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ARTICLE I.

THE PLENARY INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES.

1. *Theopneusty, or the Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures.* By S. R. L. GAUSSEN, Prof. of Theology in Geneva, Switzerland. Translated by EDWARD NORRIS KIRK: Fourth American, from the second French edition, enlarged and improved by the author. New York: John S. Taylor, 143 Nassau-st. 1850.
2. Chapter vi. *Philosophy of Religion.* By J. D. MORELL, A. M., author of the *History of Modern Philosophy, etc.* New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1849.

In an article on the United States, in the October number of the Edinburgh Review, a writer to whom our country appears to contain only New England and an *outside-barbarian* territory, among many anti-slavery and some rationalistic utterances, well and truly says, that "*the question which lies at the root of all dogmatic Theology is the AUTHORITY OF THE LETTER OF SCRIPTURE.*" And there are many indications of the interest which that question is exciting on both sides of the Atlantic. The appearance of the fourth American from the second French edition of Gausсен's work, is one of these indications. Another is, that even the literary Reviews of the day are discussing it. The Edinburgh devotes to it some paragraphs in the article above named.

cumstances, our minds are to be strengthened and supported by this consideration.

III. Hence, it is plain, what disposition ought to be in all ministers and teachers of the word. They ought to lay aside all private considerations of gain, advantage, or praise, and to apply themselves and their ministry to this end, to bring the people to God. For whatever is the intention of the master, in any business, the same ought to be that of the servant. But these words define and explain the mind of the Master, "How often would I have gathered you."

ARTICLE IV.

God in Christ. Three Discourses, delivered at New Haven, Cambridge and Andover, with a Preliminary Dissertation on Language. By HORACE BUSHNELL. Hartford: Brown and Parsons. 1849.

Talleyrand is reported to have said, that "language was invented not to convey, but to conceal thought." This celebrated dictum of the wily diplomatist must yield in intensity, if not in pomp of paradox, to the theory of language propounded by Mr. Bushnell, in his Preliminary Dissertation. Both seem to hold that language was an invention, and not an original endowment of man: both are agreed that it does not *convey* thought: and if the doctrines of these "Discourses" be not what the Church of Jesus Christ has, in all the periods of its history, pronounced to be damnable heresy, the effect of language, whatever we may say of the design and tendency, is certainly, in the opinion of both, to *conceal* thought. Dr. Bushnell, however, goes one step further than the brilliant but unprincipled Frenchman, and asserts not merely that language was invented not to convey, but that it *cannot* convey thought, however honest the intention of those who employ it. It is afflicted with a constitutional debility, which will always insure its breaking down under the burden of the lightest spiritual idea.

In order to illustrate his theory, he entertains us with a hypothetical account of the powers of language-making, which, so far as the objects of the material universe are concerned in it, does not differ much from the descriptions of other fanciful philologists who have contributed to aggravate the curse of Babel. Nor does he differ very widely from other dreamers of the same school, in his history of the process by which the names of external and material objects were, in the course of time, transferred to the department of spirit, and employed to express the informations of consciousness and reflection. But he contends that the earthly, material dregs of their original associations, still cleave to the words, even after they have been promoted to the higher sphere and the nobler functions of the spiritual world. Like Plato's ghosts of wicked men, they were so long submerged in material things, that, even when disembodied, they are not free from the admixture of earthy particles, and the law of gravity is still in force against them. This circumstance creates a sad necessity for men—that of always being mistaken in their notions of the meaning of words, when those words stand for spiritual objects or conceptions. There is nothing material in spiritual ideas; but alas for us, the terms, which we employ to denote them, contain, from the necessity of the case, material elements; the problem we have to solve is not only perplexed and complicated by the presence of unknown quantities, but vitiated by the intrusion of quantities positively false. The very term spirit now smacks of the laboratory. It denotes a substance which the chemist uses to heat his retorts; and in its original and higher acceptation, it stands for a more ethereal substance, which profane science has demonstrated to be composed chiefly of so vulgar an element as carbonic acid gas. What, then, are we to do with such dangerous instruments of thought? Is there no remedy? Must we abandon ourselves to a fatal necessity of error in that department of investigation, in the results of which we are most deeply and lastingly interested? Dr. Bushnell shall answer these questions for us (p. 55):

“Since all words, but such as relate to necessary truths, are inexact representations of thought, mere types or analogies, or where the types are lost beyond recovery, only proximate expressions of the thoughts named: it follows that language will be ever trying

to mend its own deficiencies, by multiplying its forms of representation. As, too, the words made use of generally carry something false with them, as well as something true, associating form with the truths represented, when really there is no form; it will also be necessary, on this account, to multiply words or figures, and thus to present the subject on opposite sides or many sides. Thus, as form battles form, and one form neutralizes another, all the insufficiencies of words are filled out, the contrarieties liquidated, and the mind settles into a full and just apprehension of the pure spiritual truth. Accordingly, we never come so near to a truly well rounded view of any truth, as when it is offered paradoxically; that is, under contradictions; that is, under two or more dictions, which, taken as dictions, are contrary one to the other. Hence the marvellous vivacity and power of that famous representation of Pascal: 'What a chimera, then, is man! what a novelty! what a chaos! what a subject of contradiction! A judge of every thing, and yet a feeble worm of the earth; the depositary of truth, and yet a mere heap of uncertainty; the glory and the outcast of the universe. If he boasts, I humble him; if he humbles himself, I boast of him: and always contradict him, till he is brought to comprehend that he is an incomprehensible monster.'

