

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XIX.—NO. 3.

JULY, MDCCCLXVIII.

ARTICLE I.

The Atonement. By the Rev. ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER HODGE, D. D., Professor of Didactic, Historical, and Polemical Theology, in the Western Theological Seminary at Allegheny, Pa. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 440 pp., 12mo.

"We preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God."

"For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness; but unto us which are saved it is the power of God."

What is the gospel but the doctrine of Christ crucified, the doctrine of the cross? This is its central truth, on which all others depend, around which they revolve, without which they are vanity and confusion. This doctrine founded the Church. The Church has always believed it, and preached it, and lived by it, and drawn from it the inspiration of all its hopes, the strength of all its energies, and the secret of its triumphs. Without it Christianity and the Church are a folly and a lie.

But precisely against this doctrine—and that of course—human reason and pride and depravity, with deadliest hostility, have ever waged an implacable warfare. It has scandalised the Jew,

VOL. XIX. NO. 3—1.

and awakened the contempt of the Greek. The infidel outside of the Church has scouted it. Heretics within her bosom have labored to corrupt it. And no wonder. For it is a doctrine to be discerned only by the illumination of the Spirit of God, and faith in it is possible only to a soul that has been brought into the depths of humility and self-abasement and self-despair on account of sin, and is ready to believe and trust as God shall teach. Otherwise it encounters in diametrical antagonism the uttermost strength of human pride, human corruption, and human reason in its present estate.

Now, as evermore, this precious life-doctrine of the Church is assailed with all the power which the literature, learning, and philosophy of the world can minister. But let not the humble believer, who regards it as the very hope of his soul for immortality, be terrified. Let not his heart shrink and shiver as if, this truth about to perish, nought will remain for him but chaos and despair. It is believed to-day with a more sure and intelligent faith, and loved with more intense and entire devotion, and by a greater multitude of disciples, than ever before. It still lives and it will live forever. It has survived for eighteen hundred years the combined efforts of earth and hell to destroy it. It has survived far greater perils from the folly, ignorance, and unfaithfulness of its professed friends. It can never die, for it is truth. As it is the truth of God, it has the life of God.

All who profess to accept the New Testament as true, in any sense, as inspired or uninspired, are of course compelled to believe also, in some sense or other, what it every where teaches as to the condition and character of men as sinners, and that Jesus Christ our Lord came into the world to *save* them from sin and its consequences. But here the question arises, *how* does he save them? What was that work by which their salvation is accomplished? By his sufferings and death preëminently, the Scriptures abundantly testify. But *what* did he suffer? What death did he die? What was that mysterious transaction on Calvary, where the Son of God expired in tears and blood and anguish of soul? What were the nature, meaning, design, and effect of it? What its bearings and relations?

The answer to these inquiries is intimately and necessarily connected with other questions having reference to the character and position of men under the moral government of God. What is our condition in that respect? What was *necessary* to be done in order to our salvation? *That*, whatever it was, our Saviour did. It is granted that we are subjects of the divine government; that we are under law to God. It is granted further that we have transgressed that law, that we are sinners, and consequently under obligation to suffer the penalty, which is a part of that law, for a law without a penalty is an absurdity. Our position under the law of God, then, is that of sinners, guilty, condemned, bound to suffer the punishment attached by it to our transgressions. Prominently, therefore, *one* thing necessary to be done for our salvation is to secure for us the remission of that penalty. We must be punished, or we must be *pardon*ed.

But this pardon, this necessary, indispensable pardon—how, in what way, on what terms, can it be granted to sinners by the just and holy Majesty of heaven? Not by an absolute, arbitrary, unconditional act of the divine sovereignty. Never in that way, answer the universal common-sense and instincts of mankind. The stupidest heathen seeks it by sacrifice and penance. The lowest Socinian makes the repentance of the sinner a condition of it. Even the small class of orthodox theologians who hold that the mere will and pleasure of God is the only foundation of moral distinctions, the fountain of law and justice, the sole ground and origin of all the dispensations of his moral government, yet hold that as he *has* willed as he has, unconditional pardon is impossible.

On what condition, then, can this pardon of sin be granted and the sinner saved? The current opinions, among professed believers of the gospel, on this point, may be generalised in three classes, each including among its adherents men of various shades and differences of doctrine, but whose sentiments on this point are clearly reducible to one or the other of the following heads:

1. There are those who hold that the only necessary condition of pardon and salvation is the *repentance* of the sinner—that is,

that he shall cease to sin and return to the path of holiness and obedience. 2. A second class, while assenting to and affirming the necessity of repentance on the part of the sinner, add to it this other condition, that his pardon must be granted in such a way and on such a plan that no evil shall ensue to the authority of the divine government, the potency of the divine law, and thereby to the well-being of the universe. For, it is argued, if sin is pardoned unconditionally, by the sovereign prerogative of God, the bonds of the law will be thereby relaxed as to all moral creatures, its compelling power weakened, the motive to obedience diminished, and the authority of the divine government impugned and dishonored. If the sinner is saved, therefore, it must be in some way which will provide a sufficient guarantee and security against these direful results. 3. A third view of the subject, while it includes the two former, and asserts the necessity both of the repentance of the sinner and of adequate security against the dangerous consequences of unconditional pardon to the moral government of God, affirms that sin cannot be pardoned *without an atonement*, that is, an adequate satisfaction to divine law and justice of all their claims against the sinner. And the necessity of such an atonement is affirmed in two respects: first, independently, resulting from the very nature of the case; and secondly, as the necessary means by which the two former conditions are to be secured and provided for.

Corresponding with these three views as to the necessary conditions of the sinner's salvation, there are three principal opinions as to the nature of the work of Christ by which he has undertaken to effect it—three answers to the question *how* he saves; what did he do and suffer for us, what was his death, and what the meaning of that dread tragedy of the cross? And in enumerating them, our readers must forgive it if we are compelled to employ the language of Ashdod, to use words foreign and strange to the Israel of God.

1. First in order is that which is designated as the "Moral Influence Theory." It regards the work of Christ as intended solely to produce a moral impression on the soul of the sinner, and thereby, by the force of "moral suasion," to

lead him to repentance, the only necessary condition of salvation. The sufferings and death of our Lord had no reference whatever to the divine law, justice, or government, or to the penalty of sin. Their effects terminate only on the moral nature of the sinner, and somehow exert an influence to convert him. *Somehow!* But *how?* Here, in attempting to understand this theory, we get into a fog. All is vague, dim, and misty. Or to change the metaphor, we find ourselves in the realm of shadows. Faint rhetorical figures in multitudes pass before our vision, but when we attempt to grasp them we seize emptiness and nothing. One advocate of this theory, in endeavoring to interpret the nature and meaning of Christ's sufferings and death, compares them to the bursting anguish of a loving parent over the sin and folly of a wayward and erring child, at sight of which the heart of the child is melted and overcome, and he repents. That is, they were an expression and exhibition of the mingled love and sorrow of God for the sinner and on account of his sin, designed to touch, to win, to subdue, to persuade the sinner to repent and sin no more. And this is all of it. The cross was just an appeal to our hearts, through the love, gentleness, meekness, tenderness, patience, tears, sufferings, and death of Christ, and nothing more. But when we inquire *how* the sufferings and death of our Lord express and exhibit divine love and sorrow for the sinner; what was there in them to give them this virtue and efficacy; what in their interior nature to constitute them a demonstration of these divine emotions; we are again, so far as this theory is concerned, clutching at the air. No answer to that question has yet been given presenting anything tangible and real. At the last analysis, all this theory yields to the chemistry of logic, is, that the cross was a tragic scene, a kind of stage play, to show us by way of a picture, the anguish of God's loving heart over our sins, and so to move and melt us to sorrow and repentance and to persuade us to cease from sin. This theory is the one adopted generally by Socinians, Unitarians, *et id genus omne*.

2. The second view on this subject is the one known as the "Governmental Theory." This, while including the idea of the

former, regards the sufferings and death of Christ as chiefly and essentially designed to produce an impression on the minds of God's intelligent creatures throughout his moral government generally. This impression, or influence, is intended to provide the second necessary condition of the pardon of sin, which we have previously mentioned—an adequate security and safeguard, namely, against the possible evil consequences if sin is not punished and the transgressor escapes with impunity. As to what this impression is, it is variously described as of the evil of sin, of God's hatred and abhorrence of it, of what it deserves, of the certainty and terribleness of its punishment, of the majesty, holiness, and terror of the divine law and government, and of the awful doom of the impenitent, unpardoned transgressor. Here we are again among shadows, pictures, and figures. God means to forgive and save the sinner, but lest thereby others should be encouraged to sin in hope of like impunity, lest the authority of his government and the bonds of his law should be weakened and thereby the happiness of his creatures be impaired, the awful drama of the cross is devised and enacted. It is an exhibition, a representation. Its efficacy and effect are to show the universe what God thinks of sin, what it deserves, and what it must receive if not repented of and forgiven; and this is all. Christ did not really make an atonement for sin. By his sufferings and death he only made such an impression on the subjects of God's moral government, in the respects before mentioned, that it would be *safe* for him to forgive sin. His mission in the world and his work here was merely a governmental expedient, a device of administration, to guard against the possible evil consequences of the sinner's forgiveness and salvation.

But when we raise the question again here, *how* do the sufferings of Christ produce this needful impression; what was there in them, that is, in their nature, to have this effect on the moral universe; we set out again on a fruitless search. The governmental theory has no intelligible answer to give. It denies that Christ suffered the penalty of sin in the sinner's place; it denies that in any proper sense he atoned for sin; it denies that he satisfied the claims of the divine government against sinners; it denies that

law and justice were executed in regard to our sins. It only affirms that he showed by his agony and death that it is not safe to sin. Do you ask *how*? You might as well ask how a lofty column can stand erect with no resting-place and support for its base.

