

THE PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

NO. 28.—APRIL, 1894.

I. THE ATTRACTIONS OF POPERY.

DR. JOHN H. RICE, with the intuition of a great mind, warned Presbyterians against a renewed prevalence of popery in our Protestant land. This was when it was so insignificant among us as to be almost unnoticed. Many were surprised at his prophecy, and not a few mocked; but time has fulfilled it. Our leaders from 1830 to 1860 understood well the causes of this danger. They were diligent to inform and prepare the minds of their people against it. Hence General Assemblies and Synods appointed annual sermons upon popery, and our teachers did their best to arouse the minds of the people. Now, all this has mainly passed away, and we are relaxing our resistance against the dreaded foe just in proportion as he grows more formidable. It has become the fashion to condemn controversy and to affect the widest charity for this and all other foes of Christ and of souls. High Presbyterian authority even is quoted as saying, that henceforth our concern with Romanism should be chiefly irenic! The figures presented by the census of 1890 are construed in opposite ways. This gives the papists more than fourteen millions of adherents in the United States, where ninety years ago there were but a few thousands. Such Protestant journals as think it their interest to play sycophants to public opinion try to persuade us that these figures are very consoling; because, if Rome had kept all the natural increase of her immigrations the numbers would have been larger. But Rome points to them with insolent triumph as prognostics of an assured victory over Protestantism on this continent. Which will prove correct?

III. PRESENTATIONISM vs. REPRESENTATIONISM.

PHILOSOPHIC nihilism either dogmatically denies or skeptically doubts the existence of any substantial reality, whether matter or mind, and admits nothing but impressions and ideas, a panorama of appearances; for which reason it is known also as phenomenalism.

Philosophic monism asserts substantial reality, but denies substantial differentiation; there is substance, but there is but one substance. Monism has three forms: 1. Idealism, which asserts that the one substance is mind, and denies that matter exists, except as a mere illusion of the mind. 2. Materialism, which affirms that the one substance is matter, and that mind is either nerve matter in the brain, or else is a form of physical force, the same as light, heat, or electricity. 3. Absolutism, which holds that the one substance is neither mind nor matter, but God, as pantheism declares; or force, as taught by Herbert Spencer.

Philosophic dualism asserts that there are two substances, mind and matter, each a reality and each essentially different from the other. There are two schools of dualism: 1. Representationism, which avers that matter exists independently of mind, but that mind is unable to cognize matter directly, and does so mediately, by means of a representation. There have been two theories of representationism; the first of which held that the mind, being unable to know immediately its antipodal opposite matter, cognizes it by means of a *tertium quid*, sufficiently material to represent matter and sufficiently spiritual to be known by mind. This is objective or non-egoistical representationism, and is now no longer advocated. The other view maintains that, although the mind is unable to know any material object directly, it can yet form of itself an image of that object, which represents it and which the mind immediately perceives. This is the mental modification theory, and may be called subjective or egoistical representationism. 2. The other school of dualism is presenta-

tionism, which teaches that, although mind and matter are two distinct substances, nevertheless mind has the power of immediately cognizing material objects. There are two divisions of presentationism: Relativism, which affirms that the mind immediately perceives the qualities of matter and necessarily believes in, but does not directly cognize, the substance of which they are the phenomena; and noumenalism, which avers that the mind immediately cognizes both the qualities and the substance of matter.

I apparently see and feel this paper on which I am now writing. The nihilist says there is no mind to see and no paper to be seen; seeing and feeling are, but there is nothing more. The idealist asserts that there is a mind to see and feel, but no paper to be seen or felt, it is an illusion. The materialist affirms that the material eye sees and the material hand feels the material paper; it is the action and reaction of one material agent upon another. The absolutist holds that this is but the play of the one force which makes the universe; that my mind and the paper are but modes of the manifestation of God; and that the seeing and feeling are but feeble pulsations of the one life that throbs throughout immensity. How and what the mind sees and feels is of little interest to these.

REPRESENTATIONISM.

