic Missions also. The General Assembly, it is said, violated the constitution in forming those Boards! We must, therefore, give up the entire work of education and of missions, domestic and foreign, to be wholly neglected or carried on for our Church by such voluntary associations as may be formed! in ten years, what will be left of Presbyterianism? Then, Perhaps the *name*. But there are some most singular things connected with this New School view of our constitution; for,

1st. It represents the Presbyterian Church as so organized that she dares not either educate her own sons for the ministry, or send the Gospel to the perishing heathen! Now the New School admit, that one of the most important objects to be secured through the instrumentality of the Church, is the universal spread of the Gospel, and they profess to believe that the Presbyterian church is organized according to the Scriptures, and yet they maintain that she has no right to send the Gospel to the destitute and perishing. And do they consider this a defect in her organization? By no means. They are conscientiously opposed to her possessing such a right. Was not the Church made an *organized body* for the express purpose of making her more efficient in promoting the great objects connected with the Redeemer's kingdom? Is not every *organisation* designed

to promote efficiency in securing the objects contemplated. If, then, we believe the Presbyterian organization to be in conformity with the word of God, shall we say it is badly adapted, and even that it has not the right, to engage in the most important duty imposed on the Church? A Church so organized as to have no right to engage in the work of education and of missions, would certainly appear singularly in the nineteenth century!

2d. But the *novelty* of this doctrine is worthy of remark. From the time of her organization, the Presbyterian Church had engaged in the work of missions as her appropriate work—never once imagining that her constitution forbid it. It remained for Dr. Peters and his friends to discover, in 1836, that all this while the fathers in the Church were ignorant of the constitution which they had formed. And even with the gentlemen themselves, this discovery was altogether new.—“To the best of our knowledge,” says the *Biblical Repository*, “this is the first time that this principle has ever been advanced in any of our judicatories, and it is now advanced by men who, for a long series of years, and in many different forms, have professed a different opinion. When the friends of the Home Missionary Society, on the floor of the Assembly, in their public addresses and official publications, have taken the Catholic ground that all they desired was, that both Boards should be allowed free scope, and both recommended to the churches, they did thereby in the strongest manner acknowledge the Assembly’s Board as a lawful institution. \* \* \* \* \* The Secretary of the Home Missionary Society has, from his station, been the most frequent organ in giving utterance to the professions to which we have alluded. He was the active

agent also in proposing different plans of compromise and co-operation, all involving the admission of the right of the Assembly to conduct missionary operations. Yet he was the leader of the party which now assumes the opposite ground. The men who have hitherto professed the most liberality and friendship, are now foremost in avowing a principle of deadly hostility—a principle which demands not merely reform, a change of men, or of measures, but absolute destruction.” *Biblical Repertory* for July, 1838.

Now, what says our constitution on the subject of missions? “And the General Assembly may, of their own knowledge, send missions to any part, to plant churches, or to supply vacancies; and for this purpose may direct any Presbytery to ordain evangelists or ministers, without relation to particular churches; provided, always, that such missions be made with the consent of the parties appointed, and that the judicatory sending them make the necessary provision for their support and reward in the performance of this service.” Form of Government, Chap. xviii. Is it not astonishing that any man who ever read this chapter, should deny that the General Assembly has the right to conduct the work of Home and Foreign Missions?

It is not our purpose now to notice all the flimsy arguments urged by the New School against the Boards of our Church. Our readers will perceive from what we have said, that they were determined upon the destruction of those Boards. Every objection we have noticed, tends to that result. Their enmity to the Boards of the Church was never fully developed until the Assembly of 1836, when they had a majority. Dr. Peters could then boldly say—“I do not wish to be met

every where, as we have been often in the work of Domestic Missions, with the authority of the Church held up to the popular eye and ear." *New York Observer*, July 25, 1836. The Assembly's Board came in collision with the Home Missionary Society, and therefore it must be destroyed!

The Old School had choice of three evils, viz: 1. To sacrifice their own consciences, by giving up the Boards of the Church, to suit the new discoveries of the New School. 2. Or to be engaged in perpetual conflicts with those who felt conscientiously opposed to the Boards of the Church, until overruled by their growing numbers. 3. To seek a separation from them. We may safely leave the candid Christian to determine which they ought to have chosen, especially in view of the doctrinal errors which we have pointed out. It is vain to say—the Old School could carry on missions by Presbyteries or Synods. Did they not meet in those bodies the very same men, and the same opposition, with which they had to contend in the General Assembly?