This theory is inwrapped with a distinct and peculiar system of ethics. It is a moral philosophy moulding and forming a theology. Its fundamental principles may be briefly stated as follows: 1. The highest good, the supreme final end of all things, is *happiness*. 2. Hence all virtue, all moral excellence, consists essentially in *benevolence*, a desire to promote the happiness of others. All forms of virtue, every species of moral goodness, may be resolved into that. Truth, honesty, humility, temperance, purity, justice, love, for example, are only specific forms of the genus *benevolence*. 3. Hence the supreme, ultimate end of all God's dispensations towards his creatures, is, of course, their *happiness*. 4. Hence the *end* of the law, both in its precept and its penalty, its origin, reason, and necessity, are to be found in the happiness of its subjects. 5. Hence it follows that if any expedient or device can be found by which that end can be secured as well, the law may be set aside, abrogated, annulled, in any particular case. 6. But as the forgiveness and salvation of a sinner necessarily imply that in reference to him the law is nullified and abrogated, and as the unimpaired authority and constraining force of the law are necessary to the happiness of the moral universe, his salvation is impossible unless some such expedient can be contrived. 7. Such an expedient has been found and employed in the work of Christ, by which, while the law is not executed and the claims of the divine government against the sinner are not exacted, the same effects are produced on the minds of the moral universe as if the penalty had been inflicted on him to the full extent—the same moral impression as to the ill desert of sin, the holiness and authority of the law, the rights and majesty of the divine government, and the danger of transgression. So far we can follow this theory and think we understand it. And so far it seems to be plausible and consistent, though fundamentally erroneous. But when we

desire to know how the sufferings of our Lord produce these effects, what did he do and endure to make this impression on the moral universe, this theory gives no satisfactory or even intelligible answer. Like the preceding, it converts the cross into a mere scenic exhibition, where there is representation, but no reality.

This "governmental theory" was suggested by the celebrated Grotius in the seventeenth century, but it was left for certain New England theologians to develop and clearly state it. It is a part of what is known among us as the New School Theology.

3. The third view of this subject is the one which has been and is held almost universally in the Christian world, and is the good old "gospel of the grace of God." While including the main ideas of the two preceding theories, as to the sufferings of our Lord, it regards them as a real and proper expiation of sin, satisfying the claims of the divine holiness, justice, law, and government against sinners, and providing this necessary condition of their salvation, namely, a true and adequate *atonement* for their sins. It regards the work of Christ as not only designed to produce a certain effect on the heart of the sinner, and to prevent the possibly injurious results of his salvation to the welfare of the universe, but as having reference also to God himself, to his divine attributes, and to his character and position as the sovereign ruler of his creatures. The "moral influence" theory finds the sole impediment in the way of the sinner's pardon and salvation in the subjective state of his own soul, as alienated from God and morally corrupt, and it makes the work of Christ to be but a demonstration of God's great love to the sinner, which by its mere moral power shall melt and charm and convert him, and then forgiveness and salvation follow as a matter of course. The "governmental" theory finds another difficulty in the possible harm to the happiness of other moral beings which might follow if sin in any case goes unpunished, and it adds to the former doctrine that the sufferings of Christ were a demonstration to the universe that sin will certainly be punished, and none must presume from the impunity of the saved from

among human transgressors that any can sin with the hope of safety.

The orthodox doctrine finds another difficulty, the first and the greatest, in God himself—in his *holiness*. The holiness of God is the infinite moral purity and perfection of his nature. It is the sum total of his moral excellence in himself, in his own divine and eternal being. It is that moral perfection especially as it is related to moral evil, to sin. It is that principle of his nature whereby he loves right and hates wrong, his everlasting and unspeakable joy in the one, his intolerable aversion and eternal enmity towards the other. It is the fashion of modern sentimentalism to strive to eliminate this element from the character of God. But the Bible is full of it. And while we accept its statements as truth, we must admit that there is something in God which is truly and properly described in the language of men as hatred, abhorrence, wrath, toward all sin. And ere it can be forgiven, this holiness of God must be appeased and propitiated.

Then there is the *justice* of God, which demands that sin shall be dealt with *as it deserves*. Intrinsically, in its own nature, it merits punishment. Apart from its injurious consequences, from all the harm it may inflict on the happiness of the transgressor and his fellow creatures, it deserves to be punished. If there are no other reasons for its punishment, a sufficient and necessary reason is found in itself, in its own intrinsic, inseparable, essential demerit. It must be punished because its punishment is *just* and God is just. Justice is not benevolence, no more than bitter is sweet. No analysis of thought can resolve the one into the other. No sophistry can confound our moral perception that they are distinct and different. Justice stands on a level with all the other attributes of the divine nature, as distinct, necessary, and eternal as any one of them. It is an ultimate, unresolvable principle. Its reason and necessity are found in itself. It is its own end, and ere sin can be forgiven, justice must be done. Justice must be fulfilled and satisfied.

Then, again, there is *the divine law*. This is but the embodied and expressed principles of the divine holiness, justice, and benevolence. It contains in a revelation from God to his crea-

tures what they require. Further, as thus made known, it is a declaration not only of his will in the precept, but of his *purpose* in the penalty. It is an express, deliberate, solemn utterance of God, as to what he will do if the creature sin. Its execution involves, therefore, the *veracity* of the Most High. The truth of God is at stake. The law, therefore, evidently possesses the sacredness, the inviolability, the necessity, and the immutability of the divine holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. It can no more be set aside and abrogated than these everlasting principles of God's very being and nature can be annulled and abjured. The very glory of Jehovah is in it, and the law must stand, or that glory shall perish with it. "Wherefore," says the apostle, "the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good." How then can it be set aside, repealed, or so much as relaxed, but at the sacrifice of holiness, justice, and goodness? Ere sin can be pardoned, therefore, and the sinner saved, *the law* of God must be fulfilled, its claims must be satisfied. The law must be sustained, honored, and glorified.

Now, according to the orthodox doctrine, our Lord Jesus Christ met and fulfilled all these conditions of salvation. He took our place in and under the divine law. He assumed our liabilities as sinners under that law and fulfilled them, answering all its claims against us. He obeyed its precept and he endured its penalty in our stead, in our name, and on our behalf. And as that law expresses and contains the demands of divine holiness and justice against us, in fulfilling it he satisfied them. As our representative and substitute, he did and suffered all the law required of us as sinners. Thereby he expiated and atoned for our sins. That expiation appeased and propitiated the divine holiness and justice. Propitiation secured reconciliation with God. Reconciliation is salvation. This was the meaning of the cross. This was the wondrous transaction enacted there. The pale sufferer who in a mysterious passion expired on that accursed tree was burdened with the responsibilities of the sinner to the law of a just and holy God, and then and there he fulfilled and discharged them. He did and suffered precisely what the law required sinners to do and suffer, in their place, in their name,

and for their benefit. The holiness and justice of a sin-hating and sin-avenging God in that awful hour dealt with him in their stead; and when the deed was done, salvation for them was possible, was secured.

Intimately and logically connected with the orthodox doctrine on this subject, and necessary to be known in order to a clear apprehension of it, are the great scriptural doctrines of the Trinity, the union of the divine and human natures in the one person of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the mystical union between him and all who are redeemed and saved by him. The subsistence of distinct persons in the Godhead rendered it possible that the Father should execute justice and law upon the God-man as the substitute of his people, and that the Son, assuming our legal liabilities, should answer to the Father for them.

It is further manifest that the Redeemer of men, in order to be competent to fulfil these conditions of salvation, must be one who was not originally and personally responsible to the law on his own behalf. Otherwise, as it would claim his all for himself, he could render it nothing for any other. He must also have an independent and sovereign right over his own life and powers, to dispose of them as he will. But these are the prerogatives of God. The Saviour of men therefore must be a divine person. This is necessary, moreover, by the infinite dignity of his person, to attach transcendent dignity and merit to what he shall do and suffer, commensurate with the infinite majesty of the divine holiness and justice whose dishonored claims were to be fulfilled and satisfied.

And yet it was equally necessary for this Redeemer to be man. It was the human race who were guilty, condemned, and lost. It was against them that infinitely holy and just law entered its demands and proclaimed its terrors. And out of the bosom of humanity, from among men themselves, by one of the same race, that law must be answered and satisfied.

Hence the second person of the adorable Trinity united our nature with himself in a personal union. Thus constituted and qualified, he undertakes the mighty task. He bends his Godhead to the great achievement, and in the form of a man triumphantly

fulfils it. He had power to lay down his life, and power to take it again. He was able to endure the penalty of sin, to endure it all, to endure it all at once, and enduring it, to triumph over it; to exhaust it, and to live again; to die, and again to rise in the power of an endless life. The law exacted of him its last item, and he paid it. Sin's entire curse fell upon him, and he bore it. Justice launched at him all its thunderbolts, and he quailed not at their shocks. It let loose upon him the terrors of a sin-avenging God, and he answered, "I delight to do thy will!" He stood between a guilty world and a wrathful heaven, intercepted the descending vengeance, and let it expend all its fury upon himself. And when the darkness and terror cleared away, he appeared living and victorious, showing his wounds and pleading for the souls he had saved.