It is upon the assumption of dualism that the connection between mind and matter becomes an interesting problem. From the days of Democritus, over four hundred years before Christ, it has been a vexed question, how mind can cognize matter. Two difficulties have been thought to lie in the way: 1. Mind, as immaterial, can have no direct relationship with matter; there seems no common platform on which they can meet. This was met by Democritus by the assumption of an intermediary between the two opposites, the *tertium quid* above referred to. Thus I do not see nor feel the paper, but there is a third something, an efflux from the paper and yet not the paper, sufficiently spiritual to be apprehended by the mind, and yet a true representative of the material paper.

With regard to this theory, it rests upon the assumptions that

contraries cannot come into direct relation; that there is a third something, neither mind nor matter; that this thing, not matter, can yet take the place of matter as the object of cognition; that this thing, not mind, can yet be cognized by the mind, contrary to the first assumption. This *tertium quid* is either mind, and, if so, cannot represent its opposite, matter; or it is matter, and, if so, cannot be cognized by mind, according to the assumption; or it is neither, and, if so, it is a chimera; or it is at once both mind and matter, and, if so, it is contradictory to dualism; or, finally, it is, like man, a union of mind and matter, and, if so, it is itself in need of a medium. This crude hypothesis has been abandoned, and yet it survived to modern times, and was believed by Malebranche, Newton, Clarke, and, possibly, by Locke and Descartes.

How does egoistical representationism meet this difficulty growing out of the radical difference between mind and matter? It agrees with the other school that they cannot come into direct relation; that mind cannot immediately cognize matter. Its theory is, that I do not and cannot see and feel the paper, but my mind forms an image of the paper, or a representation of the paper, and this mental modification is what I see and feel. It is at once manifest that either the mind must of itself, without any influence from the paper, form this mental representation of it; and, if so, what reason have I to believe that there is any paper to be seen or felt? and thus we fall into the arms of monistic idealism; or the mind is influenced by the paper to form this mental representation; and, if so, then matter can affect mind, and the chasm is bridged, contrary to the fundamental postulate of representationism. Or this mental effect, which represents the paper, is not caused by either the mind or the paper; and then we have either an uncaused effect, or else a supernatural miracle.

We see that neither form of representationism can meet their own difficulty of the alleged impossibility of mind directly cognizing its opposite, matter.

2. But they base the necessity of representationism upon the further impossibility of an agent's acting where it is not. It is triumphantly asked, How is it possible for my mind to see the paper, when it is fully a foot away from the sheet? The non-ego-

istical theory seeks to meet this difficulty by the alternative assertion that either the mind goes out to meet the *tertium quid* representation of the paper, or else that the efflux from the paper goes through the senses into the mind. The first of these assertions the presentationist could as well make, and it would serve his theory as well. It is, however, not only a groundless hypothesis, but it is entirely unnecessary. As to the latter assertion, it is, in a sense, true, for the rays of light, not a *tertium quid* efflux, do go from the paper and fall upon the mind's organ of vision.

The egoistical representationist thinks to meet the difficulty by the immediate connection between the mind and the mental representation of the paper; but, as before, this involves him in the dilemma already noticed. If he affirms that the mental representation has no connection with the paper, and is entirely independent of it, then he cannot escape idealism. If, to avoid this, he declares that the paper causes the mind to make the mental representation, then he makes the paper act a foot from where it is.

With regard to this latter spatial difficulty, Sir William Hamilton, a presentationist, meets it by affirming a direct contact between the mind and the paper on the scholastic theory of the ubiquity of the mind in the nervous system. He alleges that my mind is in my eye to see the rays of light that come there from the paper, and that my mind, at the same instant, is at the end of my fingers to feel the smoothness of the paper.

The query arises, What has our accepted dualism to do with the where of mind? Both representationist and presentationist affirm that the mind bears no relation whatever to space. If so, how can there be a difficulty arising out of the mind's situation with reference to the paper? But these same dualists, in one breath, aver that the mind has, and can have, by its very nature, no relation whatever to space; and, in the very next, dispute with each other as to the seat of the mind, whether in the brain, in the pineal gland, in the cerebrum, in the gray or the white matter, or in the entire nervous system. What is the truth? Contrary to the dictum of every idealistic or dualistic philosopher, we venture to say that mind, though the essential opposite of matter, sustains,

and must sustain, a relation to space. This is so true that it is axiomatically true, and the inconsistency above noted grows out of the impossibility of the philosopher ignoring it, whatever be his theory. There are certain absolutely universal categories; they are being, space and time. There is, there can be, nothing outside of these. Being is the absolutely comprehensive category; everything is a being. Space and time are the absolutely universal conditions of being; no being can exist out of space or time. Space conditions matter in two ways: matter is in space, and matter fills space. Space conditions mind in only one way: mind is in space, but does not fill space. Is my mind in heaven? No. In Europe? No. In America? Yes. In this room? Yes. In my body? Yes. Here, looking at and feeling this paper? Yes.