## CHAPTER IX.

### CHURCH POLITY.

LOOSE MODE OF ADOPTING OUR STANDARDS; PLAN OF UNION, AND EVILS GROWING OUT OF PRACTICE UNDER IT.

There were *three* important sources of corruption in our Church, which we have not yet noticed. The first was the manner of adopting our Standards by ministers and elders when ordained. The question proposed previous to ordination, and which the candidate is required to answer in the affirmative, is this: "Do you sincerely receive and adopt the Confession of Faith of this Church, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures?" The New School regard it as consistent with truth and honesty to answer this question in the affirmative, and thus most solemnly to adopt our Confession of Faith, when at the same time they reject some of the most important doctrines, as there taught. They adopt it "for substance of doctrine." Thus Dr. Beman could adopt it, though he believes and teaches that Christ did not satisfy divine justice for his people, as it affirms. Mr. Barnes could adopt it, though he rejects the doctrine of imputation and original sin as unjust and absurd. Mr. Duffield could do the same, though he wholly rejects the doctrine of original sin, and believes regeneration to consist in "moral suasion." The whole seceding party could profess great regard for our Confession of Faith, and, at the same time, express the ardent desire that the *shades* of difference between Orthodoxy and Taylorism may soon be forgotten. The course pursued by the New School generally justifies the conclusion that

they agree with Mr. Duffield, who contends that in adopting the Confession of Faith it is sufficient to believe the facts stated, and that we are at liberty to reject what he calls the philosophy involved in the language. "Will any man say," he asks, "that it is a point of faith, and that in adopting the language of these (Westminster) divines as a confession of faith, our consciences are bound to adopt the philosophy involved in it? We presume not. A man may entertain very different, and more correct views of the nature of the human mind, and mental operations generally, and yet hold the same facts with the Catechists. Shall he be condemned for this, and denounced as heretical?" Book on Regeneration, pp. 444-45.

Now, let this loose mode of adopting our Standards be admitted, and what do you know about a minister's faith after he has solemnly adopted them? Do you know that he holds the doctrine of imputation or of original sin? No—for in his view these may be (as Mr. Barnes and Mr. Duffield pronounce them) mere philosophical speculations. And since it is easy to reject any doctrine or any number of doctrines taught in our Standards, as philosophical speculations; you know little or nothing more of a man's faith, after he has adopted them, than before; and the adoption of them becomes little better than a solemn mockery. They cease to form a bond of union for the Church, and become the occasion of distrust and contention. The door is thus thrown open for the admission into our Church of the most dangerous errors. This mode of adopting the Confession of Faith has been one principal cause of distrust and dissatisfaction to the Old School, who regarded it as uncandid and dishonest, and

who were compelled to withhold their confidence from those who practiced it. We may safely leave every unprejudiced mind to decide whether they had not a right to be dissatisfied.

2. Another danger which threatened the purity of the Church, arose from the Plan of Union between Presbyterians and Congregationalists, adopted in 1801. The Plan, though formed by wise and good men, and from the best motives, is certainly most palpably unconstitutional; and therefore it is not surprising that evils have grown out of it. According to our form of government, "The Church Session consists of the pastor, or pastors and ruling elders, of a particular congregation;" and, "A Presbytery consists of all the ministers, and one ruling elder from each congregation, within a certain district." Chap. ix: 10. Any Session or Presbytery differently constituted, is unconstitutional. The pastor and elders constituting the Session, and those constituting the Presbytery, must have adopted our Confession of Faith. The Plan of Union violates the Constitution.

1st. By providing for the settlement of Congregational ministers over Presbyterian churches, and Presbyterian ministers over Congregational churches. 2d. By providing for the organization of churches composed of Presbyterians and Congregationalists, and the appointment of "a standing committee" instead of elders, to perform the duties of elders. 3d. By declaring that if "the said standing committee of any church shall depute one of themselves to attend the Presbytery, he may have the same right to sit and act in the Presbytery, as a ruling elder of the Presbyterian Church."—And not only were those *committee men*, who were not

