

PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED,
AND
SHOWN TO BE INCONSISTENT
WITH THE
PRINCIPLES OF PHYSIOLOGY,
MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE,
AND
THE DOCTRINES OF CHRISTIANITY.
ALSO
AN EXAMINATION
OF THE
CLAIMS OF MESMERISM.

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## P R E F A C E .

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ONE of the many evidences, that "all Scripture is given by inspiration of God," is the harmony between its teachings and the principles of sound philosophy. Almost four thousand years have been numbered since the first five books of the Bible were written; and nearly eighteen hundred, since the *Amen* was set to the last book of the New Testament. During this long period, men have wearied themselves in the search after Wisdom. Many a time, have those who were reputed sages, proclaimed to the world, that they had found her retreat. But the discoveries of those who proudly claimed the name of the *Sophoi*, and of those who were content with the more modest name of *Philosophoi*, have alike passed away; and now in the nineteenth century, true philosophy claims an antiquity of less than three centuries. And it is a fact truly remarkable, that the oldest book in the world, the writers of which were not philosophers, stands forth as the great Patron of sound learning and true science. Without pretending to any extraordinary attainments in human learning, those remarkable men rejected the various systems of philosophy which prevailed in their day, and without professing to teach any of the sciences, they inculcated doctrines which perfectly harmonize with them all, and even the great principles which lie at their foundation. And now the men who have solemnly received the Scriptures as the only unerring guide in faith and duty, are the Presidents and Professors of the most celebrated literary and scientific institutions.

The following work originated in a series of lectures delivered by the author, to his church, during last winter, the design of which was to prove and illustrate *the harmony which exists between sound philosophy and divine revelation*. In the

course of those lectures, he took occasion to contrast the Scripture account of the *constitution of man*, with the several systems of anthropology which have prevailed in different ages. In carrying out his plan he was naturally led to inquire into the claims of Phrenology and Mesmerism. Only a very brief review of these was intended; but, partly in consequence of the public opposition made to his views, and partly because multitudes whose minds had become more or less interested in these plausible *sciences*, had heard nothing in opposition to them, a very unexpected degree of interest was awakened in the public mind. Convinced, as he had been for several years, that the fundamental principles of both are false, and that they lead to mischievous errors in morals and religion, he resolved to take advantage of the interest unexpectedly awakened, and to subject them to a more extensive investigation, than was originally contemplated. The desire of many who heard the lectures, or who heard of them, to see them in print, determined him to prepare a more extended discussion of those subjects for the press. For this purpose, he employed the few hours he could spare from other labors; and the work, such as it is, is now offered to the public.

The author was the more easily prevailed on to prepare the work for the press, because, whilst books on Phrenology and Mesmerism, especially the former, of all kinds and sizes, are circulated extensively throughout our country, and placed in the hands of multitudes unaware of their true character, almost nothing has been written against them, except by physiologists, to whose works the people generally have not access; and even these do not attempt to inquire into their moral and religious tendencies. And in addition to the popular works in defense of these modern sciences, traveling lecturers are found visiting every town and village throughout the country, propagating their false principles. We cannot but think it is high time the real character of these pretended sciences should be better understood.

In preparing the work, the author has labored under the serious difficulty of having access to scarcely anything published on the side of the questions he has felt constrained to advocate. Ministers of the gospel, and other Christian men, if they have not admitted the truth of the general principles of Phrenology, have at least regarded it as harmless, and therefore, have not felt it their duty to investigate its claims.

And too frequently, if we mistake not, they have been deceived by the apparently strange phenomena of Mesmerism, and have too readily lent their influence in its support. In the preparation of the present work, the author has read chiefly the writings of the ardent friends of Phrenology and Mesmerism; and the views presented, with the exception of those obtained from the writings of physiologists, are such as have presented themselves to his own mind. If they should be found imperfect, they may, nevertheless, prove a timely warning to some against the false principles concealed under the garb of philosophy, and may, perhaps, call forth some abler pen in the discussion of them.

Let those who think such discussions out of place, remember the fact, that Christianity has suffered more from philosophy falsely so called, than from all the open attacks of infidelity, and all the persecutions of the wicked. And let them not forget, that it has not been the habit of the advocates of false philosophy openly to assail Christianity, when it has had so strong hold upon the public mind, as it has in our day and in our country. Much more frequently have they sought to undermine its doctrines, whilst professing great respect for its moral code. Thus they have succeeded in throwing Christians off their guard, and in securing the active aid of many who did not perceive the true character of the system they were induced to receive.

We are aware, that we shall be, as we have been, denounced as bigoted, and unfriendly to the progress of light, because we venture to investigate the claims of Phrenology and Mesmerism. None are more clamorous for the right of free discussion, than the advocates of new and false principles of religion or of science; and yet none more bitterly denounce those who venture to subject their pretensions to too close scrutiny. Unmoved by the denunciations of such men, we proceed firmly in the discharge of our duty to the glorious Author of revelation, and to our fellow men.

We should not be surprised if some excellent men should feel and express the fear, that, in opposing these modern *sciences*, we are doing an injury to Christianity. They have learned that the Pope and his clergy condemned the philosopher Gallileo; and because they erred in so doing, fears are entertained lest similar errors may be committed again. To such we would say, first, that, if they will give themselves the trouble to read the book, they will see, that we have not

condemned Phrenology and Mesmerism simply, or even chiefly, on the ground of their inconsistency with the Scriptures. On the contrary, we have endeavored to subject them to a kind of investigation from which their advocates should not shrink, and of which they cannot complain. We would say, secondly, that we are not afraid of injuring Christianity by arraying it against false philosophy, however popular it may be. The Scriptures carry with them evidence of their inspiration, which, to candid minds, is not only conclusive, but overwhelming. They have outlived and triumphed over the most popular systems which have risen, even in darker ages, and which have prevailed far more extensively than those we are now considering. And in taking a retrospect of the past, we see, that Christianity was injured, not by being arrayed against false philosophy, but by being made to yield undue deference to its unsound principles. Let us learn wisdom from the past.

In the hope, and with the prayer that, by the blessing of God, these pages may be instrumental in promoting the cause of truth and righteousness, the author ventures to place them before the public.

# PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED.

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## CHAPTER I.

**IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT—INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY UPON THE DOCTRINES OF CHRISTIANITY—APOSTOLIC WARNINGS—ECLECTIC PLATONISM—PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE—SENSATIONAL PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE—GERMAN PHILOSOPHY AND ATHEISM—CLAIMS OF PHRENOLOGY TO GIVE NEW INTERPRETATIONS TO THE SCRIPTURES.**

"PHRENOLOGY," says Combe, "professes to be a system of Philosophy of the Human Mind, founded on the physiology of the brain." It was offered to public consideration, as the same author states, on the continent of Europe, in 1776, but in Britain was almost unheard of till the year 1815. It originated with Dr. Gall, a physician of Vienna, who, it is stated, from an early age, was struck with the fact, that each of his brothers and sisters, companions and school fellows, possessed some peculiarity of disposition. The scholars who first excited his attention, were those who learned by heart with great facility, and who frequently gained from him by repetitions, the places which he had obtained by the merit of his composition. He observed that his school fellows so gifted, possessed prominent eyes. He soon conceived, that if memory for words was indicated by an external sign, the same might be the case with other powers of the mind.\* From this beginning he proceeded with his examination of the dispositions and skulls

\* Spurzheim's Phrenology, vol. i, pp. 9, 10.

of men, until his inquiries ripened into something like a system. Dr. Spurzheim became associated with him A. D. 1800; and the two prosecuted their labors together. Spurzheim gave to the new science the name PHRENOLOGY, derived from the Greek *phren*—mind, and *logos*—discourse. It has found many admirers in the United States; and by the writings of phrenologists, and by traveling lecturers, it has been extensively propagated. There is scarcely a village in the east or west, whose inhabitants have not been amused and edified by some itinerating phrenologist, who has excited occasionally no little wonderment by examining the heads and describing the characters of all who presented themselves as subjects.

It is high time, we cannot but think, that the claims of this new philosophy should receive the attention of the friends of science, and particularly of Christians, and be subjected to an impartial scrutiny. If its fundamental principles are true, every other system of mental and moral science must be, not modified and improved, but absolutely abandoned as utterly false. Locke, and Reid, and Stewart, and Brown and all others, must be forever laid on the shelf.

Phrenology professes to teach a complete system of mental and moral science. It will be perceived at once, therefore, that it must exert an important influence upon the morals of individuals, and, consequently, upon those of every community where it may prevail; and, further, that it must materially affect the interpretation of the scriptures and the Christian faith.

The history of the Christian church, and of the world, teaches an instructive lesson on this subject. Every age and every civilized country has had its philosophers, who have made the nature, the duty, and the destiny of man their study. Each of the ancient systems of philosophy has been found radically erroneous, and has passed away; not, however, without having done much to corrupt the pure doctrines and morality of the sacred scriptures. In the days of the

Apostles, several systems were in repute, each claiming high deference for its discoveries, and casting contempt on the simple and sublime truths of Christianity. The gospel of Christ, not characterized by the intricate speculations of Plato, or the hair-splitting dialectics of Aristotle, were to the learned and philosophic Greek, foolishness; and often did Paul, the apostle to the Gentiles, find it necessary to lift a warning voice against "oppositions of science falsely so called," and against "philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ."\* And, indeed, from scarcely any other source has Christianity suffered so much, as from the different, contradictory, and ever-varying systems of mental and moral philosophy, which have gained credit in different ages. In the early ages of Christianity, the Platonic philosophers exhausted all the resources of their wisdom in opposing it. They succeeded far better, however, when afterward they pretended great friendship for it, and claimed only that the language of the scriptures should be interpreted in accordance with the principles of their sublime philosophy. "This new species of philosophy" (the eclectic Platonism), says Mosheim, "imprudently adopted by Origen, and many other Christians, was extremely prejudicial to the cause of the gospel, and to the beautiful simplicity of its celestial doctrines. For hence it was, that the Christian doctors began to introduce their subtle and obscure erudition into the religion of Jesus, to involve in the darkness of a vain philosophy, some of the principal truths of Christianity, that had been revealed with the utmost plainness, and were indeed obvious to the meanest capacity; and to add to the divine precepts of our Lord, many of their own, which had no sort of foundation in any part of the sacred writings."† This system of philosophy, wonderfully popular for a length of time, gave rise, says our learned author, to "that melancholy set

\* 1 Tim., vi, 20. Col. ii, 8. † Ch. Hist., v. i, pp. 143, 144.

of men who have been distinguished by the name of mystics, whose system, when separated from the Platonic doctrine concerning the nature and origin of the soul, is but a lifeless mass, without any vigor, form, or consistence." The same philosophy gave rise, as he says truly, "to the slothful and indolent course of life which continues to be led by myriads of monks retired in cells, and sequestered from society, to which they are neither useful by their instructions nor by their examples. To this philosophy we may trace, as to their source, a multitude of vain and foolish ceremonies, proper only to cast a veil over truth, and to nourish superstition."\*

The philosophy of Aristotle, too, found its way into the church to aid in corrupting the doctrines of Christianity, inculcating principles utterly inconsistent with the scriptures, and involving its admirers in the foolish subtleties of scholasticism. In the reformation of the 16th century, the power of Aristotle, who, as Dr. Chalmers says, "tyrannized for nearly two thousand years over the understandings of men," was broken by the pure word of God, proclaimed by Luther. In more modern times, the sensational philosophy which prevailed in France, and which was defended by men of the most brilliant talents and extensive learning, destroyed the very foundations of morals, and prepared the way for the terrible scenes of the revolution. On this subject Morell, in his history of modern philosophy, bears the following testimony:

"The whole history of the literary society of France, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, is, in fact, but a comment upon the progress of sensationalism toward its ultimate climax. The school of Voltaire shows us the effects of it while still incomplete, shrinking, as it yet did, from that hard materialism, that blind fatality, and that daring atheism, to which it afterward attained. But the way to all this was already prepared; the bud was already formed, which

\* Ibid, pp. 143, 144.



only needed time to expand in the full light of day, in order to show its colors in their very deepest dye. In short, let any one view the brilliant circles of talent and impiety, which at once enlivened and disgraced the French capital—circles rendered famous by the wit and learning of d'Alembert, Diderot, Dupuis, Baron de Grimm, Galiani, Madame d'Epinaÿ, not to mention others equally celebrated in the literary world, and he has a complete reflection, as from a mirror, of the philosophy of sensationalism when expanded into all its various ramifications, and at the same time brought down to the level of daily life. \*

\* \* \* The storm of the revolution, to which these principles, in their political bearing, had not a little tended, broke in upon this scene of philosophical irreligion, from the confusion of which a fresh element sprang up," &c.\*

If we descend to our own times, we shall read in the history of Germany, a lesson no less instructive. A false philosophy, which took the name of rationalism, unsettled and destroyed the faith of multitudes, both of ministers and laymen, in the inspiration of the Bible. In the pride of a speculative philosophy, they were borne from error to error, until they found themselves in the gross absurdities of *pantheism*. Speaking of Strauss, the most powerful promoter of pantheism, and his coadjutors, D'Aubigne says:—"They had gone very far, but the limit was not yet reached. The German youth—I mean those who were grouped around the doctors—were hurrying down a steep descent which terminated in the abyss of atheism. This they quickly reached, nay, even rushed beyond it. Then began in Germany a fearful race of intellects, each striving to outdo the other in impiety. Scarcely had one of these rebellious spirits reached a certain stage of irreligion, when another started off to outrun him, and assert falsities still more diabolical. Strauss had stript Christianity of every

positive and historical element. Bruno Bauer, a theologian likewise, went still farther. He stigmatized the 'theology of the heart,' the pectoral theology, as he called it, and exposed what he termed the theological shamelessness, or indecencies; and, rejecting Christianity altogether, held it up to the ridicule of his countrymen. A general idea of religion still remained. But then came forward Feuerbach, another of those champions of impiety, who undertook to deliver his nation from 'the illusion of religion.' And scarcely had this wretched man arrived at this pitch of atheism, when he was overtaken by another still bolder than himself, Max Stirner, who, as he passed on, jeered at him, calling him a *priest*, a superstitious man, seeing that he had allowed one *idol* to subsist:—*the love of mankind*. 'Down,' he cries, 'down with this superstition also! Egoism, selfishness! that is all that is left. Behold the supreme ruler of the world! All these forms of impiety have thus devoured each other. Anti-christianism has been swallowed up by atheism, and this in its turn by egoism. This satanic principle has asserted itself to be the ultimate expression of human wisdom.'\*

It is surely high time that Christians should learn a lesson of wisdom from the history of the past. In every age, philosophy, as it is called, has put forth high claims to extraordinary wisdom, and has demanded great deference from Christianity. If any of its ministers have refused to interpret the language of inspiration by the discoveries of the prevailing philosophy, they have been denounced by its admirers as opposers of science, as enemies of the progress of the human mind in knowledge, as advocates of an irrational faith. Or they have been gravely told, that all truth is, of necessity, harmonious; that revelation cannot contradict nature; and that to array them against each other, will only destroy confidence in the former, and promote infidelity. Gallileo, the enlightened phi-

\* Ger., Eng., and Scot., pp. 24, 25.

losopher, they are told, was imprisoned by the pope and his clergy, for understanding natural philosophy and astronomy better than they; and this fact is triumphantly adduced to show the folly and the danger of arraying Christianity against what is called science, as if a blunder committed by men unacquainted with the scriptures, in the dark ages, were a reason why Christians should not venture to open their mouths, at any time, in opposition to anything called philosophy. Allured by the apparent wisdom of the different systems of philosophy, or overawed by the authority or the denunciations of their advocates, Christians have, once and again, admitted their claims, and agreed to interpret the bible according to their principles. In every instance in which there has been a departure from the obvious teaching of that blessed volume, on any doctrine or principle of morals, in accommodation to any system of philosophy, the result has been the corruption of morals and of pure Christianity, and the consequent injury of the church. Nay, the very wildest freaks of fanaticism, and the grossest absurdities of atheism, are alike traceable to the different systems of philosophy, which have prevailed in different ages.

This is just what we might expect. The scriptures were given, not for learned men and philosophers only or chiefly, but for all men. They profess to teach perfectly the science of morals and religion. Their language on these subjects is remarkable for its clearness and its beautiful simplicity. If any man, therefore, pretends to have discovered principles inconsistent with the plain teaching of the bible, we know he is in error; and we reject the pretended discovery. The lesson to be learned from the past history of philosophy, as D'Aubigne well remarks, "is to yield nothing when the truth of God is concerned. If we take but one step backward, we give the first impulse to go an hundred, a thousand, and we know not what will be the end."

Christianity is not the enemy of science in any de-

partment. On the contrary, true science has flourished chiefly under her patronage. Her sons have stood prominent in every branch; and her fostering care has been extended to every department. Nor do we condemn phrenology, or any system of philosophy, simply on the ground of its inconsistency with the doctrines of Christianity. We are willing to examine every system on strictly scientific principles, assured that there is nothing in the scriptures which contradicts any true principle of physical or moral science. Yet Christians have the very best reasons for believing the bible to be the word of the all-wise Jehovah. They know that philosophers, confident and boastful as they have been in all ages, "have wandered in endless mazes lost." When, therefore, a new system springs up, boasting great things, and proposing to give new interpretations to the scriptures, and a new phase to Christianity; it is right that they admit none of its claims, until they have subjected them to the closest scrutiny. Indeed, the very fact that any system of philosophy claims to attach a meaning to the language of revelation never before attached to it, and which, without the aid of such a system, never would have been, is in itself evidence conclusive of its falsity. For it is worse than absurd to say, that He who gave to man a revelation of his will, gave it in such a way that, until some particular system of philosophy should be discovered, it could not be understood, and understood then only by those who might be fortunate enough to understand that system.

But what are the claims of Phrenology in reference to the scriptures? "The theologians," says Combe, "who condemned the natural world, lived in an age when there was no sound philosophy, and almost no knowledge of physical science; they were unavoidably ignorant of the elementary qualities of human nature, and of the influence of organization on the mental powers—the great link which connects the moral and physical worlds. They were unacquainted with the relations subsisting between the mind and

external nature, and could not by possibility divine to what extent individuals and society were capable of being improved by natural means. In the history of man they had read chiefly of misery and crime, and had in their own age beheld much of both. They were, therefore, naturally led to form a low estimate of human nature, and to expect little good from the cultivation of its inherent capabilities. These views appear to me to have influenced their interpretations of scripture; and having once been entwined with religious sentiments, they have descended from generation to generation." Again—"Divines have laboriously recommended spiritual exercises as means of improvement in this life, and of salvation in the next; but have rarely dealt with the philosophy of this world, or attempted its rectification, so as to render these exercises truly efficacious. Their minds have been infected with the first great error, that this world is irremediably defective in its constitution, and that human hope must be concentrated entirely on the next. This may be attributed to the premature formation of a system of theology in the dawn of civilization, before the qualities of the physical world, and the elements of the moral world, and their relationship, were known; and to erroneous interpretations of scripture in consequence, partly, of that ignorance."

Phrenology, it seems, is greatly to modify our views of scripture truth; and it is to do this chiefly by giving us a higher opinion of the capabilities of the natural world, and of man. One of its most striking effects, we are told, "will be the lifting up of the vail which has so long concealed the natural world, its capabilities and importance, from the eyes of divines." They, we are assured, have entirely failed in applying scientific discoveries, or the knowledge of the divine character obtained by means of them, "to the construction of any practical system of mental philosophy, capable of combining harmoniously with religion, and promoting the improvement of the human race. This, however, Phrenology will enable them one day

to do." It will discover to them that men are not naturally depraved, as they had been led to believe from reading the scriptures, but that God has bestowed upon them faculties that "have been incessantly operating according to their inherent tendencies, generally aiming at good, always desiring it, but often missing it through pure ignorance and blindness, yet capable of attaining it when enlightened and properly directed;" and Phrenology is to afford this much-needed light!

"All existing interpretations of scripture," says Joseph A. Warne, A. M., "have been adopted in ignorance of the fact, that, *cæteris paribus*, a brain in which the animal organs preponderate greatly over the moral and intellectual organs, has a natural, and instinctive tendency to immoral conduct, and *vice versa*; and that the influence of the organization is fundamental—that is to say, that no means are yet known in nature, by which the brain of the inferior combination may be made to manifest the moral and intellectual faculties with the same success as a brain of the superior combination. The religious teachers of mankind are yet ignorant of the most momentous fact in regard to the moral and intellectual improvement of the race which nature contains." Fowler, in his excessive admiration of this wonderful science, says that "Phrenology, in fact, teaches us 'what most we need to know,' WHAT IS RIGHT, AND WHAT IS WRONG;"\* and Spurzheim says, "moral precepts are necessary to those only who do not possess them in their interior."†

These professed philosophers do not directly assail the scriptures, and reject Christianity, though infidel sentiments are scattered throughout Spurzheim's Phrenology, and similar works. On the contrary, they profess a high veneration for the word of God, and great regard for the moral code of Christianity. They only assume that the principles of Phrenology are infallibly true, and claim, as philosophers have ever done, that the scriptures shall be interpreted in ac-

\* Phren., p. 134.

† Phren., v. ii, p. 138.

cordance with them. Combe, in his *Constitution of Man*, says—"To the best of my knowledge, there is not one practical result of the natural laws expounded in the subsequent pages, which does not harmonize precisely with the practical precepts of the New Testament." "Indeed," says he, "this work has been characterized by some individuals as the philosophy of Christian morality, because they regard it as exhibiting the natural foundations of the admirable precepts which are taught only dogmatically in the New Testament."\*

The very high claims of Phrenology, and the very extensive and important influence it proposes to exert in modifying or entirely changing the received exposition of the word of God, are certainly good reasons why its principles should be subjected to careful scrutiny. It is the more important that this be done, because, unlike most other systems of philosophy, it has been completely popularized. Its influence is by no means confined to men of speculative minds. It is a visible, tangible thing. The human skull has been mapped out, and the region of the brain occupied by each faculty and propensity carefully noted. Men have only to learn the *geography* of the skull, look at its general shape, and feel its protuberances and indentations, and they can at once read the whole character of the individual, intellectual and moral! Indeed, the study of the philosophy of the mind has become, by means of Phrenology, almost a matter of mere mathematics—measurements and calculations constituting the chief part of it! And then, lecturers of all sorts and sizes traverse the country, as we have before remarked, to enlighten the people in the principles of this wonderful science, and to confirm them by examining indiscriminately the heads of all who are willing to undergo the process, often calling to their aid the kindred science of Mesmerism; whilst

\* Pp. 23, 24.

the writings of Combe, Fowler, and others, are to be found in almost every town and village.

There is, indeed, much plausibility in the manner in which the claims of Phrenology are advocated. The science, it is said, is immovably established by *facts* innumerable. Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, the fathers of it, traveled, it is said, "through many countries in Europe, visiting the various hospitals, prisons, and other places where extreme cases of character might be found, and examined the heads of all the remarkable persons within their reach; and thus, slowly but surely, confirmed the discovery and location of about thirty of the phrenological organs: and in this way they collected an amount of *facts* sufficient to fasten conviction upon any philosophical mind that will examine them. Thus, in the discovery of phrenology, nothing was *theorized*; but every organ was *discovered*, and that by observing, that certain manifestations of the mind are always accompanied by particular manifestations of the brain. Phrenology rests its claims to respect and belief upon the same ground with the sciences of chemistry, mineralogy, botany, electricity, anatomy, and all the other sciences which are deduced from an observance and classification of natural facts."\* Since Gall and Spurzheim commenced their labors, the work of examining heads and skulls has gone forward rapidly, confirming, at every step, it would seem, the truth of Phrenology; and the science of physiology is said to add its decisive testimony in favor of this modern system of philosophy.

Well, since Phrenology offers its friendly aid in removing the vail from the minds of ministers of the gospel, and in enabling them to understand the language of inspiration, and proposes to accomplish much toward bringing human nature to perfection; it is right that we should examine candidly, but carefully, its credentials. Let us, first, ascertain whether its kindly professions are like those of other systems

\* Fowler's Phren., p. 25.



of philosophy, to the high claims of which Christian men gave too ready credence. *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*

The following are the fundamental principles of Phrenology, as stated by standard writers:

1. *The brain is the organ of the mind.* "To prove that the brain is the exclusive organ of the mind," says Spurzheim, "I have said that its functions are more or less disturbed by its diseases, and by wounds of its substance." Again: "Thus the arguments of the metaphysicians against the dependence of the mental functions on the brain are unsound, and leave the first principle of Phrenology, the brain is the organ of the mind, in its original integrity."\* "We have now," says Combe, "arrived, by a fair and legitimate induction, at strong presumptive evidence in favor of the general principles of Phrenology—namely, that the brain is the organ of the mind," &c.†

2. The second great principle of Phrenology is, *that the brain is a congeries of organs*; that it contains a distinct organ for each faculty, sentiment, or propensity of man. Thus, there are organs for the manifestation of the animal appetites—such, for example, as amateness, philoprogenitiveness, adhesiveness, &c. There are also intellectual and moral organs. "From all these considerations," says Spurzheim, "it follows that there are as many organs as special and independent faculties; and consequently, that the brain cannot be a single organ, but must be composed of several."‡ "The brain," says Fowler, "consists of as many different portions, or organs, as the mind does of faculties."§ "The brain," says Combe, "is a congeries of organs manifesting a plurality of faculties."||

3. The third fundamental principle of Phrenology is, that the vigor with which the mind acts is determined by the size of the brain; or, as Combe expresses it, "that in it (the brain) vigor of function is in

\* Phren. vol. i, pp. 38, 57. † Phren. p. 52. ‡ Phren. p. 75.

§ Phren. p. 17.

|| Phren. p. 51.

proportion to size, other conditions being equal." Accordingly, he states, that "small size in the brain is an invariable cause of idiocy;" that men who have been remarkable for great force of character, have had heads of unusual magnitude; and that the same is true of nations.\* It is not maintained, that a larger brain acts with more vigor than a smaller one *in all cases*. There are certain circumstances which are said to modify the effects of size. "These," says Combe, "are constitution, health, exercise, excitement from without, and, in some cases, the mutual influence of the organs."† Phrenologists, therefore, say that a large brain, *cæteris paribus* (other things being equal), acts with more vigor than a smaller one.

4. The fourth great principle of Phrenology is, that the strength of each faculty, sentiment, or propensity, compared with the other faculties, &c., of the same individual, is in proportion to the size of its particular organ, compared with the other organs of the same brain. "There exists," says Fowler, "a reciprocal proportion between the relative strength and power of the various mental faculties, and the size of those portions of the brain, or those organs, by which they are severally manifested. It has already been shown, that each mental faculty is exercised *exclusively*, by means of one particular portion of the brain; and, upon the principle, which holds good throughout all nature, that other conditions being equal, size is *always* the measure of power—a principle too familiar to require proof—it follows that the stronger a faculty is, the larger must be its organ; and, *vice versa*, the larger an organ, the stronger its faculty."‡ The circumstances which modify the effects of size in different brains, do not interfere with the principle here stated. For, in the first place, Combe says, "As a general rule, all the parts of the same brain have the same constitution, and if size be the measure of power, then in each head the large organs will be more powerful than the small ones. "This," says he, "en-

\* Phren. p. 45, 47.

† Phren. p. 48.

‡ Phren. p. 21.

ables us to judge of the strong and the weak points in each head." Again: "The same brain has in general the same constitution, and on the principle that size is a measure of power, the largest organs in each individual will be naturally the most vigorous. If the temperament be lymphatic, all the organs will act slowly, but the largest will be most powerful and most active, on account of their superior size. If the temperament be active, all will be active, but the largest will take the lead."\* In the second place, if any organ be excited, its *size* is increased, as Phrenologists tell us, and thus its power is increased. So that the largest organ is the most powerful.

5. A *fifth* principle of Phrenology, to which I have just alluded, is—that the brain, or particular organs, are increased in size, and consequently in *power*, by exercise or by being stimulated; just as the right arm of a blacksmith becomes larger than the left. Fowler lays it down as a principle of Phrenology, that the *increase* of the organs of the brain must be proportionate to their *exercise*, and the increase of each organ proportionate to the exercise of its faculty.†

6. The *sixth* principle of Phrenology is—that not only the size of the brain, but the relative size of the different organs, can be ascertained by the shape of the skull. "It is in general possible," says Spurzheim, "to distinguish the size of the brain and its parts, by examining the external surface of the head or skull."‡

These are the fundamental principles of Phrenology. Are they true? Is it a true science? To this inquiry I propose now to proceed, and if I mistake not, the impartial reader will admit, that the evidences against it are conclusive and irresistible; that it is not sustained by physiology; that it is wholly inconsistent with self-evident and universally admitted principles of mental and moral science; and that it is equally inconsistent with the doctrines and precepts of the sacred scriptures.

\* Phren. pp. 48, 49. † Phren. p. 22. ‡ Phren. v. i, p. 117.

## CHAPTER II.

## A STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES AND PHYSIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

IN opposing Phrenology, I by no means contend that the system has no truth at all in it. There never was a system of philosophy so erroneous as to embrace unmixed error. On the contrary, many of the most injurious systems have embraced a sufficient amount of truth to make them plausible, and have by this very means misled a greater number of persons. Writers on Phrenology doubtless state correctly many physiological facts; and in their investigations they may have made valuable contributions to the science of physiology. Those who expended immense labor in searching for the philosopher's stone, never found it, but they made other valuable discoveries. The learned Morell, speaking of the sensational philosophy, and its disastrous effects in France, says: "The whole intellect being thus concentrated upon the outward and material, gave rise, it is true, to the noblest discoveries in the departments of physical science; but, at the same time, religion, alas! was disowned, morality degraded, and man himself made but a feeble link in the great chain of events, by which nature is inevitably accomplishing her blind but glorious designs."\* Who can doubt whether the ruinous errors of this philosophy did injury which was never compensated by the value of its discoveries? Who doubts, that the real discoveries might have been as successfully made without the errors that belonged to the system? Phrenology, we cheerfully admit, presents many truths; but those truths are not peculiar to it, but are held by

\* Vol. i, p. 162.

many who reject it. In mental and moral science, we firmly believe, it has made no valuable discoveries.

I. The first principle of Phrenology, as we have stated, is, *that the brain is the organ of the mind*. That is, the mind performs all its operations by means of the brain, or some one or more parts of it. This principle, with certain qualifications, may be admitted. I shall not deny, that it is by means of the brain that the mind comes in contact with the material world. Nor shall I deny, that a diseased state of the brain interferes with the intellectual operations of the mind, and, consequently, with its moral feelings. But that the mind cannot act at all, without using the brain as an organ, cannot be certainly proved. So far, however, as the truth or falsehood of Phrenology is concerned, it is unnecessary to determine this question. Its falsity can be established on other and more obvious grounds. The general principle is, by no means, peculiar to phrenologists. It was held long before Phrenology had an existence, and is still held by multitudes who reject this modern science.

II. The second principle of Phrenology, viz: that the brain is a congeries of organs, containing a distinct organ for each faculty, sentiment, or propensity of man, is wholly destitute of evidence to support it.

1. Physiology affords no evidence in support of this principle. According to Phrenologists, the brain is divided into more than *thirty* different organs; or as each organ, like the eyes and ears for sight and hearing, is said to be double, there are more than *sixty* organs, each pair being employed for a different operation or feeling. Now it is admitted that the brain, when subjected to the closest scrutiny, affords not the slightest evidence in favor of the phrenological division. Combe says, "it appears to the eye only as a mass of curiously convoluted matter; and the understanding declares its incapacity to penetrate the purposes of its parts. Simple dissection of the brain, therefore, could not lead to the discovery of the functions of its different parts." "It is true," the same

author says, "we cannot by merely dissecting any organ of the body whatever, discover its functions." "Anatomists," he remarks, "for many centuries dissected the nerves of motion and feeling, and saw nothing in their structure that indicated the difference of their functions; and, at this moment, if the nerves of taste and of hearing were presented together on the table, we might look at them for ages without discovering traces of separate functions in their structure."\*

All very true; but the nerves of motion and feeling, of taste and of hearing, appear to the eye as *distinct and distinguishable organs*, not, like the brain, "a mass of curiously convoluted matter." If there were in the brain thirty or more distinct organs perceptible, when it is dissected, we would cheerfully leave it to observation, as in the case of the nerves of motion and feeling, to determine the particular function of each organ. But when we are assured that the brain is a congeries of more than thirty distinct organs, each of which is double, and when, after the closest scrutiny, we not only do not find any such number, but cannot perceive that there are distinct organs at all, we must be allowed to be unbelieving.

That I may not seem to be ignorantly contending against the authority of physiologists, I will introduce a few brief quotations on this point, from Dr. Thomas Sewall, late professor of anatomy and physiology in the Columbia College. He says: "Upon removing the *dura mater* [the outer membrane by which the brain is covered], there are exhibited to the eye numerous convolutions, rendered distinct by grooves which separate them to a greater or less depth; but these convolutions do not, in any respect, correspond in form, size, or position, with the bases of the phrenological organs as mapped out upon the figured skull. Phrenologists do not pretend that there is any relation between the one and the other." "The brain," he remarks, "when divided by incision, presents two substances, differ-

\* Phren., p. 56.

ent in color and texture: the cortical or pulpy portion, which forms the external part, and is of an ash color; and the medullary, or fibrous portion, which forms the central part, and is of a beautiful white, and is fibrous in its structure." "But," he adds, "neither the cortical or fibrous part of the brain reveal, upon dissection, any of those compartments, or organs, upon the existence of which the main fabric of Phrenology is based. No such divisions have been discovered by the eye or the microscope. The most common observation is sufficient to show that there is not the slightest indication of such a structure. Indeed, no phrenologist, after all the investigations which have been made upon the subject, from the first dawn of the science to the present time, not even Gall and Spurzheim themselves, venture to assert that such divisions of the brain have been discovered. The fact of the existence of the horizontal membrane, called the sensorium, separating the superior from the inferior part of the brain, as well as the arrangement of the lateral ventricles, the corpus callosum, the fornix, and other parts, clearly show the absurdity of the idea of organs as described by phrenologists. The notion, then, of the division of the brain into phrenological organs is entirely hypothetical, is not sustained by dissection, and is utterly inconsistent with its whole formation. These facts are perfectly well known, and are universally admitted by all anatomists."

I take pleasure in introducing here a brief discussion of the physiological question from the pen of J. P. Harrison, M. D., Professor of the Theory and Practice of Medicine in the Medical College of Ohio, which he was kind enough to prepare, by particular request, for this work.

How far do the anatomy and physiology of the brain sustain phrenology?

During every age, since anatomical inquiries have been prosecuted, there has existed an earnest wish on the part of curious minds to solve the mysteries of psychology by the light of physiology. Or, in other

words, to make the size and structure of the brain a groundwork of interpretation to the enigmas of the mind. And as far as two points are concerned, there can be no objection, upon the part of the strictest logic, to this investigation ;—first, there can be no valid objection to a careful examination of the question, what relation does the size of the brain in man, and in the lower animals, bear to the peculiar attributes of mental and instinctive capacity, which each species of living beings displays ? and, second, what are the conditions which these capabilities of thought in man, and of instinct in animals, require for their healthful performance ?

But when the physiologist goes beyond these legitimate points of inquiry, and hazards rash speculations in reference to the nature and modes of action of the mind, because he has ascertained the peculiar formation of the human brain, and upon this exclusive research grounds the assumption that there is no such separate entity as mind, and that all we know of the soul, is through the physical organization which it inhabits, he at once throws off the reserve and modesty which ever characterize true science, and surrenders himself up to all the vagaries of a reckless *a priori* fallacy.

There have been five hypotheses advanced on the question of the connection or dependence of the mind on the brain.

First. It was for awhile confidently asserted, that the absolute quantity of cerebral matter constituted the foundation of mental superiority, not only in reference to man as a genus, but to each individual.

Second. It was maintained that the relative quantity of brain to the size of the body, was the true basis of the difference in mind.

Third. Other physiologists, dissatisfied with the explanations referred to above, endeavored to prove that man owed his infinite advancement in intellectual power over all the other created beings of earth, to the fact that he had a larger brain in comparison



to the quantity of nervous matter proceeding from it; or, in other words, he had more brain, with less amount of nervous substance connected with the brain, relatively, than any other creature.

Fourth. Some, not reposing confidence in either of these views, refer mental superiority to the quality—the finer organization—of the brain, and adduce temperament as the true basis of the great diversities of mental capacity seen among men.

The fifth view, is that taken by Gall and Spurzheim, and their followers, or disciples. These physiologists have attempted to establish a distinct system upon four positions: first, that the mind is made up of a plurality of innate faculties; second, that these faculties owe, if not their existence, their manifestation to separate parts of the brain, termed organs; third, that these organs reveal their presence on the surface of the brain; and, fourth, that the prominences on the surface of the brain, produced by the organs, impress their configuration on the skull, the inner part of which is pushed out by the organ attached to any portion of the general mass; and this pushing out of the inner table, or part of the bone, induces a correspondent elevation on the outside of the head.

Thus we have three distinct questions presented by Phrenology: 1, a metaphysical point as to the nature of mind; 2, one of organology; and 3, a question of craniology. As to the first question, that of the nature of mind, its unity, and essential individuality, we shall not, in this place, say anything. We address ourselves to an examination of the other two points: First, do these separate organs exist; and if demonstrably existent, do they show their presence on the surface of the brain? If their localities have been fixed by rigid inspection, and if the phrenologist has shown them, each in its place, on the surface of the brain, is the development, absolute and relative, of each organ positively pronounced on the skull?

Let us see how far the most recent discoveries in anatomy and physiology bear testimony to these aver-

ments of Phrenology. The authorities on which we rely in our statements, are Todd, Bowman, Carpenter, Solly, Flourens, Leuret, and Ritzius. Without any special quotations from these high authorities, we shall freely avail ourselves of their arguments and facts to fortify the positions taken.

Phrenology assigns to the anterior part of the head the organs of intellection ; to the middle portion, those of sentiment ; and to the posterior region, the propensities. But positive experiment has proven, that in the lower animals the entire hemispheres may be gradually pared off, either in front or behind, or above or on one side, to a very considerable extent, with no obvious impairment of intelligence. If these reductions are carried on, the intelligence becomes enfeebled, and, certain limits being passed, extinguished. As soon as one sensation is lost, in this process of cutting away the brain, all sensation is lost : with the disappearance of one faculty, all the faculties disappear. This experiment, performed by some French physiologists, shows that the entire brain, the whole cerebral substance, is a unit in functional action ; that the whole concurs to the full exercise of the intelligence. Gall places the love of offspring in the posterior lobes of the brain ; but unfortunately for this allocation, the posterior lobes are wanting in most of the mammifera, and in all the birds.

Phrenology attributes the seat of sensation to the cerebrum, or upper and larger portion of the entire mass filling the skull ; but it has been demonstrated that the cerebrum is not the seat of sensation ; insects have no cerebrum, and yet insects possess sensation. Phrenology ascribes to the cerebellum, or the posterior and lower portion of the encephalon, or entire brain, a particular function. But the cerebellum, or little brain, is the organ for combining and regulating voluntary muscular actions ; coördinating the locomotive efforts, and maintaining the equilibrium of the body. Where there is no cerebrum, there is no cerebellum. Comparative anatomy and physiology dis-

prove the position taken by Phrenology, in fixing on the cerebellum as the special seat of the sexual propensity. There is a gradual increase in the size of the cerebellum, as we ascend in the scale of animals, up to man. There is, however, no corresponding increase of the sexual propensity. No one will assert that man surpasses the monkey in this respect, and yet the cerebellum is larger in man than in the quadrumanous series. The cerebellum of the gelding is, on the average, both absolutely and relatively, larger than that of either the stallion or mare.

But what completely disproves this location of the sexual propensity in the cerebellum, is the well-ascertained fact, that the average size of this little brain in females is greater, relatively, to the entire brain, than it is in males. The male cerebrum is, on an average, about five ounces heavier than the female; whilst the female cerebellum is only about seven drachms lighter than that of males. The size of the female brain, relatively, to the body, or to the amount of nerves emanating from it, is greater than that of males. These facts do not prove either superiority, or inferiority, of mental power;—that question is to be settled by other kinds of evidence than that afforded by anatomy; but the facts adduced prove that Phrenology is certainly at fault in attributing the seat of the sexual propensity to the cerebellum.

Another very grave objection to this organology, is, that one half of the cerebral surface is unappropriated. Thus, in the convoluted surface of the brain which lies on the cerebellum, and on the basis of the skull, constituting the posterior, middle and anterior lobes, and that portion of the surface in apposition to the falx major, which separates the two hemispheres, there is a large amount of vesicular neurine, or ceneritious matter, entirely overlooked by Phrenology. Why all this waste of material? it is the same kind of cortical substance to which is allotted such very important consideration in other portions of the brain. Embryonic development of the human cere-

brum has determined this controversy against Phrenology. The development occurs in early existence in the following order: in the second and third months of fœtal life, the anterior lobes form first; at the end of the third month, and on to the fifth, the two middle lobes appear; and after this time, the posterior lobes. Now the part of the cerebrum most developed, is the posterior, and not the anterior. The posterior lobe is altogether wanting in the lower mammalia, as in all the inferior vertebrated animals. The rudiment of a cerebrum which is seen in fishes, represents the anterior lobe only. The fullness of the forehead in man is not owing to the greater magnitude of the anterior lobes of the brain, but to the greater size of the posterior lobes. These facts have never been disproved by phrenologists, although directly antagonistic to their positive and reiterated statements.

But what are the proofs given by Phrenology to establish the assertion that these thirty-two organs, through which thirty-two faculties act, are obviously—plainly present—on the surface of the brain? Has the attempt ever been made to define their boundaries on the surface of the brain itself? Analogy is confidently appealed to, in order to help them out of the dilemma; but in a science of positive demonstration, analogy will not subserve any useful end. We want the facts, the actual demonstration, respecting these thirty-two organs. But no such demonstrative evidence has been given; no separate, well defined, accurately circumscribed organs have ever been seen on the surface of the brain. If these organs are like the organs of the external senses, as the eye or ear, then would they be readily recognized. No one would confound an eye with an ear, or the nasal prominence with the gustatory apparatus; and yet when told to inspect the surface of the brain, in order to convince our incredulity that organology is a true science, what have we presented to our notice? Anything resembling the distinct organization of a retina, or a tympanum? Nothing of the sort, but only sulci, or fur-

rows in the brain ; and these do not correspond on the opposite side ;—there is the same smooth surface, the same color, the same structure in all respects—no shooting up, or sinking down—no unevenness which would indicate that nature had been at work to impress some peculiarity of design on any portion of this general surface.

And the empirical mode of discovery of these supposed organs, at once fixes doubt and uncertainty on the whole affair. Gall did not first dissect the brain, and after discovering these organs on the surface, proceed to demonstrate their action on the skull in creating corresponding developments on its exterior side ; but he, by observations on his school fellows, first discovered the external configurations, and then at his leisure proceeded to fix his organology. The craniological preceded the organological explorations, and in this there was witnessed a total reversal of nature's mode of procedure ; for if Phrenology be at all true, the organs assuredly were first formed, and then they impressed their figure and size on the skull ; but Gall first seizes on the exterior, arranges the faculties on the outside, and then goes to work to prove that the internal parts must tally with the exterior. Now all this looks very much like a heroic devotion to an *a priori* theory, and bears about it very little of the semblance of a pains-taking effort to find the true before the plausible was relied upon. Can these organs, if existing on the surface of the brain, impress their shape and magnitude on the skull ? Fallacy accompanies this part of the whole scheme, from the inception to the termination of craniology. Aside from the miserable quackery every day perpetrated, and the reckless appeals to credulity and self love practised by the itinerant phrenologists who wander up and down the land in quest of the means of subsistence, which a more honest occupation should secure, there are four objections which lie in the way of the adoption of craniology. First, if nature intended that the mind should be imaged, not in the flexible and vary

ing features of the "human face divine," but in the hard, unyielding surface of the skull, why was she ashamed of her work, and spread over it the covering she has given the head? But again: this method of reading the character is liable to this serious difficulty, that no matter what moral influences may be made to modify a man's character, by which even an entire revolution may take place in his sentiments, and mental pursuits, yet as the bone is unyielding, no indication can be given on the skull of this radical change. Once more: the skull does not afford any just criterion of the developments of the brain. The diploë, or intermediate structure, which is compact in some parts of the bone, is in other portions of the head of a loose and more spongy consistence, and, of course, occupies a larger space in one portion than in another. This is seen in the frontal sinuses, or the open space between the inner and outer parts of the front bones of the head. In some persons, these frontal sinuses are very large, and, of consequence, a bolder brow is produced. In different parts of the skull there is a general thickness, as in the occipital bone, which augmented size of the bone will show itself outside; and it also will push the brain directly under it, down, for the density of the bone is exhibited both in the inner as well as outer direction. As we advance in life, the bones of the body grow more dense; they become larger and stronger, having more earthy matter in them than in youth. The skull is no exception to this general law of osseous growth. The skull, growing in thickness, would tend to push the organs down, and therefore craniology becomes additionally a source of fallacy at the very time when it should furnish the most decisive test of character.

Lastly. Look at this whole matter of organology, in connection with craniology, in another light. Conceding that the organs exist, and that they impress their figure and size upon the skull, then can you authoritatively pronounce that these developments which you perceive, are veritably the result of the greater

magnitude of those portions directly beneath the exterior prominences, or are they attributable to the augmented volume of other parts of the brain? Not at all; for it has been most irrefragably established, that a part of the surface of the brain may appear largely developed by reason of the large size of some subjacent or neighboring part. This is not only true as regards the frontal projection, or fullness, which, as already remarked, is owing not to the greater magnitude of the anterior lobes of the brain, but to the greater size of the posterior lobes, but it is emphatically true as respects the cerebellum. The portion of the brain called by anatomists mesocephale, which lies contiguous to the cerebellum, by its increased volume, may push back the cerebellum, and thus occasion a thick neck and large occipital region.

Why, then, should we put any credence in organology and craniology? The anatomy and physiology of the brain stand in direct antagonism to the assumptions and plausibilities of this physical scheme of explanation of the reciprocal action of the mind and of the organic structure. And, assuredly, we have no warrant for the daring postulate, that mind is only to be recognized by the organic arrangements of the nervous apparatus. Neither the quantity of brain, absolute or relative, nor the complexity of its parts, in man, can satisfactorily account for his immeasurable superiority over the whole of the lower creation. It is not in his brain, nor hand, nor erect attitude, that we are to seek a true solution of the dignity of the human being; but in the endowment of a spiritual life—in the original gift conferred upon him by his Creator, of His own divine image.

The brain of man is superior in every respect in its organic arrangements to that of any other animal. This superiority of structural development in the human brain, proves that the Allwise and beneficent architect of our frame, fitted up by a most elaborate contrivance and finer workmanship, a habitation in beautiful harmony and adaptedness to the noble quali-

ties and high capabilities of the immortal spirit. As the varied and multiplied uses of the hand, and the locomotive movements of the feet, required a greater range of nervous endowment, so the finer capacities of the eye, ear, touch, smell, and taste, and the superior educability of these five senses, in man, called for a more complex apparatus of sensation. The brain of man exhibits a wider scope, and a more refined finish of workmanship, because of the greater extent, and more exquisite delicacy of the physical functions confided to its keeping. But there is nothing in all the composite machinery of either the sensory ganglia, or of the hemispheres of the brain, to sustain the wild and gratuitous creations of Phrenology. The hand, as a prehensile instrument, is infinitely superior to the proboscis of the elephant, or the hand-like paw of the monkey. And the erect attitude of man, in virtue of which he holds communion with the floating orbs which people immensity, attests at once the grandeur of his destiny, and the glory of his nature. But all these specific attributes, these special endowments, only evince that the *body was formed for the mind, not that the mind was formed from the body.*

The argument from the science of physiology may be summed up in the following particulars:

1. The brain, when submitted to the closest scrutiny, affords not the slightest evidence of the existence of the organs for which phrenologists contend; but the natural divisions of the brain are inconsistent with the phrenological division. Now, if such organs do not exist, the pretended science is confessedly false.

2. The phrenological division of the organs is disproved by the well ascertained fact, that in the lower animals, the entire hemisphere, in front, behind, above, or on one side, may be pared off, to a very considerable extent, with no obvious impairment of intelligence; and that when, in the process, one faculty is lost, all are lost.



3. Facts prove conclusively, that the appetites, propensities, &c., which Phrenology locates in certain parts of the brain, do not there exist. Philoprogenitiveness is located in the posterior lobes of the brain, which are not possessed by most of the mammiferæ and by birds. The location of amativeness is proved to be equally unfortunate.

4. Phrenologists, after long and anxious search for organs, have located some thirty-three, and have yet left one half of the cerebral surface unappropriated. One would suppose, there are many faculties yet undiscovered.

5. Embryonic development of the brain disproves the fundamental principles of this science—the posterior lobes, in which are located the appetites, being more largely developed than the anterior, which last are yet to exert the controlling influence; whilst the former are entirely wanting in some animals which have strong appetites.

6. Even if the phrenological organs existed, it would be impossible to determine any thing concerning their relative size by the external appearance or feeling of the skull. The skull is composed of two parallel plates or bones, the intermediate space between which is filled up by a kind of net work of bone, called *diploë*. These bones, in some parts of the skull, approach, and in other parts recede, from each other, leaving a larger or smaller space filled with *diploë*. Consequently, it often happens, that there is a protuberance on the external surface of the skull, without any corresponding indentation of the inner plate; and an indentation on the external surface, without any corresponding protuberance on the inner surface. The irregularity with which the two plates of the skull approach and recede in the heads of different persons, renders it absolutely impossible to determine the precise shape of the brain, or the relative development of its different parts. It is obvious, that even a slight irregularity of this kind must be a matter of great importance in ascertaining the rela-

tive proportions of organs so small. Combe says, the diploë, with the exception of several parts which he specifies, "is almost equally thick," and he thence infers, "that the two tables of the skull are nearly parallel to each other." "The departure from perfect parallelism," says he, "where it occurs, is limited to a line, one-tenth, or one-eighth of an inch, according to the age and health of the individual."\* Such a departure, however, especially since it is impossible to ascertain where it occurs, must necessarily defeat any effort to discover the relative size of the organs.

Combe is candid enough to acknowledge, that serious difficulties attend the examination of the skull in order to learn the size of the different organs. He speaks, as we have seen, of the irregularity of the two tables of the skull. He also acknowledges several other difficulties. He says, "there are cases in which it is *not* possible to discover the form of the brain by examining the skull," as in cases of disease and old age. He further states, that "there are parts at the base of the brain, in the middle and posterior regions, the size of which cannot be discovered during life, and whose functions, in consequence, are still unknown. From analogy, and from some pathological facts, they are supposed to be the organs of the sensations of hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and some other mental affections for which cerebral organs have not been discovered."† This, however, as he admits, is mere conjecture.

The *frontal sinus* also presents an insuperable obstacle in the way of measuring several organs, as of form, size, weight, individuality, &c. The *frontal sinus* is at the part of the frontal bone immediately above the top of the nose, and is formed between the two tables of the bone, either by the external table swelling out without being followed by the internal, or by the internal table sinking, and thus receding from the external. Combe says—"Phrenologists admit a difficulty in determining the exact degree of develop-

\* Phren., pp. 80, 81.

† Phren., p. 82.

ment of the organs lying immediately above the top of the nose, except in extreme instances." Dr. Sewall says, the two tables of bone are separated in some points at the distance of an inch, and the intervening cavities so capacious as to measure one and a half fluid ounces.

The *temporal muscle* presents another difficulty. It is one of the principal muscles of mastication, and from its situation, as Dr. Sewall remarks, necessarily conceals a number of the phrenological organs. "It rises from the temporal ridge, which is in the form of an arch as it passes over the frontal, parietal, and occipital bones, and covers a large portion of the cranium. This muscle is very various in volume, in different persons, being in some twice the thickness that we find it in others. It covers wholly, or in part, the organs of destructiveness, constructiveness, acquisitiveness, secretiveness, cautiousness, ideality, number, and tune. Of the degree of development of these organs, therefore, it is evident, we can form no correct estimate, by an examination of the living head." Dr. Sewall affirms, that "by means of the frontal sinuses and temporal muscle alone, we find *seventeen* out of the thirty-four organs beyond the reach of observation."

These, though sufficient to destroy confidence in Phrenology as a science, are not all the difficulties to be encountered in ascertaining the relative size of the organs from the external surface of the skull.

7. Another insuperable difficulty arises from the impossibility of obtaining an accurate measurement of the different organs of the brain. Some thirty-three organs, it is said, have been discovered and located. The character of a man is, of course, the sum total of these organs in their operations, acting and reacting upon each other. To form an accurate estimate of the character of any individual, it is, therefore, necessary to ascertain the relative sizes of all these organs; for each of them, according to its size, modifies it to some extent. In measuring the different organs, Combe says, "The real dimensions, *including*

*length, breadth, and thickness*, and not the mere prominence of each organ, should be looked for.”\* To ascertain the three measurements of each of the organs, and to estimate their mutual influence upon each other, and sum up the whole, would indeed be a very difficult undertaking.

It is difficult, in the first place, because the *frontal sinus* and the *temporal muscle* conceal, wholly or partially, some *seventeen* of the organs, so that their dimensions cannot be ascertained. It is difficult, secondly, because “there are parts at the base of the brain, in the middle and posterior regions, the size of which cannot be discovered during life, and whose functions in consequence are still unknown.” What influence these unknown organs may exert upon the character, it is, of course, impossible to determine. It is difficult, thirdly, because, “in old age, the inner table of the skull sometimes sinks, while the outer table preserves its original size,” and, “in such cases the true development of the brain cannot be accurately inferred from the appearance of the head.” Now, old age comes on very gradually; and, of course, this change in the skull takes place by imperceptible degrees. But when it begins, and how rapidly it progresses, it is impossible to determine. It is difficult, fourthly, because neither of the three measurements can be accurately made in a single organ. This difficulty is worthy of special consideration. “The length of an organ,” Combe says, “including its supposed apparatus of communication, is ascertained by the distance from the *medulla oblongata*, and hence the external opening of the ear is assumed as a convenient point from which to estimate length. The *breadth* of an organ is judged of by its peripheral expansion; “for,” says Combe, “it is a general law of physiology, that the breadth of an organ throughout its whole course bears a relation to its expansion at the surface.”† But here we encounter several serious difficulties:

\* Phren., p. 88.

† Phren., p. 88.

1st. All the organs do not reach the surface; and those which do not, cannot be measured. Spurzheim says: "It may be questioned whether all organs reach the surface; and, consequently, whether all faculties of the mind may be determined by the size and shape of the head. There are many convolutions, it is true, in the middle line between the two hemispheres of the brain, and others at the basis and between the anterior and middle lobes, which do not appear on the surface." How, then, can these organs be measured? He says, "it seems to me that a great part, at least, of every organ does present itself there; and farther, that all the parts of each organ are equally developed, so that though a portion only appear, the state of the whole may be inferred."\* This is mere conjecture, in the first place, and then an inference founded upon conjecture! Spurzheim does not pretend to have proved by physiological examination, that all the parts of each of these organs are equally developed. "*It seems to me,*" is all he can say. Guessing that such is the fact, he infers the state of all of them! Can such conjectures and inferences be regarded as of any value in science?

2d. It is impossible to determine the breadth of any one organ, or to judge of its expansion at the surface, by feeling the skull. There are no marks upon the skull by which the boundaries of the organs can be determined. How is it possible to determine precisely what are the territorial limits on the skull, of the organ of conscientiousness, or of acquisitiveness, for example? The difficulty is rendered still greater by the admitted fact, that when one organ becomes very large, it invades the territory of one or more neighboring organs, and, to some extent, displaces them. How is it possible to ascertain how far it has traveled out of its appropriate limits? Combe says: "When one organ is very largely developed, it encroaches on the space usually occupied by the neigh-

\* Phren., v. i, p. 121.

boring organs, the situations of which are thereby slightly altered. When this occurs, it may be distinguished by the greatest prominence being near the center of the large organ, and the swelling extending over a portion only of the other."\* That is, you first run your fingers over the skull and *approximate* the boundaries of a certain organ, and then you endeavor to ascertain how far and in what direction it has traveled out of its legitimate bounds, or been pressed out of its place by its overgrown neighbors; which again you only *approximate*. You are liable, therefore, to two errors in attempting to measure the area of each organ on the skull: in ascertaining precisely its proper limits, and in discovering how far it has displaced others, or has been displaced. Combe admits, that in measuring the breadth of organs, we can do nothing more than *approximate* the truth; and he thinks that, in a great multitude of cases, "the very doctrine of chances, and of the compensation of errors, must satisfy any one that these boundaries may be defined with sufficient precision for all practical purposes." We beg leave to dissent. The doctrine of chances has no place in the measurement of solids; and the fact that error may be, and almost certainly will be committed in the measurement of every one of thirty-three or more organs, does not prove that there will be any "compensation of errors" which will enable us to discover the character of the individual whose head is under examination. Combe thinks, that if the opponents of Phrenology "would only make themselves masters of the binomial theorem, or pay a little attention to the expansion of infinite series, they would not persist in calling for a degree of accuracy which is impossible, or in neglecting an important element in a calculation, because it is involved in a certain liability to error within very narrow limits."† To this the Biblical Repertory, in an able article supposed to have been written by that eminent scholar, Prof.

\* Phren., pp. 91, 92.

† Phren., p. 89.

