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### III. THE THEOLOGIES.

Theology is sometimes used in a broad sense as including all God's relations to His universe. In this discussion we employ it with a restriction to the views which have prevailed as to the nature of God.

If there be a God, and He is a single, spiritual person, infinite in every perfection, then every doctrine of God which ignores, or denies, or adds to this conception of the Deity that which is inconsistent with it, is a false theology. Moreover, every false theology is virtual Atheism, as Buchanan asserts, because it does not accept the existence and character of the true God.

#### ATHEISM.

Atheism proper is the belief of those who do not recognize the existence of any kind of a god as the fit object of man's divine worship. This belief may be either theoretical, or merely practical. Theoretical atheists are, of course, also practical, but there are some practical atheists that are not so in theory.

Of the theoretical atheists there are two classes: Those intelligently and avowedly so, and those ignorantly so. To the first class belong those whose philosophy leads them to deny the existence of a god. Here will be found the materialists, especially those of the grosser school. This is their proper logical position, and those who fearlessly accept the consequences of their philosophy are bold to say so. Materialistic evolutionists are like La Place, who is said to have declared to Napoleon that he had no need of the hypothesis of a god in his theory of the universe; matter is eternal, and from itself and by itself has evolved all that is.

There are two kinds of ignorant, theoretical atheists, those who are unaware of the existence of God, who are non-believers, but not disbelievers. The first are those degraded savage races whose language indicates the

utter want of the conception of any kind of a Deity. It is disputed by some that any such races have been found, and it is as confidently asserted by other intelligent travelers that they have come into contact with those who had no word to express the idea of a being superior to themselves, or to whom they paid religious worship. The other class are deaf-mutes, who have never had the power to hear a word spoken by their fellows, and who are said by those familiar with them to be, prior to their instruction, entirely ignorant of any being superior to man.

There are also two classes of merely practical atheists. To the first belong those agnostics, like Herbert Spencer, whose logic convinces them that there must be an infinite God, but whose philosophy teaches that He is unknowable, and therefore ignorable. Here are also to be found a large number throughout Christendom who have been taught to believe in God, and who have never, perhaps, doubted His existence, but who live without any recognition of Him. There is no class so unreasonable and without excuse as this. There is no stronger proof of man's mental and moral fall than the fact that he can believe in a Creator, Father, Saviour, Judge, and yet act day by day for years as though there were no God.

Atheism still exists as a speculation, as well as a sentiment ; it sadly exists the world over as a life. Moreover, it is by no means logically the puniest foe with which the truth has to contend. On the contrary, we assert not only that all the false theologies are virtual atheisms, but also that atheism proper is the most logical of them all. If there is no single, infinite, personal God, then surely there is no God at all ; there is, there can be no other being, nor collection of beings who meet the demands of the case, and we must perforce launch our barks on the dark, shoreless sea of atheism.

#### POLYTHEISM.

This is the belief in many gods, and probably has been the popular faith of the race of man ; taking into considera-

tion his entire history. As it is the lowest form of belief as to the Deity, its prevalence is a lamentable proof of the degradation of the race. Its forms have been protean. It reaches its lowest depths in Fetichism, the worship of stones, plants, any material object upon earth not in human form ; a belief which is held chiefly by the negroes of Western Africa.

Among the more civilized races, polytheism has prevailed in the personifying deification of the objects and forces of nature : the sun, the moon, the sky, the earth, fire, the storm, etc. This characterizes the ancient religions of Chaldea, Persia, Egypt and India. The Greeks and Romans advanced a step beyond this mere animism to the higher conception of anthropomorphism ; their gods were persons. Among the Greeks they were largely ideal conceptions of virtue ; with the Romans, they were useful ministers to the people, and especially to the State. This finds an analogue in the deification of the Platonic ideas, suggested and begun by the great philosopher himself.

Hero-worship is another form of polytheism ; closely related to the preceding, especially to anthropomorphism. Those give personality, godship to the forces or objects of nature, or to the abstract virtues of humanity ; this worships the extraordinary manifestations of the animate and concrete. It begins with the lower animals, and finds its simplest form amongst the rude tribes in the adoption of some beast or bird or fish as the hero, the patron, the totem, the god of the family. Then we find civilized peoples exhibiting this cult, as the Egyptians, Persians, and the Israelites, in their worship of the bull. From this the step is easy to the deification of some noted ancestors, and then to the worship of all parents. The process culminates in cutting loose from the narrow bond of descent, and selecting some distinguished hero of the tribe or race, as the object of religious veneration.