The work of our Lord, according to this orthodox doctrine, while thus answering the liabilities of sinners to divine law and justice, further, and in a way intelligible and most satisfactory, provides for the two other conditions of salvation insisted on by the preceding theories. For, first, it presents to the moral universe a demonstration of the evil of sin and of God's inflexible purpose to punish it, the most impressive and convincing possible, inasmuch as it was the actual execution of law and justice as the indispensable condition of our salvation. And secondly, as it was from beginning to end the work of divine grace and mercy, it was a most amazing exhibition of the love of God, of a love which underwent the most stupendous self-sacrifice, and paid an infinitely precious price for the redemption of sinners—a love therefore which is transcendently adapted to meet and subdue and convert the hearts of men.

The opponents of this doctrine of the cross, in their turn, raise the question of "*how?*" which we have so often put against their theories. They ask, if justice is so sacred a thing, how was it consistent with justice to punish the innocent for the guilty? Jesus Christ our Lord was innocent; how then could it be right for him to be made to suffer for our sins? Moreover, how, in what way, on what principle, can the sufferings of one person satisfy the demands of law and justice for the sins of

another? How can any one bear the punishment due to a different person, consistently with the principles of law and right? The answer to these inquiries and objections is one, and it is found in a truth and fact abundantly taught in the Holy Scriptures. But it should be remarked that any difficulty felt in the idea that it is unjust for the innocent to be made to suffer for the guilty is involved in the moral influence and governmental theories just as truly and fully as in the orthodox view. They teach that Christ was innocent, and yet that his sufferings were caused by our sins. What may have been the relation and connexion between our sins and his sufferings, does not alter the case. There is no more injustice in the orthodox view of this point than in theirs, but less, as it would be easy to show.

The satisfactory solution of these difficulties, however, is furnished by a doctrine often expressly affirmed in the Scriptures, and every where assumed and implied, where they speak of the salvation of sinners through Christ; the doctrine, namely, of the *union* between him and those who are saved by him—that which theologians call the “mystical union” between him and them, inasmuch as while the truth and fact of it are clearly and fully revealed to our faith, and its nature and consequences in part set forth, the essential basis and nature of it are not explained. This union is such, however, that there results from it a community of relations and responsibilities under the divine law and government between Christ and those whom he saves. It lays a foundation in law and right for him to be punished for our sins, and for us to enjoy the benefits and consequences of all he did and suffered for us. By virtue of it, he and they are vitally, spiritually, morally, and legally ONE—one in law and in justice. Their liabilities attached to him. His work and sufferings are imputed to them. The satisfaction he rendered for sin, they rendered in him. The righteousness he wrought out, they wrought out in him. It is theirs in the eye of the law. What he did, they are regarded as having done themselves. In him they obeyed the law. In him they fulfilled all righteousness. In him they paid the penalty of sin. In him they died. In him they live. His death for sin was

theirs. His life is theirs also. In short, it is by virtue of this union that the Scriptures explain, so far as they explain at all, the whole mystery of our salvation, from its beginning in the counsels of eternity to its finished consummation in the unspeakable glory of a future heaven. It is admitted to be mysterious. It transcends human reason. But it is unquestionably revealed in the word as a truth and a fact. Moreover analogies and illustrations of it abound as facts in the dealings of God with the children of men. In the peculiar constitution and administration of the divine government over the human race, the principle appears to be incorporated and often proceeded on—the principle, namely, of the responsibility of one for another, frequently for many, and the correlative participation of the many in the guilt or the righteousness of the one. Adam sinned, and as a matter of fact the penalty of that sin has been executed upon him and all of his descendants. The divine covenants with Noah, Abraham, and David, were with them and their posterity. Paul testifies of the Jews that “they are beloved for the fathers’ sakes.” The “exceeding great and precious promises” are not only to the people of God but “to their seed after them.” He expressly declares that he will visit the iniquities of fathers upon their children. All Israel was punished for the sin of Achan and again for a sin of David. And evermore, in the actual history of men, it is a fact that the penal consequences of many sins, and the benefits of many works of righteousness, pass over upon those who stand some way related to and connected with the doers of them. And so is there a foundation and necessity laid for this arrangement in the nature and constitution of the human race, that it is, in many forms, incorporated in the laws and governments which they themselves establish. They are pervaded by it from beginning to end. Take out of them the idea of agency, representation, substitution, suretyship, of one acting for others, and they are nothing. In international law it is the same. One government and nation holds another responsible for the acts of its rulers, and even of its private citizens. In short, the general principle that there may exist such a relation and connexion between one person and others that there shall

result a community of responsibilities between them, is interwoven with the whole web of human affairs. And what shall we say, if God, by whom it was so inwrought with the constitution and administration of law, both human and divine, extend and carry it out in the matter of our salvation? Shall a principle which every where else prevails be here abandoned? The method of the divine government in regard to man must be one. Its general and fundamental principles must be the same every where and always. And "as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." In the work of our salvation there is a union, relation, connexion, call it as we please, between Christ and us, "of such a nature as to involve an identity of legal relations and reciprocal obligations and rights." Though personally innocent, holy, and undefiled, yet by virtue of that union our sins were laid to his charge and he bore their penalty; while law and justice recognised what he did and suffered, as done and suffered by us, and therefore an adequate satisfaction to all their claims against us.

According to the orthodox view of this great subject, therefore, this was the work of Christ. As our substitute and representative, he made a true, a real, and a proper atonement and satisfaction to the holiness, justice, and truth of God for all their demands against us as sinners, and he did this by enduring in our place, under the law, the penalty of our sins.

But a clear and complete apprehension of this doctrine cannot be had if we do not consider it distinctly in another view. The work of Christ may be regarded in a passive or an active aspect, as suffering or as obedience. We do not divide it into two separate parts, one of which is made up of his obedience to the precepts of the law and the other of his suffering of its penalty. It is true that he fulfilled essentially its precept as well as endured its penalty. But his whole undivided work may be viewed in one respect, as it was voluntary in the highest and most absolute sense, as obedience; and in another respect it may be viewed as suffering. In obeying he suffered, and in suffering he obeyed. Corresponding with this twofold relation of that transcendently glorious and divinely perfect work, there attaches to it a twofold

efficacy and value. Regarded as suffering, it atones for sin, it satisfies the penal requirements of the law, it propitiates the divine holiness and justice. Regarded as obedience, it is righteousness, it fulfils the preceptive demands of the law, it merits the rewards of eternal life, it justifies. As an atonement merely, it could obtain only pardon for the sinner, the remission of the penalty due his sins. In that view, it could only absolve him from obligation to punishment. But that is not all the sinner needs. That would leave him midway between hell and heaven, to work out for himself a title to everlasting life and a claim to the rewards of righteousness, which of course he could never achieve. But the work of our Lord had not this abortive result. It was not mere atonement and satisfaction for sin. It was an infinitely perfect and meritorious righteousness. It not only pardons, it justifies. It does not merely remove the difficulties in the way of salvation, it saves. It redeems from hell and it secures heaven. It provides both a full acquittal for the sinner from the indictment of the law, and a title perfect and complete to the reward conditioned on stainless obedience. And it has always been the doctrine and faith of Christians that the life and death of our divine Saviour not only atoned for their sins, but merited, procured, and purchased every grace and blessing, from the greatest to the least, necessary to their complete, final salvation and glorification in eternal blessedness. Repentance, faith, holiness, knowledge, all the gracious work of the Spirit in the soul, the beginning, progress, and consummation of all actual experience and enjoyment of salvation, are the fruits of his blessed work, the reward of his obedience and sufferings. This is the gospel of the grace of God. This is the doctrine of Christ crucified, so unspeakably precious in the faith of the Christian—which oftentimes so fills his heart with love and joy and gratitude that he wants an eternity in which to praise and to thank him who loved us and gave himself for us. In the plain phraseology of the olden times, he is not half a Saviour. He is a whole Saviour, complete and perfect, the author and finisher of salvation, in whom and from whom by whose finished and completed work, the redeemed have all things. "Ye are complete in him."

In the preceding pages, we have endeavored, avoiding as far as possible the use of technical and abstruse terms, to present a general view of the subject discussed in the work of Dr. A. A. Hodge, named at the head of this article. Our readers will be able to gather from them an idea of the field of debate over which his discussions lead. His book is divided into two parts: 1. The nature of the atonement; and 2. Its design or intended application. The former occupies the body of the volume, 346 pages out of 429; and as the author states, the subject of it "is the real interest for the sake of which this book is written." Intimately connected with the discussion of the *nature* of the atonement, and indeed inseparable from it, the *necessity* of it has to be considered. The first chapter is introductory, presenting the importance of the doctrine to be discussed, the general agreement of the Church in all ages in regard to it, the danger of rationalism, and certain preliminary points necessary to be kept in view, viz.: that all dangerous error contains some element of truth, which is afterwards illustrated in the case of the moral influence and governmental theories of the atonement; that systems and definite statements of religious truth are a necessity; and that the questions in regard to the work of Christ are to be answered only by the authority of the Holy Scriptures and by a full and fair induction from all they teach on the subject.

The second chapter is occupied with a statement of the orthodox doctrine respecting the work of Christ, as to its motive, its nature, and its effects, in connexion with those conditions which made that work necessary to the salvation of sinners, while the Philistine theories, with Ashdod names, are also stated.

The third chapter contains a definition of the terms employed in the discussion of this subject, and a statement of the principal points involved in the doctrine of the Church.

In the fourth chapter, the author enters upon the direct arguments by which that doctrine is established, and shows that the essential and immutable perfections of the divine nature make the punishment of sin necessary and inevitable. The discussion here carries us into the deep things of God. The questions involved are, what is the ultimate motive of his actions? are holi-

ness and justice essential and necessary principles of his very nature? why does he hate and punish sin? what is the nature of virtue? The "governmental" notion, that all virtue in God and man must be resolved into benevolence, is considered and refuted.