But, apart from this, is it true that an agent cannot act where it is not? If so, can there be any action and reaction? Can any material object be where another material object is? If so, matter does not fill space. Agents always do and must act outside of what they affect. Immediate juxtaposition even is not necessary, else the magnet would not attract, and gravity would not hold the worlds in position. It is, therefore, not a valid objection to presentationism

The first difficulty is as little in the way, because it is a mere assumption. It is not true that contraries cannot come into direct relation. It is a mere *a priori* assertion, without a fact to confirm it. So far from being true, it is contradicted by numberless facts. In chemistry, when do we see the surest, the quickest, the most manifest action and reaction? Can a man pull himself up by his boot-straps? Can he not lift his own weight of something else? Do not contraries suggest each other quite as readily as similars, and more graphically? Do not the mind's thoughts, feelings, volitions, cause the body to move? Is it not an equally palpable fact that I do see and feel the paper? *A priori* assumptions must yield to manifest *a posteriori* facts. We need no theory, no explanation, of this, because it is an ultimate fact. Just as we cannot understand how a mental volition can cause our muscles to contract; as I cannot tell how my mind makes my fingers move

the pen as I write these lines, so I do not know how it is that I see and feel the paper; but the fact in either case is certain.

There is a third objection to presentationism, urged by the nihilist Hume, which would not be noticed here if Dr. Davis, of the University of Virginia, had not given it his approval. We are looking at a balloon, which, as it rises in the air and floats away, becomes smaller and smaller to the vision. Now, says Hume, if it was the balloon we see, it would always be the same to our eye, for it does not change and grow smaller as it recedes; it is an image, a representation of it, therefore, that we see. In a sense, this is true; we do not see the balloon, we see a colored image of it; we may say we see the figure of it. The presentationist avers that we see, not a *tertium quid*, not a mental modification, not a representation of the balloon, but the figure of the balloon itself. If this be so, it is a mere question of optics what changes are produced in the material figure of the balloon as it recedes; and we know the optical law that the figure and distance are in inverse ratio. If, therefore, the image of the balloon did not decrease as it departs, it would rather tend to prove that we do not see directly a figure of it, but a representation in the mind, unaffected by the objective fact.

Before dismissing representationism, we notice that it logically leads to monism and nihilism. As the *tertium quid* form of the theory has been abandoned, we limit ourselves now to the mental modification, or egoistical form of the doctrine. If, as this theory must hold, the mind modifies itself of its own impulses, if my mind, without any perception of the paper, modifies itself to represent the paper, and this is true in all cases of the mind's apparent cognition of matter, then, by the law of parsimony, there is no reason to affirm the existence of an external world, a world outside of the individual mind. On what ground do we believe in a world of matter? Clearly, because matter manifests itself to us in these sensible experiences. As these experiences are said to be purely mental, and not due to matter, we are without evidence of the existence of a material world, and idealism is the result.

We cannot stop, however, at mere idealism. What evidence have we of the existence of other minds than our own? It is

sensible phenomena; we see and hear them through their material bodies; mind has no direct intercourse with mind. But these supposed bodily manifestations are my own mental modifications. Idealism has shown that there is no paper to be seen or felt; I turn and look at my wife and converse with her; but idealism again affirms that her body is an illusion, and her talk equally so. How, then, can I know that she exists? The same reasoning applies to God; how does he manifest himself to us? The proofs of his existence are given to us, directly or indirectly, through these sensible experiences, all of which are nothing but my own mental states. Thus we are reduced to individualism, or egoistic idealism.