Dod, late of Princeton, replies: "Those who have already paid some attention to the binomial theorem, and to the development and summation of infinite series, will probably be surprised to learn that they have been accustomed to processes of reasoning which involve 'a liability to error within certain very narrow limits,' and that they are expected, in consequence, to be more tolerant than others of the uncertainties of Phrenology." And we may add, that it is ridiculous thus to appeal to mathematics in aid of the uncertainties of Phrenology; for who does not know, that in measuring very small bodies, great accuracy is absolutely necessary? Not less than sixty-six organs (each being double) are said to be found in the brain; and yet a considerable portion of it is unappropriated. Now divide a little more than half the brain of an individual into sixty-six unequal parts, and then try to determine their relative proportions. Does not every one see that even a slight mistake in the measurement of solids so very small, would materially affect the result?

3d. But suppose we could ascertain precisely the length and breadth of every one of the organs, then would it be possible to estimate their relative power? We take leave here to quote again from the admirable article on Phrenology in the *Biblical Repository*. "We are told that the size of the organs must be ascertained; and that in forming our judgment of the size, we must take account both of the length and breadth; but we are not told what relative weight must be allowed to these two constituent elements. Suppose two organs are found to be to each other in length as *three* to *four*, and in breadth as *three and a half* to *four*, what proportion do they have to each other in size? What are the mental effects of the lateral expansion of one of the organs, in comparison with its projection? Is it the increased number of the fibres, or their increased length, or a certain determinate ratio of the one to the other, that produces the most vigorous action of the faculties? Is it

even pretended that this point has been satisfactorily decided? And yet it is plainly impossible, that the fundamental position respecting the influence of size, can have been proved by observation, without a preliminary or concurrent adjustment of this subordinate question."\* Spurzheim disposes of this difficulty very briefly, and in a very superficial way. He says: "The development of the cerebral organs differs in regard to length and breadth; for the fibres which compose them are sometimes thick and short, sometimes thick and long, or slender and short, or slender and long. This difference of development must have some influence on the manifestations of the faculties. Long fibres seem to produce more activity, and thick fibres more intensity."† The length and thickness in the fibres of the brain must be taken into consideration, we are told; and yet what is the effect produced by greater length or greater thickness of fibres, is perfectly uncertain! Spurzheim thinks this difference must exert some influence on the manifestation of the faculties; and length *seems* to produce activity; but all is uncertain.

4th. Now let us consider the mutual influence of the organs upon each other. A man, for example, has acquisitiveness very large; but the action of this organ is modified by conscientiousness, benevolence, cautiousness, self-esteem, combativeness, destructiveness, &c. To what extent will each and all these organs modify the feelings and conduct to which acquisitiveness would naturally prompt? Every individual may be justly regarded, if Phrenology is true, as a body acted upon by at least thirty-three different and unequal forces. It is impossible to learn with any accuracy the proportion which these forces bear to each other, or to form any idea how far they will modify the action of each other. Let any mathematician determine, if he can, in what direction a body would move, if acted upon by thirty-three unequal forces. He will solve the question as soon as a phre-

\* Bib. Rep., April, 1838.

† Phren., v. i, pp. 118, 119.



nologist will cipher out the character of an individual made up of the action of as many organs.

I cannot close this chapter without giving the testimony of Robley Dunglison, M. D., formerly professor of physiology, pathology, &c., in the University of Virginia, more recently of Philadelphia, one of the ablest writers on physiology in our country. He says: "One of the greatest objections that has been brought against the system of Gall, is the independence in it of the different faculties of each other. Each is made to form a separate and independent state; with no federative jurisdiction to produce harmony in their actions, or to regulate the numerous independent movements and complicated associations which must inevitably occur in the various intellectual and moral operations. He appears indeed to have entirely lost sight of the important doctrine of association, which applies not only to the ideas, but to every other function of the frame; and with which it is so important, for the pathologist particularly, to be acquainted. The second point of doctrine: that each of the cerebral organs ends at the periphery of the brain, and is indicated by more or less development of the part, is attended with equal difficulties." These difficulties are the following: 1. Hernia of the brain, in which, in consequence of a wound of the cranium and dura mater, a portion of the cerebral substance will protrude, and be removed; yet the individual will do well, and to all appearance, retain his faculties unimpaired. 2. Cases of severe injury to the brain, of which there are many on record, where loss has been sustained in both hemispheres of the brain, and in corresponding parts; and yet the faculties have remained.

Speaking of the phrenological doctrine, that by observation of the skull, we may be able to detect the protuberances produced by the cerebral organs of the different faculties, and which has laid the foundation for the whole system of craniology, he says:

"It has been remarked, that the size of an organ is but one of the elements of its activity; and that, by

cranoscopy [examination of the skull] we can of course judge of this element only; and it must be that myriads of observations are necessary before we can arrive at any accurate specification of the seats of the cerebral faculties, even if we grant that separate organs can be detected by the mode of examination proposed by the cranioscopist. Gall, indeed, asserts that the whole 'physiology of the brain is founded on observations, on experiments, and on researches a thousand and a thousand times repeated on man and animals;' yet the topographical division of the skull, which he has proposed, can hardly be regarded otherwise than premature, to say the least of it; and the remark of course applies *a fortiori* to that of SPURZHEIM, who enumerates thirty-five original and innate faculties. It is this mapping of the skull, accompanied with the selfconceit and quackery of many of the *soi-disant* phrenologists or craniologists, that has excited the ridicule of those who are opposed to the doctrine of innate faculties," &c.

Dunglison tells a story from Dr. Burrows: that when Gall was in England, he went in company with Dr. H. to visit the studio of the eminent sculptor CHANTRY. Mr. C., being at the moment engaged, they amused themselves in viewing the various efforts of his skill. Dr. Gall was requested to say, from the organs exhibited in a certain bust, what was the predominant propensity or faculty of the individual? He pronounced that the original must be a great poet. His attention was directed to a second bust. He declared the latter to be that of a great mathematician. The first was the bust of TROUGHTON, the eminent mathematician; the second, that of Sir Walter Scott!

I will add the testimony of one of the most eminent physiologists of England, Dr. James Cowles Prichard, corresponding secretary of the Institute of France, member of the Royal Academy of Medicine, of Paris, &c., &c. Dr. Prichard thinks that the attempt by phrenologists to illustrate the phenomena

of the human mind, and of human action, by comparison with the powers, habits, and propensities of the inferior orders of the creation, though extremely ingenious, is not safe; that it tacitly assumes, what has not been proved, that the supposed distinction between instinct and reason is unreal, and that the active principles are of the same kind in the higher and lower beings in the creation. After stating a number of facts which are inconsistent with the principles of phrenology, he says: "They seem, in the first place, to show that the relations which in it are assumed to prevail through all nature, are subject to vast exceptions, and as one great proof of the doctrine is the assumed universality of such relations, or the endowment of psychical properties in coëxtension with certain peculiarities of structure in cerebral parts, the exceptions endanger at least the outworks of the whole doctrine. When, in a more limited survey, we confine our observation to the sphere of vertebrated animals, and discover that variations in psychical phenomena take place without any evidence of corresponding changes in the structure of cerebral parts, and that these changes, on the other hand, occur without such alterations as we are led to anticipate in psychical properties, the system of organology seems to be shaken to its very center." Again: "The phrenologist needs not to go beyond the limits of the human species in order to establish his doctrine on the basis of experience; but then this experience must be uniform and unquestionable. It is not enough to have a few chosen coincidences brought forward by zealous partizans, who go about in search of facts to support their doctrine, and pass by, or cannot perceive, the evidence that ought to be placed in the opposite scale. The principles of the system ought to be applicable in every instance. The phrenologists, however, aware of numerous and striking exceptions, elude these evidences by asserting that when a certain portion of the cranium and of the brain is greatly developed, while the faculty there

lodged has never been remarkably distinguished, it nevertheless existed naturally, though the innate talent, for want of proper cultivation, has never been displayed; the predominant organic power was never discovered by the owner, though, according to the principles of the doctrine, with this organic power a proportional impulse to exertion, or an instinctive energy is combined, which communicates of itself a strong and irresistible tendency to particular pursuits. When, again, a strongly marked propensity or a decided talent has been manifested without any corresponding amplitude of structure, it is in like manner pleaded that by sedulous exercise and culture a natural deficiency has been overcome. Thus the phrenologist avails himself of a double method of elusion—his position, like the cave of Philoctetes, affords him an escape on either side, and in one direction or another he contrives to baffle all the address of his opponents.”

Dr. Prichard states, that he has taken every opportunity that has occurred for many years, of making inquiries of persons who had a great field of observation within their reach, concerning the result of their observations on the subject. Many of these persons, he says, have been physicians who were superintendents of extensive lunatic establishments; some of them have been men who had devoted themselves to the study of phrenology, and were predisposed to imbibe the opinions of its authors; some have been persons distinguished by their researches in the anatomy and physiology of the brain and nervous system. “Among them,” says he, “I do not remember to have found one who could say that his own observation had afforded any evidence favorable to the doctrine. Yet we should imagine that a man who lives amidst hundreds of monomaniacs must have constantly before his eyes facts so obvious that he could not be mistaken in their bearing. Some hundreds and even thousands of such persons have passed a part of their lives under the inspection of

M. Esquirol, who possesses most extensive resources for elucidating almost every subject connected with the history of mental diseases, and has neglected no inquiry which could further the attainment of that object. The result of his observations will be allowed to be of some weight in the decision of this question, in which the appeal is principally to facts of the precise description of those with which he has been chiefly conversant. At his establishment, at Ivry, he has a large assemblage of crania and casts from the heads of lunatics, collected by him during the long course of his attendance at the Saltpetriere and at the royal hospital at Charenton, which is under his superintendence. While inspecting this collection, I was assured by M. Esquirol, that the testimony of his experience is entirely adverse to the doctrine of the phrenologists; it has convinced him that there is no foundation whatever, in facts, for the system of correspondence which they lay down between given measurements of the head and the existence of particular mental endowments. This observation by M. Esquirol was made in the presence of M. Mitivié, physician to the Saltpetriere, and received his assent and confirmation. M. Foville, physician to the extensive lunatic asylum at St. Yarr, gave me a similar assurance." Dr. P. adds, that "there are few individuals in Europe whose sphere of observation has been so extensive as that of M. Esquirol and M. Foville; and certainly there are none whose science and habits of observation better qualify them to be witnesses in such a subject of inquiry."

Rudolphe, another celebrated physiologist, states that he has examined many hundreds of brains without finding any thing that appeared to him favorable to the phrenological theory. As the result of his own examination, Prichard states, that there is great defect in the evidence by which the doctrines of phrenologists are supported, and this becomes sufficiently apparent to those who take a near and accurate view of them. "I entertain a strong persuasion," says he,

“that the time is not far distant, when the whole theory will be abandoned.” \*

I have been thus tedious in adducing physiological facts, and quoting the opinions of eminent physiologists, because phrenology appeals specially to physiology in support of its claims. I think we are forced, in view of what has now been presented, to the following conclusions:

1. That the science of physiology affords no evidence in favor of the truth of phrenology. Few persons are, or can be, intimately and thoroughly acquainted with the physiology of the brain and the facts in view of which a decision must be made. We appeal, therefore, to the testimony of men who are confessedly eminent physiologists, who have been long conversant with the facts. If they, with any tolerable unanimity, had decided in favor of phrenology, or even of the facts on which it bases its claims to our confidence, we might feel constrained to admit that it is probably true, at least in part. But when the most eminent physiologists, at least many of them, bear decided testimony against it, the very best that we can say, is, that we have no evidence from the science of physiology in favor of it. It is in vain for phrenologists to plead, that new discoveries have always met with great opposition; for phrenology is now old enough to have overcome any prejudice which its novelty and the singularity of its principles may have excited. It has been examined, too, by men against whom the charge of bigotry and prejudice cannot lie. It is equally in vain for them to denounce Christians who oppose their favorite science, as illiberal, bigoted, persecuting, opposers of light, and the like. If phrenology were wholly false, they will acknowledge that its advocates could and would use just such weapons. But they fall powerless, in view of the fact that the most eminent men, who make no pretensions to religion, and who are in

\* Treatise on Insanity, pp. 232, 234.

nothing else behind the age, are found standing in opposition to it.

2. Although we may be obliged to rely on the testimony of physiologists for many important facts bearing on this subject; yet we can see, even in facts admitted by phrenologists, difficulties attending its fundamental principles, which are sufficient to satisfy us of its falsity.

## CHAPTER III.

## THE CLAIMS OF PHRENOLOGY, AS A SYSTEM OF INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, EXAMINED.

It is worth while to examine briefly the claims of Phrenology as a system of *intellectual philosophy*. Phrenological writers declaim eloquently concerning the failure of metaphysicians in ascertaining the primitive mental powers, and in rendering the philosophy of man interesting and practically useful to persons of ordinary understanding. "From the days of Aristotle to the present time," says Combe, "the most powerful intellects have been directed, with the most persevering industry, to this department of science; and system after system has flourished, fallen, and been forgotten, in rapid and melancholy succession. \* \* \* Thus, after the lapse and labor of more than two thousand years, philosophers are not yet agreed concerning the existence of many of the most important principles of action, and intellectual powers of man. While the philosophy of mind shall remain in this uncertain condition, it will be impossible to give to morals and natural religion a scientific foundation; and, until these assume the stableness and precision of sciences, education, political economy, and legislation, must continue defective in their principles and application." \*

It is, indeed, true that metaphysicians have failed to agree upon any classification of the faculties of the human mind; and that in attempting to explain philosophically the origin of its ideas, they have often wandered far in the dark regions of infidelity and atheism. And there is reason to fear, that the day

\* Phren., p. 53.



is not at hand, when these obscure speculations will terminate in establishing clear principles of philosophical truth. Happily, however, the human race are not destined to walk in darkness concerning great practical duties, until philosophers shall have satisfactorily solved the metaphysical questions which have hitherto divided them. We may think strongly, reason correctly, take correct views of our relations, duties, and destiny; nay, we may make rapid progress in all other sciences, whilst metaphysicians are differing and contending about the origin of ideas and the primitive powers of the mind. The following remarks of Dr. Chalmers on this subject are to the point: "Without the visual faculty, there could be no vision; yet there is no antecedent necessity to become acquainted with the visual faculty, ere we can see. Without the knowing faculty, there could be no knowledge; yet there is not, on this account, the antecedent necessity for our making acquaintance with the knowing faculties ere we can know. \* \* And, in like manner, we are not to wait for the perfecting of mental science, ere that hopeful progress can be made toward the perfecting of all other sciences. It may be very long before those physiologists be at one, who speculate on the functions of the optic nerve, which retires behind the organ of vision till lost in obscurity among the convolutions of the brain—yet do all men see aright notwithstanding. And it might be just as long before that our mental physiologists, or psychologists, come to a full and final settlement on all these questions; yet, meanwhile, might all other men of science save themselves, by philosophizing aright on all other departments of human knowledge."

It is not half so important that men agree on those speculative points, as metaphysicians and phrenologists seem to think. If men can only be protected against the skepticism, the infidelity, the atheism, into which false philosophy has driven so many, and against the demoralizing tendencies of materialism,

they will be able to discharge well their various duties, and, in the light of divine revelation, arrive safely in heaven. Still, however, if Phrenology can afford any aid in settling those endless disputes, and giving to the world a complete system of mental science, we would be thankful for all its light. Let us very briefly inquire how far it affords the much needed assistance. "A system of intellectual philosophy," says Morell, "must contain an analysis and classification both of our faculties and feelings; it must give a complete enumeration of the elements of human knowledge; and it must trace them all to their real origin." How far does Phrenology answer these purposes?

In the first place, it is a remarkable fact, that, with all its high pretensions, it is incapable of discovering a single faculty, sentiment, or propensity, of human nature. Could any phrenologist, by the most minute examination of the brain and the skull, ascertain, if he did not know it before, that man possesses such a faculty as memory? Could he discover by physiological examination, a faculty such as he calls Philoprogenitiveness, or Selfesteem, or Benevolence, or Firmness, or any other? Most certainly not. How, as a matter of fact, have phrenologists proceeded in discovering and locating their organs? They have ascertained, just as metaphysicians do, by consciousness and observation, that the human mind possesses such a faculty as memory; and then they proceed to search for the organ, or rather the several organs, through which it is manifested—for that part of the brain in which this faculty is lodged. What, then, is the amount of the information afforded by Phrenology on this point, even if we suppose its principles true? It does not inform us that the mind possesses the faculty of memory; nor does it give any analysis or philosophical explanation of its nature. All this it of necessity leaves to the metaphysician, and simply tells us, that this faculty, whatever may be its nature, is manifested through a certain part of the brain, and

that it is strong or feeble in proportion to the size, &c., of its organ. This is the whole amount of the information it gives. Similar remarks may be made concerning every other faculty. Phrenology did not, and could not, discover that the human mind possesses a *conscience*—a moral sense. If man had not been conscious of such a feeling as conscientiousness, phrenologists would never have thought of the organ of Conscientiousness. If it had not been known that the feeling of *benevolence* exists, the organ would never have been thought of. "The whole march of phrenology," as Morell well remarks, "goes upon the supposition, that there is a system of intellectual philosophy already in the mind, and its whole aim is to show where the seat, materially speaking, of the faculties we have *already* observed, really is to be found." He further remarks, "Either our various powers and susceptibilities are *known* and *classified* before we begin any outward observations, or they are not. If they are already known and classified, then Phrenology has nothing to do with the discovery; if they are not, then assuredly we can never find them out by mere external observation upon the skull; we can never turn them up to view by the scalpel of the anatomist, nor find them impressed upon the outward form of the brain. \* \* \* Strictly speaking, Phrenology cannot reveal a single intellectual fact, which was not equally known before; it cannot trace any points of human knowledge to their primary elements; it cannot perform, in any case, a single analysis of our complex notions; in a word, it can do nothing, allowing its facts to be all true, but point out a certain connection between two parallel series of mental and physical phenomena, the former of which have been already investigated." \*

Now, of what practical importance it may be, to know that memory is distributed among some three or four parts of the brain, called organs, the moral sense

\* Hist. of Mod. Phil., v. i, pp. 503, 504.

in another part, and so on, we cannot say; but certainly such facts, even if true, add nothing to our knowledge of mental phenomena. We know generally that disease of the brain interferes with the operations of mind, and that the gradual decay of the body tends to weaken the energies of the mind as to their manifestation. Whether it will be of any special advantage to know that the memory fails as one particular part of the brain is diminished, and that the same thing is true of other powers, we pretend not to decide. We affirm only, that Phrenology adds nothing to our knowledge of intellectual philosophy—that it is compelled to leave that whole subject where it found it, in the hands of metaphysicians, to be elucidated simply by an appeal to consciousness.

But this is not all. The phrenological division of the mental phenomena is confused and absurd, the effect of which is to prevent, instead of promoting, the securing of clear views. It is true, that we find man possessed of *appetites, intellect, and moral affections*; and this general division is recognized, though it was not discovered, by phrenologists. There is, according to Phrenology, a cerebral organ for each faculty, sentiment, and propensity; and, of course, each organ is, or represents a primitive power of the mind. Now, let us look a little closely at some of these organs.

Phrenology points us to the organ called *philoprogenitiveness*, that is, the love of offspring. This organ also leads to a fondness for *pets*, small dogs, and the like. Now, it is not quite clear that the affection of a parent for a child is precisely of the same kind as that which shows itself in fondness for pets. We are disposed to consider these two classes of feelings wholly different, quite as different as any other, and requiring consequently different organs for their manifestation. But, however this may be, it is certain that the affection of children for parents is quite as different from that which is experienced toward others, and from that which parents feel toward chil-

dren, as this last is from the general feeling of benevolence. There ought, therefore, to be an organ for the manifestation of this class of feelings, and another for the manifestation of fraternal affection. Indeed, there ought to be quite a *group* of *family organs*. Why phrenologists have been content with the single organ of Philoprogenitiveness, we cannot imagine.

Phrenology tells us of the organ of *Concentrativeness*. Dr. Spurzheim observed, that cats remained in houses sold, while dogs went with their masters; and losing sight of several plain reasons which might be given for this difference, he sought for an organ for the manifestation of the love of a particular place. He saw a clergyman in Manchester, known to his friends as particularly attached to his dwelling-place, so that he was unhappy if obliged to sleep elsewhere. He examined his head and found a certain spot *warmer* than any other; and *there* he located the organ of *Inhabitativeness*. Mr. Combe thought this faculty had a much more extensive sphere of action, than that assigned to it by Spurzheim. Some persons, he remarked, can detain their feelings and ideas in their minds, giving them the quality of continuity; while others cannot do this. The former readily think connectedly, either dwelling on a subject which interests them, till they have placed it clearly before the mind, or passing naturally and gracefully to a connected topic. Such persons, he says, uniformly have this organ large; while those who have it small, find it difficult and painful to follow a connected train of thinking. He regards the function of the faculty (which he calls Concentrativeness) to be, "to give continuity to impressions, be they feelings or ideas."\* Now it would be difficult to conceive of two classes of mental phenomena more unlike, than the love of home and the power of reasoning connectedly. The latter, one would think, might, with far more pro-

\* Phren., pp. 120, 121.

priety, be referred to the intellectual organs, as more or less developed and educated. Who would imagine, that the same organ which keeps cats in sold houses, and makes men love to sleep at home, is also employed in connected thinking and reasoning? What philosopher would ever confound things so essentially dissimilar? And then the power of giving continuity to emotion, we are told, belongs to the same organ. But who does not know that in multitudes of instances, men who are almost strangers to strong emotions, are remarkable for close and connected thinking and reasoning; while others who seem incapable of closely connected thinking, experience strong and continued emotions? How absurd to set out with the principle, that there is in the brain an organ for each faculty, sentiment, and propensity, and then assign to the same organ the manifestation of mental phenomena so radically diverse!

Again. We find in phrenological works the organ of *Secretiveness*. This organ, we are informed, produces "an instinctive tendency to conceal;" and its legitimate object, according to Combe, is "to restrain the outward expression of our thoughts and emotions, till the understanding shall have pronounced judgment upon its propriety." Now one would think, if the mind possesses *intelligence*, that it might be able to determine when it would be prudent to speak, and what it would be prudent to divulge. "A sufficient endowment of this organ," says Combe, "is essential to the formation of a prudent character." Prudence, it has been commonly supposed, is one of the clearest indications of a well-balanced intellect; but phrenology makes it only a *propensity*! This propensity, called Secretiveness, we are told, prevents the expression of thoughts till the understanding has determined whether it is proper to utter them. If it were not for this organ, every thought and emotion, we are to believe, would be at once uttered, whether pure or impure, before the understanding could give its decision. But does not the under-

standing decide, in general, that it is not prudent to utter our thoughts without due regard to circumstances? and is not this general dictate of the understanding sufficient to prevent the instantaneous utterance of whatever rises in the mind? Why, then, is such an organ needed?

But this organ is almost identical in its function with another, called *Cautiousness*. This organ, we are told, leads individuals to apprehend danger, to hesitate before they act, and look to consequences, that they may be safe. Gall thought, it gave men and animals a power to look forward to coming danger, and avoid it; and he called it foresight; but Spurzheim describes it as "blind and without reflection, though it may excite the reflective faculties. It incites us to take precautions; it doubts, and says *but*, and continually exclaims, *take care!*"\* Now it does not appear very obvious that there is a necessity for an organ specially to *excite* the intellectual organs; and it is certainly most remarkable that an organ which is "blind and without reflection," should reflect enough to say *but*, and to doubt, and to discover enough of danger to say—*take care*. Or if without reflection it is always crying out—*take care*, whether there is danger or not; its warnings must fall into entire neglect.

But it is not quite easy to determine the distinct offices of the two organs of Secretiveness and Cautiousness. The former, in animals, is designed to prompt them to seek concealment from danger; and the latter constantly cries out, *take care!* for the same purpose. The former is necessary, Combe says, "to the formation of a prudent character;" and the latter, he affirms, is "essential to a prudent character."† Now it strikes us as rather strange, that there should be one organ to make men prudent in *talking*, and another to make them prudent in *acting*; and still more remarkable that both these wise organs are

\* Phren., v. i, p. 199.

† Comp. Phren. pp. 159, 195.

mere blind, unreflecting *instincts* ! For Combe speaks of *Secretiveness* as an "instinctive tendency ;" and Spurzheim and he agree, that *Cautiousness* is "blind and without reflection." Without the former of these blind instincts, we are told, men, even the wisest, would give utterance to every idea that might rise in their minds, and "man would shun the society of his fellows as more loathsome than pestilence or famine ;" and without the latter, they would *act* just as foolishly, as without the former they would *speak* ! It is really difficult to believe that intelligence and wisdom would be so perfectly foolish, unless made prudent and foreseeing by these instincts that neither reflect nor foresee !

Among the *propensities*, phrenology finds the organ of *Acquisitiveness*. In this faculty, Combe says, "the phrenologist perceives an instinct prompting the human being, after his appetites of hunger and thirst are appeased, and his person protected against the elements of heaven, to labor, prompted by the mere delight of accumulating ; and to the ceaseless industry which this instinct produces, is to be ascribed the wealth with which civilized man is every where surrounded." \* This instinct, it appears, is perfectly blind, and "takes its direction from the other faculties with which it is combined." Directed by Individuality, it collects objects in natural history ; by Form, Coloring, and Ideality, it gathers pictures ; by Veneration, it gathers "old coins." In those who have no "appetite" for accumulation, and who are incapable of retaining their property, Mr. Combe has observed that this organ is small.

Now, that a blind instinct should prompt men to desire property, may be possible, though not probable ; but that this same instinct should impart to them the capacity to retain it, is rather incredible. Who does not know, that the strong desire to *acquire*, constantly hurries men into the most imprudent specula-

\* Phren., p. 169..



tions, by which they lose everything they had gained? It can scarcely be believed, that the same instinct which impels men forward in bold speculations, does yet enable them to retain their property. Besides, according to phrenology, it is the proper office of *Cautiousness* to induce men to *take care* of what they have.

But why should there be an instinct prompting men to acquire? If one is naturally fond of pictures or old coins, is there necessity for an organ particularly designed to prompt him to acquire them? If one has the organ of *Alimentiveness*, and desires food, is it necessary that another organ should prompt him to gain it? And if he knows he will need food to-morrow, must he have an instinct to induce him to provide for to-morrow? Or if one's self-esteem or desire of approbation, should induce him to desire wealth as a means of gratifying these feelings, where is the need of a special organ to prompt him to seek it? Does a benevolent man desire wealth, that he may do good? Surely he needs not a particular instinct to prompt him to seek it. Is instinct everything, and reason nothing, to man? The truth is, one individual desires to acquire property for the sake of the pleasures of the table; another for the sake of show; another for the distinction that wealth imparts; and others for other reasons. It cannot be proved, that there is any such thing in human nature, as the abstract, blind desire to acquire. No one is conscious, we believe, of such a feeling. Men who have become wealthy by persevering industry, to which they have been impelled by such motives as would naturally influence rational beings so situated, will doubtless be surprised to learn, that their industry and their success are to be attributed to a blind instinct to acquire.

It is true, some persons, sane in other respects, have manifested a peculiar propensity to steal; but this fact affords no evidence that in a sound mind or head there exists a propensity or organ of the kind.

Monomaniacs sometimes conceive a peculiar dislike of particular persons, especially their relatives; shall we, therefore, conclude that every individual has a faculty resembling this feeling in its character? Unless men generally are conscious of a disposition simply to *acquire*; or unless there is evidence that they are accustomed to seek to acquire from such an instinct, and not from intelligent purposes, the organ of Acquisitiveness must be blotted from the catalogue as a mere phrenological invention.

In the Phrenological account of "the intellectual faculties which procure knowledge of external objects," we find many curious things. There is, for example, the organ of *Individuality* which "renders men observant of objects that exist—gives the notion of substance, and forms the class of ideas represented by substantive nouns when used without an adjective, as *rock, man, horse*." It gives "the desire, accompanied with the ability, to know objects as mere existences, without regard to their modes of action, or the purposes to which they are subservient. Individuals in whom it is large will observe and examine an object with intense delight, without the least consideration to what it may be applied. It prompts to observation, and is a great element in a genius for those sciences which consist in a knowledge of specific existences, such as natural history."\* In common life, Combe says, a great development of this organ confers a talent for observation, curiosity to know, and aptitude for acquiring knowledge of details.

As there are scarcely any two persons in the world whose features are precisely similar, and whose countenances have precisely the same expression; so it is probable there are no two minds which are originally precisely similar in their faculties and dispositions. From the original structure of their minds, individuals are disposed to pursue different departments of knowledge, and are pleased with different objects and qua-

\* Combe's Phren. pp. 277, 278.

lities. The original differences are, doubtless, very much modified by the circumstances in which persons are placed, their early education, their pursuits, &c. There may be some difference in the dispositions and susceptibilities of two minds, the one of whom is pleased with the knowledge of the works of nature and of art, as they appear to the eye; and the other with analyzing bodies, and searching out the elements of which they are composed, and ascertaining their chemical affinities. One class of minds are specially interested in the study of human nature, as it appears in the actions of men; and they are delighted with the study of history. Another class confine themselves chiefly to psychology, and find great pleasure in the analysis and classification of mental phenomena. They are much more interested in inquiring into the faculties of the mind, the origin of ideas, the philosophy of perception, and the like, than in the narrative of the most important and exciting events which the history of our race records. Still another class are delighted with the study of physiology—with inquiring into the strangely complicated and wonderful machinery of animal and human organization; and these often manifest a strong desire to refer all the phenomena of mind to the physical organization. And not unfrequently they show as great contempt for metaphysical investigations, as the mental philosopher can possibly feel for the attempt to make man, with his wonderful capacities and susceptibilities, a mere physical agent. In a word, there is an almost endless variety, we believe, in the structure, the capacities, the susceptibilities of the minds formed by the all-wise Creator; and in this fact we have reason to admire his wisdom. For, in consequence of this original difference, there are found persons who, though placed in the same circumstances, are disposed to engage in different pursuits; and as no one can possibly investigate every department of science, each is made to contribute to the general stock of human

knowledge; each throws into the common treasury what he has gained.

But in all this variety of mental endowments, there is probably no one class that possess the phrenological organ of *Individuality*—imparting the desire and the capacity “to know objects *as mere existences*.” One individual desires to become acquainted with one class of objects, and another with another class; but the desire of each originates in the fact, that there is in the class of objects to which his attention is directed, something to gratify his peculiar tastes, or that can in some way be turned to profitable account. A rock lying in the road is an existence, as truly as the most beautiful object in nature. Is there any one who would examine the former with delight, unless his taste should incline him to the study of geology? Would any one look at the stone under his feet, simply as a thing existing, with peculiar delight? “When this organ is deficient,” says Combe, “the individual fails to observe things that exist around him; he may visit a house, and come away without knowing what objects were in the rooms. A person thus deficient walks in the streets, or through the country, and observes nothing.” Now, the truth is, there is no individual who fails to observe the classes of objects which gratify his tastes, or promise to afford the means of gaining what he desires; and there is no one who takes interest in observing every thing. If a phrenologist were introduced into a splendid room, beautifully furnished, with walls covered with the most exquisite landscape paintings, a table covered with the most delicious viands, and a company of poets, sculptors, mathematicians, lawyers, &c., entertained by a band of music; his attention would be given almost exclusively to the phrenological developments of the different heads before him. If a painter were to enter the same room, his mind would be chiefly occupied with the beautiful paintings with which the walls were decorated. If a cabinet maker were introduced, he could afterwards tell you far more about the splendid

furniture than any other objects that were before him. If a musician were to be one of the company, his mind would be specially interested with the performances of the band. And if there were present an epicure, his eye would rest on the table; and, if afterwards questioned, he could give a much more accurate description of the viands, than of any other objects in the room. Individuals might be found who would give almost equal attention to several classes of objects; but no one, we venture to say, whose attention would be given equally to all the objects mentioned, and no one who could find any pleasure in observing them as "mere existences."

The organ of *Individuality*, too, seems pretty decidedly to encroach upon the province of *Eventuality*. The function of this faculty, as Combe informs us, "is to take cognizance of changes, events, or active phenomena, indicated by active verbs. In such expressions as the ROCK *falls*, the HORSE *gallops*, the BATTLE is *fought*, the substantive springs from individuality, and the verb from eventuality." Now it strikes us as rather wonderful that there should be an organ to notice a *horse*, as a mere existence, and another to observe that the said horse is *galloping*!—one organ to observe the existence of such a thing as a *battle*, and another to take cognizance of the fact that the battle is *fought*! The mind looks through the eye, and sees a horse; and it sees him in *motion*, or *standing*, or *lying*. In the name of common sense, what is the difference between the act by which the mind takes cognizance of the horse as recumbent or standing, and that which observes him as in motion? What is the difference between that act of the mind by which it observes a tree, and that by which it notices a limb falling from the tree? We cannot look at a tree without viewing it as occupying a certain space and a certain position. We observe the tree standing, and the limb falling: do we, in the two cases, exercise two different mental faculties?

Eventuality, we are told, "prompts to investiga-

tion by experiment, while individuality leads to observation of existing things." It does not so readily appear, how it is that the same organ whose peculiar office is to take cognizance of changes and events indicated by active verbs, also prompts to investigate *by experiment*. Experiments are made for the purpose of discovering the simple elements of which bodies are composed, or of ascertaining some unknown law of nature. What relation exists between a desire for such knowledge, and a power to observe that a rock falls, or a horse gallops, we cannot perceive. It will not do to say, that eventuality inquires into the *causes* of active phenomena; for then it would interfere with the office of the organ of *causality*. For Combe informs us, that individuality and eventuality take cognizance of things obvious to the senses; while causality looks a little further than these, perceives the dependencies of phenomena, and furnishes the idea of causation, as implying efficiency, or something more than mere juxtaposition or sequence.\* It is strange that a philosopher should confound the mere notice of active phenomena, as the galloping of a horse, with the desire to gain that knowledge which is derived from experiment; and not less remarkable that any one should find an organ for investigation by experiment, and another for inquiring into the causes of things. In many instances it is true, the causes of phenomena may be ascertained without experiments; but in many others they cannot. If, therefore, there is any faculty which prompts to investigate by experiment, it is *causality*.

Again. Individuality, we are told, "gives the tendency to personify abstract ideas, such as Ignorance and Wisdom; and eventuality to represent them as acting." Now can any one believe, that the faculty whose proper function is "to know objects as mere existencies," is identical with that which invests abstract ideas with the properties of a person? Combe

\* Phren., p. 343.

states, that in a work written by an author with whom he was acquainted, and in whom both these organs were large, Ignorance and Common Sense were represented as personages who addressed the people. Now it is true, that minds of a certain caste are disposed, especially when the feelings are much excited, to personify either inanimate objects or abstract ideas; but to do it with effect is considered one of the highest efforts of genius and of imagination. The *Pilgrim's Progress*, by John Bunyan, is one of the most remarkable and successful efforts of the kind ever made. "This," says Macaulay, "is the highest miracle of genius—that things which are not should be as though they were—that the imaginations of one mind should become the personal recollections of another. And this miracle the tinker has wrought. \* \* \* All the stages of the journey, all the forms which cross or overtake the pilgrims—giants and hobgoblins, ill-favored ones, and shining ones; the tall, comely, swartby Madam Bubble with her great purse by her side and her fingers playing with the money; the black man in the bright vesture; Mr. Worldly Wiseman, and my Lord Hategood; Mr. Talkative and Mrs. Timorous—are all actually existing beings before us. Bunyan is almost the only writer that ever gave to the abstract the interest of the concrete. The mind of Bunyan was so imaginative, that personifications, when he dealt with them, became men." Shelley excelled in this species of composition; and his strong imagination, says the same elegant writer, "made him an idolater in his own despite. Out of the most indefinite terms of a hard, cold, dark, metaphysical system, he made a gorgeous pantheon, full of beautiful, majestic, and life-like forms. He turned Atheism itself into a Mythology, rich with visions as glorious as the gods that live in the marble of Phidias, or the virgin saints that smile on us from the canvass of Murello. The Spirit of Beauty, the Principle of Good, the Principle of Evil, when he treated of them, ceased to be abstrac-

tions. They took shape and color. They were no longer mere words; but "intelligible forms;" "fair humanities;" "objects of love, of adoration, or of fear." That such powers should be ascribed to a faculty whose function is to take cognizance of bodies, as mere existencies, is truly marvelous, and shows with what philosophical accuracy Phrenology has arranged its organs and assigned them their offices.

We might pursue much further this part of our subject; but we desire to pay some attention to the *moral organs*, and their manifestations. On taking leave of the intellectual powers, we cannot but remark what a number of organs are brought into operation in looking at a single object. There is the *visual organ*, to enable us to look at a horse, for example; there is the organ of *Individuality*, to enable us to see him as a mere existence; there is the organ of *Coloring*, to enable us to determine whether he is bay, gray, or brown; there is the organ of *Form*, to enable us to determine his particular shape; there is the organ of *Comparison*, to enable us to see wherein he resembles a cow, and wherein he differs from that quadruped; there is the organ of *Eventuality*, to enable us to see when he walks, trots, or gallops! Rather a complicated machinery, truly! Now if the organ of individuality should be lost or diseased, we could not know the existence of the substantive *horse*; although if the organs of vision and coloring were still sound, we could see him, and determine his color; and with the help of good eventuality, we could be assured that he trots or gallops. We should, therefore, be in the rather singular predicament of holding to the *adjective* and *active verb*, and losing the *substantive* horse! Or if eventuality were defective, the other organs remaining sound, we might see the horse, recognize his existence, and determine his color; but we would not be enabled to decide whether he were standing, walking, trotting or galloping! We should have no organ by which to take cognizance



of "the active phenomena." Or should the organ of *figure* unhappily become diseased, we could indeed see the horse—the image being distinctly drawn upon the retina of the eye—and we could determine his color and motion; but we should not be able to know anything of his shape or figure. This difficulty, moreover, would render our organ of comparison useless, since in consequence of being unable to ascertain the figure of the horse and of the cow, we could not compare them together, and might be unfortunate enough to mistake the one for the other. Whether we could escape serious difficulty by adverting to the manes and tails of the two animals, the science, we believe, has not decided!

We are not supposing an impossible case; for it is well known that particular parts of the brain may be injured or lost, and the person may nevertheless do well. And a particular organ may become diseased, while the other organs continue sound; for Combe says, this is the cause of *monomania*.<sup>\*</sup> Now, we should be glad to know whether any cases of monomania have occurred, in which a horse standing still appeared to be galloping, or a galloping horse to be standing still; or in which the color and motion of an object were distinctly perceived, while the mind could not take notice of the object itself.

Errors in the classification of the instincts and of the intellectual faculties might be safely left by the Christian and the moralist to be investigated and corrected by those who are pleased with such speculations. But he cannot so properly pass by errors concerning the *moral nature* of man. Phrenology professes to be the science of mind; and, therefore, it necessarily embraces the great principles of moral philosophy. We do not now agitate the question whether its organology is consistent with the accountability of man—with the existence of virtue and vice. This we reserve for another chapter. We simply in-

<sup>\*</sup> Phren. p. 38.

quire now into its analysis and classification of moral affections.

The first of the *moral organs* we are called to consider is that of Benevolence. This faculty, Combe says, "produces desire of the happiness of others, and delights in the diffusion of enjoyment. It disposes to active goodness, and, in cases of distress, to compassion."\* This is, indeed, one of the noblest affections of the human heart. It desires the happiness of all men, and delights in promoting it, even though to do it requires sacrifices to be made. It does not arise from the contemplation of any moral excellence in the objects to which it is directed, but regards them simply as a portion of God's rational creatures. It extends likewise to the animal creation. He who is truly benevolent, bears the image of his Creator; for "God is love." It is truly remarkable that any one claiming to be a philosopher, should confound this noble feeling with that instinct which renders some animals harmless, or with that kind of attachment which animals placed together conceive for each other, or with that species of sympathy which prompts animals to defend each other when attacked. "This organ," says Combe, "is found in the lower animals, and, when largely developed, they are mild and docile; whereas, when it is deficient, they are vicious, ill-natured and intractable." Dr. Gall says, "the head of the tiger is more flat in the region of this organ, than that of the lion; and the heads of the hyena and wolf are more depressed than that of the dog." And Combe says, when the middle of the horse's forehead, a little above the eyes, is hollow and narrow, the animal is invariably vicious, and disposed to bite and kick. The conclusion, of course, is, that the lion has more *benevolence* than the tiger; the dog, more than the hyena and the wolf; and some horses, than others! Dr. Gall saved two puppies, we are gravely told, and watched their dispositions with the closest

\* Phren., p. 205.

attention. Even before their eyes were opened, he remarked a great difference between them; one of them, when taken into the hand, testified, by its gestures, that it was pleased; the other growled, whined, and struggled till it was put down. Scarcely were they fifteen days old, when one indicated, by the motions of his tail, contentment and gentleness, not only toward other little dogs, but to persons who approached it; the other, on the contrary, never ceased to grumble, and to bite every one within its reach. Spurzheim tells of a family in Paris, who had a horse and cow living together in the same stable; the horse several times got untied, went to the corner where the sack of oats stood, and drew it in his teeth near the cow, probably to make her partake of the good cheer. A cat, as Mr. Combe was informed, seized a young sparrow; and a flock of sparrows perceiving it, attacked the cat, fastened on its back, pecked and flapped until they rescued the poor bird. Now, that the different dispositions, mentioned by Gall, as manifested by his two dogs, really exist in many cases, there can be no doubt; but that a philosopher should have thought of calling the inoffensiveness of the one *benevolence*, is most marvelous—quite as much so, as if he had carried out his *moral* philosophy by naming the ill temper of the other *selfishness*! Can any one imagine, that the former really experienced any thing like a desire for the happiness of other animals and men? It is well known, too, that two animals kept together like the horse and the cow, mentioned by Spurzheim, do often conceive a kind of attachment for each other; but what is there in this that bears any resemblance to benevolence? If there were an organ to which this disposition could be referred, one would think *Adhesiveness* must be the one. It is also true, that among birds and other animals there is a kind of sympathy which prompts them to defend each other from injury; but who would mistake this sympathy for benevolence?

Dr. Gall, we are told, discovered this organ, the ex-

istence of which he had not previously suspected, by having his attention directed to a boy said to have been distinguished from infancy "by his goodness of heart." "Although he was passionately fond of games, and delighted in scouring the forests in search of birds' nests; yet, no sooner did any of his brothers and sisters become sick, than an inclination still more powerful kept him at home, and drew from him the most assiduous attentions toward the sufferer." \* All very natural; but did this conduct evince any thing like true benevolence? Did it prove any thing more than strong *natural affection* for those nearly related to him? This feeling might, with much more propriety, be considered as evidence of the existence of an organ yet undiscovered, for the manifestation of *fraternal affection*. We venture to suggest, whether it would not be well to examine carefully the unappropriated territory of the brain, and see whether such an organ cannot be found. But to confound this natural affection, which is often possessed in a high degree by the most selfish persons, with that benevolence which desires the happiness of all men, is ridiculous. Again: it is said, "he was never more pleased than when some good fortune happened to those whom he loved, on which occasions he often shed tears of joy." It was very natural, indeed, that he should rejoice in the good fortune of those whom he loved; but this fact is no evidence that he was remarkably benevolent. Benevolence rejoices in the happiness not of those for whom personal attachment has been conceived, but in the happiness of *every one*—even of *enemies*. It is further said of this remarkable boy, that "he was fond of taking charge of sheep, dogs, rabbits, pigeons, and birds; and if one of these birds happened to die, he wept bitterly." This would only prove that he was fond of *pets*—a feeling which, strangely enough, phrenologists attribute to the organ of Philoprogenitiveness; but surely it cannot be mistaken for benevolence.

\* Combe's Phren., p. 200.

Dr. Gall had become acquainted with two other persons of similar character; he took casts of their heads, and placed them beside each other until he discovered a development common to them all. He then continued his examinations among birds, dogs, horses, and other animals, and men, until he became certain that he had discovered the organ of *goodness of heart*, or *benevolence*! St. Paul, Combe tells us, gives a beautiful description of the genuine character of this sentiment, in his account of Christian charity. And yet he gravely tells us, that birds, dogs, horses, and other animals, possess it!

But let us leave *animals* out of view, and examine the organ of Benevolence as it exists in the human head. To this organ, as we have said, is attributed the manifestation of fraternal affection, of pleasure in the good fortune of those we love, of fondness for pets, of amiability of disposition, and of true benevolence. Are these feelings identical? Do they bear even a distant resemblance to each other? Is it not true that the last alone possesses moral character? If the fundamental principle of Phrenology be true, that there is in the brain an organ for the manifestation of every distinct feeling or sentiment, how can it be true, that all these different feelings are manifested by the same organ? And what confidence can we place in the formidable array of facts spread before us to prove the existence of the phrenological organs? If phrenologists find one dog more illtempered than another, search is made for the organ of benevolence; and if they find on the skull of the latter a prominence, and on that of the former a smoother surface, it is of course discovered. If one individual is more affectionate to brothers and sisters, or is more amiable, than another, the result is likely to be the same; although there is a radical difference between genuine benevolence, and animal instincts; natural affection, and amiability.

The next organ we will examine is Veneration. Gall observed that some persons were more religious

than others; and he, of course, commenced a search for the organ for the manifestation of religious feeling. Having ascertained, as he supposed, in what part of the brain it exists, he called it "*the organ of Theosophy*." This name Spurzheim thought objectionable, inasmuch as it implied the capacity to know God. Gall finally called it "*the organ of God and Religion*." He thought it proved the existence of God. He said: "As every other faculty of man and animals has an object which it may accomplish, it is not possible that while there is an organ of Religion, God should not exist; hence God exists." Spurzheim, however, decided that "this faculty is a *sentiment*; that it is blind, and does not reveal the existence of any object." \* He mentions, moreover, the fact, not very favorable to Phrenology, that in all the busts and portraits of Voltaire, it is represented as much developed; "and certainly," he remarks, "he was not religious." But Combe, willing to save the credit of the science, says, "he is known to have venerated the Supreme Being, and to have paid great deference to persons of high rank." † It would have been more to the credit of Combe's candor, if he had passed Voltaire as a very clear exception to the general phrenological rule.

Spurzheim and Combe have agreed to give the organ of Veneration a much wider range than did Gall. Its principal and noblest object, they acknowledge, is to prompt man to *worship*; "but it has also," they tell us, "objects and a wider sphere of action in the present world." It produces the feeling of deference and respect in general. It is a chief ingredient in filial piety. It leads to deference for superiors in rank as well as in years, and prompts to the reverence of authority; produces respect for titles, rank, and power, for a long line of ancestry, or mere wealth. It fills persons with profound awe in visiting ancient temples, Gothic cathedrals, and places of

\* Phren., v. i, pp. 220, 221.

† Phren. p. 213.

sepulture for the illustrious dead; gives reverence for church yards; and, strange to tell, it is one ingredient in the love of *old coins*, and in the tendency generally to antiquarianism.\* This is indeed a wide range for one phrenological organ. Let us try to analyze some of the feelings which it is said to produce.

Its principal function, we are told, is to prompt man to *worship*. But what is the feeling of the human mind which prompts it to worship God, and which is expressed in acts of worship, such as adoration, prayer, and praise? Is it a simple feeling—"an original emotion"—or is it the result of several distinct feelings? Phrenology maintains the former view; we, in common with writers on mental science, contend for the latter. The most important feeling under the influence of which worship is offered, is *love to God*. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," is the language of the perfect law. There is the perception of moral beauty in the Divine character; and the affection called love, is the admiration with which the virtuous mind contemplates that beauty. But God is infinite in all his attributes. The mind, therefore, contemplates the moral beauty of infinite Greatness. God is infinitely holy; and "the beauty of holiness" is infinite. Under this contemplation man is overpowered by a sense of his own littleness, and falls with reverential awe before the great I AM. It was when under the influence of such emotions, that the Psalmist exclaimed, "When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained; what is man that thou art mindful of him? and the son of man that thou visitest him." In the object of worship two qualities are distinctly seen—holiness, which excites love; and greatness, which excites the feeling of reverence. These two emotions are quite distinct; for we love persons whom we do not reverence, and perhaps, in some instances, reverence those whom we do not love.

\* Combe's Phren., pp. 212, 213.

But as the worshiper bows before God, there is, connected with the emotions just mentioned, the feeling of *obligation*—of the obligation arising from his relation to God as his Creator, and which is expressed by the language of the moral law—"Thou *shalt* love the Lord thy God." "For," said the Psalmist, "he is thy Lord; and worship thou him." There is also the feeling of *gratitude* for blessings bestowed. The expression of grateful feeling forms no small part of the worship of God. In divine worship, therefore, we find at least *four* classes of emotions, viz: admiration of moral beauty, reverence of infinite greatness, the feeling of obligation which the conscience awakens, and the emotion of gratitude for blessings received. *Praise* expresses the first; *adoration* expresses the second; *acknowledgment* and *confession*, the third; and *thanksgiving*, the fourth. Purity of heart lays the foundation for them all.

We have spoken thus far of the worship which is acceptable to God, which is morally good. There is often a large amount of apparent devotion and fervor, where there is little or nothing of true worship. Combe says, "Catholic countries afford peculiarly favorable opportunities for such observations. Dr. Bright, a traveler in lower Hungary, informs us, that in Vienna, the churches are almost constantly open, and enter them when you will, servants who had been sent on errands are seen kneeling before the altars or the images, with their buckets or parcels by their sides. Thus prayer, by its frequency, becomes a habit and recreation, rather than the performance of a duty."\* It might have been well for Mr. Combe, whilst philosophizing on this subject, to have remembered that the church of Rome prescribes the frequent repetition of prayers as a kind of penance, and as a means of gaining indulgencies. As a necessary consequence, the saying of prayers and counting of beads become, in the great majority of instances, mere

\* Phren., p. 209.



recitations or repetitions, with little or no devotion. Philosophical observations, therefore, made on the presumption that the frequent repetition of forms of prayer is evidence of the feeling of worship, are entirely deceptive.

But is respect for titles, rank, and wealth, identical with those feelings which prompt to the worship of God? Phrenologists answer affirmatively; but we deny. In these things, especially in *wealth*, there is not the beauty to admire, the greatness to reverence, the obligation, nor the gratitude. And how it is possible for any man to find even the appearance of identity between fondness for old coins and for antiquarian researches, and the worship of God, we know not. Surely the two classes of feeling possess not one element in common. The love of old coins and of antiquarian researches possesses nothing at all of moral principle; while the worship of God is wholly of a moral character. The former concerns merely the *tastes* of men, or their desire for knowledge of a particular kind; the latter, their affections as moral and accountable beings. It really seems the peculiar office of Phrenology, not to analyze and classify the phenomena of mind, but to confound things wholly unlike, and, in plain contradiction of its first principles, to attribute to the same organ the production of feelings totally dissimilar.

The next organ to which we invite the reader's attention, is that of Conscientiousness. The proper function of this organ, according to Combe, is to produce "the feeling of obligation or incumbency." Justice is said to be the result of this sentiment, acting in combination with the intellectual powers. It is expected to be a kind of regulator of all the other organs. "If Combativeness and Destructiveness be too active, Conscientiousness prescribes a limit to their indulgence. If Acquisitiveness urges too keenly, it reminds us of the rights of others."\* The great

\* Combe's Phren. p. 220.

importance of Conscientiousness, as the regulator of all the other organs, would seem to require, that it should be the largest organ in the brain: but this, we are told, is far from being the case. In many individuals it is represented as so small that it can by no means perform its proper office. Spurzheim says, "its energy is very different in different individuals, and even in nations;" that it is "so weak in some as to be by no means sufficient to restrain or to direct the inferior propensities." \* Such persons are truly to be pitied; since they have the organ large enough to render them unhappy, but yet too small to be of any practical service.

The view taken of this subject by phrenologists exhibits strikingly the erroneousness of the fundamental principle of their philosophy, in representing the mind, not as a unit, but as a congeries of different organs. True philosophy evidently teaches us, that a truly benevolent man cannot be unjust; for benevolence desires the happiness of every one, and, of course, it will prevent injustice being done to any one. It is evident that a man cannot do injustice to one whose happiness he strongly desires. "Love," says the Apostle, "worketh no ill to his neighbor; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." To be just, according to God's just law, is to be benevolent. But Spurzheim says, "Benevolence may even be contrary to justice. I may find it my interest to be very benevolent to certain persons. This behavior, however, cannot easily be called just." † Can any one believe that apparent kindness, shown to particular individuals from interested motives, constitutes true benevolence? "It is easy," as Combe well remarks, "to distinguish kindness flowing from this sentiment, from acts of attention arising from love of approbation or interested motives." But he himself falls into an error of the same kind, when he says—"No mistake is more generally committed than that of con-

\* Phren., v. i, p. 229. † Ibid, p. 229.

ceiving that, by exercising the faculty of Veneration, we cultivate those of benevolence and justice; but, if Veneration be large, and Conscientiousness small, a man may be naturally disposed to piety, and not to justice; or, if the combination be reversed, he may be just and not pious, in the same manner as he may be blind and not deaf, or deaf and not blind." \* Having set out with the false principle, that the mind is a congeries of organs or faculties, and not a unit, and admitting, as a necessary consequence, that moral purity is not a unit, but something divided between several faculties, phrenologists very naturally conclude, that the different parts assigned to the respective organs are as independent of each other as the sight is of hearing, or as hearing is of sight; that a man may be eminently benevolent or pious, and yet most unjust. But what is it to be *just*? Certainly it is to be disposed to render to all their dues; to satisfy every just claim; and a just man finds pleasure in doing so. Now, the law of God consists of two tables, of which the first prescribes our duties to God; the second, our duties to mankind. Our Savior teaches us in what justice consists, when he says—"Render, therefore, unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." Indeed the whole duty of man consists in serving God. Acts of justice to our fellow men are but acts of obedience to Him who says, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Is it possible, then, that a man can be fully alive to that part of his duty which consists in worshiping God, and can experience pleasure in discharging it, and yet be regardless of the just claims of his fellow men? Or can a man take pleasure in satisfying the just claims of men, and yet be indifferent to the higher claims of his Maker and Redeemer? It is true, that men who believe that religion consists in the repetition of prayers, and in strict attendance upon the external forms of religion, may appear very

\* Phren. p. 222.

devout, while at the same time they trample upon the rights of others. The Pharisees, of old, afford striking examples of this species of piety. They prayed standing in public places, were strict in tithing mint, annise, and cummin, fasted frequently, and multiplied religious ablutions, while neglecting "the weightier matters of the law." But theirs was not true piety; their apparent devotion was not genuine. They were nothing better than whited sepulchers. Their piety was a proud selfrighteousness or a degrading hypocrisy. It is true, likewise, that men who believe that true religion consists exclusively or chiefly in doing justice to man, may be strictly regardful of all human claims, and equally neglectful of the duties they owe more immediately to God. But their righteousness, if indeed it be a sincere regard for the claims of justice, is essentially defective, because their moral instruction is so. John, the Apostle, says, "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" \* In other words, piety toward God cannot exist without benevolence toward man. And benevolence toward man, we know, cannot exist without a disposition to do justice to man; for "love worketh no ill to his neighbor." Love to God prompts to the discharge of all the duties we owe to God; and love to man, to all the duties we owe to man.

The truth is, that such is the nature of the human mind, that it can and does perceive a moral quality in affections and actions; and when we have done that which appears to be right, we experience a feeling of self-approbation; and when we have done what we know to be wrong, we experience a painful sense of guilt. And men are constantly urged to the discharge of their duties by the desire of the former, and restrained from the commission of crime by the fear of the latter. The admonitions of conscience,

\* 1 John iv, 20.

however, are insufficient of themselves, to control the conduct of men; but when the heart approves what the conscience enjoins, duty is cheerfully and pleasantly performed. An enlightened conscience enjoins alike the discharge of our duties to God and to man; and if the affections induce us to regard the one, we cannot be indifferent to the other. It is, therefore, a serious error—an error which is mischievous in its consequences—to say, that a man may be truly devout in the worship of God, without being just in his conduct toward men. This error has begotten, in many minds, a contempt for religion, who yet profess a high regard for morals.

We might pursue this investigation much further; but it is not our purpose to examine all the organs which phrenologists imagine they have found, and the peculiar functions ascribed to each. Our object was simply to prove, that as a system of intellectual philosophy, it not only affords no assistance in the analysis and classification of the mental phenomena, but that it throws them into inextricable confusion. Even a partial examination of the system must satisfy the unprejudiced of the correctness of the declaration of Morell (who, by the way, is one of the most acute metaphysicians of this age), that in the matter of analysis “phrenology has gone completely astray, that it has followed a method of classification altogether fallacious, and that it has given results totally worthless in a philosophical point of view.” He says—“It has made its classification turn mainly upon the objects of our mental faculties, and almost entirely neglected their fundamental characteristics. On the one hand, it assigns different organs for the same faculty or feeling, because they apply to *different objects*; and then, on the other hand, it will turn a complex operation into a simple one, and appropriate to it a single organ, just because the whole process is directed to *one particular object*. Thus memory is distributed between three different organs, according as it applies to persons, to places, or to

things; love, as a propensity, is divided into two or three more; judgment and imagination are mutilated in the same way. In brief, the form of our mental operations is utterly lost in the contemplation of their objects, and a classification results, which has all the bad qualities which can possibly attach to what is termed in logic, a cross division. But, reiterates the phrenologist, nobody can deny that these separate tendencies, such as love to wife, love to children, love to humanity, *really exist*, and that, therefore, they demand a separate allocation in our mental analysis. We reply, that love to a hundred other things really exists, and, by parity of reasoning, ought to have distinct organs. If once the principle be admitted, that we may overlook the form, and classify according to the matter or object of our feelings and faculties, confusion will have no limit and no termination.”\*

Phrenology professes to be a system of *moral*, as well as of *intellectual*, science. Now of what practical value are all its discoveries? Can it prove against the Atheist, that there is a God? On this point Combe writes in the following strain:

“A practical application of much importance follows from these doctrines.

