

no doubt, been deterred by their consciousness of a want of ability to do justice to such a work, who would else have been glad to lay their tribute upon the tomb of one from whom they have received so much instruction and so much confirmation in "the glorious gospel of the blessed God." Those who are familiar with the history of THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW may be especially excused for a feeling of surprise that no extended notice of these Writings has appeared in this journal. They are aware that Dr. Thornwell was its main pillar; that the ablest articles that adorned its pages were the productions of his pen; that he—it may be said without invidiousness—did more to give it reputation than any other regular contributor, or, possibly, than all other contributors combined. But does not this very fact, combined with the fact that a large portion of these "Collected Writings" first appeared in the shape of articles in this REVIEW, constitute a sufficient apology for the seeming neglect? We think it does.

But now, having said thus much, our readers are no doubt asking, What apology can the present writer offer for his presumption? Our answer is, we have no apology but that of *love*. We are among the number of those who acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Dr. Thornwell which they feel can never be repaid. If we know anything of Christ's salvation; if we have any comfort of love or any fellowship of the Spirit; if we have any stability of faith in the midst of the temptations of the world, the flesh, and the devil; any joy in hope of glory, honor, and immortality: we owe it more to him, under God, than to any other human being, with the exception, perhaps, of her who bore us. Without the smallest affectation of modesty, we acknowledge our inability to do him justice. With but slender pretensions to theology or philosophy, we undertake to serve the purpose only of a finger-board to direct the attention of our readers who have not procured these volumes, or have not read them, to the treasures of theology and philosophy they contain.

We do not profess to be very familiar with the literature of South Carolina, but we know only three of the many distinguished men whose names adorn her annals, whose writings have

been collected and published—Calhoun, Legaré, and Thornwell. It is a little remarkable that in the case of all these, the largest part (in the case of Mr. Legaré, the whole,) of their literary remains consists of monographs, chiefly in the form of contributions to Quarterly Reviews, or in the form of discourses. In the works of Mr. Calhoun, there are two treatises only, both published after his death for the first time: one, a Dissertation on Government, and the other a Dissertation on the Constitution of the United States. These occupy the first volume. The remaining volumes are composed, if our memory serves us, of speeches. It is greatly to be regretted that the lessons of statesmanship and of political philosophy, which these speeches contain, were not collected and digested by the master himself, and thus handed down to posterity. We are free to confess to a regret still deeper, that a similar thing was not done by Mr. Legaré. No more splendid man has this country produced. He was familiar with the whole range of Greek and Roman literature, a learned and accomplished lawyer, a profound and judicious thinker, a noble orator, a fascinating writer, and there was little within the compass of the human faculties which his genius could not have achieved. We think that the subject of this present notice was greater than either Calhoun or Legaré. With natural endowments equally great, he had that strength which was derived from the dedication of his endowments to God who gave them, and from the discipline of all his faculties in the bracing atmosphere of revealed truth. We hazard nothing in predicting that his writings will be studied long after those of the other two illustrious men we have named shall have been forgotten.

The comparison may be extended a little further. Dr. Thornwell has been more favored in his editors. The works of Calhoun and Legaré were edited by Virginians, and, in the case of the last named, very poorly edited. Dr. Thornwell's editors were "to the manner born," if we may judge by their success; and they have done their work *con amore*, both as fellow-countrymen and as devoted friends. He was a man of refined and exquisite taste, and we do not doubt that he would have been perfectly satisfied with these volumes in every respect, with the

exception, perhaps, of the binding.* He loved sumptuously bound books.

The first volume, according to the arrangement of the editors, contains Dr. Thornwell's "Theological" writings; the second, "Theological and Ethical;" the third, "Theological and Controversial;" the fourth, "Ecclesiastical." We shall attempt, in this article, to give our readers some idea of the author in each of these departments, and that, either by quotations, or, where this is impracticable, by a summary statement of his views in our own words.

I. His fame as a theologian must rest ultimately, of course, upon his writings. The tradition of his extraordinary ability in handling the great doctrines of revelation, which is now kept alive by the gratitude and enthusiasm of his pupils, is doomed to fade, as they pass, one after another, from the world. We are thankful for what remains, but nothing can reconcile us to the loss of what has perished, but the fact that it was all ordered by the wisdom of the great Head of the Church, who makes no mistakes. We have, in truth, not much more than the foot of Hercules, and from this we may judge what the giant in his full proportions must have been.

The most valuable part of this first volume consists of sixteen Lectures prepared by the author for his classes in the Seminary. They were all written twice over, but were never prepared for the press. This accounts for the somewhat fragmentary appearance exhibited at the closing parts of one or two of them. The author proposed to divide Theology into three parts: the *first*, treating of God and of Moral Government in its essential principles; the *second*, of Moral Government as modified by the Covenant of Works; and the *third*, of the same, as modified by the Covenant of Grace. These Lectures cover with tolerable completeness the ground of the first two parts. They are occupied, therefore, with *Theology* (in the narrower sense) and *Anthro-*

* We do not mean to disparage the binding in its kind. It is excellent of its kind; but the kind is not the best. Would it not have been better to issue the work (after the manner of the French) in unbound volumes, and let the buyers have them bound to order?

pology. The most elaborate and the most striking discussions in this last department are those on Man and on the Covenant of Works, on the breach of the Covenant, the Fall of Man, on Sin—its nature, its pollution, and guilt, and on Degrees of Guilt. It would be difficult to exaggerate the ability with which these great subjects are handled. Let us tarry a moment on one or two points.

And *first*, as to the nature and purpose of the covenant of works, the great merit of our author, it appears to us, is the clearness with which he brings out the precise points of difference between the dispensation which goes under this name, and the dispensation under which man was by the mere fact of his creation; or, in other words, the difference between moral government absolutely considered, and the same as modified by the covenant. The Westminster standards throw no light on this question. They say nothing, in describing man's condition under the covenant of works, from which we can gather the import of the promise of life, or determine why such a promise could not have belonged to a dispensation of *mere* moral government. They make the condition of the covenant to be "perfect and personal obedience" (Confession of Faith, VII., 2), or "perfect, personal, and perpetual obedience" (Larger Catechism, Question 20). This is all. Now, what does "perpetual" mean? If it means throughout his whole career as an immortal being, then it is impossible to see how man's covenant condition differed from "the estate wherein he was created;" since his probation, in either case, must have been endless. The promise of *eternal* life would have no meaning. And, how, in this case, could the condition of *all* his posterity be determined by his acts? Suppose he had sinned in his one thousandth year, after he had begotten a multitude of children! The promise of life, if it means anything more than that he should live so long as he continued to obey—or, in other words, that he should not die until he sinned—is left without any explanation by the statements of our Confession and Catechisms. Dr. Hodge says (Systematic Theology, II., 119): "The question whether perpetual, as well as perfect, obedience was the condition of the covenant made with

Adam, is probably to be answered in the negative. It seems to be reasonable in itself, and plainly implied in the Scriptures, that all rational creatures have a definite period of probation." This hesitating statement does not give us much relief, as it seems to make the limitation of the probation not so much an act of God's favor as an act of justice which reason might demand. This view of Dr. Hodge's meaning is confirmed by his explanation, on the preceding page, of the promise, which might all be said if there had been no covenant at all. "As the Scriptures everywhere represent God as a judge or moral ruler, it follows of necessity, from that representation, that his rational creatures will be dealt with according to the principles of justice. If there be no transgression, there will be no punishment. And those who continue holy thereby continue in the favor and fellowship of Him whose favor is life." Plainly, if this be all that is in the promise, it needed not to have been made. It is impossible for God to frown, it is impossible for him not to smile, on a holy creature. The promise is not one of a life which, in point of fact, shall be eternal in its duration, if the man shall continue obedient forever, but of a life which is in its own nature inalienable, indestructible, eternal. It is exactly the promise, as Dr. Hodge goes on to state (inconsistently, we think), which Christ has secured for his people; and this is a life eternal, which every believer *now* has, is in actual possession of, though he be still compassed about with a body of death.

