SYLLABUS

—OF—

Francis L.

PROF. PATTON'S LECTURES

—ON—

THEISM

PRINTED, NOT PUBLISHED.

The Princeton Press.
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THEISM.

INTODUCTORY.

Theism may be considered religiously or philosophically. From the standpoint of religious belief men may be regarded as believing or not believing in God.

Thus:

1. Theism. { Polytheism. Pantheism. Monotheism. } = { Theism par excellence.
2. Atheism.

Theism, philosophically considered, is a theory of the universe affirming the existence of one Infinite, Personal God; the Creator, Preserver, and Ruler of the Universe. The theistic conception of the universe implies three things:

1. A finite, personal, and permanent self; or *ego*.
2. A totality of objective phenomena; or *cosmos*.
3. An infinite personal author of all dependent existence; or God.

Opposed to Theism in this view of the subject would stand Anti-theism in its various forms.

Adopting this philosophical conception of Theism, we shall carry on the discussion under three main divisions: Historical; Constructive; Polemic.

PART I. HISTORICAL.

Three topics fall under this head:

1. The phenomenology of Theism.
2. The genesis of Theism.
3. The discussion of Theism.

I. The Phenomenology of Theism.

A. The Theism of the three great historic monotheistic religions: Mohammedanism, Christianity, Judaism.

The discussion here concerns the purely monotheistic character of Judaism. This has been attacked—though as Oehler (Theo. of O. T. ii. 150) shews, without success—by

attempting to prove (*a*) That the unity of God gradually unwound itself from a polytheistic religion, and (*b*) that even the Mosaic Jehovah does not exclude the existence of other gods. The plain facts of the O. T. regarding Theism and Polytheism seem to be these:

1. A people surrounded by Polytheism made the pupils of God in regard to a monotheistic faith.
2. A perpetual tendency to relapse into idolatry or Polytheism.
3. A monotheistic emphasis given in the decalogue and whole Mosaic *cultus*.

Original Jewish Monotheism cannot be attacked, except upon the basis of the following foregone conclusions:

a. That all religion was originally based on an animistic view of nature.

b. That a complex religious system must be the fruit of a long process of development.

c. That consequently the books of Moses are not earlier than the period of the monarchy, if they are not post-exilic.

With these postulates Kuenen interprets the religious type of the Jews in the eighth century B. C. as exhibiting three phases:

α. The uncompromising Monotheism of the prophets.

β. A lax public sentiment, seen in a disposition to break away from Monotheism.

γ. A compromising religious system, stipulating only against the rivalry, without denying the existence, of other gods.

The minute discussion and refutation of this view belongs to Biblical Theology.

B. The Theism of comparative Theology.

According to this view, pure Theism is the residuum after eliminating the differentiating elements of the great historic religions. The most systematic effort to give expression to this form of belief is found in the *Brahmo-Somaj*, of India. The recent schism in these theistic churches and the formation of a mystical party, is proof of the unsatisfactory value of mere Theism.

C. The Theism of speculative philosophy.

According to which God is regarded simply as a hypothesis for giving rational explanation of the universe.

II. The Genesis of Theism.

There are four generic theories in explanation of our idea of God, namely:

1. Development.
2. Revelation.
3. Inference.
4. Intuition.

These are to be considered in their order.

First Theory. Development.

By which is meant that Monotheism sustains genetic relations to antecedent impure or less pure forms of belief. This theory assumes several forms.

A. Hume.

Polytheism, according to H., is prior to Monotheism. The advance out of the one into the other is not due to philosophic reflection and a growing appreciation of the unity of nature, but is explained by the tendency to flatter a local deity, to impute greatness, and so by degrees to invest him with the attribute of infinity. A view lacking every element of plausibility, and speculatively worthless.

B. Compte.

The theory under notice is credited to Compte, not because he is the originator of the term fetich, nor yet because he has given the best account of fetichistic religions—for this distinction is due to F. Schultze, (Fetichismus)—but because Compte first presented in reasoned form the doctrine that all religion begins in Fetichism and passes thence through Polytheism to Monotheism. Discussing the fetich-theory of religion (1) inquire into the origin and meaning of the word fetich, and (2) consider reasons for and against this view.