“Some men deny the existence of God; and others strenuously maintain that his existence is demonstrable by a legitimate exercise of reason. The former, who deny God, say, that all we perceive in nature is existence and the *succession* of phenomena; that we can form no idea of efficiency or power; and that, therefore, all we know philosophically is, that matter exists, and undergoes certain changes. This is the natural conclusion of men in whose heads individuality and eventuality are large, and causality small; and, accordingly, atheists are generally very deficient in the organ of causality, and show its weakness in their general arguments on other topics. If, on the other hand, a mind in which causality is very power-

\* Hist. of Mod. Phil. v. i., p. 509.

ful, surveys the phenomena of nature, the conviction of a Cause of them arises irresistibly and intuitively from the mere exercise of the faculty. Benevolence and design, in the arrangements of the moral and physical world, are clearly perceived by it; and it therefore instinctively infers, that benignity and intelligence are attributes of the Cause which produced them. Hence the fact is phrenologically explained, why all master spirits are believers in God. Socrates, Plato, and the ancient philosophers, are represented as endowed with large organs of causality; and they all admit a Deity. Voltaire had too large a causality to doubt of the existence of God; and Franklin continued to reverence the Supreme Being, although he had renounced christianity."

The amount of this is, that men whose heads have a certain shape (possessing the organ of causality large), reason from effect to cause—from the works of creation to the existence of the Creator; and other men, with heads of a slightly different shape, reason differently, and come to a different conclusion. Now since each class are brought to their particular conclusion by their physical organization, who shall decide between them? Why may not the atheistic head reason as conclusively as those differently formed? The fact that men with a protuberance on a certain part of their skull, believe in the existence of God, is surely no evidence that their faith is true. The probability is quite as strong in favor of those whose skulls are somewhat differently formed. By making the decision of the question turn upon the shape of the head (since it is admitted that the heads of men are differently formed), phrenology forces us, unless the peculiar shape of our brain prevent, into the dark regions of universal skepticism. It makes men *reason*, as well as *act*, from physical necessity; and thus destroys all confidence in the former, and all moral character in the latter.

*Is there an external world?* Bishop Berkeley, driven from the regions of common sense by a false philos-

ophy, denied that there is. It is amusing to see Mr. Combe's method of accounting for the philosophical folly of the bishop. He says :

“Phrenology enables us to refer these different speculations to their sources in the different faculties. Individuality (aided by the other perceptive faculties), in virtue of its constitution, perceives external objects, and its action is accompanied by intuitive belief in their existence. But Berkeley employed the faculty of causality to discover *why* it is that this perception is followed by belief; and because causality could give no account of the matter, and could see no necessary connexion between the mental affection called perception, and the existence of external nature, he denied that nature exists. Dr. Reid's answer, translated into phrenological language, was simply this: The cognizance of the existence of the outward world belongs to individuality: Individuality has received its own constitution and its own functions, and cannot legitimately be called on to explain or account for these to causality. In virtue of its constitution, it perceives the existence of external objects, and belief in that existence follows; and if causality cannot see *how* this happens, it is a proof that causality's powers are limited, but not that individuality is deceitful in its indications.”

The whole trouble of the bishop, it seems, arose from the fact that he was unacquainted with the peculiar office of Mr. Individuality, and that he had the right to claim implicit confidence in his testimony, and was not aware that Mr. Causality, though an important personage, and used to inquiring into the *causes* of things, did not know *every thing*! How far this *philosophical* exposé of the source of the bishop's difficulty would have been satisfactory, had he been so happy as to live to hear it, we pretend not to decide. We cannot but think with Morell; however, “that in such a dilemma the phrenologist would be glad to take a refuge in the citadel of *common sense*, or some such reflective principle, and leave



his developments to fight an easier battle." For, as he well remarks, "Once shake man's confidence [as did the Berkeleian philosophy] in the reality of his sense-perceptions, and it is not, neither can it ever be, in the power of a philosophy, which is built entirely upon external observation, to venture a single reply to any of the objections which the skeptic may have to offer."

*Is man a free moral agent?* Can Phrenology answer the question? He is a being made up of some thirty-three or more *instincts*. "The faculties, in themselves," says Combe, "are mere instincts; the moral sentiments and intellects are higher instincts than the animal propensities."\* Now on what authority, we ask, does he place one *instinct* above another? Are they not all equally a part of human nature? Does not Mr. Combe himself assert, that "every faculty is good in itself?" Why, then, claim supremacy for Veneration, Benevolence, Conscientiousness? Why have not the other faculties an equal right to reign? But we are digressing. Since all the faculties are mere *instincts*, can the result of their action be free moral agency? On what evidence can this be affirmed? Phrenology cannot answer this most important question.

*What is virtue? Or when can an action be pronounced virtuous?* The definition of virtue, according to Phrenology, Fowler tells us, "is the harmonious exercise of all the faculties in due proportion, upon the legitimate objects, controlled by the moral sentiments, and directed by intellect."† But can this system of philosophy answer the question already suggested, how it can be made to appear, that the instincts called moral and intellectual, are to govern the other instincts called *propensities*? Or how does it appear that there is more morality in one instinct, than in another? Again: How can the faculties be exercised in due proportion, if they do not exist

\* Const. of Man, Boston, 1833.    † Self Culture, p. 69.

in due proportion? Mr. Combe informs us, that "Phrenology shows that different individuals possess the faculties in very different degrees"—that "in most individuals one or more of the moral or intellectual organs are so deficient in size, in proportion to the organs of the propensities, that his individual perceptions of duty will be far short of the highest standard." And, he says—"The dictates of the moral and intellectual powers which constitute rules of conduct, are the collective dicta of the highest minds illuminated by the greatest knowledge."\* This is extremely indefinite. The *minds* of men have not yet been classified. Some are highest in one department, and others in another. It might be very difficult, therefore, to decide just what minds are "the highest." And it would be no less difficult to determine what particular individuals are "illuminated by the greatest knowledge." Some excel in one department of knowledge, and others in other departments. How shall we strike the balance? Besides, since all men are imperfect, "the highest minds illuminated by the greatest knowledge," even if we could certainly find them, would not give us a perfect standard of virtue. Nor is it yet known, we believe, what proportion the faculties should bear to each other. The *governing organs*, one would think, should be the largest, since size is the measure of power; but how much larger, we know not. And on this fundamental point we are left in the greater difficulty, since, if we appeal to the scriptures, the organs themselves will seriously, and perhaps very injuriously, affect our views of their teaching. For, Mr. Fowler tells us, that "every phrenological faculty constitutes the medium, or, as it were, the colored glass through which the mind looks at all objects. As, when we look at objects through green glasses, they look green; when through yellow glasses, they look yellow; when through dark, shaded, or smoky glasses, they look dark, gloomy, or smoky;

\* Const. of Man, p. 56.

when through glasses that are light shaded, they look light; when through red glasses, every thing assumes a red aspect—and that, too, whatever may be their actual color; so the phrenological faculties constitute the mental glasses through which we look at mental and moral objects.”\* Now, how, with such *colored glasses*, we are ever to get at the true color of things, we cannot imagine. We may even be aware that our glasses are colored; but this knowledge will not enable us to determine the true color of the objects we are viewing. Our only remedy would seem to be, to collect a company of “the highest minds, illuminated by the greatest knowledge,” and appoint them our moral and religious teachers. And even this remedy must fail, since it is not in the power of any man, however clearly he may himself see, to make men with colored glasses see objects in their true colors. *What is virtue?* Phrenology fails to give a satisfactory answer, and even drives us to despair of ever attaining correct views.

Phrenological writers excel in the art of setting forth old truths, with which every one is familiar, as if they themselves, by the wonderful light of their new philosophy, had been the discoverers of them. They speak learnedly and gravely on the vast importance of obeying *the natural laws* of the Creator, and declaim against ministers of the gospel, because they do not preach on these subjects. If any one will take the trouble to read what Combe and Fowler have written on this subject, he will need no more evidence of the extreme self complacency with which they parade the most common place truths, as if the world had, until now, lived in ignorance of them. Take the following examples: “The physical laws embrace all the phenomena of mere matter.” “Organized substances and beings stand higher in the scale of creation, and have properties peculiar to themselves.” “Intelligent beings stand still higher

\* Self Cult., p. 73.

in the scale, than merely organized matter, and embrace all animals," &c. "Obedience to each of the natural laws is attended with its own reward, and disobedience with its own punishment. Thus, mariners who preserve their ship in accordance with the physical laws, reap the reward of sailing in safety." "They are universal, unbending, and invariable in their operation. When the physical laws are infringed in China or Kamschatka, there is no instance of a ship floating there more than in England." "They are in harmony with the constitution of man." "Men by getting drunk injure their health." "The human body consists of bones, muscles, nerves, blood vessels, besides organs of nutrition," &c. "By the law of gravitation, the body falls to the ground, when unsupported, and is liable to be injured, like any frangible substance; by a chemical law, excessive cold freezes, and excessive heat dissipates its fluids," &c. "When the animal propensities triumph over the moral sentiments, evil results." "To be happy, man must become *wise* and *religious*—must subject his animal nature to his higher powers; and he is most happy, other things being the same, who does this the most habitually and effectually."

These, and similar truths, important indeed, but well understood before Phrenology was heard of, are presented and illustrated as if they were quite new, and as if for their discovery the world were indebted to it. And then we have sentiments like the following: "In view of these truths, how comparatively ineffectual in its reclaiming power is most of the preaching of the present day. Does it urge the preservation of health as a means of promoting moral excellence and intellectual power? Does it even recognize, except incidentally, the existence of physical laws, or the duty of obeying, or sin of violating them?"\* It is really amusing to hear deliverances such as this from our selfcomplacent philosophers; as if minis-

\* Fowler's Self Cult., p. 67.

ters of the gospel were not in the constant habit of inculcating the duty and the necessity of temperance in all things. It is true, the most of them have not taught, that attention to dietetics will produce sanctification. Nor have they taught the doctrine of the transmission of hereditary qualities, viz: that "the qualities of the children are determined jointly by the constitution of the stock, and by the faculties which predominate in power and activity in the parents, at the particular time when the organic existence of each child commences."\* These are principles not only not taught in the scriptures, but which are most certainly not true. Ministers are, therefore, quite excusable for failing to inculcate them. Phrenology has not brought to light a single moral truth which was not as well known before; nor has it presented a single new motive to virtue. The whole that it has accomplished, even, if we admit the truth of its general principles, is to have pointed out the particular part of the brain through which the different faculties are manifested; and this information certainly is not likely to revolutionize the world.

\* Combe's Const. of Man, p. 153.

## CHAPTER IV.

PHRENOLOGY WHOLLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE—LEADS TO MATERIALISM—INCONSISTENT WITH FREE AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, VIRTUE, AND VICE.

THE fundamental principles of Phrenology are wholly inconsistent with selfevident and universally admitted principles of mental and moral science. Phrenology sets out with the principle, that "the human mind, as it exists in this world, cannot, *by itself*, become an object of philosophical investigation;" that "every act of the will, every flight of imagination, every glow of affection, and every effort of the understanding, in this life, is performed by means of cerebral organs unknown to us through consciousness, but the existence of which is capable of being demonstrated by experiment and observation: in other words, that *the brain is the organ of the mind*—the material condition without which no mental act is possible in the present world." \* Accordingly the advocates of the system teach, that not only the animal appetites and the intellectual faculties, but *the moral sentiments and conduct* of men depend wholly upon the physical structure of the brain. They find in the brain the organs of the animal appetites, as Amativeness, Philoprogenitiveness, Alimentiveness, &c.; intellectual organs, as Individuality, Calculation, Causality, Comparison, &c.; and moral organs, as Conscientiousness, Hope, Veneration, &c.

Now, it is important to the right understanding of this subject, to inquire whether the organs are to be

\* Combe's Phren. pp. 27, 30.

considered as the *causes* of the faculties and propensities manifested through them; or as mere *instruments* which the mind may employ as it chooses for the manifestation of its faculties and dispositions. On this subject the language of phrenologists is very strangely inconsistent. When they speak of the developments of the organs, and their effects upon the character, they speak of them not as instruments to be employed by the mind, but as efficient causes to which the peculiarities of individual character are to be ascribed. But when they speak of the obligations and duties of men, they employ language which would induce the belief that they consider the organs mere instruments to be employed by the free, intelligent mind.

As the matter stands, however, taking either view of the subject, we should be forced to conclusions subversive of the fundamental principles of Phrenology. If we regard the organs as *causes*, it follows, that men are mere physical agents, incapable of either virtue or vice. If we regard them as *instruments*, they are, in multitudes of instances, so defective, that the mind cannot act through them as it should. Suppose, for example, we say that the organ of Conscientiousness is the instrument employed by the mind in order to perceive the moral quality of actions, just as the eye is the instrument it uses in looking upon the material world. Then, as a blind or diseased eye would present a physical obstacle, absolutely insuperable, in the way of its perception of material objects, so would a defective organ of Conscientiousness present an insuperable obstacle in the way of its perception of moral qualities. And there would be no more responsibility in the one case than in the other. So far as the conduct of men is concerned, it matters little whether it is the result of physical causes over which they have no control, or of organs so defective that the real character of the mind cannot be manifested of them. In both cases the difficulty is purely physical.

It is evident, however, that phrenologists regard the organs, not as *instruments* to be used by the mind as it chooses, but as *causes* of which the character and actions of men are the effects. For, in the first place, if the organs were mere instruments, the examination of the head, though it might indicate the capabilities of the individual, would give no clue whatever to his real character. The fact that a man has a strong arm, would not afford even presumptive evidence that he is disposed to be pugnacious. So the fact that a man has the organs of Veneration and Conscientiousness large, would prove only that he is capable of being very religious and very conscientious, but not that he is in fact so. And the fact that another man has Acquisitiveness and Combateness very large, and Conscientiousness very small, would prove him capable of being an oppressor or a robber, but not that he is really so. For he might not choose to exercise his large organs to the extent of their capacity, and might choose to exercise vigorously the smaller ones. But it is a fundamental principle of Phrenology, that the character may be known by an examination of the organs. The language of phrenological writers leaves us in no doubt on this subject. It proves conclusively that they regard the organs, not simply as instruments to be used, but as efficient causes, producing each its legitimate results. Concerning the intellectual organs, Combe says: "Small size in the brain is an invariable *cause* of idiocy." \* The same writer says: "Dr. Gall mentions that among the young men confined in one of the prisons of Berlin, one in particular attracted the attention of Dr. Spurzheim and himself. They strongly recommended that he should never be set at liberty, as they thought it impossible he could abstain from stealing. The organs of the higher sentiments were extremely deficient, while that of Acquisitiveness was developed in the highest degree." † Gall and Spurzheim evi-

\* Phren., p. 45. † Ibid. p. 171.



dently regarded the organs as efficient causes, and considered the moral organs in the brain of the young man entirely too feeble, owing to their diminutive size, to resist the large organ of Acquisitiveness, which must desire gratification with an intensity proportioned to its overgrown size. Combe says, when the organ of Conscientiousness is small, and Secretiveness large, "especially when the latter is aided by Ideality and Wonder, a natural tendency to lying is produced." \* In his Constitution of Man, he says: "If individuals, having brains resembling those of Gibson and Haggart, both of whom were remarkable for dishonesty, should be placed in situations of trust, in which temptations to embezzlement should be presented to them, which could be resisted only by strong sentiments of justice; their misconduct, sooner or later, would be almost certain, owing to the great size of their animal organs, and the deficiency of their organs of Conscientiousness." Fowler says, "One having Conscientiousness *very large*, will make morality and duty the pole star of his life, and the only guide of his conduct; will not, for the world, knowingly do wrong or injure another; will make almost any sacrifice sooner than incur guilt," &c. \* \* \*

\* \* "One having Conscientiousness *very small*, will neither know nor feel the difference between right and wrong *in themselves*, nor have any moral discernment; will have no conscientious scruples; deny the doctrine of rewards and punishments, and the whole system of moral accountability," &c. †

The same author accounts for the different religious creeds and denominations of Christians in the world, by the different shape of the heads of those holding the creeds and constituting the sects. "Every phrenological faculty," says he, "constitutes the medium, or, as it were, the colored glass through which the mind looks at all objects. As, when we look at objects through green glasses, they look green, &c.,

\* Phren. p. 223. † Ibid. pp. 129, 133.

so the phrenological faculties constitute the mental glasses through which we look at mental and moral objects. \* \* \* \* To apply this fundamental law of mind to the religious opinions of mankind: The moral faculties constitute the colored glasses through which we look at the Deity and his moral government, as well as at the moral relations of man to man, and to his Maker. Veneration worships God, yet the other organs color our views of his character and attributes. Thus the ancient Greeks and Romans had large Veneration, and were very religious, but their other moral organs were small, and their animal propensities were powerful. Hence they worshiped gods of various animal passions," &c. "This fully-established law of mind shows sectarians why they differ and quarrel about religion. Their organs differ, and this diversifies and distracts their religious views and feelings. One sect has one set of organs, or looks through glasses of one color, and another sect wears glasses of another color, and both are looking at the same object and quarreling about its color." He proceeds to describe the heads of Universalists, old-fashioned Calvinists, Congregationalists, and New School Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and Quakers, in which description he betrays sufficient ignorance of the people he is describing.\*

It is perfectly clear, from these quotations from phrenological writers, which might be multiplied indefinitely, that they regard the cerebral organs as efficient causes from which flow the moral and religious views and feelings of men, and by which their conduct is controlled. It is true, most phrenologists consider each of the organs good and useful; and, therefore, no one organ, as they believe, directly causes wickedness. But the difficulty arises, we are told, from the fact that the organs are in many heads badly balanced. It was not because the young man in the prison in Berlin had the organ of acquisitiveness large,

\* Self Culture, pp. 73-5.

that Gall and Spurzheim thought he could not avoid stealing, but because the other organs, which might have constituted a kind of balance against this, were relatively too small. The organs, then, are the causes of the propensities or sentiments; and the fact that some are too large for others, produces sin and misery. The organ of Conscientiousness, for example, is, in some heads, too small to produce any clear perception of the distinction between right and wrong, whilst the animal organs are disproportionately large. The former cannot, therefore, impose the necessary restraint upon the latter, and the individual is, of course, immoral!

We now proceed to the proof, that Phrenology is utterly inconsistent with selfevident and universally admitted principles of mental and moral science.

I. *Phrenology is involved in all the absurdities of Materialism.* In the first place, if it does not deny the existence of mind, an immaterial spirit, it makes its existence entirely doubtful. It finds all the phenomena usually ascribed to mind, in the brain. Not only the animal appetites, but the intellectual faculties and the moral sentiments, are found located there. Now, the only evidence we have of the existence of mind distinct from the body, is, that we think, reason, love, hate, hope, fear, rejoice, sorrow, &c.; and these are acts of which matter, however organized, is incapable. But Phrenology finds all these in the brain. And if all the exercises of which we are conscious, are found in the brain, we can have no evidence of the existence of a mind distinct from the brain.

We are not drawing conclusions from the principles of Phrenology which its advocates repudiate. Combe discusses the question, suggested, as he says, by Phrenology. "Is the mind simple, or is it an aggregate of separate powers?" He says, "It is extremely difficult to give a satisfactory answer to this inquiry. Looking at the facts presented to us by observation, the most obvious inference seems to be, that the mind consists of an aggregate of powers, and

that one of these supplies the feeling of personal identity, or the *I* of consciousness, to which, as their substratum, all other feelings and capacities bear reference. This view of personal identity is strongly supported by some of the phenomena of madness," &c.\* Now, the question, whether the mind is simple or an aggregate of powers, would not be difficult of solution to any one who is not a materialist, or so nearly so as to be skeptical. But in another part of his *System of Phrenology*, he expresses his convictions still more clearly. In answering the objection, that Phrenology tends to *materialism*, he says: "The question, then, is, whether the *substance* of which the thinking principle is composed be matter or spirit?" This question he pronounces "one of the most vain, trivial, and uninteresting, that ever engaged the human intellect." We beg leave, however, to differ from him on this point. We must regard it as one of the most important questions we are ever called upon to investigate, being most essentially connected with the questions, whether man is an accountable being, and whether he is immortal? The sentence pronounced on Adam was: "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return;" and if the thinking principle is matter—dust—then it too returns to dust at the hour of death. Moreover, matter operates according to fixed laws, and is incapable of voluntary action. If, therefore, the thinking principle is nothing more than organized matter, man cannot be a free moral agent, or an accountable being. But the zeal of Mr. Combe to have this question, ever considered by wise men so important, regarded as perfectly trivial, arises, we presume, from the fact that it has an important bearing upon his favorite system of philosophy.

All our knowledge on this subject, he says, must be derived from either consciousness or observation. In regard to the former, he remarks: "In short, the truly philosophical conclusion is, that, by means of consciousness we are unable to discover of what sub-

\* Phren., p. 101.

stance the thinking principle is composed ;" and "observation," he asserts, "reveals as little in regard to the substance of the mind, as does reflection or consciousness." His conclusion is, that "as no other modes of arriving at certain knowledge are open to man, the solution of the question appears to be placed completely beyond his reach." He confirms his conclusion by quoting an article in which the following language occurs: "Thought and feeling are, equally with extension and solidity, qualities of *concrete* beings, and mankind have no knowledge of any other than *concrete* beings that possess such powers. Reflection, indeed, upon consciousness, has brought thinking men to the conclusion, that their powers of thinking, feeling, and willing, are the attributes, not of their whole being indiscriminately, but of their brain exclusively; but beyond this their means of inquiry cannot carry them. It is the concrete being lodged within the skull (the *concrete* being, and not the abstraction, called mind), that feels, thinks, and wills; but what are the elements that compose that concrete? and what is the principle, or mainspring, of its activity? are questions which no man can answer." \*

It is, then, fairly acknowledged, that if Phrenology is true, we never can ascertain, in this world, whether man is merely organized matter, or whether he possesses an immaterial, spiritual mind. Phrenology has been dignified as Anthropology, or the science of man; and yet it confessedly cannot determine whether he possesses two natures, a material nature or body, and an immaterial nature or mind; or whether he is wholly material. So far as the advocates of this modern philosophy can determine, the brain is the mind, and the mind is the brain!

It is not our purpose now, to prove the absurdity of materialism, or of the skepticism of phrenologists concerning the existence of mind. We desire simply

\* Phren. pp. 456-8.

to point out the tendencies of their philosophy. We are persuaded that common sense and sound philosophy have too strong a hold upon men, in our country, to admit of the prevalence of materialism. Its doctrines belong to an age long passed. With the properties of matter we are tolerably familiar. We know that matter consists of minute particles which cohere according to fixed laws; that it is inert—incapable of reasoning and of choice. We cannot believe that reasoning, hoping, fearing, loving, hating, worshiping God, &c., are exercises that can be predicated either of particles of matter taken separately, or of any possible combination of particles. The properties of matter are essentially different from those of mind, and even the opposite of them. To give the same name to two substances, of properties so different, is to abuse language in order to perplex the mind. To represent man as mere organized matter, is to degrade him from the exalted position of a being created in the image of God, with intelligence and holiness, to a machine governed by fixed laws. What meaning can we attach to the inspired declaration, that God created man *in his own image*, if the brain is the mind? And what meaning would there be in the dying prayer of Stephen, the protomartyr—“Lord Jesus, receive *my spirit*?” But why do we argue the point? Revelation and Reason teach too clearly to admit of a doubt, that man possesses an immaterial, immortal mind. Phrenology, which either teaches the opposite, or seeks to bring into doubt this important doctrine of Revelation and of sound philosophy, is false.

II. Phrenology, by making the moral and religious feelings and sentiments of man the effects of cerebral organization, *denies his free moral agency, and makes him alike incapable of virtue or vice*. Perfection of character, Phrenologists tell us, depends upon the proper balance of the faculties. Fowler says—“Whenever in my professional examinations I find an unevenly developed head—some organs project-

ing far out, and others retiring far in—I predict an equally uneven character. Such are liable to have marked excesses and deficiencies; to take partial and one-sided views of things; and are subject to extremes, which is only another name for imperfection, excesses, and tendencies to evil. But an even head, in which all the organs are equally developed, and the faculties harmoniously exercised, facilitates correct judgment, consistent conduct, perfection of character, and a virtuous and happy life. Indeed, the very definition of virtue, according to Phrenology, is the harmonious exercise of all the faculties in due proportion, upon their legitimate objects, controlled by the moral sentiments and directed by intellect; but vice and sin consist in the **EXCESSIVE, DEFECTIVE, or PERVERTED** action of the faculties, and especially of the animal propensities, not thus directed.”\* We may conclude, therefore, that a head perfectly formed would form also a perfect character. Let the different parts of the brain bear to each other the right proportion, and holiness is the result, and *vice versa*.

There are, according to Phrenologists, two principal causes of what they call *depravity* and *sin*. The first is a badly balanced brain; the second is disease. Combe says: “Every Phrenologist knows, that the brains of the New Hollanders, Charibs, and other savage tribes, are distinguished by great deficiencies in the moral and intellectual organs;” and in consequence of this fact, he expresses the opinion, “that the native American savages, and native New Hollanders, cannot, *with their present brains*, adopt European civilization.”† The same writer expresses the clear conviction, as we have already stated, that individuals having brains resembling those of Gibson and Haggart, both of whom were remarkable for dishonesty, if placed in situations of trust where strong temptations to dishonesty were presented, would almost certainly yield to the temptation, “owing to the

\* Self Cult. p. 67. † Const. of Man, pp. 166, 167.

great size of their animal organs, and the deficiency of their organs of conscientiousness." \* Gall and Spurzheim, as the reader has been informed, found a young man in one of the prisons of Berlin, whose brain was so badly formed—his Acquisitiveness being extremely large, and his moral organs small—that they advised that he should never be set at liberty, "*as they thought it impossible he could abstain from stealing.*"

Combe says, "the fact, that this organ [Conscientiousness] is occasionally deficient in individuals in whom the organs of intellect are amply developed and the animal propensities strong, accounts for the unprincipled baseness and moral depravity exhibited by some men of unquestionable talents." †

The second cause of sin, according to Phrenology, is *disease*. Fowler has a chapter on "Cerebral disease, as causing depravity." A diseased liver, he says, cannot produce healthy bile; nor diseased eyes, correct vision. And "this law," he affirms, "pervades hearing, taste, smell, intellect, *morals*, and every other organ and function of body and mind." "All cerebral disease," says he, "violates the laws of MIND, and breaks the MORAL, as well as physical laws; and this is sinful. All normal exercise of mind is virtuous, because it fulfills the laws of mind, and therefore occasions happiness. But all abnormal action of mind violates its laws, and this occasions pain, and is of course sinful. Now, all diseased action is painful, and, by consequence, sinful; for how can pain exist unless caused by violated law, and what is such violation but sin? The fact that any thing is painful, proves, that it is sinful." He concludes, and boldly asserts, that "much of the wickedness of mankind is on a par with insanity. It is the offspring of PHYSICAL DISEASE. It is caused by the sickness of the ORGANS of the erring faculties, not by depravity of purpose." ‡

It is scarcely necessary to pause here to expose the

\* Const. of Man, pp. 179, 180. † Phren. p. 222.

‡ Self Cult., pp. 4, 43.



ridiculous absurdity of the assertion, that all physical disease is sinful—that whatever is painful, is of course sinful. The mortality of man, it is true, is one of the sad consequences of the fall; but no man ever felt that the pain of a broken limb, of an aching head, or of diseased lungs, is sinful. Such declarations show, with sufficient clearness, in what sense the word *sin* is used by phrenologists—that it is used merely in accommodation to popular usage, to express the misfortunes, not the guilt, of men. It is impossible to convince any man of common sense, that *insanity* is criminal, and deserving of punishment; and if, as Fowler asserts, much of the wickedness of mankind is on a par with insanity, it is evidently not wickedness at all, and it is an inexcusable perversion of language to call it so.

The two causes of sin, according to Phrenology, then, are a badly balanced head, and disease. If this be true, it is easy to prove, that man is not a free, but a necessary agent, incapable alike of holiness and of sin, of virtue and of vice.

It may be admitted that the *animal appetites* are connected with, and dependent upon the brain; but they are neither good nor bad in a moral sense. Under proper direction and restraint they are both useful and necessary to man; and the Creator has placed them entirely under the control of the mind. Improper indulgence can never take place but by the voluntary consent of the mind. No man is compelled to become a glutton, a drunkard, or a debauchee. It is the consent of the mind to unlawful indulgence, that constitutes the sin. It is true, the appetites may, and often do, become the occasion of sin. If the Creator had not given an appetite for food, no one would be in danger of becoming a glutton. If taste were entirely destroyed, all temptation to eat and drink intemperately would be removed; and intemperance would disappear from the world, with all its numerous train of crimes, and griefs, and woes. It is also true that disease, produced by improper indul-

gence, or by other causes, often produces a morbid state of the appetites, in consequence of which they are less easily kept within proper bounds, than in their healthy state. The drunkard has succeeded in creating an unnatural thirst for ardent spirits, which, unlike the natural and healthy appetites, is absolutely insatiable. Drinking does not slake, but aggravates it; and its importunate and dreadful cravings become a source of powerful temptation, even when the intellect is clearest in its perceptions. Still, however, so long as the intellect is not overthrown wholly, or partially, the man is perfectly free to eat and drink, or to abstain. He labors under no physical necessity of doing the one or the other. The mind has the sovereign control; and, until, in the exercise of its free agency, it deliberately chooses to become enslaved by the flesh, the man will be neither a drunkard, a glutton, nor a debauchee. And, moreover, there are always motives sufficiently powerful, if considered, to give direction to the choice. We have no difficulty in admitting, therefore, that the appetites, or propensities, are connected with the brain. The body is *for* the mind, and is placed, with all its appetites, under the mind's control. The sin connected with them, as before remarked, is to be found in the consent of the mind to unlawful indulgence.

Since the mind becomes acquainted with external objects through the medium of the brain, it may be admitted, that its *intellectual operations* depend upon the brain—that a defective or diseased brain will seriously interfere with its perceptions and reflections. But mere intellect possesses no moral character. No one is deemed worthy of praise for having a clear and strong intellect, or censurable for being idiotic or of a weak mind. The intellect, like the arm or the foot, is under the direction of the moral powers, and may be used either for good or bad purposes. It may be employed in propagating false and demoralizing principles, or in inculcating the pure doctrines of revelation; in devising and executing plans of benevolence,

or of unhallowed ambition. *Disease* in the brain may produce derangement, and thus, by interfering with the intellectual perceptions, it may indirectly affect the moral feelings. But to the extent to which the intellect is affected does responsibility cease. No one considers the maniac accountable for his opinions, or his actions. Even the drunkard, though his derangement is produced by his voluntary act, is not considered fully responsible for his misconduct.

The mind cannot see external objects, if the eye is blind; nor hear sound, if the ear is deaf. Nor can it have correct perceptions or reasonings, if the brain is defective or diseased. When laboring under inflammation of the brain, persons seem to themselves to see distinctly objects that are not present; or objects that are present, appear in a false light. But in all this there is nothing of a moral character. The drunkard, though deeply guilty for having inflamed his brain by drinking poisonous liquors, the effects of which he knew, cannot be condemned for thinking that he sees evil spirits gathering round and haunting him. There is such a thing as *monomania*—derangement in relation to a particular subject, or class of subjects; but so far as such derangement extends, it is universally admitted to destroy responsibility.

But that the *moral affections and principles* of men depend upon their peculiar cerebral organization, we utterly deny. The following arguments demonstrate the absurdity of this fundamental principle of Phrenology:

1. *It is chargeable with the absurdity of finding moral feelings and principles in MATTER.* We have seen that the organs are regarded as the efficient causes producing the propensities or dispositions manifested through them. A man is disposed to be religious, because a certain part of his brain is large; or irreligious, because it is small. He is conscientious, or regardless of right, for the same reason. He is a liar, because his organ of conscientiousness is small, and his ideality and wonder large. He is a thief, because

his acquisitiveness is large and his moral organs small. If that part of the brain called the organ of veneration were wholly wanting, in any head, the individual would have no religious feeling at all. If that part in which conscientiousness resides, were removed, he would not perceive any difference between right and wrong. Now, we know that the brain, like all other organized matter, is composed of minute particles. If, therefore, moral feeling is to be found in the brain, it must be either in the particles separately considered—each particle having a portion of it—or in the peculiar organization of the brain. It would seem that, according to Phrenology, religious feeling is found in the particles; since it is a fundamental principle of this system, that “every faculty desires gratification with a degree of energy proportionate to the size of the organ; and those faculties will be habitually indulged, the organs of which are largest in the individual.”\* The size of an organ, of course, depends upon the number of particles of which it is composed, so that one man is more religious, more benevolent, or more conscientious, than another, because a larger number of particles in the circulation of his blood have been located in a particular portion of his skull. It is truly wonderful, too, that those particles which become located in the upper part of the skull, contain feelings of veneration; whilst those located in other parts, contain feelings of an entirely different character! But it is unnecessary to argue a point so plain. If the moral and religious feelings and principles of men are to be found in their brains, it matters not whether they exist in the particles of matter separately considered, or whether they are produced by the cerebral organization of a living being; in either case they cannot be regarded as either holy or unholy, good or bad. There is really as much propriety in praising a man as virtuous, for having a large foot, as a large brain; and for having a strong

\* Combe's Phren., p. 405.

appetite for food, because the organ of alimentiveness is large; as for having strong religious feeling, because the organ of veneration is large. There is neither virtue nor vice, merit nor demerit, in any inherent property of matter, or in any appetite or feeling flowing from its living organization. So the common sense of all men has decided.

2. *It is a principle universally admitted, that men are not responsible for defects in their PHYSICAL ORGANIZATION, or for any evil effects flowing from such defects.* This universally admitted principle is doubtless founded upon the truth, doubted or denied by Phrenology, that the mind is an intelligent, free, moral agent; and that the body is nothing more than the material organization in which, for the time, it dwells, and through which it acts. "A man," says Butler, "determines that he will look at such an object through a microscope; or, being lame, supposes that he will walk to such a place with a staff, a week hence. His eyes and his feet no more determine in these cases, than the microscope and the staff. Nor is there any ground to think they any more put the determination in practice, or that his eyes are the seers, or his feet the movers, in any other sense than as the microscope and the staff are. Upon the whole, then, our organs of sense, and our limbs, are certainly instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move with. There is not any probability that they are any more, nor, consequently, that we have any other kind of relation to them, than what we may have to any other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff."\* God furnishes to each mind its material organization, which, in consequence of the introduction of sin into the world, is, in many cases, more or less defective. Now, as a man with weak eyes could not be considered responsible for seeing imperfectly with defective glasses furnished him, nor a lame man for not walk-

\* Analogy, p. 123.

ing well with a broken staff; so the mind is in no degree responsible for defective perceptions, feelings, or actions, caused by a defective physical organization.

The unhappiness of the human race has been caused chiefly, if not exclusively, by the erroneous principles they have adopted, and the immoralities they have practised. But their religious views and their moral conduct, according to Phrenology, are effects flowing from the cerebral organs, and from their healthy or diseased state. Now, all admit that an individual is not to be regarded as criminal because he is an idiot, or because he is of weak intellect. It would outrage the feelings of every one to see a man punished, or to hear him severely censured, for not possessing vigorous and comprehensive intellectual powers. Why? Simply because the strength or weakness of his intellect depends upon his physical organization, over which he has no control. His brain is too small, or it is diseased; and for this he is not responsible. And, for the same reason, no one is regarded as virtuous, because he has a large brain or a powerful intellect. But Phrenology teaches, that the moral feelings and sentiments of men depend upon the brain, just as does the intellect. How, then, can they be justly held responsible for their moral character, more than for their intellectual character? A man is weak minded, and therefore, with the best intentions, often errs in judgment, and injures himself and others. Does any one hold him criminal for such errors? Why not? Because, as the phrenologist would say, the intellectual organs in his brain are defective. A man reads the bible, and greatly errs in his interpretation of it: Why does he err? Let Mr. Fowler answer: "Few think alike, even in the fundamentals of religion, and fewer still in its details, *because of the difference in their phrenological developments.*" Sectarians, he says, quarrel about religion, because "their organs differ, and this diversifies and distracts their religious views and feelings." Every phrenological faculty, he says, constitutes the medium, or, as it were, the "co-

lored glass" through which the mind looks at objects. A man errs in judgment, because his *intellectual* organs are defective; and you say, he is not responsible for the error. He errs in religious faith, because his *moral* organs are defective; how, then, can you hold him responsible? Why is a man more responsible for the size of one part of his brain, than of another? Why is it more criminal to have a depression on the top of the skull, than in the fore part of it? And why is he more responsible for the size of his brain, or any part of it, than for the size of his arm or leg? Or, to use Mr. Fowler's illustration, would there be any justice in condemning a man, because the objects at which he looks through *green glasses* appear to him green, and in requiring him to see them through such glasses in their true colors? "Each sect," he says, "has its own peculiar set of phrenological developments, which harmonizes perfectly with the peculiarities of its creed."\* If, then, there are defects in the creed of any sect, to what are these defects to be ascribed? To the peculiar form of their brains and skulls, if we believe Mr. Fowler. Then, can they be justly held responsible for their errors? or for any evil practices legitimately flowing from them? It is equally clear that men, if Phrenology be true, are not accountable for any of their *actions*, since they, as well as their opinions, are the legitimate results of their physical organization. If a man is benevolent or selfish, truthful or false, conscientious or regardless of right, the shape of his skull will explain it all!

But we are told, that every man has not only intellectual, but moral organs; and if he will, he may cultivate those which are defective, and restrain those which are too large; and thus the former will be increased, and the latter diminished. Fowler professes to have examined this principle with great interest, and all his observations, he informs us, "have tended

\* Self Cult. pp. 73, 74.

to confirm the glorious truth, that small organs CAN be enlarged, and excessive ones diminished, even in ADULTS,"—that "man is not compelled to carry his faults, excesses, and defects to the grave."\* It is true, he says, that the tendency of the large organs is to become larger, and of the small ones to become still more diminutive; that the larger the organ the greater the pleasure taken in its exercise, and therefore the more spontaneous and continual that exercise, which naturally reincreases its size and activity; while the smaller the organ the less pleasure is taken in its action, and hence the less it is exercised, so that it becomes diminished by inaction; yet this tendency CAN BE COUNTERACTED, and the power of any required faculty increased or diminished at pleasure. He explains the philosophy of the thing thus: the exercise of every organ causes a flow of blood to that organ, in proportion to the vigor and continuance of that exercise; and therefore the vigorous and continuous exercise of any faculty, as of Benevolence, Causality, &c., causing a flow of blood to that organ, thus secures its enlargement. The same principle is contended for by Combe.

Let us admit, that a particular organ, if kept in frequent and vigorous exercise, will become larger, and if allowed to remain inactive, will become smaller; the difficulty is still not removed. For, in the first place, if the smaller organs are cultivated and enlarged, and the larger diminished, this must be done either by the organs themselves operating contrary to their natural tendency, or by the mind acting independently of the organs, in favor of the smaller, and in opposition to the larger. But it is a principle in Phrenology, that "every faculty desires gratification with a degree of energy proportionate to the size of the organ; and those faculties will be habitually indulged, the organs of which are the largest in the individual." It is, therefore, absurd to say, that

\* Self Cult. p. 85.



the organs will operate contrary to their natural tendency. Consequently, if the smaller organs are to be cultivated and enlarged, the mind must act upon those organs, stimulating them, and against the larger ones, keeping them inactive.

But here we are met with two important principles of this philosophy, viz: 1st. That the brain is the organ of the mind, and that "the mind does not act in this life independently of its organs."\* 2d. That the vigor of each faculty is in proportion to the size of its organ, and consequently the mind cannot act vigorously through small organs. Now suppose a man to have the organ of Acquisitiveness, and other animal organs very large, and the organ of Conscientiousness very small. Either his mind can cultivate and enlarge this last organ, and diminish the others, or it cannot. If it can, then it can act efficiently not only without the aid of its organs, but contrary to their natural tendency—it can act upon them, against the stronger, and in favor of the weaker, which is utterly inconsistent with Phrenology. If it cannot, then it is not true, that a man can, at pleasure, enlarge or diminish his organs. On either supposition, the fundamental principles of Phrenology are false.

Secondly: the heads of vast multitudes are so badly formed, that by no possible cultivation can they make any considerable attainments in virtue. Dr. Spurzheim, speaking of the organ of Conscientiousness, says—"My only intention is to prove that there is a fundamental power which seeks for justice, which is more or less active in different individuals, *being so weak in some as to be by no means sufficient to restrain or direct the inferior propensities.*"† If Conscientiousness be so weak in some individuals, how is it possible for them to overcome the inferior propensities? I have already mentioned the case of the young man in one of the prisons of Berlin, whose Acquisitiveness

\* Combe's Phren., p. 405. † Phren., vol. i. pp. 228-9.

was so very large, and the organs of the higher sentiments so extremely deficient, "that Drs. Gall and Spurzheim strongly recommended that he should never be set at liberty, *as they thought it impossible he could abstain from stealing.*"\* Combe mentions a man at Munster, who assured a judge before whom he appeared, "that his thievish propensity was so rooted in his constitution that he could not by any possibility resist it."† Now it is perfectly clear, that these men labored under such physical difficulty, if Phrenology is true, that they could neither cultivate the higher organs, nor restrain the lower—the latter being so much larger and more powerful. Were they justly responsible for their thefts?

The New Hollanders, Charibs, and other savage tribes, Combe assures us, "are distinguished by great deficiencies in the moral and intellectual organs;" and he expresses the opinion, that "with their present brains," the native American savages and native New Hollanders cannot adopt European civilization. He says, however, "If, by obeying the organic laws, the moral and intellectual organs of the American savages could be considerably enlarged, they would *desire* civilization, and would adopt it when offered."‡ Observe, with their *present brains* they cannot even be civilized, much less moralized and Christianized; and they must obey the organic laws to such extent, that their intellectual and moral organs will become *considerably enlarged*, before they can even *desire* civilization. And if they cannot desire it, how can they cultivate the proper organs? And since they labor under so great a physical disability, how can they be accountable?

Thirdly: those who are so unfortunate as to have badly balanced organs, certainly cannot *immediately* turn from their evil practices, and become virtuous. They must enlarge their moral organs, and diminish those of the animal appetites. Now if we admit

\* Combe's Phren., p. 171. † Ibid. ‡ Const. of Man, 166-8,

that they can accomplish this work, it must be a tedious process. The right arm of the blacksmith, we are told, becomes larger than the left; and so the organs that are most exercised, become larger thereby. But the enlargement of the blacksmith's arm to any considerable degree, is a slow process, requiring long-continued labor at the anvil. And so a small organ of the brain cannot be suddenly enlarged. The skull, we are informed, changes with the changes in the brain; and we know that this process, even if we admit the possibility of it, must be rather tedious. Since, therefore, the difficulty is physical, and can be removed only by effecting a physical change in the brain and skull, it surely would be cruel to require of a man with a badly formed head, immediate reformation. He must have time to effect the necessary physical changes. And until he has time sufficient, he cannot be chargeable with crime in consequence of his irregularities. In other words, his sins are not sins !

But, finally, the difficulty is absolutely insuperable; for, if Phrenology is true, *man has no will*; and it is in vain, therefore, to say, he can cultivate his moral and intellectual organs, and restrain the others, *if he will*. In ages past, there has been much controversy about the *freedom* of the will; but phrenologists escape all difficulty on this point, by denying that man has a will. Thirty-three or more organs have been discovered and located; but the *will* is not one of them; and, indeed, if Phrenology is true, it is impossible that there should be such a faculty. "Every faculty," says Combe, "desires gratification with a degree of energy proportionate to the size of the organ; and those faculties will be habitually indulged, the organs of which are largest in the individual."\* If every faculty desires gratification with a degree of energy proportionate to the size of the organ, then the strongest desire, or inclination in the individual,

\* Phren., p. 405.

will be that which exists in the largest organ; and who does not know, that no one ever acts contrary to his strongest desire? Indeed, if Phrenology is true, man may be said to have as many *wills*, if the word can be applied to a physical appetite or propensity, as he has organs. For every organ *desires* gratification, or *wills* to be gratified; and the largest organ produces the strongest *will*, and, therefore, if not overpowered by several weaker ones, determines the choice. Combe, speaking of a boy whom he refused to employ as a servant because he had a *thievish* head, says: "But to guide strong animal propensities to virtue, there must be a directing power. If, however, the moral and intellectual faculties be deficient, which was the case with the individual under discussion, then I certainly maintain, that strong animal feelings will *not guide themselves* to virtue. In this case the directing power must be supplied *from without*."\* The conduct of every man, according to Phrenology, is simply the result of the combined action of thirty-three or more different forces; and he must go in the direction of the strongest pressure. If the organs themselves fail to give him a right direction, the directing power must be supplied FROM WITHOUT.

Look again. Has man a will by which he can control his *hunger* or *thirst*? Certainly not. Well, if the organ of Alimentiveness be very large, according to Phrenology, the individual will necessarily have a strong appetite for food. Other organs may be strong enough to prevent the *improper indulgence* of this appetite; but they cannot prevent the *existence* of it. And if he had a *will*, he could not by his will prevent the existence of it. And so, if the organ of Acquisitiveness be very large in any brain, the *love of money* will be necessarily very strong. Other organs, or his will, if he had one, might prevent his resorting to robbing or theft to obtain it; but neither the other organs nor the will could prevent the existence, or diminish

\* Phren. p. 419.

the strength, of the desire. Now, it is a fundamental principle in morals, that sin consists not in overt acts, but in the feelings which prompt to those acts; and the scriptures teach us, not only that all kinds of dishonesty are sinful, but that "*the love of money is the root of all evil.*" Now, how is it possible for a man with the organ of Acquisitiveness very large, to avoid loving money? Would it not be just as impossible as for one who had Alimentiveness very large, to avoid loving food? Are not both classes of feelings mere appetites, equally without moral character, and equally beyond the control of the will, even if a will existed?

Indeed, Phrenology degrades all the noble affections of the human mind to mere animal appetites. A man has a strong appetite for food, because a certain part of his brain is large; and another man has strong feelings of conscientiousness, because another part of his brain is large. Now, is not the latter as truly a mere *appetite* as the former, and equally devoid of moral character? Both are equally the results of physical organization.

I have said that Phrenology finds in man no such thing as a will. It is a fundamental principle of this system, that the mind cannot, in this world, act independently of the cerebral organs; and Combe maintains, that "*every act of the will*" is performed by means of them.\* But where is the organ of will or choice? None such has been discovered. Mr. Fowler, however, maintains that man has a WILL, and in his *Selfculture* he has something amusing, if not instructive, on this subject. Speaking of the organ of *Selfesteem*, he says: "Man is a VOLUNTARY being, endowed with the selfdetermining power which enables him to choose or refuse the evil or the good. This iron WILL, which takes the reins into its own hands, and does according to its own pleasure, is the product in part of this faculty, aided by Secretiveness, Firm-

\* Phren., p. 30.

ness, and some other faculties."\* The organ of Self-esteem, as we learn from Combe, "inspires with the sentiment of selfesteem or selflove." When too small, a predisposition to humility is the result. With deficiency of the moral powers, "it produces arrogance, superciliousness of deportment, and selfishness."† Secretiveness, as the same author says, "is an instinctive tendency to conceal, and the legitimate object of it is to restrain the outward expression of our thoughts and emotions, till the understanding shall have pronounced judgment on its propriety."‡ Firmness, we are told, has no relation to external objects; but "its influence terminates on the mind itself, and adds only a quality to the manifestations of the other powers." For example, an individual having the organs of Firmness and Tune large, will persevere in making music; and one having large Firmness and Acquisitiveness, will steadily pursue his plans for acquiring property.§ Now, really it seems to me, that great ingenuity would be required to manufacture a *will* out of these organs. Selfesteem induces a man to think highly of himself, and, of course, produces a desire for whatever will promote his own interests. But an individual is urged to give something to the poor, and he says, "*I will not.*" How does Selfesteem produce this act of the will? Or how does Secretiveness, which induces one to conceal his thoughts, contribute to the choice under consideration? Or what hand has firmness in producing it? If he were urged to do something degrading to himself, Selfesteem might lead him to refuse. If urged to the expression of his thoughts, Secretiveness might induce him to decline. If urged to abandon a pursuit, upon which by the prompting of one or more large organs, he had entered, Firmness might induce him to persevere. But how any one, or all of these organs, could induce him, when urged to give to the poor, to say,

\* Phren., p. 225. † Ibid. pp. 182, 183. ‡ Ibid. p. 159.

§ Ibid., pp. 215, 216.

"I will not," it is difficult to conjecture. But Mr. F. would escape all difficulty by saying, the will is the result of these organs "*and some other faculties.*" This is sufficiently indefinite. He might as well have said, it is the result of the operation of all the organs! We cannot consent to have a matter of so great importance disposed of in this summary way.

But look at the absurdity of Phrenology. The *will*, Mr. Fowler says, is the selfdetermining power, which "takes the reins into its own hands, and does according to its own pleasure." It is the power of self-control, and is to govern *all* the faculties; and yet it is *the product of several of those faculties!* The will is to govern Selfesteem, which, when not under proper restraint, produces egotism and disgusting pride. But the will, we are told, is the *product* of this faculty, aided by others. It is to govern all those organs or faculties of which it is the joint *product*. That is, the *effect* is to control the *cause!* This is, indeed, putting the cart before the horse! And to make his doctrines as inconsistent as possible, Mr. Fowler exhorts those in whom the faculty of Selfesteem is weak, *to choose and act for themselves.\** That is, if the *cause* be weak, the proper remedy is to make the *effect* strong! He exhorts us to *cultivate* every one of the *thirty-three* faculties; and, of course, he desires that we shall determine or will to cultivate them all. Then the *will* should be independent of those faculties, so that it can act upon them; but so far from this, it is a mere effect or *product* of some of them! It is nothing more than an effect produced by several *physical* causes. To talk of its freedom, therefore, is perfectly absurd.

But it is clear, that if Phrenology be true, man has no *will*; and, therefore, it is absurd to say that he can, if he will, cultivate the smaller organs, and restrain the larger ones. He is under a *physical necessity* to act in accordance with the promptings of his cere-

\* Self Cult. p. 223.

bral organization, and is incapable of either virtue or vice.

Mr. Fowler is quite indignant at the charge, that Phrenology destroys the free agency of man. "If the science I idolize," says he, "really taught this abominable doctrine of fatality, Calvinist by education though I am, I would repudiate and condemn it. \* \* \* I would RIVER, not unloose, the chains of moral obligation. And Phrenology does this in the most effectual manner possible. It demonstrates the existence and function of Conscientiousness, as above analyzed, and thus renders human accountability CERTAIN, from SCIENTIFIC data. It leaves no cloud to obscure this point. Its proof is ABSOLUTE. It is this: The existence of feet renders man a walking being, and proves him to be such; of ears, a hearing; of eyes, a seeing; of nerves, a sentient; and of brain, a mental being; and so of all his other physical organs and functions. Phrenology admitted, what higher proof that man is a friendly being than his possession of Adhesiveness; a talking being, than his endowment with Language; a reasoning being, than his being constituted with reasoning powers? Can any ordinary amount of proof—can even mathematical demonstration—render any thing even more absolutely CERTAIN? Then does not the fact of the existence of Conscientiousness in him, as forming a part and parcel of his PRIMITIVE CONSTITUTION, both prove and render him a moral, accountable being, and, therefore, not merely a fit, but a NECESSARY subject of rewards and punishments?" \*

This is a fair specimen of the abuse of analogical reasoning, in which Phrenologists abound more than any class of writers with whom we are acquainted. Look at it. The possession of feet, ears, eyes, and nerves, proves man a walking, hearing, seeing, sentient being; and so the existence of the organ of Conscientiousness proves him an accountable being.

\* Self Culture, p. 241.



Now in the feet, ears, and eyes, we can see an adaptation to walking, hearing, and seeing; but did any man in his senses ever appeal to the existence of *nerves* in the human system, to prove man a sentient being? Combe says truly, that "we cannot, by merely dissecting any organ of the body whatever, discover its functions;" that "anatomists for many centuries dissected the nerves of motion and feeling, and saw nothing in their structure that indicated the difference of their functions." \* That man has *feelings*, is proved by his consciousness—the best of all evidence; and the investigations of science have referred those feelings to the nerves of feeling. Would any one attempt to prove man "a mental being" by the fact that he has *brains*? Combe says, the most minute examination of the brain does not enable the understanding "to penetrate the purposes of its parts." † That man possesses a mind, is an intellectual being, is proved by the fact that he thinks, reasons, hopes, fears, loves, hates; and scientific investigations lead to the conclusion, that the mind is mysteriously connected with the brain. Who would not laugh at the individual who would gravely argue that man is a friendly being, by showing that part of the brain situated at the middle of the posterior edge of the parietal bone? We look at the part of the brain to which we are referred; but what do we see that indicates the existence of friendly feelings in man? Absolutely nothing. That such feelings do exist, is matter of consciousness, and is further proved by the conduct of men. Phrenologists have located those feelings in a particular part of the brain. But even if Phrenology is a true science, it is ridiculous to refer to any part of the brain in proof of the existence of any particular class of feelings. That men had friendly feelings toward each other, was as certain before Phrenology was born, as it is now. So it is ridiculous to attempt to prove man a moral, ac-

\* Phren., p. 56.

† Ibid.

countable being, by referring to a particular part of the brain, called Conscientiousness. If men had not been conscious of the feeling of conscientiousness, no Phrenologist would ever have thought of the *organ* of Conscientiousness; and if we did not know that such a feeling exists, we should never place any confidence in the location of the organ. When, therefore, Mr. Fowler asserts, that the existence of this organ demonstrates that man is an accountable being, he talks most absurdly—as absurdly as the man who would attempt to prove that man can see by pointing to the optic nerves!

Phrenologists are not firmer believers in human accountability, than those who reject the science, as they would be, if their science afforded stronger evidence of the doctrine. The fact that they have located the moral sense in a certain part of the brain, is indeed slender evidence that man is a free moral agent, and an accountable being.

III. One of the most conclusive arguments against Phrenology, is, that it flatly contradicts the testimony of *human consciousness*. When we are conscious of feeling pain or pleasure, we need no further proof—the case admits of none. The parent who is conscious of loving his children, never doubts his parental affection. In a word, the testimony of consciousness is, in every case, conclusive. This will not be denied. Now let us apply this selfevident truth to the principles of Phrenology.

Our consciousness compels us to believe, that our animal appetites, our intellectual powers, and our moral feelings and conduct, cannot be referred to the same or similar causes; while Phrenology teaches that they are alike to be referred to cerebral organization. A man, according to this system, delights in eating and drinking, because a certain part of his brain is large; is an idiot or weak-minded, because another part is small; and is conscientious or not, in proportion to the size of still another part. Now it is absolutely impossible to make any man feel that

he is criminal for having a strong appetite for food or drink. One may feel guilty for having improperly indulged his appetite; but no sophistry can awaken in his mind a feeling of ill desert for simply having strong appetites. It is equally impossible that any one should feel a sense of guilt for having a weak intellect—for being inferior in intellectual strength to others. It would be as easy to convince him that he deserves punishment for having weak eyes, or for failing to grow to the stature of six feet. But every one who knows that he has violated any moral obligation, is conscious of ill desert. His own conscience pronounces sentence against him, severe in proportion to his perception of the heinousness of his crime. So strong is this feeling of guilt, in multitudes of instances, that the transgressor has no rest, day or night, and can with the greatest difficulty avoid exhibiting in his countenance and actions his feeling of criminality; so that it has long since become a proverb—“*A guilty conscience needs no accuser.*” There was nothing peculiar in the feeling or the conduct of Judas who brought his ill-gotten gain and threw it down at the feet of the Jewish priests, and went and hanged himself. But the principle for which I am contending is too plain and evident to require or admit proof. The evidence is found in the bosom of every one.

Now why this difference between the feelings with which men view the possession of strong animal appetites, and of weak intellects, and the feelings with which they regard moral delinquency? Simply because the strength of the appetites and of the intellect depends on causes over which they have no direct control; while in their moral exercises there is a *conscious voluntariness* which lays the foundation for just accountability. It is in vain, to tell men that the latter, equally with the former, depend upon their physical organization. They know it is not so, as certainly as they know that they exist.

The same truth is manifest from the light in which

we are obliged to view the conduct of others. Your child enjoys vigorous health, and has a strong appetite and an exquisite relish for food. Do you either condemn or commend him for it? One of your children has a weak intellect, and another extraordinary talents. Do you condemn the former, and commend the latter, for this difference? One of your children is truthful, conscientious, honest; the other is deceitful, regardless of his moral obligations, thievish. Do you — can you view the difference between these last two characters, as you do that between the former? Why not? Evidently because the strength of the intellect depends on causes over which men have no control, while in their moral feelings and conduct they are free agents, and therefore accountable. Again: One of your children is deranged, and he sets your house on fire. Another is angry and vindictive, and he does the same thing. Can you regard them as equally criminal? Why not? The answer to this question disproves the fundamental principles of Phrenology. The consciousness of every man will compel him to disbelieve that fundamental principle of this philosophy, which makes the animal appetites, the intellect, and the moral character, alike dependent upon the physical organization. The proof, therefore, is conclusive.

