




# MEMORIAL BOOK

OF

THE SESQUICENTENNIAL CELEBRATION OF THE FOUNDING OF THE COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY AND OF THE CEREMONIES INAUGURATING

# PRINCETON UNIVERSITY



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versity, and the entire assembly sang the One Hundredth Psalm.

Professor De Witt, of the Princeton Theological Seminary, read the third chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, and then President Patton preached the following sermon :

### RELIGION AND THE UNIVERSITY.

FOR OTHER FOUNDATION CAN NO MAN LAY THAN THAT IS LAID, WHICH IS JESUS CHRIST.

1 Cor. iii. 11.

THE first charter of the College of New Jersey was signed by John Hamilton, "President of His Majesty's Council," on the twenty-second day of October, 1746. A second charter, still more liberal in its provisions, was obtained from Governor Belcher in 1748.

It was surely the day of small things when a little company of Presbyterians in the city of New York and its vicinity interested themselves in establishing a seat of learning in the Province of New Jersey as a means of providing a liberal education for young men intending to enter the ministry. The ineffectual efforts which they had previously made, and their ultimate success, bear striking testimony to the religious intolerance of the times, the more enlightened policy of President Hamilton and Governor Belcher, and the liberal spirit of the founders of the new institution, who, though Presbyterians by conviction, and actuated, in the main, by zeal for the religious necessities of their own church, accepted without scruple a charter which gave no advantage to any denomination, and, beyond a scheme for liberal culture, made no specific provision for the needs of any profession.

The spirit of the founders has been kept alive in their successors. The interests of the college have always been in the hands of religious men, and of men, I may



say, belonging, as a rule, to a particular branch of Protestant Christendom; but it has never been under ecclesiastical control. It has served the Church and it has served the State without in any sense being under the authority of either. The founders of the College of New Jersey did not establish a theological school with a preparatory department in arts; they established a Faculty of Arts with an embryonic department of theology. There is a great difference between the two methods, and this difference has determined the course of Princeton's subsequent development. The establishment, at a later date, in Princeton of a theological school under ecclesiastical control made it unnecessary and unwise to continue theological instruction in the college; and from that time until now the teaching force of the College of New Jersey has consisted of a single University Faculty of Arts. Thanks to the liberal policy of her founders, thanks also to the wise Christian spirit of those who have guided her course, Princeton College, though ever hospitable to new ideas, and ever ready to recognize new truth, has throughout her history been true to the spirit of those who founded her, and has never had reason to feel that in any instance she has violated her charter, or been unfaithful to the moral obligations imposed by the labors and benefactions of the Christian men who have been interested in her welfare.

Considered in respect to nations and periods that are characterized by immobility, the lapse of a hundred and fifty years is not a matter that need call for special commemoration. But in this country the beginning of such a period antedates the national life. Princeton shares with her older sisters, Harvard and Yale, the distinction of a life coeval with our national independence, and she claims for herself a distinction, shared in equal degree by

no other institution, of being a large factor in the making of the nation. Of the part that Princeton played in the Revolutionary struggle; of President Witherspoon, who signed the Declaration of Independence; of the Princeton men, and particularly of Madison and Paterson and Oliver Ellsworth, who helped to make the Constitution of the United States; of the meeting of the Continental Congress in this place and under the roof of Nassau Hall, you will in all probability be told by another speaker on a later occasion. It is enough for me, having mentioned these names in connection with the political history of the country, to add to them the names of Henry and Guyot in science; of Jonathan Edwards and James McCosh in philosophy; of the Alexanders and Hodges in theology; and then to ask if I am making an empty boast when I say that Princeton has won for herself a conspicuous place in the intellectual history of America.

It has been the aim of those who have governed this institution to make and keep it a Christian college. The men who have contributed to its endowment and administered its affairs and taught in its class-rooms have been Christian men. They have been men of deep conviction regarding God and his government, and they have had high ideas respecting their responsibility for the use of time and money. There is in the history of the college, in what she has done and in what she has been saved from doing, in what she has achieved and in what she has escaped, abundant reason for profound gratitude. Filled, then, with these thoughts of the past, and standing upon the threshold of a new period in the history of this institution, let us give thanks to God for the good that has been done in his name by the men who have served it and the men who have gone out from it; and let us pray that to us upon whom devolves

the responsibility of opening a new era in the educational policy of Princeton there may be granted that wisdom which shall save us from mistakes, and that grace which shall enable us to use for God's glory the power and influence that are given to us by reason of our place in the organic life of a great institution.