The second argument, contained in the fifth chapter, is derived from the immutability of the divine law. That law is absolutely immutable, because the essential principles of righteousness which it embodies have their ground not in the mere will of God, but in his eternal and unchangeable nature. The penalty is an essential element of the law, and therefore cannot be set aside. The Scriptures clearly teach that Christ came not to annul or relax the law, but to fulfil it. But if the penalty is a necessary part of the law, if the whole law is immutable, if in fact Christ came to fulfil the law, then it follows that he suffered the penalty of the law in order to save us.

But if the law is immutable, as shown in the fifth chapter, how can the legal relations of one person be assumed by another, and the legal liabilities of the principal be discharged by his substitute? Light is thrown on this question, in the sixth chapter, by the distinction, noted by Turretin, of the threefold relation of men to the law, viz., the *natural*, *federal*, and *penal* relations. It is shown that with regard to the first there can be no substitution or representation; but that this is possible in regard to the other two in the case of man. This brings up the relations of Adam to the human race, the federal and representative nature of which is presupposed by the federal headship of Christ.

Hence the seventh chapter is occupied with a discussion of the legal relations of Adam to his posterity, and a defence of the orthodox doctrine on that subject.

The third general argument, contained in the eighth chapter, is "derived from the fact that the Scriptures constantly represent Christ as dying, and thus effecting the salvation of his people, as a *sacrifice*." Here it is shown that the primitive sacrifices were of divine origin, and expiatory and propitiatory; that the Jewish sacrifices were also expiatory in their nature; and that the sacrifices of the law were *typical* of the sacrifice of

Christ, from which it follows of necessity that his death was vicarious and expiatory.

The next chapter presents a fourth argument in the fact that the Scriptures teach that Christ saves his people by acting as their *High Priest*. It is proved that the work of the priest primarily had reference to God and terminated on him, being propitiatory—that he acted as the representative of those whose priest he was, and secured for them the actual remission of their sins. When he offered a sacrifice for any, the design and effect of it was not to produce a moral impression on them or on others, but to procure the pardon of their sin—its remission, not its remissibility. And it is further shown that Christ was really and truly, not figuratively, a High Priest for his people, and therefore offered a propitiatory sacrifice for them, atoning for their sins, and securing pardon and salvation.

In the tenth chapter, a fifth argument is founded on that large class of scriptures which teach that Christ's sufferings were *vicarious*—that is, that he suffered, not merely for our advantage, but in our room and stead, in the strict sense of the word as our substitute. He took our place in law, and therefore necessarily assumed our legal responsibilities, which were obedience as a condition of life, and suffering as a penal consequence of sin. The adherents of the erroneous theories admit in words that Christ's sufferings were "vicarious." Dr. Bushnell, one of the arch-advocates of the "Moral Influence" theory, has published a book with the title "Vicarious Sacrifice," to teach that error. But they use the word in a perverted and fallacious sense.

A sixth argument is contained in the next chapter, derived from the fact that the Scriptures teach that *our sins were laid on Christ*. In this connexion the scriptural doctrine of the imputation of sin is explained, defended, and proved. This is followed in the next chapter by a seventh argument found in the numerous passages of the Holy Scriptures which describe the effects of the work of Christ. These are of three classes: as they have respect to God, these effects are termed *propitiation* and *reconciliation*; as they regard sin, *expiation*; and as they relate to the sinner himself, *redemption*. The natural import of this language:

necessarily teaches the orthodox doctrine, and cannot be harmonized with the other theories. The work of Christ is presented in Scripture in various forms of conception, and in its multifold relations; all of which were designed to limit and supplement each other, are all accordant and consistent with each other and with the Church doctrine, (in fact constitute and express it,) but with no other view.

In the following chapter, the true nature of the atonement is proved by an eighth argument—the Scripture doctrine of the *union* which subsists between Christ and his people. This doctrine, as revealed in the word of God, is set forth, and it is shown that it involves as a necessary consequence his suffering for our sins, and our being invested with the results of his righteousness, and that this doctrine cannot possibly be consistent with the two erroneous views of the work of Christ.

The fourteenth chapter presents a ninth argument in the teachings of the Scriptures as to the nature of *justification* and the grounds on which it proceeds. In this argument the true doctrine on this subject is defined and established, and shown to involve necessarily the orthodox doctrine of Christ's redeeming work.

Then follows in the next chapter, as a tenth argument, an exposition of the nature and office of *faith* according to the Scriptures.

In the succeeding chapter, an additional argument is drawn from those statements of Scripture which directly establish the fact that the atonement of Christ, in order to the pardon of sin, was *absolutely necessary*. For if that necessity was absolute, it must have its ground in the nature of God, and not in the exigencies of government or the subjective condition of the sinner, as the erroneous theories teach.

The seventeenth chapter presents the doctrine of the Scriptures as to *the perfection* of the atoning work of Christ, and that in two respects, that it truly and fully, by reason of its own intrinsic value, satisfied divine law and justice, and that by virtue of its own intrinsic merit and efficacy it secures the salvation of those for whom it was made, and does not merely render their

salvation possible, leaving the actual result to depend on other conditions. The advocates of the moral influence and governmental theories, and of a general indefinite atonement, necessarily hold that the atoning work of our Lord does not of its own force and effect actually save any one, but only removes legal difficulties so as to make salvation possible. It is shown however that the work of Christ secures salvation as a whole, the means as well as the end, all the conditions as well as the result.

In the following chapter, it is proved distinctly that the satisfaction rendered by Christ embraced his *active* as well as his *passive* obedience. With this the author closes his positive arguments in regard to the nature of the atonement, in the progress of which, however, he has constant occasion to answer objections to the orthodox doctrine, and to present proof of the errors of the opposing theories. In the nineteenth chapter, he proves the doctrine he advocates to have been the faith of the Christian Church through all ages; in the twentieth, he states and answers more distinctly and formally the principal objections to that doctrine; and in the twenty-first, he carries the war into Africa, and directly attacks the moral influence and governmental theories, proving their errors by multiplied and accumulated arguments. With this ends the first part of the volume.

The second part discusses the *design*, or intended application of the atonement, or, as it has been often expressed, its *extent*, the persons for whom it was made. In this part, the first chapter is introductory, and considers the question as involved in the controversy with Arminians and with Calvinistic advocates of an indefinite, universal atonement.

The second chapter presents an accurate statement of the true doctrine on this point, first negatively and then positively. The third chapter examines the relation which the nature of the atonement sustains to its design. In the fourth, we have a historical review of the opinion of Calvinists as to the design of the work of Christ. The fifth shows the true position of Calvin himself on this question, answers the inquiry, "what is the standard of Calvinism?" and proves that it admits only the doctrine of a

definite, personal atonement, and that the Westminster Confession and Catechism teach the same.

In the sixth chapter, the orthodox view, that the design of the atonement was the salvation of the elect personally and definitely, is established by eight arguments; and in the seventh and last, three principal objections to this doctrine are stated and answered.

It will be seen from this summary of the contents of the volume before us, that its discussions lead the reader over the richest and widest fields of religious thought and study. Its broad sweep swings us round well nigh the whole circumference of theology. This is inevitable in a complete and thorough examination of the subject. The question of the atonement connects with itself every other question as to the religion of the Bible. When we ask, "*What* did our Lord Jesus Christ do and suffer for our salvation?" we ask everything. If the orthodox answer to that question is correct, then religion, both doctrinally and experimentally, is one thing. If either of the opposing theories is true, then it is another and altogether a different thing. It was therefore with most sufficient reason that Dr. Hodge devoted so many of his pages to a discussion of the nature of the atonement, and has interwoven his argument with so many of the principal doctrines of the Holy Scriptures. And so abundantly, clearly, and conclusively is the received faith of the Church on this subject taught in the written word, and that both expressly and directly, and in other doctrines which necessarily involve and imply it, that the question whether we shall accept that faith or reject it, is virtually equivalent to the question whether we shall or shall not submit our faith to the plain, grammatical sense of that word. It is just the old and ever recurring debate between those who hold that we should come to the Scriptures as humble inquirers and disciples, to learn, to be taught, to hear and to believe what God shall say, and to believe it because he says it; and those who open the Bible only to compel it, by the torture of a subtle or a violent exegesis, to teach the dogmas of their own self-derived reason and philosophy. This is one of the considerations which attach an importance so vital and immense to

the question as to the nature of the atonement. Shall our faith rest on the authority of God speaking in his word, or shall it stand in the strength of our own reason and understanding? The adherents of the moral influence and governmental theories do not derive their views in the first instance from the Scriptures, but from their own wisdom and philosophy, and then endeavor to find their doctrines in the word, or rather to force them into it. The former is the view adopted generally by Pelagians, Socinians, and Rationalists. It implies at least one step in infidelity. The advocates of the latter, as Dr. Hodge shows, "do not pretend that they generate it out of Scripture; the most they claim is, that having developed it as a product of speculation, they are able to show that it *harmonizes* with all the facts of Scripture." This is at least one step towards infidelity. It is just a parallel to the case of the "abolitionist," who proves by his own ideas of justice and of the natural rights of man the wrong of slavery, and then goes to work to force the Bible to the support of his own preconceived opinion.