If the probation of the first man was limited in point of time, there could be the promise of such a life. At the close of the period of probation, Adam, if still faithful in his allegiance to his Maker, would have been put in possession of it. This life implied two things: *first*, that he should be justified and adopted, that he should pass from the precarious condition of a servant into the permanent condition of a son; and, *second*, that his will should be immutably determined to good ("*felix necessitas boni*"), that the "*posse peccare*" and the "*posse non peccare*" should be changed into a "*non posse peccare*." How this immutability of the will would have been produced, it is, of course, impossible to say. We are very well assured that it would not have been the

result of *habit*, as some theologians think. It would have been a part of the promise of life; not acquired at all, except in the sense that, the condition of the covenant having been performed, a title to the whole life promised was acquired.*

This view of the covenant, as involving the ends of justification and adoption, enables the author, as he thinks, to unify the two forms of religion, that of nature (or of man in a state of innocence), and that of grace (or of man a sinner and yet a prisoner of hope). Cocceius and the "federal" theologians of Holland unified with the idea of a covenant only. Our author unifies with the idea of justification, which is common to both the covenants. (See the Inaugural Discourse at the end of the first volume.)

The *second* matter we propose to notice is the discussion towards the end of the thirteenth lecture. The subject of this lecture is "Original Sin," and the author grapples with the question, How the verdict of conscience, which pronounces us guilty on account of our native turpitude, can be justified? It is purely a speculative question. It may not be possible to find a satisfactory answer. It is not necessary to find one. The fundamental "deliverance" of conscience must stand, whether we be able or not to apprehend the grounds of its truth. Our author's solution, proposed with great modesty and not without some hesitation, is as follows:

"The human race is not an aggregate of separate and independent atoms, but constitutes an organic whole, with a common life springing from a common ground. There is an unity in the whole species; there is a point in which all the individuals meet, and through which they are all modified and conditioned. Society exerts even a more powerful influence upon the individual than the individual upon society, and every community impresses its own peculiar type upon the individuals who are born into it. This is the secret of the peculiarities of national character.

* A *caveat* ought to be entered here against an unguarded statement on page 278 of Volume I., in which the author seems to teach, that Adam had no positive holy character, but only the possibility of it, or tendencies to it; and that the positive character would have resulted from the deliberate determination of his will with reference to the forbidden fruit. That this is not his meaning is abundantly evident from the whole of the discussion, and especially from such formal and elaborate statements as that on page 231, in the lecture on "Man."

There was one type among the Greeks, another among the Asiatics, and still another among the Romans. The Englishman is easily distinguished from the Frenchman, the Chinese from the European, and the Negro from all. In the same way there is a type of life, common to the entire race, in which a deeper ground of unity is recognised than that which attaches to national associations or the narrower ties of kindred and blood. There is in man what we may call a common nature. That common nature is not a mere generalisation of logic, but a substantive reality. It is the ground of all individual existence, and conditions the type of its development. The parental relation expresses, but does not constitute it—propagates, but does not create it. In birth, there is the manifestation of the individual from a nature-basis which existed before. Birth, consequently, does not absolutely begin, but only individualises humanity. As, then, descent from Adam is the exponent of a potential existence in him, as it is the revelation of a fact in relation to the nature which is individualised in a given case, it constitutes lawful and just ground for federal representation. God can deal with the natural as a covenant head, because the natural relation proceeds upon an union which justifies the moral." (II., pp. 349, 350.)

This passage has perplexed our author's friends. Some have gone so far as to say that he teaches the very Realism which, in his review of the "Elohim Revealed" (see pp. 515-568 of this volume), he had censured Dr. Baird for teaching; that he holds to a "numerical identity of nature between Adam and his posterity." As even "Homer nodded," it is of course not impossible that Dr. Thornwell may have done the same. But those who are at all acquainted with the working of his mind, and with his habits of thought, will admit that the presumption against his having fallen into such a gross inconsistency is very strong; so strong, indeed, as to require the plainest proof to overthrow it. Whether his solution is any more satisfactory than Dr. Baird's, or whether it is even intelligible at all, is not here the question; but whether it is the same solution as Dr. Baird's. On this question let the reader consider the following suggestions which have been sent to us by one of Dr. Thornwell's intimate friends:

1. The review of Baird was written in 1860, and at that time these Lectures were already written. The two compositions may therefore be considered as contemporaneous. If there is any inconsistency, Dr. Thornwell was not conscious of it.

2. In the two papers, he uses two distinct phrases with such

uniformity and consistency as to evince design and to show that he did not consider them as identical. In the Lecture he speaks of "a generic unity in man;" in the REVIEW he combats Baird's notion of "a numerical identity of nature between Adam and his posterity."

3. In the REVIEW he seems to affirm the view of the Lecture in contrast with that of Baird. (See Pp. 552 and 563.) The first of these passages is so conclusive, that we quote it entire :

"The connection by blood betwixt Adam and his descendants constitutes a basis of unity by which, though numerically different as individuals, they may be treated as one collective whole. There is a close and intimate union, though not an identity, among the members of the human family. They are one race, one blood, one body—an unity, not like that of the Realists, growing out of the participation of a common objective reality, answering to the definition of a genus and species, but an unity founded in the relations of individual beings. It is this unity, and not the fancied identity of Dr. Baird, that distinguishes the Family, the State, the Church, the World. That the human race is not an aggregate of separate and independent atoms, but constitutes something analogous to an organic whole, with a common life springing from the intimate connection between the parts, is obvious from the very organisation of society. There is one unity of nations, in consequence of which national character becomes as obtrusively marked as the peculiarities of individuals. There was one type among the Greeks, another among the Asiatics, still another among the Romans. The Englishman is in no danger of ever being mistaken for a Frenchman, and the Frenchman is not more distinguished from his Continental neighbors by his language than by his habits, his sentiments, his modes of thought. These facts show that there is a bond among men, a fundamental basis of unity, which embraces the whole race. What it is we may be unable to define; we know, however, that it is connected with blood. The basis is that which justifies, but does not necessitate, God's dealing with the race in one man as a whole. So that Adam's federal headship is the immediate ground of our interest in his sin, and his natural headship is the ground of the representative economy."

Let the reader now compare this passage with that quoted from the Lecture, and say whether the author did not, at least, *intend* to set his view in contrast with Dr. Baird's. He employs in both the same illustration of "the unity of nations" to set forth his idea of "generic unity" in opposition to the Realistic notion

of a "numerical identity." In the other passage of the REVIEW (p. 563), he says :

"We are guilty : conscience testifies that we are guilty—that our native corruption is sin. But as we did not sin personally, as we did not sin naturally, we must have sinned vicariously. The only alternative is : In ourselves or in another. Ourselves are out of the question. Therefore we sinned in Adam, and our history truly began before our birth. Our appearance in time was not an absolute commencement, but moral relations preceded and determined it."

Here again he seems to intimate the doctrine of the Lecture as different from that of Dr. Baird.