You may say, with Combe, that the Creator designed that the moral sentiments should rule; but the difficulty is not thus removed, so long as it remains true, that in the heads of multitudes, according to Phrenology, the moral organs are so defective that they cannot rule. Nor will the answer avail, so long as the effects of physical causes, such as cerebral organs, cannot partake of a moral character.

But the Phrenologist will reply — that all the human faculties are in themselves good, — that only the *perversion* of them is sinful, — that as men are not criminal for having strong or weak appetites, but only for the improper indulgence of them; so it is only for the perversion of their moral faculties that

they deserve condemnation. The answer will not avail; for the law of God and the common sense of all men, do hold men responsible for the *kind*, as well as the *degree*, of their moral feelings. Every individual is under positive obligation to be conscientious, —entirely conscientious in all his conduct. Defective conscientiousness, or veneration, or benevolence, is sin. Is this true of defective intellect or defective appetite? It is impossible to avoid the conclusion, that the character of the appetites and of the intellect depends upon causes wholly different from those which affect the moral feelings and conduct of men. The radical principles of Phrenology are, therefore, false.

IV. The principles of Phrenology, even if we admit them to be consistent with the existence of virtue and vice, are wholly inconsistent with a *uniform standard of morals*. Combe has a chapter "on the cerebral development of nations." Amongst the Charibs, he informs us, the organs of the animal propensities generally preponderate over those of the intellectual faculties; and the organs of the moral sentiments, compared with those of Europeans, are deficient in size. In the regions of Combativeness and Destructiveness their brain is "prodigiously developed." Consequently they are fierce and cruel. The New Holland skull, he says, indicates a lamentable deficiency in the regions of the moral and intellectual organs, whilst those of the animal propensities are largely developed. The New Zealander has a better head than the New Hollander; but the great predominance of size is in the region of the propensities. The anterior lobe of the brain, containing the intellectual organs, though larger than in the New Hollander, is smaller than in the European. "The character," says Combe, "which this head indicates, is one moderately intellectual, of considerable energy, cruel, cunning, cautious, vain, and decidedly deficient in Benevolence, Veneration, and Conscientiousness." The North American Indian, the same writer informs us,

has a head different in some respects from either of those already mentioned, but so defective as to render it quite improbable, if not impossible, that they can ever be civilized. He quotes, with approbation, the following language of Dr. Caldwell: "This analysis [of the Indian's head], brief and imperfect as it is, unfolds to us much of the philosophy of the Indian character, and enables us, in a particular manner, to understand the cause of the peculiar inaptitude of that race of men for civil life. For, when the wolf, the buffalo, and the panther, shall have been completely domesticated, like the dog, the cow, and the household cat, then, and not before, may we expect to see the *full-blooded* Indian civilized like the white man."

The French, we are told, have the organ of Veneration very imperfectly developed; and this peculiarity in their organization is made to account for the prevalence of infidelity in France. "I have said," remarks the writer, just quoted, "that the sentiment of Veneration, that is to say, the faculty which disposes us to respect men and things, is little developed in the French. It is to this deficiency of development that the want of religion, nearly general in France, falls to be attributed."

It is no part of our design to disprove the facts here stated concerning the heads of different nations. But supposing them true, and supposing the shape of the head to determine the moral character, would there be any justice in establishing for all of them the same standard of morals? Every one sees, that to establish a uniform standard of *intellectual powers*, and require all to come up to it, would be most unjust and tyrannical. By proper cultivation a weak intellect may be improved, and a strong intellect may be made yet stronger; but by no possible cultivation can the man of weak intellect make the attainments which may be made by the man of talent. But why would it be unjust to require all men to attain to the same intellectual standard? Simply because the

vigor of the intellect depends upon causes beyond the control of men. Phrenologists would say, it depends on the size and quality of the intellectual organs of the brain. But, according to their philosophy, the strength of the moral sentiments depends equally upon the size and quality of the moral organs. Why, then, would it not be equally tyrannical to establish a common standard of morals? Will any phrenologist pretend that the Charibs, New Hollanders, and American savages, if the gospel were preached to them, could be justly required to become as conscientious, as moral, as religious, as the Europeans, in whose brains the intellectual and moral organs are so much more largely developed? Suppose we admit that the moral and intellectual organs of the former might be very much improved, phrenologists will not pretend that the present generation could, by possibility, be brought to the standard to which the latter might easily attain. The following language of Combe shows how extremely defective he considers the moral organs of the New Hollanders: "Suppose an individual with a brain like that of a New Hollander, to turn philosopher; he would never, by reflecting on his own consciousness, find an instinctive sentiment of justice, and, therefore, he would exclude it from his system. On the other hand, another philosopher, constituted like Dr. Spurzheim, would feel it strongly, and give it a prominent place."\* Now, could there be any justice in erecting a common standard of morals for two such men? Could the former possibly be as moral as the latter? Joseph A. Warne, in an appendix to Combe's Constitution of Man, asserts, "that no means are yet known in nature, by which a brain of the inferior combination may be made to manifest the moral and intellectual faculties with the same success as a brain of the superior combination."† How, then, can it be just to require one with "the inferior combination"

\* Phren., pp. 55, 56. † Ibid., p. 324.

to be as moral and as religious, as one with "the superior combination?"

But do the scriptures and the common sense of men establish a uniform standard of morals for all men? They do. There is but one moral law, which is obligatory upon all men capable of understanding their relations, and to whom that law is made known. The idiotic and the insane, it is **true**, **are not at all accountable**, because they cannot comprehend the relations they sustain, and the corresponding obligations. For a similar reason, infants are not regarded as accountable. The common sense of men has decided, that accountability ceases just so far as the intellect is defective; for moral feelings cannot be called into exercise, except as the mind perceives moral truth; and a defective intellect, like an imperfectly formed or diseased eye, cannot see clearly.

And even where the intellect is perfect, there may be an almost entire ignorance of the moral law, except so far as it is written on the heart. The degree of accountability, therefore, depends not only on the soundness of the intellect, but also upon the means of instruction enjoyed. In order to see distinctly, the eye must be sound, and it must have light. Therefore, the Apostle Paul teaches, that "as many as have sinned without law, shall perish without law; and as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law." \* That is, no one is held accountable for more light than has been given him. They who sin without a knowledge of revelation, will be held responsible only for transgressing the law of nature; whilst they who sin under the light of revelation, shall be judged by that revelation.

But the different degrees of intellect and of information are the only circumstances materially modifying the accountability of men. Whenever men are made acquainted with the claims of the moral law, they are, without exception, bound to obey its just

\* Romans ii, 12.



and holy precepts. No exception is made in favor of badly formed heads, unless the malformation is such as to weaken or destroy the intellect. The moral law requires all men to worship and serve the true God, and him only, and all children to honor their parents, whether they have that part of the brain called Veneration strongly developed or not. It forbids all men to steal, whether what phrenologists call the organ of Acquisitiveness be large or small. The young man in the Berlin prison, who, according to Gall and Spurzheim, could not possibly abstain from stealing, in consequence of the overgrown size of that organ, was still required by the moral law to be an honest man—as honest as Spurzheim himself. All men are forbidden to kill, without regard to the size of the organ of Destructiveness. The New Hollanders and Charibs, who, as Combe says, with their present brains cannot be even civilized, are nevertheless required to repent and become Christians; for God “now calleth on all men everywhere to repent;” and he proclaims to all nations, “he that believeth not, shall be damned.”

Now if it be true, that the physical organization of the brain and the shape of the skull do materially modify human accountability, how happens it, that in the scriptures where this subject is so variously and fully presented, there is no reference to any thing of the kind? And how happens it, that men whose common sense has induced them to release their fellow-men from accountability to the civil and social laws, so far as their intellects are defective, have never made an exception in favor of those whose morals are corrupt?

The truth is, the scriptures and sound philosophy harmonize in teaching, that man possesses a mind which is immaterial and distinct from the body; that intelligence, and moral principles and affections belong exclusively to mind, and not to the body; that man is, therefore, a free moral agent, justly held accountable for all his moral conduct; that accounta-

bility is impaired or destroyed only as by physical causes the intellectual perceptions are injured; and that the mind, when separated from the body by death, will carry with it into eternity its moral character. On this point we shall have something to say in another chapter.

It is a happy thing for men, that there are some great truths so inwrought in their very nature, and to which their consciousness bears testimony so unequivocal, that however absurd the philosophical theories they adopt, they cannot expel them from their minds. While Hume and Berkeley, as philosophers, doubted the existence of an external world, their own conduct gave the lie to their philosophy; and they who could not have answered their sophistry, still had evidence conclusive that it was mere sophistry. The miserable Atheist finds it quite as difficult to satisfy himself that there is no God, as to convince others. The fundamental truths in mental and moral science are so completely selfevident, and so strongly commend themselves to every man's conscience, that they require but to be distinctly presented, in order to be acknowledged. And Phrenology requires to be exposed, only because its true principles are not well understood, and its inconsistency with those truths is not perceived; and because sinful men are ready to lay hold of any and every plausible excuse for their crimes or their impiety. There is not, therefore, so much a necessity for a refutation of its principles, as for a distinct statement of them, and exposure of the fallacies under which their odious features are masked.

The exposé we have made of the unphilosophical character of the fundamental principles of this modern philosophy, we cheerfully leave to the judgment of the candid and impartial.

## CHAPTER V.

## TENDENCY OF PHRENOLOGY TO IMMORALITY, AND TO THE DESTRUCTION OF SOCIAL AND CIVIL ORDER.

If Phrenology were only a speculative system of philosophy, having no important moral bearings, we might safely leave it to the fate of other systems equally false, which have had their day and passed away. But such is not its character. It treats not only of man's intellectual powers, but of the fundamental principles of morality. And if the views presented in the preceding chapter are at all correct, it requires no great penetration to perceive, that it sweeps away the very foundations of virtue, and tends most decidedly and strongly to immorality, and to the destruction of social and civil order. And if its tendency, as set forth by its own advocates, be such, we shall, from a view of them, be the more fully convinced of its utter unsoundness. For, that the truth on moral subjects tends to produce virtue, in every mind where it finds a lodgment, is too obvious to require proof. We may, therefore, safely apply to all systems of philosophy, and of religious faith, the test applied by our Saviour by which to judge of religious teachers—"Ye shall know them by their fruits."

I. *Phrenology leads to immorality, by silencing the voice of conscience.* The wisdom of the Creator is remarkably manifested in the nature of the human mind. It possesses not only an intellect and affections, but a conscience—a moral sense, by which it is able to perceive a moral quality in affections and actions. The conscience may be perverted by erroneous doctrines, or stupefied by long indulgence in

sin; but it cannot be destroyed. However it may be, for a time, silenced, it will ultimately make its voice heard. The pleasures of an approving conscience are among the strongest encouragements to virtue; and the dread of the lashings of a guilty conscience, of remorse and fear, are among the most powerful motives to deter from the commission of crime. None adequately know the terrors of a guilty conscience, aroused from temporary lethargy after the commission of crime, but they who have experienced them. All, however, know enough to dread them.

But Phrenology comes to take away this powerful motive to virtue, this effective restraint of evil, and to throw loose upon the neck the reins of human passion. This it does most effectually, by inducing men to regard their transgressions as nothing more than *misfortunes*, not as *crimes* for which they are deserving of punishment. The crimes of men, according to Phrenology, are caused, as we have seen, by *badly formed heads* and by *disease*. Now, suppose Gall and Spurzheim had informed the young man in the Berlin prison, whose case we have before mentioned, that such was his physical organization, that he could not possibly abstain from stealing; what would have been the effect of this information? Falling back upon the universally admitted principle, that men are not justly accountable for the defects of their physical organization, especially when they are incurable, he would no longer have been under the restraining influence of conscience, but would have become a thief *without a sense of guilt*. Combe, in his *Constitution of Man*, describes the heads of two men, who were remarkably dishonest, and states it as his clear conviction, that all persons with similarly formed heads, if placed under strong temptation, will act dishonestly. Preach this doctrine to persons having such heads, and what will be the effect? Their physical organization makes them thieves; and for their peculiar organization they are not responsible. It is their misfortune, not their crime, to have thievish heads; and

they cannot, and will not, severely condemn themselves. Being convinced, that if they are at all to blame, the criminality is very slight, the restraints of conscience will be entirely, or nearly, removed; and if their *brains* do not make them dishonest, their *philosophy* will. Go and tell the man with a head resembling that of the New Hollander, that he is degraded by the very shape of his brain and his skull, and that, until that can be materially improved, he can rise but little higher in the scale of intelligence and virtue, and what will be the effect upon his moral conduct? We mean no offense to phrenologists when we say, that the father of lies himself could not devise a better excuse for crime—one which would more effectually put the conscience to sleep—than to trace it to the physical organization, as its cause. It is worse than vain to attempt to convince men that they are responsible for the shape of their heads, or that they are under obligation to effect important changes in their brains.

Induce men to believe, that “much of the wickedness of mankind is on a par with insanity;” that “it is the offspring of physical disease;” that “it is caused by the sickness of the erring faculties, not by depravity of purpose;” and it is impossible that they can feel a sense of guilt, when they transgress. Your friend is suffering from inflammation of the brain, and is consequently deranged. Do you hold him responsible for what he says or does? And when he shall have been restored to health, can you convince him that he was criminal in his words and actions? If men can be induced to believe that much of their wickedness is on a par with insanity, their consciences will acquit them for the past, and cease to restrain them for the future. Let the doctrine prevail, that “those whose propensities clamor for unlawful gratification, may find the cause in cerebral or nervous inflammation,” and all who commit crime to gratify those propensities, will be regarded, not as criminals, but as partially or wholly insane. They were *unfortunately* diseased, and therefore they trans-

gressed. They are, consequently, to be pitied, not condemned. Mr. Fowler has furnished all such people with a triumphant answer to all reproofs of *conscience*, and to all the censures of men. He writes in the following strain: "Can a diseased heart execute a healthy function, or a healthy heart disease of function? Does not stomachic disease necessarily disorder the digestive process—and its inflammation or debility inflame or debilitate its product? Can a diseased liver possibly produce healthy bile, or a healthy liver disordered bile? Or diseased eyes correct vision? Or inflamed nerves normal or pleasurable sensations? This law pervades hearing, taste, smell, intellect, MORALS, and every other organ and function of body and mind. All sickness consists simply, solely, in functional derangement caused by organic disease, and all remedial efforts presuppose that organic restoration secures functional health. As a corrupt stream cannot send forth clear water, so a diseased brain must produce an abnormal, painful, depraved function. This is the NECESSARY consequence of that fixed relation which exists between all organs and their functions."\* Phrenology places moral feelings and actions upon a perfect equality with the action of the liver in secreting bile, of the eye in vision, or the ear in hearing; and the inference is unavoidable, that men are just as criminal for having diseased livers, eyes, or ears, as for having bad morals; and no more worthy of praise for preserving pure morals, than for enjoying firm bodily health. Convince them, then, of the truth of Phrenology, and you at once release them from the restraining and controlling power of conscience, and leave them at liberty to go the full length to which their unbridled appetites and passions impel them. A public sentiment formed by better principles, and habits formed under better instructions, may for a time restrain; but the tendency is evident, and the result certain.

\* Self Cult., pp. 41, 42.

II. *Phrenology, in silencing the voice of conscience, removes also from the mind the fear of the future punishment of sin, as well as the hope of virtue's reward.* It is impossible for us to know to how great extent men are restrained from vice, both secret and open, by the conviction that the sin which their own consciences condemn, is infinitely hateful to God, and that he will certainly inflict upon the impenitent transgressor the severe, but just penalty of his law. But we do know that there is, in every mind, an intense desire for happiness, both here and hereafter, and an equally intense dread of misery. Every one, therefore, who has even partially correct views of sin, and feels convinced that God hates and will punish it, cannot but be powerfully restrained from vice and impelled to virtue by this conviction; just as every one who desires life, and knows that poison will destroy it, will be deterred from eating or drinking it. And in this wicked world, he who loves and will practice the pure principles of virtue, is often exposed to reproach and persecution for righteousness' sake. Many a time have the servants of God felt, as did Paul, the Apostle of the Gentiles, when he said: "If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." But, like him, they have been sustained by the assurance that affliction, patiently borne in the practice of virtue, will work for them "a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." Primitive Christians endured joyfully the spoiling of their goods, knowing that they had "in heaven a better and an enduring substance." And even when the practice of virtue exposes to no persecution or reproach, yet such are the evil influences with which men are surrounded, that they need the powerful motives of the gospel to restrain them from the evil, and encourage them to pursue the good. The motives which appeal to the hopes and the fears of men cannot be dispensed with without the most disastrous results.

But Phrenology teaches that what has been called

sin, is the result of physical organization and of disease. It forces men to the conclusion, consequently, that they are not free moral agents, but that they act as impelled by physical necessity. They cannot, therefore, believe that they deserve severe punishment, or that they are justly accountable for their conduct. If, then, they believe that God is just, they of course do not believe that he will inflict upon them undeserved punishment. Nor can they believe that for the *physical virtue*, proceeding from a well-formed head and healthy organs, they will receive any considerable reward.

“With nought in charge, man could betray no trust,  
And if he fall, would fall because he must;  
If Love reward him, or if Vengeance strike,  
His recompense in both unjust alike.”

The consequence is, that the powerful moral influence of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, ceases to be felt; and men with all their depraved affections are left to seek for themselves the highest gratification they can obtain in this world. This tendency of Phrenology is doubtless one principal reason why it receives so general favor among modern Universalists, who wholly deny the doctrine of future rewards and punishments.

The restraining influence of conscience, the fear of the punishment which God has threatened against the transgressor, and the desire of future happiness, exert a more potent influence in preserving morality in the world, than all civil codes. Without these influences civil government can exist only in the form of despotism, where absolute power crushes all before it. Without them society cannot exist. Every man would be an Ishmael, whose hand would be against every other. That system of philosophy which strikes down these pillars in the temple of moral truth, must ultimately become an unmitigated curse.

III. *Phrenology tends directly to destroy the restraining influence of a virtuous public sentiment, and thus leads to*



*immorality.* Every individual strongly desires the approbation and respect of the people among whom he lives. This desire is, indeed, one of the strongest principles of our nature. It is manifested in the extreme reluctance with which multitudes do even that which they know to be duty, if there be a strong current of public sentiment against it; and in the surprising facility with which they follow the multitude to do evil. Charge upon a man a crime, which in the opinion of those with whom he associates is peculiarly odious, and what pains he will take to disprove the charge, and to regain their confidence. So far, therefore, as a correct public sentiment exists in any community, open vice is restrained; and multitudes of the young are prevented from falling under its corrupting influence.

But, according to the principles of Phrenology, vice is the effect of physical organization and of disease. We pity, but cannot condemn, the man whose vision is imperfect, or whose brain is so badly formed, or so much diseased, as to cause insanity. And, for the same reasons, we may pity but cannot condemn the man whose badly balanced or diseased brain has made him a thief or a debauchee. Let Phrenology gain credit, and the vile transgressor needs no more shrink from the searching gaze, or cower under the frown, of a virtuous public. Let him come forth in open day, and he shall excite their sympathy, even as the blind beggar by the way side, or the unfortunate idiot. The worst he has to fear is, that in their excessive sympathy the good people may conduct him to a comfortable asylum, and place him under the care of a phrenological doctor! It requires not the spirit of prophesy to predict the certain effects of such a public sentiment upon the morals of individuals.

IV. The demoralizing and mischievous tendency of Phrenology is further seen in the fact, that it casts suspicion upon those who are so unfortunate as to have what the admirers of the system consider ill

shaped heads, and would thus exclude them from proper employment. and from public confidence. It is a fundamental principle of Phrenology, that "a brain in which the animal organs greatly preponderate over the moral and intellectual organs, has a native and instinctive tendency to immoral conduct, and *vice versa*." \* To what particular kind of immorality an individual with such a head would be inclined, would depend upon the peculiar form of his brain. If his Acquisitiveness were very large, and his Conscientiousness and the other moral organs small, he would be a thief. Such was the brain of the young man in the Berlin prison, whom I have repeatedly mentioned. When the organ of Conscientiousness is deficient and Secretiveness large, and especially when the latter is aided by Ideality and Wonder, a natural tendency to lying is produced. † If Conscientiousness be deficient, and Cautiousness and Secretiveness large, the individual will almost certainly be dishonest, if put in a place where the temptation is strong. ‡

Now, let Phrenology prevail, and if a servant desire employment, he must first undergo a phrenological examination; and, however excellent the recommendations he brings from those acquainted with him, if his head is not well formed, he is rejected. Combe states, that he refused to hire a boy as a servant, because he found his head to belong to the inferior class, although he was introduced by a woman whose good conduct and discrimination he had long known, and who gave him an excellent character. On another occasion he hired a female servant, although a former mistress gave her a very indifferent character, because her head belonged to the superior class. § He gives several directions to those desiring to employ servants concerning the particular organs which must be largely developed. Of course, should Phrenology prevail, all those servants who are so unfortunate as

\* Combe's Const. of Man, p. 324. † Combe's Phren. p. 223.

‡ Const. of Man, p. 179. § Phren., pp. 415, 416.

to have *immoral heads*, must be thrown out of employment. Clerks, too, and all classes of persons seeking employment, must share the same fate. A good character and high recommendations are worthless. The shape of the skull proclaims at once their business talents and their moral character. Enumerating the immense advantages to be derived from "this science of sciences," Mr. Fowler says: "Such examination [of the head] will also teach those who have occasion to employ domestics, apprentices, and the like, who will best suit their respective purposes." And he adds, by way of confirmation, "Take the following advertisement, copied from the New York Sun, as an example:

'AN APPRENTICE WANTED.—A stout boy, not over fifteen years of age, of German or Scotch parents, to learn a good but difficult trade. N. B.—It will be necessary to bring a recommendation as to his abilities from Messrs. Fowler & Wells, Phrenologists, 131 Nassau street, New York.'

"The same firm," says Mr. Fowler, "had already chosen several apprentices in the same way, and found them such excellent workmen, and withal so trusty, that they will not now make choice of any apprentices unless they possess the right DEVELOPMENTS—large intellectual, constructive, and moral organs." He tells also of another firm in New York, which pays out half a million of dollars in France yearly, who would not make choice of a purchasing agent till his head had been submitted to the test of phrenological science. He adds: "Similar instances are common; and the advantages of ascertaining the true character, beyond the possibility of mistake, in these and kindred cases, are incalculable."\* Suppose all men of business, and all housekeepers, to adopt this method of finding apprentices, agents, and servants, what multitudes must be thrown out of employment. Nor is this the worst. Many of them are

\* Self Cult., pp. 115, 116.

rejected because they are believed to be *immoral*. The evidence of the truth of this charge, is the fact that certain parts of their skulls are rather more prominent, and others rather more depressed, than the phrenological examiner thinks they should be ! They leave the office of this knowing gentleman under dark suspicions, with a mark upon them ; and their prospects are about as gloomy as if they had just been let out of the penitentiary with their heads shaved. No matter how upright their conduct heretofore, it is suspected that, should strong temptation present itself, their large organs would still prevail over the smaller, and they would commit crime. The only hope for them is, that by a mighty effort, long-continued, they will be able so to stimulate the defective organs, that they will become enlarged, and will effect a corresponding change in the shape of the skull !

And why should the application of this wonderful science stop with servants, apprentices, and agents ? Who would be willing to trust a dishonest man in pecuniary transactions ? Does a gentleman propose to make a purchase of goods of one of those houses in New York, mentioned by Mr. Fowler ? Why should they not, before trading, send him to the office of "Fowler and Wells, Phrenologists, 131 Nassau street, New York," to ascertain, first, whether he has business talents ; and, secondly, whether he is truthful and honest ? Or if he should chance to take off his hat—especially if he is unfortunate enough to have a bald head—they might themselves judge whether the moral organs are largely developed ! Phrenology will be even of further service. A young gentleman becomes attached to a young lady ; but before venturing too far, he would be glad to know whether her organs and his would go well together, and especially what is the relative size of her Combative-ness, Destructive-ness, and Conscientiousness. A scientific Phrenologist must be applied to ; and the important question, whether she shall have an offer of marriage, depends

upon his decision. And why should not she, or her more prudent father, wish to know the particular developments of her admirer? His head, too, must undergo an examination. Perhaps her moral organs are not quite right, or his are defective; and it becomes understood that such a defect prevented the marriage! Phrenologists do gravely propose to regulate affairs matrimonial by this wonderful science. "Until Phrenology was discovered," says Combe, "no natural index to mental qualities, that could be practically relied on, was possessed, and each individual, in directing his conduct, was left to the guidance of his own sagacity; but the natural law never bended one iota to accommodate itself to that state of ignorance. Men suffered from unsuitable alliances, and they will continue to do so, until they shall avail themselves of the means of judging afforded by Phrenology, and act in accordance with its dictates."\*

In a word, the phrenological developments, as manifested on the skull, must regulate not only matters of business and matrimonial alliances, but social intercourse and friendship. Spurzheim says, "Guided by early experience, which shows, that the greatest number of persons act more from the dictates of their propensities and sentiments than of their understanding and moral will, *I never choose for my intimate friends, individuals in whom the inferior organs are very large, and the superior very small.*"† The shape of a man's head, it matters not how unexceptionable may have been his conduct, or how pure his virtue, fixes suspicion upon him, so that no man who believes in Phrenology, will confide in him as a friend!

One can scarcely imagine a more horrible state of society than the prevalence of a belief in Phrenology would produce. Multitudes of the most upright men and women looked upon with suspicion, thrown out of business, and shunned, though perhaps pitied! and thus irritated beyond endurance, because the shape

\*Const. of Man, p. 143.

†Phren. v. 2, p. 171.

of their heads is not what certain pretended philosophers think it should be!

And what is to become of those persons who are so unfortunate as to have been born with ill shaped heads? This question is naturally suggested by the application phrenologists propose to make of their favorite science. "This application of Phrenology," says Combe, "has suggested the question, Are individuals with 'ill shaped heads' to become 'outcasts from society'? This is precisely the evil which, under the actual system of criminal legislation, exists, and which the phrenologists are laboring to remove." A very benevolent work indeed! But let us hear how they propose to effect it. Their plan is developed in the following extract:

"An unfavorably developed brain and good natural dispositions are two conditions which do not coëxist in nature. Phrenologists, therefore, by establishing the fact, that an imperfectly formed brain, renders an individual naturally prone to vice, will afford an inducement to society to treat men so constituted as *moral patients*, and to use more effectual means for restraining their propensities than any that are at present adopted. This, in my opinion, would be far preferable to the existing practice, which leaves individuals with the worst natural dispositions, at liberty, in the most unfavorable circumstances, to follow their instinctive tendencies, and only punishes them after having committed crimes."

Speaking of the boy he refused to employ as a servant, he says, "if he had been placed from infancy in an asylum, from which temptation to vice was excluded, and in which the highest moral and intellectual treatment was administered, he might have had a good character, notwithstanding the form of his brain; because, *so situated he could not* have offended.

\* \* \* At present society is greatly deficient in institutions in which the moral influence of higher minds can be brought habitually to bear on inferior minds, in the absence of external temptation. \* \*

\* This influence, however, cannot exert itself efficiently, unless external temptation to evil be withdrawn, which cannot be the case without institutions formed for the purpose. Phrenology will hasten the day when these shall exist.”\*

We have here the phrenological method of dealing with “ill shaped heads.” It asserts, that such heads are never found in connection with good natural dispositions; that they render their possessors prone to vice; that “their mental deficiencies render them incapable of guiding themselves to virtue;”† that the safety of society requires that they should not be allowed to run at large; that they should from infancy be treated as *moral patients*, not to be blamed, but to be cured; and that, for this purpose, asylums should be established, in which, before they commit crime, they should be placed under proper treatment. If their organs should become sufficiently improved, the proof of which will be in a considerable change in the shape of the skull, they might be permitted to walk abroad. But if, like the young man in the Berlin prison, their organs should be incurably bad, their phrenological protectors and nurses would, of course, advise, as did Gall and Spurzheim, that they be imprisoned for life!

How this matter would be managed among the New Hollanders, and other savages, we cannot imagine; since among them almost all heads are “ill shaped.” There would, therefore, be a much greater number in the asylums, than out, if indeed there could be found a sufficient number of Phrenologists to imprison them. Indeed, it is a question, whether, in our own country, the “ill shaped heads” do not outnumber those of a more virtuous form. Certainly, wickedness prevails to a very great extent. It might be difficult, too, to determine just which heads were so badly formed, that they could not be safely left at large.

It is really difficult to treat this matter with the

\* Phren. pp. 418, 419.

† Ibid., p. 149.

gravity due to any thing like a science. The ridiculous folly, however, of the method, so seriously proposed, of disposing of heads not phrenologically formed, affords the most conclusive evidence, that "this science of sciences" is no science at all, but a most mischievous system of error. Imagine Combe's plan carried out. Asylums are multiplied throughout the country. A law is passed, requiring all the inhabitants to submit to an examination of their heads, that society may know whether it is safe to allow them their liberty. Scientific phrenologists are appointed to examine them; and those with "ill shaped heads" are hurried into asylums, to be treated as "moral patients." Parents, too, are required to present their children for examination, and those having thievish propensities, or other dangerous inclinations, are placed in asylums, under the care of phrenological nurses and phrenological doctors! *Risum teneatis, amici.*

VI. The prevalence of Phrenology would make it impossible to execute the laws of the land, especially the criminal laws. It is essential to the peace and prosperity of every community, that there be wise and equal laws, by the faithful execution of which the life and the rights of each individual shall be secured. For if the civil government do not afford protection, the virtuous are oppressed, the wicked are emboldened; and individuals are forced to defend themselves. Strife, violence, and perfect anarchy would be the results. There must be laws, not only, nor even chiefly, for the purpose of regulating property interests, but for the punishment of evil doers. And whatever penalties it may be wise to inflict for less aggravated crimes, the all-wise Creator has decreed, that "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed."\* And again: "He that killeth a man, he shall be put to death."† The apostle Paul teaches, concerning the civil law, that "there is no power but

\* Gen. ix, 6.

† Levit. xxiv, 17, 21.



of God;" that "the powers that be are ordained of God." And concerning the civil officer he teaches, that "he beareth not the sword in vain."\* It would be worse than vain for any one to attempt to prove by the scriptures, that capital punishment should be abolished. Their language on this subject is too clear to be mistaken. And to attempt to prove all such punishments unjust or unwise, would be as wicked as it would be foolish. God knew what was in man; and he knew that the lives of men could be protected only by letting murderers know, that their lives would pay the penalty of their crimes.

It is in vain to say, that this law was adapted to a barbarous age, and that in this day and in our country men are too enlightened and too virtuous to require it. For, in the first place, the number of crimes committed, and of murders perpetrated, annually, prove the claims set up for this enlightened age, false; and, in the second place, if society has so greatly improved, there will, of course, be fewer murders committed, and less frequent occasion to execute the law. And then they who commit murder in this age of light, are the less excusable, and the more deserving of the severity of the law. God knew men; and every attempt to improve the great principles he has taught, and the laws he has enacted, will be mischievous in its consequences, and will prove the folly of those who venture to claim to be wiser than God.

But with what consistency can phrenologists aid in either making or in executing criminal laws? According to their principles, a man steals because his organ of acquisitiveness is naturally too large, or has become diseased. He acts according to the promptings of the physical constitution his Creator gave him. The murderer, too, has powerful destructiveness, with weak benevolence; and hence his cruelty. For, says Combe, "when one organ is small, abuses may result from another being left without proper restraint.

\* Romans xiii, 1—4.

Thus, large organs of acquisitiveness and secretiveness, combined with small organs of reflection and conscientiousness, may, in certain circumstances, lead to theft. Powerful destructiveness, with weak benevolence, may produce cruel actions.\* Can those who hold such a system of philosophy, punish the thief or the murderer? Surely not. Let them, says Combe, be treated as "*moral patients*." Who would agree to send to the penitentiary, or to the gallows, those persons whose mental deficiencies, as Combe says, "render them incapable of guiding themselves to virtue?" No—if Phrenology is true, there are laws stronger than civil enactments, urging men forward; and it would be cruel to punish them for what they do.

But here we meet a serious difficulty. The organs of one man impel him to steal; whilst the organs of another induce him to seek to punish the thief. And although it would seem to be wrong to punish a man for stealing when he cannot avoid it, it would be no better to condemn the man whose organs might lead him to punish the thief! The truth is, if Phrenology be true, the conduct of each individual is simply the result of a perpetual war among his organs; and the course of society the result of the conflicting organs of different heads! Let its principles prevail, and social and civil order disappear, and immorality in all its forms prevails.

It is true that phrenologists speak fluently of the supremacy of the moral organs, and of the evils which flow from the predominance of the animal propensities. But when the moral affections of the human mind are degraded to the level of mere *instincts*, and when men are taught that in many heads the *moral* instincts are entirely too small to restrain the animal; all that is said of the supremacy of the former, becomes perfectly powerless. Strike down the great doctrine of man's voluntary agency, and substitute for

\* Phren., p. 350.

it that of physical necessity; and you strike down one of the chief pillars in the temple of virtue. Treat men as "moral patients," instead of addressing them as perfectly free and accountable, and you have on your hands a disease you cannot cure—a disease which will wax worse under your treatment. Why should not atheists admire Phrenology, since it leads to universal skepticism, by making the decision of the question concerning the existence of God, depend upon the relative size of the organ of causality in the head, not upon the evidence in the case.

Why should deists object to it, since the different combinations of organs in the different Christian denominations, constituting "the colored glasses" through which moral subjects are viewed, account for the differences of their faith, and render them all alike uncertain? Why should not Fourierites be pleased with it, since it reduces all the affections of man to *instincts* of unequal strength, and thus furnishes an excuse for breaking up the domestic circle, and indulging unrestrained lusts? Why should any wicked man dislike it, since it furnishes him with a most plausible, if not entirely valid, excuse for his crimes?

We are well aware that phrenologists deny these consequences. We would not charge them with holding sentiments which they disclaim. Still, however, we are obliged to regard the evils we have pointed out, as legitimately flowing from the system. All philosophers have professed to aim at the promotion of virtue, and the improvement of man; but in multitudes of instances, their systems of philosophy embraced principles, the legitimate tendency of which they did not perceive, and produced results which they did not anticipate. Worthy men may become phrenologists, and persuade themselves that its moral tendencies are all good; but we are not at liberty to judge of the character of the system from the uprightness of some who admire it. Others have embraced systems of philosophy, or of faith, without perceiving their real tendencies.

**We have endeavored to examine the fundamental principles of Phrenology. We have found in authors who have written upon it, many important truths, happily expressed; but we cannot admire their consistency. The real tendencies of the system we are obliged to regard as most injurious to morals and religion. Hence our uncompromising opposition to it.**

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE PRINCIPLES OF PHRENOLOGY IRRECONCILABLE WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF CHRISTIANITY.

AGAIN and again, in past ages and in the present, have the doctrines of Christianity been corrupted by different systems of false philosophy. Phrenology, though yet in its infancy, boldly proposes, like its predecessors, to throw a flood of light upon the inspired volume. Ministers of the gospel, in ages past, and even those of the nineteenth century, it tells us, have labored almost in vain, not understanding the capabilities of man, nor how to expound the Bible in accordance with the principles of sound philosophy. It acquits them of any great criminality in failing to preach effectively, inasmuch as it was their misfortune to live in ages unblest by the clear light of Phrenology; but it now calls on them to come without delay, put on phrenological glasses, and through them look at things divine. Under its direction, religion is to assume new beauty and exert greater power.

We would not fail to receive gratefully all the light that may be afforded on the great themes which Christianity presents; but we would first examine with care, whether the gospel of Christ, viewed through phrenological glasses, is not "another gospel." We are the more disposed to do this, because this new philosophy was born of infidelity, and passed its earlier years under its roof. Dr. Gall, the father of the system, believed that the Creator had given to men *wicked propensities*. "Dr. Gall," says Spurzheim, "is disposed to admit wicked propensities."\* He found

\*Phren., v. 2, p. 142.

in the brain the organs of *murder*, of *quarrelsomeness*, and of *theft*, to which Spurzheim and succeeding Phrenologists gave the less offensive names of Destructiveness, Combativeness, and Acquisitiveness. Spurzheim speaks in terms of high regard of the *morality* of the gospel, but fills his work on Phrenology with infidel sentiments.

I would not positively reject a system of mental and moral philosophy, simply because infidels were the fathers of it; but I would examine its principles more thoroughly, before receiving them. For there is not in existence, so far as I know, one such system which has not undermined Christianity, so far as it has prevailed, and which has not been found fundamentally erroneous.

I proceed now to specify some of the important points in which Christianity and Phrenology cannot be reconciled.

I. The scriptures teach, that man is a *free moral agent*; that the mind, which is not identical with the brain, but a distinct substance, possesses intelligence, affections, and will; that men are free to consider all motives to action, and to choose for themselves the course they will pursue. To prove this, it is not necessary to cite particular portions of scripture; for it is taught by every precept, exhortation, and promise, in the sacred volume. The aged Joshua delivers his parting address to the elders of Israel, summing up the motives by which they should be urged to serve God faithfully, and concludes with the exhortation, "Choose you this day whom you will serve."\* God expostulates with the wicked Jews, declaring that he has no pleasure in the death of the wicked, and exhorts them, "Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways, for why will ye die, O house of Israel?"† Our Saviour said to the Jews, "Ye *will not* come unto me, that ye might have life."‡

This doctrine, the truth of which is proved by the

\* Josh. xxiv, 15.

† Ezek. xxxiii, 11.

‡ John v, 40.

consciousness of every man, can never be reconciled with Phrenology; for it holds, that the choices and actions of men are determined, not by the free exercise of an intelligent mind, but by the physical organization. It is vain to talk of freedom of choice, if the choice is determined by physical causes which the mind cannot control. This subject, however, has been so fully discussed in a preceding chapter, that I need say nothing more concerning it. It is simply mentioned that the reader may have before his mind a full view of all the important parts in which this modern philosophy contradicts revelation.

II. Phrenology contradicts the scripture doctrine of *human depravity*. According to the scriptures, *sin* and *holiness* belong exclusively to *mind*. It is mind, not matter, that believes and disbelieves, loves and hates, is truthful or false, is proud or humble, is pure or impure, just or unjust. God is a spirit, and it is of the spirit of man the scriptures speak, when they teach, that he "created man in his own image."\* And it was the spirit, the soul of man from which, by the fall, that image was obliterated. The mind, moreover, will retain its moral character, when it leaves the body, and will bear with it to another state of existence its holiness or unholiness. The great majority of those who take the bible as the rule of their faith, have always understood it to teach, that, since the fall, all men are wholly depraved—destitute of all holiness, and disposed only to sin. In this belief they are sustained by many of the plainest declarations found in the inspired volume. Take, for example, the following: "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked: who can know it?"† The prophet does not say the hearts of *some men*, or of the *Jews*, are deceitful; but *the heart*. A general term without limitation is employed; and the meaning, according to one of the plainest principles of language, is, that the *human heart* is thus deceitful, thus wicked.

\* Gen. i, 27.

† Jer. xvii, 9.

Again, Paul teaches us, that all men are either in the flesh or in the spirit.\* By the natural birth, as our Saviour taught, all are in the flesh; for "that which is born of the flesh is flesh."† And "they that are in the flesh cannot please God."‡ If they cannot please him, it is because they are entirely destitute of holiness, and disposed only to sin. Accordingly, Paul, in enumerating the "works of the flesh," finds amongst them nothing good. They are "adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, seditions, heresies," &c.§ They are "evil and only evil, and that continually." The scriptures, therefore, clearly teach the doctrine of the entire depravity of man. I will not detain the reader to refer to other portions, my object being not so much to prove that the scriptures teach it, as to put Christians and others on their guard against the false principles of Phrenology on this important subject. I speak of it as important, because the gospel is a glorious remedy for fallen men; and to understand the remedy, we must have correct views of the condition of those who are to be saved by it.

What are the instructions which Phrenology gives us concerning the moral character of man? Phrenological writers tell us, indeed, that men are depraved; but the depravity of which they speak, is found in the *brain*, not in the mind. Every one, according to this philosophy, has something of Veneration, Conscientiousness, Benevolence, &c., and in proportion to the size of these organs in each head, compared with the other organs, every one possesses real virtue or holiness. All that would be necessary to change the vilest sinner into a perfect saint, would be to effect the necessary change in the cerebral organs—to enlarge those that are defective, and secure to them healthy action. Whether there is any such thing as mind, distinct from the brain, is, as we have proved,

\* Rom. viii, 9. † John iii, 6. ‡ Rom. viii, 8. § Gal. v, 19–21.



rendered uncertain by the principles of Phrenology. If there is, whether it possesses a moral character, and if it does, what that character is—are questions not to be answered. It is certain that men manifest evil dispositions, and are chargeable with sinful actions. But is this sinfulness to be found in the intelligent mind, or is it to be attributed to the cerebral organs, as badly balanced or diseased? And if the mind were separated from the body, as it will be by death, would it possess the same moral dispositions which were manifested in the body? or would it be morally pure? or would it possess any moral character? These important questions phrenologists, who do not desire openly to contradict revelation, wisely decline answering. One thing, however, is certain, that all the depravity of men is traced to a badly-balanced or a diseased brain. And when we observe certain effects, and look for, and find their true causes, we can go no farther. Mr. Fowler, speaking of original sin, says: “If by ‘innate depravity and original sin,’ you mean a *constitutional* depravity of the *primary faculties* of man’s mind, as I understand Phrenology, it, in common with every principle of moral justice, of divine perfection, and of common sense, *does* deny such a dogma.” Again, he says: “That human depravity, in some form, and in a greater or less degree, is coextensive with the existence of the human race, or, at least, as far back as the fall of Adam, is a fact which I readily admit.” This language is a clear intimation that Mr. Fowler at least *doubts* whether Adam was originally better than his descendants. Why else should he have used the language, “coextensive with the existence of the human race, *or*,” &c.? In answer to the question—“what are the *origin* and *procuring cause* of this depravity,” he says: “I answer, that if Phrenology cannot fully explain the whole matter, it can, at least, point out *one* of the causes of this depravity; and that one is found in the *depraved physiology* of mankind, proceeding from a *pervverted education and train-*

*ing of both their physical and their mental powers."* He goes even further, and says: "But I do not see anything in Phrenology which teaches that, in our day, man is born with a *different*, or *less perfect* moral or physical nature, than that given to Adam when he came from the hand of his Maker, excepting always the degeneration and variation which our species, or different portions of it, have undergone by the *perversion* of the laws of our physical nature already alluded to."\* Here we have a clear and unequivocal declaration, that Phrenology represents man now as possessing as perfect *moral* and physical nature as Adam had—the only difference being, that some have perverted their physical nature. Except so far as their physical nature has been perverted, men are, of course, just as holy as Adam was when he came from the hand of his Maker; and if the physical nature of those in whom it has been perverted, could be restored, the whole of Adam's family would be, in every respect, equal to their father before the fall! For, says Fowler, "the nearer our heads approach to this phrenological standard of perfection, the more correct will be our moral feelings and conduct, as well as religious opinions and worship. But the farther they depart from this standard, that is, the more uneven they are, and the more imperfectly balanced the organs, the more erroneous will be our religious opinions, and proportionally imperfect our moral conduct and worship."†

There is no depravity, according to Mr. Fowler, but in the brain, in its unevenly balanced or diseased parts, and no holiness but in its well-balanced and healthy organs. Dr. Spurzheim does not differ from him on this subject. In his remarks on *the origin of evil*, he says: "To explain the existence of evil, however, is a simple and easy task. It is only necessary to know that all natural phenomena depend on certain conditions or circumstances; that things are in

\*Phren., pp. 403, 404.

†Self Cult., p. 77.

relation to each other, and that these relations generally are governed by fixed laws. Now, as soon as the conditions are wanting, or their laws violated, proper effects are not elicited, and evil results." Again: "The philosophers who maintain man to be born good or bad, are not acquainted with the fundamental powers of the mind, and with their mutual relations. This knowledge alone satisfactorily explains the nature and origin of evil." Once more, in his remarks on the "*natural goodness of man*," he says: "There is, undoubtedly, a great deal of moral evil in the world. Man, it is also certain, is commonly inclined to evil; that is, to follow the activity of the animal faculties, which are, for the most part, very energetic, and submit with difficulty to the guidance of the powers proper to man. I am, nevertheless, astonished to observe so much goodness in the world. Its abundance evidently proves that man is naturally good, and by no means in consequence of his social institutions; these, indeed, are, for the most part, calculated to pervert him. \* \* \* There are some naturally good, some who instinctively, so to say, do the things which Christian morality commands."\* It is very easy for Dr. S. to explain that difficult question, as to the origin of evil. The organs are not properly balanced, and moral evil is the consequence. Nevertheless, he is astonished to find so much goodness in the world—proving conclusively, that men are *naturally good*. How different the view taken of this subject by the apostle Paul. He said: "There is none righteous, no, not one; there is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the way; they are together become unprofitable; *there is none that doeth good, no, not one.*"† How widely different the opinion of the inspired John, who said, "The whole world lieth in wickedness."‡

But Spurzheim's opinions are in perfect accordance

\*Phren. v. 2, pp. 140, 141, 155.

†Rom. iii, 10, 12.

‡1 John v, 19.

with Phrenology. It must be admitted, that there are great numbers of persons who have the anterior and upper portions of the brain, containing the intellectual and moral organs, largely developed; and it would be an outrage on Phrenology to deny, that a man with the organs of Conscientiousness, Veneration and Benevolence large, possesses a large amount of genuine goodness. But to reconcile this with the bible, is impossible. For, in the first place, it knows nothing of *cerebral* holiness, or *cerebral* depravity. It places all holiness and all sin, in the mind. And, in the second place, it acknowledges no true goodness in any of Adam's race, save that which is the result of regeneration. "For," says Paul, "we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works."\*

Now we are far from denying that unregenerate men possess natural affection for children, for parents, for relations, for neighbors and friends, and even for men generally. But this affection, though important in its place, does not constitute holiness. It is even manifested by animals. It may be, and often is, possessed by those who pretend not to regulate their lives by the law of God. Natural men, we admit, possess a conscience by which they perceive a moral quality in their affections and actions, and feel a sense of guilt when they do what they believe to be wrong; and it is certainly true, that their conscience exerts a restraining influence upon them. But the checks and warnings of conscience do not constitute holiness. Judas experienced them when he had sold his Lord for thirty pieces of silver; but Judas did not love God, nor approve of holiness. The affections may be most impure; and yet the conscience may prevent the unlawful gratification of them, at least by external acts. To secure an approving conscience, men discharge many duties; but to delight in the service of God, is a widely different thing. Men are selfrighteous; and to work out their salvation by a righteousness of their

\* Eph. ii, 10.

own, instead of acknowledging themselves debtors to grace for it, they do many things which, as to the outward act, are in accordance with the law of God. But selfrighteousness is not holiness. It has been the ruin of multitudes, who, like the unbelieving Jews, "being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God."\* Men desire to enjoy the respect of others; and, therefore, in a society where religious influence prevails, they conduct themselves as they would not under different circumstances. They perform duties for which they have no real taste, that they may enjoy the good opinion of men. For this purpose, the scribes and pharisees gave alms, taking care to sound a trumpet, that their liberality might be publicly known. There are many motives which influence the conduct of men, besides those presented in the gospel, and many feelings which prompt them to perform good deeds, that are not pure. But true holiness, sincere love to God and man, dwells not in the unsanctified heart. The exercise of it is declared to be conclusive evidence of a radical, moral change; for "every one that loveth, is born of God, and knoweth God."†

But if the principles of Phrenology are true, every individual possesses some degree of true holiness, and many who are blessed with well-balanced organs, are, in consequence, almost perfect in virtue. All have the moral organs more or less developed; and therefore all, if correctly taught, are disposed, to some extent, to the exercise of true benevolence, to worship and serve God, and to do that which is right; and those whose heads are well formed, are quite religious! Of such, if such there be, it could not be said, that their hearts are "exceedingly deceitful and desperately wicked;" nor that they are "dead in trespasses and sins;" nor that they "cannot please God;" nor that their minds are "not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be."

\* Rom. x, 3.

† 1 John iv, 7.

This point of contradiction between Phrenology and the bible, is, as we have intimated, one of great importance. The physician who errs concerning the character or the virulence of a disease, will err as much in seeking a remedy. The gospel is a glorious remedy provided by the God of grace for fallen, ruined men ; and they who believe men to be better than they are, will err equally in understanding and appreciating the plan of salvation. The ancient systems of philosophy either represented human nature as better than it is, or excused its corruption. Phrenology does both. Those systems corrupted the gospel, and destroyed its power ; and Phrenology will do the same.

III. Phrenology denies the scripture doctrine, that death is the consequence of sin. That the scriptures do teach, that disease and death are the consequences of sin, and would never have afflicted the human race but for sin, is too clear to require a labored argument to prove it. "Wherefore," says the apostle Paul, "as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin ; and so death hath passed upon all men, for that all have sinned."\* God created man in his own image ; and being perfectly holy, he enjoyed uninterrupted communion with his Maker, and was perfectly happy. Had he continued holy, he must have continued happy ; he never could have known suffering, either mental or corporeal. For if they who sin not must still suffer, wherein is their condition materially better than if they were sinners ? The apostle, therefore, teaches a doctrine which is approved by sound reason—that by one man *sin* entered into the world ; and then death entered *by sin*, and as a punishment of sin. And, consequently, inasmuch as sin, the *cause*, is universal among men, death, the *effect*, is equally so. Adam, the father and representative of the human race, sinned and died ; and "in Adam all die."†

\* Rom. v, 12.

† 1 Cor. xv, 22.

But what says Phrenology on this subject? Mr. Combe has a chapter on "man considered as an organized being." In defining his terms, he says: "An organized being is one which derives its existence from a previously existing organized being, which subsists on food, which grows, attains maturity, decays and dies."\* This is truly a singular definition, or description of an organized being. First, it derives its existence *from a previously existing organized being*. We come, then, to one of two conclusions, viz: either the first pair of the human race were not organized beings, since they did not thus derive their existence; or there has been no first pair, but an *eternal succession* of beings without beginning. The first is obviously false; and the second is profoundly absurd. Combe certainly did not believe the first; and if he believed the second, he necessarily rejected the bible as a revelation.

But Mr. Combe does not scruple to avow his disbelief of the scripture doctrine on this subject. He says: "I am aware that, theologically, death is regarded as the punishment of sin, and that the attempt to reconcile our minds to it by reason, is objected to as at once futile, and dangerous to revelation. But I beg leave to observe, that philosophers have established, by irrefragable evidence, that before man was created, death prevailed among the lower animals, not only by natural decay and the operation of physical forces, but by the express institution of carnivorous creatures destined to prey upon living beings; that man himself is carnivorous, and obviously framed by the Creator for a scene of death; that his organic constitution, in its inherent qualities, implies death as its final termination; and that if these facts be admitted to be undeniable on the one hand, and we are prohibited on the other, from pointing out, from the records of creation itself, the wise adaptation of the human sentiments and intellect to this state of things,

\* Const. of Man, p. 44.

neither the cause of revelation nor of reason can be thereby benefited.”\*

Now suppose we admit that philosophers have proved, that death prevailed among animals before man was created; does it follow, that because in a state of things existing before the six days' work of which we read in Genesis, animals died, therefore man, who was created in the image of God, was mortal, and would have died, even if he had not sinned? Might not he who created him, have preserved him in the enjoyment of perfect health, and in the undiminished vigor of manhood? Are not all things possible with God? Mr. Combe doubts whether the mind itself is not material; and yet he professes to believe it immortal. With what consistency, then, can he deny that the body would have been immortal, if sin had not been committed? The scriptures plainly teach, that *the tree of life* was to have been, at least, the sacramental pledge of immortality; for it is said, after the fall, God expelled Adam from the garden of Eden, “lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever.”† Will it be pretended that philosophers have proved anything inconsistent with this declaration of God's word? We confess our skepticism in regard to the alleged discoveries of geologists in relation to the age of the world. Their *facts* we do not deny; but of their *inferences* we stand in doubt. But if they are all true, it does not follow that the death of man is not the consequence of his sin.

But, says Mr. Combe, “man himself is carnivorous, and obviously framed by his Creator for a scene of death.” It is true, that men do eat flesh, and are nourished by it; but has Mr. Combe discovered that flesh is *necessary* as part of their food? Originally, God gave to man “every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed,” and said:

\* Const. of Man, p. 184.

† Gen. iii, 22—24.



**“to you it shall be for meat.”\*** Have philosophers discovered that this food was insufficient? True, Phrenologists profess to have found in the human brain the organ of Destructiveness; but we beg leave to question whether there is any such organ. Spurzheim tells us there is a difference in the shape of the skulls of herbivorous and carnivorous animals; but this is most inconclusive evidence of the existence of an organ of Destructiveness. • That difference may be designed to answer some very different purpose. It is true, that some persons are indifferent to the sufferings of animals, and even of men, and some find pleasure in acts of cruelty; but these facts prove, not that, as originally created, man had an organ prompting him to destroy life, but that he has lost the image of God in which he was created, and has become deeply depraved. The fact that some deranged persons manifest a strong inclination to kill, proves nothing. If there should be an organ for each of the singularities of monomaniacs and other insane persons, the number must be very much increased.

Mr. Combe says, man’s organic constitution, in its inherent qualities, implies death as its final termination. This is an assertion without proof. The scriptures teach us, that for the first two thousand years after man was created, the period of human life was not far short of a thousand years. Science has discovered nothing inconsistent with this. And if the human system might be preserved in health and vigor five hundred years, why not a thousand, two thousand, or twenty thousand? With God all things are possible. The causes which now shorten life, might never have existed, and causes of an opposite character might have been in operation, if sin had not entered into the world. When human philosophy, after having erred ten thousand times, and led men into the greatest follies, steps forward and boldly contradicts the word of God, we pronounce its claims false, impudent, and impious.

\* Gen. i, 29.

The arguments by which Combe attempts to prove death, as an institution appointed to man without reference to sin, consistent with justice and benevolence, are of the most shallow and flimsy character. He tells us, first, that in consequence of the institution of death, Amativeness, Philoprogenitiveness, and Adhesiveness, are provided with direct objects of gratification; just as if lawful enjoyments such as these must have ceased, if Adam and Eve had not died! He tells us, secondly, that all the other faculties would have been limited in their gratifications; such, for example, as imparting knowledge to the young: just as if young persons could not come into being, unless the old die! He tells us, thirdly, that "constituted as man is, the succession of individuals withdraws beings whose physical and mental constitutions have run their course, and become impaired in sensibility, and substitutes in their place fresh and vigorous minds and bodies, far better adapted for the enjoyment of creation." The amount of this reason is, that it is undesirable that persons who, in consequence of the decay of their physical powers, can no longer enjoy life, should still be kept lingering in life. But suppose the human system had been so preserved that age would not be attended with decay and infirmity. The truth is, the infirmities of age are part of death, and are the sad fruits of sin. Strange that a philosopher should try to reconcile men to death as an institution, by urging that when men have begun to die, it would not be well to detain them in a dying state!

Combe tells us, fourthly, that if the organic laws transmit, in an increasing ratio, the qualities most active in the parents to their offspring, the law of succession provides for a far higher degree of improvement in the race than could have been reached by the permanency of a single generation possessing the present human constitution. But suppose the heads of the single generation had been perfect, as they came from the hand of God, would not the improvement in knowledge and happiness have been

quite equal to anything we are authorized now to anticipate? Mr. C. evidently proceeds upon the suppositions, that if death had not been appointed, God would have created at once all the human beings who were to inhabit earth, and that he would have given them a defective cerebral organization. Is there the slightest evidence to support this supposition? Is not the latter supposition most manifestly false?

But before passing to another topic, we must notice one of Mr. Combe's illustrations, designed to show how a conscientious man becomes willing to die. He says: "Conscientiousness, if thoroughly enlightened, perceives no infringement of justice in a guest, satiated with enjoyment, being called on to retire from the banquet, to permit a stranger with a keener and more youthful appetite to partake." This illustration proceeds on two suppositions, both of which are false, viz: that persons who have lived a few years, become satisfied with life, just as one becomes satiated with eating; and that young persons cannot enjoy life unless their parents die, just as one individual may not find a place at a table, until another has withdrawn.

The great difficulty which presses the minds of men, when they think of suffering and death as prevailing in the world, is this: why did the Allwise and Almighty Creator adopt a system which contemplated, as a part of it, suffering, decay, and death? Mr. Combe's phrenological arguments give no answer to this question, nor can any satisfactory answer be given, save that which we find in the scriptures. God made man *upright*, and placed him in a state of perfect happiness. In the exercise of his free agency, he sinned. Thus sin entered into the world, and death by sin. Even this answer is unsatisfactory, until viewed in connection with the plan of redemption through Christ.

We object not to philosophy; but we insist that it shall learn modesty from its multiplied errors, and con-

fine itself to its proper limits. Philosophers may well examine the human system, with all its complicated machinery. In the body, "fearfully and wonderfully made," they may find much to awaken admiration for the wisdom and benevolence of the Creator, and acquire knowledge which will enable them to improve the condition of man. But when from an examination of this organization they draw *inferences* at war with the plain declarations of inspiration, they pass beyond their proper boundaries, and, in the name of philosophy, teach uncertain and injurious speculations.