Idolatry, or the worship of deities as seen in images, has been and is widely prevalent. This is not necessarily con-

nected with polytheism nor limited to it. It is possible for a polytheist to have unseen gods, and to make no image to represent them ; and it is equally possible for a monotheist to use idols in his worship. Idolatry has its degrees. The very ignorant among the barbarous races look upon the image itself as their god. Others, doubtless, believe that the idol is the dwelling place of the deity, as our bodies are the homes of our souls. This was probably the belief of Cyrus as to Bel and the Dragon ; for it is hard to think that so intelligent a man could have believed the very images themselves to be animate gods. There are others still, who look upon the images as merely the representatives to them of the gods whom they adore. So probably the Ephesians regarded the effigy of Diana, and so the Athenians looked upon the figure of their patroness, Pallas-Athene. Here too we place those Christians, who use images of the saints, of Mary, and of the Christ, as helps to their faith ; not that they are polytheists, but that they use images for the same purpose that the most intelligent class of polytheistic idolaters do.

In these several ways, there are "lords many and gods many," not themselves the creators but the creatures of their worshipers, deified by the imagination of those who bow the knee to them. Fear, the offspring of guilt, makes the avenging gods, and hope, the child of love, creates the propitious ones.

#### TRITHEISM.

This is a species of polytheism. It is nowhere found as a separate and complete doctrine of the Deity. While several religions have gods in groups of three, they are all systems of polytheism, and there are only two in which the triads are a distinctly marked feature. In the Hindoo mythology of Brahmanism, we have the Trimurti:—Para-Brahm, Creator ; Siva, Destroyer, and Vishnu, Restorer and Preserver ; represented by the sacred trilateral A U M.

Plato's speculations suggested to his followers, the Neo-Platonists, their triple ternary:—I. The Absolute, from

which emanated (1) Being, (2) End, (3) The Finite ; II. Life, from which (1) Potentiality, (2) Existence, (3) Intelligible Life ; III. The Nons, including (1) Static Thought, or Pure Reason, (2) Thought in Motion, or Perception, (3) Reflective Thought. These metaphysical concepts were deified by them, and regarded as real gods. This well justifies Paul's criticism. "The world by its wisdom knew not God."

#### DITHEISM.

This may be regarded as a form of polytheism and is usually so reckoned ; and yet it is really a distinct belief. Its peculiarity consists in its doctrine of two infinite, metaphysically equal beings, of diametrically opposite moral characters. The one is the supremely good God ; the other, the supremely evil. This was the belief of the ancient Persians, under the teaching of their prophet, Zarathushtra, whom the Greeks named Zoroaster. There are a few, known as Parsees, who still represent this view. The good God was called Armazd, sometimes Mazdoo, sometimes Ahura Mazda ; the first name is also written Ormazd, and Ormuzd. The evil principle is Ahriman, or Angromainyush. Their theology is found in the Zend Avesta, their Bible. The faith is sometimes called Mazdaism, but more commonly, from its founder, Zoroastrianism. This ethical dualism is a feature of all religions, but Zoroaster stands alone in his monotheistic deification of the two opposite principles.

#### HENOTHEISM.

Says Max Muller, in the *Science of Religion*, "Henotheistic religion differs from polytheistic, because, although they recognize the existence of various deities, or names of deities, they represent each deity as independent of all the rest, as the only deity present in the mind of the worshiper at the time of his worship and prayer. This character is very prominent in the religion of the Vedic poets. Although many gods are involved in different hymns, sometimes also in the same hymn, yet there is no rule of prece-

dence among them; and according to the varying aspects of nature, and the various cravings of the human heart, it is sometimes Indra, the god of the blue sky, sometimes Varuna, the ancient god of the firmament, who is praised as supreme without any suspicion of rivalry, or any idea of subordination." This form of henotheism is what in other passages he calls kathenotheism, or the supreme worship of one god at a time.

Prof. C. P. Tiele, in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, writes, "Henotheism. not the henotheism of Max Muller, or of Harkman; or of Asmus, but a practical henotheism, i. e., adoration of one god above others as the specific tribal god, or as the lord over a particular people, a national or relative menothcism, like that of the ancient Israelites[?], the worship of an absolute sovereign who exacts positive obedience. This practical monotheism is totally different from the theoretical monotheism to which the Aryans, with their monistic speculative idea of the godhead, are much nearer." This henotheism is tribal monotheism, but does not deny that other tribes may have other gods.