One of the most striking and delightful features of these Lectures is the "unction" that pervades them from the beginning to the end. With the most relentless rigor of argument, a rigor which might satisfy any Doctor Irrefragabilis, or "*moulin raisonnant*," of a mediæval cloister or university, there is combined a fervor and sometimes an ecstasy of emotion which might satisfy a Doctor Seraphicus of the mystic school. The author was not of the opinion that because theology was a science, it ought to be treated as an affair of the intellect only. He did not think it unseemly to express those powerful emotions which the truth of God is suited to excite, because he was in the professor's chair and not in the pulpit. When he is analysing sin, he feels that he is handling a poison which has corrupted his own nature ; and while his clear and subtle mind looks down into the depths, his own soul recoils with horror and disgust from what he sees there. When he is treating of God, his soul adores while his intellect explores. He holds religion to be "the spiritual knowledge of God," and therefore "not a single energy, intellectual, moral, or emotional, nor a state of mind in which each energy succeeds the other so rapidly as to make the impression that it is composed of them all as separate and separable elements. It is the whole energy of our being carried up to the highest unity ; the concentration of our entire spiritual nature into one form of life ; a condition in which intellect, conscience, and heart are blended into perfect union. "Spiritual cognition," according to him, "includes the perception of the beautiful and the good. The

same energy which knows God unto salvation knows him in the unity of his being as the perfection of truth, beauty, and holiness. The perception of his glory is the effulgence of this unity." The author is "himself the great sublime he draws." God is contemplated by him as "the True, the Beautiful, and the Good;" and his whole being is poured out in these Lectures in a stream of mingled love, thought, and adoration. All who have sighed, from Spencer down, for an edifying method of treating the science of theology, for a method which should stir the heart and purify and elevate the affections while it informed and strengthened the mind, might find their ideal realised here. Students of theology cannot make themselves too familiar with such a model. Private Christians, who are unable to rise to the height of this great argument, may yet imbibe something of the *tone* of these discussions. There is here a bracing, invigorating, spiritual atmosphere which no one can breathe without advantage to his soul's health.

II. We come now to notice his labors as a moral philosopher. The results of his thinking in this department, so far as this collection is concerned, are contained in the "Discourses on Truth" in the second volume.* These Discourses were delivered as sermons to the students of the South Carolina College, in the regular course of his ministry as the Chaplain of the College. They were published by the author himself; and this volume, indeed, was the only *treatise*, with the exception of the collection of Letters on the Apocrypha, which he ever published. He speaks of it, with characteristic modesty, as "an unpretending little volume." But in this case, as in many others, the merit is in inverse proportion to the pretension. It is, nomi-

*We remember to have read a very thorough and masterly discussion of Paley's System of Morals from the pen of Dr. Thornwell in one of the Quarterly Reviews (the "*Southern Review*," probably, during the short time that he was the editor of it.) We trust that this article may appear in some future additional volume of his writings. For an account of this *Review* (not the "SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW") and Dr. Thornwell's connection with it, see Dr. Palmer's Biography, Pp. 397 *et seq.*

nally, a series of discourses preached in the ordinary routine of his ministrations as Chaplain in a College; it is, really, a series of profound discussions touching the very foundations of truth and duty—discussions so profound and searching, displaying such extraordinary subtlety and thoroughness of analysis, as to make it impossible that they should have been adequately understood, at the time of their delivery, by any other audience than one accustomed to listen to the more detailed expositions of the lecture-room. But they are not mere discussions. They are sermons, full of earnest exhortation, of pungent appeals to the conscience, of zealous remonstrances against all that is false, low, and dishonorable in human impulses and human conduct, and pervaded by a lofty and generous enthusiasm in the cause of truth and righteousness, which shows that the preacher is not contending for barren generalities of the schools, but for living principles which have moulded and controlled his own character and life. He speaks and writes in what the ancient masters of rhetoric called the “agonistic” or “wrestling” style; and there are few of his hearers or readers so athletic in stupidity or wickedness as not to feel the force of his reasoning, and yield to the influence of his intense enthusiasm. We find no far-fetched fancies, no coruscation of brilliant images introduced for the sake of coruscation, no effort to produce a “sensation,” no chasing of tropical butterflies for the amusement of an auditory; but a solemn simplicity of purpose and a unity of design such as befits an ambassador of God rushing in between the living and the dead. Nothing can divert his eye or relax the vigor of his arm, as he wrestles with dying men for their salvation. Happy or wretched are the young men who listen to such preaching! Supremely happy, if they give heed; supremely wretched, if they do not! Would that the lessons of these sermons might awaken the dull, cold ear of an age of sophists, economists, and calculators!*

*Among the papers of Dr. Thornwell the editor discovered the following note from Sir William Hamilton, which does honor to both these illustrious men:

EDINBURGH, 23d July, 1855.

Rev. Dr. Thornwell.

SIR:—I beg leave, to return my warmest acknowledgments for your

Before we pass from the sermons of Dr. Thornwell, we cannot refrain from calling attention specially to the one entitled "The Sacrifice of Christ, the Type and Model of Missionary Effort." We were in the Assembly in New York in 1856, before which this great sermon was preached, and shall never forget the impression it produced. Those who heard it seemed to be filled with awe produced by the greatness of the preacher; not only or chiefly by the greatness of his intellect, but by the greatness of his heart, filled and expanded as it was by the truth and by the mighty working of the Holy Ghost. It was of this sermon that Dr. Addison Alexander is reported to have said, "that it was as fine a specimen of Demosthenian eloquence as he had ever heard from the pulpit, and that it realised his idea of what preaching should be."

III. We come next in this rapid and imperfect review to notice the contents of the third volume, which, according to the arrangement and classification of the editors, contains the author's "Controversial" writings. The contents are distributed under the heads of "Rationalist Controversy" and "Papal Controversy." The first embraces three essays: one on the "Standard and Nature of Religion," the second on "The Office of Reason in regard to Revelation," and the third on "Miracles," their Nature, their Apologetic worth, and their Credibility. A few words on each of these.

The paper on "The Standard and Nature of Religion" was not so entitled by the author, but by the editors. It appeared in sections in the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW as a criticism upon Morell's "Philosophy of Religion." This book of Morell was doing great mischief. It was applauded not only by

Discourses on Truth. I have read them with great interest and no less admiration. I was particularly pleased with the justice with which, it seems to me, you have spoken of the comparative merits of Aristotle as a moralist, and cordially coincide with your judgment upon Paley and other modern ethical writers. I need hardly say that I feel much flattered by the way in which you have been pleased to make reference to myself; and I remain, sir, your most obedient servant,

W. HAMILTON.

fools and sciolists, but even by good and sensible men, who had been deceived by its pious, hypocritical cant. We have a very distinct recollection of hearing a pastor of a large Presbyterian congregation in a large city say that he considered it one of the most edifying books he ever read. He was astounded when he discovered that its pious phrases were a disguise for the most radical species of infidelity, an infidelity which was not satisfied with denying that the Bible was authenticated as a divine message by sufficient evidence, but asserted and attempted to prove, by reforming Psychology, that any external revelation was an impossibility. In short, the infidelity of the "Philosophy of Religion" was almost identical with that which Henry Rogers so relentlessly demolishes and so mercilessly ridicules in the "Eclipse of Faith" and the "Defence of the Eclipse of Faith." It is indeed no new phase of infidelity. It is as old, at least, as Ammonius Saccas; and Mosheim's account of the Neo-Platonic doctrines reads, in some parts, as if it were intended to describe the modern form of the error. The ancient and the modern sprang from a similar source, Pantheism; and we find in both the same idea of an "absolute" religion, and the same hypocritical use of a phraseology which had been consecrated by the use of Christians to the expression of thoughts and emotions utterly different. None knew better than these deceivers "the fatal force and imposture of words," and they have practised the imposture, from Ammonius down to Morell, with fatal success. Give us any thing to contend with but a pious devil.