Now, this is all very fine; but the question will arise, in the mind of every thinking man, what has it to do with Mr. Bushnell's theory? If we were asked, why are we bound by the law of God, would it be proper to answer "the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles?" The noble passage from Pascal, and the still nobler passage from Paul, (2 Cor. vi. 8, 10,) are examples of highly-wrought rhetorical descriptions of human nature and human life. But what have they to do with Dr. Bushnell's theory of language? We ask him a question in metaphysics, and he answers us by a lecture on antithesis, illustrated by examples. The *essential* deceptiveness of words is one thing; the propensity of employing antithesis, in an address to the *imagination*, is quite another thing. As to the logical understanding's acquiring more accurate knowledge of ideas and relations by antithesis, than by simple, unadorned propositions, we had always supposed that sober men, in imparting instruction, abstained from the use of that and other highly rhetorical methods of *impressing* truth, till they were satisfied that the truth was *logically apprehended*. How common is it,

in the use of such figures, to sacrifice truth to point? If taken as a didactic statement, in which light Dr. Bushnell would seem to have us regard it, the fine paragraph from Pascal cannot be exonerated from this charge, or, at least, from the charge of exaggeration. But, taken as it was intended to be taken by the splendid genius who conceived it, it is faultless.

The truth is, that this theory of contradiction is framed to serve a turn. The author tells us, that it will afford "the true conception of the Incarnation and the Trinity." The precious doctrines of the Bible are to be converted into figures of speech, and hence this laborious attempt to confound things that differ. But of this more hereafter.

The juxta-position of Dr. Bushnell's principles and examples may be accounted for by his possession of a faculty of "poetic insight" (as he calls it), which relieves him of the burden imposed upon ordinary mortals—the

* The following extract from the Preliminary Dissertation will show that the author's "contra-dictions" are not merely opposite "dictions" in spiritual equilibria, but what plain people would call *contradictions* in the old-fashioned sense: "So far from suffering even the least consciousness of constraint, or oppression, under any creed, I have been readier to accept as great a number as fell in my way; for, when they are subjected to the deepest chemistry of thought, that which descends to the point of relationship between the power of the truth and its interior formless nature, they become, thereupon, so elastic, and run so freely into each other, that one seldom need have any difficulty in accepting as many as are offered him. He may regard them only as a kind of battle-door of words, blow answering to blow, while the reality of the play, viz., *exercise*, is the same, whichever side of the room is taken, and whether the stroke is given by the right hand or the left."—P. 82. Truly we may say of this doctor of divinity, as has been said of those who can believe the contradictory formularies of the Church of England, that he must be blessed with extraordinary powers of digestion, if he escapes dyspepsia after so miscellaneous a feast. The pompous inanities of German Transcendentalism have been profanely compared with the speech of the clown in "Twelfth Night," (A. 4, 8, 2,) "As the old hermit of Prague, that never saw pen and ink, very wittily said to a neice of King Gorboduc, "That, that is, is; so I, being master parson, am master parson; for what is that, but that?—and is, but is?" But Dr. Bushnell, in prosecuting the brilliant career of discovery on which he has entered, has advanced one step beyond the old hermit, and ascertained that is, is not—is, and that is not—that: the *das Ich* is *das nicht*—*Ich*. In his understanding, truth and falsehood embrace and kiss each other; nay, the twain become one flesh. This is a "higher unity" with a vengeance! This "chemistry of thought" is a wonderful science: it has accomplished for thought what the old alchemists, after all their laborious experiments, could never do for matter. But, seriously, is it not almost incredible, even with the evidence before our eyes, that the understanding of a grown man can be capable of such drivelling folly?

burden of logical thinking. He stands upon an eminence, which, though it may appear to us toiling in the vale below, to be surrounded with clouds and mists, is, really, far above the floating vapours which shade our mundane atmosphere; and, from that eminence, he has an intuitive inspection of eternal and necessary realities. We are very much disposed to envy him the possession of this singular felicity, but, as we are unfortunately without it, we are often compelled to employ the humble faculty of *deduction*, and to grope our way back to intuitive principles and fundamental laws of belief, by very long and tortuous threads. We think it hard, however, in an author, that, instead of bearing his honors meekly, and commiserating our unhappy condition, he should rail as he does against logic. He has no use for it, it is true; but we have. A man with sound legs will not abuse crutches, simply because he has personally no use for them: there *are* lame men, and they ought not to be too severely censured, if they attempt to achieve locomotion in the best way they can. He will not acknowledge that God can teach *him* any thing:* but