IV. The principles of Phrenology are irreconcilable with the scripture doctrines of *regeneration* and *sanctification*. The scriptures teach, as we have seen, that God created man in his own moral image. The affections of his mind were consequently in perfect accordance with the perfect law of God. They teach, that the divine image was lost in the fall; and that now all men, in their natural state, are "dead in trespasses and sins"—that the carnal or unrenewed mind is enmity against God, and, therefore, is not and cannot be subject to his law. They teach, that such is the disposition of men to sin, and such their aversion to holiness, that no *motives* which can be presented, are sufficient to lead them to virtue; that "except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God."\* Regeneration, or the new birth, is not a change in the substance or faculties of the mind, but in its moral nature and affections—a change from sinfulness to holiness. This change is effected, generally, through the instrumentality of the truth, and always by the agency of the Holy Spirit on the heart.

The word *heart* is used in the scriptures to signify man's moral nature, because as the heart in the physical system is, in a sense, the seat of life, from which the vital fluid is thrown out into every part, so from the moral nature flow those affections and actions on which depend the spiritual life and happiness of man;

\* John iii, 3.

for, says Solomon, "out of it (the heart) are the issues of life."

That the Holy Spirit is the efficient agent in this important change, the scriptures abundantly teach. If it is represented as a *birth*, men are "born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God."\* If it is *life from the dead*, it is said, "You hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins." If it is a *creation*, "We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus, unto good works."† If it is a change of *heart*, God says, "A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh. And I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes."‡ Is it called *regeneration*? He saves us "by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost; which he shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ."§ *How* the Holy Spirit operates on the heart, we pretend not to know. It is mysterious, but not more so, perhaps, than the blowing of the wind. Our Saviour answered the objection of the Jewish ruler to its mysteriousness, by saying, "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit."|| The fact, however, that a radical moral change is effected, by the Holy Spirit, in the mind of every one who becomes truly pious, is as clear and as certain as language can make it. This doctrine is regarded by all evangelical denominations of Christians as of fundamental importance.

With this great doctrine of Christianity the fundamental principles of Phrenology cannot be reconciled. Regeneration, according to the scriptures, is the commencement of holiness in the human heart—spiritual life from spiritual death. But according to Phrenol-

\* John i, 13.      † Eph. ii, 1, 10.      ‡ Ezek. xxxvi, 26, 27.

§ Tit. iii, 5, 6.

|| John iii, 8.

ogy, there can be no such radical change; for it teaches, that every man possesses, by nature, the organs of Benevolence, Veneration, and Conscientiousness. In the heads of many they are deficient in size and vigor, and consequently cannot control the animal propensities; but yet they exist, and to some extent, produce their appropriate sentiments; and these sentiments are morally good. They are defective in vigor, but they are, nevertheless, truly virtuous and holy. Moreover, the heads of some men are much better formed, than those of others—having the intellectual and moral organs more fully developed. Even the most depraved require no *radical* change, but only an improvement of the virtues they possess in a very imperfect degree; whilst the better class of heads require but little change to make them morally perfect. “There are some,” says Spurzheim, “naturally good, some who instinctively, so to say, do the things which Christian morality commands.” And again—“I finish this section by asking, what individual can determine moral evil and moral good, that is, dictate the moral laws? I think that it is with moral as with all other principles; a blind man cannot establish the principles of coloring, nor one born deaf, those of music; the great painter gives the rules of his art, and the great genius for music indicates the laws of harmony. In the same way, he who possesses the faculties proper to man in the highest perfection, and in whose actions they predominate, he who can challenge the world to *convict him of sin*, has a right to determine moral principles, and fix rules of moral conduct.”\* Now, is it not evident, that those who possess natural goodness, if such there be, do not need, and cannot experience what the scriptures call the *new birth*? Who does not see, that if Phrenology is true, there are some men, perhaps many, in whose heads the moral organs are, naturally, almost or quite large enough, and who, consequently,

\* Phren. v. 2, pp. 155, 158.

are almost perfect? With such a system of philosophy it is impossible to reconcile the plain teachings of revelation. The bible teaches, that all men, until regenerated, are utterly destitute of holiness. Phrenology teaches, that none are entirely destitute of holiness, and that many possess it in a high degree.

Nor is this all; for the *kind* of change required by Phrenology is wholly different from that contemplated by the scriptures. The former requires merely a physical change—a change in the *cerebral organs*; while the latter requires a change in the *mind*. The scriptures never recognize either sin or holiness as the effect of physical causes. It is the intelligent mind that hates or loves God, and the moral affections of the mind need to be changed.

Again: Regeneration is an *immediate* as well as a *radical* change. Like imparting life to the dead, it is necessarily instantaneous; and the result is a sudden change in the views, affections, and conduct of the individual. The change though not perfect, is great; so that “if any man be in Christ Jesus, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new.” Three thousand unbelieving Jews were converted and baptized in a day; and henceforward their whole conduct was revolutionized. Paul, though he entered upon his journey to Damascus, to persecute even unto death, the disciples of Christ, rejoices to preach, in that city, the faith which he had destroyed; and the chief of sinners becomes one of the most zealous in doing good.

But how could these things be so, if Phrenology is true? The causes of sin, according to this system, are, as we have seen, badly balanced, or diseased organs. Consequently, there must be important changes in the cerebral organs, before there can be any radical change in the moral character. The moral and intellectual organs must be considerably enlarged; and the shape of the skull must be changed. For if there can be any considerable improvement in the moral character, without a corresponding change

in the brain, that principle of phrenology is false, which teaches that the largest organs are the most vigorous. And if there can be a radical change in the character, without a corresponding change in the shape of the skull, it is not true, that the character of individuals can be known from its configuration. But we do certainly know, that to effect a material change in the brain, and in the skull, even if it be at all possible, must be a very gradual work. Months, perhaps years, must pass, before the change would be very perceptible.

It will not answer to say, that the organs, though not materially changed in size, have received a new direction; for, in order to give such direction, a directing power is necessary; and this must be found in the enlargement of one or more of the organs.

The reader will not object to a digression from the point under discussion, in order to notice Dr. Spurzheim's views of the comparative merit of religious faith, and of works flowing from natural goodness, or from a conscientious regard to the divine precepts. Religious belief and charity, he maintains, spring not from the same faculty—may exist separately or conjoined, and may be active in very different degrees. "Religious belief," says he, "is the result of feelings, and all feelings, without exception, are blind; religious belief, consequently, may be deceived; and I think it causes error, whenever the faculty on which it depends, ceases to act in harmony with other powers proper to man. It has, unquestionably, done a great deal of harm in the world. Some standard, by which its manifestations may be regulated, is, therefore, extremely desirable. \* \* \* Farther, the tendency of charity is solely to do good; but religious belief may do evil too; it easily finds an excuse for selflove, personal views, and abuses of many complexions. Priestcraft, when asked what is right, commonly answers, expediency, or our decision. \* \*

\* Finally, even those who have no religious faith or belief, still admit charity and its good effects.



Thus, I do not hesitate to place, with St. Paul, charity above faith. \* \* \* The naturally good do more acts of beneficence, without faith, than those who, little endowed with primitive charity, take mere faith as their guide and rule of conduct.\* In these quotations we find some singularly unphilosophical, as well as unscriptural principles set forth.

In the first place, it is not true that religious belief is the result of mere blind feelings. Religious truth lays claim to credence, on the ground of evidence, quite as clear and conclusive, to say the least, as that furnished by any system of mental philosophy. Why, then, may not the human understanding candidly weigh the evidence in favor of any system of religious faith, and come to a clear, rational conclusion? It is true, that the judgment is often perverted by prejudice in the examination of the doctrines of religion; and consequently, men often believe without evidence, and as often reject evidence the most conclusive. But this is true of all subjects that interest the human mind, philosophy not excepted. "I am farther convinced," says Spurzheim, "that different philosophical systems have resulted from various combinations of faculties in their authors." And he, and Combe, account for the skeptical philosophy of Pyrrho and Bishop Berkeley, by the defect of the organ of Individuality.† Why not contend then, that *philosophical belief* is the result of blind feelings?—for it is certain that philosophical, as well as religious faith, may be deceived.

But, says Spurzheim, religious belief "has unquestionably done a great deal of harm in the world." Does he mean to say, that the belief of religious *truth* has done harm in the world? We can scarcely imagine such to be his meaning, for then we must believe truth to have a demoralizing tendency. If he means that the belief of *false doctrines* has done great harm, we admit it; but the same may be said of the

\* Phren., v. 2, pp. 156, 157, 158. † Ibid., p. 165, and v. 1, p. 309.

belief of *philosophical* error, or of errors in medical science. This fact, however, only proves the necessity of inculcating the truth. The fact, that multitudes have lost their lives by the blunders of men who were unacquainted with medical science, surely does not prove the true principles of the science unimportant, but the opposite. Why, then, does Spurzheim undervalue religious belief, on the ground that false doctrines have been productive of great evil.

"Every hypocrite," says he, "may say, *I believe.*" Yes, and every hypocrite may say, *I love.* Is it replied, that true charity manifests itself in benevolent deeds? We answer, so does true faith; for James, the apostle, says, "I will show thee my faith by my works." The truth is, there cannot be genuine benevolence without religious faith, nor genuine faith without benevolence. We must believe that God exists, and have some correct views of his character, before we can love him; and we must understand our relations to men, and our corresponding obligations, before we can exercise true benevolence towards them. All correct religious and moral feeling, instead of being "blind," is founded upon correct religious knowledge. "Ye shall know the truth," said our Saviour, "and the truth shall make you free." And again—"Sanctify them through thy truth."

Persons who are "naturally good," Spurzheim thought, "deserve less credit for their beneficent actions, than those who do good principally because it is commanded. The former are charitable, because they find pleasure in charity; while the others, of charity, make an act of virtue. In reference to energy and effect, however, natural benevolence is superior to that which results from faith." Strange principles again! If there are persons who possess natural goodness, certainly the Creator has written his law upon their hearts, with extraordinary distinctness; and in performing acts of benevolence, they are but acting in obedience to that law. Now, of two persons, one, we will suppose, obeys the law, not

only with cheerfulness, but with pleasure; the other obeys it somewhat reluctantly, and finds little pleasure in the required service. The former evidently loves God's holy law more than the latter; and yet, according to Spurzheim, the latter is the more virtuous!

But, to return to the subject under discussion, how is it possible to reconcile such a system of philosophy with the doctrine of regeneration, as taught in the scriptures? It may be that some, who have held the doctrine, have favored Phrenology; but in so doing, they are evidently inconsistent.

Regeneration, we have said, is the commencement of holiness in the human heart. *Sanctification* is the gradual progress of this work to perfect holiness. Every true Christian has been regenerated; but every one finds in himself much remaining corruption. "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." The attainment of perfect holiness, is a necessary preparation for heaven; for without holiness, no man shall see the Lord. God began the good work in regeneration; and He will finish it. In regeneration, the Holy Spirit is the efficient agent; and in the progress of the work, Christians are "strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man."\* By this divine influence "the fruits of the Spirit" appear: "love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance." In the end they are presented to their Saviour, "holy and without blemish." For this divine influence, every Christian pours forth his most earnest prayer—"Create within me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me."

Can the principles of Phrenology be reconciled with this doctrine? Certainly not. If, as it teaches, sin is the result of physical causes, sanctification must be a physical work. If, as Fowler teaches, much of the wickedness of mankind is "the offspring of physical disease," the only method of delivering them from it,

\* Eph. iii, 16.

is to heal their diseases. A good physician would contribute more to their sanctification, than any influence on the mind; and lectures on *dietetics* would accomplish more in the way of reformation, than the most eloquent sermons! Indeed, Mr. Fowler thinks that the fall of man is to be ascribed to his eating *unwholesome fruit*, which made him sick! "Indeed," says he, "I construe its [the bible's] narration of the eating of the forbidden fruit, as introducing into our world 'death and all our woes,' to mean that perverted appetite, or wrong eating, caused the fall of man, and most of his subsequent depravity and consequent suffering." Again: "For is it certain that the forbidden fruit did not usher in moral depravity by occasioning an obnoxious state of the physiology?"\* One thing, however, he regards as certain: "that the starting point of human reformation and restoration is the *stomach*! \* \* To become good or great, men must first learn how to EAT." We have here a fair specimen of the phrenological interpretation of scripture, and can form some idea of that flood of light which it is destined to shed upon the inspired volume!

We are by no means disposed to undervalue the importance of wholesome diet, and of temperance in eating and drinking; but it is a miserably shallow philosophy which would represent eating and drinking as the original *cause*, or a chief cause of depravity. This is precisely reversing the true order. Why do men become enslaved by their appetites? Is it not because their moral affections being unholy, and their minds being consequently incapable of those high and holy enjoyments suited to their nature, they have sought happiness in degrading objects. If the heart were pure, and were filled with holy pleasures, would it not easily control the appetites? Would it seek pleasure in the unlawful indulgence of them? The true philosophy on this subject is found in Jër. ii, 13. "For my people," saith God, "have committed

\* Self Culture, pp. 176, 58.

two evils; they have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters, and hewed them out cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water." Men first become alienated from God, and then they seek enjoyment where it is not to be found. Depravity of heart is first, and unlawful indulgence of the appetites follows as a consequence. The error of Phrenology is in mistaking the *effect* for the *cause*. Consequently the mode of reforming and sanctifying men proposed by Mr. Fowler, is precisely the opposite of the true mode. Reformation, he contends, begins with the stomach. Regulate the diet, and health and *virtue* will be the consequence. No—the body was made for the mind; and the mind controls the body. The appetites cannot be unlawfully indulged without the consent of the mind. Then let the affections of the mind be purified; and it will secure the proper regulation of the appetites. Let the glutton become truly religious, and he will be a glutton no longer. Let the drunkard become a Christian by the renewing influence of the Holy Spirit, and he will abandon his cups. Let the unchaste man be renewed in heart, and he will "go and sin no more." For thus saith Jehovah—"I will give them one heart and one way, that they may fear me forever, for the good of them, and of their children after them."\* How utterly unphilosophical and false, then, the doctrine advanced by Fowler, that "both human and personal reform and improvement must begin with restoring normality of function to body and brain, and *be mainly effected by physical regimen*." The truth lies in the opposite direction. He who knew what was in man, said: "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man, but that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man. For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies."† The heart, the *moral nature*, is the polluted fountain. Let it be purified, and the conduct will be right. Make the tree good, and the fruit will be good.

\* Jer. xxxii, 29.

† Math. xv, 11, 19.

It is not true, then, that reformation is either to begin, or to be mainly carried forward by physical regimen. True, if a sinner can be induced to give up any of his transgressions, there is more reason to hope for his conversion to God; but you must have the consent and the purpose of the mind, before he will reform. So that the reformation, of whatever character it may be, must commence with the *heart*, and be carried forward by moral and spiritual means. Indeed, even Mr. Fowler must believe this, for he reasons with men, and exhorts them to regulate their diet. Now suppose him successful in persuading the glutton to become temperate in eating; does not the reformation commence with the mind? and is it not carried forward by the fixed determination of the mind, influenced by proper motives?

But suppose the body in perfect health, and nourished by suitable food, something more remains to be done; for the organs of many, if we are to believe phrenologists, were badly balanced originally, and those of many more have become so by indulgence. In order to perfection of moral character, a considerable change must be effected in the relative size and vigor of the organs. But the required change is wholly *physical*. The change must take place in the *brain*. The smaller organs must be enlarged, and the larger ones diminished. It was a grave question with Dr. Spurzheim, whether the moral character of men could not be improved by *pressure upon the skull*. After stating that various ancient tribes in America gave to their heads artificial forms, and that the flat-headed Indians of North America owe the depression of their heads to artificial means, he says: "I even consider this a question of the highest importance; and I certainly do greatly wish that it were possible to prevent, by artificial pressure, the growth of certain parts of the brain. But in examining flat-headed Indians after death, or in instituting in animals a series of experiments on the effects of pressure upon the configuration of the skull and the organization

of the brain, it would be necessary to observe, whether the development of the cerebral parts was entirely impeded, or whether the compressed parts increased in another direction, so that the form of the head alone was altered."\* We are not prepared to say that he did not reason quite philosophically from his premises. For if sin is caused by the too great development of certain parts of the brain, external pressure might prevent such development, and contribute materially to the formation of good morals! † He was disposed to remove physical evils by physical applications. Phrenologists, however, not finding this method of promoting virtue practicable, would bring human nature to moral perfection by the following means, viz :

1. *By regulating marriage by Phrenological principles.* Mr. Combe labors to prove that "the qualities of children are determined jointly by the constitution of the stock, and by the faculties which predominate in power and activity in the parents, at the particular time when the organic existence of each child commences." † Persons of suitable heads should marry together ; for, says Combe, "if we imagine an individual with the splendid cerebral development of Melancthon, under the influence of youthful passion and inexperience, uniting himself for life to a female possessing a head like that of Hare or Bishop, the effects could not fail to be most disastrous, with respect both to his own happiness, and to the qualities of his offspring." ‡ If, then, the best heads can be married together, the moral and intellectual organs of the offspring will be well developed ; and then if the proper faculties should predominate in power and activity, at the particular time when the organic existence of each child commences, the children will be quite *holy* ! What would be done with the ill-shaped heads, does not appear ; for they will certainly marry !

2. The second means of bringing human nature to

\* Phren., v. i, p. 113. † Const. of Man, pp. 153, 154. ‡ Ib., p. 147.

perfection, is *to regulate the diet*. Reformation, says Fowler, begins with the stomach. "Mankind must abandon flesh, condiments, narcotics, gluttony, and fermented liquors, and substitute farinaceous food, cold water, and a light diet—must learn how to EAT AND LIVE, before they can expect to attain the exalted destinies and powers of which human nature is capable." There are certainly sufficient reasons for being "temperate in all things;" but when temperance is represented as a sufficient means to "allay propensity, and develop morality and intellect," its advocates are guilty of the worst species of quackery. The mind possesses moral dispositions and feelings; and it would still possess them, if it were separated from the body. No change, therefore, in the physical organization, can effect any important change in the moral character. When Mr. Fowler, carrying out the principles of Phrenology, says: "Put your PHYSIOLOGY into the right state first, and then KEEP it right, and you will improve apace in this world, and ripen rapidly for a better," he deceives the unwary to their eternal ruin, and proves his favorite philosophy false.\*

3. A third means of perfecting human nature, *is to exercise and stimulate the organs that are too small, and avoid exercising those which are too large*. By this means, we are told, a larger amount of blood will be thrown into the organs exercised, and they will become enlarged. If the head is so defective, that it cannot guide itself to virtue, the individual is to be withdrawn from temptation, and placed in an asylum. So says Combe. After all, the change contemplated is purely *physical*, a mere increase in the size and vigor of certain parts of the brain, effected by natural means, and in no respect like what the Psalmist prayed for, when he offered the petition—"Create in me a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within me." It is nothing like the restoration to the soul of the image of God in which it was originally created.

\* Self Culture, pp. 57, 68.



Fowler is in ecstasies in the anticipation of a *phrenological millennium*. Every succeeding age, he says, has advanced man from the predominance of Amative-ness, his lowest and posterior cerebral organ, up through one propensity after another, each higher up and farther forward than its predecessor, to Acquisitiveness, the last of the animal group, which is now powerfully exciting both Constructiveness and Intellect. \* \* \* His next step will dethrone propensity, and give dominion to his higher faculties. Then shall all know the Lord, from the least even unto the greatest; every spring of sin and suffering be done away, and all mankind rendered perfectly holy and happy.\* One after another of the animal propensities, it seems, has been mastered, until man, in his onward march to moral perfection, has fallen under the dominion of Acquisitiveness—the love of money—which eighteen hundred years ago was pronounced “the root of all evil”! The millennium must, indeed, be very distant, if men have only advanced to the root of all evil! The plain truth is, no real progress has been made in morality, except in regions where the gospel has molded the character of the people; and those who have become converts to this modern philosophy are not better than others, but many of them are grossly immoral.

But to reconcile this philosophy with the scripture doctrines of regeneration and sanctification, is evidently impossible. It proposes to effect the moral perfection of the human race by physical changes; and, for aught that appears, the soul, if it admits the existence of a soul, when separated from the body, may be perfectly holy without any other change!

V. The principles of Phrenology are equally irreconcilable with the scripture doctrine of *justification*. This doctrine constitutes one of the chief pillars in the temple of truth. Luther did not over estimate its importance, when he represented it as *articulus stantis*

\* Self Cult., pp. 27, 28.

*val cadentis ecclesiæ*—the doctrine by which the church stands or falls. And as in all ages men have been strongly inclined to think of themselves more highly than they ought to think, the doctrine of gratuitous justification has ever been most offensive to the carnal mind. Human philosophy, however numerous and great its errors, has never been chargeable with undervaluing the capabilities and virtues of men. Phrenology is not more modest in its pretensions, nor more correct in its estimate of the moral character of human nature, than older systems which have flattered the pride of men, and filled their minds with prejudice against the gospel of Christ.

The scriptures teach, that men, as accountable creatures, must stand before the bar of God, and give a strict account of the deeds done in the body, and that “by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight.” The law, which is the measure of human responsibility, and by which men will be judged, is “holy, just, and good.” Nothing less than perfect holiness will meet its claims; and no human being, capable of understanding his obligations, is excused from obeying it. Now, when Jesus Christ shall “judge the world in righteousness,” upon every individual he will pronounce sentence either of justification or of condemnation. There are two reasons given in the scriptures, why no one of Adam’s race can be justified on the ground of works, viz :

1. The unregenerate perform no good works—none that, as to the motive with which they are performed, are truly good. “The carnal mind is enmity against God; it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God.” Dead in trespasses and sins, they cannot put forth the acts of life. Destitute of that love which is “the fulfilling of the law,” their best works profit them nothing. They are described as “ungodly,” “sinners,” and “enemies” of God.\* It

\* Româns v.

requires no argument to prove, that such beings cannot be justified, either in whole or in part, by their works. The apostle's conclusion is, that "all have sinned and come short of the glory of God."\*

2. The works of Christians, though to some extent good, are still imperfect; and so far as they are good, they are so *by the grace of God*, who "worketh in them to will and to do." The acknowledgment of the apostle Paul, when speaking of his abundant labors, is the acknowledgment which every Christian must make: "By the grace of God I am what I am; and his grace, which was bestowed upon me, was not in vain; but I labored more abundantly than they all; yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me."† Works done by the promptings of divine grace cannot claim a legal reward, especially when, through our depravity, they are imperfect. The works of men, therefore, though important in their place, can never constitute the meritorious ground on which any human being can be justified before God. "Therefore," says Paul, "we conclude that a man is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law."‡ Obedience to the moral law is not the ground of justification, but *faith* secures it. Faith has for its special object "Jesus Christ, and him crucified." To the trembling jailer, asking what he must do to be saved, Paul answered, "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved."§ By their sin all men have fallen under sentence of condemnation; and Christ "was made under the law to redeem them that are under the law." He bare their sins in his own body on the cross; and by his perfect obedience and sufferings he delivered all who believe in him from the curse of the law, and secured to them an eternal inheritance. "By the obedience of one shall many be made righteous."|| They who appear before God in heaven, "have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb."¶ The

\* Romans iii, 23. † 1st Cor. xv, 10. ‡ Romans iii, 28.

§ Acts xvi, 31. || Romans v, 17. ¶ Rev. vii, 14.

entire salvation of the gospel is by *grace*, not by works—by the unmerited favor of God, not by the merits of men. “For by grace are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God: not of works, lest any man should boast.”\*

But what are the teachings of Phrenology on this subject? It teaches, as we have seen, that all men, even the worst, have something of true goodness, and that many, whose heads are well formed, are almost perfect. “I am, nevertheless, astonished,” says Spurzheim, “to observe so much goodness in the world. Its abundance evidently proves that man is naturally good.” Again: “There are some naturally good—some who instinctively, so to say, do the things which Christian morality commands.”† But, he asks, “have we not all heard religious people say, that their natural disposition to do well profits those who exert it in no wise?” We have all heard them say, and have read the humbling truth in the Word of God, that there is no such natural goodness among men; that “there is none that doeth good, no, not one.”—“Some,” says he, “may wish to excuse their sins in degrading the nature of man, not aware that in degrading man they degrade his Maker, since they tell us at the same time that man is made according to the image of God.” If he had been better informed in religious matters, he would have known, that according to the scriptures, “God made man upright, but he hath sought out many inventions”—that, though originally holy, men are now “by nature children of wrath.”

Now, if all men have some natural goodness, and many are almost perfect, the good works of each must constitute part, and of some a very large part, of the ground of their justification before God. The doctrines of Pelagius were quite as consistent with the scripture doctrine of justification, as are the fundamental principles of Phrenology. Both rob Christ

\* Eph. ii, 8, 9.

† Phren., vol. ii, p. 155.

of his glory, and exalt man. "To reject natural benevolence," says Spurzheim, "is equivalent to saying that pure and natural gold is not worth such as is extracted from very heterogenous minerals, and that a swift and willing horse is inferior to one which must be spurred to go quickly."\* The good works of the "naturally good" must, therefore, be taken into account in their justification.

We need proceed no farther. For, if Phrenology is utterly irreconcilable with the great doctrines we have mentioned, it is necessarily subversive of the gospel. The doctrines of the fall of man, of depravity, of regeneration, and of justification, are fundamental to Christianity. He who rejects them, rejects the gospel itself. Combe was right, when he said—"If the doctrine before expounded be true, that every faculty is good in itself; that the folly and the crime which disgrace human society spring from abuses of the faculties; and that the tendency to abuse them originates in the disproportion of certain parts of the brain to each other, and in moral and intellectual ignorance of the proper mode of manifesting them, *how completely do these considerations go to the root of theology and morals!*"† The principles of Phrenology do indeed go to the root both of theology and morals; and they destroy alike the foundations of both. Let Christians pause and consider, when they are told, that "before religion can yield its full practical fruits in this world, it must be wedded to a philosophy founded on the natural laws," as expounded by Phrenology; that "it must borrow light and strength from them, and in return communicate its powerful sanction in enforcing obedience to their dictates."‡ If this philosophy is so presumptuous in its pretensions, even before it has fully surveyed the brain, and located its organs; and when, as Fowler says, "its warmest advocates do not deny, that, for years, it must totter along in its

\* Phren., vol. ii, p. 158. † Const. of Man, pp. 146, 147.

‡ Combe's Const. of Man, p. 39.

leading strings," what may we expect of it when fully grown?

And what is it, after all, but a miserable system of gross materialism, degrading the immortal spirit of man to a mere mass of "curiously convoluted matter," and its noble affections to mere *animal instincts*! Read the following language of Fowler, one of the most ardent advocates of Phrenology, and from it learn the true character of the system: "By the truly wonderful process of digestion, food and drink are converted into thought and feeling—*are manufactured into mind and soul*. Is it then unreasonable to suppose that different kinds of food produce different kinds of mind? Reasonable or unreasonable, it is, nevertheless, the *fact*."\* The mind of man, we are here told, instead of coming from the hand of God, is the result of *digestion*! A more degrading sentiment was never uttered in the darkest age of pagan philosophy; a more demoralizing system could scarcely be invented.

We wonder not that modern Universalism lays hold of Phrenology. It suits the doctrine of Hosea Ballou, the father of it, that "man is dependent in all his volitions, and moves by necessity."† It suits the doctrine of the same author, that God is "the first cause" of sin.‡ It suits the doctrine, that since man is a necessary agent, his sins, if he can be said to sin, deserve little punishment. It suits the doctrine advocated by Priestly, that the soul, being material, dies with the body. It suits the doctrine, that a *physical resurrection* will be sufficient to make the greatest sinner holy. It suits equally well the Fourierite, who seeks to break up the foundations of society, that he may freely indulge his lusts. It suits all who desire an excuse for sins which they love to commit.

Let parents know, that those wandering lecturers on Phrenology, who traverse every part of the country, and amuse persons who are willing to hear them,

\* Prac. Phren., p. 30. † Treat on Atonem't, p. 64. ‡ Ib. p. 36.

by describing the characters of those whose heads are submitted for inspection, are infusing into the minds of their children infidel sentiments and immoral principles. Treat them as you would treat men who propose to lecture in favor of Paine's Age of Reason; and treat their writings as they deserve. Remember the declaration of Combe, that the principles of Phrenology go to the root of *theology and morals!*

Let ministers of the gospel look into this system of pretended philosophy. Error is never more dangerous than when it assumes the name of *philosophy*, and comes professedly as the handmaid of Christianity, but really to undermine its fundamental doctrines. Ministers of Christ are no more at liberty to allow error to pass unexposed, when it assumes the mask of science, than when it professes to sustain its principles by the word of God. The apostles of Christ felt it to be their duty to warn men against teachers of philosophy, falsely so called, as well as against those who preached "another gospel." It is our solemn duty, as we must give account of our faithfulness to God, to "contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints," whether it is assailed by false religion or by false philosophy.

## CHAPTER VII.

**SOUND PHILOSOPHY AND REVELATION HARMONIZE IN RELATION TO  
THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN.**

MAN is a strangely complicated and mysterious being. His body presents to view a wonderful machinery, with its almost numberless and minute parts precisely adapted to each other—"fearfully and wonderfully made." His mind—a different substance, in its nature more refined—with all its faculties, affections and emotions, and its mysterious union with the body, presents a subject of philosophical inquiry which has deeply interested and baffled the most powerful and well trained intellects in every age. In the endeavor to understand their own nature and the operations of their minds, some have concluded that there is no external world; others, that man has no mind, but is a mere living material organization; others, that there is no God. For six thousand years men have been contemplating themselves and their powers; and now, in the nineteenth century, philosophers are not agreed upon the fundamental principles of mental science. Brown says: "When we amuse ourselves with inquiring into the history of human folly—that most comprehensive of all histories, which includes, at least for many ages, the whole history of philosophy—or when we read with regret the melancholy annals of genius aspiring to be preëminently frivolous, and industry laboring to be ignorant, we often discover absurdities of the grossest kind, which almost cease to be absurdities, on account of other absurdities which accompany them; and this is truly the case in the grave extravagance of the logic of the



schools." Even since Bacon laid down the true principles of philosophical investigation, though other sciences have made rapid progress by the application of those principles, mental philosophy is almost as unsettled as ever. German transcendentalism, Scotch metaphysics, and Phrenology, present to view three systems which are essentially different in their fundamental principles. It will probably be long before philosophers will agree upon the most important principles of mental and moral philosophy, and longer still before they harmonize in the analysis and classification of the mental phenomena.

We turn from the endless wanderings of philosophy to the clear light of divine revelation. He who made man, can teach us infallibly what is his constitution. And although we are not to expect to find in the scriptures a system of mental science in its details, we may look for whatever is of great practical importance. They treat of man as a being accountable to God, and placed under a perfect moral law; but there is an intimate and inseparable connection between the nature and the faculties of the mind, and its moral character and responsibilities. It is scarcely possible, therefore, that a complete view of the latter can be given, without an exhibition of the general outlines of the former. The scriptures do teach us perfectly every department of *moral* science, so that by their instruction "the man of God is perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works;" and, in so doing, they make us acquainted, to a considerable extent, with the constitution of man. On this important subject true philosophy is in harmony with divine revelation; and the latter gives the true clue to the investigations of the former. If the sensational philosophy of France, and the transcendentalism of Germany, have run out into the grossest absurdities and impieties, it is, because, in some of their fundamental principles, they contradict the anthropology of the bible. The first verse in that wonderful volume dispelled the dark mists which, during long centuries,

hung over natural philosophy. All ancient philosophers assumed the eternity of matter, as the starting point in their investigations. This was the *proton pscudos*—the first great error; and it vitiated all their conclusions. Let Bacon have all the credit to which he is entitled; but it cannot be denied, that it was in the bible he learned, that “in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” This great truth, too sublime for the wise men of the earth to reason out, being learned, it follows, of course, that the business of philosophy is not with theories concerning the origin of the universe, but with the *facts* which it presents for human contemplation; and this is the fundamental principle of the Baconian philosophy.

But the most important themes on which the inspired writers were taught to dwell, and in reference to which they were to instruct the world, are *God* and *man*—the Creator, and the rational, moral, accountable creature. If, then, philosophers found the clue to a satisfactory investigation of natural philosophy in the bible, much more may we expect to find there, at least, an outline of the *science of man*. Let us first learn what He, who created man, says of his nature, and in the light of his testimony pursue our investigations.

But we are warned, that it is most unwise to array Revelation against science; that by so doing we shall only destroy confidence in it. We answer, that the bible is a revelation from God, is a truth confirmed by ten times the amount of evidence to which any system of mental science can lay claim. It has outlived system after system, arising and claiming peculiar wisdom. Those systems are buried in the immense rubbish of human folly which has been, with mighty labor, heaped up in ages past; whilst the bible stands before the world in the majesty of unchanging truth, challenging the confidence of the wisest men of the nineteenth century. And shall its advocates still fear, after all its triumphs, to array it against false philosophy? Shall they tremble lest philosophers

should make it appear, that He who made man, has not taught the truth concerning his nature? Such cowardice is indeed most dishonoring to God. Let us rather call upon proud philosophers, to hear from their Creator what is in man. Wearied with the endless contradictions of men reputed wise, who have sought to know man, let them come and sit at the feet of the great Teacher, and learn the first principles of mental and moral science.

It is indeed a remarkable fact, that, although different systems of philosophy rose and flourished during the period within which the books constituting the bible were written, its luminous pages are not darkened, nor its pure principles polluted, by the adoption, either wholly or partially, of any one of them. If the inspired writers had occasion to speak of them, they spoke the language of unequivocal condemnation. Those systems, therefore, have passed away, and left the bible in its undiminished beauty and power.

The scriptures teach us, that God formed the body of man of the dust of the earth; and we perceive that it possesses all the properties of matter, and, when decomposed, returns to dust. The human body is a wonderful piece of organized matter. Its different parts, like the parts of a machine, are adapted to each other, and all move in accordance with the mechanical and chemical laws of matter. This organized body possesses *life*, by virtue of which it performs certain involuntary functions and actions, as the beating of the heart, breathing, digestion, &c. Life, whether vegetable or animal, is a mysterious thing. It is within us and around us, and yet it completely eludes all our investigations. We enjoy it, and we see its manifestations; but what it is, we know not. Human, animal, and vegetable bodies have been dissected, and every part subjected to the most careful analysis; but *life* remains a profound mystery. Indeed, the human body abounds in inexplicable mysteries. The eye, viewed as a *lens*, is understood, at

least partially; but *vision* is a mystery. Little is known of the process of digestion; but far less of the conversion of digested food into blood, flesh, bone, and the various fluids of the body. Still, however, the truth is clear, that the body is organized *matter*.

But man is not wholly *material*. There is within him that which does not operate according to the fixed laws, whether mechanical or chemical, which belong to all matter. The limbs move according to mechanical laws which are well understood. We trace the motion through the nerves and muscles; but why do they move now, and remain quiet then? Why do they move now in one direction, and then in another? Behind the nerves and muscles there is a *voluntary agent*. That agent uses the limbs when it chooses, and directs the body whither it would go. It acts not as the instincts of animals. It inquires into the laws of nature, and ascertains its relations to them. It forms far-seeing plans; and it determines upon *ends*, and selects the *means* for their attainment. It looks far ahead, and forms plans, the accomplishment of which will require years of vigorous exertion. It perceives a moral quality in the feelings and actions of intelligent beings, and inquires into human obligations. It leaps the boundary of time, conceives of eternity, and seeks out the means by which to secure eternal felicity. It loves and hates, hopes and fears, rejoices and sorrows, is proud or humble, conscientious or regardless of right. It possesses wonderful powers, powers capable of indefinite improvement, and is filled with an almost endless variety of affections and emotions.

What is that which possesses such properties and capacities? Shall we call it *matter*? But matter is *inert*; this substance is *active*. It thinks unceasingly, unless its activity is suspended by deep sleep, or the injury of the organs through which it acts. It thinks involuntarily. It has power to give direction to its thoughts, but it cannot by any effort cease to think. Matter operates according to fixed laws. Its move-

ments are caused by mechanical or chemical processes. This substance is *voluntary*. It examines motives to action; it chooses and refuses. Its affections are not like the animal appetites, which, when they have been gratified, cease for the time to desire. It perceives in persons lovely qualities, and is filled with emotions of gratitude for favors done. Its affections, when fixed, burn with a steady flame. It is never weary with loving. Matter is *divisible*; this substance is a *unit*. Its thoughts are the actings of an intelligent being who is essentially *one*. It is not the body or the brain that reasons, chooses, refuses, hopes, fears, loves, and hates. What is it?

We know nothing of matter except its properties. We know it is inert, extended, divisible, impenetrable, &c.; but of its intricate nature we know nothing. Of the MIND we know quite as much. We are familiar with its properties and its various manifestations. Are the mind and the body the same substance? Is it philosophical to give the same name to substances whose essential properties are so different and so opposite? Does not difference in the properties of bodies presuppose a corresponding difference in their nature? Do not properties essentially different compel the belief, that the substances in which they reside are essentially different in their nature? Men have so reasoned; and, therefore, in the language of all civilized nations we find words answering to the English words *body* and *spirit*, *matter* and *mind*.

And if man is a being composed of two substances, matter and spirit, there is no reason to suppose that the death of the former will produce any essential change in the latter. The mind, not composed of different particles like the body, is not susceptible of decomposition. Separated from the body, its modes of action may be modified; but its faculties, its affections, and its moral character, will remain unaltered. The mind is, emphatically, *the man*; the body the tenement in which he makes his temporary dwelling—the organization through which, for a time, he acts.

Such are the conclusions, if we mistake not, to which sound reasoning leads; and such is the teaching of the sacred scriptures. When our Saviour would encourage his disciples to discharge their duty to God in the face of persecution, he said: "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul."\* Men may kill the body, but the soul is immortal. It may be separated from the body by death, but it will still live through eternal ages. When he would refute the Sadducees, who denied the resurrection and a future life, he reminded them of the language of scripture: "I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob;" and added this comment: "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living."† The bodies of these men had long since returned to dust; but the men were still living. Paul the apostle was sure, "that if the earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens," and was willing "rather to be absent from the body and present with the Lord."‡ To the penitent thief our Saviour said, "Today thou shalt be with me in paradise." And Stephen, when dying, said, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." Indeed, this doctrine pervades every part of the scriptures. It lies, so to speak, upon the surface, so that he that runs may read. It is at an equal remove from the absurdities of materialism, on the one hand, and, on the other, from the equally absurd idea of some philosophers, that the soul is an emanation from Deity, to be again absorbed in due time. The soul, according to the bible, is truly a *spirit*—an intelligent, free, moral agent; and such, too, is the creed of sound philosophy.

However difficult it may be to determine precisely the original faculties of the mind, and to analyze and classify the emotions; yet that which is of importance for practical purposes is sufficiently plain.

The mind possesses an *intellect*. Man is capable

\* Matt. x, 28.

† Ib. xxii, 32.

‡ II Cor. v, 1-6.

of understanding his relations and the duties arising from them. The whole wide field of truth is spread out before the human intellect. The works of God, the laws of nature, the perfections of the Creator; the relations, duties, and destiny of his rational creatures, as they are seen in nature and in divine revelation; these are the themes on which it is to be exercised, and the sources of its knowledge. The themes are inexhaustible; and to the capacity of the human mind to increase in knowledge we can fix no limits. Philosophers may inquire into the origin of its knowledge—whether it has any *innate ideas*, or whether they are all derived through the medium of the senses, or to what extent they are supplied by consciousness. They may inquire into the philosophy of perception, and how we get the ideas of size, form, and distance. They may investigate the laws of association, according to which, one idea, or class of ideas, suggests another. These are curious speculations, which, perhaps, have their practical use; but some of which, as heretofore conducted, have led to great practical errors. In the mean time, all know that they have ideas; and they know, or may easily know, how to increase their number. All know that the intelligent mind does, through the medium of the senses, perceive external objects; and the most skeptical philosopher cannot so far take leave of his common sense, or of the very laws of his being, as really to doubt the testimony of his senses. All know that one idea, or class of ideas, naturally suggests another. And it may be doubted, after all, whether the most acute philosopher will ever understand much more than the mere *facts* in relation to these mental phenomena.

The inspired writers addressed men as intelligent beings, capable of reasoning, and of understanding their relations and duties, and of being influenced by rational motives. But they deemed it not their business to go into those intricate speculations which have occupied so large a space in systems of mental philosophy, and which have bewildered and misled so

many men of gigantic intellect and extensive learning. With these things the mass of the people cannot, from their circumstances, become acquainted; and there is little prospect that even the learned will soon be agreed concerning them. The scriptures would have been unsuited to the purposes for which they were written, if such speculations had found a place in them.

God treats men as being capable of reasoning concerning their relations, duties, and interests. "Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord." Our Saviour appealed to the Jews, as capable of determining, by the evidences produced, whether he was the Son of God. He appealed to his works, the audible testimony of the Father at his baptism, and to the scriptures.\* Unlike those who regard the masses of the people as fit only to be led; and unlike the clergy of the Church of Rome, who hold them incapable of understanding for themselves the revelation of God; our Saviour made his appeal to their understandings, and called upon them to judge according to evidence. Christianity not only recognizes the existence of *intellect*, but developes and ennobles it by calling it into vigorous exercise in the investigation of the noblest and most sublime themes. Consequently, nothing else is so calculated to promote general intelligence. They whose circumstances prevent the cultivation of their intellectual powers, in scientific pursuits, have them exercised upon subjects of vaster extent and greater sublimity, which, by the inimitable simplicity of the style of the inspired writers, are brought within their reach.

The mind possesses *affections* as well as intellect. It is the subject of a great variety of emotions, of which some are of a moral character, and some are not. The scriptures deal particularly with the *moral affections*, never confounding the two classes. The word *heart* is most frequently used by the inspired

\* John v, 31-47.



writers to express the moral nature and affections of man. The reason of this was given in the preceding chapter. In the intellect, abstractly considered, there is nothing of a moral nature, and the same is true of overt actions. Whatever there is of holiness or unholiness in man is to be found in his heart, his moral affections. These are the main spring of human action; and as they are corrupt or pure, each individual is vicious or virtuous in conduct, a blessing or a curse to others. Pure affections, placed on appropriate objects, become the source of the highest happiness of which man is susceptible. They keep the animal appetites under proper restraint, whilst by the worthy objects on which they are placed, and the noble ends at which they aim, they at once impart happiness to others, and realize an enjoyment which is a foretaste of heaven. Hence it is, that the law of God makes its appeal through the intellect to the affections, and sums up all its claims in the single word—LOVE. “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” “Love,” says the apostle Paul, “is the fulfilling of the law.” There is sound philosophy in the following declarations of the same apostle: “Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity [or *love*] I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.”\* The principle contained in this declaration, is—that the best actions, abstractly considered, may be performed from the worst motives; and the most valuable gifts

\* 1 Cor. xiii, 1—3.

may be rendered not only worthless, but positively injurious, by a selfish and sinful heart. The Pharisees, of old, gave alms to the poor; but they did it to be seen and praised of men. The action was good, but the motive was evil. True virtue, therefore, has its seat in the affections.

And it is worthy of particular remark, that Christianity differs from all other systems of religion, in that it is concerned chiefly with regulating and purifying the affections, and makes the acceptableness of all outward observances depend upon the state of the heart; whilst they have been concerned chiefly, if not exclusively, with the ceremonies of religion. In the days of Isaiah, the Jews had fallen into this popular error, for which God, by the mouth of that prophet, gave them a most indignant rebuke. "Hear the word of the Lord, ye rulers of Sodom; give ear unto the law of our God, ye people of Gomorrah. To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord. I am full of the burnt offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he-goats. When ye come to appear before me, who hath required this at your hand to tread my courts? Bring no more vain oblations; incense is an abomination unto me; the new moons and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies, I cannot away with; it is iniquity, even the solemn meeting. Your new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth; they are a trouble unto me; I am weary to bear them. And when ye spread forth your hands, I will hide mine eyes from you; yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear: your hands are full of blood. Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes. Cease to do evil; learn to do well; seek judgment; relieve the oppressed; judge the fatherless; plead for the widow."\* No matter how zealous and how faithful in attending upon

\* Isa. i, 10—17.

external rites, they could find acceptance only on condition of being truly righteous. Nay, their very zeal in observing divinely appointed ordinances was an abomination. In a similar manner did our Saviour rebuke the Jews in his day, who tithed mint, anise, and cummin, but neglected the weightier matters of the law, justice, judgment, and mercy; and who cleansed the outside of the cup and the platter, but left the inside in its impurity.

This excellency of the scriptures, approved by sound philosophy, is the more remarkable, when we consider how universally the idea prevailed, during the period within which they were written, that to be religious was to be zealous in attending upon ceremonies; and when we consider how large a portion of nominal Christians do still hold this false and injurious sentiment. Look, for example, at the Greek Church, and the Church of Rome. In no part of Christendom are the people, generally, so attentive to the ceremonies of religion, and nowhere is true morality in so low a state. It is no uncommon thing to find a Roman Catholic who could not be induced to eat flesh on Friday, who, nevertheless, is habitually profane. There are multitudes who would not, on any account, fail to kneel before the picture of Christ crucified, in their churches, who will spend a considerable portion of the Sabbath in gambling, and similar immoralities. Nay, in Mexico, South America, and other Romish countries, it is very common for the clergy to officiate at the altar on Sabbath morning, and attend the cockpit in the afternoon. Facts such as these, in the nineteenth century, and among those who boast of infallibility, enable us to appreciate the clearness and the exceeding emphasis with which the inspired writers insist upon pure affections and virtuous conduct, as the very soul of true religion.

The mind possesses not only an intellect and affections, but a *conscience*. It not only perceives in the affections and actions of rational creatures a moral

quality answering to the words *right* and *wrong*, but it experiences a sense of guilt, of ill desert, when it knowingly does wrong, and views with complacency its right actions. Philosophers may dispute whether conscience is a distinct faculty, or whether the feeling may be referred to other faculties; but, that all minds do possess what is called *conscience*, is a fact not to be doubted. The existence and proper office of this faculty (for so we choose to denominate it), the scriptures distinctly recognize. We find recorded in John viii, 7, a remarkable example of its power. The Pharisees, for the purpose of inducing our Saviour to contradict Moses, brought to him a female detected in the commission of disgraceful crime, and said: "Now, Moses in the law commanded us, that such should be stoned; but what sayest thou?" When they insisted upon an answer, he said: "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her. And they which heard it, being convicted by their own conscience, went out one by one, beginning at the eldest even unto the last; and Jesus was left alone, and the woman standing in the midst." A still more remarkable and terrible example of the power of conscience, is afforded by the history of Judas, who sold his Lord for thirty pieces of silver. The love of money was his ruling passion; for he was a thief. When he had received the coveted silver from the corrupt priests, his conscience would not permit him to retain it. He was constrained to return it to them, with the acknowledgment extorted from him: "I have sinned in that I have betrayed the innocent blood." Nor even then did his conscience give him rest, until it drove him to the commission of suicide. Paul speaks of conscience as exerting a powerful influence even upon the heathen. "For, when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts,

their CONSCIENCE also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another.”\*

The scriptures never represent the conscience as a sufficient guide in matters of duty. Like the judge on the bench, it is unable to decide what is right and what is wrong, until it is enlightened by the whole testimony in the case. Under erroneous instruction, it decides erroneously. “I verily thought with myself,” says Paul, “that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth, which thing I also did in Jerusalem,” &c.† His conscience, under false teaching, and the blinding influence of depravity, decided that he ought to persecute Christians, and, if possible, extirpate Christianity. But when it became enlightened, it required him to propagate the very religion he had so zealously persecuted. And in the exercise of his ministry, he said: “Herein do I exercise myself to have always a conscience void of offense toward God and toward man.”‡ Peter exhorted Christians in the midst of persecutions, to have “a good conscience,” that they might put to shame the malignity of their accusers. A good conscience is *enlightened*, not perverted by error or passion; it is *tender*, not seared as with a hot iron; it is an *approving* conscience, which, in the light of divine truth, bears testimony in our favor.

The mind possesses not only an intellect, affections, and conscience, but a *will*. It is capable of choosing and refusing in view of motives. It is not determined by external force or physical necessity. Its choices are *perfectly* free. Many persons are surprised to hear a Calvinist declare his belief in the freedom of the will; but if they would take the trouble to turn to the ninth chapter of the Westminster Confession of Faith, they might read the following declaration: “God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute

\* Rom. ii, 14, 15. † Acts xxvi, 9, 10. ‡ Acts xxiv, 16.

necessity of nature determined, to good or evil." Every mind is free to consider all the motives that come before it, and to choose the course it will pursue. On this subject, as we have seen in a preceding chapter, the language of the bible is perfectly clear.

Now, philosophers may discuss a hundred questions connected with the human body and the human mind, as they are mysteriously united; but the great features of the constitution of man are presented with perfect clearness in the bible. The body is the material organization, with its animal life and its animal appetites. The mind is a spirit, indivisible, active, immortal, possessing an intellect, affections, conscience, will—an intelligent, free, moral agent. Such is a very brief outline of the teaching of the scriptures concerning the nature of man. With these data we may safely pursue our philosophical inquiries, so far as we are capable of understanding our own nature. The division of the human faculties found in the scriptures is simple, natural, clear, and, we might say, complete.

But we cannot so fully appreciate the infallible correctness of the scripture account of the nature and constitution of man, until we take a view of the government under which, according to the scriptures, he is placed. No one could make a system of laws perfectly adapted to man, who does not perfectly understand his nature. The history of the world proves the extreme difficulty attending the making of a perfect system of laws, even for a small portion of the human race. Solon and Lycurgus were celebrated legislators; and yet their codes were very imperfect. The celebrity which they attained, is the strongest evidence of the extreme difficulty attending the business of legislation. But in the scriptures we find man placed under a moral government precisely adapted to his nature and his circumstances. If, after carefully studying human nature, we should apply ourselves to discover a system of laws and of religion

suit to man, we might reason in the following manner :

1. As man is an *intelligent* being, he should have a system which would strongly commend itself to his understanding, as arising out of existing relations, as reasonable, as adapted, if properly regarded, to render him both virtuous and happy.

2. As he possesses a *moral sense*, or *conscience*, which exercises a powerful influence upon his conduct, he must have a system which in its character and requirements will strongly commend itself to his conscience as being *right*.

3. As he possesses *affections*, which constitute his moral character, which are the mainspring of his actions, in the gratification of which he expects his happiness to consist, and which, as acted out, either curse or bless others ; he must have a system which will lay hold of his affections, place them upon proper objects, and afford them gratification.

4. As he possesses a *will*, and must be virtuous, if so at all, from choice, he must have a system which will place before him the strongest motives and encouragements to virtue.

Where shall we find such a system ? a system which will, at once, take hold of the whole mind, and mold it to virtue ? Let us turn to the bible, and there we shall find it. For "the law of the Lord is perfect."

1. It commends itself most powerfully to the human *understanding*. When the bible is presented to us as containing a system of religion, whose author is the Creator of the universe, the first question a reflecting mind would ask, is, *whether God is in truth its author ?* It was written by men ; but they claim to have written immediately "under divine direction. What evidence do they give in support of this claim ? They wrought *miracles* ; and the Son of God wrought miracles in attestation of the truth of the claim. What evidence have we that they wrought miracles, and that they saw Jesus Christ work miracles ? It is

the evidence of *testimony* the most abundant and the most unexceptionable. The facts to be proved were such that there could be no mistake—the instantaneous opening of the eyes of persons born blind, the causing of those lame from birth to enjoy immediate restoration, the healing of incurable maladies, the raising of the dead, and the like. They who testify were eye witnesses to the facts, and some of them did themselves work miracles. They were sincere. They had nothing to gain, but everything to lose by their testimony. Reproach, persecution, and death were their reward.

They predicted future events—events to be fulfilled long after the death of those who uttered them—events in themselves most improbable. For example, the entire destruction of Babylon—a city, which, at the time the predictions were written, was less likely than any other in the world to meet such a fate, and which did not meet it fully until centuries had passed. The dispersion and preservation of the Jews—an event the like of which the history of the human race does not record, yet demonstrably true. We look upon the page of sacred writ which records the prediction, and upon that wonderful people, scattered to the winds, everywhere oppressed for eighteen hundred years, and still existing a distinct people, like the bush enveloped in flames, yet unconsumed.

We turn from the miracles and clear predictions which attest the claims of the writers of that wonderful book to inspiration, and contemplate its moral code. Are its principles sound, and its precepts reasonable and just? Our eye rests upon the Decalogue—that law of laws. We read the first commandment—"Thou shalt have no other gods before me;" we read the second, the third, and on to the tenth. Is there one which does not commend itself to the understanding? Which one would you remove? What other commandment would you add? Make out a complete catalogue of the crimes committed by men, and of all the virtues that can adorn



the human character. Which of the former is not forbidden, directly or indirectly? Which of the latter is not commanded and commended? The law is perfect in its precepts and prohibitions. And then it lays hold of the *affections*; it says, *Thou shalt love*. In a word, examine its prohibitions, its precepts, its rewards and its penalties—its entire character, and the judgment decides, it is perfect.

We turn to the *gospel*. It is a remedy provided by infinite Benevolence for *fallen* man. And is he not fallen? Is he not deeply depraved? Has not God a controversy with him? Read his history in ages past, and observe him now, and answer, is he not fallen? Look at the character of this remedy. It proposes not to save the sinner at the expense of justice. It provides a glorious substitute. He dies, and both the law and the prophets witness the sufficiency of his atonement. It proposes not to save the sinner in his sins, but to deliver him *from* them. It provides the Sanctifier, who renews and purifies his heart, and presents him before God without blemish. Look at the provisions of the gospel, and turn and contemplate its effects upon the character and happiness of man. It humbles the proud, elevates the degraded, fills the covetous with benevolence, binds up the broken hearted, comforts the mourner, inspires the despairing with hope, takes away the sting of death, divests the grave of its gloom. It displays the justice, the truth, the love of God. Look at its effects upon individuals, upon families, upon communities, upon nations. Look, and read in all, the fulfillment of the angelic song at the Redeemer's birth, "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will to men." The bible, as a system of moral law and religion, commends itself most strongly to the human understanding, as from God, and as perfectly adapted to man.

It commends itself to the *consciences* of men. God is most holy, most just, most true, most benevolent, most merciful. God is love, and therefore men *ought*

to love him. God created and upholds men. He is the author of every good gift, and of every perfect gift. Therefore they *ought* to obey him. He so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him might not perish, but have everlasting life. He has been long suffering toward them. By the mercies of God, therefore, an appeal is made to conscience. What does God require? *Love*—love acted out. Is not the claim just? Conscience admits it, and enforces it. He calls for repentance and faith. How can we love him and not repent? Ought not men to repent and confide in him?

The word of God commends itself powerfully to the *conscience*. It lays hold of *the affections*, places them upon proper objects, and affords to them complete gratification. It presents to the affections a God infinitely lovely—a God incarnate, in whom all divine and all human beauties sweetly blend, and who says, "I love them that love me." It tells of all his goodness, mercy, and grace, and appeals to gratitude. It represents all men as "of one blood," as brethren, and invites to mutual benevolence. Love is the fulfilling of the law. Only let all men love God supremely, and each his fellow men as himself, and the deep fountains of human misery will be dried up. Happy in the love of God and of each other, the nations would beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks, and learn war no more.

The scriptures make a powerful appeal to the *will*—placing before the mind motives of infinite moment, and in view of them calling upon men to choose the ways of wisdom, which are pleasantness, and to walk in her paths, which are peace. The love of God, the sufferings of Christ, eternal happiness, and endless misery—these are the great motives of the gospel.

Let us pause and consider the subject thus very briefly and superficially presented. Among all the sins by which men have dishonored God, degraded

themselves, and injured their fellow men, is there one which is not, directly or indirectly, but clearly, forbidden and condemned in the word of God? We affirm, without fear of successful contradiction, that there is not one. Let the infidel find even one, if he can. We challenge him to the investigation. Among all the virtues by which human nature has been elevated, the Creator honored, and the happiness of men increased, is there one which is not inculcated in the scriptures? Look carefully at all the relations which God has constituted, approved, or even tolerated, and consider carefully all the duties growing out of them, and answer the question. Let the husband and wife feel and act as the scriptures direct, and what more can be desired? Let parents and children make the word of God their guide in their feelings and duties toward each other; and what more could either party claim? Let masters render to their servants "that which is just and equal," and servants obey their masters, as the apostles of Christ direct; and what more could be done to make the relation mutually advantageous. Let every one act upon the principle, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even the same to them;" and what more will be required to improve human society? As an epitome of gospel morality take the following: "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things."\*

Again: Look at the actual condition of men, and consider carefully how it might be improved. What is the chief cause of the unhappiness of men? Look at it as a philosopher, and say what is it? Is it not *sin*? Go and trace all the sufferings of the human family to their cause, and say whether Paul did not give it, when he said, "Sin entered into the world"? To sin, directly or indirectly, may be traced every sigh

\* Philip. iv, 8.

that was ever heaved, every groan that was ever uttered, every sorrow that was ever felt. Then, can the *effects* ever be removed, except by the removal of the *cause*? And can there be any thing more efficacious in the removal of sin from the world, than the perfect moral law, and the gospel of God's grace? The one is perfect as a rule; and the other lays hold of degraded men with irresistible power, and raises them to virtue. It is the power of God to salvation.