A third view of henotheism seems presented by Sir Henry Rawlinson as a monotheism of the ancient Babylonians. Of this Prof. Sayce says, in the *Chaldean Account of Genesis*, "The various deities of the popular faith are all resolved into the one supreme God, the Maker of the world and man, who was worshiped at Babylon under the names of Bel, 'the Lord,' and Merodach, the sun-god; at Eridu under that of Hea; and at Nipur, under that of Anu. The gods of the multitude are said to be only the fifty names of the Creator." This seems for the unintelligent, a monotheism with polytheistic names for the supreme God; and for the masses, a real polytheism.

Shamanism may be considered still another phase of henotheism. It is the worship of one supreme deity, and of numerous subordinate ones, to whom the management of the world is held to be entrusted. This reminds us of the Neo-Platonic philosophy, which taught substantially the

same doctrine; the ineffable One not condescending to concern himself with such vulgar matters as the creation and care of worlds. Shamanism is the faith of certain Finnish tribes that inhabit the Ural-Altaic regions of Asia. Its devotees also use charms, practice magic, and believe the present state superior to the world to come.

We see that henotheism is a curious combination of polytheism and monotheism, and may be regarded by the evolutionist as the most advanced stage of the former; but in truth is more probably a decay of monotheism and a step towards polytheism. Max Muller asserts, "This peculiar phase of religion, this worship of single gods, forms probably everywhere the first stage in the growth of polytheism."

#### PANTHEISM.

Of the three forms of monistic philosophy, idealism, materialism, and absolutism, the last is the most subtle and plausible. The highest, best minds in all the past have been far more inclined to idealistic views of the universe than to materialistic. Since Spinoza's day, idealism has yielded largely to the monism of absolute identity, the doctrine that mind and matter are but phases or attributes of the one universal substance. Absolutism, pure monism, or the belief in the absolute substantial sameness of mind and matter, is the philosophic basis of pantheism.

The semi-Christian Jew, Spinoza, a man of superb intellect, is its worthy founder. This monism originated in this scholastic definition of substance, as *Ens per se subsistens*. Descartes, who started the modern mind towards ontological study, adopted this definition, declaring substance to be "that which so exists as to need nothing else for its existence;" and even down to the present day, dualistic philosophers incautiously admit this as a correct definition. Spinoza accepted this fundamental tenet from the orthodox philosophy of his day, modifying its expression so as to read, "Substance is that which is in itself and is conceived by itself; *Id quod in se est et per*

*se concipitur.*" Upon this as a basis he built his system of pantheism. If substance is *ens per se subsistens*, then substance must necessarily be the infinite, the uncaused, the self-existent, the independent God. Matter does not exist of itself, nor does finite mind; God alone does. There is, there can be only one such substance. Spinoza made this the corner stone of his edifice:—One substance, God; with two attributes, thought and extension; individual objects, the finite modes of the one substance. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel have developed the system, each with marked peculiarities. Cousin introduced it to the French; Herbert Spencer is its English apostle. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* and the Concord School have taught it to Americans. It is the philosophy of *Faust*. To-day pantheism and materialism are the giant foes of orthodoxy in philosophic theology; materialism working upon lower minds and pantheism upon the higher.

Is Pantheism true? It is not true: I. Because it is philosophically, metaphysically, ontologically false. The underlying basis of pantheism is pure or absolute monism; that form of monism which holds that all forms of being are substantially one, neither distinctively matter nor mind. Monism in all its forms is contradicted by facts; because there are two irreducible, fundamental dualisms in the universe. The first, most radical, most important is the dualism of the infinite and the finite. If God and time and space exist, there is a category or class of the infinite. If human minds and human bodies exist, there is also a category or class of the finite. This dualism monism cannot overcome, except by denying the reality of all the infinities, on the one hand, or of all the finites, on the other. That the chasm between the infinite and the finite, (should both exist), is infinite and beyond the power of any monistic engineer to bridge is unquestionable. Dualism lies at the very root of being.

There is another radical dualism, within the realm of the finite. The finite presents things to our cognition, which

are divisible; such are all solids, all liquids, all gases; such are all physical forces, light, heat, electricity, gravity, etc. These same forces are also characterized by the fact that they are always active in certain definite ways; they must act and must act in a fixed way. There are other finite things present to our cognition, which are not divisible; such are all minds; and such are all mental forces, thoughts, feelings, volitions. Light is divisible, so that no two eyes receive the same rays; truth is indivisible, so that a million of minds can receive the same truth in its entirety the same time. Mental forces are not always active, and when they act their words are indefinitely varied. They act or not, they act in this way or that, as pleases them. The finite has this line of cleavage running through it, separating it into the world of matter, divisible and necessarily active, and the world of mind, indivisible and freely active.