* "What, then, it may be asked, is the real and legitimate use of words when applied to moral subjects? For we cannot dispense with them, and it is uncomfortable to hold them in universal skepticism, as being only instruments of error. Words, then, I answer, are legitimately used as the signs of thought to be expressed. They do not literally convey, or pass over a thought out of one mind into another, as we commonly speak of doing. They are only hints or images, held up before the mind of another, to put *him* on generating or reproducing the same thought; which *he can do only as he has the same personal contents, or the generative power out of which to bring the thought required.*"—P. 45, 46. This is, substantially, the doctrine defended by Mr. Morell and others, that it is impossible for God Himself to give us a logical Revelation, or, to use their own term, a "Theology." It is very much like the doctrine of the Meno of Plato—all our knowledge is "*reminiscence*" merely. God presents us with words, but they are only hints, which awaken the dormant contents of the reason: He "stirs up our pure minds by way of remembrance," but imparts no new knowledge. Is it not marvellous that these men have not perceived the difference between *ideas* and *relations*? It is no doubt true that the use of names, in the intercourse of mind with mind, implies that the ideas exist, in a greater or less degree of clearness, both in him who communicates, and in him who receives. But the knowledge mainly consists in the *relations* of the persons, things, or ideas denoted by the terms. The ancients had an idea of a Supreme Being, of the material universe, of creation. But the relations among these ideas, expressed in the proposition, "God created the heavens and the earth," they never recognized, except to deny: the general principle being "*ex nihilo, nihil fit.*" Our philosophers neglect to discriminate between truths which are simply expressive of existence, and truths which express relations among

we are disposed more and more every day to acknowledge the ignorance of poor human nature, and to admire that Socratic modesty which prompts a man to confess that he knows nothing. The "οὐκ οἶδα σαφῶς" of the Athenian Philosopher will be sought in vain in the oracular utterances of the German School: they are gods; it is only in their minds that God comes to a consciousness of His personality: they are able to make a universe out of their own brains, as a spider spins its web from its own bowels. But we confess that we are men and have not such power as this; that it is necessary for us to compare, to analyse, to arrange, to deduce, to dig for truth as for hid treasures, and, after we have obtained the precious ore, to smelt it, to separate the pure metal from the earthy admixture: in short, that we are groping our way in a dark world, and are anxious to hear the voice of God amid the gloom, saying unto us, "This is the way, walk ye in it." And we hope Dr. Bushnell and other Illuminati will pardon us for saying, that it is unkind in them, it betrays a want of magnanimity, to laugh at or to abuse us, because we are destitute, and that too without any fault of our own, of that lofty instrument of knowledge which they possess, and are compelled, in the absence of it, to employ such an antiquated utensil as logic. Let them enjoy to the utmost the distinction of free access into the inner sanctuary of the "pure reason," or "poetic insight," or "intuitional consciousness;" but let them not insult the less

existing objects. They also confound the perception of "concrete realities" by the "intuitional consciousness," (the process being analagous to that of external perception by the senses,) with the apprehension of what are called necessary or universal truths, by the same faculty. According to the first view, it would be as absurd to attempt to give a man an idea of God, who had not the idea already, as it would be to attempt to give a man born blind an idea of color. . . . Dr. Bushnell does, indeed, admit that there is such a thing as inspiration, but it seems to be very much like Mr. Morell's; and both have probably obtained it from the German masters. He tells us, (P. 350, et seq.) that it is a great mistake to suppose that inspiration has ceased, and leaves us to infer that while the tripod continues in Hartford, it will be unreasonable to attach any peculiar importance to the inspiration of Paul or Peter. Truly, any mortal who will thread his way through the sinuosities of this book, will be satisfied that if we have not the inspiration, we have, at least, the contortions of the Sybil. Note, that we have used the term *idea*, in the above remarks, sometimes as equivalent to *object*. In one acceptation of the term, a relation is an *idea*. See some excellent observations on this subject in Mill's System of Logic, B. 1, c. 2.

happy destiny of those who are doomed to tread the court of the Gentiles, "the logical understanding."*

It will be readily imagined by our readers, from the preceding remarks, that it is not our purpose to attempt a review of the "Discourses" themselves. The Preliminary Dissertation has so awed us, that we cannot go further without trembling. If such be the portico, what must the temple be? We shall not invade the retirement of the Seer, where he gazes, in solitary rapture, on the unconditioned, the absolute and the infinite. In truth, we do not know that we understand him: we have only learned the language of men, and know nothing of the dialect of those who dwell amidst the clouds which hang around the summit of Olympus. So that there is danger of our misrepresenting him. To us, the first discourse seems an odd mixture of Sabellianism and Pantheism; but, perhaps, if cast into the alembic which our author has furnished, and subjected to the powerful agencies of the "chemistry of thought," it may turn out, after all, to be a doctrine with which Spinoza would feel no sympathy, and which can look the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian creed calmly in the face. To us, the second discourse appears to be a sweeping besom of destruction to all the hopes of man, founded upon the atonement of Jesus Christ—an utter impudent mockery of the cries of agony which burst from a world groaning under the curse of the Almighty—taking away from us the precious *work* of our Lord and Saviour, as his first discourse does His *Person*. He speaks of a *subjective* atonement; but, as we have not been endowed with the faculty of "poetic insight," we must acknowledge our inability to comprehend any such thing, unless, done into English, it means the effect of the atonement in the hearts of men. His *objective* atonement is not a sacrifice—no! no! It is not exactly a myth—for the death was a real death—but a something which might embody and realize our subjectivity: just as the brilliant creations of the poet's fancy have obtained, though airy nothings, a local habitation and a name, by the pencil of the painter and the chisel

* This image is borrowed from an article on Morell, in the Westminster Review for April, 1847, in which the writer handles the nonsense of our Teutonic brethren with very little politeness.