Dr. Hodge refers to the fact that there is little to be found in the writings of the early fathers of the Church, which have come down to us, in the way of a dogmatic and clearly defined statement of their faith as to the atoning work of Christ. Is not the explanation of this to be found in the facts that the true doctrine was so manifestly taught in the Scriptures, and so unquestionably constituted the very essence of the gospel, and was so fully and undeniably delivered by a tradition yet fresh and worthy of reliance, and was so universally believed, that no early heretic had the folly or the rashness to assail it? It was unquestionable and unquestioned. Dogmatic, defined, and developed formulas of doctrine are of course the result of controversy and opposition. It was only when errorists had gathered courage from their attacks on other doctrines, and from the confusions and divisions of more modern times, that they ventured to essay the corruption of the very doctrine of the cross itself, and to deny that "Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures." It was reserved for the more daring unbelief and presumptuous speculations of latter days, clothed in the form of Christianity itself, to question

a truth which is so clearly the sum and substance of revelation. And just so far as men depart from the received doctrine of the Church on this subject, it will be generally found that theoretically or practically they so far reject the word of God as an authoritative standard of belief. It is just the old contest between faith and reason, the question whether we shall appeal to the testimony of God speaking in the Scriptures, or excogitate our creed from the resources of our own reason and understanding—not indeed right reason, but man's reasoning powers, as they are now crippled, blinded, and perverted.

This question of the nature of the redeeming work of Christ assumes a supreme and essential importance also in that it involves the moral nature and character of God himself. The discussion of it penetrates to the original and ultimate principles of his very being, and turns upon the question of *what he is*. The schoolmen of the middle ages followed the argument up to that last point. The great theologians of the seventeenth century, orthodox and heretical, fought the battle on that ground, and there it must be decided. If holiness, justice, and truth, are absolute, original attributes of the Godhead, not resolvable into benevolence, or not the effects and creations of his mere will, then of necessity the orthodox doctrine is true. And on our doctrine of God, *all other* doctrines depend. As is the fountain, such must be the stream. An error there will taint and corrupt all other parts of our faith. Every drop of it will contain poison. All theology, all religious belief, is logically but the unfolding and development of our idea of God. And as all subjective, experimental, and practical religion, is but a condition of our moral nature correspondent and in harmony with our ideas of God, it will be one thing if we believe the orthodox doctrine, and a different thing if we reject it. Our faith on this point will modify and characterise the very feelings and affections of the soul in the most vital respects, as in regard to sin, to holiness, to Jesus our Lord, to God himself. This, the relation of the atonement to the divine attributes, as Dr. Hodge remarks, is "the centre of the question in debate between ourselves and the advocates of the governmental and of the moral theory of the atone-

ment. Both parties estimate it as a moral question of the utmost importance and incapable of compromise." And referring to the fearful terms in which some prominent advocates of those two theories have spoken of the orthodox doctrine in regard to the divine nature, he adds, "What these men blaspheme, the inspired Scriptures and the Christian Church revere and vindicate as an essential element of that holiness which is the crowning glory of our God." Let none therefore ignorantly suppose that this question is a mere abstraction, a curious speculation and nothing more. It enters into the most vital and fundamental matters of our faith, and involves the very essence of living and experimental piety.

What, indeed, is this question but that of a sinner's hope for eternal life? If the received doctrine of the Church is true, that hope as to its ground, its foundation, its reason, its origin, is one thing; if not, it is in these respects something different. The hope of glory which has always comforted and often thrilled and ravished the hearts of the children of God, springs from and is founded on the truth that Christ did, in the orthodox sense, die for our sins, bearing them in his own body on the tree. If we can trust to the united testimony of the faithful in all ages, it is the apprehension of this truth, under the convicting power of the Spirit of God, which brings peace to the soul and inspires the hope of salvation. Under that power, understanding, heart, and conscience, are enlightened and quickened, and the sinner comes so to see and to feel the vileness and guilt of sin, his own ill-desert, and the infinite purity and majesty of the divine holiness and justice, that nothing can lay to rest the terrors of conscience, satisfy the demands of his own moral nature, and save him from despair, but an adequate atonement for sin satisfying what he sees and knows to be the demands of eternal immutable justice. There is a voice in his own soul which requires that sin must be expiated, and which must be appeased. And it is not until the Son of God is revealed to him, as the propitiation for sin, whose blood cleanseth from all unrighteousness, that his own convictions are satisfied, his heart is "sprinkled from an evil conscience," his "conscience purged from dead works to serve the living God," and hope awakens within his despairing breast.

The highest importance belongs to this subject in yet another respect. As we have seen, it involves fundamental principles as to moral distinctions and obligations—in the language of the schools, as to the nature and obligation of virtue. The orthodox view teaches that moral principles are absolute, essential, immutable, having their ground and origin in the very nature of God—that he can no more cease to be holy, just, and good, than he can cease to be at all; that he commands all that is right, not because it is benevolent, or for any other reason, but just because it is right, and punishes sin, not because its punishment is necessary to the welfare of the universe, but because it is *right* to punish it, because sin by reason of its own intrinsic evil nature *deserves* to be punished; that he is just in his dealings with his creatures, not in order to promote their happiness, but because he is just in his own eternal nature and cannot act otherwise; that the reason of justice and of every moral principle is in itself, as it eternally constitutes a part of the very glory of God. Plant a conviction of this absolute, immutable, and inviolably sacred character of moral principles in human hearts, and what will be the sure result? We have the answer in the historical fact that where the orthodox views on this subject have been held, they have ever been attended and followed by a morality purer and loftier in its tone and standard than has been elsewhere common in the world. A popular reproach has universally been cast upon “high Calvinism” on account of what men are pleased to call its austere, rigid, inflexible, and (as meaning all that and something worse,) its *puritanical* code of morals, which will not yield so much as one hair-breadth of the sacred claims of right and principle to any pleadings of expediency, of interest, of passion, or if you please, of benevolence; for it holds that the highest right is itself the highest benevolence, and that benevolence is benevolence only so far as it is right. The other and opposing theories deprive moral distinctions of their sacredness and power. They teach either that they may be set aside, annulled, and abrogated, or resolved into a thin and airy phantom, called benevolence or the love of happiness. Right is not something sacred, fixed, unchangeable. It is a thing of times

and circumstances. In short, it is expediency—it is *policy*—the poorest, paltriest, most pitiful thing that fell from heaven. This matter affects not only the moral character of men personally, but also legislation and government. The idea that sin is to be punished, not because it intrinsically deserves it and justice demands it, but only for the good of the transgressor and the public, will pass over and has passed over from the theologian to the law-maker and the magistrate, the criminal code of nations is modified to suit it, government is administered according to it, and the execution of *justice* ceases to exist except in name. There is no such thing. It should be called the promotion of the public happiness. The politic and the expedient have usurped the place of the just and righteous. To what other causes than these can we ascribe the general corruption of morals, the prevalence of crime, the relaxation of law, the abolition of capital punishment, the utter confusion of moral principles, which are spreading so rapidly in those very communities where the fundamental ideas of those heresies of which we speak have received the most favor? Men cannot unsettle the foundations of the social fabric and expect the superstructure to stand strong. This argument then, is no mere battle of words, not just a contest of skill with the weapons of logic and learning, the only result of which is to decide who is the ablest disputant and to settle some abstruse point in some abstract creed. Under cover of this war of the theologians, mighty *moral forces* strive for mastery over the souls of men, one to purify, exalt, and bless the world, the other to dissolve the very bands of society, to let loose the powers of evil, to corrupt and to destroy.

The importance of the second main question considered by our author, viz., as to the persons for whose benefit the atonement was made, whether for all men, indiscriminately and indefinitely, or for the elect, personally and definitely, he correctly states, grows out of its relations to the question as to the nature of the atonement chiefly. It is perfectly obvious that according to the moral influence and governmental theories, the death of Christ had not and could not have any special reference to any

one individual of the human race more than to another. And according to the orthodox doctrine, the work of our Lord, considered in itself, separately and abstractly from his design and purpose in undertaking it, may be related indifferently to one man as much as to any other. But according to that doctrine, the very nature of that work involves and implies a personal reference, a purpose and design as to the individuals for whose benefit it was wrought. Take, for example, the general principle on which our salvation was effected by the Redeemer, the principle of *substitution*. To act and to die in our place, as our substitute, to assume our liabilities to divine law and justice, to suffer vicarious punishment, necessarily implies a definite and personal recognition of those for whom the substitute acts and whose obligations he discharges. Any other idea is absurd and impossible. The very conception of substitution involves a purpose and design as to the persons for whom it is made.

The same conclusion is inevitable from the orthodox view of the work of Christ as a real and proper satisfaction to the demands of law and justice against sinners. For the law can have no further claims against those with regard to whom all its requirements have been fully satisfied. Hence, it follows that Christ did not make such a satisfaction for all men indiscriminately; or if he did, that all will be saved. To say that he made a true and real satisfaction for the sins of any one, and yet that the same person is by the same law condemned and punished, is a contradiction. When it is said that Christ made a real and proper atonement for sin, the simple meaning is that he *really atoned* for it; which manifestly he did not do if that sin is punished in the person of the sinner. If we hold to the orthodox view of the nature of that atonement, therefore, we must of necessity admit its definite and personal design as to the elect, or we must adopt the folly of universal salvation. There is no alternative.

As we have previously stated, the orthodox view of the nature of Christ's redeeming work ascribes to it the whole process and result of our salvation; the means, the beginning, the progress, and the consummation of it, are all the fruit and effect of that

work. The gift of the Spirit, regeneration, faith, repentance, pardon, justification, sanctification, and the future glory, are all the purchase of his death. And a vital point in this inquiry is, what did our Lord *effect* by his death for those for whom he died? Every form of the universal atonement theory necessarily teaches that it only removes the legal difficulties out of the way of the salvation of men, making salvation possible, but not actually saving any, leaving the result in any individual case dependent on other conditions. The logically absurd Calvinistic Universalist conditions it on election. Evangelical Arminians, whose theory is only incidentally noticed in the work before us, while holding the true doctrine of the nature of the atonement as expiatory and propitiatory, and ascribing to it as the meritorious and efficient cause, all our salvation, yet conditions the actual result in the case of each individual on the act of his own self-determined will, which, in their view, is in its own nature uncontrolled and uncontrollable by any influence, human or divine. After all that Christ has done, and all the means of salvation and the grace and power of God can accomplish, the actual saving efficacy of it all is arrested by the insuperable barrier of the sinner's will, until that, self-determined, consents and concurs: thereupon, the conditional cause coöperating, the cause meritorious and efficient carries on the work.