Is there one *motive* by which men can be influenced to virtue, that is not presented in the bible? If there is, what is it? Have philosophers suggested one? Has Phrenology, with all its boasting, discovered even one? No, not one. Can any of the motives offered in the gospel be strengthened? Can any thing be added to the glories of heaven, on the one hand, or to the horrors of hell, on the other? Can any thing be added to the motives, from the love of God, and the sufferings of Christ, or from the relations men sustain to one another? Let the skeptic, the infidel, the proud philosopher, find one motive to offer, by which virtue may be promoted; or let them add one particle of strength to any motive offered in the gospel, if they can. Let them suggest one additional consideration for the consolation of the afflicted, or for the encouragement of the desponding. Let them try to add or subtract. The law of the Lord is perfect; and He who made it, understood perfectly the constitution of man, and wisely adapted it to his character and condition. When the Son of God gave the commission, "Go, teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe whatsoever I have commanded you;" he appointed the only and allsufficient means for the moral elevation and happiness of man. And when he added, "Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world," he insured the success of those means.

A thousand times have men devised other remedies for the evils of society and the unhappiness of

men; and a thousand times have they sought to improve the system which God has revealed; and as often has the result illustrated the declaration of Paul the apostle: "Esteeming themselves wise, they became fools." It is time that men were satisfied with vain experiments. It is time they should be willing to sit at the feet of Jesus, and learn of him. Let them not seek to separate the *morality* of Christianity from its *doctrines*, as does Spurzheim, and as philosophers have been wont to do. "What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." The one cannot be sustained without the other. Christian morality, unsustained by Christian doctrine, is a cold, powerless thing; and Christian doctrine, without Christian morality, is a body without the soul. They who would enjoy the blessings of Christianity, must take it as its glorious author gave it to them, and "obey from the heart that form of doctrine which was delivered to them."



# M E S M E R I S M ;

AN INVESTIGATION OF ITS

MENTAL AND PHYSICAL PHENOMENA,

AND OF ITS

MORAL TENDENCIES.

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BY N. L. RICE, D. D.

PASTOR OF THE CENTRAL PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, CINCINNATI.

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MESMERISM.

FEW created things are more mysterious to men, than *man*.* From time immemorial his nature, his faculties, and his susceptibilities, have been the subjects of anxious investigation among the learned; and even in our day, not only do new systems of anthropology spring up and gain favor, but new susceptibilities are professedly discovered, and new influences adapted to those susceptibilities, which fill the minds of the ignorant with inexpressible wonder, gain great favor with even learned men who are fond of the marvelous, and puzzle the minds of the more incredulous. It may not be surprising that the ablest writers cannot satisfactorily explain all the wonders of Mesmerism, when we remember that even ordinary *sleep* remains an inexplicable mystery, defying the profoundest investigations of physiologists. Of sleep, Dr. Good says: "I freely confess to you, that although I have endeavored to investigate almost every opinion that has been offered upon it, from the time of Aristotle to our own day, I have never met with anything in the least degree satisfactory, or capable of unraveling the perplexities in which it lies entangled."* It is thought to be caused by whatever exhausts the principle of life, as great muscular excitement, violent pain, and the like; but if such are in truth the causes of sleep, they afford no clue to an explanation of its

* Book of Nature, sec. viii.

nature. Dunglison, an eminent writer on Physiology, says: "The functions of sensibility, voluntary motion, and expression, cannot be indulged for any length of time, without fatigue being induced, and a necessity arising for the reparation of the nervous energy which has been expended during their action. After a time—the length of which is somewhat influenced by habit—the muscles have no longer power to contract, or the external senses to receive impressions; the brain ceases to appreciate; mental and moral manifestations are no longer elicited; the whole of the functions of relation become torpid, and remain in this state until the nervous system has been renovated, and adapted for the repetition of those functions, which, during the previous waking condition, had been exhausted. This state constitutes *sleep*, which, consequently, may be defined—the periodical and temporary suspension of all or most of those functions that connect us with the universe."* This is, probably, as good a definition as can be given; but it leaves the mystery unexplained.

Dreaming, too, is not any better understood than sleep. Anciently, dreams were regarded as supernatural, and were supposed to reveal future events. Bishop Newton, and Baxter, divided dreams into two kinds, good and evil, and ascribed the former to angels, and the latter to evil spirits. But, what is dreaming? "Dreaming," says Dunglison, "is now properly considered to be an irregular action of the brain, in which the agency of the great controlling power of the will is suspended, and the memory and imagination are allowed unlimited sway, so that the most singular and heterogeneous ideas are formed—still kept, however, somewhat in train by the force of association." It has been a question, whether the mind ever ceases to think, even during the profoundest sleep. This question, Dr. Good thinks, can only have been proposed by persons who have not paid a due attention to a variety of phenomena that are perpetually

* Human Physiology, vol. ii, p. 574.

occurring, as in complete paroxysms of apoplexy, sleepy coma, suspended animation from drowning, and the like. In these states, he affirms, that no man is conscious of a single thought or idea. But the most that can be certainly affirmed is, that men, on being relieved from such states, do not *remember* any mental exercises. This fact, however, would not prove that the mind was inactive. For, in *somnambulism* the mind is often intensely active, and the individual not only walks even over difficult and dangerous places, but writes, converses, or performs correctly ordinary business; and yet, on awaking, he has not the slightest recollection of anything that has occurred. If the activity of the mind during sleep continues, its thoughts will, of course, produce emotions more or less powerful. And as, during waking hours, thousands of thoughts pass through the mind which are wholly forgotten, while those attended with strong emotions, painful or pleasing, are generally remembered; so those dreams only which excite the feelings strongly, will be recalled. To what extent the mind, in dreaming, uses the bodily organs, cannot be certainly known. The exercise of the will, it is said, is suspended. This, however, is not uniformly the case; for in sleep, as Dunglison remarks, "intellectual operations are sometimes effected in a surprising manner; difficulties being occasionally solved which have obtained the mastery during waking. Condorcet saw in his dreams the final steps of a difficult calculation, which had puzzled him during the day; and Dr. Gregory, of Edinburgh, composed thoughts, and clothed them in words, which were so just in point of reasoning, and so good in point of language, that he used them in his lectures, and in his written lucubrations." Dr. Good states, that a friend of his, who was passionately fond of music, on one occasion, during sleep, composed a very beautiful little ode of about six stanzas, and set the same to very agreeable music, the impression of which was so firmly fixed in his memory, that he was able the next

day to copy from recollection, both the music and the poetry. "In these cases," says Dunglison, "the will must direct, more or less, the intellectual process." But the controlling power of the will is often suspended in our waking hours, and the mind, following the laws of association, flies from object to object with singular rapidity, until it lights upon something which interests the feelings, and by them is confined for a time. But after all that learned physiologists have written on the subject, dreaming is a mysterious thing. The will, it is true, seems to be, at least, partially inoperative, and the "trains of ideas which persevere in rushing over the mind are produced and catenated by that general habit of association which catenates them while we are awake." These, however, are not all, nor even the most remarkable features of dreaming. In our waking hours, as we have said, the mind thinks, and often without attempting to give direction to its thoughts, wanders uncontrolled; but in dreaming, we seem to see, to hear, to speak, and our emotions are produced by persons, objects, and events, which seem actually before us.

If sleep and dreaming are so mysterious, *somnambulism* is even more so. "There is a kind of dreaming," says Dunglison, "in which the sleep is less profound than during ordinary dreams; when the body has, consequently, more capability of receiving external impressions, but where the will has a certain degree of power over the muscles of voluntary motion, but imperfectly regulates the thoughts. This is *somnambulism*, or *sleep walking*. During the continuance of this state, the individual can apparently see, hear, walk, write, paint, speak, taste, smell, &c., and perform his usual avocations, yet remain in other respects so soundly asleep, that it is impossible to awake him without making use of violence. Cases are on record, of an authentic nature, of individuals who have risen from bed asleep with their eyes closed, and have not only walked about the room or house, going up or down stairs, finding their way readily

and avoiding obstacles, but have passed through dangerous places, as windows or on the roofs of houses. They have executed, too, yet more difficult feats; such as dressing themselves, going out of doors, lighting a fire, bathing, saddling and bridling a horse, riding, composing verses, &c., and executing all the actions of life correctly, and even acutely; yet, they have been asleep during the whole of these acts." In this state, the person, as Dr. Drake remarks, "will wander among objects in the dark, without encountering them, even when blindfolded; and should he undertake to perform a work which is generally directed by the sense of sight, he appears to be capable of going on with it, while screens impenetrable to light are interposed between his eye and hand. At other times he uses light, or *seems* to use it, and has been known, when his candle was snuffed out, to relight it, and then proceed with his manipulations. In this state, whether silent or talkative, he is generally inattentive to what is said to him, and even to the loudest noises, as he is insensible, in a great degree, to bright lights, to strong odors, and to impressions, whether painful or pleasurable, on his nerves of feeling. But every now and then, he will unexpectedly address himself to an attendant, whom he had immediately before refused to recognize; and in other instances, after many questions had been asked without answers being returned, he has made a distinct reply. Whether he himself had put the question or made the reply, the individual thus recognized may generally, thenceforth, maintain intercourse with him, and more or less control the current of his thoughts and actions."

There is a species of somnambulism which is caused, perhaps, by a diseased condition of the brain and nervous system, some of the phenomena of which are truly wonderful. In 1834, an account was published by Dr. L. W. Belden, of JANE C. RIDER, a native of Vermont, who was called "*The Springfield Somnambulist*." Her mother died suddenly from disease of

the brain, and she herself had been subject from childhood to frequent headaches, and other symptoms, arising from an undue determination of the blood to the head. A small spot on the left side of the head had been tender, and was painful when pressed, and particularly so when she was suffering from headache. Her eyes were extremely sensitive to light, so that she found it necessary to wear a veil when she walked out during the day. The singular affection of which she was afterwards the subject, commenced with what was supposed to be derangement, on the night of the 24th of June, from which she was relieved by an emetic. About a month after this, she had another paroxysm, during which she dressed herself, went down to the kitchen, and proceeded to make preparations for breakfast. She set the table, arranged the various articles with the utmost precision, went into a dark room and to a closet at the most remote corner, from which she took the coffee cups, placed them on a waiter, turned it sideways to pass through the doors, avoided all intervening obstacles, and deposited the whole safely on the table. She went into the pantry, the blinds of which were closed, skimmed the milk, poured the milk into one cup and the cream into another without spilling a drop, cut the bread, and placed it on the plate. "In fine," says her physician, "she went through the whole operation of preparing breakfast with as much precision as she could in open day; and this with her eyes closed, and without any light except that of one lamp, which was standing in the breakfast room to enable the family to observe her operations. During the whole time, she seemed to take no notice of those around her, unless they purposely stood in her way, or placed chairs or other obstacles before her, when she avoided them, with an expression of impatience at being thus disturbed." She finally returned to bed, and had not the slightest recollection, on awaking, of anything that had occurred. On another occasion she imagined herself at Brattleborough, and spoke of scenes and

persons known to her there. She denied ever having been at Springfield (where she then was living), nor could she be made to recollect a single individual with whom she was acquainted there, except those she had known at Brattleborough. Even the name of the family with whom she lived, was not recognized. At one time she not only arranged the table, but really prepared a dinner in the night, cooking the various articles of food as well as when awake. She saw as well, apparently, with her eyes closed as when they were open. Sitting in almost entire darkness, she read a great number of cards which were presented to her, some of which were written with a pencil, and so obscurely, that in a faint light no trace could be discerned by common eyes. She told the dates of coins, even when the figures were nearly obliterated. "On Wednesday, November 20th," says her physician, "I took a large black silk handkerchief, and placed between the folds two pieces of cotton batting, and applied it in such a way that the cotton came directly over the eyes, and completely filled the cavity on each side of the nose. The silk was seen to be in close contact with the skin. Various names were then written on cards, both of persons with whom she was acquainted, and of those who were unknown to her, which she read as soon as they were presented to her. This was done by most of the persons in the room. In reading, she always held the paper the right side up, and brought it into the line of vision."

In these and similar phenomena we cannot but perceive a striking resemblance to those said to attend the *mesmeric sleep*. They are profoundly mysterious. Physiologists may speculate concerning them; but it is scarcely probable that they will ever be understood. We need not be surprised, therefore, if in examining the claims of Mesmerism, we should find some things difficult to explain or account for.

What estimate shall we form of Mesmerism? If the half that is confidently asserted and testified of it be true, it is indeed a wonderful discovery. "The

estimate," says Dr. Drake, "of the phenomena of Mesmerism, by different minds, presents us with examples of the easiest credulity, and the most obstinate unbelief, not less than a reasonable skepticism. This ultraism has arisen from want of analysis. Among the phenomena, there are some which have their prototypes in nature; others which have not. To indulge in a spirit of infidelity in regard to the former, is quite as absurd as to cherish credulity in reference to the latter; and still, many persons have grouped the whole, and affirmed or denied their truth *en masse*." Let us endeavor, if possible, to steer a middle course, admitting nothing without evidence, denying nothing which is fairly proved.

We have said that Mesmerism, if the one half that is affirmed of it by its advocates be indeed true, is a wonderful discovery—is decidedly the most wonderful of this or any other age; throwing into the shade the propelling power of steam, and the "lightning talk" of the telegraph. Dr. Caldwell, of Louisville, who, having, as he says, "borne and breasted the war storm alone" in defense of Phrenology, during the space of twelve years, is now equally zealous and confident of success in doing battle for Mesmerism, sets forth its wonders in the following language: "For one person completely to identify another with himself—sense with sense—sentiment with sentiment—thought with thought—movement with movement—will with will—and I was near saying, existence with existence—and to gain over him so entire a control, as to be able to transport him, in his whole mind and being, over mountains, seas, and oceans, into distant lands, and disclose to him there the objects and scenes which actually exist—of which he was utterly ignorant before, and becomes alike ignorant again, when restored to his usual condition of existence—and, higher and grander still, to waft him at pleasure through space, to any or all of the heavenly bodies, of which we have any knowledge, and converse with him about them—such deeds as these may well be

called amazing! Yet are they as easy, certain, and speedy of performance, as many of the most common transactions of life." Again: "Of all the phenomena, as elsewhere observed, which I have ever witnessed, or of which I have any conception, those of Mesmerism seem best calculated to give to the mind or spirit of man some antepast of the existence and character of its exercises when separated from the body. This is true, especially of its darting with light-like swiftness at the will of the mesmerizer, from country to country, and from one heavenly body to another, observing what they contain, and making its comments on them. Compared with such phenomena, all the fervid and high-flown bursts of eloquence, on the condition and employment of human spirits, in a future state of being, are, in my view, comparatively feeble and unimpressive."* If these things be so, we can scarcely charge the doctor, in the fervor of his zeal, with overstating the wonderful character of *the science*. And of these truths, if we believe him, we may be easily and perfectly satisfied. The success of those who are doing battle for it, he says, "will be achieved by so slight a struggle, that the victors will derive from it no palm of honor." He declares the contest to be "as susceptible of an immediate, easy, and certain decision, as would be a dispute about the product of the union of sulphuric acid with soda, zinc, or any other substance;" and that he has himself done, "in a single hour, what ought to convince, and, did he witness it, *would* convince any unprejudiced, candid, and intelligent man, of the *entire* truth of mesmerism, and of its usefulness to a certain extent."

It may be so; but when we remember, that Mesmerism has been known to the world nearly a century, and that, as yet, it cannot claim as converts more than a small portion of the intelligent and the learned; we are constrained to doubt the perfect clearness of the evidence upon which its claims to a place

* Facts in Mesmerism, &c. pp. 21-23.

among the sciences are based. And our doubts are increased, when we take into view the extreme facility with which men generally give credence to marvelous things, especially when they do not conflict with their pursuits and pleasures. A tolerably expert fortune teller can turn the heads of half the people in almost any neighborhood. We have seen a dozen horses standing at the door of a weak minded old woman, who professed to cure divers maladies by rubbing the diseased parts with her hands. She was, indeed, quite successful, for a time; and even intelligent people visited her from a distance. Some years since, a colored man came to Cincinnati, and proclaimed his skill in detecting and healing diseases of all kinds. The person diseased was directed to dip his fingers into a glass of clear water, and send or take it to the black doctor. On receiving it he put into the glass three small balls, and by their motion, with other conjurations equally sensible, he determined the character of the disease, and often gave quite a history of the ailments of the patient. Strange as it may appear, his success was, for a length of time, astonishing. Multitudes resorted to the Negro doctor; and he effected wonderful cures, and filled his pockets with something more substantial than his cures. Intelligent people bore testimony to the accuracy of his descriptions of their sufferings, and the success of his prescriptions. At length the bubble burst—the imposture was detected; and the black doctor was despised as much as he had been admired. There is in human nature a strong proclivity to the belief of the marvelous. To this feature in our nature Mesmerism, more than any other professed discovery in science, makes an appeal, while it does not awaken prejudice by any requirement of moral reform. The fact that, with such advantages, its claims have been so generally rejected or questioned, compels us to doubt whether Dr. Caldwell has not very much overestimated the evidence by which they are sustained.

What is Mesmerism? "By Mesmerism," says Dr. Caldwell, "I mean a peculiar influence, or general effect, which one person is able to produce on the system of another, by the eyes or the entire countenance and the *will*, accompanied by given movements of the hands, either in contact with some part of the body of the individual mesmerized, or at a short distance from it, at the option of the mesmerizer—or, I mean the science and art, by which the phenomena referred to are produced." This definition, or explanation, is sufficient to satisfy us how little is known of this wonderful science, even by its most learned admirers. Mesmerism, we are told, is "a peculiar influence, or general effect." This peculiar influence, or general effect, is produced by the eyes or whole countenance and the will, together with certain manipulations. Is there a *subtile fluid* set in motion by the countenance, the will, and the *passes* of the hands, which causes the wonderful effects which constitute the mesmeric phenomena? Or has the countenance, together with the will and the manipulations of one individual, such power over the mind and body of another? Dr. Caldwell professes entire ignorance on this subject. "On the immediate or efficient cause of mesmeric influence," says he, "having no definite knowledge of it, I do not design to hazard a theory. Well defined and incontrovertible *facts*, not fancies, hypotheses, or empty opinions, constitute the only objects of my regard." Still, however, we cannot divest ourselves of the conviction, that every *effect* has a *cause*, and that effects so amazing as the mesmeric phenomena must proceed from a cause equally wonderful. One would think that scientific gentlemen would be deeply interested in searching for this cause.

The advocates of Mesmerism have not all been so modest in their pretensions, as Dr. Caldwell. They have sought for the cause of the phenomena of the science, and are much divided upon this subject. "There are now," says Dr. Caldwell, "three schools of animal magnetism, two of which differ widely from

each other in opinion, as it respects the agents with which they operate." The first, which is that of Mesmer, work by *physical agency* alone; and by frictions, touches, passes, and grasps, they occasion, as they say, the passage of a subtile fluid, or ether, from the magnetizer to the magnetized, or the reverse, by which the effects that follow are produced. "These," says Caldwell, "are the genuine *animal magnetists*." The second school, which is that of Chevalier Barbarin of Lyons, operate exclusively by the psychological effects of *faith* and *volition*, and are hence called *spiritualists*. They either wholly reject all physical means, or regard them as mere accessories, and assert that the effects attributed by others to animal magnetism, are the product of resolution in the operator, and of his energetic volition; and that he can effect his purpose as well when somewhat remote from his patient, as when in contact with him. With this school Dr. Caldwell seems strongly to sympathize. "Startling and incredible as this position *may* and *does* appear," says he, "to those who have never seen it realized, and who have no knowledge of mesmerism, it is notwithstanding true. The *will*, in some cases, is *alone* sufficient (the subject being at a distance, and unconscious of the operator's intention), for the production of mesmeric somnambulism, and the manifestation of its most extraordinary phenomena."

The third school of mesmerists is that of the Marquis de Puysegur, of Strasburg, which occupies a middle ground, operating both with physical and psychological agents, such as frictions, touches, passes, grasps, the eye, the will, &c.

The celebrated *Andrew Jackson Davis*, whose mesmeric "revelations" have attracted some attention, has delivered his revelations on this subject; and since they are the *dicta* of Mesmerism itself, his deliverances certainly should settle the controversy among the admirers of the science. He says, when all the parts of the body are in perfect unison and harmony, "then the system is thoroughly *magnetized*."

In order to *dcmagnetize* it, you must in some way overcome the equilibrium, and extract the positive power by a power still more positive, and this will produce the unconscious state called the magnetic." The state termed magnetic, he says, is produced in the following manner: "One system coming in contact with another of less positive power, will be attractive (the attraction depending upon the medium universally established), and will attract the positive power from the patient or subject, with whom the former is in contact; and the positive or magnetic, which is attracted from the subject's system, is that which exists upon the nerves of sensation, which terminate in the serous surfaces. This fluid being withdrawn, the patient is not susceptible of external impressions, simply because the medium by which these are transmitted is *absent*. He is then *dcmagnetized*—leaving sensation only existing upon the internal, or mucous surfaces, which produce vital action. The negative power remains; the positive does not remain. Vital action becomes torpid and feeble, according to the loss of power which previously controlled it. This is the magnetic state; and in this peculiar condition, the patient is in sympathy with, or is submissive to the will or positive magnetic power of the operator." The chain of sympathy which connects the mind of the operator with that of his subject, he tells us, "is *animal electricity*—the same fluid which is the agent of all muscular motion. It is through the agency of this fluid that the magnetic sleep is induced." The electric fluid, he farther informs us, passes from the brain and nerves of the operator to the brain and system of his patient—"his will being exercised to this point"—and forms between the two a chain of sympathy. "The one, then, is completely under the control of the other," &c. There are properly, according to our clairvoyant, *four* magnetic states—the first, in which only a feeling of dullness pervades the system; the second, in which

the patient manifests his intellectual faculties, but is deprived of muscular power, in the latter part of which all sensation and feeling are destroyed, the external organs are closed, and no impression can be received but through the medium of the operator. In this condition the patient appears mentally associated with the operator. The third, in which the external senses are more completely closed; and the fourth, which is the *clairvoyant*.

A brief history of the discovery of Mesmerism may aid us in forming a correct estimate of its claims. The admirers of the science claim for it a very high antiquity. Dr. Caldwell finds it, "or something tantamount to it," in Egypt, near four thousand years ago. He thinks the priesthood of that country, in common with a like fraternity in Chaldea, who constituted the faculty of medicine, practiced it with the address and dexterity of a well devised and long pursued art, and with all the solemnity of a religious ceremony, under the immediate supervision of their gods. "We are informed by Prosper Alpinus," he remarks, "that those dignitaries of the temple and the lazar-house, not only treated their patients by certain mysterious manual operations, or the imposition of hands, but often enveloped them in the skins of animals deemed sacred, and conveyed them into their consecrated shrines, and other holy places, there to be visited by dreams, trances, and pretended inspirations, which were believed to come down on them through the agency of heaven." The Doctor also finds something of the same kind in the ceremonies performed by the ancient Greeks, at the cave of Trophonius, and the shrine of Æsculapius, and in the vague and equivocal communications and visions invoked and received in the temples of their gods; also in the religious rites practiced by the Romans. We may venture to doubt, without being chargeable with an unreasonable skepticism, whether any one less ardent in his attachment to Mesmerism than the Doctor, would ever think of looking for it among the

superstitious rites of the ancient pagans. It is sufficiently evident that they relied upon something very different, in order to effect the cure of diseases. We are still more surprised that he should profess to have found anything like Mesmerism among the ancient Jews! But he informs us, with all gravity, that "even among the Hebrews, the chosen people of heaven, where, if in any nation, truth and reality ought not and would not be sacrificed to fiction and show—even there, the wisest of their teachers and the holiest of their prophets believed in and practiced the sympathetic influence and healing power of corporeal contact. Thus, to effect the revival of the widow's son, Elijah thrice stretched his body on the body of the child. And in restoring to life the young Shunamite, Elisha did the same." Now, we do not believe that Dr. C., with all his admiration for Mesmerism, and with all his confidence in its miraculous virtues, would attempt to restore to life a dead man by mesmerizing him; nor would he have the least hope of reviving him by stretching himself upon the dead body. Why those ancient prophets thus acted, we pretend not to know; but, Elijah "cried unto the Lord, and said, O Lord my God, I pray thee, let this child's soul come into him again;" and a similar prayer was offered by Elisha. In the name and by the power of God they wrought those miracles. There is no true believer in the inspiration of the scriptures, who would not be shocked at hearing the most stupendous miracles which they record ascribed to mesmeric influence. We are satisfied that the advocates of this *science* (if so we may call it), will gain no advantage in its favor by representations of this kind. (But when the miracles of our Lord himself are connected with Mesmerism, if not attributed wholly to its influence, we must consider such views not only absurd, but even impious.) We regret to find in Dr. Caldwell's Dissertation on Mesmerism, the following remarks: "Nor are we without a still higher and more authoritative example to the same effect. In many, if not in most instances,

the Messiah himself associated, with his acts of healing, the *laying on of hands*. And though that part of the ceremony was not necessary to him—his higher attributes preventing such necessity—yet, as he always, in his phraseology, costume, and general deportment as a man, conformed to the habits, fashions, and even the prejudices, of the times, that he might avoid giving offense, there can be no doubt that he adopted, on the same ground, the form of action in healing to which I have referred. He applied his hand, and *removed* diseases which common operators only *mitigated*." Now, it is scarcely necessary for us to say, that there is not a particle of evidence in support of the fact which Dr. C. regards as undoubtedly true. His ardent attachment to Mesmerism, and his warm imagination, have enabled him to discover in the gospel what few, if any, others ever found. But when he seems to assign to our Lord only the honor of being an extraordinary mesmeric operator, we must regard the sentiment as infinitely dishonoring to the Saviour of men. It is the boldness with which the advocates of Phrenology and Mesmerism pervert the language of inspiration (with which too generally they have little acquaintance), which renders it necessary for Christians to take their stand in firm opposition to them.

Whatever "curious arts" have been practiced among pagan nations, we may properly regard M. Mesmer, a German physician, who lived in the latter part of the last century, as the father of the so-called science which has taken his name. Dr. Caldwell regards him as "by far the most famous, and, in some respects, the most successful magnetizer the world has produced." But, notwithstanding his skill in the science which the Doctor almost idolizes, he gives him rather a bad character. From an early period of his life, he informs us, Mesmer entertained wild and visionary notions respecting the production and cure of disease. "Without being an astrologer, in the usual acceptation of the term, he had rather

whimsical and extravagant fancies in relation to the influence of the heavenly bodies, in removing complaints, as well as in exciting them." And, though he pronounces him the ablest and most successful magnetic operator, he regards him as "far from being the most honest and praiseworthy." On the contrary, he admits that he "is too justly regarded as, *practically* speaking, one of the most flagrant impostors that has disgraced the profession. And his imposture was as selfish and unprincipled as it was deliberate, well devised and matured, and artfully executed. To produce effect, excite the wonder and applause of the multitude, and *accumulate wealth*—no matter how nefarious and revolting the means of action—were his only objects. And for the accomplishment of these (the *latter*, especially being the pole star of his movements* and measures), he possessed by nature extraordinary powers. Nor did he refrain from exercising and strengthening them, with a reckless determination, and a daring indecency, that have rarely been equaled. By this course of glaring offensiveness and fraudulent imposition, he brought down on himself and his doctrines a degree of odium, which has done more than all other causes to prejudice the world against Mesmerism, and retard the adoption and diffusion of its truths."

We will not say, it is impossible that a discovery so wonderful and so eminently useful to the world as Mesmerism is represented to be, should have been discovered by so base a man as M. Mesmer; but most assuredly the fact that it was brought to light by an uncommonly erratic genius, and by a man chargeable not only with gross imposture, but even with indecency, speaks nothing to its credit. History, if we mistake not, does not teach us to look to such men for the most valuable discoveries, or to expect the most sublime of all sciences to be found, in its origin, in such company. "The waters," as Rev. C. H. Townsend, a zealous advocate of Mesmerism, well remarks, "come not to us pure, but from a fountain-

head that is itself disturbed and sullied ; so that, instead of spreading forth into a lucid mirror, reflecting heaven and earth, and enlivening all around, they stagnate in a thick and blinding marsh."

However degraded the moral character of Mesmer was, his success in France, for a considerable time, was astonishing. For a time, Dr. Caldwell tells us, he threw Paris, if not the whole kingdom of France, into a feverish ecstasy, almost as enthusiastic and wild as if the entire population had been under the mystical influence of the magnetizer. He furnished himself with magnets of various forms and sizes, operated with them himself, and distributed them to others. We cannot so well give the history of his further progress and success, as in the language of Dr. Caldwell:

"Preparatory to the career he was about to commence, and as no ordinary means for the achievement of success in it, he selected, as the temple of his mystic rites, and the theater of his magical exhibitions, a spacious and magnificent edifice, in a fashionable quarter of the metropolis of France, and furnished it in a style of surpassing elegance. His carpets, sofas, ottomans and mirrors, chairs, tables, imagery, and curtains, were as splendid and costly as Paris could supply. And the grounds without and around his mansion were as tasteful and attractive as the furniture within. Marbled and tessellated walks lined with orange trees, and ornamented with grassy and violet-clad borders, statuary highly-finished and beautiful, marble basins, urns, and vases, and crystal fountains flashing amidst the sunbeams, united in the creation of an earthly elysium. Music, of varied and enchanting excellence, made, in like manner, an element in the fascination of the place. So also did the delicious fragrance and temperature of the saloons, heightened in their effects by a soft and shadowy obscurity, approaching that of twilight, produced by the skillful arrangement of curtains and drapery. Nor was this all.

"To aid him in his enterprise, Mesmer employed, as ministers and acolytes, in the processes to be practiced, some of the handsomest and most portly and accomplished youths in Paris, decorated in rich and graceful costumes; while he himself, as the high priest of the ceremony, was fancifully robed in oriental sumptuousness, and presided over the ministry, like a chief of the Magi.

"Such was the array of the apparatus and its accompaniments, with which this reputed magician went to work. And the effects of his means and operations were enhanced not a little by the constitutions and susceptibilities of the individuals who became the subjects of them.

"Mesmer's patients were mostly females, many of them of high Parisian rank and refinement, some in the early flower of youth, and others in the ripe flush of womanhood, and not a few of them as beautiful as they were delicate. Partly, moreover, in obedience to fashion, and their own love of toilet decorations, and partly in emulation of the costumes of those with whom they were to mingle in the saloons of the magnetizer, they were habited in the highest style of the day dress of the time. Nor, from the nature of the occasion, their ardent expectancy, and the deep impressiveness of the pageantry around them, could they fail to be under an inordinate excitement. Of this the natural effect must have been to fire their imaginations, give a higher intensity to the glow of their complexions, and add not a little to the radiance of the scene.

"With sufficient facility and effect might another Fenelon have portrayed, from the impassioned and not over virtuous cortége which here presented itself, another voluptuous court of Calypso. It could hardly be deemed extravagant in me to alledge, that by the bloom of their countenances, and the luster of their eyes, such patients might have contributed toward the magnetizing of each other. That they must have acted to that effect upon the youthful and warm-

blooded ministers of the ceremonial, it would be stoicism to doubt.

"In such an assemblage of the most sensitive class of by far the most sensitive people on earth (for such is believed to be the condition of refined and cultivated Frenchwomen), it was impossible for Mesmer's artful and imposing operations not to be productive of astonishing effects. No wonder, therefore, that hysterical weeping, sobbing, laughing, and screaming; raving, dancing, convulsions, and fainting, should have occurred, as elements of the impassioned and disorderly spectacle. It would have been sufficiently wonderful had the case been otherwise. Nor was it, perhaps, possible, for commotions so tumultuous and violent to have assailed the brain and nerves of delicate women, without producing in them decided changes of condition and action. Was disease present? they must have altered it for better or worse—removed it or confirmed it. And, as we are confidently assured, conformable to this view of the subject was the result."

So great was the excitement produced by the wonders of Mesmerism, and so extensively was the art practiced that, in the year 1784, the French king appointed a committee, consisting of four physicians, and five members of the Royal Academy of Sciences, to investigate the matter. Of the latter, the members were Benjamin Franklin, then American minister to France, Le Roi, Bailley, De Bori, and Lavoisier. With these a number of eminent physicians were associated. Dr. Caldwell, who, in consequence of the character of their report, is not likely to be prejudiced in their favor, says of them: "As relates to these members of the several committees of inquiry, Franklin, their president, was the first philosopher of the age; and each of the others, especially Jussieu, was of high rank, not only in medicine, but also in the range of general science." But he adds: "In animal magnetism, however, they were entirely unversed, and, therefore, but *ill qualified*, if not positively

disqualified, for the interesting and responsible trust reposed in them." The design of this remark is, of course, to destroy public confidence in their report, which was decidedly unfavorable to Mesmerism. The Doctor, when he made it, must have forgotten what he had previously written, viz: That the contest about Mesmerism is "as susceptible of an immediate, easy, and certain decision, as would be a dispute about the product of the union of sulphuric acid with soda, zinc, or any other substance;" that, "of either question the solution must be drawn from the result of experiments alike simple and easily performed;" that, "in each case, *ten* experiments, *correctly* performed, and *identical* in their issue, are as conclusive as *ten thousand*;" and that he has himself "done in a single hour what ought to convince, and, did he witness it, *would* convince any unprejudiced, candid, and intelligent man, of the *entire* truth of Mesmerism." Now, if it is true, that the question about the claims of Mesmerism is of so easy solution; if to solve it satisfactorily requires but an hour's attention from an unprejudiced, candid, and intelligent man; we cannot conceive with what consistency the Doctor can declare that learned committee unqualified, if not *disqualified*, for the investigation. That they were intelligent, and even very learned, he admits. Their candor he does not question; and there is no evidence, so far as we know, that they were under the influence of prejudice. The report of such a committee, under the circumstances, must be considered as justly entitled to great weight—far greater, surely, than the testimony of men of greatly inferior acquirements, called in for a single evening to witness experiments.

"The first step of the commissioners was to examine the mode and instruments of operation, and the effects of the agent. It was observed that M. Delson [a disciple of Mesmer] operated upon many individuals at the same time. In the middle of a large room was placed a circular chest of oak, raised about a foot from the floor, which was called the *baquet*.

The lid of this chest was pierced with a number of holes, through which there issued movable and curved branches of iron. The patients were ranged in several circles round the chest, each at an iron branch, which, by means of its curvature, would be applied directly to the diseased part. A cord, which was passed round their bodies, connected them with one another; and sometimes a second chain of communication was formed by means of the hands, the thumb of each one's left hand being received and pressed between the fore finger and thumb of the right hand of his neighbor. Moreover, a *piano forte* was placed in a corner of the room, on which different airs were played; sound being, according to the principles of Mesmer, a conductor of magnetism. The patients, thus ranged in great numbers round the *baquet*, received the magnetic influence at once by all these means of communication; by the branches of iron, which transmitted to them the magnetism of the *baquet*; by the cord entwined round the body; by the union of thumbs, which conveyed to each the magnetism of his neighbor; and by the sound of the music, or of an agreeable voice, which diffused the principle through the air. The patients were, besides, directly magnetized, by means of the finger of the magnetizer, and a rod of iron which he moved about before the face, above or behind the head, and over the diseased parts, always observing the distinctions of the magnetic poles, and fixing his countenance on the individual. But above all, they were magnetized by the application of the hands, and by the pressure with the fingers upon the hypochondria and the abdominal regions, which was often continued for a long time, occasionally for several hours together.”*

The effects which followed were various, and some of them surprising. Some of the patients remained unaffected; some were affected with coughing and spitting; some felt pains, heats, and perspirations;

* Dr. Reese's New Encyclopedia.

and some experienced violent convulsions, which were extraordinary in number, severity, and duration. In some instances, they continued *three hours*. The commissioners say: "Nothing can be more surprising to, or more inconceivable by those who have not witnessed it, than the spectacle of these convulsions; all seem to be under the power of the magnetizer; a sign from him, his voice, his look, immediately arouses them from a state even of apparent sopor." And they add: "It was impossible not to recognize in these constant effects, a great power or agency, which held the patients under its dominion, and of which the magnetizer appeared to be the sole depository." The convulsive and lethargic state is called the *crisis*.

The commissioners remarked, on frequently witnessing the same experiments, that of those who fell into the *crisis*, the great majority were women; that the *crises* were not effected in less than an hour or two; and that so soon as one person was thus taken, the rest were similarly seized in a very short time. Unable to obtain satisfactory results from experiments upon so many persons at once, they resolved to try experiments upon individuals, in a more private way, to ascertain the direct effects of the newly discovered agent on the animal economy, in a state of health; and they determined to become themselves the subjects of the first experiments. Ranged around the *baquet*, they submitted to be magnetized by M. Delson, once a week, for two hours and a half. The most irritable and delicate of them were magnetized the most frequently and for the longest time. But none of them experienced any sensations that could be attributed to Mesmerism. They concluded, therefore, "*That magnetism has no agency in a state of health, or even in a state of slight indisposition.*"

They then resolved to try experiments on diseased persons. Seven persons of the lower class were magnetized by M. Delson; but the effects produced were very slight. Four persons of intelligence, in bad health, were then magnetized; of whom three

experienced nothing, and the fourth, a nervous lady, was several times on the point of falling asleep, and felt some uneasiness. On another occasion, a large number of persons, of whom several were Delson's patients, were magnetized at the house of Dr. Franklin; but none of them were much affected, except those patients who had been magnetized before. Of *fourteen* invalids, *five* only experienced any effects; and one of these was a very nervous lady, and three others were of the lower class. The commissioners, therefore, began strongly to suspect that the effects which had been ascribed to Mesmerism, were really attributable to an excited *imagination*. They, consequently, directed their experiments with a view to determine how far such effects might be produced by this cause. They applied to M. Jumelin, who magnetized just as did Mesmer and Delson, except that he made no distinction of the magnetic *poles*. Eight men and two women were operated on; but none of them experienced anything. At length, a female servant of Dr. Le Roy experienced certain sensations in those parts of the body toward which M. Jumelin moved his hand. But when her eyes were bandaged, the magnetizer removed to a distance, and she induced to believe she was magnetized, precisely the same effects followed, although no one operated either near her or at a distance. At the end of fifteen minutes, Delson was directed to magnetize her stomach, and then her back; but no effects followed. Here the evidence was conclusive, that the effects produced were to be ascribed to the imagination. The same experiments were made upon many individuals, and with similar results. M. Sigault, an eminent physician of Paris, communicated to the commissioners several facts, showing that the effects attributed to animal magnetism could be produced by exciting the imagination. "Having announced," says he, "in a great house, that I was an adept in the art of Mesmer, I produced considerable effect upon a lady who was there. The voice and serious air which I affected made an

impression upon her, which she at first attempted to conceal; but, having carried my hand to the region of the heart, I found it palpitating. Her state of oppression also indicated a tightness in the chest, and several other symptoms speedily ensued: the muscles of the face were affected with convulsive twitches, and the eyes rolled; she fell down in a fainting fit," &c. In a similar way he relieved a certain artist, who was suffering from violent headache.

The commissioners now directed their experiments to ascertain whether, by influencing the imagination, convulsions, or the complete *crisis* they had witnessed, could be produced. The complete success of experiments, as M. Delson said, depended upon the subject's being endowed with sufficient sensibility. They, therefore, requested him to select some of his patients who had proved their susceptibility of the magnetic influence. According to the principles of the advocates of animal magnetism, when a tree had been touched by the magnetizer, and charged with magnetism, those who stopped near the tree would feel the effects of the agent. An apricot tree in Dr. Franklin's garden was selected, and duly magnetized by M. Delson. He selected a boy of twelve years of age, who was brought out with a bandage over his eyes, and successively led to four trees, which were *not magnetized*, and was directed to embrace each for two minutes; whilst M. Delson was standing at a considerable distance and pointing his cane toward the magnetized tree. At the first tree the boy sweated profusely, coughed, expectorated, and complained of pain in his head, though *twenty-seven feet* from the magnetized tree. At the second tree he was giddy, and still had headache, though now *thirty feet* from the magnetized tree. At the third, these symptoms were much increased, and he thought he was approaching the tree, though *twenty-eight feet* from it. At the *fourth* tree, though *twenty-five feet* from the magnetized tree, the *crisis* came on; he fell down in a state of insensibility, and his limbs became rigid.

These results were evidently to be attributed to the imagination. A similar experiment was tried on two females, patients of Delson, who were induced to believe that he was magnetizing them, though he was not near them; and in both cases the *crisis* was speedily produced.

→ The conclusion at which the commissioners arrived from their numerous experiments, was decidedly unfavorable to Mesmerism. "That which we have learnt," say they, "or, at least, that which has been proved to us, in a clear and satisfactory manner, by our inquiry into the phenomena of Mesmerism, is, that *man can act upon man*, at all times, and almost at will, by striking his imagination; that *signs and gestures* the most simple may *produce the most powerful effects*; that the action of man upon the imagination may *be reduced to an art*, and conducted after a certain method, when exercised upon patients who have faith in the proceedings."

The effect of the report of the commissioners was to destroy public confidence in Mesmerism; and consequently it sunk into contempt. Its advocates object to the report on several grounds—such as, that a large majority of the committee were prejudiced against Mesmerism; that Dr. Franklin was in feeble health, and consequently unable to do justice to the subject; that the experiments were conducted, not under the supervision of Mesmer himself, but of two of his less skillful followers; and that the committee were singularly at fault, as respects the true end of their inquiry, viz: to ascertain *facts*, not to inquire into *causes*—to observe *results*, not to inquire concerning the *agent* that produced them. These objections, however, appear to be without weight. As to the first, we know of no evidence to support it; and besides, the reputation of those learned men was to be affected by their report. It was, therefore, their interest to lay aside prejudice, and seek for the truth. As to the second objection, Dr. Franklin was not the man to make so important a report without due

examination. As to the third, the men under whose supervision the experiments were conducted, certainly understood the art they were practicing; and if it be so simple as Dr. Caldwell asserts it to be, the objection is utterly worthless. As to the fourth, it is a strange mistake. Mesmer, as Dr. Caldwell states, believed and taught the existence of a *fluid* which was the cause of the phenomena exhibited; and the precise point of inquiry was, whether there is such a fluid, or whether the phenomena may be accounted for upon principles which were already well understood. The influence of the imagination over the body has long been acknowledged, and, to a considerable extent, understood. If, therefore, the phenomena attributed to Mesmerism could be proved to be caused by the imagination, the conclusion would follow, of course, that Mesmer and his associates had made no new discovery—that they had only adopted means to excite the imagination to which others had not resorted; and had succeeded in producing considerable results. Dr. Caldwell charges those eminent men with reasoning most unphilosophically. He says, “Because no such fluid, or other material agent, was seen or felt to pass from the magnetizer to the magnetized, nor the reverse; the unwarranted conclusion (*totally irrelevant to the true object of their inquiry*) was drawn by the committee, that no such agent existed; nor, in their judgment, were the effects produced to be attributed to animal magnetism, although they occurred during the operation of the magnetizer, and at no other time.” This is a great mistake. Those men understood too well the principles of sound philosophy, either to mistake the true object of their inquiry, or to reason so unphilosophically as the Doctor charges them with having done. They witnessed a number of experiments, in which it was certain, that the imagination of the patients was much wrought upon, but in which it was affirmed, that the results were caused not by the imagination, but by the magnetic fluid. How were they to determine to which of these causes the

phenomena were to be attributed, or whether both were concerned in their production? Evidently, the course pointed out by sound philosophy, was to make some experiments in which only one of the causes could operate. If in these experiments precisely the same phenomena appeared, the inference would be conclusive, that the other supposed cause does not exist. They, therefore, tried experiments in which they operated solely upon the imagination. It was impossible that the results thus obtained could be attributed to animal magnetism, because no attempt was made to magnetize the persons. In these experiments the phenomena were precisely the same as in those in which they were said to be magnetized. The conclusion of the commissioners was, that since by operating simply upon the imagination all the phenomena appear, there is no evidence to sustain the magnetizers in attributing them to mesmeric influence. The examinations were evidently conducted upon the principles of sound philosophy, and the conclusion to which they came, supposing the experiments to have been sufficiently numerous, and the phenomena occurring as stated in their report, absolutely irresistible.

Mr. Townsend's method of disposing of the report of the commissioners, is worthy of a passing notice. He says—"As to the phenomena themselves, the Academy not only allows them, but, as it appears to me, concedes the real question in debate, in terms the most explicit. * * * It is only respecting the cause, that the two [parties] are at issue; the one asserting that it is a fluid, the other that it is imagination. * * * Were Mesmerism only viewed as illustrative of the mind's influence upon the organization, it would hold out high claims to notice." * It is true, that the influence of the imagination upon the body is an interesting matter; but if the phenomena attributed to Mesmerism are really the effects of excited imagination, of course there is no such science as that

* Facts in Mesmerism, pp. 18, 19.

called Mesmerism ; no new principle or fluid has been discovered ; and *clairvoyance* is mere delusion or deception.

The report of the commissioners, as we have said, destroyed, for a length of time, the confidence of the public in Mesmerism. But about the year 1825, so much interest was again awakened in the subject, that the Royal Academy of Medicine of Paris instituted a new investigation. A committee was appointed for the purpose ; and after they reported, a still larger committee was raised, on the 28th of February, 1826. This committee prosecuted their inquiries during some five or six years. Dr. Caldwell speaks of their investigations as "one of the best devised and most laborious courses of experiments that is any where recorded, persevered in for not less than five or six years, with all the scrupulous cautiousness and accuracy that experience, judgment, and an ardent love of truth could inspire and direct." Of course, we are to believe, that this committee did the subject the most ample justice ; and the advocates of Mesmerism cannot complain of their report, as the result of ignorance, prejudice or haste. They say in their report : "We have therefore established the following four divisions : 1. Magnetism has no effect upon persons in a state of *sound health*, nor upon *some* diseased persons. 2. In *others* its effects are *slight*. 3. These effects are *sometimes* produced by *ennui*, by *monotony*, by the *imagination*. 4. We have seen them [the phenomena] developed *independently* of these last causes, *most probably as the effect of Magnetism alone*."

With this report, though it was the result of one of the best devised and most laborious courses of experiments any where recorded, and though the examinations were conducted with all the accuracy that experience, judgment, and an ardent love of truth, could inspire, Dr. Caldwell is by no means satisfied ! The very first conclusion it presents, viz : that magnetism has no effect upon *healthy persons*, he pronounces "a mistake." He says : "Though persons

of delicate constitutions and health are in general more easily mesmerised, yet many individuals of perfect health and strong constitutions are susceptible of the influence. There is reason to believe that every one is more or less susceptible of it, provided the operator be sufficiently powerful." This is, indeed, an important point of dispute; for if the learned committee are right in their conclusion, all confidence in many of the most wonderful stories concerning mesmerized persons, is necessarily destroyed; since they were persons in sound health. It is a fact, worthy of particular remark, that J. P. F. Deleuze, a celebrated French mesmerist, agreed with the committee in their conclusion. He says: "*Magnetism generally exercises no influence upon persons in health.* The same man who was insensible to it in a state of good health, will experience the effects of it when ill." He also agrees with the committee in the conclusion, that upon ~~some~~ *some* diseased persons magnetism has no power. "There are diseases," he remarks, "in which the action of magnetism is not perceived; there are others in which it is evident."* He states, further, in contradiction of the opinion of Dr. Caldwell, that "all men are not sensible to the magnetic action."† This testimony we regard as of great weight, coming, as it does, from a zealous advocate of Mesmerism, and one who has had much experience in the art. It is worth while also to remark, that the committee of which Dr. Franklin was chairman, arrived at these same conclusions.

⇒ Some of the phenomena attributed to Mesmerism, the Parisian committee, in accordance with the commissioners of 1784, found to result simply from the *imagination*. Dr. Caldwell considers the term *imagination*, as employed in this case, as meaning "almost *anything* or *nothing*, according to the character of him who uses it." Indeed, he regards the word as so intangible in its nature, so perfectly indefinite in its

* Deleuze's Prac. Instruction, p. 13.

† Ib.

meaning, that "if expunged from the English language, but little loss would be sustained, in the *settled* and *accurate* meaning of our speech." The Doctor, we venture to predict, will find it extremely difficult to convince intelligent men, either that the word *imagination* means nothing, or that a committee so learned, and so able as that by whom the report was made, employed a term which no one can understand—which conveys no definite idea. He says, "however, that when the term *imagination* is employed in the *phrenological* sense, it is true that the mesmeric phenomena are always produced by the imagination.—"They are always, I mean, the product of a given condition of some organ or part, or of the whole of the brain." Unfortunately for Mesmerism, however, the committee did not use the word in the *phrenological* sense.

It is a remarkable fact, that the committee, after all their protracted and laborious investigations, seemed not entirely satisfied of the existence of any such thing as Mesmerism. They say, they saw the phenomena developed independently of the influence of imagination, "*most probably* as the effect of magnetism alone." Now, it is most marvelous, if indeed the truth of Mesmerism is so easily established to the perfect satisfaction of any intelligent, candid man—and if, in a single hour, as Dr. Caldwell avers, sufficient evidence can be produced—that, after some five or six years of investigation, such a committee should have made a report, in which the most they can say for it is, that some of the phenomena are *most probably* to be ascribed to magnetic influence alone! When we carefully examine the reports of two such committees as those who investigated this subject in France, we may well excuse the unbelief of many who have had no such opportunities to satisfy their minds, and are far less qualified to come to satisfactory conclusions.

The first committee, it will be remembered, attributed the phenomena wholly to the imagination, and

the last were satisfied, that they are, at least, partly produced by this cause. It is an important question in this investigation, to what extent an excited imagination may exhibit the mesmeric phenomena. The experiments by the first committee proved, that heat in particular parts of the body, coughing, expectoration, profuse perspiration, nervous twitching, convulsions, and the like, may be produced in this way.

It can scarcely be doubted, that many of the cures said to be effected by Mesmerism, are really to be attributed to the imagination. The history of *Perkinsism*, as it has been called, affords abundant evidence, that cures that seem wonderful, may be thus effected; or, at least, that temporary relief may be given. In the year 1798, an American, by the name of Perkins, introduced into England a method of curing diseases, for which he obtained royal letters patent, by means of two small pieces of metal, denominated *tractors*. These were applied externally near the part diseased, and moved about, gently touching the surface only; and thus multitudes of painful disorders were removed, some most speedily, and some after repeated applications of the metallic points. Pamphlets were published, announcing the wonderful cures effected by the *tractors*, and the newspapers teemed with certificates of their curative powers. The Quakers became extremely interested in this new mode of curing diseases, and actually established what was called the "Perkinsian Institution," for the purpose of relieving the diseases of the poor without expense! "The transactions of this institution were published in pamphlets, in support of the extraordinary efficacy of these new instruments. In somewhat less than six years, Perkins left the country, in possession, as we have been informed on good authority, of upwards of ten thousand pounds, the contributions of British credulity; and now (1811) the *tractors* are almost forgotten."*

* Dr. Reese's New Encyclopedia.

Dr. Haygarth, a man of eminent learning, suggested to Dr. Falconer, about 1798, when the *tractors* were in high repute at Bath, even among persons of rank and intelligence, that their virtue might be tested by the use of *false tractors*, resembling the real ones. It was resolved, therefore, to put the matter to the test by experiments in the general hospital of Bath. *Wooden tractors*, of the same shape, and painted the same color as the metallic tractors, were prepared. "Five cases were chosen of chronic rheumatism, in the ankle, knee, hip, and wrist; one of the patients also had gouty pains. All the affected joints, except the last, were swollen, and all of them had been ill for several months. On the 7th of January, 1799, the *wooden tractors* were employed. All the five patients, except one, assured us that their pain was relieved, and three much benefited by the first application of this remedy. One felt his knee warmer, and he could walk much better, as he showed us with great satisfaction. One was easier for nine hours, and till he went to bed, when the pain returned. One had a tingling sensation for two hours. The wooden tractors were drawn over the skin, so as to touch it in the slightest manner. Next day the true metallic tractors of Perkins were employed exactly in like manner, and with similar effects. All the patients were in some measure, but not more, relieved by the second application, except one, who received no benefit from the former operation, and who was not a proper subject for the experiment, having no existing pain, but only stiffness in her ankle. They felt (as they fancied) warmth, but in no greater degree than on the former day."

Many other experiments were made by Dr. Haygarth, and by other physicians, and with similar results. *Lead tractors* were used in the case of a patient who had been some time in the Bristol infirmary, "with a rheumatic affection of the shoulder, which rendered his arm perfectly useless." In six minutes the only effect of the application was *warmth* of the

skin; but on the following day the patient informed his physician, "that he had received so much benefit, that it enabled him to lift his hand from his knee, which he had in vain several times attempted on the Monday evening, as the whole ward witnessed."

Wooden tractors were next used in this case; and in order to add solemnity to the farce, Mr. Barton held in his hand a stopwatch, whilst Mr. Lex minutated the effects produced. In four minutes the man raised his hand several inches, and he had also lost the pain in his shoulder, which he usually experienced when attempting to lift any thing. He continued to undergo the operation daily, and with progressive good effect, until in a few days he could touch the mantelpiece. Two common iron nails were then employed, disguised with sealingwax. In three minutes the patient "felt something moving from his arm to his hand;" and soon after he raised his hand a foot above the fireplace. This patient continued to improve, until he could carry coals, &c., and use his arms sufficiently to assist the nurse; although previous to the use of the spurious tractors, as he declared, "he could no more lift his hand from his knee than if a hundred weight were upon it, or a nail driven through it." A servant girl, afflicted with a very acute headache which had prevented sleep for several nights, was relieved in the same way. When the spurious tractors were moved near her forehead, in *four minutes* she felt chilly in the head; in a minute or two more she felt as if cold water were running down her temples, and the pain was somewhat diminished; and in ten minutes she said the pain was entirely gone. She slept pleasantly through the night, and was free from headache the next day.

Examples of the cure of diseases by exciting the imagination, especially of diseases connected with the nervous system, might be multiplied to any extent. A curious, if not an instructive chapter, might likewise be written, exhibiting many other strange and

unaccountable phenomena resulting from the same general cause.

But let us take a somewhat nearer view of the phenomena of Mesmerism. The first phenomenon claiming attention, is the *mesmeric sleep*. The method of producing this state is thus described by Dr. Caldwell:

“Let the parties be seated close to each other, face to face, the mesmerizer occupying the higher seat, and the mesmerizee so accommodated as to sit at ease and in comfort, provision being made for the support of the head, in case sleep be induced. Having requested the mesmerizee to dismiss, as far as practicable, all agitating and impressive feelings, thoughts, and emotions, and be as tranquil as possible in mind, as well as in body, the mesmerizer gently grasps his hands, applying palm to palm, and thumb to thumb, for the purpose of equalizing and identifying their temperature and condition. Continuing this for about a minute, the mesmerizer lets go his grasp, and, removing his hands, and raising them just above the head of the mesmerizee, brings them gently down along each side of the head, very softly brushing it, and places them on his shoulders. Let the hands rest there about another minute—the mesmerizer all this time looking steadily and intensely in his subject's face, and forcibly *willing* that he shall fall asleep. The hands are then to be moved from the shoulders along the arms with a very slight pressure, until they reach the hands of the mesmerizee, which are to be again grasped for four or five seconds, as before. After a few repetitions of these movements, the operator may begin his more regular passes. These he makes by raising his hands near to the face or top of the head of his subject, and bringing them down, with a gentle sweep along the neck and breast (touching those parts not being necessary), to the ends of the subject's fingers, turning his palms outwards, and widening the distance of his hands from each other, as they descend. The ends of the operator's fingers

may be also advantageously applied at times to the pit of the patient's stomach, and held there for a short time." The passes, we are told, may be continued from twelve or fifteen to thirty minutes, according to circumstances.

By these and similar means, we are told, the mesmeric sleep is induced. The effect of the countenance of the mesmerizer, which, ordinarily, is considered one of the principal influences, it would seem, is not always necessary; for it is stated that in some cases, sleep has been produced when those operated on were blindfolded, and did not know, except by the influence exercised on them, that the magnetizer was at work. It is even affirmed, that on one occasion, if not more, sleep has been produced when the operator was not in the same room or house with the person operated on. Mr. Townsend states that he, on one occasion, mesmerized one of his female patients, when she was in conversation with his wife, and knew nothing of his intention. Having succeeded in concentrating his thoughts on her, she suddenly broke off in the midst of a sentence, and exclaimed, "Oh! he is magnetizing me!" falling back at the same time on the sofa, in a profound mesmeric slumber! At another time, he says, he mesmerized the same patient while he was sitting in his house, and she was in her own house. To the great alarm of her mother and sister, she fell asleep, and could not be roused. He had endeavored to bring before his imagination very vividly the person of his sleep-waker, and even aided the concentration of his thoughts by the usual mesmeric gestures. At the end of an hour he said, "I will now awake Anna," and used appropriate gestures. On the next morning Anna came to his house, and told him that she fell into the sleep precisely at nine o'clock—just the time when he willed her to sleep!* In other instances, we are told, sleep has been produced simply by the influence of

* Townsend's Facts, p. 307.

the mesmerizer's look and volition, without pass, touch, or other movement.

When the mesmeric sleep has been induced, the senses are perfectly torpid, so that no impression can be made by external objects. The eye, the ear, taste, sense of touch, are completely closed; so that the report of a pistol by the ear would not be heard; and surgical operations, usually very painful, may be performed without causing the slightest suffering.* In this state the person mesmerized hears distinctly what is said by the mesmerizer, or the person put in communication with him by the mesmerizer, and is completely under his control.

We have some remarks now to make, bearing upon the different phenomena connected with this *sleep-waking*, as it has been called.