Our history, as I cannot help believing, is also a prophecy. There has been ample time in that history for the line of tendency along which we are likely to develop to reveal itself. For there is an analogy between the history of an institution and the growth of an organism, and growth is recalcitrant to interference from without. You may shape your block of marble as you will, but you must be content to see the process of self-realization go on in the organism according to the logic of its inner life. There are universities that are made in obedience to the wills of their founders, which have no tradition to conserve. They are free to shape their policy in unhampered independence of the past. But it is not so with us. We have come to be what we are through the slow growth of a hundred and fifty years.

We have our own ideas of education, which are, in part, the result of our experience, and, in part, perhaps, an expression of our conservatism. We give large place in our curriculum to contemporaneous knowledge, but we are unwilling to part with our modest heritage of Hellenic culture. We believe in specialization, but we also believe that the student makes a mistake when, in his haste to win his spurs in some narrow field of inquiry, he foregoes the advantage of a broad general education. Intellectual discipline is good, but it is not so important as high manhood; and, eager though we may be to turn out from year to year a few men of high intellectual attainment, we

deem it far more important that the great body of our graduates should be men of moral courage and religious convictions, public-spirited, patriotic, and possessed of clear, balanced, and discriminating judgment in regard to public questions.

Princeton has a great work to do in science, philosophy, and literature. I have no doubt that she will do it well. I hope she will continue to do it under Christian rubrics without any loss of moral initiative or religious faith.

I confess that I am not without my anxieties when I think of the future of our American institutions in relation to their religion. I see no reason why I should not feel anxiety in regard to Princeton, for we cannot hope to escape altogether from the operation of the forces that are potent elsewhere.

I feel inclined to-day, speaking not to Princeton men alone, nor in regard to Princeton specifically, to employ the time allotted to me in considering the relation of religion to the university. I do not know of any subject that could more properly be considered in a sermon addressed to an academic audience; nor do I know of a time when this theme could be more seasonably treated than that which is given me in connection with these religious services with which we begin our Sesquicentennial Celebration that is designed to commemorate the history of the College of New Jersey and to inaugurate Princeton University.

## I

I CANNOT better begin what I have to say on this subject than by reminding you of the fact that religion—and by that I mean, of course, the Christian religion—is the genetic antecedent of the university. It

is true that we cannot impute a distinctively religious origin to the universities of Salerno and Bologna, and if we are looking for an explanation that will apply equally to all the mediæval universities, we must pay for our comprehensiveness by being correspondingly vague; and then we can do no better than say with Mr. Rashdall that the rise of the university is due to the spirit of association that spread over Europe during the middle ages, and that the universities were simply guilds of learning. Even then, however, it might be worth while to ask whether these guilds, as illustrating the fellowship of kindred minds, did not receive a new impetus from Christianity, which itself was an expansion of the idea of the higher kinship as expounded by the Saviour when he said, "Whosoever doeth the will of my Father in heaven, the same is my mother and sister and brother." But whatever be the origin of the Southern universities, those of the North (and they are the prototypes of our American colleges and universities) were undoubtedly the outgrowth of Christianity. The religion of Christ gave men new ideals. It turned them from the quest of pleasure and the love of plunder to a life of contemplation and the pursuit of knowledge. It made them thoughtful, serious, and reverent. Thinking is also religion, I believe Hegel somewhere says; and whether he is right or not, it is certain that the man who takes a serious view of life and has learned to appreciate the deep mystery of Being is not far from the place of communion with God. Christianity popularized philosophy. For the Christian's creed was a metaphysic; and the man who had been taught to believe in Creation, the Incarnation, the Trinity, Sin, and the Atonement was obliged in the nature of the case to have a very considerable theory of the universe. Many

of us, I dare say, remember that we took our first lessons in philosophy in the pew, and that we got our first impulse to think through the sermon. I believe it is Stevenson who says that there is "a hum of metaphysical divinity about the cradle of every Scot." There can be little doubt, I think, that the religious training of the Scottish people has had much to do in making them the metaphysical people that they are. Christianity has done for the world what a particular type of it has done in a more marked way for Scotland. It has forced men to think. It has made learning a necessity for all who wish to be intelligently informed in regard to religion, and a particular necessity for those who were the official expounders of Christianity. The mediæval universities were, for the most part, in the hands of the clergy, because they had most need of them and could make best use of them; for it must never be forgotten that if to-day there are other professions that require quite as much learning as the clerical, there was a time when it was the only profession that required any. If now, in addition to what has been said, it be remembered that Christianity inculcated philanthropy and high ideas respecting the duties of citizenship, we shall see how largely it enters as a constitutive element in the making of the modern university.