of the sculptor. We say that a painting is *beautiful*, but we all know that beauty is not an attribute of the painting, but of the percipient mind; but it gratifies our importunate appetite for objectivity to refer the quality to the painting, instead of regarding it as an affection of ourselves. So the atonement is *in us*; but we speak of it as being in the history of Christ—we refer it to something objective. Most people who read the Bible suppose that Christ came into the world *in order* to make a sacrifice for sin—was born *in order* that He might die. But this is their ignorance. The death of Christ was only an incident which occurred in the discharge of His commission, as the death of Alexander, in the full tide of successful war, was. He did not go to Asia for the purpose of dying; neither did Christ come into the world for that purpose: it was a misfortune, which happened to them in prosecuting their benevolent designs, just as a monk of St. Bernard might perish among the snows of the Alps, in searching for the benighted travellers, who were the objects of his kindly solicitude.* He denies the *penal* character of the sufferings and death of Jesus; and, this being denied, we care not what he asserts concerning the atonement. If Christ did not die under the curse, all our hopes are vain. We are yet in our sins, and the majesty of the law must be vindicated in our own persons: the Gospel is a mockery, and the preachers of it worse than fools.†

But we must check ourselves. Perhaps our author means just the contrary of all this, for he tells us that language cannot convey thought. It may be the purest orthodoxy of the Westminster Confession. Some of our readers may be able to judge what his views of the atonement really are, from the fact that they furnished a platform (as he tells us ‡) on which Protestants, Philosophers and Papists can stand amicably together! We have

* See p.p. 201, *et seq.*

† A distinguished New England scholar is reported to have said, when he abandoned the ministry for other pursuits, that "preaching was a small business." We cordially agree with him. Upon *his* principles (he was a Unitarian), preaching the New Testament is the smallest and meanest of all businesses, in which an *honest* man can engage.

‡ See pp. 268, *et seq.* The philosophers, to whom he chiefly refers, are the Unitarians, whom he seems much more anxious to conciliate than any other class.

heard of authors who could "bespeak all reverence for that fancy of Justin and others, that the 'ass and the colt' for which Christ sent his disciples, are to be interpreted severally of the 'Jewish and the Gentile believers,' and also attach much weight to that of Origen, who rather expounds them of 'the Old and the New Testaments.'" But Dr. Bushnell is determined to let none be before him in the race of absurdity.

The third and last "Discourse," in this extraordinary collection, is on "Dogma and Spirit." In the language of men, we should say that this discourse is a very earnest assault on creeds and confessions—a very pathetic plea for the glorious liberty of thinking and believing one thing to-day and another to-morrow, and for the associated privilege of writing one thing on one page and contradicting it on the next. The objection is not to *creeds*, but to a *creed*, as will be seen from a citation in a preceding note. Provided there are more than one, the author's *cacoethes credendi* is agreeably soothed, though, we suppose, it can never be satisfied but by a universal syntagma, or rather *congeries, confessionum*. "He has been readier," he tells us, "to accept as many creeds as fell in his way." The only damning sin is to believe anything *in particular*.

And here we close our notice of the book as such; for we suspect that our readers are as weary as ourselves. The author is a man of great power, unquestionably: there are many eloquent sentences in his book; he uses, with great point and force, the phraseology of spiritual religion. We will add that we have no reason to suspect his *sincerity*: his mind seems to have been in great distress through doubt, and he thinks that in the theories of these discourses he has found rest and peace. He is very naturally anxious that others, who have been in the same afflictions, should share in his consolations, and, therefore, presents them with this "*Ductor Dubitantium*." But we are amazed beyond our power to express, that a man in his senses should regard such stuff as affording an adequate foundation of hope to dying men; that he can have the hardihood to say, while acknowledging, in form, the Divine authority of the Scriptures, that Paul does not reason in his Epistles, or, if he does intend to reason, his reasoning is inconclusive; that the illative particles which

occur so frequently in his writings are only the remnants of the discipline of Gamaliel, which he had not been able to throw off,* and many other things as outrageously absurd, and yet imagine that he is a sort of Star of Bethlehem, whose only office and design is to lead men to the Saviour of the world. We must say that we have never met with an instance of stranger hallucination in the annals of Christian literature, unless it be the case of the madman, in the time of Tertullian, who imagined himself to be the Holy Ghost.

These "Discourses" furnish melancholy evidence of the progress of infidel principles in the church. The time was when the denial of the *Divine authority* of the Scriptures was a distinguishing badge of the enemies of Christianity: but that time has passed. The devil has changed his tactics. He is still aiming at the same great end; still bent upon persuading men to prefer the farthing candle of their own reason to the sun-light of Divine revelation: but he employs a different method of address. The "logical understanding," or what uninitiated and un-

* "True, there is a power of reasoning, or argumentation about him (Paul), and he abounds in illatives, piling "for" upon "for" in constant succession. But, if he is narrowly watched, it will be seen that this is only a dialectic form that had settled on his language, under his old theologic discipline, previous to his conversion; for every man gets a language constructed early in life, which nothing can change afterwards. * * * Besides, it will be clear, on examination, that his illatives often miscarry, when taken as mere instruments or terms of logic, while, if we conceive him rushing on through so many "fors" and parenthesis, which belong to his old Pharisaic culture, and serve as a continuous warp of connections to his speech—now become the vehicle or channel, not for the modes of Rabbi Gamaliel, but for a stream of Christian fire—what before seemed to wear a look of inconsequence, assumes a post of amazing energy, and he becomes the fullest, heartiest and most irresistible of all the inspired writers of the Christian Scriptures."—pp. 75-6.