Dynamism is probably true; everything that exists is a force, a power, an agent, an actor, a cause. In this sense monism is true. But forces, powers, agents, actors, causes are irresistibly of two kinds, the infinite and the finite; and the finite are either irreducibly divisible and necessary on the one hand, or indivisible and free, on the other. Pantheism, which obliterates both of these dualisms, cannot be true.

II. The theology of pantheism is unsatisfactory. 1. The universe is God; God is the universe; the two are identical. God is being; there is no being but God. But the universe is finite, however immense it may be. Then God is finite, however immense He may be. If we escape this by saying that space is a part of the universe, and space is infinite, then all space, beyond the circumference of the finite universe of matter and mind, is empty, vacant, cold, dead; and God is saved from finiteness by His expansion as empty space.

2. The God of pantheism is without self-consciousness. Pantheism teaches that God attains a temporary, finite consciousness in individual men; but this no more endows the Deity with intelligence than do the fireflies make a starless

night luminous; it only makes the lack of consciousness that characterizes his nature the more perceptible and striking. A God without a knowledge of Himself is no God; he is inferior to His own finite manufactures, man.

3. The God of pantheism is not a person. A person is a being, separate and distinct from all other beings, and endowed with the power of free, rational action. In denying God's personality, pantheism bereaves Him of His individuality by identifying Him with the universe. This is done on the plea that personality is a limitation and God must be unlimited. Personality is a limitation, without reasonable doubt; it is, as it were, a hedge, a boundary around the being of God, separating Him from his Universe, making Him a distinct being. The question arises, Can God have limits? The answer depends upon the further question, Are all limits imperfections, or signs of an imperfect being? If so, God cannot be limited; if not, He may be. Most limits are marks of imperfection, but there are others which are signs of perfection; and so God is omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient. On the other hand, limitations of character to right thoughts, feelings, purposes, words, acts, are perfections. And so it is impossible for God to lie or to be unjust. Is the limitation of personality a perfection or an imperfection? Were the Siamese twins more or less perfect than other twins? Manifestly, less so. Why? Because of their lack of complete individuality, their want of perfect personality. God's personality separates Him from the universe, and at the same time is an infinite, omnipresent, immanent personality.

Pantheism says that God is the infinite, the absolute. All believers in the true God assert that He is infinite; not that He has no limitations, but that He has none which are not perfections, and none which are not self-imposed. God is infinite within the limits of perfection. All theists believe that God is the absolute, in the sense of complete perfect, that he is possessed of every excellence to an unlimited degree; also, in the sense that He is the independ-

ent source of His own being and nature. It is, however, not true that God is the absolute in the meaning of the unrelated. All finite beings have relations, many of which are independent of their will. God has more relations than any finite being, as He is the center and source of all beings, and He is thus universally related; but all of God's relations are self-imposed.

III. There are ethical objections to pantheism. 1. Its theory of the universe is mechanical, necessitarian. According to it God is not a master artist, conceiving an oration, and then, as an agent distinct from the instrument, expressing His grand thoughts and feelings by simultaneous and successive touches of the various keys in the several banks of the organ; but He is made nothing more than the coiled spring in the music box, or rather He is the music box itself, and man is but a cog on the cylinder, making a predestined sound, without variation or possibility of variation in and of itself. These sounds, high or low, weak or strong, harmonious or discordant, are due to the unchanging nature of the cog and its place on the cylinder: conditions which are fixed for it, and over which it has no control. If this is true, men are not agents but instruments; God is the only cause in the universe; and truth and error, right and wrong have no subjective significance, are contraries due to nothing in the free action or character of the agents involved, but are mere objective facts, qualities of things, differing just as sweet and bitter, cold and hot differ. physical but not moral opposites, and are the creations of God, who is responsible for them. But while sweet and bitter are physical opposites, which we immediately recognize by our senses, as qualities of material things; truth and error are intellectual opposites, which we immediately recognize by our reason as qualities of assertions in their relation to fact, assertions made by responsible minds; and right and wrong are moral opposites, which we immediately recognize by our reason as qualities of conduct or character belonging to free agents.