The stages of university history can be roughly indicated, though we must not press the idea of chronological sequence too far. First came the democratic guild of scholars and masters devoting themselves to the study of law as in Bologna, or to scholastic divinity as in Paris, and living without endowments or even fixed places of abode. Then came the period of endowed foundations—and perhaps it would be as well to take William of Wykeham as a typical example of the great

patrons of learning, for he, says Mr. Rashdall, "may be allowed the credit of having been the first college founder who required his scholars to say their prayers morning and evening and go to chapel daily." Then in the New World came the colleges like those in New England, like Princeton, like Lafayette, like a multitude besides in the middle and western States, which were the direct outgrowth of Christian philanthropy, and which were established with the avowed purpose of giving a liberal education from the Christian point of view. Then came the State universities, and, last of all, the triumph of Christian philanthropy in the lavish use of wealth on the part of men like John C. Green, Johns Hopkins, Ezra Cornell, and John Rockefeller, for the more complete equipment of existing institutions or the establishment of new universities. Now, though the circumstances attending the establishment of colleges and universities are different in different cases, and though the religious motive in the establishment of some of the more recent universities by private beneficence, and particularly in the establishment of universities under control of the State, is not so manifest as in the establishment of those which are more directly identified with the religious interests of a particular denomination of Christians, I am disposed to give Christianity credit for them all. I have not yet known of a State university where the profession of atheism was regarded as a desirable quality in a professor, and I happen to know of more than one State university where a sympathetic attitude toward revealed religion is regarded as an essential qualification for a teacher of philosophy. I am glad to have Princeton in that goodly fellowship of American colleges that have been established by Christian men, and have been built upon

Christian foundations. I believe that these colleges have done, and are still doing, a work of priceless value for the Church and for the State. And yet I sometimes wonder whether more use might not be wisely made of the State universities; whether a wise economy of resources as in the newer States might not suggest such an affiliation of various educational interests as would serve to throw around young men a distinctly Christian influence, and at the same time open to them the opportunities of a wide range of study which only a large institution can afford to offer. I recognize very distinctly the fact that the ranks of the ministry have been recruited very largely from the smaller denominational colleges, and I must not for a moment be understood as in any sense detracting from the immense services which those colleges have rendered and have yet to render, or as implying that they deserve any but the most liberal support of the denominations to which they naturally appeal, when I say that at the present day it is a matter of some importance that a very considerable number of those who enter the sacred calling should be very intelligently informed in respect to the questions now involved in science and philosophy before they enter upon the professional study of theology; and that it would be a misfortune if the time should ever come when it would be the strong men of the weak colleges and the weak men of the strong colleges upon whom we should mainly rely to fill up the ranks of the Christian ministry.

I do not wish, however, to ignore the fact that true though it may be that the universities are in a general way the offspring of Christianity, there are universities (and Princeton is one of them) that may be regarded as distinctly Christian institutions. Still they

are Christian rather in the conditions of their origin than in the contents of their curricula. Their object is not so much to teach religion as to teach science in a religious spirit. It is more in the way they teach than in what they teach that they deserve to be called Christian schools. Hence a Christian college is not to be judged by the amount of religion that it teaches, or the place it assigns to the Scriptures in its curriculum. In the colleges and universities of which I speak, Christianity underlies, informs, unifies, and is the unexpressed postulate of all instruction. And this Christian spirit that practically affects teaching without announcing itself, which presupposes Christianity without any irritating self-assertion, is on the whole the most effective. Not that it is to be expected that a Christian university should be reticent in regard to the truths of religion. Indeed, as I shall at present be at pains to show, it cannot be. And so it has come to pass that the university has had its share of religious controversy. Very naturally; for when religion plants a seat of learning and installs a faculty, it clearly says that religion is ready to be tried by rational tests. The child of the Christian consciousness, the university by and by becomes its critic. Born of Christianity, the time comes when it attains its majority and refuses to remain in ecclesiastical leading-strings. This may seem ungrateful, but it cannot be helped. The necessary consequence of the alliance between religion and the university is the rationalizing of religion. It is easy to see that the extremes of tendency are superstition on the one hand and infidelity on the other. Ecclesiasticism pure and simple may easily run to the one extreme; intellectualism pure and simple may as easily run to the other. How to be saved from either may be difficult; but we

may be sure that the religion which in the last analysis will not bear examination must go down. *Credo quia impossibile* is not the basis of a sound apologetic; and whether it be Tertullian or Mr. Kidd who would have us think so, it can never be rational to believe in an irrational religion.