We had thought of commending to the perusal and study of our author, the celebrated chapter in Dr. Campbell's Rhetoric, in which the question, "how a man may write nonsense without knowing it," is ingeniously discussed and answered. But we fear that it would be far more suitable to recommend to him the concluding chapter of the first part of Hume's Treatise on Human Nature, in which the subtle philosopher describes the state of mind into which his speculations had brought him, a description which we were scarcely able to read without tears. A melancholy example of the danger of trifling with the truth and of abusing those faculties which God has given us for its investigation! It is not at all strange, that after a man has reached the conclusion, that all knowledge is equal to zero, he should be anxious to persuade himself, that suicide is an innocent thing, a mere "divesting of a little blood from its ordinary channel." Upon the principles of such a philosophy, the condition of an oyster is far preferable to that of a man; the

sophisticated mortals call the "reason," was his great weapon, before the star of cant arose above the horizon of philosophical speculation. Men sat in judgment upon the evidence and upon the subject matter of the documents which professed to be the word of God. They proceeded upon the supposition that the record meant what the received canons of interpretation compelled them to conclude *was meant*. They knew nothing of the science of hermineutical chemistry, which has been the source of so many splendid discoveries in our own day. The meaning of the record being ascertained, they brought it face to face with the logical judgments of the understanding, and decided either that it was no new substantive addition to their stock of knowledge, or that it was con-

oyster has no power of thought, and cannot know the misery of thinking which is doomed to hopeless uncertainty in all its conclusions, the misery of aspirations after truth which *must* be disappointed. Dr. Bushnell differs, it is true, from Mr. Hume. The one is brought to a negative of all belief, to absolute Pyrrhonism, by contradictions in nature: the other is brought to a negation of all disbelief, by *his theory* of contradictions in Theology. But we may rest assured, that Mr. Hume's conclusion is more logical than Dr. Bushnell's. The rule of logic, that "contradictories can never be both true or both false," is a rule which will hold, till the structure of the human understanding has been entirely subverted. Two and two make four, and two and two make five, are propositions which can never be both true. There is no "depth of consciousness" (unless there be a deep lower than the *lowest*, as the "poetic insight" of Milton hints that there is,) in which they can meet in *unity*. This we believe to be the insinictive and irresistible judgment of any sound understanding; and, therefore, it is our solemn conviction, that the tendency of the "discourses on God in Christ," is as mischievous as that of the "Treatise on Human Nature." It may be well enough for the doctors of the Church of Rome to teach that contradictions may be both true, for their doctrines require such a notion for their defence; but it is a shame for one who professes to be a champion of the Protestant cause, and of the rights of the human mind, (his system indeed needs it, but he ought not to hold a system which needs it,) to perpetrate such an outrage upon common sense. The distinction which he makes between kinds of truth, as absolute or relative, necessary or contingent, is a just distinction, but it does not help his case. A contradiction is a contradiction, (we hope he will not object to this statement,) and though it may be more readily detected in one class of ideas than in another, its nature is not changed. "No lie is of the truth."—1 John, ii. 21.

We deeply regret to see this theory of contradictions propounded, in another form, by Dr. Park of Andover, in his "Theology of the Intellect and Theology of the Feelings." We should not be surprised, if some future historian of opinions, should treat of these different systems in a chapter entitled, "On the Art of Lying made Easy." Such a historian would deserve more respect for his judgment than for his charity. We do not say that these gentlemen are not honest: we judge no man: but we do say, and are ready to maintain it, that their principles make havoc of all fair-dealing amongst men.

trary to what they knew to be true, or that it was incomprehensible, and that, in any or all aspects of the case, it could not be the word of God. There was something bold, frank, manly in that species of infidelity. The challenge was given to the friends of Christianity to meet its enemies on the field of argument: they met, and the issue of the controversy is very impressively proclaimed by the change in the mode of conducting the war. Satan has now entrenched himself behind fortifications which are impregnable against all the engines of the logical understanding. The enemies of the Gospel have refused to be tried by the rules of logic, agreeably to the custom of offenders generally, renouncing the jurisdiction of the court whose verdict, they are certain, will be against them. They have taken refuge in a power of the mind, called the "pure reason," "intuitional consciousness," "poetic insight," &c. (for, like other things of questionable moral character, it goes under more names than one), which takes cognizance of spiritual realities, immediately and directly, as the eye does of color, or the ear of sound, or the taste of beauty in works of art. To make a logical objection to any of their doctrines would imply the absurdity of the enthusiastic mathematician, who, when coming out of the theatre, was asked by his companion how he liked the performance, and replied, "I do not see what it *proved*." They disdain to argue with us: for, argue as you will with a man born blind as to the true notion of scarlet, he will obstinately persist that it is like the sound of a trumpet. They can only pity us, and we can only bewail our misery, that nature should thus have curtailed us of our fair proportions, and left us without a faculty so necessary to our comfort here and our blessedness hereafter.