The obliteration of moral distinctions from truth and error, right and wrong, is due to the denial of free moral action to the human mind. That man acts out his nature is true. We do not object to this assertion of the pantheist. Man's freedom depends primarily on his determination by internal as opposed to external impulses. It may be said, as it has been, that all mechanical and chemical action is determined by the inner nature of the agents involved ; and man's action being similarly determined has no more freedom than has a lever or an acid. It is true of all being that its nature determines its action ; but it is not true that all beings have the same nature. There are two essentially different kind of beings. The one kind must act and must act in a fixed way ; there is with it no deliberation, no pondering the question whether it shall act, or in what way it shall act ; it acts regardless of rational or moral considerations ; such is the law for acids and levers and all chemical and mechanical forces. The other kind may or may not act, and may act in this way or that ; before it acts it deliberates, it ponders whether it shall act and whether in this way or that ; it sometimes finds it hard to decide, sometimes decides hesitatingly, turns back, renews the question, and then confirms or reverses the former decision ; it decides and acts from rational and moral considerations ; such is the law for all mental and spiritual forces. It is vain for us to ask, why is this ? As well ask why oxygen is not hydrogen, why red is not blue. It is a fact, an ultimate fact that is incapable of explanation ; and that does not need an explanation. Man is free ; he is the author of his own acts : he freely determines, for reasons rational and moral whether and how he will act ; he holds himself and other men morally responsible for the truth and error, the right and wrong of personal belief, action and character. This is so ; he knows it is so ; it is an axiomatic truth ; all history, every language, all legislation, every conscience shows it is so. Men may evade it, reason around it, deny it, but in their hearts remorse and conscious wrong-doing shows their philosophy false.

2. Pantheism is fatal to moral responsibility, chiefly because it takes away freedom from moral action; it is none the less really so for another reason. It must deny God's responsibility, because it denies God's conscious personality. In a sense a stick may be held responsible for being crooked, as for this reason it is rejected or burned. In a sense a rose may be rewarded for being fragrant and beautiful; it reposes on the bosom of a belle. But in both of these cases the responsibility is not moral, because the consequences are not felt by the stick or the rose. So God, according to pantheism, does not realize the consequences of His acts.

With man responsibility is not wholly excluded, but is radically abridged. Pantheism denies any personality, any self-consciousness to God; it also denies immortal personality or self-consciousness to man. With the denial of conscious immortality, morality loses one of its strong props; distressed virtue is bereaved of a blessed hope; and prosperous wickedness gloats in triumph over its success. This objection cannot be met by the assertion that men feel the full and just consequence of their acts in this life, because it is not true. It is the pure, virtuous, sensitive soul that feels the keenest regret for wrong-doing; while the fiend, who has steeped his soul in sin, is undisturbed by the reproaches of conscience. Let men believe that there is no future retribution, and the masses will sink into sensualism; "let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

#### PANENTHEISM.

This is the name given to his theology by the Belgian philosopher, K. Chr. Fr. Krause, who was dissatisfied with Pantheism as founded upon the theory of absolute identity, and sought to improve upon it by teaching that everything instead of being God, is in God. There is, of course, a sense in which this is true. God's infinite presence, knowledge, and power, as it were, encompass the finite universe; all things were originally in God's conception of them and remain ideally present to His view; and all things originate

in God and remain dependent upon His power; in Him we live and have our being.

There are other meanings in which it is not true that all things are in God. If it means that the universe is not a separate being or collection of beings, but is consubstantial with God, then it is but another name for Pantheism. If it means that the universe does not really exist at all, but is a form or manifestation of the Deity, then it is idealistic Pantheism, based upon the nihilism of finite substance.

The old Greek philosophers, down to the time of Christ, held that the world was uncreated and eternal. After the Christian doctrine of *ex nihilo* creation was revealed and taught, the Neo-Platonists and Gnostics conceived and promulgated the theory of emanation; that is the universe was primarily in God as a part of His being but was sent forth by Him as a fulguration, or as light from the sun. It being dishonoring to the Absolute, the One, that this world should proceed directly from Him, it was held that He gave forth a Demiurge, 'an inferior God, from whom this finite universe emanated. It is curious that Sir Wm. Hamilton seems to have resuscitated this old doctrine. In discussing his pet law of the conditioned, he says, "Can we realize it to ourselves in thought that, the moment after the universe came into manifested being, there was a larger complement of existence in the universe and its Author together, than there was the moment before in the Deity himself alone? This we cannot imagine." If it be true that the complement of being was not increased by the creation, then, 1. There is no such thing as *ex nihilo* or absolute creation; it is a mere evolution, or a simple change in the mode of being. 2. If the universe is so much substracted from God, then He has been proportionally lessened, and thus rendered incomplete by the amount of the substraction. 3. God no longer infinite in being, He and the universe,\* mutually supplementing each other, constitute infinite being. Sir William can escape from these conclusions by applying his principle, "All this may be possible, but of it we cannot