The rationalizing process may go wrong, but that is no reason why men should stop thinking; and a university is a very dead place if the men in it do not think. When, therefore, the masters of the University of Paris told the Pope that on a certain matter of dogmatic theology they were more competent to speak than he was, they were doing exactly what they might have been expected to do, and in doing this were the precursors of that movement which put so many of the universities of northern Europe on the side of Protestantism and made them the embodiments of the spirit of religious independence. When I say that the criticism of religion in the university is inevitable, I am not saying that it is of the essence of the university that its teachings should be absolutely free. I have nothing to say here by way of objection to those universities where absolute freedom of teaching is the rule. There are universities, I know, where that absolute freedom would not be allowed. So far as Princeton is concerned I find myself in very agreeable harmony with what one of my younger colleagues has said in a recent periodical. "Princeton," says Professor Daniels, "is definitely and irrevocably committed to Christian ideals. It has therefore, with reference to certain primary problems, already taken a definite position. It stands for a theistic metaphysic. Nor does it claim or desire any reputation for impartiality or open-mindedness which is to be purchased by a sacrifice of this its traditional philosophic

attitude." Princeton then, as we are told, "stands for a theistic metaphysic." The critic might say, if he were so disposed, that with equal reason it might be made to stand for something less, or might be made to stand for something more; and that there is something arbitrary about the boundary line that separates the kingdom of fixed belief from that of free discussion. Now I venture to say that the weight of the sentence that I have thought sufficiently significant to quote lies not so much in what Princeton is said to stand for as in the fact that she is said to stand for something; and I can easily believe that the exact *quantum* of belief for which Princeton stands may be some thing about which individuals may now differ and may vary from age to age. What Princeton stands for really depends upon those who govern her. No matter what our origin was; what was believed one hundred and fifty years ago; what Christian symbol or legend we put on the university seal; what moral obligations are imposed by gifts of generous benefactors,—the exact amount of religious belief that this university will stand for can be determined only by the amount of belief that the trustees have the moral courage to enunciate in the form of a resolution. That will depend upon the state of public opinion; the degree of sensitiveness to public opinion on the part of men who hold the places of responsibility; and the amount of strong conviction ready for expression at any given time by the governing body.

This only shows how solemn the responsibility is which rests upon the twenty-seven men who control Princeton University. They have power to vote in the election of their colleagues, but no power to direct their votes after they take office. We have received this institution from a past generation, and we hold it

with absolute power of tradition to the next. We cannot bind our successors. We may install them with due solemnity of precatory phrase, but we cannot predict or control their action. The sacred interests of Princeton are in our keeping. We have but a simple duty respecting their transfer to the next generation. St. Paul has expressed that duty in his own words to Timothy: "The things which thou hast heard of me, the same commit thou to faithful men who shall be able to teach others also."

## II

THERE is another phase of the subject with which we are dealing. It concerns the inquiry as to the extent to which religion, and particularly the Christian religion, should enter into the curriculum of the university. There are two extreme positions sometimes taken by those who express themselves upon this question. There are some who seem to suppose that it is proper and possible to exclude all reference to religion, and confine the work of university instruction to strictly secular themes. Others, again, seem not to realize the changed conditions of university life, and suppose that it is easy to carry on through the entire undergraduate curriculum a scheme of enforced religious instruction based upon an accepted type of thought in respect to the Bible and revealed religion. I am confident that a more careful study will show that both of these positions are wrong; and that nothing requires more wisdom, tact, and knowledge of the actual conditions of thought in the learned world than the problem of religion in the university. It is a very large subject, and I question whether it can be adequately dealt with by any one who is not in actual contact with undergraduate life, and who is not aware



of the ins and outs of thought in it; and who, moreover, is not by reason of professional study brought into close relations with the religious problems of the present day. For myself, I believe that in the early years of undergraduate life a course of elementary biblical instruction, adapted to the needs of young men who are no longer school-boys on the one hand, and are not yet students of philosophy on the other, is a most important part of the curriculum; but I would not carry biblical instruction into the upper years of the curriculum, unless, in point of scientific thoroughness, it could compare favorably with the work done in other departments; and then, of course, I would not make it compulsory, though I firmly believe that advanced students in philosophy and literature should have the opportunity of seeing how the problems of literature and philosophy bear upon the Bible and Christianity. For if secular themes are to be discussed in a Christian university in a religious spirit and under Christian conceptions, it is no less true that religious themes must be discussed in a scientific spirit and according to scientific principles. It is impossible for a university to discharge its functions without declaring itself upon the great question of religion. The subject no longer lies within the easy possibilities of definition which existed half a century ago. Then the student of Reid or Dugald Stewart debated the question of mediate or immediate perception, or accepted the easy account of the mental powers as they were mapped out for him in the psychology of introspection, and seldom went any deeper. His religious faith was buttressed by a course of lectures on the evidences of Christianity, which treated as postulates what have since become some of the most serious problems of our times. There were religious difficulties to be dealt with, but they lay,