The criticism on Morell is divided into two parts. In the *first*, his book is considered as an argument, and the question discussed is: Granting his premises (the truth of his psychology), does the conclusion follow which he seeks to draw? In the *second*, the question is: Is his psychology sound? The *first* is a question of logic; the *second* is a question of philosophy. This whole discussion reveals the author's powers as a reasoner and a thinker more strikingly perhaps than any other of his productions, with the exception perhaps, as to his power as a reasoner, of the work on the Apocrypha, to be afterwards noticed. The first part is a complete and overwhelming logical discomfiture of

Morell. He has not left him an inch of ground to stand on. In the second part, if we do not find anything absolutely new, we find at least a very thorough-going explanation and defence of "the philosophy of common sense" against the German philosophy of the absolute, and against the scheme attempted by Cousin, of conciliation of the German philosophy with the Scotch philosophy of common sense. Here Dr. Thornwell shows himself a profound philosopher, as in the preceding part he had shown himself a masterly logician.

We quote a paragraph or two as a specimen of his manner :

"The philosophy with which Mr. Morell is impregnated is essentially arrogant ; and it is more to it than to him that we ascribe the pretending tone of his work. The pervading consciousness of the weakness and ignorance of men, the diffidence of themselves, the profound impression of the boundlessness of nature and of the limitless range of inquiry which lies beyond the present grasp of our faculties, the humility, modesty, and caution which characterise the writings of the great English masters, will in vain be sought among the leading philosophers of modern Germany and France. Aspiring to penetrate to the very essence of things, to know them in themselves as well as in the laws which regulate their changes and vicissitudes, they advance to the discussion of the sublimest problems of God, the soul, and the universe, with an audacity of enterprise in which it is hard to say whether presumption or folly is most conspicuous. They seem to think that the human faculties are competent to all things, that whatever reaches beyond their compass is mere vanity and emptiness ; that omniscience, by the due use of their favorite organon, may become the attainment of man, as it is the prerogative of God, and that, in the very structure of the mind, the seeds are deposited from which may be developed the true system of the universe."

"Within the limits of legitimate inquiry, we would lay no restrictions upon freedom of thought. All truly great men are conscious of their powers ; and the confidence which they have in themselves inspires the strength, intensity, and enthusiasm which enable them to conceive and to execute purposes worthy of their gifts. To the timid and distrustful, their excursions may often seem bold and presumptuous ; but in the most daring adventures of their genius they are restrained, as if by an instinct, from the visionary projects and chimerical speculations which transcend the sphere of their capacities, as the eagle, in his loftiest flights, never soars beyond the strength of his pinion. Confidence adjusted to the measure of power never degenerates into arrogance. It is the soul of courage, perseverance, and heroic achievement ; it sup-

ports its possessor amid discouragements and obstacles ; it represses the melancholy, languor, and fits of despondency to which the choicest spirits are subject ; it gives steadiness to effort, patience to industry, and sublimity to hope. But when men forget that their capacities are finite, that there are boundaries to human investigation and research, that there are questions which, from the very nature of the mind and the necessary conditions of human knowledge, never can be solved in this sublunary state,—when they are determined to make their understandings the sole and adequate standard of all truth, and presumptuously assume that the end of their line is the bottom of the ocean,—this is intolerable arrogance, the very spirit of Moloch,

* Whose trust was with the Eternal to be deemed,
Equal in strength ; and rather than be less,
Cared not to be at all.'—(Vol. III., Pp. 11. 12.)

The next paper, under the head of "Rationalist Controversy," is entitled "The Office of Reason in regard to Revelation." It was published in June, 1847, as the first article of the first volume of the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW. The question which he considers here is not the office of reason in relation to doctrines *known* to be a revelation from God—where, of course, the understanding is simply to believe—but the office of reason where the reality of the revelation remains to be proved and the interpretation of the doctrine to be settled. The general principle is maintained that the competency of reason to judge in any case is the measure of its right. And—a distinction being made in the contents of Scripture betwixt the supernatural or what is strictly revealed, and the natural or what is confirmed but not made known by the divine testimony—it is argued that the office of reason in the supernatural department of revelation may be *positive*, but never can be *negative*, while in the natural it is negative, but to a very limited extent, if at all, positive. In other words, in the supernatural, reason may prove, but cannot refute—in the natural, she may refute, but cannot establish.

It is not to be supposed that this view of the office of reason would satisfy the infidel. In the first place, a difficulty would be made about the "supernatural" altogether. A professed revelation which contains supernatural elements is self-condemned. But in the second place, granting the supernatural, how shall we draw the line between it and the natural? The death of

Jesus of Nazareth, for example, belongs to the natural, in so far as it is an event in history capable of being established by the same sort of proof as the death of Cæsar or of Brutus. It is supernatural, so far as its *meaning* is concerned, its relations to the government of God and to the salvation of men. So we say and so the Bible teaches. We cannot know who this Jesus is, nor for what end he died, except by a revelation from God. But the infidel and Socinian think that all can be explained upon the principles of human nature and the principles of moral government. In the third place, the natural must not only be consistent with itself and with other natural knowledge, but has a right to demand that the supernatural shall show itself consistent with the natural. Here is the tug of war. It is perfectly plain that the Bible as a *revelation*, as that by which the supernatural contents of a divine message can alone be made known, must show itself to be such to the unbeliever by some external evidence which is palpable to the senses. The testimony of Jesus concerning himself is perfectly conclusive to those who are like-minded with himself. Their souls respond to his testimony readily and joyfully. "Though I bear witness of myself, my testimony is true." Amen! say all his people. But those who are not his people say: "Thou bearest witness of thyself; thy witness is not true" (not valid, not sufficient). The Saviour seems to concede the justness of the demand: "If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true. There is another that beareth witness of me, . . . the works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me." The evidence of miracles, therefore, is that which he presents to unbelievers.

This brings us to the *third* paper under the head of "Rationalist Controversy," the paper on Miracles, their Nature, Apologetic worth, and Credibility. It was first published in the *Southern Review* in July, 1857. Its peculiar value lies in the thorough analysis of the nature of testimony and of the conditions of its credibility. The possibility of an event is the sole limit to the credibility of testimony, and the possibility of the miracle is simply the question of the existence of a personal

God. The author furnishes a complete polemic against Rationalism as a method. He extracts it from our Saviour's reply to the Sadducees' question concerning the woman who had seven husbands. The Sadducees argued from *analogy*, from the principle that the unknown must be *like* the known (likelihood, probability); that if there was to be a resurrection-state, it must be like the present, must have relations similar to the present, must have the marriage-relation among others; and, therefore, it would be difficult to determine, in the case presented, whose wife of the seven the woman should be. The Saviour's answer exposes the fallacy of the method. "Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God." Ye err in supposing that you are dependent upon analogy for a knowledge of the resurrection-state. You have an altogether different source of information: that of testimony, and the testimony of him alone who knows anything at all about the matter, God. This testimony is contained in the Scriptures which you, Sadducees, profess to receive as the word of God. Testimony does not depend for its validity upon the likelihood of its matter. but upon the competency and credibility of the witness. There is no limit to its credibility but possibility. And if you doubt the possibility of a state in which there shall be no marrying or giving in marriage, but human beings shall be like the angels,—consider "the power of God." This power is a sufficient answer to all objections drawn from the antecedent improbability, unlikelihood of such a state.*

The principles here laid down by the Saviour are exceedingly fruitful in their applications. All arguments from analogy are subject to correction by authentic testimony. All the theories of geologists are subject to correction by the testimony of the Scriptures, if the Scriptures bear any testimony in reference to the matter, and the true meaning of that testimony can be ascertained. Whether *this* application of the principle be allowed or not, the principle itself no sane man will dispute. Nothing can

*The illustrations of Dr. Thornwell's views here employed are taken mainly from his discussion of the same subject in a Baccalaureate Sermon on Matt. xxii. 29, published in this journal in April, 1851.

be idler than a controversy about this or that theory devised to account for certain facts, if credible testimony can be had as to the real historical origin of the phenomena.