think the possibility; that is, by admitting that, though inconceivable, the universe was nevertheless not originally a part of God, but was created by Him *ex nihilo*. This doctrine of emanation is based upon a theory of panentheism, that all things were originally in God.

#### DEISM.

This view of the deity is of modern English origin, and was due to a recoil of the British mind from scholasticism, traditionalism, formalism, and despotism in Church and State. As a protest against extreme orthodox positivism, its influence was probably, on the whole, salutary, resulting in the enlargement of the views and the strengthening of the faith of Christians.

It is difficult to define historical deism, for the reason that its adherents differ greatly among themselves. Lord Herbert, of Cherburg, who has been called the father of deism, formulated its creed into five articles: 1. One Supreme God. 2. To be worshipped. 3. By virtue and piety. 4. Sins to be repented of and forsaken. 5. Rewards and punishments, here and hereafter. All deists may be said to agree: 1. That there is but one God, a person distinct from the universe. 2. That God works by natural means alone; and so they discard prophecy, miracles, a vicarious atonement, and supernatural revelation. They differ: 1. As to God's immanence in the universe; the majority probably denying it, but some, like Franklin, holding to a special divine Providence and the efficacy of prayer. 2. As to the freedom of the will; Collins denying and Morgan affirming it. 3. As to Christianity; some, as Woolston, bitterly opposing it; some, as Herbert, ignoring it; and others, as Chubb, professing and rationalising it. 4. As to immortality; being divided into what were called "mortal" and "immortal" deists. 5. As to retribution; some basing their ethics upon it; others, as Shaftesbury, pronouncing it immoral. It is enough for our purpose to know, that deism differs from all the theologies we have so far considered in holding to one

personal God ; and that it differs from theism, which we are yet to examine, in denying all supernaturalism.

In teaching the personality of God, deism is a decided advance upon pantheism, and so far has our sympathy. We join issue with it in its denial of supernaturalism. Supernaturalism may be discussed as a possibility and as a fact ; it may be possible and yet not actual. As a possibility it is an *a priori* question ; we ask on what grounds can deism deny the possibility of God's directly interposing in the affairs of the universe. It cannot do so on the ground of a want of power on God's part ; for God as the Creator has both the power and the right to do with his creation as His perfect wisdom and justice and love shall see fit. Nor can it do so because God sustains such a relation to the universe as the mainspring to the watch ; for this would make God a part of the universe, which deism denies. Nor because God is the machine itself ; for this is pantheism, and is repudiated by deism. Granting the mechanical theory of the universe, and assuming with deism that God is its creator and is a being distinct from the grand machine, why is it impossible for God to be directly concerned in its movements ? Because, says the deist, the universe is a watch or a music box that needs no interfering hand to assist or to regulate its action ; God made it able to run its course, and now leaves it to work out its destiny uninfluenced by him. It is not denied that this may be true ; this is a possible conception of God's relation to the world. But is it necessarily the relation ? Is it not possible that God might have thought it wisest to make the world a mere tool or instrument, useful in the hands of an intelligent manipulator, but useless otherwise ? May not the universe be an organ, or a violin, dumb until played upon by the skilled hand whose thought and feeling it then expresses ? Is there not, moreover, a third possible conception of the universe as a machine ; God may have made it like a music-box, with its power of movement wholly in itself ; or He may have made it like a violin, silent, motionless except as used by a power external to itself ;

may He not also have made it a complex machine, part of whose movements are self-produced and self-regulated, and part produced and regulated by an external force ? The candid rational mind must see and admit that one of these three conceptions is possibly true. There is still a fourth possible relation between God and His creation ; He may have made it in any one of the three ways above suggested, with the additional fact that He is not an indifferent, careless spectator of the machine He has made, but stands ready to repair any injury it may sustain. He may be a watchmaker, whose watch runs of itself and yet as finitely imperfect may occasionally need his correcting, readjusting skill. On *a priori* grounds, then, the theory of natural deism or of supernaturalism, or of a combination of both is credibly possible.