This species of infidelity does not deny the inspiration of the Scriptures: it denies the inspiration of no man; on the contrary, it affirms the inspiration of all men. This wonder-working faculty may lie dormant: it is actually dormant in the whole human race, except in a few highly favored individuals, such as Paul, Peter, John, Schleiermacher, Bushnell, Morell and others. It may exist in a great variety of degrees. Some, with the eye in a fine frenzy rolling, only see the *shapes* of things unknown:

others, aroused to a higher energy of the intuitive faculty, see things unknown with no shape at all, or a shadow of a shape, or a very doubtful shape, like that of Milton's Death. When the faculty is excited, it becomes a powerful telescope, analyzing appearances, which, to those in whom it lies dormant, are mere nebulous lights, into clusters of brilliant suns. But we all have it, if we did but know it. Such being the case, there is no impropriety in infidels of this stamp becoming preachers of the Gospel. And thus Satan gives the finishing touch to his policy; the serpent tracks his slimy way into the very pulpits of our churches; and Christ and his apostles, if they cannot be satisfied with places in the Pantheon alongside of the preachers themselves, are either violently ejected, or bowed, with the blandest courtesy, to the door. Infidels of this sort are more dangerous than those of the class of Herbert of Cherbury, because they are in the church, and because they do not, like him, openly reject the divine authority of the Scriptures, or pretend to a peculiar supernatural revelation made by God to themselves. They use the language of spiritual religion, and appeal to the experience of men, to their intuitional consciousness or poetical insight, not to the Scriptures, for the truth of what they say. Religion comes to be regarded merely as a work of art, intended to accomplish its effects by impressions upon the imagination, not by convincing the understanding, or arousing the conscience. Whatever pleases is truth, whatever excites displeasure or disgust is falsehood, or rather there ceases to be any inquiry as to what is truth. If the question is ever asked, "What is truth?" it is asked in the spirit of Pontius Pilate, and, like him, the inquirer does not wait for an answer.*

* It would occupy too much space, to make quotations large enough to justify our representation of Dr. Bushnell's views on this point. He himself warns us, at the outset, that a man is not to be judged by single passages from his works, but that the impression is to be received from them as a whole: and this is specially true, he says, of a "many-sided writer," (that is, in the language of men, a writer who frequently contradicts himself,) who is never "able to stand in harmony before himself, (such is the nature of language,) save by an act of internal construction favourable to himself, and preservative of his *mental unity*." * * * Therefore every writer, not manifestly actuated by a malignant or evil spirit, is entitled to this indulgence. The mind must be offered up to him, for the time, with a certain degree of sympathy. [That is, in plain English, we must, as the Oxford Apostles re-

Now let us look at the consequences of this doctrine. If the sensibilities of men are made the criterion of truth, the Gospel will cease to be the Gospel, good news of *salvation*. Where there is no *loss*, there can be no *salvation*: where there is no sense of loss, there can be no sense of the need of salvation. But what does the "poetical insight" pronounce concerning the doctrine of loss or damnation? It cannot see deep enough to see it. Hell is no suggestion of the "pure reason." It is not recognized by the "intuitional consciousness." It shocks the tastes and sensibilities of inspired preachers and philosophers. It is, therefore, the dream of a morbid fancy, a nursery tale of horror, suited to quiet refractory children, but utterly beneath the notice of a full-grown man, who has ascended to an eminence from which he gazes directly and immediately upon the soul, the universe and God. If they refer to it at all, it is for poetical effect, and then the reference is, more to an unreal, imaginary hell, like that of the *Paradise Lost*, in which the devils are heroes in misfortune, nobly struggling for their rights, against the tyranny of power, than the hell of the Scriptures, whose fires have been kindled by the breath of God's justice, to consume the transgressors of law, overwhelmed with merited shame and everlasting

commend, "maintain before we have proved, and believe before we examine."] It must draw itself into the same position; take his constructions *feel* out, so to speak, his meanings, [truly, it is a darkness of Egypt, that may be *felt*,] and keep him, as far as may be, in a form of *general* consistency, [a labour of Hercules.] Then, having endeavoured thus, and for a sufficient length of time, to reproduce him or his thought, that is, to make a realization of him, some proper judgment may be formed in regard to the soundness of his doctrine."—p. 89. "They (human teachers) may be obscure, not from weakness only, which, certainly, is most frequent, but quite as truly by reason of their exceeding breadth, and the *piercing vigor of their insight*."—p. 91.

Our readers, we think, will now excuse us from quoting: for they would hardly have the patience to read the whole book in a note. We fear, that even after reading the whole volume, they would not be able, unless they should be so fortunate as to possess this "piercing vigour of insight," to see down into that "depth of consciousness," where truth and falsehood lay aside their hostility, and lovingly embrace each other, in "mental unity."—For the statements of the text, therefore, we refer generally to that part of the second discourse, which has the running caption at the head of the page, "Religion as in Art," from page 250 to 255, with the preceding pages from page 246.

As to the infidel tendencies of his principles, it is a very significant fact (if it be true, as stated in the public prints,) that his work is about to be published by an infidel book establishment in London.