Under the head of the "Papal Controversy," we find two discussions: the first on the "Validity of Roman Baptism," and the other on the "Romanist Arguments for the Apocrypha." Our author, like every other man who loves the gospel and knows what Romanism is, judged that system to be the greatest and most dangerous enemy which the gospel has to encounter in this world. He was an ardent patriot, and fully concurred in the opinion of LaFayette that the liberties of this country were in danger from the machinations of Papal priests. The "Syllabus" had not then appeared, in which Rome declares herself the enemy of all modern civilisation; but her whole history had shown that no part of the human race would be tolerated which did not acknowledge its subjection to her authority and was not willing to subserve her schemes of avarice and ambition. Hence he detested Rome with his whole soul, and was prompt to use his great talents in resisting her.

The treatise on the Validity of Roman Baptism originated in a speech made by him in the General Assembly at Cincinnati in 1845 against the validity. The decision of the Assembly in accordance with his views was, no doubt, due to his great speech; and when the decision was attacked by the *Princeton Review*, he felt bound to appear in its defence. The speech and the defence at once gave him great reputation throughout the Church; and Princeton gained nothing in reputation either for ability or learning in the contest with the young Timothy.

The paper adopted by the Assembly is a sort of brief of this article of our author. The principal ground on which the validity of Papal baptism is denied, is, that the sacraments belong to the visible Church, are its ordinances; where there is no Church, there is no baptism; but the Papal body is no Church; *ergo*, its baptism is no baptism. The General Assembly, in pronouncing Rome to be no Church of Christ, simply followed in the track of the Reformers. But in deducing the conclusion

from this position, that Roman baptism was not valid, they went further than the Reformers, and, we may add, were more logically consistent. We are constrained to admit that our author does not make out his case as against Princeton upon this particular point. Turretin, we apprehend, expressed the common view when he said that in Rome the sacrament of baptism was preserved "*integer quoad substantiam.*" (L. 18, Q. 14, ¶ 3.) So also in L. 19, Q. 18, he decides that the true doctrine concerning baptism remains in that body, as to its essence, and that therefore baptism administered in Rome is to be considered valid and not to be repeated.* This indeed was the counterpart of the Roman doctrine itself from the time of Stephen in the third century down; and the position of his great antagonist, Cyprian, who denied the validity of heretical baptism, was given up by the North African Church in Augustine's time. As before intimated, however, we think the position of our own Church more consistent, a position it had assumed as early as 1835, as to the question whether the Papal body is a Church, and precisely analogous to the position it assumed in 1814, as to the Unitarian body and its ordinances. Within the last few years it has taken a similar attitude as to the Campbellite body. The Church, in pronouncing this judgment, is of course not to be understood as denying that any members of these communions are saved. It simply affirms that they are destitute of the notes or marks of a visible Church.

This treatise of Dr. Thornwell is well worthy of attentive study, not only in its bearings upon the question of the validity of Roman baptism, but as a masterly discussion of Justification and Sanctification, the Water and the Blood. The denial of these by Rome furnishes the most terrible indictment against

*Turretin, in the 14th paragraph of this Question, gives three reasons why the baptism of the Papists is not to be "iterated:" 1. That the essence of the sacrament remains among them. 2. That its efficacy does not depend on the heretical administrator, but on Christ. 3. Because there are some remains of a Church in the Papacy; now baptism belongs to the Church, etc. He seems to feel that the Papacy must be in some sense acknowledged to be a Church, or its baptism must be pronounced invalid.

her. She has abolished the gospel; and those who are sayed within her pale are saved in spite of her.

The history of the origin of the other treatise needs not be recounted here. Its beginning was "accidental," as the beginning of many great works has been, or has been called. It is sufficient to say that a controversy begun in Baltimore was taken up in South Carolina by Bishop Lynch (then plain Mr. Lynch) of the Papal body. Pugnacity is a trait not unexampled among the priests in that State. We remember a famous instance of a controversy there, concerning the existence and authority of the "Tax Book of the Roman Chancery," an infamous production of Popery, in which all imaginable and unimaginable sins are set down, with the prices in money opposite, at which they may be committed. Bishop England was the champion on the one side, and the late Dr. Fuller of the Baptist Church, on the other. This controversy was transferred to Baltimore, or rather was *settled* there by Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, in a single article against Bishop England, which he never, so far as we know, attempted to answer. Both these priests were a little unfortunate in having adversaries who were not only too much for them, but were perhaps the ablest men in the American Church. Certain it is, that the work of demolition performed by Breckinridge and Thornwell was complete.

The work on the Apocrypha was published in 1844, before the author had completed his thirty-second year. Critics who were not specially friendly to him, acknowledged their amazement at the learning displayed. The first and only separate edition was full of errata. The author was at a great distance from the press, and the proofs were badly read, though read by one of the most learned men in the city of New York. The errors, however, were chiefly in the Greek and Latin notes, and have no doubt been corrected by the painstaking editors of the Collection now before us. The title—"Romanist Arguments for the Apocrypha Discussed"—is a very modest one, and conveys a very inadequate idea of the range and completeness of the discussion. The author's mind was of such a cast that he could not be satisfied, like most controversialists, with merely answering the

arguments or refuting the positions of his antagonist. He could never be content with merely "Thornwell *vs.* A. P. F." He must go to the bottom of the subject, and produce a work which should have a permanent value, independent altogether of the occasion which gave rise to it, and which determined its force. He who reads this work will find that it is not only a discussion of Romanist arguments for the Apocrypha, but an able treatise on the Canon and a crushing refutation of Popery.

IV. We come now to consider the "Ecclesiastical" writings of our author, as contained in the fourth volume of this Collection. His influence as an ecclesiastic upon the Church at large was more direct than his influence as a theologian. As a theologian, he could scarcely have been said to have any peculiar views, any views in which he did not have the sympathy of the great mass of the Church. It was not so with his views of the nature, polity, mission of the Church. The organs of a very large and respectable party pronounced many of his positions to be mere "whimsies," and the same section continues to act upon the views he opposed as unscriptural and dangerous, as hampering and limiting the liberty which Christ had bought for his people, as compelling them to walk by rules, like Jews, when it was their privilege to act upon "general principles," like freemen. We proceed to notice some features of his ecclesiasticism.

1. He insisted upon the rigorous observance and application of the great principle of the sufficiency of the Scriptures as a rule of faith and practice. He believed thoroughly the doctrine laid down in the first chapter of the Westminster Confession, that "the whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture," while he admitted fully, what the Confession also admits, that "there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and government of the Church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the word, which are always to be

observed." He urged that the liberty of the people of God was not a license to walk in the light of their own eyes, restrained only by the prohibitions of the Word, but that it consisted in being governed by the Word only, and in being "free from the commandments of men;" that the discretionary power contended for by the other side was a power to enslave the Lord's freemen, it being a power to make laws which the people were bound to obey; that this had been the history of the exercise of such a power, especially, on a grand scale in the Papacy and in the Church of England; and that the martyrs had contended against it even unto blood.