elders, permitted to enjoy the same privileges as elders in Presbytery; but they exercised the same prerogatives in Synods, and, until the Assembly of 1831, in the General Assembly also. In that Assembly the right of a standing committee man from Grand River Presbytery to a seat in the house was strongly contested; but after much discussion he was received, a number protesting against his reception. Afterwards, however, the Assembly adopted a resolution excluding committee men from being members of that body, many of the New School voting against it, and protesting. 4th. The Plan of Union violated the Constitution also, by providing, that if a difficulty exist between a Congregational church and its Presbyterian pastor, it should not be referred to the Presbytery, unless the church would agree to it, but to a council consisting of an equal number of Presbyterians and Congregationalists, agreed upon by both parties: thus in matters which might seriously affect his ministerial character and usefulness, depriving him of the right of being tried by his Presbytery, and of appeal to the higher judicatories of the Church. 5th. A Presbyterian church, having a Congregational pastor, is in the same way deprived of constitutional rights.

But these are not the worst features of the Plan of Union, as will be seen from the following considerations:

1st. The Presbyteries are the source of power in our Church. The General Assembly cannot make the slightest alteration in the Constitution. If any change is to be made in the Confession of Faith or Form of Government, it must be made by the Presbyteries.— Now the Plan of Union allows Presbyteries to be con-

stituted, at least in part, of men who have never adopted, and perhaps never even read our Standards. It is not uncommon to find in our Presbyteries, in consequence of the number of vacant churches and from other causes, a majority of elders. In the Assembly of 1837, it was ascertained that in the Synod of Western Reserve there was one Presbytery in which there was but *one* Presbyterian church, and another in which there were but *two*; and in the whole Synod more than three-fourths of the churches were not Presbyterian.

Now suppose the General Assembly sends down to the Presbyteries a question to be decided concerning the doctrines or order of our Church; a large number of votes—perhaps enough to turn the scales either way—are given by committee men who never adopted, and in all probability, never carefully read our Confession of Faith! And those men, who will not submit to be governed by our Constitution, have the same influence in determining what it shall be as if they were equally interested with Presbyterians. Suppose that, instead of *four* Synods formed according to the Plan of Union, we had a dozen. Then our system of doctrine and our Constitution would be formed for us, by men who know quite as little about either, and have quite as little personal interest in either, as the Methodist, Baptist, or any other denomination. This indeed would be tyranny of a new order.

2d. Again—the Presbyteries alone can license and ordain men to preach the Gospel. Suppose a candidate for the ministry presents himself before a Presbytery containing but one, two or three Presbyterian churches, and a dozen that are either Congregational or mixed. The majority, perhaps, of those who vote are commit-

tee men ; and these men, who never adopted our Confession of Faith, and do not approve of it—perhaps never read it—are to examine the candidate, whether he is qualified to be a Presbyterian minister! What possible assurance, under such circumstances, can the Church have that her ministers will be sound in the faith and apt to teach? Would she not have equally as much assurance, if their ordination were determined by the examination and vote of a parcel of Methodist or Baptist laymen? And who does not know that such Presbyteries can ordain as many unsound men as may present themselves, and thus in a few years fill the Church with error?

3d. But again—to the Presbyteries it belongs to guard the purity of the Church—to try and acquit or condemn ministers charged with heresy. A minister is arraigned before his Presbytery under charge of heresy, and he is to be tried by men who do not understand, and will not adopt, the Creed by which his soundness is to be tested, and of whose soundness in the faith we have no assurance whatever. They may depose a sound minister for holding the truth, or sustain an unsound one in preaching error. The Church cannot possibly place confidence in them. But suppose the minister, feeling himself aggrieved, should appeal to Synod—there he meets the same committee men, exercising all the prerogatives of elders.

This is not all. The standing and the rights of every minister in the Church are affected by this Plan ; and so are all the operations of the Church. Until 1831, as we have already remarked, committee men were allowed to sit and vote in the General Assembly. But though they were afterwards excluded, they still hold

their seats in Presbyteries, and of course in many cases their votes determine what ministers shall be commissioners to the Assembly. Then let the appeal of a minister of the Synod of Kentucky, charged with heresy, come before the General Assembly ; and there he meets commissioners elected by those committee men, and very probably biassed in their opinions by those by whom they were appointed. Mr. Barnes' appeal was sustained by men, many of whom represented Congregational or mixed churches ; and the Foreign Missionary Board was voted down in the same way. It cannot be surprising that great evils have grown out of a Plan so palpably unconstitutional ; nor, we think, can it appear strange that the body of the Church should seek to be freed from it.