Account of the word given in Max Muller's Hibbert Lectures, p. 54. Introduced by De Bross, 1760. Origin of the word found in the custom of Portuguese navigators, who called the inanimate objects worshipped by the people of West Africa—*feiticos*.

Word used, though improperly, with great latitude. Schultze speaks of mountains, water, etc., as fetiches; Tiele, of Heaven as a fetich. Compte gives the doctrine of *anima mundi* as illustration of fetich worship. And so an object of special regard is termed a fetich; a child's doll; a lock of hair; and by way of reproach, a theological opinion; the Protestant's Bible; the Roman Catholic wafer. This is wrong. The word is properly used to describe the worship of tangible, inanimate objects.

So regarding it, consider the reasons for calling it the earliest form of religion:

a. It is the lowest form. What is lowest was anterior. But this needs proof.

b. Savages and uncivilized races are types of primitive man. But this assumes there has been no degradation.

c. Empirical philosophy is under obligation to expound a natural history of religion. But this necessity is only condition by the exigencies of an erroneous philosophy.

As to the value of the theory, it is, however, to be remarked:

1. It does not satisfy one of the leading evolutionists, Mr. Spencer.
2. It is difficult to determine, from the evidence furnished by savage tribes, whether the Fetich is a determination of a general belief in God, or whether the larger belief in God is developed out of fetich-worship: whether belief in God is the logical *prius* of the fetich or *vice versa*.
3. And though the people of W. Africa had no knowledge of God at all, there is nothing to show that this condition is not due to a degradation from a primitive faith.
4. The literature of India proves that there was a primitive Monotheism or Henotheism lying back of the Polytheism of a later day.
5. Spencer's criticism is good. Before the savage can invest this or that stick or rag with life, he must have a general animistic conception. Spencer is trying to show that the ghost-theory is the true theory and that belief in ghosts antedates belief in the fetich. What is good against fetichism in favor of ancestor worship is good also against fetichism in favor of primitive Theism.

C. Herbert Spencer.

The primitive religion, according to this thinker, was ancestor-worship. Having in dreams come to a knowledge of his second self, that is, having reached the belief in the soul, the step was easy to belief in the continued conscious existence of the departed. Hence ancestor-worship. And Mr. Spencer is at great pains to show how what began as worship of ancestors in time took on the form of worship paid to plants, animals, the heavenly bodies and finally the infinite God.

Genenral Considerations.

Spencer has faced the question his philosophy required him to face, that of accounting for religion by natural causes. To fail here would be the destruction of his system. But to show that the origin of religion *may* be as he describes it, does not furnish proof that such *is* its origin. The theory of religion can have no more value than the 'First Principles.' Again, among naturalistic theories of religion this must be considered the most thorough-going: for while fetichism leaves unanswered the question how men came to worship a fetich, the theory of ancestor-worship professes at least to explain how belief in the post mortem existence of ancestors came to be entertained. Omitting all reference to criticisms against the theory and against the philosophical system of which it is part, the most that could be claimed for it would be that it presents a plausible naturalistic theory of the origin of religion, as opposed to the supernaturalistic theory of Christianity.

Special Considerations.

Spencer has failed, however, to make out even so strong a case as this.

1. To prove his theory he should have shown that when homage was paid to ancestors, no homage was paid to the gods. But the Vedahs seem to illustrate the contrary idea (Sociology 306).
2. It is important to show that filial piety is worship or such worship as is paid to the gods. Spencer talks very loosely in regard to this.

3. Because the savage regards God as his father, he is not therefore worshipping his ancestors. To make much of the case of Unkulunkulu in this direction would require him to draw a similar inference form our use of the Lord's Prayer.
4. The attempt to show how idolatry, animal worship and nature worship were related to ancestor-worship is an illustration of very far-fetched reasoning. Thus: fetich worship from identification of deceased with portions of his clothing: idol worship from the habit of making images of the deceased; animal worship from the frequenting of the home of the deceased by certain animals, or from the fact that the deceased had an animal name; plant-worship from the intoxicating liquors produced from some plants, supposed in this way to be possessed by supernatural beings; mountain worship and worship of the sea from the fact that their ancestors came from the mountain or over the sea—origin in this sense was mistaken for parentage.
5. The most plausible argument in support of Spencer's view would be derived from Greek and Roman mythology. Mr. Spencer is thoroughly committed to the Euhemeristic theory of mythology; but he has to encounter the opposition even here of a very influential school of mythologists.
6. Mr. Spencer must answer more fully than he has already done, the allegation that ancestor-worship is confined to the inferior races and that no Indo-European or Semitic nation, so far as we know, seems to have made a religion of worship of the dead. Mr. Spencer believes that the "divine man as *conceived* had everywhere for antecedent a powerful man as *perceived*" (Sociology, 438). This is supported by saying that the Jews worshipped an ancestor in Jehovah; and this simple and absurd assertion is his answer to the objection just quoted.