for the most part, in a remote corner of the field of inquiry, and concerned questions like the days of Genesis and the extent of the Deluge. It is otherwise now; for the doctrine of evolution has made a great change in regard to the place of religion in the studies of the universities. Every subject is considered from the historical point of view and according to the genetic method; and, whether we approve of it or not, the religious problem is forced into prominence. A man cannot study genetic psychology and metaphysics and the theory of knowledge at the present day without facing the problem of a separate and enduring selfhood, and without asking whether the world is to be construed according to a theistic or a pantheistic metaphysic. It is idle for the theologians to attempt, as the Ritschlians do, to exclude metaphysics from theology; but it is just as idle for the philosopher to talk of excluding theology from metaphysics; theology is philosophy and philosophy is theology, so far as the question of the relation of God to the world is concerned. All problems in philosophy go back to two questions: whether God exists separate from the world, and whether we exist separate from God. The fate of religion lies in the answer to these questions. When, therefore, the student is wrestling with the problems of metaphysics, he is putting his religious faith on trial. It is easy, then, to see the vital relations which the chair of philosophy sustains to practical Christianity, and the responsibility that one assumes when he undertakes to be guide, philosopher, and friend to the young man who finds himself obliged to seek for himself a fresh orientation in reference to his religious belief. Now, if one half of our religion, or what is commonly called natural religion, is necessarily involved in the study of philosophy, the

other half, or what is known as revealed religion, is as necessarily involved in the study of history. We should hardly think of excluding the history of civilization from the studies of the university, yet it would be difficult, I imagine, to treat the history of institutions without reference to Christianity, or to trace the history of ethical ideas without mentioning the New Testament, or to write the history of opinion in respect to social morality without regard to the Sermon on the Mount and the Pauline literature. These writings may, doubtless, be referred to without raising the question of their authority; but that question must be raised sooner or later, because the question respecting authority is involved in that of origin; and the question respecting the origin of the sacred books is involved in the question respecting the place of Christianity in the history of the world; and this again is part of the broader question respecting the meaning and the history of religion. Any theory that undertakes to explain human history must be adequate to give a rational explanation of religion. It is not merely because of its practical importance, but also because of its persistent universality, that it has become the object of so much interest to the philosopher. Hence it happens that the most earnest students of the phenomena of religion are not always religious men, but men, often, who are anxious to show that their theories which destroy the value of religion are abundantly adequate to explain it. Now, when one enters upon the study of the history of religion, I do not see how he can content himself with the simple recognition of Christianity as one of the forms in which the religious consciousness has been manifested; or how he can avoid assuming some attitude in respect to the exceptional claims that Christianity makes in its own behalf. He

knows what attitude some of the philosophers are taking. They are becoming constructive theologians. They are lecturing on Jesus and St. Paul, and expounding the ethics and metaphysics of the New Testament in the interests of naturalism. What shall he do? Shall the agnostic be free to deny the claims of Christianity, and he be hindered from defending it? Now I venture to say that the philosophical construction of the facts of Christianity is forced upon us by the conditions of thought under which we live; and that there is no subject wider in its sweep, more imperative in its claim, and more momentous in the issues with which it deals, than the philosophy of religion. Into the making of it go one's psychology, one's ethic, one's metaphysic, one's history, one's literary criticism; and on it depend in greater or less degree one's social science, one's politics, one's jurisprudence, one's theology, one's religion. The day has passed when religion was regarded as something very important, but not very interesting. There are too many, I fear, who do not regard it as important; but among philosophers it is generally conceded to be interesting. No well-appointed university can refrain from dealing with its problems. For us there can be but one of two positions: we must be silent and hand over the discussion to the sceptic, or we must show ourselves worthy of the high place we have already won in the department of religious philosophy, and take a strong position on the side of historic Christianity. There is little doubt among us, I think, respecting the attitude that Princeton should ever hold. Leaving to the theological schools and to the appropriate ecclesiastical tribunals the discussion of questions in divinity on which the churches are divided, and standing aloof from sectarian contro-

versy, it is our duty to hold ourselves ready for the defence of those fundamental truths in philosophy and in religion, in the maintenance of which Christians of every name have a common interest. I hope that Princeton will always stand for belief in the living God, the immortal self, an imperative morality, and the Divine Christ. On this broad platform all the true friends of Princeton can meet, and here we must stand if we would be true to the spirit of our history and continue to deserve the confidence of Christian men.