The orthodox doctrine, however, teaches that the atonement, by virtue of its own force and efficacy, fulfils and carries out to the end the whole work of salvation, securing all the means and conditions necessary to the great result. It not only makes salvation possible, it saves. It purchased repentance, faith, and obedience, for all those for whom it was made. "The Scriptures over and over again declare that Christ died with the design and effect of procuring for those for whom he died the subjective grace of sanctification, including faith, as well as the objective grace of forgiveness conditioned on faith." They ascribe all our salvation, in every part and particular, and the whole glory of it, to that work of Christ alone. There are here two questions, first, what does the atonement effect; secondly, for whom was it made? We must limit the first or the second, or else hold to

the actual salvation of all men. How can a Christian put his limitation on the first, and rob the Son of God of at least a part of his glory as a Saviour? Dr. Hodge remarks well, "it is not we who teach a limited atonement, but our opponents;"—an atonement limited, incomplete, imperfect, in its saving efficacy; an atonement which limits the honor of our divine Redeemer, and would teach us to sing, "unto him that loved us and washed us from our sins in his own blood," and to ourselves, or to somebody or something else, be glory!

In this respect, therefore, as it necessarily affects our view of the nature of the atonement *in regard to its effects*, the question as to its design becomes one of the highest importance, both theoretically and practically.

It has not been our object to put our readers in possession of our author's arguments on the various points which he discusses: to do that, it would be necessary to transfer substantially the entire volume to this article. His arguments are in his own pages so condensed that they cannot well be reduced to greater simplicity and brevity and remain intelligible to the general reader. Nor have we aimed in our own way to construct a complete argument on any of the questions connected with this subject. We have endeavored rather to give an idea of the scope and contents of the work before us, of the subject matter of which it treats, of the method in which that is handled, and the relations and bearings of the great themes which are discussed. Our object is gained if our readers gather from what we have said, an understanding of the subject of the book, and of its supreme importance, and conceive a more earnest desire to acquaint themselves with it.

There are several incidental points of interest and importance, which come up for notice in the progress of Dr. Hodge's discussions, to which we desire to call attention before we conclude.

One of these has reference to the relation of the atonement to the doctrine of election, which is one particular involved in the general question of what has been called "the order of the divine decrees." An unfair attempt has sometimes been made to excite odium against any statement on this point by an effort to con-

nect it with the unpopular discussions of what is known as the supralapsarian and sublapsarian theories. But every competent theologian knows it has nothing to do with that. It has been still further attempted to prejudice the doctrine of the Reformed theology on this subject by accusing it of an endeavor to pry into the secrets of the hidden things of God, and to assert a sequence of thought in the divine mind itself. But every competent theologian knows that the statements of the Reformed theologians on this subject refer solely to the sequence of thought in our own minds, to the order and arrangement of our own conceptions of the divine dispensations, which the laws of human thought necessarily and inevitably compel us to form. It is impossible for us to think at all on this subject without defining to ourselves some relation or other between the divine election of some to salvation and the redeeming work of Christ.

What is that relation? We will quote the statements of Dr. Hodge on this point, which no man who has any regard to his reputation for a knowledge of the subject should venture to deny:

“Was it the design of the redemptive work of Christ that it carry into effect the purpose of election, or was it the design of God’s sovereign election that it should carry into effect, in part, the general purpose of redemption? The theology of the Reformed Churches was broadly characterised by its subordination of redemption to election. Their habitual mode of representation, is, that God, having of his mere good pleasure elected some men to everlasting life and to all the means thereof, sent his Son to effect that purpose by his obedience unto death. All the advocates of indefinite redemption, on the other hand, must agree in maintaining that God provided the atonement for the good of all men indiscriminately, and that election comes in subordinately to redemption, either conditioned on foreseen faith (so the Arminians), or as a sovereign purpose on the part of God to make certain the success of the general purpose of redemption, at least in the case of the persons elected, (so the Calvinistic Universalists).” Pp. 361, 362.

“Calvinists” “believe that an absolute sovereign, in that eternity which is without beginning, end, or succession, foreordains whatsoever comes to pass. They acknowledge that if the decrees of God are eternal, they must be one, single, changeless,

all comprehending intention. They profess to believe that as of his mere good pleasure God has chosen out of the great mass of men, equally guilty, some men to eternal salvation, 'so hath he fore-ordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore, they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed in Christ,' etc. (Westminster Conf., chap. iii., sec. 6.) Redemption must be in order to accomplish the purpose of predestination, because, as a matter of fact, it does precisely accomplish that purpose. On the contrary, a sovereign election of some *cannot* be in order to accomplish the purpose of the general redemption of all, because, as a matter of fact, it does *not* accomplish it. If, then, redemption be in order to accomplish the purpose of the sovereign election of some, then it is certain that Christ died in order to secure the salvation of the elect, and not in order to make the salvation of all men possible. St. Augustine and all consistent Augustinians, Calvin and all the Reformed Churches, held that REDEMPTION IS IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THE PURPOSE OF ELECTION." P. 370.

In regard to the views of the great Calvin himself the following cannot be questioned:

"The entire analogy and spirit of Calvin's system was, as a whole, broadly characterised by the subjection of redemption to election, as a means to an end."

And after quoting the testimony of "the able, learned, and impartial F. Christian Baur," to the effect that Zwingle and Calvin held the satisfaction of Christ to be only the carrying out of the purpose of redemption, Dr. Hodge adds, "that this is true, so far as it represents Calvin subordinating the purpose of redemption to the purpose of election, every student of his *Institutes* and of his *Consensus Genevensis* knows; and that this conclusively settles the present debate, every competent theologian will confess." (That is, the debate as to Calvin's opinion on the extent of the atonement.) P. 389.

As to the doctrine of the Westminster Confession on this point, whatever may be said as to its teaching or its silence on the supralapsarian and sublapsarian controversy, no unprejudiced mind can deny that it plainly decides that the work of redemption was in order to accomplish the purpose of election, and not that election was in order to carry out the work of redemption—which is the question. Redemption, atonement, is the means by

which election is carried out, and not *vice versa*. Chap. iii., Sec. 6: "As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, foreordained *all the means thereunto*. Wherefore, they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ, are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due season, are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power through faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only." This deliverance of that venerable testimony, taken in connexion with the fact that the relation of redemption to election was one of the controversies of the times, in consequence of the innovations of Cameron and Amyrald on the faith of the Reformed Churches, cannot be mistaken by an honest and candid reader.

A cautionary remark of Turretin, in regard to speculations concerning the order of the divine decrees, is sometimes quoted to discredit all such distinctions. But in fairness it ought to be stated that he says the opposition of its adversaries to the truth has made such distinctions "necessary," that he discusses them at length, and that he decides in favor of that view which he affirms is the "common" opinion of the Reformed Churches, which subordinates the work of redemption to the decree of election, as the means to the end. Indeed, this matter of the relation of the work of Christ to election is just one of those logical analyses in which the question is reduced to its simplest, ultimate terms, and which serve as the formulæ of mathematics, as a test of truth. If a doctrinal statement on the subject involved cannot be reduced to this form, it contains an error.

The reader will not fail to observe, in the language quoted from the Westminster Confession, the distinction clearly, unequivocally, and unquestionably noted between "redemption" and the application of it to the elect, which some have confounded. By redemption, the Confession and the Reformed theologians generally, denoted the work of Christ in order to procure salvation for the elect, and they carefully and clearly distinguish between that and the actual application and execution

of its results. In the old theology "redemption" meant what "atonement" means in modern phraseology, and we must not be misled by a play upon words.

In connexion with this, it is worthy of notice that the adherents of the moral influence and governmental theories use freely many of the terms employed in the statement of the orthodox doctrine, but in a loose and deceptive sense, with a meaning very different from that which they are intended to convey when applied to the truth. They use the word "atonement" for example, but they mean by it simply the reconciliation of sinners to God, the change of their hearts from a state of enmity to him to one of friendship, and not at all the reconciliation of God to sinners. The advocates of the governmental theory will say that Christ "satisfied justice" in regard to our sins; but when they explain their meaning, it refers to what they call "public justice," and the phrase in their dialect only signifies that by his death he prevented the injury which otherwise would have befallen the public interests of the divine government in consequence of the salvation of sinners. They contend with implacable hostility against the doctrine that he satisfied the demands of justice against the sinners who are saved themselves. And as Turretin states, the Socinians admitted that Christ made a "satisfaction" improperly so called, and the adversaries of the truth generally, a satisfaction in a metaphorical sense, that they might impose on the simple. As to the words "substitution" and "vicarious," Dr. Hodge says, correctly, "these terms are admitted in a loose sense even by Socinians, and are paraded by Young, Maurice, and Jowett, and very much in the same loose indifferent sense by Barnes and the advocates of the governmental theory generally." It has been stated that Dr. Archibald Alexander was accustomed to say, that he who admitted the atonement to be *vicarious* was substantially sound on that point. If he did, he must have meant vicarious in *his*, the orthodox sense of that word; and to suppose that he could have made such a statement without reference to that meaning would be to make that great and good man utter nonsense of which he was not capable.