It may seem strange that we should seem, by implication at least, to charge eminent ministers in our own Church, who have solemnly adopted the Confession of Faith, with denying its doctrine on so fundamental a point. We do not mean to assert that they intend to deny it. We do not impeach their integrity. But we all know that even great men may hold doctrines unconsciously which cannot be reconciled. There have been few greater minds than that of Augustine, and few teachers have controlled the thinking of the Church as he has done. Yet Augustine held two sets of views, which were utterly at variance with each other; his views of grace, on the one hand, and his views of the Church and the Sacraments on the other. There was no conflict in his own mind. But the legacy he bequeathed to the Church in his writings contained both, and the conflict was obliged to come. It did come. The history of the Middle Age is, in great part, a history of this conflict. The Thomists represented the one set, and the Scotists the other set of doctrines. After the Reformation, which was itself a triumph of Augustine's doctrine of grace over Augustine's doctrine of the Church, we find the conflict revived in the sixteenth century, between the Dominicans and the Jesuits, and again in the seventeenth, between the Jansenists and the Jesuits. It does not follow, therefore, that because a great and good man holds the truth in the main, he may not hold serious error, which may be all the more pernicious by virtue of the reputation he has acquired in the exposition and defence of the truth.

We only mean to assert, therefore, in the case before us, that the brethren on the other side give such a latitude of meaning to the word "circumstances" in the Confession, as virtually to deny the sufficiency of the Scriptures as a rule, and to invest the Church with a discretionary power, limited only by the prohibitions of the word. The "general principles" by which they contend the Church is to be governed in matters of polity and worship, seem to be "regulative" only, principles which define only ends to be aimed at, or conditions to be observed; while the other side contends that the general principles are "constitutive" also, determining the concrete forms in which those ends are to be realised. The Scriptures, for example, not only lay down the regulative principle of the parity of the ministry, but they give us also the constitutive principle that the jurisdiction of the ministers is to be exercised jointly with elders who are not ministers, in courts called Presbyteries. Again, according to one view, the "circumstances" of the Confession are inseparable adjuncts of the action as such, and so surround it (*circum stant*) that they cannot be separated from it. According to the other view, circumstances are attending adjuncts which may be separated from it, but which need not be separated, if they are not forbidden in the Word. Of circumstances in the first sense, we have an example in the appointment of time and place for the assemblies of the Church, the use of Moderators, Committees, etc. *Every* assembly, sacred or civil, implies an agreement as to the time and place of meeting. *Every deliberative* assembly must have a Chairman and Committees, in order to accomplish its business with decorum and dispatch. Of circumstances in the second sense, we have an example in a liturgy, or in instrumental music. Public prayer can be performed, and was performed for two centuries, at least, without a liturgy; the service of praise for nine centuries, at least, without an instrument of music.

This statement will remind our readers of the Puritan controversy in the Church of England. That was mainly a controversy about these very circumstances, in connexion with the great principle of the sufficiency of the Scriptures as a rule. The

“general principle” insisted on by the Puritan leaders was that nothing be added to the Rule; that the Bible was the charter, the constitution, the statute-book of the kingdom of Christ; that all which was not granted was for this very reason to be deemed prohibited; that all additions to the Word, if not explicitly prohibited, are at least implicitly prohibited in the general command that “nothing be added.” This was the ground upon which Dr. Thornwell took his stand in the controversy about “Boards;” denying that a board was a “circumstance,” in the sense of our Confession, and asserting that it was an unauthorised addition to the law given to the Church for doing its work.

We have dwelt the longer on this position of Dr. Thornwell, on account of its fundamental importance considered in itself, and on account of its importance in his own ecclesiology and churchmanship. The intrinsic importance of the principle cannot be overrated. It is a question whether the Church shall walk by faith in her great Head, or in the light of her own wisdom; whether she shall depend for success in her work on a worldly policy, or on the ordinances of Christ, administered by the power of the Holy Ghost. There have always been “two manner of people” in the bowels of the Church: a people who insist upon walking according to the rule given of God—“strict constructionists,” and a people who insist on the right to make additions to the rule as exigencies may demand—“latitudinarians;” a people who testify that “our faith must not stand in the wisdom of man, but in the power of God,” and a people who contend that our faith must stand in the wisdom of man as well as in the power of God. We believe “the Presbyterian Church in the United States” to be as pure as any other on earth; but even in *her* bowels these two manner of people are found. In how many of *her* congregations do the people humble themselves before God with fasting and prayer for the quickening power of the Holy Ghost, when the ordinances of Christ seem barren? In how many do they resort for help to inventions of their own? Is there no congregation in which the people trust more in the breath of a bellows than in the breath of the Spirit? None in which fairs and festivals are more relied upon for revenue than

upon the grace of God in the hearts of his people? How many Presbyterians, not to say Protestants, act habitually on the principle that the Bible, and the Bible alone, is their religion? We do not doubt that the hopes of final victory in this country and in England, which inspire the Papal hierarchy, are built upon the fact that the most pronounced Protestants are to so great an extent conforming themselves to the principles and maxims which have made the Papal communion what it is. Papal Rome was not built in a day. *Nemo repente fit turpissimus*. We are very far from being idolaters like the Romanists—a thousand voices will exclaim—and we do not intend to be. So, doubtless, the Church of Rome would have said at the close of the second century. But behold it now! and ponder the wisdom of the maxim, "*Obsta principiis*."

2. This principle of the Bible, and the Bible alone, led Dr. Thornwell to his position as to the nature and scope of the Church's mission. An opinion or feeling existed to a considerable extent, if it might not be called a prevailing opinion, that every good thing, good in the sense of conducive to the welfare of man in this life as well as in the life to come, fell within the proper scope of the Church's mission. She was to be a great philanthropist, as well as a witness for God and a preacher of salvation. She was to patronise every association which had for its object the relief of human distress, or the promotion of human comfort. She was to patronise even the government of the civil commonwealth, direct it or correct it, if necessary or practicable, since the temporal welfare of men was so dependent upon the character of its administration. Hence, resolutions of the General Assembly commending temperance societies, colonisation societies, and what-not. Hence resolutions condemning the institution of slavery. Hence, at last, resolutions asserting Federalism to be the true theory of the Constitution, and condemning the theory of "States' Rights."

Now, Dr. Thornwell did not deny that some of these things might be good things. Much less did he deny that the mission of the Church was a philanthropic mission; that the results of a faithful fulfilment of it would promote in the highest degree the

temporal welfare of men. He was a philanthropist of the highest style and of the most ardent sort; not a *humanitarian* philanthropist, but a *divine*. He held that the highest welfare of men was subordinate to the glory of God; subordinate, not hostile or opposed; subordinate, yet in harmony with it, moving in the same plane with it. The Church's *sole* function was to be a witness for God, to be an expounder and administrator of his revealed will, both law and gospel. She had no vocation to interfere with any human institution directly, but to declare the law for all moral relations, and to condemn all immoral. She had no vocation to manage benevolent societies, but to leaven the whole community with the principles of the gospel, which, while they are "glory to God," are also "good will to men." She had no commission to direct or to correct the political administration, but so to saturate the community with the spirit of Jesus Christ that magistrates would rule with justice, truth, and moderation, and the people would obey the laws with cheerfulness and for conscience's sake. He held that this legitimate influence of the Church was the more powerful for being *indirect*; that history would confirm this view; that in the so-called theocracies (New England, for example), where the Church was made τὸ πᾶν, the Church became corrupt by handling matters which were secular and did not belong to her; and, having become corrupt, lost her influence upon the community for good, and exerted an influence for evil.