contempt. Hell, as implying the *curse* of God, comes, in this way, to be placed in the expurgatory index of pulpit ministrations. This is not a fancy sketch. A writer in the Westminster Review, the organ of the Radical Party in Great Britain, (April, 1850,) in an article on the Church of England, ascribes the insufficiency of that establishment to the fact, as one cause, that its creed is behind the age, and its doctrines have become obsolete. One of these obsolete doctrines is that of a penal doom, threatened against impenitent offenders, in another world. In proof that this doctrine does not form a part of the current, popular faith, and therefore ought not to be taught, he alleges the acceptance in which the term salvation is commonly held: "A meaning," he says, "far different from the historical definition of divines, is currently given to the word *salvation*—a word, however, which, after every softening, is not sincerely congenial with the highest religion of the time. Its direct opposition to *damnation* is very much lost: and instead of denoting mere rescue from a penal doom, it is accepted as an expression for personal *union with God*, spiritual *perfectness of character*; or without reference to any penal alternative, the simple *attainment of a blessed and immortal state*." (The italics are the author's own.) The cold-blooded indifference with which this assertion is made, an assertion which stultifies the Bible, and makes it, indeed, a bundle of old wives' fables, unworthy the respect of a masculine understanding, is calculated to fill every sober mind with the most melancholy reflections. "Salvation, a word which, after every softening, is not sincerely congenial with the highest religion of the time!" The highest religion of the time, basing its pretensions to be so considered upon the repudiation of that doctrine which constitutes the discriminating characteristic of the Christian Religion! Paul was "not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ," because it was "the power of God unto *salvation*." When the angels descended to earth to announce the tidings of the birth of Jesus, it was not the advent merely of an illustrious prophet or a mighty king that filled them with rapture, but the advent of *Jesus*, Jehovah the *Saviour*. "Unto you there is born this day a *Saviour*, who is Christ the Lord." The proclamation which the Saviour put into the mouth of all his apostles was—"He

that believeth shall be *saved*: he that believeth not shall be *damned*." And yet, in the "highest religion" of the year eighteen hundred and fifty, there is nothing sincerely congenial with the idea of "*salvation*," and "the direct opposition of that term to *damnation*, is very much lost!"

Some simple people might conclude that this man is an infidel. But their simplicity misleads them. It is true that he not only laughs at the notion of a penal doom, but speaks contemptuously of the Mosaic cosmogony, and of the unity of the human race, and of other plain statements of the record. But he is not an infidel—he does not deny the inspiration of the Scriptures. He has only been a follower of Bushnell, and performing, under his direction, experiments in the "chemistry of thought," neutralizing and "liquidating contrarieties." The whole article bears evidence of the author's recent perusal of the "Discourses on God in Christ," and of his having been (to use his master's phrases) "drawn into the same position," "taken his constructions," "felt out his meanings," "reproduced him and his thought," and "made a realization of him." In the very paragraph from which the above citation is taken, the poetical theory of religion is formally announced.*

Such is one very natural consequence of the poetical or artistic theory. Men dislike to think of hell, even as a fancy. The most skilful and finished painting of the horrors of the damned will not please: admiration for the artist is lost in the terror inspired by the subject of his pencil. Some few men of sombre imaginations might be found, who could be charmed with the "Inferno" upon canvas: but the great majority of amateurs would much prefer a gallery, furnished exclusively from the descriptions of the Poet of the "Seasons." Hence, artistic preachers must say nothing about it, and, when once thoroughly *ignored*, it

* The reviewer quotes some long passages from Dr. Bushnell's book, on the subject *atonement*, with his cordial approbation. He is no fool, and is able to see that such a sentence of approbation is not at all inconsistent with the assertion, that "salvation, after every softening, is not sincerely congenial with the highest religion of the time." With the usual recklessness or ignorance of the English, when matters and things in America are concerned, he styles Dr. Bushnell an "orthodox divine," and a "Presbyterian Clergyman." As to his orthodoxy we say nothing—that depends upon the standard of comparison; but we most earnestly protest against his being called a "*Presbyterian*."

will cease to be beloved or feared, and all inquiry about *salvation* will cease.*

Another consequence of this view of religion, is the loss of a sense of responsibility for opinions. If judgments are to be framed upon *evidence*, a man is responsible for the state of mind, whether candid or otherwise, with which he examines the evidence: but in matters of mere taste and sensibility, it is different. We usually regard the absence of refined taste or delicate sensibility, as a misfortune rather than a crime. But if objective religion be a work of art, and we are to judge of it, as we do of a painting; then we are not responsible for our judgments. There is no moral element at all in the process. Let us hear Dr. Bushnell, as to the effect upon his own sense of responsibility: "As regards the views presented," says he, "I seem to have had only about the same agency in forming them, that I have in preparing the blood I circulate, and the anatomic frame I occupy. They are not my choice, or invention, so much as a necessary growth, whose process I can hardly trace myself, and now, in giving them to the public, I seem only to have about the same kind of option left me, that I have in the matter of appearing in corporal manifestation myself,—about the same anxiety, I will add, concerning the unfavourable judgments to be encountered; for though a man's opinions are of vastly greater moment than his looks, yet, if he is equally simple in them, as in his growth, and equally subject to his law, he is responsible only in the same degree, and ought not, in fact, to suffer any greater concern about their reception, than about the judgments passed upon his person."—pp. 97, 98.

We make no comments on this passage, but only quote the solemn words of the Son of God: "He that *believeth* not shall be damned." "If ye *believe* not that I am He, ye shall die in your sins." God grant that the opinions of these "Discourses" may not be laid to the author's charge!