### III

I TRUST that I have made it clear that I fully recognize the fact that however true it may be that Christian ideas have been the moving causes in the endowment of universities and particularly of this, and however much it may be proper and even inevitable that the great fundamental truths of Christianity should have place in university teaching, the particular end for which the university exists is not primarily the promotion of religion. The university should not be expected to do the work of the Church. It has ends of its own, and these are not distinctively religious. And yet we cannot keep religion altogether out of our minds when we consider these ends. Religion is indeed, as a little reflection will show, necessary to the full and satisfactory realization of the ends for which the university exists; and it is in this light that I now wish to regard it.

It is not necessary to lay stress upon the mediæval distinction between the university of masters and the university of scholars for the purpose of settling questions of precedence or of determining the relations they sustain to each other. It would hardly be denied on

the one hand that the professor's business is to teach; and it would be pretty generally conceded on the other that more is expected of him than the discharge of his pedagogic functions. But the distinction I have referred to will serve a good purpose if it reminds us that the professors of a university sustain a relation to the general public apart from the relation they sustain to the students who listen to their instruction. They constitute the priesthood of learning, and are set apart for the service of truth. Besides training young men for the active duties of life, it may be fairly expected of them that they should enlarge the borders of knowledge and contribute substantially to the formation of a sound public opinion. These, indeed, I take it, are the three great functions of the university. The institution that is not doing something in each of these directions is not accomplishing the work it was intended to do; and for the successful accomplishment of this work a reverent attitude toward religion and a certain amount of religious faith would seem to be a logical necessity.

I lay stress upon that side of the professor's life which relates him to the general public, for the non-academic consciousness does not always properly apprehend it. The professor would not think that his calling were possessed of so much inherent dignity if he regarded himself simply as the means of imparting to a body of mediocre and often very idle young men the modest amount of knowledge that they acquire during a college course; and he would particularly resent the crude Philistinism that regards him simply in the light of an employé. The dignity of the professor's calling can be maintained only by regarding the incumbent of this office as holding a commission as an independent seeker after truth. There is something fascinating in such a life.

In its fine scorn of material things, in its dignified and independent simplicity, there is surely something to admire. We cannot help feeling, it is true, that intellectual labor is sometimes wasted on very unimportant matters; and that much of what was never known before is not worth knowing; and that original research so often means only infinite pains for the gathering of facts that involve no theory and help no generalization and apparently serve no other purpose than to verify the statement that of making many books there is no end, and that much study is a weariness of the flesh. Then, too, we find it hard sometimes to bear the great man's arrogance and conceit; and it disappoints us to see him enter the world's market and sell his rash judgments and crude novelties for such poor price of place or fame as the world will give. But, after all, the marvel is that the appetite for learning and the zest with which men engage in intellectual toil should be so enduring. I particularly wonder at the intellectual earnestness of men who have discarded all religious belief. They seem to be so inconsistent and illogical; they especially impress me so when they employ their energies in seeking to destroy the world's faith in God, for they seem to be undermining their own career and leaving it without a reason. For on the supposition that the world is a system of thought-relations there is something natural in man's persistent effort to explain his *habitat* and give an account of himself. For whether God be our unreached goal of endeavor, the ideal Good, the infinite Knower in front of us, above and beyond; or whether it be that the inspiration of the Almighty gives man understanding, so that he is the master light of all our seeing: in either case there is a religious element in all inquiry; there is something that partakes almost of a

religious act in every serious effort to understand the world; there is something almost sacramental in the apprehension of a great idea which at the same moment interprets the world and brings the mind into fellowship with God. I believe that the indwelling Spirit of God is the source of our curiosity; that our restless seeking after the right understanding of the world is one of the ways in which God reveals himself; that the religious nature of man is the key to his intellectual activity and the basis of even his irreligious zeal; that if there were no God and no fellowship between God and man, if all that is were explicable in the terms of matter and motion, there could be no ideals and no intellectual ambition; that if man should lose his faith in God, he would lose his love of truth; and that the death of religion would be the death of intellectual endeavor.