Again, I seem to see and feel the paper; this is a mistake, I really see and feel my own mind. There is no external, material substance answering to these phenomena; is there an internal, mental substance? Here are seeing and feeling, but nothing seen or felt; is there anything that sees or feels? If phenomena, apparently material, do not show material substance, how can these same phenomena show mental substance? Thus we reach mere phenomenalism, or phenomenal nihilism.

But, once more, in this experience there is apparently a double set of phenomena—seeing and feeling, on the one hand, and color, shape, hardness, and smoothness, on the other. We have found that the second set, what we ordinarily call the material phenomena, though apparently as real as the other, are, nevertheless, an illusion; why may not the other set be also? Experience is alike the ground of belief in both sets; experience deceives in the one case, so it may in the other. Thus we finally land in universal skepticism, or absolute nihilism.

PRESENTATIONISM.

Hamilton properly divides the qualities of matter into three classes: 1. The primary are those which are essential to matter; found, therefore, in all of its varied forms. Of these the most important is extension, in all of its three dimensions, as the length, breadth, and thickness of this paper. 2. The secundo-primary are those qualities of matter which are manifested to us

in the modes and degrees of resistance which it offers to us, as the smoothness and hardness of the paper. These are accidental. 3. The secondary are those which are revealed to us by the ordinary senses of sight, hearing, etc., as the color of the paper. These are also accidental.

Hamilton holds that there are three ways in which we cognize extension—two *a posteriori*, and one *a priori*: 1. When he definitely proposes to himself the task of bridging the chasm between mind and matter, he says that it is done by our consciousness of the affections of our own bodies, as relatively external to each other, and thus revealing to us extension. In the concrete case before us, my little finger touches the paper and my thumb the pen; each of these causes a sensation, and these sensations, not so much as different from each other, but rather as in distinct places, show me that my body is extended. Professor Davis agrees with this, and adds that we become conscious of our own bodies by the muscular sense also. 2. This teaching of Hamilton might imply that we have no immediate perception of the extension of other matter than our own bodies. In another lecture, however, he says, "We may safely establish the conclusion that sight is a sense principally conversant with extension." Dr. Davis assents that we can immediately see surfaces, but denies the immediate vision of solids. 3. Hamilton holds that, as extension is essential to matter, it is involved in the very idea of matter, and thus comes to us *a priori*. It is manifest, however, that this supposes a previous knowledge of matter.

As to the secundo-primary class, presentationists agree that we cognize them immediately in the consciousness of our muscular energy being resisted. I run my finger along the surface of this paper, and there is little or no resistance to the movement, because the paper is smooth. I attempt to push my finger through the paper, and the resistance shows that it is tough. Dr. Davis thinks that the resistance must be to our voluntary movement. This seems doubtful. Suppose we are thrown from a vehicle; the experience of resistance, when we reach the ground, is the same as when we jump of our own accord. Moreover, is actual movement, voluntary or involuntary, necessary to give this expe-

rience? As I sit in my chair, am I not conscious of resistance that prevents movement, as truly as when I sat down I was aware of the resistance that arrested the movement? We are so conditioned that we are always in contact with the material world; sitting, standing, lying, we are sustained by a material $\pi\omicron\upsilon\ \sigma\tau\tilde{\omega}$, and thus always in a condition to perceive the secundo-primary qualities.

Presentationists, we may say, agree that we have no real perception of the secondary qualities; that they are the unknown causes of mere sensations; that I know this paper has extension, smoothness, hardness, but I merely believe that it has something which causes in me the sensation of color. I know what extension and smoothness are, for I directly perceive them. I do not know what color is, for I do not perceive it. I believe color exists as the cause of a sensation of which I am conscious; but this effect no more reveals the nature of its cause than matter reveals the nature of a spiritual creator.