1. We shall not deny the existence of what is called the *mesmeric sleep*, or *stupor*. There appears to be evidence that many persons have been thrown into a state very much resembling *somnambulism*, in which the mind is more or less active, yet, attentive to most surrounding objects. Whether this *stupor* is produced by a *fluid*, called *animal magnetism*, or whether it can be accounted for on other principles, we leave physiologists to determine. There are some reasons for considering the mesmeric sleep not essentially different from ordinary *somnambulism* and *somniloquism*. Dr. Drake draws the following comparison between them:

"The principal characteristics, then, of ordinary *somnambulism* and *somniloquism*, including, in part,

* We are surprised to find the testimony of Mr. Deleuze so different from that of other mesmerizers, concerning the susceptibility to pain of persons in the magnetic state. He states, that although this insensibility is manifested in many cases, it is far from being general. He says: "I am even inclined to think that it would never occur, if the magnetizers did not overcharge their subjects, and if they took care to preserve the harmony of the system. *My somnambulists have never exhibited it to me.* On the contrary, their sensibility was more delicate than in the natural state," &c.—*Practical Mesmerism*, p. 84.

at least, the curious varieties just mentioned, are the following :

"1. They occur chiefly in young persons of both sexes, those of a delicate nervous system, and in connection with bad health.

"2. In some cases the sense of sight seems to be greatly increased in acuteness, or that of feeling, or the instinct of the individual, in some mysterious way, is substituted for it.

"3. There is great abstraction. The attention of the person is entirely concentrated on the train of thoughts which is passing through his mind ; and he is, consequently, insensible to what is passing around him, and even to violence on the body. But if, by chance or perseverance, his attention should be gained, he may, in general, be guided both in his thoughts and actions. His state of mind may be modified without his being awakened.

"4. There is a spontaneous, inherent activity of imagination, which excites into action the muscles of locomotion and speech.

"Let us now compare mesmeric with natural somnambulism and somniloquism.

"1. It is chiefly producible in children and young persons of both sexes, in individuals of frail and susceptible nervous systems, and in natural sleep-walkers, or members of families in which somnambulism prevails.

"2. Of all the alledged phenomena of this state, none have excited more wonder than those connected with the sense of sight, which has been said to be greatly increased in acuteness, and even transferred from the optic to other nerves. This is the *clairvoyance* of writers on mesmerism.

"3. In this condition, the abstraction of mind is so great that the individual is inattentive to impressions which, in the waking state, would give acute pain, and cannot be spoken with, except by the mesmerizer, who had her attention from the beginning, or by persons introduced by him."

It has been maintained that the mesmeric sleep is not produced by the supposed magnetic fluid, nor by the countenance, the volition, and the passes of the operator, but by other causes, which admit of an easy explanation. The *Liverpool Chronicle*, several years since, published the following account of experiments made by Mr. James Braid. We give the statement entire, as affording interesting suggestions to those who are disposed to prosecute such curious inquiries:

"The Mystery of Mesmerism and Somnambulism Explained.—Animal Magnetism has for some years amused and bewildered the lovers of the marvelous. Ridiculed as a mere illusion or delusion, it has, nevertheless, perplexed the scientific. Its effects are too palpable to be denied; but any rational solution of the cause or causes in which they have originated has hitherto evaded detection. The honor of unveiling this mystery was reserved for Mr. James Braid, an eminent surgeon in Manchester, who, having witnessed the recent experiments of Mons. Lafontaine, in the Athenæum of that town, determined, if possible, to bring the system to the test of physiological and anatomical principles. This gentleman, having satisfied his own mind that he could produce the phenomena without personal contact, and even induce sleep when in a different room from the person to be thrown into a state of somnolency, announced a public lecture on the subject, which he delivered at the Manchester Athenæum on Saturday last, before seven hundred persons.

"Mr. Braid first placed on the table a common black wine bottle, in the mouth of which was a cork having a plated top. The individual on whom the experiment was to be performed was seated on a chair, and directed to gaze intently at the cork without winking or averting the eyes. The cork was about two feet from the person operated upon, whose head was inclined backward, forming with the object an angle of forty-five degrees. In this position he

remained for about five minutes, when profound sleep was produced.

“The second experiment was completed in the same time. In the third case a bandage was placed round the head, for the purpose of retaining in an immovable position a common bottle cork, a little above the root of the nose, as the object to be gazed at; and in about four minutes a complete state of somnolency ensued. In this case was proved an inability in the patient to open the eyelid, although consciousness was in no respect suspended, as he was able to reply distinctly to any question. The fourth experiment failed, either through the noise that prevailed, or owing to the person not fixing his gaze continually on the object.

“The fifth was successful: and although the party made a desperate effort to open his eyes, so much so as to agitate his whole frame, they remained as though hermetically sealed; when Mr. Braid took from his pocket a wooden ruler, and drew the end of it gently over the upper eyelids of both eyes, when the spell was broken, and the sense of sight restored with perfect ease. These experiments fully demonstrated that the phenomena were perfectly independent of animal magnetism, as in no one instance was there the least approach to personal contact, or any manipulation.

“Having thus convinced the audience that sleep could be produced without pressure of the thumbs or waving of the hands, as employed by Mons. Lafontaine, Mr. Braid proceeded to explain the *rationale* of his discovery.

“The artificial mode of producing sleep is to fatigue the rectus and levator muscle of the eye, which is effected by a continuously-strained and intent gaze at an object viewed under an acute angle. Under such circumstances the irritability of those muscles becomes exhausted, as well as the irritability of the optic nerve, giddiness causes a mist to rise up before the eyes, and sleep ensues. Congestion is induced in the eyes, and carried from them to the optic

and muscular nerves of the eye; and owing to their proximity to the origin of the nerves of respiration and circulation, affect them through sympathy, and enfeeble the action of the heart and lungs. The heart thus acting feebly, is unable to propel the blood with sufficient force to the extremities: and hence their coldness.

"The blood, consequently, is accumulated in the region of the heart, and it is thus stimulated; and in order to remove the inordinate load, it is compelled to increase the frequency of its contractions, in order to compensate for the feebleness of its efforts. The brain, head, and face, now become congested in consequence, and varied phenomena, resulting from irregularity in the circulation of that important organ, the brain, follow. The inability to raise the upper eyelid Mr. Braid accounts for on the principle of temporary paralysis of the levator muscles, owing to excessive and long-continued exertion at the commencement of the operation."

2. We are little concerned to inquire whether it is true that the body of the person mesmerized is strongly attracted to that of the operator; although we confess our skepticism on this particular point. Dr. Caldwell, giving an account of some experiments he witnessed in London, the subject of which was a young lady, states, that "when, as the mesmerized was standing erect, the mesmerizer moved silently around her, she turned after him as the needle does after the loadstone, her feet remaining *fixed*. Her change of posture was produced by the revolving of her body on her lower limbs, as on a pivot. In this way, perfectly rigid as were her upper and lower limbs and her neck, she performed with her person a semi-revolution," Mr. Townshend, giving an account of some experiments in the case of a young lady whom he mesmerized, says: "Though indisposed at first, like others in the mesmeric sleep, to motion, Miss T——, when I arose from my chair, rose also. Without touching her, I moved onward, and she seemed

compelled to follow me. At one time I ran quickly to a distance from her, when she remained standing where I had left her, but bent towards me, and wavered as if she would fall. I made a motion with my arms as if I would draw her to me, when, recovering herself, she slowly and, as it were, reluctantly, came to where I stood. When her hands were lying on her lap, if I held mine above them, they were attracted upward, more quickly as they drew nearer my own. It was much like the effect which a piece of rubbed sealing wax has on a bit of paper. In proportion to the attraction toward her mesmerizer seemed the patient's repulsion from others. If any but myself presented their hands to her, she drew back her own with a slow but singularly repugnant shrinking," &c.* We agree with Mr. Townshend in the belief, that if this attraction does exist, "there is an action of matter as distinct and specific as that of light, heat, electricity, or any other of the imponderable agents."† It is absurd to say, that by mere volition I can move the body of another person. As Townshend says, "I must bring myself into absolute contact with the body which I desire to move." But herein is something truly wonderful. In the first place, the attraction appears not to be *mutual*. The mesmerizer moves as freely as if he were not in communication with the person mesmerized; whilst the latter is constrained to follow him. Now, if there is an attraction analogous to that of the loadstone, we should expect it to be mutual, and to find the mesmerizer strongly drawn toward his patient. And, then, as they approach each other, we should expect to find the attraction increasingly strong; and, if it were strong enough to draw the body of the person mesmerized to the operator, we should anticipate some difficulty in separating them. It appears, however, that no difficulty of this kind has been experienced. Perhaps, the ease with which this attraction is managed, is to be attributed to the peculiarly *accommodating* character of the

* Facts in Mesmerism, pp. 74, 75. † Ib. 276.

mesmeric fluid, which, it would seem, is wonderfully obedient to the *will* of the mesmerizer! This, indeed, is, perhaps, the most wonderful property of this unknown fluid. All other fluids, whether ponderable or imponderable, seem to be governed by fixed laws; but this moves with singular power in obedience to the volition of the operator! It is rather difficult, we must confess, to give credit to this class of mesmeric phenomena: but we are more interested in the investigation of some others.

3. It is a matter of probably no very great importance to determine, whether persons in the mesmeric sleep can see with their eyes closed, or through bandages, wrappings of paper, and the like. Some somnambulists have seemed to see in the same manner; and if the mesmeric sleep be a species of somnambulism, the phenomena of both may perhaps be explained on the same principle, if indeed they admit of explanation.

4. We are much more interested in ascertaining whether it is true, as the advocates of Mesmerism contend, that the person mesmerized loses all consciousness of his own, and becomes completely identified with the mesmerizer, in feeling, in thought, and in volition. Is it true, as Dr. Caldwell asserts, that the former becomes completely identified with the latter, "sense with sense—sentiment with sentiment—thought with thought—movement with movement—will with will." The person mesmerized, we are told, is insensible to external impressions, destitute of taste, hearing, feeling, &c.; but if an injury is inflicted upon the body of the operator, he feels pain; if the operator drink wine, or taste salt, or smell hartshorn, the person mesmerized will taste wine or salt, and smell hartshorn. "It is affirmed," says Dr. Drake, "that a peculiar sympathy of both body and mind exists on the part of the mesmeric somniloquist with the mesmerizer and those introduced, or as the technical phrase is, put in communication. But this sympathy is not reciprocal. It is confined to the

somniloquist, who, it is asserted, can be made to experience the same feelings of both body and mind, and entertain the same thoughts, as the person in conversation with her, and this in some unknown manner, by some occult influence, altogether independent of the ordinary means of intercourse by the senses. Let it here be particularly noted, that it is not a stimulation of the body or mind of the somniloquist into increased activity, her own sensations and thoughts being the objects of her consciousness; *but an actual infusion of the feelings and thoughts of the person in communication, at the expense of those belonging to the somniloquist, and that, too, to such a degree, that if she had pleasurable sensations of the body before, she would, in the midst of them, suffer pain, if his body were wounded; and although she might retain her own consciousness, so far as to understand and answer questions put to her through the medium of the ear, still that her predominant ideas are those impressed on her mind, which arise simultaneously with their origin in the mind of the person who is in communication.*"*

In proof of this complete identity between the mesmerizer and the person mesmerized, we have singularly conflicting testimony. As to identity of *taste*, the testimony is not very consistent. In some cases, we are told, the experiments on this point have been completely satisfactory. But then again, we have such facts as the following, which is stated by Mr. Townshend. A Mr. T. mesmerized a young lady. He then drank some wine, turning his head away, and asked, "Do you taste any thing?" *Answer*, "No, but I *smell* wine."† Now, between the taste of wine and the smell of it there is a wide difference. Mr. Townshend says—"The wine was too far off from the patient to have been distinguished by her, in any way, under ordinary circumstances." But this does not

* Analytical Report on Mesmerism, p. 34.

† Facts in Mesmerism, p. 82.

explain the fact, so inconsistent with identity of tastes, that when the mesmerizer drank wine, the patient *tasted* nothing, but *smelled* wine; for according to Mesmerism, she must have imagined herself actually drinking wine. As to the assertion, that the wine was too far from her to have been distinguished, it is ridiculous. Every one knows, that the sense of smell is more acute in some persons than in others, and that if a slight breeze is blowing in the right direction, one may smell wine at quite as great a distance as the mesmerizer could have stood, in any room of ordinary size, from his patient. And the fact that the young woman did smell the wine, is proof conclusive, that at least *one* of her senses was not closed against external impressions.

The mesmerizer then took a nosegay from the table, and smelling it, asked, "What is this?" *Answer*, "Flowers." Now, it is not at all wonderful that she could smell a nosegay, which probably every person in the room could smell.

The eyes of the person mesmerized are perfectly closed, we are told; but he can see any object at which the operator is looking. But Mr. Townshend states a very singular fact, which evidently conflicts with this principle. He states, that the mesmerizer placed the young lady, of whom we have been speaking, in the middle of the room, "and held up various objects (not belonging to him) before her eyes. These she declared she could not see; but whenever the mesmerizer held up before her any thing *which belonged to himself*, she named the object directly. In this way she told rightly when the mesmerizer successively presented his pocket handkerchief, purse, and watch, &c. On being asked if she could distinguish the hour on the mesmerizer's watch, she held it before her closed eyes, and said, 'It is a quarter to something.' In effect, it was a quarter to eleven."* We have already remarked how completely the mesmeric

* Townshend's Facts in Mesmerism, p. 82.

fluid is under the control of the mesmerizer's will. We are now called upon to note another of its unaccountable peculiarities. The mesmerizer holds certain articles up before the eyes of his patient; but she cannot see them, *simply because they do not belong to him*. He holds up some articles of his own, and she sees them distinctly! Her vision depends simply upon the *right of property*! Verily, the advocates of Mesmerism draw strongly upon our credulity. The thing is ridiculously absurd. After all, however, her vision, even when the Mesmerizer presented articles of his own, was rather imperfect. When asked if she could distinguish the hour on his watch, she said, "It is a quarter to something." How definite! and how remarkable, that she could distinctly see the *minute* hand, but could not see the *hour* hand.

Another young lady was mesmerized, and the phenomena of vision were quite different. Mr. Townshend says: "When I first asked her if she saw any thing, she answered in the negative; but added, after a pause, 'I see *you*.' After this, she seemed, by degrees, to acquire a more general vision. She recognized, on being led up to them, the several members of the family, consisting of nine persons, and could not be deceived by any change in their position." She saw, also, a book placed before her, "on a level with her eyes;" and when asked to read, she objected, but finally, "as if making a great effort, she made out the word *London* at the bottom of the page." Mr. Townshend, however, is candid enough to state, that "the book, at the moment when the word was distinguished, was resting upon the patient's lap, below the level of her eyes." Now, it seems not a little remarkable, that one patient could see nothing which did not belong to the operator, whilst the other could see all the members of her family, and could distinguish a book which did not belong to him! It is equally unaccountable, if all the senses are closed up during the mesmeric sleep, and the patients taste, hear, see, and feel, by means of the operator's senses, that these

persons saw without depending upon the vision of the operator. It is no less wonderful that such persons taste and smell what the operator tastes and smells, but cannot *hear* what he hears. For example, the operator held before his patient a wine glass, and asked if she knew what it was. Her father told her with a loud voice what it was; but she did not hear. "For," says Mr. Townshend, "on being again questioned, she said impatiently, 'I do not know; I cannot tell.'" Now, it appears rather unaccountable, that, since she used the senses of the operator, not her own, she did not hear what he heard; and not less so, that she could not tell what a wine glass was, although it was held up before her, and the operator saw it distinctly.*

There are in Townshend's work some not very consistent statements concerning the sense of *touch* in the mesmeric sleep. We have abundant testimony, some of which Mr. T. furnishes, that persons have pinched the individuals mesmerized, severely, and they have not felt the slightest pain. But he tells us of a gentleman whom he mesmerized, and who, when another person laid his hand on his shoulder, experienced something like an electric shock. "The patient's whole body quivered, his features were convulsed, his countenance became deadly pale, and he seemed to gasp for breath, like a person who has been suddenly immersed in cold water." He continued to tremble, though he seemed not aware of suffering, until the mesmerizer tranquilized him by placing his hand on his forehead, and by mesmeric passes! The following statement is even more unaccountable: "I asked for the pocket handkerchiefs of all the party, twisted up my own in the midst of them, and laid them on the knee of D. C. [the person mesmerized]. He was immediately affected with slight shuddering, and tossed away very quickly all the pocket handkerchiefs but mine. The experiment repeated, gave the same

* Townshend's Facts, p. 77.

result; but the second time he grasped and firmly held my handkerchief until the time of his awaking.”* Now how shall we account for the effect which the handkerchiefs of the persons present had on the individual mesmerized? Were they less magnetized than that of the operator?—and did they abstract from him a portion of the fluid? But the operator had them all in his hands, and twisted them all together. One would suppose, then, that all the handkerchiefs were, so far as magnetism is concerned, in the same state. Did the operator *will* that the singular effect should be produced upon his patient? He does not pretend that he did. We are not able to explain the matter, if indeed the shuddering was not feigned. It is quite common, however, for persons to touch the mesmerized individual, and for him to touch articles not belonging to the operator, without any such effects following.

Among the wonderful phenomena of Mesmerism, is the entire control the operator has over the physical movements of the patient. He wakes up the patient, still retaining his influence over him, and tells him, “You will be obliged to put your hands on your head, but do not do it, if you can avoid it.” The patient struggles to keep his hands off his head; but, irresistibly attracted, they rise to the head, with a motion increasing in rapidity as they approach it. And then, without permission from the operator, the individual cannot remove them. How shall we explain the philosophy of this and similar phenomena? The operator *wills* the thing; and the hands move accordingly. But the effect we are observing is *physical*; the hands move, not only without the will of the individual, but in opposition to it; and they move irresistibly. As Townshend says, in the chain of events observed, “there is a deficient link.” There must be some physical agent acting upon the nerves and muscles of the person. Dr. Caldwell imagines

* Townshend's Facts, p. 72.

the existence of a subtile *aura*; and Townshend believes, that there is a distinct action of matter. But the supposition of a fluid, however subtile, gives no clue to the explanation of the motion of the hands to the head. For, it is inconceivable that the mere volition of the operator should give to any fluid such direction and such power over the limbs of another. It is even more rational to consider the effect as caused by the imagination, than to attribute it to a fluid which, wholly unlike all other fluids, is obedient to the human will, and moves in accordance with the volition of the operator in any direction, with irresistible power. We know that when an individual has, to some extent, gained the confidence of one who is nervous and excitable, he can effect wonderful results.

But let us pass from the *physical* phenomena of Mesmerism, to those more immediately connected with the *mind*. It is in this department of the *science*, if we may so call it, that we feel most deeply interested; because it is most intimately connected with morals and religion. In the mesmeric sleep, we are told, the mind of the patient becomes the passive recipient of the thoughts and emotions of the operator, and is perfectly obedient to his will. The thoughts which arise in his mind, become the thoughts of his patient. Nay more—not only his perceptions, but even his thoughts and imaginings, become the *perceptions* of the patient. If he imagines himself in the city of Paris, or London, and thinks of objects he has seen there, his patient sees the objects of which he is thinking, and is filled with corresponding emotions. Dr. Caldwell tells us of one of his patients, in the mesmeric sleep, that he willed her to see the *sun*, and asked her if she saw any thing. “Oh! yes,” was the reply, “and it is very bright.” She then said, “It is the sun.” Simultaneously with another effort of his volition, she said—“But it is clouded over now—the clouds are dark and heavy. How much it resembles some persons’ life!” He then willed her to see the

ocean, which she described in a peculiarly vivid manner. "In a moment after," says the Doctor, "as if her very being was transferred to mine, her language expressed the unspoken dictates of my will, and she said, "I see something a long way off—but it is very indistinct." Immediately after she resumed with a smile—"Oh! I see it now—it's a vessel, just rising in the distance. It seems as if it had risen out of the water." She described the vessel, told what flag it had, and other particulars. "Through all this time," remarks the Doctor, "I had not uttered a single word which had the slightest bearing towards the objects which I wished her to describe. Yet I could not have told my own thoughts with greater accuracy." He then willed her to see a storm on the ocean, and herself in the vessel tossed on the billows, when she exclaimed in terror: "There is the lightning—it dazzles me—there is the thunder—oh! what a terrible peal—the water's filling the ship—I shall drown—I shall drown—oh! God, how terrible!" Her countenance, he says, was the picture of terror—her voice the scream of distress—and her whole frame was convulsed with the violence of her emotion.* This, as related, must be considered quite an extraordinary case. The mesmerizer *thinks* of a vessel at sea, and then he *imagines* a storm arising, and *wills* that his patient shall see the vessel, and the storm, and seem to herself likely to perish in the sinking ship. And sure enough, his thoughts and imaginings become her vivid perceptions. She sees the lightning, hears the thunder's awful peal, and is overwhelmed with terror at the impending danger!

The same writer gives another case somewhat different in the phenomena developed, but equally successful as an experiment. He willed his patient to think of a mutual friend. She not only thinks of him, but sees him, though not present, sitting in an armchair in the front room of his dwelling. She describes the

* Caldwell on Mesmerism, p. 91.

chair minutely, though she had never seen it; she also describes his coat, and laughs *hysterically* at its uncouth appearance.*

These cases are given as fair examples of that mental identity which Mesmerism claims to effect between different persons. The latter case also exhibits a tolerably fair specimen of what is called *clairvoyance*, of which we shall have something to say in the following pages.

Now let us try to reason concerning these alledged phenomena. In the first place, we must suppose the mind of the person mesmerized entirely inactive, so far as thoughts of its own are concerned; for if it has its own proper consciousness and its own thoughts, they will not be identical with those of the operator; and the patient will not, therefore, be subject to his will. But the mind of the person mesmerized is not in a state of inactivity, if we believe the advocates of Mesmerism, but is often intensely active, and reveals things wholly unknown to the operator, as did the patient who described the individual in his armchair. How the alledged identity of thought and emotion can consist with the alledged independent activity of the mind of the person mesmerized, we cannot conceive. If the mind, in the mesmeric state, has thoughts of its own, and these are mingled with those of the operator, rising spontaneously, the result must be confusion confounded!

Again: we are to believe that the thoughts of one mind are most vividly impressed upon another, without the aid of any signs whatever. Now we know that words are arbitrary signs of ideas; and when the signs have been connected with the ideas, they become the medium through which the ideas of one mind are conveyed to another. We also employ *visible* signs, as well as *audible* signs. But in the case before us, neither visible nor audible signs are used, nor any other means known to us; and yet the ideas of

* Caldwell on Mesmerism, p. 86.

one mind are communicated to another, and conveyed so vividly, that they become the perceptions of the latter! Mr. Townshend philosophises on this difficult subject thus: "Every thought moves the brain in its own appropriate manner. A pervading medium being allowed to exist throughout nature (such as the electric), it follows as a consequence, that every thought which moves the brain imparts motion also to the ethereal medium. Mesmerized persons, being in a state of extreme sensibility, are cognizant of the motions of finer media than common. The motions created by the thoughts of other persons being transferred through the brain, and through a certain medium to the sensorium of the mesmerized person, are to him intelligible signs of thought: a language which, though new to him at first, he, by a gradual process of association, gives meaning to and learns to comprehend."* This attempt at an explanation of the process by which the thoughts of one mind are transfused into another, seems to us an entire failure. It assumes the existence of a subtile fluid, like the electric, which is susceptible of vibratory motion, like the atmosphere, which motion passes uninterruptedly through the head to the brain. It assumes, of course without the least evidence, that when the mind of the mesmerizer thinks, his brain is agitated; and that this agitation gives a vibratory motion to the particles of the unknown fluid. It assumes, that the vibrations caused by thinking of a man, are different from those produced by thinking of a child, a horse, or a tree; that each distinct thought imparts to the subtile fluid a distinct kind of vibratory motion, which is perceptible to the person mesmerized. And it assumes, that these different vibratory motions of the fluid are *intuitively* understood by the patient. True, Mr. Townshend says, the language of vibrations is new to him at first, and that by a gradual process of association he learns to comprehend it. But we

* Townshend's Facts, p. 316.

are assured, that individuals, when first mesmerized, do think just as the operator thinks; so that the vibratory motions, according to the theory, must be understood intuitively. It is surely unnecessary to attempt to refute these *airy* assumptions, which are not sustained by a particle of evidence.

But admitting them all true, they by no means account for the singular fact, that the thoughts of the operator become apparently the thoughts of the patient. As when the former drinks wine, the latter supposes himself to be drinking; so, when the former thinks of a splendidly furnished parlor, the latter thinks of the same object—nay, imagines himself in the parlor, actually looking at the various objects of which the operator is thinking. If the operator thinks of a thunderstorm, the patient sees the lightnings flash, and hears the roar of the thunder; sees the dark clouds, and the torrents of rain descending. When we are told, that by *the mere act of the will*, or by means of a *subtile fluid*, the thoughts of one mind become the perceptions of another, we must demand evidence the most conclusive; for the assertion is in plain contradiction of all that we know of human nature, and of the intercourse of different minds with each other.

But there are other difficulties attending the averments of the advocates of Mesmerism. The thoughts of the operator, we are assured, become the thoughts and perceptions of the patient; even the consciousness of the former becomes the consciousness of the latter. The two are, for the time being, as one person. Yet they hold conversation in the usual mode—the operator asking questions, and the patient returning answers. The former *thinks* of Trinity church in New York, of its various parts, its ornaments, &c. The latter *sees* Trinity church, and describes correctly the objects of which the former is thinking. At this moment the consciousness of the two persons is identical; and yet when the operator asks, “What do you see?” the patient recognizes him as a distinct person,

and answers the question. Now we should naturally expect, when the operator asks a question, to hear the patient ask the same question, instead of answering it. It is certainly most marvelous, that there should exist, at the same moment, so perfect identity, both of physical sensibility and of mental acts; and yet that the patient, when questions are asked, or remarks made, should have a distinct consciousness of his own. As Dr. Drake well remarks, when the operator has, for a short time, thought of some object or scene, "he wishes to know its effect, and then frames, and puts the question; but, in doing this, his state of mind necessarily changes, and he becomes attentive to the expected answer. Now, how does it happen that this new state of mind is not impressed on that of the somniloquist, like that which immediately preceded it? But, if impressed, it must bring hers into the same condition with his own; that is, waiting for a reply, and of course she could not make it: if not impressed, it is certainly an argument against the infusion into her mind of what he first thought over. The alledged ability of the somniloquist to give an account of her consciousness, while the person remains in communication, during which, according to the terms of the case, she has *his* thoughts, is, then, a paradox, and seems to be an absurdity."*

The difficulties multiply as we proceed; for it appears, not only that the *sleep-waker*, as the mesmerized person is called, has sufficient consciousness and thoughts of his own to respond to inquiries made by the operator; but his mind frequently acts with great energy, independently of the operator's mind. Mr. Townshend mesmerized an under-graduate of Trinity college. When he was perfectly asleep, he said to him: "I wish you now to get up from your chair." He replied—"Oh, no, no! I prefer staying where I am; but *you* must stay with me." Mr. T. replied—"No, I am going;" whereupon he seized both his

* Analytical Report on Mesmerism, p. 35.

hands, and exclaimed: "You must, on no account, leave me."* He relates a similar circumstance, in the case of a Belgian gentleman, whom he mesmerized. He says: "I now made a motion, as if I were going away; when suddenly the patient seized my hands, one in each of his, and exclaimed: 'You must not go away, on any account.' After this, he grasped my hands so tightly, that it would have been no easy matter for me to liberate them. Fearing to irritate him, I remained quiet; and, as long as I did so, he lay perfectly motionless, but always with his eyes a little open." Mr. T. then became anxious to awake his patient; but he objected to being waked. "Thus circumstanced," says he, "I scarcely knew what course to take. That he should be awakened, was desirable, for it was late; but every effort that I made, to free my hands, only made him grasp them more firmly. My position was sufficiently ridiculous. I had raised a spirit which I could not quell; and the work of my own hands had become as unmanageable as the creation of Frankenstein. At length, after matters had remained in this state a full hour, I so strongly insisted upon his awaking, that he reluctantly permitted me to take the necessary measures for arousing him."† Now these patients were by no means in the same state of mind with the operator; nor were they obedient to his will. He was thinking of leaving them; they were taking measures to prevent his doing so. He was even afraid of irritating one of them; and, when he desired to awaken him, he positively refused; and only by earnest persuasion did he, at length, prevail upon him to allow himself to be aroused! Now if, during the mesmeric sleep, the ideas of the operator flow into the mind of the patient, and the will of the former completely controls the latter; how would such occurrences be possible? Could not Mr. T. *will* his patients to let go his hands? Evidently, in the case before us, the patient had a

* Townshend's Facts, p. 71.

† Ibid. p. 64.

consciousness, feelings, and a will of his own, and was quite independent of his magnetizer. Such cases, furnished by the advocates of Mesmerism, clearly disprove one of the most important principles of the science.

But it may be said, that, whatever apparent difficulties and inconsistencies may seem to attend the theory of the mental identity of the mesmerizer and the person mesmerized, we cannot call in question the uniform testimony, to this point, of persons of the highest respectability, and of undoubted veracity. We answer, first, that when human testimony requires us to believe palpable inconsistencies and absurdities, we are forced to conclude, that the witnesses are either deceivers, or deceived. In many cases, as even the advocates of Mesmerism admit, there is collusion between the operator and his patient. In some instances, the coincidence between the thoughts of the two may be accidental; in others, it may be the result of *leading questions*, which suggest to the mind of the patient the thoughts of the mesmerizer. But more on this point hereafter.

In the second place, the testimony is contradictory. As we have seen, the warmest advocates of Mesmerism furnish cases in which the person mesmerized not only has his own thoughts, but his own desires and will, which are in decided opposition to those of the operator. Mr. Townshend mentions cases, in which not only had the patient his own thoughts, but could read and reveal the thoughts of others. While one of his sleep-wakers was in the mesmeric sleep, a little basket, as he says, brought in by his wife, was standing on a table near him. "He took it up, and considered it (always with his eyes shut), and said to my wife: 'Ah, you are thinking now of making this a present to Mr. V. O.'s little girl. This was quite true. Again; I asked the same sleep-waker, in his state of Mesmerism, if he knew of any application which would strengthen his eyes, then weak. 'Yes,' he said, 'something of which you have been thinking';

a wash, for the prescription of which you wrote to a physician in Paris, not long ago, for the use of a friend of yours.' He spoke correctly; and I declare, most positively, that the sleep-waker had no means whatever of knowing the facts he stated, except through the medium of my own thoughts."* "Anna M——," he tells us, "occasionally manifested phenomena similar to the above," and (woman-like, perhaps) accompanied them with a far more delicate and accurate perception of the state of his feelings at such times as she was placed in mesmeric relation to him. She would frequently anticipate his wishes, and say: "Come, you are now wishing that I should do a piece of needlework. I own, just now, it is rather a trouble to me; but I will do it, notwithstanding." These persons had a distinct consciousness; and, instead of having just the thoughts that were passing in the mind of the operator, they were observing the thoughts passing in his mind, and determining to anticipate his wishes!

But, it may be said, the person mesmerized has the thoughts of the operator only when the latter *wills* him to have them. That is, the operator can, by an act of his will, without uttering a word, or making a visible movement, expel from the mind of the patient all its thoughts, and so infuse into it his own, that it will mistake them for its own thoughts, or even perceptions! One mesmerizer, who has traveled extensively through our country, displaying to the public gaze the wonders of Mesmerism, has pretended to make his patients believe themselves to be other individuals, and to take from them wholly their understandings—and all by an act of his will! Truly, when such things are believed by intelligent people, we may conclude, that ours is a *credulous age*!

It may assist the reader to form a correct opinion on the subject in question, if we here introduce some facts from an "Analytical Report of a Series of

* Facts in Mesmerism, p. 311.

Experiments in Mesmeric Somniloquism, performed by an Association of Gentlemen; with Speculations on the production of its Phenomena, by Daniel Drake, M. D., of the Medical Institute of Louisville,"—published in 1844.

A certain gentleman was exhibiting a young lady, in the mesmeric sleep, and exciting the wonder of the good people of Louisville; when Professor Drake proposed a series of experiments. With the consent of the mesmerizer, he and nine other gentlemen, nearly all men of science or letters, united for the purpose of prosecuting them at the lodgings of the somniloquist. All, except one, had an opportunity of conversing with her; and those conversations were presented in the Analytical Report, and were decided unanimously, by the gentlemen associated, to embody the facts correctly, and then ordered to be published in the *Western Journal of Medicine and Surgery*. They were limited to the inquiry, "*whether their thoughts, when introduced to the somniloquist, could, independently of speech, or visible signs, impress themselves on her mind.*" Dr. Drake's opinion is, that the young woman was really in a state of somniloquism. To satisfy themselves on the point of inquiry, "it was agreed in writing, that each member of the association should describe the objects or scenes which he intended to present to the somniloquist, not making them known to any person whatever, and, sealing the paper, hand it to the member appointed to keep the same; that he would put no leading question to the somniloquist; that her answers should be listened to, and reported, by members of the association, written down by others, sealed up, and delivered to another member than the one who held the other sealed papers, and that, at the close, the two sets of papers should be opened and compared." The experiments of each afternoon lasted about one hour and a half, during which the female sat erect and unsupported, on a sofa, and seemed not fatigued.

The result of these experiments is thus summed up, by Drs. Drake and Yandell, the committee :

“ The record of questions and answers submitted to the committee has been carefully examined, and the first remark they have to make upon it, is that the somniloquist seems to have been silent except when she was addressed, as they nowhere find a single observation made by her, but in reply to a question, or in consequence of a remark made by the gentleman in conversation with her. This taciturnity shows itself still farther, in the brevity of her answers, which were generally limited to the enunciation of a single idea, or conception of the mind, which in every instance, except two or three, where a leading question was put in relation to sound, involved visual perceptions only. In comparing or uniting her answers on the same topic, it is obvious, that she seldom had a clear conception of it ; and they scarcely find any evidence of her perceiving the relations of the different members of any group. Nearly one hundred of her replies were entirely negative ; in quite as many more, she saw something, but too indistinctly to give any account of it ; in a great many cases, her enunciation of an object was prefaced by the expressions, ‘ looks like ; ’ ‘ resembles ; ’ ‘ seems like ; ’ ‘ appears as if ; ’ and ‘ seems to be ; ’ when she answered in a more confident manner, the reply does not, in general, extend beyond a single quality or characteristic of the object, such as color, form, position or motion, often imperfectly or partially expressed, and scarcely ever referred to an absolute standard. Thus her vocabulary is barren, and her style eminently vague and obscure. In a great number of cases her answers, of course, are susceptible of various applications and interpretations ; and it is obvious to the committee, that in many instances, she herself did not make an application of the qualities or characteristics which she announced to any particular object. The committee have not been able to discover any connection between the distinctness of her answers and their

truth, for some of the most obscure and even negative, relate to the objects which were really present in the minds of the gentlemen conversing with her, or actually before their eyes ; while some of the most explicit, refer to other objects than those which occupied their attention. The catalogue of subjects exhibited in the analysis just given, must be admitted to present a great variety, but there is by no means a corresponding variety in her answers. On the contrary, they are abundant in set phrases. Among these the committee find, and may cite—‘ the figure of something ;’ ‘ a small place ;’ ‘ something moving ;’ ‘ something moving round ;’ ‘ something that looks dark ;’ ‘ something white ;’ ‘ something painted,’ or of ‘ different colors ;’ ‘ something that looks bright ;’ the last of which the committee have counted fourteen or fifteen times, while many of the others recur eight or ten times. ‘ A person’ or ‘ persons’ occurs about thirty times, generally when they were present, but did not make more impressive parts of the group than things ; a ‘ house,’ ‘ building,’ or ‘ room,’ occurs twenty-three or twenty-four times, seventeen of which, it should be stated, correctly, the remainder erroneously ; and in a few instances she made no allusion to either, when it should have been done. She announced water four times when it was present, four times when it was absent, and failed to indicate it four times, when it made a part of the landscape. Once she saw it after a leading question, twice failed to see it under a leading question, and once under a leading question she heard it. In all cases, except one or two, she was confused and uncertain as to its appearance and extent ; which, however, was the case with almost every other object. Her answers generally presented something which could be applied to familiar scenes and objects, but not to those of a remote and uncommon kind, in which houses, furniture, and persons were not the principal matters. Hence she said nothing which was applicable to the boat-scene on the lakes, the excursion on the Ohio, the walk on

Santa Rosa Island, or the descents into the Mammoth Cave."

These experiments were made by gentlemen, some of whom were eminently qualified by their intimate acquaintance with physiology, and its kindred sciences, to form a correct judgment; and all of whom were qualified to decide correctly concerning the phenomena exhibited—as whether the patient correctly described the objects before their minds, when in communication with her. And we cannot but remark, how very unsatisfactory is the evidence afforded in favor of the identity of thought, feeling, and perception, between the operator and the person Mesmerized. It is worth while to note the fact, that when Mesmerism is subjected to the careful and protracted scrutiny of scientific men, it is very much shorn of its glory. Its most wonderful phenomena disappear; and it becomes little more than ordinary somnambulism. Such was the result under the examination of the learned committees in France; and such is the result in the examination we are now considering.

Professor Drake has some ingenious speculations upon the mesmeric phenomena. He states it, as an undeniable fact, that a Mesmeric somniloquist "is in an extremely passive and quiescent state of mind—not so sluggish and insensible as not to comprehend a question, but too torpid to put forth mental manifestations, without its stimulus;" like stagnant water, without a current, but capable of being excited by external influences. And as the undulations and currents in stagnant water will vary according to the nature, direction, and mode of the external force; so when the external influences, the remarks and interrogatories, which are brought to bear upon the mesmeric somniloquist, may vary in their substance or manner, they will raise in her a variety of mental conceptions: stir up her imagination to various creations. "Thus the question itself is what arouses her imagination, and the answer announces, not what existed in her mind by secret infusion previously to

his putting the question, but what was created between the time of hearing the interrogatory, and sending forth the reply."

In support of this theory, Dr. Drake states a number of facts, principally connected with the experiments, he, in connection with the association of gentlemen, made. There is generally, and especially in the beginning of the conversation, a lapse of time between the question and the answer, which sometimes lasts several minutes. This could not occur, if the thoughts and perceptions of the operator were infused into the mind of the patient. But if the imagination must first be excited by questions and remarks, and these form the image of an object, the delay is accounted for. If what is said, naturally suggest an object, the answer will, of course, be more prompt. Thus, one of the gentlemen held in his hand a *silver lancet case*, and asked: "What have I in my hand?" The patient, of course, would not take it to be a horse, a man, or a landscape. And although she might have heard of a Hindoo idol, a pineapple, a pocket compass, or a silver lancet case; yet, as there are a number of things more familiar, she would likely not think of any one of these. Accordingly, she answered: "*a book*;" and, under a series of questions, which did not deny the truth of her answer, described it as such, as follows: "Q. Anything in my hand? A. Yes, a book. Q. What kind? A. A dark one. Q. Large, or small? A. Small. Q. Its color? A. Dark." One gentleman asked her what she saw? She answered, correctly, a large house, with columns. But when another gentleman held a Hebrew bible in his hand, and a third thought of a human skull, and asked the same question; in both cases she mentioned a house. "Such answers as the latter," remarks Dr. Drake, "relieve us from the necessity of concluding, that Mr. C. D. had sympathetically impressed her with the image of a building; from which we are still further relieved by the fact, that her imagination immediately entered the house which it had created, and

consistently presented her with rooms, and persons standing, walking, and sitting; though Mr. C. D., meanwhile, had, in imagination, descended into the Mammoth cave, and was threading its strange labyrinths." It is, indeed, most remarkable, if the pretended identity of thought and perception really exists, that when those in communication with the patient, descended, in imagination, into this wonderful cave, and were viewing its strange sights; and when one ascended the Ohio river in a skiff, on a fowling voyage; and when three different gentlemen conducted her to the anatomical lecture-room of the Medical Institute; she saw nothing that indicated the slightest sympathy with them. And it is not less remarkable, that, in a number of instances, in which her answers were most correct, other things, far more impressive, in the same group, were not perceived; although the person in communication had them distinctly before his mind. Thus, for example, one gentleman conducted her to the bull-baiting, in England; and she saw people, but not the object that brought them together. And when three gentlemen, at different times, conducted her to the amphitheater of the Institute, she saw a room, and persons, but not the striking objects peculiar to the place; although their object was to show *them* to her. It is also a fact, of particular importance, that several of the gentlemen, without being aware of it, presented the same objects; but her answers to their questions concerning those objects, instead of being identical, or even similar, were entirely different.

To prove that the answers do not express the ideas of the person in communication, secretly imparted, but the *effects* of *his* conversation and questions on *her own* imagination, Dr. Drake refers to a report published in the Western Journal for June, 1842, of a series of experiments on corporeal sympathy, made in Cincinnati, in the presence of many respectable witnesses, which conclusively shows, that by varying the questions, or introducing them with different prefatory

remarks, the same water and the same bread and meat, were made to have, respectively, many different tastes, and to be a variety of things, according to the varying creations of the imagination of the somniloquist.

The theory of Dr. Drake has several advantages which go far to prove it correct. 1. It accounts for many strange coincidences between the thoughts of the mesmerizer and those of the patient. 2. It accounts for the many failures on the part of persons mesmerized to think as do their operators. By the way, the coincidences are generally published, and the failures forgotten. 3. It accounts for the indistinctness and imperfection of many of the answers of somniloquists, even when in the main correct. 4. It relieves us from the necessity of believing that the thoughts of one mind are infused into another mind without either words or signs, by a subtile fluid under the direction of the will of the mesmeriser. 5. It relieves us from the necessity of believing, that the thoughts of the person mesmerised are the same as those of the operator, whilst yet they converse together, and each manifestly has thoughts of his own. Let those who would see this theory more fully presented and defended, read the Analytical Report, with the accompanying Speculations.

Let us now venture into the lofty regions of *clairvoyance*. Of this there appear to be several kinds or degrees.

1. The lowest degree, perhaps, is that in which the mind of the patient is said to be guided by the thoughts and imaginings of the operator, but corrects the errors into which he may chance to fall; or in which the patient sees things which are not in the mind of the operator. Of the latter kind is the case stated by Dr. Caldwell, in which the patient not only thought of their mutual friend, as he willed her to do, but saw him in the front room of his dwelling, and described accurately his chair and his dress. Professor Bush, who has, within a few years, become a zealous convert to Mesmerism and Swedenborgianism, states,

that a certain celebrated sleep-waker was requested by a gentleman in communication, or as the French have it, *en rapport* with him, to visit his study, and describe it. The whole description was precisely correct, as the gentleman stated, except that the sleep-waker said, there was a *box* on the table in the middle of the room, the top of which was painted, and represented a landscape. He affirmed that there was no box on the table. The sleep-waker replied : "There is no box, do you say? you are wrong : I am certain that there is a box there, I see it distinctly still. Look now, there, at the place where you write. Do you not see it? That is astonishing, for it is of considerable size." The magnetizer, and several other persons, immediately repaired to the library ; and "there stood the box, in the identical place pointed out by the magnetized." How shall we understand this singular phenomenon? If it be indeed a truth, and not like thousands of wonderful coincidences found in the history of fortunetellers, and similar characters ; we must conclude that the spirit of the sleep-waker left his body at the bidding of the person *en rapport*, and passed through the library ; and thus was able not only to see what he saw, but to correct his errors. Bush, without denying this, attempts to explain the occurrence thus : when the operator first saw the objects contemplated, they impressed themselves in their true features, on the tablet of his heart. They painted themselves there in their genuine traits, as really as the colors and forms are impressed upon the canvas by the hand of the artist. Thus the impression remained for some time. Subsequently, from some inexplicable cause, error crept into the mind concerning some of the objects—the position of the box, for example. "But this mere error of judgment did not obliterate the true, underlying impression, originally made. The senses, then, did their duty, and made a veritable report. The image then daguerreotyped upon the mind, in fact, remains there still, unconsciously to the person ; and from this image

the corresponding image, in the mind of the mesmerizee, is derived."* The objection to this explanation is, that it is no explanation at all. No definite idea is conveyed, by saying, that objects seen by us impress themselves upon the tablet of our minds—are daguerretyped, and the like. Who can conceive of all the objects one has ever seen, remaining painted upon his mind in all their forms, colors, and relative positions—of their being so clearly there, as to be seen by a clairvoyant, and yet not discovered by the individual himself, even when his attention is particularly directed to them? If we admit the truth of such facts as that just stated, we must suppose the spirit of the mesmerizee to forsake the body, and go, at the bidding of the operator, whithersoever he is directed. And in believing this, there is no difficulty whatever, if we can credit statements equally substantiated, concerning other exploits of clairvoyants.

2. The second degree in clairvoyance, perhaps, is that in which the person mesmerized, at the will of the operator, goes to a distant house, and not only describes the house and the furniture, but the persons who are, at the moment, in the house. A gentleman of high respectability told us, some months since, that he had been put in communication with a young female in the mesmeric sleep, and that he willed her to go to his brother's house in Baltimore. The house she described pretty accurately, and told him, that she saw a man, who, from the description, seemed to be his brother, standing before the fire, conversing with a grey-headed gentleman; and there were two females in the room. He wrote to his brother and ascertained that an old gentleman was in his house at the time. Now suppose we admit, that she saw the house and the persons in it as described, then it is certain, that her spirit, at the will of the operator, left the body; that by a wonderful intuition it knew just where to find the city, the street, and the house; that it

* Mesmer and Swedenborg, pp. 87, 88.

entered the house, deliberately surveyed the objects which presented themselves, and reported accordingly. There are serious difficulties in admitting these things. In the first place, we cannot readily believe, that an individual can, at pleasure, separate the spirit of another from the body, and keep it in that separate state as long as he chooses. In the next place, it is difficult to believe, that a disembodied spirit would so easily find the city, the street, and the particular house. And, finally, it is even more difficult to believe, that the spirit of the young female was in a certain house in the city of Baltimore, observing what was passing there, and at the same moment in the body in Louisville. But this we must believe, or reject the whole of the phenomena reported; for she answered promptly all the questions put by the operator; of course, her spirit was in the body. And then she told him what she saw at the moment she was replying; of course, her spirit was in Baltimore. Consequently either her spirit was in Louisville and in Baltimore at the same moment, or the apparent coincidences between her statements of what she saw, and what actually occurred in Baltimore, were merely accidental.

The advocates of Mesmerism tell many wonderful stories concerning the perfect accuracy with which clairvoyants describe persons and things at any distance, of which the operator knows absolutely nothing. In Bush's work on Mesmerism and Swedenborgianism we are told of a female, who, like all famous clairvoyants, "is the perfection of integrity and every other moral excellence," of whom it is testified by her mesmerizer, that, "she will accurately describe who are in a particular room in her father's house at a particular moment, and the arrangement of the furniture, &c., a distance of above fifty miles; or she will search for and see a member of her family, and describe the place in which he or she is, and the others also present." He further says, "I at length succeeded in prevailing upon her to see some others,

not members of her family, or known to them, or to herself, and whose names even I did not mention, but only a very few particulars about them. She has described their persons most accurately, the places in which they were, their occupations at the moment; and told what others were in the same room with them: and all this when I knew nothing of the truth at the time, and had to verify it afterwards." In the same work, we have an account of a *natural* clairvoyant, who, at the request of the gentleman at whose house she was living, directed her thoughts to his son, then in the army in Russia. And though she had never seen him, yet in her paroxysm "she drew his portrait exactly as if she had him before her eyes," said he was constantly present to her mind, that she accompanied him in all his expeditions; that being naturally brave, he exposed himself too inconsiderately to danger. "She frequently asked the sister of this young officer, whether she did not see him in a corner of the room; and, one day, upon receiving a negative answer, she said, 'Well, then, ask him any questions you please, and I shall return his answers.' The sister, having consented, asked all sorts of questions relative to family matters, which were unknown to the somnambulist, who answered them all in a manner so precise and so accurate, that the interrogator afterwards declared that she felt herself seized with a cold perspiration, and was several times on the point of fainting with fright during what she called the dialogue of spirits." This same somnambulist told the father, that she saw his son at the hospital, with a piece of white linen wrapt round his chin; that he was wounded in the face, was unable to eat, but was in no danger;—all of which statements were soon verified.

These marvelous tales, the truth of which Mr. Bush religiously believes, can be satisfactorily accounted for, he thinks, only on the ground of the truth of Swedenborg's assertion; "that *real* space is non-

existent in the spiritual world, and that nothing more is needed, to bring spirits into conjunction with each other, than *similarity of states*, coupled with a *desire* to that effect." It will be somewhat difficult to convince sane men, that *space* has reference exclusively to *matter*, and that a spirit in the body, or out of it, has only to *desire* to converse with another spirit, in order to do so; or that a spirit in its body at one point, where it hears and answers questions promptly, can, at the same time, be present, and observe what is passing a hundred, or a thousand miles distant.

3. The third degree of clairvoyance is that in which the sleep-waker, though wholly ignorant of physiology, anatomy, and medicine, perceives precisely the character of diseases, either in his own body, or in the bodies of others, and prescribes the most effective remedies. Of this singular knowledge, Mr. Townshend gives an example. He asked his patient, whether she could open her eyes. Her reply was: "I can do it, if you insist that I should; but, I warn you, that you will see something very disagreeable; and, besides, the effort will do me no good." He nevertheless, commanded her to open them. "She did so. It was really a fearful sight. The eyeballs were turned up, and converged toward the nose; the white of the eye was bloodshot, and the whole organ quivering and convulsed." He commanded her to close her eyes; but when he awoke her, he was greatly alarmed to find her perfectly blind, and she was greatly agitated. He threw her again into the mesmeric sleep, when she immediately became calm, and begged him not to be alarmed, as her blindness was but the momentary effect of the fatigue to her eyes, caused by the effort to open them. She then requested him to breathe on her eyes, and to lay his hand on them; after which, she assured him that he might awaken her without any further apprehension. The sleep-wakers, it would seem, have a very great advantage of physicians; for they can determine precisely the state of their own system, and prescribe for them-

selves with wonderful success. DELEUZE tells us, that some care is necessary, lest by their prescriptions they injure themselves. It often happens, he says, that a patient, when put into a state of somnambulism, is afflicted, at the same time, with several very dangerous diseases; and that the treatment which is proper for one, is not proper for another. The somnambulist, occupied with the organ which is most affected, prescribes remedies for that, without examining whether they are not otherwise injurious. He mentions the case of a lady, suffering from diseased stomach and lungs, who prescribed for herself medicine for the former, which would have aggravated the latter. The magnetizer made some observations to her about it, in consequence of which she deferred taking it until her lungs were in a better condition; and the result was, that a cure was effected. Deleuze gives the following directions on this subject:

“When your somnambulist prescribes for himself a remedy which appears to be unsuitable to his condition, you will make your objections to him; you will engage him to examine the state of his organs successively, and with the greatest attention, and give you an account of them. You will request him to explain the reasons which have induced him to choose the remedy in question, and to describe accurately the effects he anticipates from it. You will present him the medicine, and make him touch and taste it. You will request him to tell what a dose should be, not only by the name of the measure or weight, but by showing you the quantity which he wishes to take. If, after all these precautions, he persists, you may depend upon him.”*

But the most wonderful story, of this kind, we have seen, is the following:

“Chardel, also a French writer on Mesmerism, gives an interesting account of two sisters whom he mesmerized, as a physician, with the hope of checking

* Practical Instruc., p. 78.

a tendency to consumption which they had both evinced. One evening, being in sleep-waking, they, as if prompted by a natural instinct, entreated their mesmerizer to leave them in that state, only so far demesmerizing them as to enable them to open their eyes, and to be committed to their own self-guidance. Day after day they renewed their petition; for day after day they felt health returning under the mesmeric influence. In other respects they pursued their usual habits, and their mesmeric existence had its alternate periods of sleep and of waking, as regular as those of the natural life. At the end of three months, their cure appearing to be complete, M. Char-del conducted the sisters, accompanied by their mother, to a beautiful spot in the country, where he restored them to a knowledge of themselves. He describes in lively terms their surprise and joy, on returning to consciousness. It was winter when they entered the mesmeric state: it was now spring. The ground was then covered with snow, but now with flowers. They were then looking forward to an early grave, but now the feeling of renewed health tinged everything with hope and life; almost doubting if they did not dream, they threw themselves into their mother's arms, gathered flowers and smelled of them, and endeavored, by the exercise of their senses, to convince themselves that it was all a blessed reality. Not a circumstance of the three past months survived in their memory.”*

But clairvoyants not only excel the physicians, in prescribing for themselves, but are equally superior in their prescriptions for others! Mr. Townshend gives some rather singular examples. The first time he succeeded in mesmerizing one of his patients, a gentleman present desired him to ask the mesmerizee, what remedy a lady of their acquaintance should apply, for the cure of a chronic sore throat with which she had been for some time afflicted. He immediately replied, “Mademoiselle De—— should, on

* Townshend's Facts, p. 93.

going to bed every night, envelop her throat in a linseed poultice, which should be kept moist the whole night through." He then added some very particular directions about making and applying the poultice. This wise patient was "a lively boy of fifteen, who was never ill in his life, and who hated everything appertaining to disorders and their remedies." The lady was, *of course*, perfectly cured! The success of this prescription induced Mr. T. to consult another of his patients—"a shy and delicate girl of sixteen"—what measures he should adopt for subduing a pain in his side, caused by a fall from a horse. She gave a prescription which a physician, who was consulted, pronounced quite as good as she could have given, if she had taken out a diploma. The prescription was *of great service!* He also mentions the case of another of his sleep-wakers, who had long been in bad health, without knowing the cause, and who, in the mesmeric sleep, told what the disease was, and made prescriptions, by following which he predicted a certain cure before the end of the year!

The sleep-wakers have great advantages over the best physicians; for the latter often mistake the nature of the disease; but the former can examine every organ, as if the whole were laid open before them. The physicians are often unacquainted with medicines that might effect a cure; but the clairvoyants, equally ignorant of all remedies, when awake, are perfectly acquainted with all, when mesmerized! And last, though not least, the physician must take the trouble to *visit* his patients, especially if they are severely ill; but the clairvoyants examine the whole case, and prescribe as well a thousand miles off, as if they were present! "Nothing is more common," says Bush, "than to submit to a subject the case of one, removed, it may be, to the distance of hundreds of miles, who is laboring under any particular malady, which, however, is not known in any of its particulars, to the consulter, but which he wishes to have investigated. A correct report is often made of such

cases, and that without the slightest previous knowledge of the person or his ailment.”* Andrew Jackson Davis, the celebrated New York clairvoyant, it appears, has been practicing medicine in the mesmeric state for several years; although it is testified, by those who profess to have known him from his boyhood, that he is wholly ignorant of the medical and other sciences.

There are several wonderful things connected with the medical knowledge of clairvoyants. In the first place, it is wonderful that they should be able to see and examine every part of the human body, and to ascertain precisely which of the organs is diseased, and to what extent. In the second place, it is wonderful that persons who, in their natural state, know nothing of physiology and anatomy, should, in the mesmeric sleep, become skilled in both. In their natural state, many of the clairvoyants, even if the human body in all its parts were laid open to the eye, could not determine what organs are diseased; but, in the mesmeric state, it seems, they can give an intelligible and correct account of every part of the system, and employ with ease and accuracy the technical terms of the sciences involved. It is wonderful, that they should so suddenly become thoroughly acquainted with the nature of all diseases, and with the proper remedies, and should be able often to predict the precise time of recovery. The following testimony is borne, concerning Andrew J. Davis, by William Fishbough, one of the publishers of his “Revelations:” “We also, at the same time, heard him examine a number of patients, while in the clairvoyant state. While in the latter state, he appeared as if metamorphosed into a totally different being. The human system seemed entirely transparent to him; and, to our utter astonishment, he employed the technical terms of anatomy, physiology, and *materia medica*, as familiarly as household words! Our surprise was equally excited by the *exceeding clearness*

* Mesmer and Swedenborg, p. 122.

with which he described and reasoned upon the nature, origin, and progress of a disease, and concerning the appropriate means to employ for its removal. From infallible indications presented, we saw that there could be no collusion, or deception, and no such thing as receiving his impressions sympathetically from the mind of the magnetizer.”*

Now how shall we explain these wonderful things? Or on what principles shall we account for them? We cannot explain them on the principle of infusion of the ideas of the magnetizer; for in the cases stated, the magnetizers were unacquainted with the physiology and anatomy of the human system, as well as with the character of the disease, and the appropriate remedy. Besides, the patient, we are told, is often hundreds of miles distant; and the magnetizer knows nothing of him. And Mr. Fishbough testifies that Davis could not have received his ideas by sympathy from the operator.