Yet in every step that has been taken to deliver the Church from the evils growing out of the Plan, the opposition of the body of the New School has been encountered. They contended earnestly that the Constitution was not violated by the admission of committee men into the Assembly, and protested against their exclusion. They denied that the Plan of Union was unconstitutional, and protested against its abrogation !

3. One other new doctrine of Church polity was necessary to open an effectual door for the entrance and spread of error in the Church, viz: The denial of the right of Presbyteries to examine ministers applying for admission with dismission from other Presbyteries.— This stand was taken by Mr. Barnes, when he applied to be received into the Presbytery of Philadelphia ; and the General Assembly of 1834, in which the New School influence predominated, passed the following resolution : “ That a due regard to the order of the

Church, and the bonds of brotherhood, require, in the opinion of this Assembly, that ministers dismissed in good standing by sister Presbyteries, should be received by the Presbyteries which they are dismissed to join, upon the credit of their constitutional testimonials, unless they shall have forfeited their good standing subsequently to their dismissal." Now observe how these doctrines work together. A man is ordained by one of those Presbyteries formed on the Plan of Union, or by one of those which allow the adoption of Standards "for substance of doctrine." He comes with his testimonials, and demands admission into an orthodox Presbytery. They are bound, the New School say, to receive him. Those Congregational Presbyteries, (for so they may be termed,) and those allowing the adoption for substance of doctrine, may so multiply the number of ministers, unsound in the faith, or badly qualified for the work, as in a few years to fill the Church with error and contention. This has been done. Now it is certain that every Presbytery possesses the right to satisfy itself of the soundness in the faith of all who apply for admission, unless that original right has been expressly surrendered. And until some clause can be found in our Constitution forbidding the exercise of it, it must remain unimpaired.

It is obviously impossible for those who differ so widely on so many important points of doctrine and order, to act harmoniously together. It is equally clear that the New School have very essentially departed from our Confession of Faith and Form of Government. They should, therefore, in candor and honesty, have quietly withdrawn from the Presbyterian Church, and adopted a Creed and Form of Government more in

accordance with their own views, instead of causing all the dissension that has grown out of their course. In the Assembly of 1837, the Old School, though they had a decided majority, proposed an amicable division, and offered them all the property which they claimed. They, however, refused thus to divide, and insisted that the subject of division should be sent down to the Presbyteries. This course would have given them at least another year, perhaps much longer, to extend their principles, and agitate the Church. To this the Old School could not consent. They believed that the safety of the Church, as well as its peace, required *immediate* action on the subject. For several years they had labored to purge the Church from dangerous error, and to restore order; but they labored in vain. At every step they met the resistance of the New School; and many sound men, not fully aware of the danger which threatened the Church, for a time stood aloof from those who were thus struggling. When it became evident that division was inevitable, they proposed an amicable division; and when this failed, they had choice of two courses: 1st. To withdraw and leave the funds of the Church and her Seminaries in the hands of the New School. 2d. To take measures to separate them from us. They, very properly, as we think, chose the latter. They abrogated the Plan of Union of 1801 as being *unconstitutional*, and declared the four Synods formed according to that Plan to be no part of the Presbyterian Church—providing, however, that those among them who are sound Presbyterians should be received into the Church by making application as directed.

## CHAPTER X.

### ABROGATION OF THE PLAN OF UNION.

We have now as briefly as we could, examined the prominent points of difference between the two parties into which our Church has been unhappily divided, in regard to *doctrine* and *Church polity*. Much more might be said on this subject, but what we have said, is, we think, sufficient to prove that so great were the departures of the New School from the Standards of our Church, that it was impossible for the Old School longer to continue in the same body with them; and that it was their solemn duty to take decisive steps to save the Church from the leaven of error. We now close what we design to say on this subject, by a few plain remarks concerning the abrogation of the Plan of Union of 1801 by the General Assembly of 1837.