Another of the incidental questions to which we referred, is whether Christ suffered the *same identical penalty* due, according to the law, to those for whom he died, or something else which was accepted in place of it, and as equivalent to it. Dr. Hodge does not fully and distinctly discuss this point, and his statements in regard to it do not seem at first sight to be altogether consistent. Thus he says "the penalty, when once incurred, can be preserved inviolate only by being executed." P. 26. Speaking of the satisfaction which Christ rendered for our sins, he says :

"Being the actual execution in strict rigor of justice of the unrelaxed penalty of the law." P. 31. "If the penalty is an essential part of the law; if the whole law is immutable; if Christ came to fulfil the law and not to relax its demands; then it follows, without doubt, that he suffered the penalty of the law as our substitute." P. 67. "It is self-evident that nothing can possibly so exactly take the place of the penalty and effect the precise end for which the penalty was designed, as the penalty itself." "Nothing else possible can so effectively demonstrate the inflexibility of the law as its literal fulfilment in precept and penalty." P. 331. "Christ satisfied the retributive justice of God by bearing the very penalty of the law." P. 343.

But while our author frequently uses this language, which seems to imply that Christ suffered the very thing which the law had denounced as the penalty of sin, he appears in other places to say that our Lord endured not *that*, but something else, and that his sufferings were penal in their nature, and may be called the penalty of our sins, inasmuch as he sustained our relations to the law, and what he suffered, whatever it was, had a legal relation to our sins, and was inflicted as punishment. Thus on p. 30 :

"But he did suffer the very penalty of the law. That is, sin was punished in him in strict rigor of justice. His sufferings were no substitute for a penalty, but those very penal evils which rigorous justice demanded of his exalted person when he stood in our place, as a full equivalent of all that was demanded of us. The substitution of a divine for a human victim necessarily involved a change in the *quality*, though none whatever in the legal relations, of the sufferings." "We say that Christ suffered

the very penalty of the law, not because he suffered in the least the same kind, much less the same degree of suffering as was penally due those for whom he acted, because that is not at all necessary to the idea of penalty. But we say that he suffered the very penalty of the law, because he suffered in our stead; our sins were punished in strict rigor of justice in him; the penal demands of the law upon his people were extinguished, because his sufferings sustained precisely the same legal relations that our sufferings in person would have done; and because he suffered precisely that kind, degree, and duration of suffering that absolute justice demanded of his divine person, when found federally responsible for the guilt of all the sins of the elect. We believe that while the sufferer is substituted, the penalty as penalty, though never as suffering, is identical." P. 38. "The execution of precisely the same sufferings, if it had been possible, in the person of the God-man, that would have been the proper penalty of the law if executed in the person of the transgressors themselves, would have been an outrageous injustice." "What Christ suffered is by no means the same with what his people would have suffered, when considered as suffering, but is precisely the very same when considered as penalty." P. 66.

These statements may perhaps be harmonized by what we find on the one hundred and sixty-eighth page. He first remarks, respecting the view of Barnes, that he maintains "that Christ suffered and died as the true substitute of his people. And yet he affirms that Christ did not suffer the true penalty of the law; that is, he did *not* suffer what they would have done; that is, that he was their substitute, while he lacked that which is essential to the idea of a substitute;"—which seems to mean that Dr. Hodge understands that for Christ to suffer the true penalty of the law, (which he constantly affirms,) was to suffer what his people would have suffered, and that this is essential to the idea of substitution. Then he goes on to say:

"It is true as I showed above, that the person upon whom the penalty is to be inflicted being changed—one divine Person being substituted for many human persons,—the law itself, on principles of essential justice, spontaneously adjusts the quality of the sufferings constituting the penalty to the quality of the victim. Sinners being the victims, the penalty includes remorse and eternal death. Christ being the substituted victim, remorse and eternal death, *ipso facto*, cease to be the penalty, and he stand-

ing in our place, suffers precisely the very penalty of the law in our stead ; that is, all that the law in rigor of justice demands on the account of our sins, when that account is settled in his person. *In every substitution there must be a constant as well as a variable quantity.* A substitute is not a different man in a different place, but a different man in the same place."

The sentence which we have put in italics seems to contain the key to the difficulty. That difficulty, as it might appear to be involved in the orthodox view of the sufferings of Christ, is this: If we say that he endured the very penalty of the law, suffering precisely what we would have suffered but for his substitution in our place, it might seem to imply that he must suffer remorse, despair, the depravation of his moral nature, and *eternal* punishment—which is abhorrent and intolerable to be thought of for a moment and impossible. The great masters of the seventeenth century, who contended with the adversaries of the truth over every point of the old theology, met this difficulty in this way. We must distinguish, they said, between the *essence* of the penalty and its *accidents*, between that which is of its substance and that which is incidental. The former is invariable, universal, immutable in the case of every sinner punished by the law, the proper and necessary suffering in every instance. The latter may vary in every case, depending on the nature and circumstances of the person who suffers. The former, the essence of the penalty, is expressed in the Scriptures by "the curse" of the law, "the wrath of God," "death"—the exact and fearful meaning of which can be fully understood only by those who have suffered it. The latter, the accidents and adjuncts of the sinner's sufferings, are not necessary and essential elements of the penalty, but result from his nature and character—from his weakness and corruption. To this latter category belong remorse, despair, etc. They are not of the essence of the penalty, but incidental to the circumstances of the person who suffers it. No two victims of any law, human or divine, though they may suffer the same punishment substantially, experience precisely and in all respects the same sufferings. And so our Lord, while he did suffer, really and properly, the very

same penalty which was threatened against his people, as to its essence, did not suffer in all respects what they would have suffered, nor that which would have been merely incidental in their punishment personally; nor was it necessary or possible that he should. He endured the curse of the law, he bore the wrath of God, he suffered *death*. But he did not feel remorse, for that attends the consciousness of personal guilt. His moral nature was preserved immaculately pure and holy, by reason of its personal union with the second Person of the Godhead. A sinful human being under the penalty of the law dies forever, for he has no strength to bear it, or to recover himself from it. But it was not possible for Christ to be held by the bonds of death. He was able to receive the stroke of divine justice and not to perish by it—to die and to live again.

In the language of Dr. Hodge, there is in the penalty “a constant and a variable quantity.” The divine substitute for human sinners endured the former; in his case the latter assumed the character which necessarily resulted from the nature of him who suffered, as it does in every other case. Our Lord fulfilled the law as to its *precept*, as well as to its penalty, as our substitute. But it was not necessary to this that he should render in all respects precisely the same acts of obedience which the law requires of us. There is as to the precept that which is of its essence, its constant quantity—perfect love to God; and there is that which belongs to its incidents and adjuncts, its variable quantity, changing with the nature and circumstances of the individual. Christ fulfilled the former exactly and perfectly—the latter just in that respect which his person and circumstances required.

The advocates of the governmental theory, as represented by Mr. Barnes, hold not only that Christ was substituted in the place of his people, but that he suffered, not the penalty of the law in any sense, but something else wholly and essentially different substituted in the place of that. This is unquestionably opposed to the view of the teachers of the old theology. By some who do not appear to have clearly apprehended their views, they are said to have taught that in the atonement not only was

one *person* substituted for another, but one *penalty* for another—that the satisfaction rendered by Christ for our sins was not the payment of the exact debt due to the law, but of *something else*, which was accepted as a moral equivalent and sufficient by God. Even Turretin is supposed by some to teach this view. What Turretin does teach, in agreement with all the recognised old authorities of the Reformed theology, is, that the satisfaction rendered by Christ was not the *exact* debt demanded for our sins by the law, *in one respect*, namely, that *that* was our own *personal* punishment. But he affirms that Christ suffered not only generically, but specifically the very same penalty due to us. This may be seen by referring to the original of a passage quoted, but not fully translated, on the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth pages of Dr. Hodge's work. Christ was substituted for his people. His suffering was substituted for their suffering. But there was no substitution of one penalty for another penalty, or of something else for the very penalty of the law. Indeed, Turretin, over and over again, argues that Christ did suffer *essentially* the very identical thing which his people would have suffered, meeting all the old objections against this view, and insisting on the distinction we have referred to between the essence of the penalty and its accidents. He even goes so far as to affirm, and to defend the language, that Christ *dolores infernales sustinuit—gehennalem poenam tulit*. The reader will find these points fully discussed in his elaborate Disputations concerning the Satisfaction of Christ, a distinct work from his Theology, and unfortunately even less read by modern students than the latter, but containing almost every thing new and old on the subject of the atonement.

It would be presumption in us to attach any eulogistic phrase to the mention of the name of John Owen, either as to the respect due to his own opinion, or as to his competency as a witness to the opinion of others. But we may quote his authority in both particulars. He had a controversy with Richard Baxter on this very subject. After stating the question as to “that kind of punishment which Christ underwent in making satisfaction for sin,” namely: “Whether it were the same that was

threatened to the transgressors themselves, or whether something else which God accepted in lieu thereof, relaxing the law, not only as to the person suffering, but also as to the penalty to be undergone?" he says: "The first of these, and that with the concurrent suffrage of far the greatest number of Protestant divines, I assert." "I affirm that he paid *idem*, the *same thing* that was in the obligation, and not *tantundem*, *something equivalent* thereunto in another kind." And in the Exercitations introductory to his Commentary on the Hebrews, he has a special dissertation to prove this view, in which he recognises the distinction noted by Turretin, a substitution of the *person* suffering, but not of the *punishment* suffered.