Dr. Davis is a presentationist, and, like all others, denies the cognition of the secondary qualities. The peculiarity of his doctrine is, that he holds the immediate object of perception to be the brain; the mind does not see the color of the paper, nor of the rays of light, nor of the image on the retina, but merely notes a modification of the brain, which causes it to have the sensation of color. It is a chain of causes and effects. The paper reflects the rays of light; these fall upon the retina and produce an impression on the optic nerve; this disturbance of the nerve is propagated to the brain, affecting it. This affection of the brain produces sensation in the mind. Now, the special point in his doctrine is, that the mind is totally ignorant of all these links except the last. The mind knows the brain as modified, but not the nerve, nor the retina, nor the rays of light, nor the paper. All between the mind and the paper serves to shut out the paper from the mind; and the brain is a kind of screen between the mind and everything else in the series; that is, God has not given us eyes and nerves and brain to see with, but to keep us from seeing! On the contrary, common sense seems to teach that the mind knows nothing of the brain in the experience of seeing.

We would not know that we had a brain from any experience we have in using it. We doubtless use it in seeing, and it is probably indispensable to our seeing; but it is like a window in a house, which we ordinarily do not observe at all, but which lets in a view of the outside; indeed, the better the glass the less we observe it. The eye, the nerve, and the brain are a set of appliances so adjusted to each other as to constitute an instrument for seeing, like the object-glass, the tube, and the eye-glass of a telescope. The purpose of the telescope is to bring the image of the object to the eye. The eye does not see the eye-glass next to itself, but the image of the object thus transmitted to it. So the eye, nerve, and brain are an instrument for bringing the image of the object to the mind, and the mind does not see the brain, but the image of the paper thus conveyed to it.

If Dr. Davis is right as to the brain being the direct object of the mind's cognition in the experience of the secondary qualities, it is equally the direct object in the observation of the secundo-primary. If I do not see the paper, but my brain, then I do not feel the paper, but feel my brain, when I press upon the paper and it seemingly resists me; for, as in vision, there interpose between my mind and the hardness of the paper the periphery of the nerve, the nerve itself, and the brain. We are thus cut off from all direct knowledge of the outer world, and we have a philosophy worse than representationism, for the modifications of the brain do not represent the qualities of matter.

Hamilton says that Reid, Stewart, and their followers in France hold that "in a sensation of the secondary qualities, as affections in us, we have a perception of them as properties in objects and causes of the affections in us." This seems justified by Reid's statement that in smelling a rose "the object of perception is that quality in the rose which I discern by the sense of smell." Yet Reid, in the very next chapter, says, "The only notion my senses give me is this, that smell in the rose is an unknown quality or modification, which is the cause or occasion of a sensation which I know well." Stewart, moreover, affirms that secondary qualities are "only conceived as the unknown causes of known sensations; and, when first apprehended by the mind, do not imply the exist-

ence of anything locally distinct from the subjects of its own consciousness." We may, therefore, say that presentationists are agreed in denying to the mind an immediate perception of the secondary qualities of matter.

Is this view correct? It would seem madness to question what has the consensus of representationists and presentationists alike. We have, however, seen that all philosophers err in their dogmatic teachings of the relation of mind to space; so they may be mistaken here. The issue is here, presentationism combats representationism as to the mind's cognition of the primary and secundo-primary qualities of matter, but yields as to the perception of the secondary. We contend that it should not yield this last point.

In favor of a complete as opposed to a partial presentationism, it may be urged that the presumption is in its favor. If presentationism is true as to the other two classes of qualities, it is likely to be wholly true; to be true of the secondary also. As representationism has been shown to be entirely untenable, presentationism must take its place.

Again, all men, the scientific and the unlearned alike, naturally accept presentationism as to the secondary as well as to the other qualities of matter. We must reason ourselves out of the belief. We instinctively believe that we see the color of the paper as really as we feel its smoothness. Moreover, the arts and sciences, both useful and fine, presume as confidently upon a knowledge of the secondary as of the other qualities. We deal with them as though they were objective, and as well known as the secundo-primary. The maker of this paper knew as well how to make it white as to make it smooth. I count as confidently on the ink making black lines as I do on the pen not penetrating the paper. We can objectively produce variations of color, sound, flavor, and odor, just as we can shapes, weights, solids, liquids, and gases. A striking proof of the natural belief in the perception of the secondary qualities, on the part even of philosophers, is seen in the fact, that Hamilton and others use sight and color to exemplify their doctrine of immediate perception.