There is another work which the university ought to perform. It should contribute toward the forming of a sound public opinion. In a broad and far-reaching sense it should teach patriotism. There is, I grant, a great deal to justify the confidence with which we rest in the sober second thought of the nation, and the optimism which makes us feel that the common sense of the American people is equal to any emergency. The essential morality of the people of our land, as it finds expression in the pulpit and the press, is a great source of comfort in a time of national peril. And yet when fundamental morality is assailed, when revolutionary views of government are publicly expounded, when socialistic theories find plausible advocates, it will not do to rely altogether upon popular sentiment or the common sense of the American people. We must do something to keep this common sense from being corrupted, and this must consist of something more than popular harangue and

the florid iteration of the commonplaces of morality. There must be deep philosophical discussion of great public questions by men of acknowledged authority in political, social, and economic science. This work can be done better in the universities than anywhere else. This is what I mean when I say that the university should be a school of patriotism. Of a certain type of patriotism there is no lack. We may trust the instincts of our people, without any help from academic sources, to resist foreign interference and defend national honor. We understand without being reminded of it that this land is our heritage and that this western civilization is our problem. But the day is past when national pride and patriotic devotion can be best exhibited by awakening the memories of international antagonism. We are in no danger of invasion. Our foes are those of our own household. Our difficulties are those which we share with other nations. They are evils incident to the struggle for the democratization of government, or that are consequent on its rapid development; that follow as a consequence of the congested life of great cities, or grow out of the complicated machinery of industrialism. We who believe in the stability of government as an ordinance of God should stand by each other in all civilized lands on account of the dangers common to all. I believe that the universities have something to do toward helping on the cause of good feeling between the nations, and particularly between those two nations that are so closely bound to each other by the ties of blood, the bonds of a common speech, a common law, and a common religion. Part of the history that we commemorate and of which we are proud is the place that Princeton took in the struggle for independence against the mother-land. And

now I trust that Princeton, as she enters upon a new era in her history, will do her part toward the formation of a public sentiment that shall make it impossible for the clash of arms ever to be heard again between the two great nations of the English-speaking world. I hope that she will do something to stimulate the development of the international conscience, to widen the range of international law, and to hasten the day when international disputes shall be settled by arbitration. International law rests on a basis of morality. It is essentially a university study, and I should like to see Princeton take a high place in connection with its development.

But, as I have already implied, the questions which give us most cause for anxiety are national, and not international. The question with us is whether the popular will is still on the side of constitutional government; whether the public conscience will stand by the financial integrity of the nation; whether great cities can have good government; and whether the ten commandments shall continue to regulate social behavior. It is true that a campaign of education is needed. But it is an education beyond that which the statistician and the collector of facts can give us. It is an education beyond that which appeals to our selfish greed. It must be an education which goes to the roots of our moral life. For purposes of convenience you may entrust the science of ethics to one man, and of politics to another, and of jurisprudence to a third. The economist may study the laws of industrial activity, and the student of social science deal with the pathological conditions of society—the poverty, the moral pollution, the crime; but when we come to ask whether the remedy is to be found in *laissez faire*, or the interference of the state, or in moral

measures, we shall find that no department is isolated and distinct; that our metaphysics, our ethics, our jurisprudence, our economics, our politics, our social science, all overlap each other; that all are comprehended in the one idea that we live in a moral universe. I do not like the phrase Christian socialism, and I certainly do not agree with the opinion entertained by those who use it most. But if Christianity is true, we cannot afford to ignore what it has to say; and there can be no sound public opinion upon these great ethical problems which does not make acknowledgment of the binding obligations of the laws of the kingdom of God.

But there is another work which the university is expected to do; and this, though it does not so completely fill the imagination of the ambitious professor who dreams of fame, is nevertheless the greatest work which it can do. It is the province of the university to train men, by means of a liberal education, for the active duties of life. It is given only to a few to add to the world's stock of knowledge; it is only at rare intervals that we shall succeed in turning out a great thinker who will make his mark upon his age. But our colleges and universities are contributing every year to the moral and intellectual forces of the world a body of young men whose aggregate influence is enormous. It would be a mistake if we should ever come to undervalue this work in Princeton or assign it a second place. There may easily be too many men engaged in the special work of the scholar; there are only limited opportunities for a career in science; but there is an unlimited demand for men who can bring to the discharge of the ordinary duties of citizenship the advantages of a liberal education. The best work of Princeton is represented to-day in her 3916 living graduates. They are our let-