It seems a great transition—*longo intervallo*—to pass from the names of Turretin and Owen to that of Principal Hill. But it is yet more remarkable that any one should regard him as a standard of the Reformed theology. Whatever value his lectures in divinity may possess, it is certainly not that. He says "the sufferings of Christ for sin have received the name of a satisfaction to the justice of God because they were not the penalty that had been incurred, but were something accepted by the Lawgiver instead of it." "It is plain they were not that very punishment which the sins deserved." It is sufficient to state the fact, that Hill endorses the work of Grotius on this subject,—the father of the governmental theory,—and represents the atonement as demanded not so much by the justice of God as by the good of the universe, as a matter of expediency rather than of necessity.

A question of some interest is, What were the views of Calvin as to the extent of the atonement? This is particularly considered by Dr. Hodge. He says:

"Many in our day who hold very imperfect views as to the nature of the atonement and as to the design of God in it, fall back upon some of the vague statements as to the latter point which they are able to glean out of Calvin's voluminous works, and under cover of his great name claim that their various specialties come legitimately under the category of genuine Calvinism." "It has been a very old, and is still a very common trick of errorists, to seek to cover themselves with the authority of

the general and unscientific statements of eminent theologians, written before any particular doctrine in question has been consciously considered and clearly discriminated and defined by the responsible representatives and organs of the Church."

After illustrating this remark by the instances of Arians, Socinians, Pelagians, Papists, and Arminians, Dr. Hodge proceeds:

"In like manner the advocates of self-styled 'improvements in theology,' on occasion, find it to their interest to quote the general and indefinite language of Reformers who wrote without ever consciously entertaining the precise points in question." "Let the fact be well noted, therefore, that Calvin does not appear to have given the question we are at present discussing a deliberate consideration, and has certainly not left behind him a clear and consistent statement of his views." Pp. 387, 388.

The author then, in a passage which we have already quoted, refers to the fact that Calvin's system was distinctly characterised by the subordination of redemption to election, and remarks that every competent theologian will confess that this conclusively settles the question as to Calvin's views in regard to the design of the atonement. We should think any one entitled to the name of a theologian in the humblest degree would acknowledge it.

"It is true, that at times Calvin uses general terms with respect to the design of Christ's death in a more unguarded manner than would now be done by one of his consistent disciples. But at other times he explicitly denies that he believes in an indiscriminate atonement in the sense of Barnes and the great majority of the modern advocates of general redemption. And let it be remembered that one deliberate statement *limiting* the design of Christ's death is sufficient to define the sense of any finite number of vague and indefinite expressions, such as that referred to in his comment on Rom. v. 18. Thus in his comment on 1 John ii. 2, he declared his adhesion to the scholastic formula that 'Christ died sufficiently for all, but efficiently only for the elect,' which is very different from the opinion of those who hold that Christ died for the purpose of removing legal obstacles out of the way of all men indifferently. And at the same time he denies utterly that the apostle in saying that Christ is the 'propitiation for the sins of the whole world' (*totius mundi*) could have meant to include the reprobate. 'Such a monstrous thing deserves no refutation. The design of John was no other than to make this benefit common to the whole Church. Then

under the word *all* or *whole* he does not include the reprobate, but designates those who should believe, as well as those who were then scattered through various parts of the world.'” “In his treatise in reply to a Lutheran defender of the corporeal presence of Christ in the Eucharist, this passage occurs: ‘I would desire to know how the impious, for whom he was not crucified, could eat the flesh of Christ, and how they can drink his blood for the expiation of whose sins it was not shed?’” Pp. 390, 391.

“In all ages many of the most rigid predestinarians have said in the words of Calvin himself, ‘*Passus est Christus pro peccatis totius mundi*,’ while it has been only very superficial critics who have inferred therefrom, that these men intended to decide against the doctrine of the Reformed Churches, which is, that Christ designed in his death to secure the salvation of his elect, and of none others.” P. 372.

The old formula of the Schoolmen, to which Dr. Hodge refers in one of the foregoing extracts, namely, that “Christ died sufficiently for all, efficiently for the elect,” has often been quoted by those who sought in some way to evade the defined and exact statements of the Reformed doctrine on this subject. In reference to it our author says:

“This form of expression was adopted by Calvin and by the early Reformed theologians previous to the thorough sifting of this subject occasioned by the speculations of the French theologians, Cameron, Amyraldus, Testardus, etc. This scholastic expression is inaccurate and inadequate rather than false.” P. 361. “This we regard as a statement inaccurate in terms, and more likely to confuse than to clear the question, yet as very near the truth.” P. 374.

The truth is, the first part of this formula is equivocal, susceptible of two if not more interpretations, under cover of which an error can easily lie concealed. It may be understood either that the death of Christ, in itself, in its intrinsic worth, was of sufficient value to save all. Or it may mean that Christ designed by his death to make a sufficient atonement for all; that is, designed it for all. And then the word “sufficient” also may be variously interpreted. So that before “the thorough sifting of this whole subject,” thoroughly orthodox men may easily have adopted that expression. But such will hardly do it now.

We intended to present the conclusive evidence that the Westminster Confession teaches the definite and personal design of the atonement, as it is exhibited in Dr. Hodge's volume. But we have already drawn out this article to such an unconscionable length that we must forbear.

It is fit that in conclusion we should express our judgment of the manner in which Dr. Hodge has discharged the task he has undertaken. And we are happy in being able to do so in terms of almost unqualified approbation. As to the style of his book, as a literary composition, it is without much grace or elegance of diction, which, indeed, it is evident the author has not aimed at. On the contrary, it is exceedingly plain, simple, and naked, often careless, and sometimes awkward. But it is nervous and remarkably perspicuous. Even when treating of the most abstruse topics, it seems impossible to mistake his meaning. And yet in the whole volume there is scarcely a superfluous sentence, and but few unnecessary words. Both the arguments and language exhibit a remarkable power of condensation. It is surprising how much the author has got into the compass of a volume no larger than the one before us. This has been attained by a happy art of simplifying every subject, of penetrating to the core of every question, of seizing the exact points on which every discussion turns, and of stating in clear and precise terms the thing to be proved.

As a discussion of the subject of the atonement, this volume is well nigh exhaustive. There is, so far as we are informed, scarcely one view of any one point of interest at the present day which it does not consider; and not many of the arguments for or against the orthodox doctrine or any value are left without notice. The arguments are perhaps not always put in the strongest light of which they are capable, but they are never made more of than they deserve. Indeed, while the author is always earnest, he is also moderate, just, and respectful to his opponents, and courteous in his terms. Sometimes an irrepressible warmth will show itself when the inevitable course of the logic unveils some hideous thing in the doctrine of his adversary. But those whose errors he assails will have no real ground for

complaint of their treatment at his hands, unless they find it in the exposure of their errors, the destructive analysis of their sophistries, and the cogency of his reasonings in favor of the truth.

While we would not endorse, without qualification at least, every statement and argument of the author, we can warmly commend his work as a most able and valuable contribution to the defence of the precious old faith of the Church, and deserving the hearty gratitude of every friend of our Old School theology. Besides the merits of the work as a treatise on the subject of the atonement, the chapters on the intimately related questions of the federal headship of Adam, of the nature and grounds of justification, of the nature and office of faith, and of the relations of Christ's active obedience to the work of redemption, are of great value. The least successful parts of it, as it seems to us, are where the author attempts to show the relations of the atonement, on the orthodox view of it, to the non-elect. Here he appears to labor. But perhaps this is inevitable. Perhaps we attempt to do more than needs to be done, when we try to prove that the atonement has done any thing at all for them. Perhaps the parable of the tares and the wheat explains this matter as our Lord would have us understand it. We confess that we cannot reconcile with one another the statements of Dr. Hodge, on pages 371, 414, 416, 417, as to the effect of the atonement in removing the legal obstacles out of the way of the salvation of all men, and making it objectively possible. We confess that we cannot see how the benefits said to accrue by the atonement to those who are finally lost are really benefits at all, since they only add to their guilt and ultimate misery.

On pages 255, 256, 257, there seems to be some confusion of statement in regard to the Arminian theory of the atonement, accidental no doubt. On page 393, there is an important verbal error of "different" for "definite;" and on page 403, twice of "redemption" for "repentance," which we note for the benefit of readers.

Dr. Hodge's pages, bristling all over as they are with the sharp points of dialectical subtlety, are relieved occasionally

by a gleam of pleasantry; but it is the grim humor of a logician, the sport of giving an adversary a nimble-witted toss on the horns of a dilemma, or the dry joke of a neat *reductio ad absurdum*. With one specimen we close our article, begging him to accept our heartfelt thanks for the instruction and pleasure derived from his volume.

Remarking on the fact that the advocates of the governmental theory when opposing the Socinians fall back on the fundamental principles of the orthodox doctrines, and when opposing the latter fall back upon Socinian ground, he says:

"They thus ceaselessly oscillate between the two—orthodox in all they affirm, and Socinian in all they deny. Their champions put one in mind of a landless laird straddling the line fence between two farms. He is always found standing upon that leg which is the *other* side of the fence."

ARTICLE II.

THE TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ATTIC TRAGEDY.

In the poetry of the classic period of ancient Greece, we observe a singular phenomenon, which the literature of no other more modern nation presents, at least, in any similar degree, namely, that its principal branches were cultivated to the total exclusion of the others, by each of the distinct races which constituted the Hellenic nation. Thus epic poetry was the sole offspring of the Ionian muse; the religious ode and hymnus was entirely of Dorian origin; erotic poetry, or the ode in the narrower sense of the word, we find exclusively in the hands of the Æolians; whilst the drama originated with, and rose to perfection among the inhabitants of Attika, or rather of Athens, the great centre of Attic life. This remarkable fact was, nevertheless, undoubtedly one of the chief causes of the surpassing excellence of all that remains to us of Greek literature previous to the