It may be said that, in seeing and hearing, the external object

of cognition is not a quality of the thing said to be seen or heard, but, in the one case, rays of light, and in the other, waves of sound. This is not disputed; we see colors and we hear sounds; and the accepted physics teaches that color is light waves of ether, and sound is waves of air. These light waves and sound waves, however, are produced by the colored and resonant objects, and vary with the character of those objects, and so disclose to us qualities possessed by those objects. The point to be settled is, do we directly perceive objective facts when we see and hear; or, is the experience merely a subjective sensation? That it is objective is confirmed by taste and smell, which are regarded as more subjective than sight and hearing; and yet their objects are qualities of material particles in direct contact with the nerves of taste and smell. As the objection does not apply to the more subjective, still less can it be urged against the more objective. In all these cases the mind is brought face to face with objective facts, and has its knowledge of the material world increased. I know that there is a difference in color between the ordinary surface of this paper and those portions which are stained with ink.

I seem to see the paper and to feel the paper; one of these experiences is said to be real, the other, illusive; the seeing is mere seeming, the feeling is real; the paper appears to be white, I know it is hard. Why this alleged difference? There are sensations in both cases; I use my nerves as instruments in both; the impression of sight is just as distinct, and apparently as real, as the experience of resistance. In seeing, the color comes to my eye; in feeling, my hand goes to the hardness; this is a trivial, a mere mechanical, difference. Why, then, is the one thought to be an illusion, and the other a reality? It is said, Because the hardness of the paper is like the sensation, while the color is not. Is this true? Is the hardness like the sensation? It would be strange if it were, for we would not expect the qualities of matter to be like the experiences of mind. But it is said that the sensation of resistance reveals to us something in the paper that resists, and, as well, the mode and degree of that resistance. It undoubtedly does; and equally the sensation of color reveals to us something in the paper that is colored, and, as well, the mode and

degree of that color. Do I know what hardness is? Only as it produces in me the sensation. In the same way, I know whiteness as the quality in the paper producing in me the sensation.

It is possible that the secondary qualities come also under the category of resistance; that the shades of color are due to the comparative force with which each set of rays strikes the eye. The secundo-primary qualities are mere varieties, in mode and degree, of the powers of resistance in matter; it may be equally true of the secondary.

The alleged crucial proof of the purely subjective nature of the secondary qualities is, that we confessedly have similar sensations that are not caused by real bodies at all. In dreaming, delirium, reverie, or intentional experimentation, these phenomena are produced. In dreaming I may fancy myself writing, just as I am now. This is true; what does it prove? That there is no cause for these extraordinary sensations? This is not alleged. That, as I look upon this paper, the rays from its surface are not the cause of the sensation of whiteness which I experience? This is not alleged. That the extraordinary sensations are merely subjective, without any impression being made on the proper nerves? This is not alleged. Any of these allegations would be fatal to presentationism. These extraordinary phenomena show that other than extra-bodily causes may produce the secondary sensations; and the inference drawn is, that there is, therefore, no perception of the extra-bodily objects when they are produced by extra-bodily causes. The facts are admitted, but the inference is questioned, for a reason that must be satisfactory to every presentationist. The same thing is true of the secundo-primary qualities and their sensations. I dream that I see the paper, when I do not see it; therefore, when I seem to see it now, I am mistaken. But I dream that I feel the paper, when I do not feel its resistance; therefore, when I seem to feel it now, I am mistaken. If it is good logic in the one case, it must be equally good in the other. Dreams, delirium, reverie, and experimentation produce sensations of hardness, smoothness, heaviness, etc. One man dreamed that the devil was sitting on him with the Bunker Hill monument

in his lap. If, therefore, this crucial proof necessitates the denial of the cognition of the secondary qualities in ordinary, normal experiences, it will require us to give up the secundo-primary as well.

This will introduce what seems a fatal and final objection to partial presentationism: It contains the germ of skepticism. Admit the validity of this skepticism, and you puncture the dam which holds back the flood of nihilism. Skepticism is progressive; it begins here with the denial of the cognition of the secondary qualities—pseudo-presentationism. Its next step is the denial of the cognition of any qualities of matter—representationism. Its next step is to deny the existence of matter itself—idealism. Its next step is to deny the existence of mind—phenomenalism. Its final step is to doubt or deny everything; and we have Fichte's "dream of a dream"—nihilism.

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