It required no small nerve to maintain this view of the Church's mission. He would, of course, be charged with being unfriendly to colonisation, or temperance, and so on. But he had the sublime courage which the possession of God's truth, and the conviction that it *is* His truth, impart. He testified, whether men heard or forbore. If these principles had been acted on by the Church, how much sin and misery would have been prevented! But most men seem to be incapable of comprehending principles. Statesmen like Edmund Burke, and ecclesiastics like Thornwell, who, by the constitution of their minds and their intellectual training, are "seers," do not frequently appear. The vast majority must wait to see how a principle works, must wait for

results, in order to make up their minds. The process of reasoning in the minds of enthusiastic managers of societies is something like this: Whoever is opposed to *this* way of doing the good thing, is opposed to the good thing itself. You are opposed to *this* way of doing, etc. *Ergo, etc.* Others who are not managers, and who have no interest, or very little, in the object or the means, take some credit to themselves for voting to recommend it, and put on an air of pious surprise that any people professing to be good should oppose so benevolent an institution. Human nature is a bundle of contradictions; but in any large body of men, we may generally count, with a considerable degree of certainty, upon their showing more indignation when the wisdom of their own inventions is questioned, than when the ordinances of God are violated, provided these ordinances have not a *very* obvious bearing for good upon their temporal welfare.

3. Another position of Dr. Thornwell intimately connected with the foregoing, but a position not at all peculiar to himself, was one which concerned the relation of the civil to the ecclesiastical power, or of the State to the Church. The true doctrine was expounded very clearly by him in "the Letter of the General Assembly of the Confederate States of 1861 to the Churches of Christ throughout the World." We do not propose to dwell upon it here, as there is no difference of judgment about it theoretically in this country; certainly none in our own Church, and, we believe, none in any other. The Papal body, of course, abhors the American doctrine, and is plotting to subjugate the civil power to itself. This it has recently itself proclaimed in "the Syllabus;" and the Syllabus is simply a reiteration of the principles avowed by Rome since the days of Hildebrand, and before. We do not recognise that body as a Church at all, but as a political empire, like the Roman which preceded it; with this difference only, that the old Pagan maintained its authority and extended its dominion by the iron hand only; the Papal by ghostly means always, and by the iron hand when possible.

4. It is only in connexion with another position of Dr. Thornwell, that we have noticed at all his view of the relations of Church and State. The position referred to is contained in a

“Memorial” presented to the first General Assembly of our Church held in Augusta, Georgia, in the year 1861. It may be found in the fourth volume of his Writings, pages 549 *et seq.* From the doctrine and purpose of this memorial, we are obliged to enter our decided and emphatic dissent. If our readers have had the patience to read this article thus far, they will find no difficulty in believing us when we say that we record our dissent with the greatest reluctance. Yet it was in *his* school that we learned to call no man master. To him, if to any man, the line of Horace might be applied—

“Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri;”

and the independence which he exercised himself, he inculcated on others. In expressing the different views which we hold, we are not conscious of doing anything inconsistent with the profound veneration we feel for his memory. Indeed, we have a strong impression that we are not dissenting from a view of Dr. Thornwell's which he had long and carefully considered, but from one taken up and presented under the impulse of a glowing patriotism. Next to the interests of the Church, that which lay nearest to his heart, was the interests of the infant Confederacy. He longed to have it baptized with the name of Christ and dedicated to his service. If he were now alive, and could see who they are in the Northern States who are advocating his doctrine, we believe he would at least give the subject a thorough reconsideration. But this is more than enough of apology, even if any at all were called for.

The amendment he proposed to be made in the Constitution of the Confederate States (to the section providing for liberty of conscience), was in these words: “Nevertheless, we, the people of these Confederate States, distinctly acknowledge our responsibility to God, and the supremacy of his Son, Jesus Christ, as King of kings and Lord of lords; and hereby ordain that no law shall be passed by the Congress of these Confederate States inconsistent with the will of God as revealed in the Holy Scriptures.”

It is impossible for us to go into an argument here to show

that such an amendment to the Constitution would be utterly inconsistent with the theory of the relation of Church and State, as held in the United States and held by Dr. Thornwell himself; that it is a virtual confounding of the spheres of the two powers; and that its inevitable effect would be the infringement of the liberty of conscience. We content ourselves with simply recording our dissent and protest. The reader who wishes to see some of the grounds on which such an amendment would be resisted, may consult the article on "Church and State" in this journal for October, 1863 (Vol. XVI., No. 2). The views of that article have been immensely strengthened by events which have occurred since it was written; events which, we are firmly persuaded, would have led Dr. Thornwell to recoil from his position, or at least to give it a careful reconsideration.

5. We pass from this the only unpleasant part of our task to consider next his views of Presbyterianism. These are contained in the papers which his editors have published under the heads of "Church Officers" and "Church Operations" in the fourth volume. We must be brief in our notices of them, as the space allotted to us is almost exhausted.

And *first*, as to the relation of all Church officers to the Church itself, he held that they were *representatives*; that the rulers were representatives as to rule, and the deacons representatives as to their functions, the custody and distribution of the revenues. This view is opposed to the view, on the one hand, of Papists and High Church Prelatists, and, on the other, to the view of Congregationalism as distinct from Independency.*

* The terms Congregationalism and Independency are often used interchangeably. But when distinguished, the former has reference to the *subject (materia in qua)* of Church power: the Congregationalists holding that the power, both as to its *being* and in its *exercise*, is lodged in "the brotherhood;" the latter having reference to the nature of the unity of the Church: the Independents holding that every congregation stately worshipping in one place is a *complete church*, and therefore denying the authority of synods, or of all courts, above that which governs a single congregation. All Congregationalists are Independents, but all Independents are not Congregationalists. Independency is the genus, Congregationalism a species or variety. The Independents of Savoy (in

The Papists hold that all power, both as to its being and its exercise (in the language of the schools, both in "the first act" and "the second act"), is lodged in the clergy alone. The Congregationalists lodge it, in both acts, in the brotherhood alone. Hence their sameness of views as to the nature of the privilege of election of officers—both holding that election belongs to the power of government. But they draw very different conclusions from the doctrine that election belongs to the power of government. The argument of the Papist, as stated by Bellarmine, is: "The power of election belongs to government. It belongs not to the people to govern. *Ergo*, it belongs not to the people to elect." The argument of the Congregationalist is: "The power of election belongs to government. The power of election belongs to the people. *Ergo*, the power of government belongs to the people." The Presbyterian of Dr. Thornwell's school denies the principle which is common to both syllogisms, and asserts that election belongs only to the process by which the government is constituted: "*Pertineat ad gubernationem et regimen constituendum, non tamen est actus regiminis aut gubernationis.*" According to the view of Popery, the ministry is a *caste*, having no life in common with the people. According to the Congregational view, the ministry is simply the *proxy* of the people. According to Presbyterianism, the ministry is the *representative* of the people. The difference between a proxy and a representative is, that the former merely obeys the people and carries out their wishes, while it is the duty of the latter to consult the interests of the people, whether in accordance with their wishes or not. The eye sees *for* the body, while it is the body that sees *by* the eye.