ters of commendation. It is of course not to be expected of the average graduate that he should be a technical scholar. But we have done something if we have opened the eyes of his understanding, that he may know what the world of thought and learning means. We have done something if we have helped him so to widen the area of his selfhood and adjust it to the world he lives in that he can enter into appreciative relationship with the true, the beautiful, and the good. We have done something if we have so impressed his moral nature that he is able to have worthy ideals in regard to his own life, and a comprehensive sense of the duties of citizenship. We have rendered no small service to the world if as the result of our work the men who go out from our halls are so appreciative of whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are of good report, that they will think on these things. It needs no argument to show that the complete man is he whose culture culminates in religion. The utilitarian view of education, which regards it as a means to an end, is not to be despised. I should not be so unpractical as to overlook the fact that education helps a man to make a place in the world, to win fortune, fame, and power. But a large place must be given to religion in the profit and loss account of life; for what shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul? University men are in an ever increasing degree to be the influential men in this nation. These are the men to whom we must look to be the standard-bearers of a high morality, to set an example of unselfish living for worthy ends; and that their influence may be good in the ratio that it is great, it is necessary that their moral and religious na-

tures shall be trained as well as their intellectual powers. We might well feel discouraged if the educated men of this land should cease to be religious. And if the graduates of our universities should turn their backs upon the religion of their fathers, we might well exclaim: "If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!"

#### IV

THIS leads me to say, in a closing word, that the religious thought of the university must inevitably affect the popular religion. University men set the intellectual fashion of the day in religion as in other things. I do not mean by this, of course, that religion will hold its own by the grace of university authorities, any more than I believe that God depends on the good-will of the philosophers for the popular recognition of his authority. Believing as I do in revealed religion, I do not believe that it will be destroyed by the labors of a few professors of historical and literary criticism. But there may be, as there have been, times of religious declension and relative loss of faith. And it is a matter of great moment to religion whether or no the intellectual atmosphere in the university is favorable to serious religious thought. I should like to see a less absorbing interest in sport and a more serious intellectual tone. I would not cut off social pleasure from university life; but I would not have a university career degenerate into a period of indolent enjoyment. I would not take life too seriously; but I would not make it a jest. There is reason to fear that men may become sceptics, but there is more reason to fear that they will lapse into indifference. There is a one-sided culture that may prove itself the enemy of all that is deepest and

best in our nature. There is a type of Hellenism that ends in a pagan rehabilitation of the flesh, where the sensuous love of beauty slides easily into sensual disregard of morals. There is a scientific devotion to material facts which may end in the atrophy of the finer elements of our spiritual nature, and so affect our poetry, our sentiment, our hope, our trust in the Father in heaven. These are tendencies in university life that awaken anxiety in thoughtful minds.

And yet I do not think that the religious influence of the university is only, or even chiefly, negative. From the time of Wickliffe in Oxford and Huss in Prague until the present day, the universities have been centres of religious movements. We have had Puritanism and Rationalism and Sacramentarianism. Christianity has been attacked and it has been defended by university men. There have been periods of negative theology and periods of apologetic. And with the thought of the day on all questions centring in and involving religious problems, one cannot help believing that the university will soon be the centre of another religious movement. It will not be patristic and it will not be Puritan in form; but it must be constructive. It will attempt the synthesis of modern thought in history, philosophy, and criticism in reference to the problem of Christianity. The process may not go on as we could wish, and there may not go into it all that we could desire; but the work will proceed upon the basis of the written Word and the Word made flesh. The Logos will be the key to our metaphysic, our history, our social philosophy, our theory of life. The men who engage in this work will rebuild the edifice of faith upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone. I do

not know what part Princeton will have in this religious movement which—dare I prophesy it?—may open the twentieth century. It would be strange if she should have none. The fathers of this institution have laid the foundations deep and strong. It is ours to build thereon. Let us take heed how we build thereupon. Let us especially be careful not to undo the work already done: for other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ.

But whatever be our place in the sphere of religious philosophy, let us hope and pray that in the sphere of practical religious life Princeton may keep the place she has always held. No part of our work is more important than that which addresses itself to the devotional side of our nature and that centres in our chapel services. There have been in past days great seasons of religious awakening in this college. I pray God that times of refreshing may come again. There has always been here a body of earnest, spiritually minded men; there were never more than there are to-day. Christianity, as we understand it, is more than a series of precepts: it is a way of salvation. We preach Christ Jesus, and him crucified. We believe that he is the propitiation for our sins, and that we have redemption through his blood. Through all the hundred and fifty years of the history of the College of New Jersey this message has been faithfully proclaimed in her pulpit; and it is the earnest prayer of all who love her best, and have served her most, that the day may never come when it can be said of those who hold high place in Princeton University that they are ashamed of the gospel of Christ.

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