God could then have so arranged the universe as to leave Himself free to directly affect its movements ; this, however, does not prove that He has so made the world ; still less does it show that He actually does immediately or supernaturally intervene in the affairs of creation. As to the ordinary operations of the world, any one of the three theories mentioned above is consistent with theism ; while the first alone is allowed by deism. Let us assume that this deistic theory is correct and that the universe is a machine like the watch or the music box, run by its own inherent, natural forces. Does this preclude the possibility of the direct interposition of the Creator for reasons satisfactory to Himself ? Suppose the watchmaker so constructs the watch that it will run automatically for thirty hours and then stop, making it necessary for him or some one distinct from the watch to wind it up and set it going again ; may not this be, and is it not the way in which the watch has been made millions of times ? Suppose again that the music box has been so adjusted that when it begins to move it will sound the notes of a certain melody and then stop, unless readjusted to strike the cogs which send forth a different air ; may not this be, and is not this the way in which

music boxes have been made ? Still again, suppose the watch runs its repeated cycles of thirty hours with uniform regularity, but not in accordance with true time, making it necessary that some one shall accelerate or retard its movements ; may not this be, and does it not often occur ? Suppose, finally, that the watch is the perfection of skill and moves with less varying uniformity than does the sun, but its wheels and pinions wear, as all finite things do, or that some shock shall dislocate or damage the parts, making it imperative that the maker shall interfere to repair the injury ; may not this be, and is it not a frequent fact ? We thus see that the most extreme form of the mechanical theory, as exemplified in the works of man, does not shut out the occasional intervention of the Creator, and this is all that, as opposed to deism, we now affirm. As a fact, no one ever made or saw a machine which did not need the interposition of some one at some time in some way to regulate, adjust, or repair it. On the mechanical theory of deistic naturalism, the presumption is strong in favor of the need of occasional interventions on the part of the Creator.

But we are not out of the woods yet ; we have not yet reached the deistic citadel, though we have captured the deistic outworks. Let the above be granted, it overlooks a radical difference between a machine made by finite man and one made by the infinite God ; the former we may expect to be imperfect and to need adjustment and repair, but the perfect Creator will make a perfect machine, one that will need neither regulation nor mending. Were the issue thus defined, whether God could have so created the universe, it would be admitted at once that God could have made a perfect and indefectible universe had He thought it wise to do so. Were the issue, whether God would probably so make world, this would also be admitted as an inference from His own perfection. But what is the real issue ? It is, Did God as a fact make the universe not only finitely perfect as originally created, but also indefectible, so that it could not go wrong and has not gone wrong ; a

perfect watch that has never needed regulation nor repair ? Let us open our eyes and see. Look upon nature in all its aspects. Inanimate nature ; do we find nowhere imperfect specimens of elementary or compound minerals ? The vegetable and animal, the organic world ; are there none but faultless plants and beasts ? The intellectual, the world of truth ; is error unknown, is no ignorance found ? The moral ; is the heart of man a pure fountain, sending forth naught but pure thought, pure words, pure deeds ? The spiritual ; has every soul a supreme regard for the unseen, the eternal, the holy, the heavenly, loving God with all the heart ? These questions need no answer ; imperfection, wreck, depravity, everywhere mar God's creation. Instead of asking whether imperfection can be found, we need to inquire whether anywhere in this universe, a perfect being exists.

Now, as we must believe, from the perfection of God's nature, that He originally made the world finitely perfect, and as it is now marred by imperfection, the conclusion is that the watch has been injured and needs the regulating, repairing interposition of its maker ; the world has gone wrong and calls for the wise and gracious intervention of its Creator to readjust it. When we further bear in mind that God's supernatural acts are no more His acts than are His natural ; that the natural is God's working as well as the supernatural ; and that the supernatural differs from the natural only in being extraordinary, unusual, we can even more clearly see that the deistic denial of the supernatural is unjustified. But, finally and especially, when we remember that God's supernatural acts are not capricious, are not for the sake of causing wonder, but are all due to emergencies that call them forth and are thus wise and beneficent interventions, we are satisfied that the supernatural is as rational and as credible as the natural.

Deism is dead ; rampant a hundred years ago, it is now scarcely to be found. It has yielded to materialism, in those skeptically inclined minds who are interested in the physi-

cal sciences ; to pantheism, in those of metaphysical and monistic tendencies ; and most largely to rationalistic Christianity, in those whose religious natures find satisfaction in the perfect character and ethically sublime teachings of our Lord. We have given such extended attention to this form of theology, because its distinctive characteristic, a denial of supernaturalism, survives, and is a living issue within the pale of Christian theism.