The occasion for bringing forward the representative character of Church officers was twofold. It was asserted, or strongly insinuated as to the minister of the Word, that he was not a representative of the people; that he was a member of a sort of caste,

London) were not Congregationalists; at least their leader, John Owen, was not, as anybody may see by consulting his "True Nature of a Gospel Church." The Independents were strong in the Westminster Assembly, the Congregationalists were weak.

holding his place in the higher courts by a tenure independent of the people. It was asserted, or strongly insinuated, that the ruling elder was a representative of the people only in the sense of appearing for them as a proxy where it was inconvenient for them to appear *in propria persona*. In other words, it seemed to be attempted, in theory at least, to convert our government into a mixture of prelacy and democracy. In opposition to this mongrel government, our author and the brethren on his side contended that Presbyterian government was a government by assemblies, consisting of presbyters, chosen rulers of the Church; and these of two sorts, teaching and ruling presbyters, equal in rank or order, but differing in function; both representatives of the people, the one class more directly (like the members of the lower House of Congress), the other class indirectly (like the Senators of the upper House). According to this view, the ruling elder is called "the representative of the people" in our book, not as asserting that he is the only representative (to the exclusion of the minister), but for the same reason that the members of the lower House of Congress are called "representatives"—because that term is an adequate description of their office. The members of the lower House are representatives of the people as to law-making, and nothing more. The Senate consists of chosen rulers, who are representatives of the people as to law-making, and something more, to wit, as to certain "executive" functions.

2. This brings us to another question between the same parties: "What is the meaning of *presbyter* in the New Testament?" Is it synonymous with preacher or minister of the word? Dr. Thornwell denied, the brethren of the other part affirmed. The importance of the question is very obvious. If *presbyter* means preacher and nothing else, then there are no elders but preachers; then the officer known as "the ruling elder" is not entitled to the name; he is no *presbyter* or elder, has no proper place in a *Presbytery*, which is a college of *presbyters*; he is a mere proxy or deputy of the people, to make known to the *presbyters* (preachers) in *Presbytery* assembled what the humble wishes of the people may be. His *jus divinum*

is clean gone. He has no rights given him of God as ruling elder which the church is bound to respect. It was held that a Presbytery might be legally constituted without his presence; and that for him to assume the right to lay on his hands in the ordination of a minister because the Bible and our Book said a minister should be ordained by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery, was sheer audacity. He had no such right on another account: "*Nemo dare potest quod non habet;*" "Like begets like."* Any number of wise saws might be quoted to show that a man who is not a preacher cannot make, or help make, a preacher; much less can a ruling elder, who is not even a presbyter or proper member of a Presbytery, help in such a work. All these plausibilities were blown to atoms by the arguments of Breckinridge and Thornwell. It was established beyond contradiction, that the meaning of presbyter was not "preacher," but "ruler;" that preachers are called presbyters, not because they preach, but because they rule; and, therefore, that there may be presbyters who do not preach. It was further shown, that in accordance with these views of the meaning of the term, the Apostolic Church had rulers who did not preach, and that this feature of the apostolic polity lingered in parts of the Church (North Africa, for instance) as late, at least, as the middle of the third century.† The right divine of the ruling elder having been established, it was very easy to show that his hands would not profane a minister's head in the ceremony of ordination, or interrupt the current of spiritual electricity as it was passing from the hands of the ministers, by showing that the elders of the whole congregation ordained of old the tribe of Levi, and that there was no current of spiritual electricity to flow or to be interrupted.

These discussions revealed the fact, that no small amount of

* Why not quote also, Dr. Thornwell suggests, from the parody of Johnson, "Who drives fat oxen must himself be fat"?

† Calvin says in his Commentary on 1 Timothy v. 17, after noticing that the passage implies that there were then two kinds of presbyters, and that all were not ordained to preach, "Ambrose (Bishop of Milan, †397) laments that this custom had become obsolete by the negligence of the teachers, or rather by their pride, because they wished to be eminent alone."

prelatical error still lingered even in the Presbyterian Church. This fact was specially manifest in the denial of the right of the ruling elder to lay on hands in the ordination of a minister. Ordination was practically treated as a sacrament. The administration of it, therefore, belonged, like that of other sacraments, to the minister of the word, and "a layman" like the ruling elder could take no part in it. Dr. Thornwell did great service to the Church in recalling its attention to the true nature of ordination, as simply a formal recognition and publication of the fact, that God, in the judgment of the Church, expressed by one of its courts, had called the ordained man to the office. There was nothing in the ceremony of ordination, therefore, which made it improper for the ruling elder to take part in it. Ordination does not make a man a minister, as the prelatical doctrine affirms. It is an act of a *court*, sitting under the law of Christ, which prescribes the qualifications of a minister, and finding a verdict according to the law and the evidence. It is an act precisely analogous to that of a court admitting a person to the communion of the Church. The law of Christ prescribes the qualifications of a church member. The court inquires whether A B has these qualifications; and if it finds that he has, the verdict is, that God gives him a right to communion. The Session does not make him a member, or give him a right to communion. It simply recognises the fact that the right has been given him of God.

3. Thus far, two distinctive features of Presbyterian polity have been noticed: *first*, its governing by parliamentary assemblies of representatives; *secondly*, its representatives being all presbyters, but of two sorts—teaching presbyters, and presbyters who rule without teaching. One more feature remains to complete the view; and that is the mode in which it realises the idea of the unity of the Church. The idea of the unity is realised by the elasticity of the representative system. Its method is opposed to that of Rome, which also attempts to realise the unity, as the principle itself of the unity is opposed to Independency. As against Independency, Presbyterianism holds that two or more congregations may be united under one government. This is

the principle. The extent of its application, or exemplification, is "a circumstance" common to human societies, which is to be regulated "by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the word." If there was but one congregation of saints in the world, the presbytery governing that congregation would be the parliament of the whole Church. Let the congregations be increased a hundred or a thousand-fold, the unity of the whole would be represented by a parliament composed of presbyters from the parts. On the other hand, the *method* of realising the unity differs as widely from the method adopted by Rome as the principle differs from the principle of Independency. Rome realises the unity by a *graded* hierarchy composed of officers of different ranks and orders, the pyramid being capped by a supreme pontiff at Rome, who embraces within himself all powers and rights, and delegates, as he pleases, powers and rights to be exercised by all the officers below him. Presbyterianism realises the unity by a series of courts composed, all of them, of exactly the same officers, the highest court being, of course, the representative of the unity of the whole. These courts are the organs through which the one body acts. The life is in the whole and in every part; the life of the whole is in every part; and the life of the whole controls the life of every part. The judges of the lower courts, in some of the States of this Union, constitute "in bank," a court of appeals; but the same commonwealth appears in all the courts, confronting the criminal by the indictment, as an offender against its majesty, alike in the court of original jurisdiction and in the court of last resort. But let it be well observed, the General Assembly and the Session are composed of the same elements. Every ruling elder who sits in the Assembly belongs to some church session. "Of such a council as this," says Milton, "every parochial consistency is a right homogeneous and constituting part; being in itself a little synod, and towards a general assembly, moving upon her own basis in an even and firm progression, as those smaller squares in battle unite in one great cube, the main phalanx, an emblem of truth and steadfastness." (Reason of Church Government urged against Prelaty, Chapter 6.) The Presbyterian

method of realising the unity of the Church protects the rights of its private members; the Roman method destroys them. Rome is a great iron wheel of which individuals and tribunals are only spokes. Presbyterianism is a wheel which contains within it a multitude of wheels, each having a life and movement of its own, yet all instinct with the spirit of the living creature, which is in the wheel.

We are now prepared for Dr. Thornwell's definition of Presbyterianism—the only satisfactory definition we have ever met with: "Presbyterianism is the government of the Church by parliamentary assemblies, composed of two classes of presbyters, and of presbyters only, and so arranged as to realise the visible unity of the whole Church."

Here we make an end. It has been a great delight to us to follow the track of the illustrious thinker whose writings we have been reviewing. We trust we have not failed to impress the reader, who has followed us to the end, with the conviction that there are treasures of thought in Dr. Thornwell's works which will amply repay the most assiduous study. Our exhortation to all, and especially to all students of theology, may be summed up in the line of Horace in reference to the Greek authors,—

"Nocturna versate manu, versate diurna."