We showed in the last chapter that the Plan was grossly unconstitutional, and of dangerous tendency. Consequently, it was right that it should be abrogated. Now, it is a plain principle, universally recognized in civil as well as ecclesiastical law, that any act passed by a delegated body, which violates the constitution under which the act, is null and void from the beginning; and whatever superstructure is reared upon such an unconstitutional act, is equally void, and must fall with it. Now, it is a fact that the four Synods, Western Reserve, Geneva, Genessee and Utica, were formed upon the Plan of Union. The large majority of the churches are either Congregational or mixed, and when

the Plan was abrogated, those bodies which were unconstitutionally connected with our Church were declared to be no part of it. As the New School have labored to render these acts of the Assembly odious to the people, it may be proper to make a few remarks in order to present them in a proper light. Then we remark—

1st. The declaration of the Assembly that those four Synods are no part of the Presbyterian Church, could not affect the ecclesiastical existence of the churches, or the ministerial character of the clergy. No censure was passed either upon the churches or their ministers, They were left free either to retain their present organization or adopt any other, as they may prefer. The validity of their ordinances is not affected. The declaration, therefore, concerning the cutting off of so many ministers and churches, *without citation or trial*, is out of place. If it had been intended to institute process against them for heresy, citation and trial would have been necessary; and if they had been found guilty, the ministers must have been deposed, and they and these churches must have been excommunicated. But the Assembly declared that they had not a constitutional connection with the Church which that body represented, and therefore they had no more right to try them for heresy than they had to try the Congregational Association of Vermont, or any other body. The effect of the *excising acts*, as they have been improperly termed, is simply to place them in the attitude of a distinct body or denomination from us—we having no authority over them, and they having no rights among us.

2d. The declaration of the Assembly deprives those

Synods of none of their *rights*. None can have the rights of citizens in any government, unless they submit to the laws by which the citizens are governed.— They who refuse to adopt our Confession of Faith, and submit to be governed by our Constitution, cannot claim the rights of members of our Church? What right have Congregational churches to be represented on the floor of our General Assembly? What right have committee men to determine by their votes who shall be ministers in the Presbyterian Church, or what shall be her faith or government? So far as their *property* is concerned, the General Assembly has manifested no disposition to interfere with them.

We have heard much from our New School brethren about the oppressive tyrannical acts of the Assembly, depriving so many ministers and churches of their rights. So far as their churches are Congregational or mixed, of what right, we ask, are they deprived? The right of governing the Presbyterian Church! So far as they are Presbyterian, the Assembly provided for their becoming *constitutionally* connected with the Presbyterian Church. And shall they complain, because, being connected with bodies unconstitutionally formed, they are directed to seek a connection with the Presbyteries or Synods formed according to the Constitution? Will it be said that, to avoid giving them this trouble, we must allow Congregational and mixed churches a connection with our Church, and thus leave open an effectual door for the entrance of error? This is demanding too much—far more, we think, than any sound Presbyterian, acquainted with the disorders prevailing, and likely to prevail in those Synods, would ask. Accordingly, some of the churches within the bounds of

the disowned Synods, well pleased with the proceedings of the Assembly, have taken the course pointed out by that body, and are now connected constitutionally with the Presbyterian Church. And it is a fact worthy of remark, that one of those Synods has, by a large majority, refused to acknowledge the New School Assembly!

3d. The peace and safety of the Church required the Assembly to pursue the course they did pursue. The great body of the Church had become so fully convinced that dangerous errors and gross irregularities existed, particularly in the bounds of those Synods, and that the Church could never be safe until there should be a return to a constitutional order; that peace and confidence could not possibly be restored but by such a course.

4th. In regard to the tumultuous secession of the New School, and the course they have since pursued, so much has been said recently, that we deem it unnecessary to say anything at present.

We have now finished what we designed in regard to the differences between the Old and New Schools. It is scarcely necessary to say, that we are very far from charging all who have sympathized with the New School, and who have disapproved of the late acts of the General Assembly in regard to them, with holding the errors pointed out. Nor do we by any means assert even, that all who have seceded with them hold all the errors of the party. As we said in the beginning of this discussion, we believe that they are far from being agreed among themselves, in the details of their faith; and we think it possible that some really sound men, believing them less erroneous than they are, have gone with them. Yet we have no doubt that the er-

rors pointed out are chargeable upon the New School *as a body*; they generally either hold them as true, or connive at the promulgation of them by others. We have referred to the writings and doings of the most prominent men of the party, and to the proceedings of the body of the New School in the General Assembly. We now leave the candid reader to decide whether the Old School, as faithful ministers of Jesus Christ, as watchmen on the walls of Zion, were not bound to take decisive steps to arrest the progress of dangerous error in our beloved Church. Contention and division are deplorable evils, but the prevalence of error is far more to be deprecated. The responsibility of all the difficulties with which our churches have for several years contended, rests upon those who have introduced novelties into the Church, not on those who have opposed them.

THE END.