We cannot explain the matter on the principle that persons in the mesmeric sleep can see through bandages and paper wrappings, and, of course, through the human body. For this principle, if admitted, does not account for their thorough acquaintance with physiology, anatomy, and medicine, and even with the technical terms belonging to these sciences. Mr. Bush says, the correct report often made of cases of disease some hundreds of miles distant from the clairvoyant, “cannot be accounted for but upon the supposition of some kind of *going forth of the spirit*, which at the same time is not incompatible with its still adhering to the body to which it belongs. The mind of the clairvoyant does undoubtedly in some way come in contact with the essential being of the person in question, and through that is made acquainted with the condition of the material organism, which stands in indissoluble relation to the soul that pervades and animates it. That there is an actual

* Introd. p. xiii.

cognizance of the individual thus spiritually visited, is evident from the fact, that when such a person is brought into the presence of the clairvoyant when in the mesmeric state, he will immediately recognize him as one whom he has seen before, and will minutely describe all the particulars of the previous vision."* Our powers of belief are heavily taxed here. The advocates of Mesmerism testify to a number of facts, which they acknowledge cannot be accounted for but upon the supposition, that the spirit of the mesmeric sleeper goes to visit the distant patients, and examine the whole case, and at the same time remains in the body! It would be quite out of the question, they tell us, to disbelieve the truth of these facts; and therefore we are shut up to the necessity of believing that the spirit of the sleep-waker is in and out of the body at the same instant; that it is at the same moment, in the body and hundreds of miles distant; that in a distant city it examines the case of a patient, and yet at the same time answers promptly the questions put by the magnetizer or person in communication! Paul, the apostle, had visions in which he knew not whether he was in the body or out of it; but it seems never to have occurred to him, that he might be both in and out at the same time! But even if we could believe an absurdity so palpable, the difficulty involved in the phenomena we are considering, is not obviated. For we should still be wholly unable to account for the wonderful knowledge the clairvoyant possesses of sciences of which in his natural state he is wholly ignorant. Whence comes his intimate knowledge of physiology, anatomy, and medicine? To call it "the instinct of remedies," as Mr. Townshend does, explains nothing.† To call such knowledge instinct, is an abuse of language; for we are told by the advocates of Mesmerism, that the clairvoyant reasons with sin-

* Mesmer and Swedenborg, pp. 122, 123.

† Facts in Mesmerism, p. 142.

gular clearness concerning the cause, nature, progress and cure of diseases. But if we call it instinct, the question arises, whence comes this strange instinct?

We are compelled to disbelieve all that is said concerning the medical skill of clairvoyants. That remarkable coincidences sometimes occur, we do not doubt. But that any human being, by being thrown into the mesmeric sleep, possesses the knowledge of which we have been speaking, we cannot believe, until we are prepared to take leave of common sense and reason. We must here state an instructive fact bearing on this subject. Some years since, a prominent physician in Cincinnati had a female patient who was laboring under disease of the heart. All remedies failing, her friends determined to take her to a physician in a town at some distance, who had gained some celebrity by means of a female clairvoyant who examined his patients, and prescribed for them. When they arrived, the clairvoyant was thrown into the mesmeric sleep, and requested to examine this lady, tell what her disease was, and what remedies should be used. She stated in the first place, that *fat* was growing around the heart; and, secondly, that there was one ounce of coagulated blood in one part of the brain, half an ounce in another, and a dram in a third. Having stated the character of the disease, she proceeded to prescribe for the patient. Her description of the disease and her prescriptions were carefully written down by the mesmerizer, and sent in a letter to the physician in Cincinnati. The friends of the afflicted lady returned to the city in fine spirits, brought the letter to him, and requested him to carry out the prescription. He positively declined,—stating his firm conviction, that the account given of the disease was false, and the prescription worthless, and refusing to render himself ridiculous by seeming to countenance such an imposition. Finding themselves unable to prevail upon their family physician to administer the mesmeric prescription, they applied to another physician of a different

school, who was a firm believer in Mesmerism. He undertook to administer the prescribed remedies ; but the patient died. The family physician, in company with others, made a post mortem examination. There was no coagulated blood in the brain ; and there was no fat about the heart. This case shows how little reliance can be placed in the revelations of clairvoyants in medical matters.

Mesmerism sets up even higher claims than those we have exposed. It professes to send the spirit of the clairvoyant, with the swiftness of lightning, from country to country, and even from world to world, and to enable it to report correctly what it sees and hears ! "Of all the phenomena," says Dr. Caldwell, "which I have ever witnessed, or of which I have any conception, those of Mesmerism seem best calculated to give the mind or spirit of man some antepast of the existence and character of its exercises when separated from the body. This is true especially of its darting with light-like swiftness, at the will of the mesmerizer, from country to country, and from one heavenly body to another, observing what they contain, and making its comments on them."* Of the facility with which clairvoyants fly from place to place, and from country to country, and tell what is passing, we have given some examples. And if we are to believe what is positively asserted on this point, we have no need of the Telegraph, if only we can have access to a clairvoyant. We can send him instantly to any point, and hear from our friends, and gain any information we may desire. The Telegraph makes its reports only in the principal towns and cities, and the wires are frequently out of order ; but the clairvoyant can go to any point, in an instant. The Telegraph cannot be extended across the ocean, but the ocean presents no barrier to the clairvoyant. Indeed, he has many advantages over the Telegraph. With little or no expense he can give information of

* Caldwell on Mesmerism. Prelim. Obs. pp. 22, 23.

a thousand things which we should never learn from it; and there is no necessity of employing the fewest words possible, as he can talk to us by the hour! And as for letter writing, it is likely to become the most useless of all things. It is as easy to converse with distant friends through the clairvoyant, as if they were present; and we need not fear to give utterance to the most important secrets, since he, when he returns to his natural state, will remember nothing that occurred in his abnormal or mesmeric state!

But clairvoyants are not confined to earth. They fly from world to world through universal space, and return to earth to describe to its astonished and admiring inhabitants, the geography, the productions, the animals, and the rational beings that inhabit each! Andrew Jackson Davis, the New York clairvoyant, we are told, has taken the tour of the universe, or at least, of the solar system; and those who can believe without evidence, can have the pleasure of knowing something of the productions and inhabitants of the planets! Of the planet Saturn, he informs us, the geography is very beautiful—"it being divided into two thirds water and one third earth"; that being entirely free from all volcanic and catastrophic occurrences, it presents an even and undisturbed surface; that organic beings inhabited this planet many thousands of years before this earth had an existence; that it has four general kinds of vegetable developments, which he describes; that it has four general classes of *animal* existences, of which he gives particular descriptions. Of the human beings who inhabit this planet, he says, their limbs are very straight and round; their bodies of perfect form, and wonderful symmetry; their heads precisely suited to such bodies; their organization, both mental and physical, of the most perfect kind; the prominent qualities of their minds, of an intellectual and moral nature; and their social attachments strong. "Their force of character is extremely great, their will firm, their veneration

very deep and impressive, their causality not so fully developed as comparison. They are governed strictly by the laws of their nature. They form associations according to *internal* desire. They are not governed by the inclinations of the natural man, and therefore take unto themselves mates according to mutual inward approbation, and thus they are united in bonds of spiritual happiness and peace. They inhabit buildings of an ingenious and peculiar structure, which are also beautiful and convenient. Their buildings are very large, covering immense areas of land, and are built near the equator!" These and many more particulars are revealed to us concerning the inhabitants of Saturn.

Of *Jupiter*, he informs us, the vegetable productions are more extensive than those of Saturn;—there being three hundred thousand species of plants. The animal developments are a degree less perfect than those of Saturn. Of the human inhabitants, he says, their relation to our conceptions of a perfect being is much closer than the inhabitants of Saturn. "Their form is full, and well sustained by inward physical force. Their size, symmetry, and beauty of form, exceed those of the earth's inhabitants. Their mental organization corresponds to their physical developments. Smoothness and evenness are apparent upon their form generally. They do not walk erect, but assume an inclined position, frequently using their hands and arms in walking, the lower extremities being rather shorter than the arms, according to our standard of proportion. And by a modest desire to be seen only in an inclined position, they have formed this habit, which has become an established custom among them.* * * They inhabit well constructed edifices, whose form corresponds to that of a *tent*, rather than a *house*, on earth. These are lined with a blueish bark, taken from a tree of the second class; and they are thus rendered impervious to cold, water, and light.* * * They are divided into families, associations, and nations. Their families are composed of such indi-

viduals as have a desire for the company of each other from a congeniality of interior affection. Families grow into associations, and these into nations: and the whole forms one perfect harmonious, *spiritual brotherhood!* ”

The inhabitants of *Mars*, Mr. Davis informs us, have a peculiar prominence of the top of the head, indicative of high veneration. Their cerebrum and cerebellum correspond in form and size; and the latter extends upward at the junction of the two brains; which makes them very susceptible of internal and true affection. Their form approaches nearly to that of man on earth, with the exception of its more perfect symmetry. The upper part of the face has a lively, yellowish cast, and radiations, as it were, proceed from the forehead, the eyes, and the flush of the cheeks. The lower part of the face is of a different color, being rather dark. They have no beard on their faces. Their attitude is modest and perfect; and there exists great delicacy and beauty of form among the females. They are divided into associated families. There are three extensive families, or nations, on this planet; but they are governed by common principles; a result of superior knowledge and sense of justice.

Similar revelations are given concerning the geography, the productions, the animals, and the human inhabitants of the other planets. These are given as specimens. What a wonderful thing Mesmerism must be! This man has been enabled, it would seem, by its miraculous virtue, to give a greater amount of information, than could possibly be gathered in half a century by any man, even if he could travel with lightning speed from world to world; and yet he is not over twenty years of age! One cannot but feel his faith tottering under the prodigious burden laid upon it by these superhuman revelations. But it is to be tried still further. We have not yet developed all the virtues of Mesmerism. It lays hold of a mind wholly uninformed, and pours into it an amount of

wisdom, compared with which that of Solomon was folly! Under its influence, Davis not only visits distant worlds, and observes what appears upon their surface, but reveals their internal structure, their natural history, and even the physiology and anatomy of their animals and human beings! He stops not here; he goes back myriads of centuries, and reveals the origin of the universe! He enters upon this sublime subject in the following style:

"IN THE BEGINNING, the univercœlum was one boundless, undefinable, unimaginable ocean of LIQUID FIRE! The most vigorous and ambitious imagination is not capable of forming an adequate conception of the height, and depth, and length, and breadth thereof. There was one vast expanse of liquid substance. It was without bounds—inconceivable—and with qualities and essences incomprehensible. This was the original condition of MATTER. It was without forms; for it was but *one* form. It had not motions; but it was an eternity of motion. It was without parts; for it was a whole. Particles did not exist; but the whole was one particle. There were not suns; but it was one eternal sun. It had no beginning, and it is without end. It had not length; for it was a vortex of one eternity. It had not circles; for it was one infinite circle. It had not disconnected powers; but it was the very essence of all power. Its inconceivable magnitude and constitution were such as not to develop forces, but omnipotent power! Matter and power were existing as a whole, inseparable. The *matter* contained the substance to produce all suns, all worlds, and systems of worlds, throughout the immensity of space. It contained the qualities to produce all things that are existing upon each of these worlds. The *power* contained wisdom and goodness, justice, mercy, and truth. It contained the original and essential principle that is displayed throughout immensity of space, controlling worlds and systems of worlds, and producing motion, life, sensation, and intelligence, to be impartially disseminated upon their

surfaces as ultimates ! This great center of worlds—this great power of intelligence—this great germ of all existences, was ONE WORLD ! corresponding to a globe visible ; for it was *but* one, containing the materials and *power* to produce all others. It had *wisdom* equal to matter, to plan them and direct their infinite movements. It had *goodness* equal to the extent of its substance, to give perfect harmony and distributive usefulness to all parts of this infinitude. It had *justice* ; but only to be manifested in proportion to developments upon suitable mediums upon these subordinate spheres, or forms of the *great* sphere. It had *mercy*, *lenity*, and *forbearance*, to be developed as corresponding with like developments in sensitive and intelligent beings. It contained *truth eternalized*, like its own nature ! So the whole of these principles were joined into one vast *vortex of pure intelligence* !”

It would probably be impossible to give utterance, in the same number of words, to a greater number of gross absurdities and follies. He begins with the old pagan doctrine, long since exploded, of the eternity of matter. He tells us, that this matter was an eternity of motion ; that is, we may presume, moving from eternity. This immense mass of matter, he would have us believe, consisted, not of different particles, but was one particle. In matter was *power* ; and that power was wise, and good, and just, and true ! Matter has been eternally moving, all the while tending to the production of perfect results ; and yet they are but imperfectly produced ! But we have too much respect for the good sense of our readers, to suppose it necessary to refute this nonsensical effusion. It is thoroughly *atheistic*, and, of necessity, profoundly absurd. This is the opening of what the keepers of Davis impiously call “Nature’s Divine Revelations !”

After giving to the world his mesmeric philosophy concerning the origin of all things, and the formation of the different planets, their geography, inhabitants, &c., he descends from his lofty flight to our earth, and

reveals to us its formation, and the commencement of vegetable and animal life. Nature produced plants, then animals of the lowest orders, then of the higher orders, and then man. He has the history of all nations at tongue's end. He takes up the bible, denies wholly its inspiration, as an atheist, of course, would; tells who are the authors of some of its books; points out the excellencies and defects of the writers, the truths and errors of the books, &c., &c. The whole is a miserably shallow attempt to disprove the truth of Revelation—a collection of worn-out, oft-refuted infidel objections. He tells his readers: "You are believing a book voted as being the word of God by three hundred and eighteen bishops, and sealed true by the emperor Constantine!"—that "it does not teach that pure morality which belongs to the nature of man, and which will result from a superior condition of the race;" that it does not "present one proper conception of the constitution, character, greatness, omnipotence, and majesty of the Divine Mind," &c. Only think of it—an atheist condemning the morality of the bible as defective, and talking of the majesty of the Divine Mind!

These "revelations" of Mesmerism, which fill 782 pages, are brought to a close by a *qualified* commendation of Swedenborg, and others, and an *unqualified* commendation of the social system of the infidel, Charles Fourier!

But who is Andrew Jackson Davis; and how happens it that he has undertaken to become an authoritative teacher of mankind? We are certified that he is a young man in the neighborhood of twenty years of age, distinguished by no mental or physical peculiarity, that would excite the attention of a superficial observer. He possesses, if we believe his admirers, excellent moral qualities, and especially a supreme *love of truth*!!! His father is a shoemaker; and he was an apprentice to the same trade. He has had, as the world is assured, only about six months of schooling, and is entirely ignorant of all the sciences.

A few years since, he became celebrated for his mesmeric susceptibilities, and commenced practicing medicine, while in the mesmeric sleep. Mr. Bush informs us, that "in consequence of what *he* (Davis) *deems* a direct communication from the spirit of Swedenborg, a year or two since—of whose name, by the way, or of the fact of his ever having lived, he was then entirely ignorant—he was prompted to enter upon a course of lectures in the mesmeric state, on a large class of scientific subjects; of which he has, thus far, delivered about eighty, embracing cosmology, ethnology, astronomy, geology, physiology, language, and various others; upon all which he is profoundly ignorant, in his natural state."* There must be some mistake about this matter; for it is not probable that Swedenborg, if indeed he is what his followers imagine, would have influenced an atheist to deliver lectures against the truth of the Scriptures, of which, while on earth, he professed to be the specially qualified expounder. Indeed, Mr. Bush, while he professed to be "well assured of the claims of Mr. Davis's statements to entire confidence, arising from the general conscientious honesty which governs his deportment," was not sure that this quality was possessed in such degree as to secure him from error. He tells us, that if, after saying so much in accordance with the doctrines of Swedenborg, he should utter things contrary to them, his errors must be attributed to the influence of a false spirit, in the guise of an angel of light. "Some secret and lurking error of life or faith, gives advantage to spirits of delusion to flow into his mind and falsify his impressions of truth." Mr. Davis's biographer tells us, that "on the 7th of March, 1844, he fell, without the assistance of the magnetic process, into a strange abnormal state, during which, phenomena occurred of the most surprising character;" that the greater part of the time, for two days, "he seemed to be entirely insensible to

* Appendix to Mesmer and Swedenborg, p. 170.

all external things, and to live wholly in the interior world;" and "it was during this extraordinary state of his mental and physical system, that he received information, of a very general character, of his future and peculiar mission to the world." Davis, himself, says: "I have been impressed to speak the things contained in the following pages, not because truth was before undiscovered, but in order to give it a new and attractive form, and a power to instruct, purify, and elevate the race."* He tells the world, also, that he "was impressed to select *three witnesses*, who should be present at the lectures, so that the world, through them, might know from what source these revelations flow." The individuals thus honored, were Rev. J. A. Parker, Theron R. Lapham, and Dr. T. Lea Smith. In addition to these, he chose Dr. Silas Smith Lyon as manipulator, and William Fishbough as scribe. In the hearing of these witnesses, we are told, this wonderful youth proceeded to the delivery of revelations received from the *spiritual world*. Concerning this whole affair, we have now a few remarks to make.

1. Heretofore, deists have contended earnestly, that the light of nature is a sufficient guide to men, as rational and accountable creatures, and that a divine revelation is wholly unnecessary. True, Lord Herbert, one of the earliest deistical writers in England, after having written a book to prove revelation unnecessary, prayed, as he said, for divine direction whether he should publish it, and received, what he regarded as an immediate intimation from heaven, that he should! Few men, however, have been chargeable with an inconsistency so glaring and so ridiculous. Atheists, of course, have uniformly regarded a revelation as impossible, and have contented themselves with impious cavils against the being and perfections of God. But we have now a book of almost a thousand pages, not on religion alone, but

* Address to the World, p. 1.

on the different sciences, not excluding history ; and this book claims to be a revelation from the spiritual world in favor of atheism ! From denying the necessity or the possibility of a revelation even concerning the great interests of religion, infidelity now presents the world with a revelation on both science and religion, a revelation made by nature in proof of atheism ! Nature, (which means *everything*) it would seem, has felt her compassion moved that a part of herself—that is, mankind, is involved so deeply in ignorance of her sublime truths ; and to remedy so great an evil, she selected Andrew Jackson Davis as the medium through which to pour light upon that part of herself, viz. mankind, which is in darkness ! Strange that, after laboring many millions of years, even from eternity, as her inspired son says she has, to bring things to perfection, they should be yet in so bad a condition.

2. But it is absolutely certain, that these pretended revelations are an immense mass of blunders in science, and of impious falsehoods in religion. To what, then, is their origin to be traced ? Is Davis the real author of them ? If the testimony concerning his entire lack of education is true, it is certain, that he is not. For, much as they abound in errors and absurdities in science, and impious errors in religion, they display an acquaintance with the subjects presented, which a youth of less than twenty years, and with less than six months of schooling, could not possess. We are, consequently, forced to one of two conclusions, viz. the lectures were prepared by other men, who used Davis as a mere tool, in order to give celebrity to their book ; or if delivered by Davis in a state of somniloquism, Satan himself, “who worketh in the children of disobedience,” is the true author of them. It is affirmed, that they were delivered by an ignorant youth, under some strange impulse, in the mesmeric sleep, and that they came from the *spiritual world*. Let this be admitted. Then as there is reason to believe that in the spiritual world there are evil, as

well as pure spirits ; the question arises, from which of them do the professed revelations come ? This question may be answered by the character of the doctrines taught. But they teach false principles in science, and false and demoralizing doctrines in religion. With the fool they say, "there is no God." They assail his glorious revelation with sophistry and falsehood ; and they bestow the highest commendation upon one of the most corrupt men who has lived, whose doctrines strike down the fundamental principles of morality, and let loose the appetites of men without control. We allude to Charles Fourier. Let it, then, be admitted, that Davis in his natural state, is as ignorant as his certifiers make him, and that he delivered the lectures whilst in the mesmeric sleep. We are at no loss to determine whence they came. No other but "the father of lies," or some of his associates in iniquity, would influence him to deliver such sentiments.

We have now before us a sufficient number of the phenomena of Mesmerism, to enable us to come to some conclusion concerning it, and concerning our duty in regard to it.

First. We do not deny, that in connection with the looks, manipulations, &c., of persons called mesmerizers, a kind of sleep analogous to somnambulism and somniloquism may be produced ; though we see no sufficient reason to admit the existence of any fluid passing from the operator to the patient, or from the patient to the operator, as the cause of it. There is reason, as we have seen, to believe, that it may be produced without any such fluid. Nay, it has been produced without any of the means employed by mesmerizers.

Second. In this state, as in somnambulism, the person may be inattentive to what is passing around him, and even to acts of violence ; whilst the operator who had his attention from the beginning, may retain it, and secure it to others.

Third. Some persons in this condition, like some

somnambulists, may see with their eyes closed. Whether they can or not, we leave physiologists to determine, and to explain the phenomenon, if it really exists.

Fourth. It is admitted that powerful effects have been produced upon the physical system of nervous persons, especially of persons in bad health, whose confidence has been gained by the operators or mesmerizers. It is, doubtless, true that many have been cured of diseases of certain kinds, and others improved in health, by what is called Mesmerism. But these effects are to be attributed, not to any newly discovered fluid or science, but to the excitement of the imagination. Even Dr. Caldwell, whilst he represents Mesmer as "by far the most famous, and, in some respects, the most successful magnetizer the world has produced," acknowledges that the machinery employed by him must have produced astonishing effects, by exciting the imagination. He says, "in such an assemblage of the most sensitive class of by far the most sensitive people on earth (for such is believed to be the condition of refined and cultivated Frenchwomen), it was impossible for Mesmer's artful and imposing operations not to be productive of astonishing effects. No wonder therefore that hysterical weeping, sobbing, laughing, and screaming; raving, dancing, convulsions, and fainting, should have occurred, as elements of the disorderly spectacle. It would have been sufficiently wonderful had the case been otherwise. Nor was it perhaps possible for commotions so tumultuous and violent to have assailed the brain and nerves of delicate women, without producing in them decided changes of condition and action. Was disease present? They must have altered it for better or worse—removed it or confirmed it. And, as we are confidently assured, conformable to this view of the subject was the result."

In view of such an acknowledgment from one of the most ardent defenders of Mesmerism, we can scarcely be charged with unreasonable skepticism, if

we doubt the existence of the magnetic fluid, and attribute all the physical effects connected with mesmeric manipulations to the imagination. If this cause was sufficient to produce the effects which attended the experiments of Mesmer, it is sufficient to produce any that are witnessed in our day. Besides, we have adduced a sufficient number of facts, which prove that precisely similar effects have been produced in a great number of instances by exciting the imagination.

Fifth. The alledged identity of feeling, perception, thought, and volition between the mesmeric operator and his patient, does not exist. The thing is in itself absurd and impossible. The facts to which the advocates of Mesmerism testify in relation to this point, involve contradictory principles; and some of the most thorough examinations have proved that no such identity exists, and that there is no infusion of the ideas of the mesmerizer into the mind of the patient. In many instances, it can scarcely be doubted, there is collusion between the two, by which the unsuspecting are deceived. Dr. Caldwell pronounces Mesmer himself "one of the most flagrant impostors that has dishonored the profession;" and it is not uncharitable to suppose that many of our traveling lecturers on Mesmerism are not much better.

Sixth. Clairvoyance, in all its phases and degrees, is a pure *fiction*. The idea that the spirit of the patient is dismissed from the body at the will of the operator, and recalled at his pleasure—that it goes to a house in Philadelphia, or to one of the planets—that while making its observations there, it answers promptly any questions put by the magnetizer—that at the same moment it is in and out of the body;—these things are too absurd to be admitted by any sane man. Nor is it more rational to believe, that an individual in the mesmeric state, comes into the possession of all kinds of knowledge—that he can determine precisely what is the nature of a disease preying either upon his own body, or upon the body of some other person, either present or a thousand

miles distant, and what are the appropriate remedies; or that he is, in some inexplicable manner, made perfectly acquainted with philosophy, in all its departments, with history, religion, and almost all other things. No sane man, one would suppose, could give credit, for one moment, to such pretensions.

What estimate ought we to form of Mesmerism in its moral and religious bearings? Is it, whether its claims are true or false, a harmless thing, to which the friends of morals and religion are not required to make any opposition? Or is it of so decidedly injurious tendency, that duty requires them to give it no countenance, and to throw the weight of their influence against it? The advocates of Mesmerism pretend, that it exerts upon the human mind a happy moral influence. Dr. Caldwell states it as a well known fact, "that both the *intellectual* and the *moral faculties* of some persons are strikingly exalted and invigorated, during that form of somnambulic sleep which Mesmerism induces. But," says he, "I know of no instance, in which the power or action of the animal faculties, has been thus augmented; nor do I believe that any such can be adduced by the most industrious and implacable enemies of the science. Hence the amelioration of the mind by mesmeric influence. And hence the encouragement and cultivation it should receive."* We have here a most singular assertion.. The enemies of Mesmerism are challenged to produce an instance in which the animal faculties have been augmented by mesmeric influence. Now, who that has witnessed mesmeric experiments, has not seen the operators excite the organ of Alimentiveness, and thus make the patient, who was not hungry, begin to eat greedily? Who has not seen them excite the organ of Acquisitiveness, and thus make the patient, not uncommonly covetous, cling with the utmost tenacity to every copper in his possession? Who has not seen them excite the organ

* Caldwell on Mesmerism, pp. 13, 14.

of Combativeness, and thus set the patient, though naturally pacific, to fighting? Who has not seen them excite the organ of Self-esteem, and thus fill the mind of the patient with disgusting pride and egotism? Such experiments, if they are not base deceptions, do prove conclusively, that the mesmeric influence excites the worst passions quite as strongly as the purest affections. Assured as we are, that the fundamental principles of Phrenology are false, we regard all such experiments as gross deceptions. But if we believed in the truth of Phrenology and Mesmerism, as Dr. Caldwell does, we should never think of contending that the latter will excite the moral and intellectual organs, but not the animal organs.

Mr. Townshend affirms, that no one conversant with mesmeric sleep-waking, can doubt that it is "a rise in man's nature." "Separated," says he, "from the usual action of the senses, the mind appears to gain juster notions, to have quite a new sense of spiritual things, and to be lifted nearer to the fountain of all good and of all truth. The great indication of this elevated state of feeling is a horror of falsehood." He gives, as a remarkable example of the elevating moral influence of the mesmeric sleep, the case of a young man who had imbibed in Paris infidel opinions of the worst kind, which he scarcely studied to conceal. In his waking state he avowed himself a materialist. He was extremely ignorant on most subjects, and, at the same time, exceedingly incredulous concerning even the commonest facts in philosophy. "In sleep-waking," says Townshend, "all this was changed. His ideas of the mind were correct, and singularly opposed to the material views he took of all questions when in the waking state." He even chided his mesmerizer for calling the soul "*une chose*," and said, "*Ce n'est pas une chose—c'est une pensée*"—*It is not a thing—it is a mind*. In answer to the question—Can the soul ever die—he said, "Certainly not. It is the soul which is the only true existence, and which gives existence to all we

apprehend." In answer to the question—Is there a future punishment for evil doers?—he said, "Undoubtedly, a great one," which, he said, consisted "in seeing themselves as they are, and God as he is." In conversing with a gentleman who had been afflicted with the loss of a beloved daughter, he "rose into eloquence which seemed unearthly. It was simple, it was beautiful, it was like an inspiration. He spoke of the never-dying nature of the soul; of its ransomed beatitude; of its progress through various eras of existence," &c. Under mesmeric sleep-waking, Mr. Townshend says, "all the hard incredulity which characterized him when awake, was gone." "His willfulness was become submission; his pride, humility, &c. He even regretted the errors of his waking hours, and spoke of his natural state as an existence apart."* Now this man was sincere in his avowal of infidelity, in his natural state, or he was not. If he was not, then he only declared his real belief, when asleep; and he did so, because the motives which induced him to conceal his true opinions, when awake, were not then before his mind. Mr. Deleuze advises mesmerizers to avoid carefully penetrating into the secrets of their somnambulists.† He, of course, knew that persons in this state have not the judgment to determine what they ought to make known, but will answer any questions put to them. This, ordinary somniloquists will do. But surely this state of mind is not an indication of elevated moral feeling. If this man was sincere in holding infidel sentiments, can we believe that his infidelity disappeared when he was in the mesmeric sleep? If so, he must have acquired, in that state, a degree of knowledge which he had not before; or the mesmeric fluid must have produced in his mind pure affections, so that he loved the truth, and therefore saw it plainly. But the mesmeric fluid could not infuse new ideas into his mind. This is self-evident. And can any one

* Facts in Mesmerism, pp. 117—120. † Pract. Instruc. p. 75.

believe, that it produced pure affections in the mind? But whatever was the state of his mind, whilst asleep, it is not denied, that so soon as he was awakened, he relapsed into his former infidelity and wickedness. Of what advantage, then, was his mesmeric virtue? We have seen men who, when partially intoxicated, seemed to become quite religious; and the same thing often occurs in connection with other forms of derangement. But who would think of maintaining, that derangement of any kind—especially that caused by intoxication—is favorable to virtue.

Mr. Townshend says, the mesmeric sleep-wakers have a great horror of falsehood. Is it not strange, then, that they have not an equally great horror of *profanity*? Dr. Caldwell tells us of a man who, when his mesmerizer willed him to mention the name of one whom he disliked, became angry, and cursed the man! *

But the case of Andrew Jackson Davis is a clear refutation of the doctrine, that the mesmeric sleep "is a rise in man's nature." So far from curing his infidelity, it enabled him, we are told, to deliver a large number of lectures against Christianity, and in favor of Atheism. It prompted him to commend in the highest terms, one of the most degrading and corrupting systems of error, which has appeared during the nineteenth century. There is not, therefore, a word of truth in the assertion, that Mesmerism produces an elevated state of moral feeling. That infidels should teach such a doctrine, is not surprising; but that a minister of the gospel (for Rev. Mr. Townshend is a minister) should give the least countenance to it, is passing strange. When mesmeric influence is substituted for the influence of truth and of the Holy Spirit, we may well take our stand in uncompromising opposition to it.

In further inquiring into the moral and religious tendencies of Mesmerism, we shall, in the first place,

* Caldwell on Mes. p. 79.

proceed upon the supposition that its claims are false. Thus viewing it, we decidedly oppose the science, as it is called, for several obvious reasons.

1. All erroneous views concerning the nature and susceptibilities of man, whether they relate to the body or the mind, or both, if they have any practical bearing, must produce unhappy results. If there is no such fluid as that supposed by the advocates of Mesmerism; then they who rely upon it to cure diseases, will be deceived. In cases where the imagination can effect cures, the results may be favorable; but in many others, they will be decidedly injurious. And they who are induced to resort to Mesmerism for the purpose of strengthening virtuous feelings in themselves or others, as Dr. Caldwell advises all to do, must be grossly deceived. If Mesmerism is not a true science, it is quackery in medicine and in morals, and will fill the pockets of unworthy men at the expense of the more virtuous and industrious.

2. It may give to the magnetizer an unsafe influence over his patients. Whether there is such a fluid as the advocates of Mesmerism imagine, or not, two things are certain, viz. 1st. That the pressing of the hands, arms and limbs of females by men, together with all their manipulations, is better avoided. It may not be quite safe in all cases. 2d. If there is nothing more in Mesmerism, than the workings of the imagination, these are sufficient in many cases, to give to the mesmerizer an undue and unsafe influence over patients whose confidence he has secured. As for those *gentlemen* who take about with them, from place to place, young females for the purpose of public exhibitions, we could not trust them. Human nature is a corrupt thing; and if men will not avoid the appearance of evil, we cannot but think, the public may well withhold their confidence.

3. The ground on which, more than any other, we condemn what is called Mesmerism, supposing its claims false, is, that it pretends to reveal secret things: not only things of earth, but things of the eternal world.

In all ages, and perhaps in all countries, there have been persons who have made pretensions of this kind. Some have professed to gain this superhuman knowledge by observing the stars; some, by watching the flight of birds; some, by examining the viscera of animals; some, by intercourse with the spirits of dead men. In all these forms, imposition has been successfully practiced. Those who resort to such methods of deception, acquire great skill in their impious arts, and exhibit so many unaccountable coincidences, that many sensible and worthy persons are deceived. Such deceivers have, in multitudes of instances, filled persons with amazement by telling facts and occurrences in their past history, which they supposed quite unknown. And Mesmerism makes pretensions of this kind, quite equal to those of the boldest fortuneteller. Take for example, the following, copied by Mr. Bush, from a London periodical entitled, "*The Zoist*," devoted specially to Mesmerism.

"In Vol. II, of *The Zoist*, p. 482, after slightly mentioning a number of facts witnessed, and detailed to me from his notes, by Colonel Gurwood, proving beyond all doubt the extraordinary powers of Alexis, I stated that the Colonel had promised to give me a full account for publication, but afterwards excused himself. I consider him on every account very wrong; and am now enabled, notwithstanding the non-fulfillment of his promise, to furnish your readers, in a circuitous way, with his own account of the extraordinary revelations made to him by Alexis respecting some testimony of which he had long stood in need to do justice to himself. In the *Journal de Havre*, last August, 20th, is an extract from the *Journal Pandore*, containing an account by a gentleman of his journey in the Malle Poste from Bordeaux to Paris, accidentally with Colonel Gurwood, on the 24th of last November. After a time, the conversation turned upon Mesmerism, in which the gentleman was a decided unbeliever, while Colonel Gurwood, who till two years ago had been a despising skeptic too, declared his firm con-

viction of its truth. A friend, he said, had with difficulty prevailed upon him at Paris to visit a sleep-waker and mesmerizer. I give you the rest of the account in the writer's words, translated in the *Cheltenham Free Press*, of September 6th.

"The mesmerizer was M. Marcillet, the patient Alexis Didier.

"I shall pass over without notice a game of cards played between me and Alexis, and gained by him through his naming the cards, although I had myself attached a triple bandage over his eyes. I shall not observe either upon the tetanic state of his legs, which were stiff and insensible, under the influence of the fluid. I hasten to come to the statement of facts personal to myself.

"After several experiments, I seated myself by the side of Alexis, my hand in his, and there we were chatting.

"My friend," said I to him, "I am incredulous, but I am so with good faith; so do not fear on my part a systematic opposition."

"Oh! I know that well! you have too much good sense to deny evidence, and too much heart not to love those who love you—and I love you much myself, Englishman though you are; I love you because you generously saved the life of a Frenchman!"

"Singularity struck by this remark, I begged him to continue.

"Yes," continued Alexis, "it is a long time ago! It is," continued he, after a pause, "thirty years! The affair took place there away in the south, during the winter. The country is wild. There, see, the night, and your troops, provided with scaling ladders, appearing under the walls of a strong place. My God, what a noise! what a battle! Poor man, you were wounded," said Alexis, placing his hand on my head; "it was there that the blow fell—but your wound did not stop you. I see you farther on, mounting to the assault—on the breach. Stifled cries come to your ears: Some English soldiers surround a

Frenchman, whom they wish to kill. You run bravely. You lift up with your arms the weapons that menace his head, and you command them to respect his life. Oh! come, I love you, indeed. The officer follows you to a square tower, where several of his comrades are made prisoners. You traverse the town to find your general, to whom, by your orders, the French general surrenders his sword."

"And what became of this sword?"

"Your general presented it to you—and you have it still in London, suspended to the wall of your room; the blade only is the same; the scabbard was changed in 1827."

"And does the officer, whose life I saved, still exist?"

"Yes, he exists; and for a long time you have made useless researches to find him again. But have good hope, come again to-morrow, and we will discover him."

"Struck, affected by what I had just heard, I went out from M. Marcillet's with my head all on fire, not knowing what to think or to believe; for, in fine, Alexis has said what was the truth."

Now we defy any one to find, amongst all the wonderful stories concerning star-gazers, wizards, witches, and fortunetellers, anything more absurd than this. Yet there are those who will believe, that a clairvoyant can look into the human mind and heart, and read there all its past history!

But clairvoyants are not behind fortunetellers in *predicting future events*, any more than in revealing the past. A certain mesmerizer quoted by Mr. Bush, says of one of his clairvoyants, that she did "predict numerous things relating to others which have since exactly taken place."* And as we have seen, Davis has made strange revelations, covering almost the whole field of science and religion.

Now against these developments of Mesmerism,

* Mesmer and Swedenborg, p. 124.

every objection lies, on the ground of which witchcraft, magic, necromancy, and other kindred forms of deception, were so severely condemned by the inspired writers. It induces men to attempt to pry into things which God, for wise reasons, has chosen to conceal from them. It turns attention from the things which God has revealed, the knowledge of which is all-sufficient to furnish men thoroughly to all good works, to the pretended revelations of clairvoyants, the most of which are worthless, and some of which are grossly false and injurious. It tends to unsettle the faith of men in the teachings of the inspired volume. But imperfectly informed concerning the evidences of the inspiration of the scriptures, and concerning the truths they teach, and confused by the singular coincidences which sometimes occur between the declarations of clairvoyants and matters of fact, and by the far more wonderful stories published at a distance, they know not what to believe. They, therefore, become confirmed skeptics, or decided infidels; or they embrace some form of error most allied to the pretended revelations of Mesmerism. When God has been pleased to reveal the things of the eternal world, or to draw aside the veil which conceals the future, he has employed men whose holy lives and whose works gave conclusive evidence of their divine mission. Are we to believe, that now the world is to be enlightened on these sublime and momentous themes by strolling girls and ignorant boys, who have nothing to recommend them, except the fact that some man, no wiser or better than themselves, has succeeded in putting them to sleep! Mesmerism had its birth in infidelity, imposture and immorality; and its subsequent history has not raised it from its original degradation.

But let us suppose its claims founded in truth, and in view of this supposition, inquire into its fruits.

1. In the first place, it puts it in the power of those who are susceptible of the mesmeric influence, to suspend their free and accountable agency whenever

they are pleased to do so, and to continue in this state for an indefinite length of time. For if the mind of the person mesmerized becomes the passive recipient of the thoughts, feelings and volitions of the operator; it is evident that the moral agency of the former is, for the time, suspended. The operator has the entire direction of his mind, and this by a physical necessity which he cannot resist. Now we submit the question, whether any one has the right to allow himself to be placed for hours or days, under the entire control of another mind. Let each one answer for himself the question.

2. Mesmerism, if its pretensions are true, enables the operator to make upon the mind of the patient, without his knowledge or consent, *moral impressions* which cannot be obliterated. If the latter may become the passive recipient of the thoughts, emotions and volitions of the former; impressions of a most unhappy character may be made, which will not disappear when he returns to his natural state. Mr. Townshend says, "A mesmerizer can always so strengthen the virtuous tendencies developed by his patient in sleep-waking as to prolong them, as it were, into the waking state."* If this be true, on the same principle he may so strengthen evil tendencies as also to prolong them. Is it right, is it safe, to allow our minds to become the passive recipients of the thoughts and feelings of others, when permanent impressions of an injurious character may be left?

3. Mesmerism places the patient completely under the control of the operator. He thinks of whatever subject or object the operator wills him to think of. He does whatever the operator wills him to do. The operator excites his appetites and passions as he pleases. He excites alimentiveness, combativeness, amateness, or any other organ, as he chooses. He makes him sing, pray, preach, eat, fight, or do whatever else he wishes. Who does not perceive, that a

* Facts in Mesmerism, p. 124.

power so absolute can and will be abused to the worst purposes? And let it be remembered, that when individuals have been mesmerized once, they become more susceptible of the influence, until the operator can throw them into the sleep without their consent, when they are ignorant of his design, and even when he is at a distance from them. Mr. Townshend states, that he threw one of his female patients into the sleep, while she was conversing with his wife, and knew nothing of his purpose; and again when she was in a house at some distance from him. Now if the operator has perfect command of his patients, and can throw them into the sleep, and place them completely under his power without their consent or knowledge; it is impossible not to perceive the dangerous character of the power thus gained. It is marvelous that any female would allow herself to be placed in such connection with any man. It is not right; and it is not safe.

But even this is not the worst. The mesmerizer, we are told, can give directions to his patient, which, when in his waking state, he will strictly regard, without knowing by what influence he is impelled. Townshend says, "It is a curious fact that, if the mesmerizer tells his patient to abstain from anything at a certain time—even from that of which he may be most fond—the latter acts upon the injunction in his natural state without being aware of the springs that impel his conduct. To what beneficial uses this peculiar influence might be rendered subservient," he remarks, "I need not suggest, nor how effectually it might wean persons from bad habits, by rendering them positively averse to the sins that most easily beset them." * Nor, perhaps, is it necessary for us to do more than suggest to what mischievous purposes this power may, and, if it exist, certainly will be applied. It is not enough, it seems, that during the mesmeric sleep the moral agency of the patient

* Facts in Mesmerism, pp. 124, 125.

should be suspended, and his mind become the passive recipient of the thoughts and feelings, pure or impure, of another mind; but even when he returns to his natural state, he still acts at the bidding of another, and without having the least idea of the power that controls him! So that in his natural state he is, in the very worst of all senses, the obedient servant of his magnetizer! Is there a human being who would, for any conceivable reward, be placed in such a condition, that while supposing himself to act freely, and in accordance with the dictates of his own judgment, he would be really obeying directions given by another, of which he has no knowledge whatever? What is such a state, but one of perfect delusion? What is it, but that of a blind slave to all the directions a mesmerizer may choose to give? It is not in human nature to possess such a power without abusing it. If there is truth in the principles of Mesmerism, the female who allows herself to be mesmerized, does so at her peril. Neither men nor women have the right thus to subject themselves to the will of any human being, whatever confidence they may have in his purity. The best men are imperfect; and the worst often appear as whited sepulchers.

4. Let us suppose, that all that is said of *clairvoyance*, is true; and then let us inquire whether it ought to be encouraged. So far as the statements and revelations of clairvoyants may be supposed useful, can they be at all relied upon? In their prescriptions for their own diseases, Deleuze says, they rarely err; yet they may prescribe a remedy for one disease, which would aggravate another under which they are laboring; or they "often prescribe for themselves remedies which they have heard spoken of, or of which they have formerly made trial." There is much greater uncertainty, he admits, attending their revelations on moral and religious subjects. He says, the somnambulist in his exalted state "feels within himself the development of a new light, whose rays are darted upon all that excites in him a real interest. At the

same time the sentiment of conscientiousness is aroused, and determines the judgment which he ought to form. Thus the somnambulist possesses at the same time the torch which gives him his light and the compass that points out his way. This torch and this compass are not the product of somnambulism; they are always in us; but the distracting cares of this world, the passions, and above all, pride and attachment to perishable things, prevent us from perceiving the one, and consulting the other." Yet he says—"Many somnambulists, when their faculties were exalted, have been known to read the thoughts of others; to have previsions, to be exempt from vanity, and moved solely by the desire of enlightening others; *and yet to be dupes of illusions which are mingled with the most luminous perceptions.*" Then what reliance can we place in their revelations? How shall we determine when they speak the truth, and when they are the dupes of illusions? Why, says Deleuze, "you ought, then, to ascertain that his opinions are not produced by old impressions on the memory, by the prejudices of early youth, by lectures or conversations which have formerly acted temporarily upon his mind; finally, that no exterior influence has contributed to impart a peculiar character to his manner of viewing things. If in all he tells you there is nothing which cannot be verified, you will evidently perceive that he is not deceived, that the torch by which he is enlightened, has not been vacillating." But how shall we ascertain, that none of these influences have been operating upon his mind? The language of Deleuze implies, that we are to inquire of the clairvoyant himself. Now, either he is able to distinguish impressions derived from other sources from those derived from his illumination, or he is not. If he is, he cannot be the dupe of illusions. If he is not, why ask him? How shall we ascertain whether he is, or is not?

But Mr. Deleuze exhorts us to listen to the clairvoyant with a desire to profit by what he tells us;

and, says he, "perhaps you will find in him a guide who will not lead you astray." *Perhaps!* But what are such revelations worth, if they are not infallibly true?—if they are mingled with *illusions*, of which the clairvoyant is the dupe?

Can clairvoyants enlighten us on the doctrines of religion? Can they instruct us concerning the choice between the various forms of worship, or concerning the religious questions by which mankind are unhappily divided? What says Mr. Deleuze? "I can merely answer, *that I do not believe they can.*" What, then, are the truths they can reveal? He answers: "The existence, the omnipotence, the bounty of the Creator; the immortality of the soul; the certainty of another life, the recompense of the good, the punishment of the evil which we have done in this; Providence, the necessity and efficacy of prayer, the pre-eminence of charity over the other virtues; to which is joined the consoling idea that those who have preceded us on earth, and who have merited the enjoyment of eternal happiness, hear our wishes, take an interest in us, and may be our intercessors before God; the profound conviction that God never refuses to enlighten us in what we ought to know, when, submitted to his will, we ask aid of him; the firm persuasion of the utility of worship, which, by uniting men to render homage to God, prescribes rules and practice to all, by which they pray in concert to obtain the blessings of heaven. These are the ideas common to all religious somnambulists. They go not beyond that, which is to say to you, in a general manner, to fulfill the duties which religion imposes upon you." *

How absurd this reply. We are, first, told that somnambulists cannot teach us the *doctrines* of religion; and then, in enumerating what they can teach, he mentions several doctrines, and amongst them the Romish doctrine of the intercession of the saints!

* Practical Instruc. pp. 88—93.

But if they can do no more than make known the most simple and generally received truths of religion, what are their revelations worth? These truths we already know from a far higher and more authentic source. Why, then, should we listen to dreamers, and labor to distinguish between their truths and their illusions?

The directions given by Deleuze to those who would profit by the revelations of clairvoyants, are truly amusing. He says :

“ While your somnambulist is giving utterance to his ideas, you will let him speak without interruption. You will not only make no objection, but you will banish from your mind all those which suggest themselves to you. You will not exert your will to influence or direct him. You will not demand of him an explanation of what he has told you, except when you have not well understood. You will not desire to know what he wishes to teach you of his own accord. You will also try not to be astonished at what appears to you extraordinary. . You will not seek to penetrate into that which appears incomprehensible. You will, above all, avoid putting your somnambulist to the proof, and taking indirect means to ascertain his clairvoyance. You will listen to him with self-forgetfulness, confidence and simplicity, as a child listens to a mother when she relates things to form his heart and his understanding, while amusing his mind. But after he has reëntered the ordinary state, and you are away from him, you will recapitulate all he has told you ; you will examine the connexion of his ideas ; you will appreciate the correctness of his reasonings ; you will weigh the degree of utility in his instructions. You can then indulge your astonishment at the penetration with which he has read your heart, at the sincerity of his wishes for your real happiness, at the exactitude which he has shown you while speaking of a passed event with which he was not acquainted ; at the probability of his previsions of the future, which it is useful for you to know. But

this astonishment should not bring on your conviction. The more marvelous a fact is, the more we ought to fear being seduced by appearances, to mistrust the impression they first make upon us, and search out the circumstances that may give them a natural explanation." *

It would be somewhat difficult, we cannot but think, to follow these directions—especially to try not to be astonished, to banish all objections, to listen with confidence, &c. It seems, that we must first awake the clairvoyant, and then we may be astonished; and it is quite important that we then recall the objections and doubts which we temporarily dismissed! The direction amounts to this: Believe him whilst he is speaking; doubt afterwards, until you are sure he spoke the truth!

But what shall we say of the revelations of Davis concerning philosophy, religion and social organization? Mr. Deleuze answers:

"I know very well that somnambulists have been, and are now known to discourse about religion, and even about the social organization; but they do not resemble those of whom I have just spoken; the imagination controlling all their other faculties, their manner of utterance, and the expression of their features, stamp them as enthusiasts. The two states cannot be confounded, if you will but conform to the rules I have given. Moreover, these somnambulists are evidently influenced by the persons who surround them, and by the circumstances in which they are placed. The errors to which they are subject, the illusions of which they are the sport, the extravagances which they utter, result from a nervous excitement which they would never have experienced, if the faculties had been naturally developed, in silence, solitude, and freedom from external influence."†

We have here the highest mesmeric authority for rejecting and condemning the pretended revelations

* Pract. Instruc. pp. 91, 92. † Ibid, p. 98.

of Davis. Even Bush, though too much under the influence of Swedenborgianism, which Mesmerism somewhat resembles, to reject the philosophical blunders and gross religious errors of Davis, felt constrained to test his revelations by those of Swedenborg. He says, "I would not, therefore, be understood as expressing a willingness to endorse the intrinsic truth of all that he utters in his lectures. I am taught by Swedenborg that a large portion of the influences from the spiritual world are delusive, and that a *true faith* as to the grand doctrines of Christianity, together with a right moral posture of the inner man, are indispensable to a safe communion with spirits and to the trustworthiness of the reports that may be made from their sphere. * * * I cannot penetrate to the real state of his affection and thought, and thus ascertain the nature and degree of his moral affinities. I should not, however, be at all surprised, if it were such as to lay the foundation for a mixture of truth and falsity in his utterances. This question remains to be decided by the issue. I am only sure of one thing, that the young man is actually the medium of communications made by prompting spirits of the other world." * So it seems, that we must thoroughly know the heart and moral affinities of the clairvoyant, and be sure that he has a *true faith* as to the grand doctrines of Christianity, before we can at all rely upon his revelations. This test, applied by Mr. Bush to Davis, might well be applied to Swedenborg himself; and it would prove conclusively, that no confidence is to be placed in his revelations; as it certainly proves, that no confidence can be placed in those of any clairvoyant.

We come, then, fairly, to the conclusion, that the revelations of somnambulists are perfectly worthless. We go further, and assert that they are of most mischievous tendency. The rebuke administered by Isaiah to those who consulted necromancers, is appli-

* Appendix to Mesmer and Swedenborg, p. 182.

cable in all its pungency to those who listen to clairvoyants. "When they shall say unto you, seek unto them that have familiar spirits, and unto wizards, that peep and that mutter; should not a people seek unto their God? for the living to the dead? To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them." * Such communications can form no foundation for faith. Their only effect is to lead men, sufficiently disposed by nature to wander, from the sacred scriptures—the sure guide in the path of duty and salvation—and to unsettle their faith. They are not a whit better than witchcraft and necromancy. Mesmeric clairvoyance, therefore, should receive no countenance from Christians, or from any friend of sound morality. It has shed not a single ray of light upon the duty or the destiny of man. It has presented not a single new motive to the practice of virtue. So far as it has had any effect, it has been to promote infidelity.

We are proceeding on the supposition, that the claims set up by the advocates of Mesmerism for their favorite science, are true. Even on this supposition, we have discovered that clairvoyance, so far as it pretends to moral and religious revelations, is not only worthless, but positively mischievous. The same charge may be justly made against it in all its phases. In the first place, no man in his senses would rely upon the statements of a clairvoyant concerning things and events at a distance, if any important interests were at stake. For, says Deleuze, "The state of somnambulism is not always accompanied with a perfect clairvoyance; and that clairvoyance when it is manifested in the most surprising manner, is often relative to a certain order of ideas, and variable in its intensity." † Mr. Townshend, who is sufficiently credulous in regard to the mesmeric phenomena, makes the following remarks on the subject under consideration. "For my own sake, I shun those

* Isaiah viii, 19, 20.

† Practical Instruc. p. 76.

tracts of thought which, if not belonging to superstition, at least closely border upon her domains. When once we pass the bounds of the definite and the probable, we can scarcely settle with our own minds what degree of credit we ought to attach to the mystic circumstances that surround us, or on what basis we should place them. Of every fact of this nature there are ordinarily two explanations to be given, a rational and a marvelous. The marvelous would lead us too far, the rational does not content us. As, for instance, a sleep-waker describes to me what her family, in a distant house, are doing at a particular hour. I inquire subsequently into this, and find that she has been correct in every point. Now there are two interpretations of this seeming miracle: we may either suppose that the sleep-waker has really seen what she has stated, or that, from her knowledge of what the occupations of her family generally are at a certain hour, she was enabled to divine, almost certainly, the truth.

“Again: a sleep-waker tells me, ‘My brother, who has been to the Havanna, and of whom we have not heard for some months, is returned, and is at this moment anchored off Flushing. He is just coming from watch, and on such a day he will be here.’ This is verified to the letter; but again, there are two methods of explaining wherefore: either the sleep-waker was gifted with extraordinary knowledge and precision, or, from expecting her brother about a certain time, she calculated on probabilities, perhaps, more acutely than in her natural state; and this, combined with that sort of coincidence which occurs more frequently than some may suppose, is sufficient to account for the verification of her assertions and her prophecy. This may be true; but I confess that such reasoning as the latter does not always satisfy me, and that, in my opinion, after subtracting from the account all of the marvelous that we possibly can, there will yet remain a residuum of something strange and perplexing. For this reason I turn my

attention to facts that appear to me more important as well as more certain, conceiving that to dwell on wonders that are at best doubtful, is far from healthy to the mind. I have therefore always discouraged my sleep-wakers from making to me extraordinary revelations, and I have endeavored to confine both them and myself within a walk—narrow, indeed, but safe; less interesting, perhaps, but certainly more direct.” *

When the zealous advocates of Mesmerism speak so doubtingly of the phenomena of clairvoyance, others may be excused, if they should be wholly unbelieving. Certain it is, however, that no reliance can be placed upon the statements of somnambulists. But suppose we admit, that with all that is doubtful, there is something of truth,—that some clairvoyants can reveal what is passing in places many miles distant. Then it is evident that busy bodies, if only they can secure the services of a clairvoyant, can make themselves acquainted with the private affairs of every individual and family who may be unfortunate enough to excite their curiosity; and even the most confidential conversations may be made public, a hundred miles distant. If Dr. Caldwell's patient could see a man in his house, sitting in an arm chair, with papers and books before him, engaged in writing, and could give a particular and minute description of both the chair and his dress; why might she not have told what he was writing, even though it had been a confidential letter? And why might she not as easily have examined his drawers, and reported the contents of his private papers? And why might she not have reported what was passing in any house in the city, or in any other city? If another clairvoyant could tell a man, that his son was in the hospital, wounded in the face, and could hold a conversation with his sister, in which she spoke of private family affairs of which she had known nothing; why might she not

* Facts in Mesmer, p. 43, 44.

have exposed the private concerns of any other individual or family? Verily, if Mesmerism could impart such knowledge, it would prove a most mischievous thing,—an unmitigated curse. It would fill every neighborhood with scandal, and, with far greater facility than the most deceitful “whisperer,” it would “separate chief friends.”

And so far as it gains credit, it will certainly produce the worst results. A certain clairvoyant tells what is passing in a certain domestic circle, and reports the very language uttered. It is calculated to produce mischief. Enemies will give ready credence; persons who are indifferent, will suspect; and thus the greatest injury is done to the persons involved. A man has a sum of money stolen. He desires to find the thief. He applies to a mesmerizer, and he throws his clairvoyant into the mesmeric sleep, and questions him. If *Alexis Didier* could make revelations to Colonel Gurwood “respecting some testimony of which he had long stood in need to do justice to himself;” why might he not point out the thief who has stolen money or goods? And men are not slow to resort to such means to satisfy themselves concerning such matters. How often have they resorted to men and women who pretend to reveal secrets, for such purposes? The clairvoyant points out the thief. There is no certainty that he is right. Perhaps he is influenced by prejudice, as it is confessed he may be. Or perhaps his mind is under the influence of the mesmerizer, who has prejudices or suspicions. The result is, therefore, uncertain. But dark suspicions are fastened upon an individual who is probably innocent; and thus one of the greatest injuries is inflicted upon him.

Let us admit that in some cases the statements of clairvoyants may be relied on. A band of thieves or robbers desire to enter a certain house, or to waylay a certain individual. What have they to do, but to keep with them an individual who is susceptible of the mesmeric influence. He can give them all needed information,—whether the family are asleep, where

the treasures are, how they may successfully enter. We need do no more than suggest the immense mischief which would surely result, if such a thing as clairvoyance really existed; and the mischief that must follow, if it could secure public confidence.

It is admitted by the advocates of Mesmerism, that it is susceptible of great abuse—that it may be employed for evil purposes. But, say they, “the same objection applies to all that is most beneficial on earth. All great engines are capable of great perversions.” * We answer, 1st, that no department of science, and no system of truth yet discovered, is capable of abuses so revolting, so destructive to the peace of society, and to a firm religious faith, as Mesmerism. The medical science may be abused, and individuals may suffer; but it interferes not with free moral agency; it cannot destroy the peace of society; and it does not unsettle the faith of men in Divine Revelation. Men may corrupt Christianity, and thus make it a curse; but Christianity itself, in its purity, cannot be used for effecting evil purposes.

2d. If the evils resulting from any “great engine” evidently overbalance the good, it is better to dispense with it. Thus far Mesmerism has done little, if any good; whilst it has certainly been employed to promote error and immorality.

We shall not assert, as some have asserted, that the phenomena of Mesmerism are the works of the devil; but we do say, that if he is as wise as he is supposed to be, he has not failed to employ it for his own purposes. Nor is he likely to let an engine so convenient—so adapted to further his designs, remain idle. “We are not ignorant of his devices.” Why should not “the father of lies,” take advantage of the credit gained by Mesmerism to divert men from the only infallible guide in matters of faith and practice, and to propagate error? Clairvoyants generally are not Christians; and whatever testimony their mes-

* Townshend's Facts, p. 12.

agitations of the muscular system—in spasms, hysteria, syncope, coughs and vomiting; to these succeeded somniloquism, with a vision so quickened, that the individual could see deeper into a mill-stone than he who picks it:—a *clairvoyance* of the eye, which could discover what was then transacting in distant places; a *clairvoyance* of the mind, that enabled the somniloquist to penetrate the arcana of science; a *prevoyance* that could perceive the shadows of coming events, when other eyes could descry nothing! But this brilliant corruscation on the face of humanity, like a meteor of the heavens, soon passed away,—and is now succeeded by the phenomena of metempsychosis. From a state of beatific inspiration, the devoted somniloquist is degraded to the condition of a mere passive and unresisting recipient of the thoughts, feelings, and will of those in communication. Her ideas are no longer her own;—she is compelled to feel what others feel;—she cannot move but at their bidding. The barriers of her mind are broken down, and “blue spirits and black, white spirits and gray,” enter without opposition, and revel in its mansions without molestation. Her personal consciousness has become a *tertium quid*, composed of her own and that of another united. She is transformed into a spiritual hybrid, and loses her accountability both to God and man, as the laws of neither recognize such personality.”

THE END.

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