But our author thinks that he finds his theory in the second chapter of the second epistle to the Corinthians:

* Men do not argue or feel so absurdly, when their own temporal interests are concerned. The gibbet, the penitentiary and the officers of police, no doubt, shock the sensibilities of thieves and assassins, but they are not abolished on that account, nor do they prove to be unreal bugbears to the transgressors of the law.

and as he does not often refer so specifically and particularly to the law and the testimony, it may be well to notice the passage. That chapter contains, certainly, a very strong assertion of the necessity of the Spirit's illumination, in order that the truth may be effectually understood. But we cannot see how it subserves Dr. Bushnell's purpose, except upon the supposition that the subject under consideration is the necessity of *inspiration*, and that this inspiration is given, though in different degrees, to all who are to understand spiritual things. We cannot admit that *he* is inspired, or that his notion of inspiration is a just one: and, therefore, must be allowed to say that this noble passage of the logical, scholastic apostle of the Gentiles, has nothing, as it appears to us, to do with his theory. It is not a gift of the Spirit bestowed upon a man to see what he pleases independently of the record, or to see what suits his tastes *in* the record: but a gift by which his understanding may apprehend the truth, and the heart feel the goodness and sweetness, of the things revealed in the word. Faith contains two elements, a conviction of the understanding and a sympathy of the heart: and the Spirit alone can produce either effectually. It appears to us that the doctrine of the "Discourses" makes the "spirit of a man" the judge of the things of God, which Paul says cannot be. We can refer our author to two places of the New Testament which seem to give more support to his *æstheticism* than the one upon which he mainly relies. They are Phil. i. 9, and Heb. v. 14. The word rendered "judgment," by our translators in the first, is *æsthesis* (*αἰσθησις*): the word rendered "senses," in the second, is *æstheteria* (*αἰσθητηρια*). And the Apostle seems to teach that there is a faculty for the apprehension of spiritual truth, analogous to the senses for the perception of external objects. But this is nothing more than the faculty of spiritual discernment of the chapter in second Corinthians: an illuminated and sanctified mind interpreting the logical revelation which God has given, with a tacit reference to the rapidity of its operation, a rapidity which is the natural result of "exercise" and which makes the faculty to resemble an instinct or taste. In cases where the record does not speak expressly or by necessary implication, the spiritual nature of a believer will often indicate to him the

will of God. "Be not conformed to this world; but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that *ye may prove what is that good and acceptable and perfect will of God.*" (Rom. xii. 2.) But this is the poles apart from the power contended for by our modern philosophers. It pretends to no vision of transcendental concrete realities; it is simply the power of judging, from our past familiarity with a person's character and opinions, and our sympathy with him, what his opinion would be in a given case, in reference to which we had never heard him express an opinion. In another form, it is the old maxim, "a sound heart is the best casuist."

We have greatly exceeded the limits which we had assigned to ourselves for the notice of these "Discourses," and conclude with expressing our earnest hope that the spirit of this Luciferian Philosophy may extend no farther in the ministry of the church. Satan fell into condemnation, through pride (probably) of understanding. The stress of the temptation by which Adam fell and brought death into the world and all our woe, was in the imagined virtue of the fruit, "to make one wise." It was listening to the suggestions of intellectual ambition, instead of following, with the simplicity of a child, the word of the Lord, which ruined him and ruined us in him. These great swelling words of vanity are rebuked even by the Pagan sages, and betray the shallowness of the thinking from which they spring. Sure we are, they are the words neither of truth nor soberness. They are not the Gospel of Jesus Christ; they are more like the ravings of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Christ crucified, Christ *made a curse* for us, Christ magnifying the law and making it honourable, Christ rising again for our justification and making perpetual intercession for us, Christ the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last, the all and in all; this is "the wisdom of God and the power of God to salvation." It is the exhibition of sovereign grace in Him, a grace bestowed freely, without money and without price; a grace which fixed upon the sinner before he was born and had done either good or evil; a grace which disdains commixture not only with human merit, but with human works; which lays the foundation and brings out the topstone; which imparts, developes and

completes the principle of spiritual life—it is the exhibition of sovereign grace like this, which brings the penitent prodigals of mankind back to their Father's house, with the confession, "We have sinned."

[NOTE.—As we have spoken in terms of some severity, of Dr. Park's discourse, in a note to the preceding article, we deem it just to add, that since the article was written, we have read a pamphlet of the author, containing forty-eight pages of remarks upon the strictures of the Biblical Repertory upon the Sermon. We are rejoiced to find that he holds more truth than we supposed, and a great deal more truth than the Doctor of Hartford. We, of course, receive the author's exposition of the leading design and main doctrines of the sermon, and the *dexterity* of his defence cannot be too highly applauded. "*Si Pergama dextra,*" &c. But we must say, that our opinion of the tendencies of the performance, remains unchanged. It is not fair to charge a man with inferences which he repudiates: but it is always fair to show, if we can, that such and such consequences do flow from his doctrines, and therefore that the doctrine is not true. It is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the mathematicians. One of the criteria which Dr. Park himself lays down in his last pamphlet, to discriminate between the true and the false, is "the *moral tendency* of a doctrine." To this test, we are perfectly willing to submit the "Discourses on God in Christ," and "The Theology of the Intellect and the Theology of the Feelings."]

ARTICLE V.

JOHN HOWARD.

John Howard, and The Prison World of Europe. From Original and Authentic Documents. By HEPWORTH DIXON. With an Introductory Essay by RICHARD W. DICKENSON, D. D. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1850.

The father of profane history sets forth his object, in committing to writing his researches into the annals of the past, in these words: "That the things done by men might not be forgotten in the lapse of time, and the great and wonderful deeds of Greeks and barbarians remain unsung." If deeds, which can be traced back to a selfish ambition as their principle, which have caused their authors