#### THEISM.

Theism agrees with deism as to the unity and personality of God ; indeed, it accepts all the positive tenets of deism, including Lord Herbert's five articles, and objects only to its denial of all supernaturalism. Deism removes God from all direct active participation in the affairs of the universe He has made ; while theism regards Him not only as immanent, directing all things by His general providence, but also as so interested in man as to reveal Himself in supernatural ways in order to meet man's needs. The vital difference between the two theologies is that deism contends for an exclusive naturalism ; while theism combines with ordinary naturalism for the every day providences an extraordinary supernaturalism for spiritual emergencies. With regard to the lower orders of creation, theism has no dispute with the better class of deists, those who believe in providence.

Theism as here discussed, differentiates itself from deism, not as to the metaphysical nature of God, but as to His relations to man. They agree as to the essential absolute, unity, spirituality, and personality of the Deity, and differ solely as to His supernatural revelations to man.

There are two classes of theists. Judaism believes that God made Himself known to the fathers of our race by theophanies, visions, dreams, Urim and Thummim, miracles, prophecies, inspiration, and revelation ; this revelation is contained in the Old Testament. Mohammedans accept this belief of the Jews, and affirm that God has made an ad-

ditional and final revelation to man in the Koran. Both assert the absolute unity of God.

#### TRINITARIANISM.

We have given the theologies in an ascending series. Beginning with blank atheism, polytheism, tritheism, ditheism, henotheism, pantheism, panentheism, deism and theism have been presented. Theological beliefs culminate in Trinitarianism, frequently called Christian Theism. It differs as radically from theism, as theism does from deism, and should therefore be considered a distinct creed.

As already seen theism raises itself above deism in its assertion of God's supernatural dealings with man, in the way of revealing His will and making Himself known. Trinitarianism is in accord with theism upon this point. It differs materially from theism, however, both as to God's nature and as to His relation to man. Theism asserts the absolute, unqualified oneness of the Deity; Trinitarianism agrees that there is but one God and that He is in nature essentially one; but it affirms, on the authority of God's own revelation, that there is a non-essential, non-substantial threeness in the Godhead, relative to Himself and relative to His created universe. The Trinitarian's Bible teaches that God is one; and that this one God is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; that as Father He sustains certain relations to man, as Son other relations, and as Holy Spirit other relations still.

In another fundamental point, Trinitarianism is quite distinct from theism; it affirms the hominification (if we may coin a word that seems to be needed) of the Deity, or, as it is commonly called, the Incarnation. By this is meant, not simply the assumption of a human form or body, but more, that God became man in soul as well as in body; not that He ceased to be God and was transubstantiated into man, but that, continuing to be God, humanity in Him became consubstantiated with the Deity; not that from eternity He was God and man, but that in time this consubstantiation

occurred, and, having occurred, continues as an everlasting union; that this taking of human nature into vital and perpetual union with Himself was not a caprice, nor an evolution, but was His free act, prompted by His infinite love for the race of man, whom He thus restores to filial relations with himself.

Trinitarianism is the teaching of the New Testament, and the creed of Christianity; as all three of the grand divisions of the Church, the Roman, the Greek, and the Protestant, accept and proclaim it.

It might seem at first view that Trinitarianism is rather a retrogression towards polytheism, than an advance upon the absolute monotheism of the Jews and Mohammedans. This is true when Trinitarianism becomes nothing more than a disguised tritheism. Indeed some Christians refuse to believe either in the Trinity or the Incarnation, thus placing themselves theologically with the theism of the Jews and the Moslem. But Christianity is in this, as in every other point of difference, markedly a progress beyond theism. The theistic conception of the Deity is manifestly naturalistic, rationalistic; it does not advance beyond deism; while Trinitarianism, in its two cardinal, differentiating doctrines, presents truths that transcend human reason, are incomprehensible and supernatural, and that are thus both examples and proofs of the inspired revelation of the New Testament.

The ten theologies, Atheism, Polytheism, Tritheism, Ditheism, Henotheism, Pantheism, Panentheism, Deism, Theism, and Trinitarianism, are all shades or combinations of three radial views: Atheism, Polytheism, and Monotheism. If Trinitarianism is true, then all the other conceptions of the Deity are defective or positively false. It is the conception which underlies the Gospel of Redemption.

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