D. Hegel.

There is nothing that calls for special remark so far as the theistic problem in the Hegelian philosophy is concerned. The development of Theism is a part of a system of

development, and no criticism is called for beyond the criticism of the system itself, which is obviously out of place here. Hegelianism is the idealistic form of the doctrine of development. It is the antipodes of the philosophy of Compte, yet presenting points of resemblance to it. In the one case the problem is: Given atoms, to make a cosmos; and the solution is offered us in the First Principles of Herbert Spencer. In the other case the problem is: Given the *Idea*, to explain the cosmos; and for answer we are told of a process of successive evolutions ending in conscious, thinking, praying man. Monotheism in this system, as in that of Compte or Spencer, is the result of a process which has been going on silently through millenniums.

E. Max Muller.

It is not very easy to determine the position of this author in religious thought. His didactic position does not quite accord with that which his polemic would suggest.

1. In his attack on the Comptean theory of religion he has conclusively shown that fetichism is not the primitive religion.
2. In his Hibbert Lectures he avows less heartily than in an earlier work his belief in a religious instinct; indeed he practically discards the idea.
3. The Max Müller of to-day is not the Max Müller of Chips from a German Workshop, (Transactions of Victoria Institute, July 1881), and cannot be quoted as the advocate of primitive Monotheism or Henotheism. For while, as a student of literature, he tells us that Vedic Writings show that belief in one God (Henotheism) antedated Polytheism: as a psychologist, asking what religion a man can learn through his five senses, he tells us that whether Monotheism be or be not the primitive religion is of no consequence, since, before man had reached any belief in God, he "had already accomplished half his journey." The primitive Monotheism pointed to in the Vedas is thus made of no avail by the suggestion that the journey of progress was half done before men came to the idea of God. Max Müller must be classed among the evolutionists; but it must be noted that his recent conclusions regarding primi-

tive religions are in conflict with the testimony of the ancient literature of India which he has brought to the attention of English readers.

F. Schelling.

Schelling held that primitive man had an intuitive or instinctive knowledge of God; but that his Theism was relative, not absolute. From this original relative Monotheism have come two streams of tendency, one issuing in Polytheism, the other in absolute Monotheism.

His reasons for this view are:

1. It furnishes a natural answer to the question how men became Polytheists. Belief in one God did not exclude belief in a plurality of gods.
2. Monotheism absolute, or belief in only one God, is said to be a generalization derived through contact with a previously existing Monotheism and through protesting against it.

Second Theory: Revelation.

1. Distinguish between revelation and tradition. The question is not how *we* came to believe in God, but how *any* belief in God originated. Tradition does not originate anything, and hence, a traditional theory of the origin of religion is absurd. The genesis of a belief is one thing and the perpetuation of a belief another.
2. So distinguish between the correcting and the conserving influence of the Bible in regard to Theism and the genesis of theistic belief.

   Doubtless our pure Theism is due mainly to the inspired Word, and we believe in one and only one God, because we have a revelation from God; but this is not the question.
3. The question is whether the genesis of primitive theism is due to revelation.

A. Watson holds that man first knew God "by sensible converse with Him."

Schelling objects to this view with great force, by declaring that this would imply "a previous Atheism of consciousness." Cocker objects, by saying that if man had

been devoid of the idea of God, it never could have been taught him. (Christianity and Greek Philosophy, p. 95.) But Cocker does not distinguish sufficiently between an intutitive knowledge of God and *a priori* beliefs that lead logically and necessarily to the theistic inference. Watson holds that the successive revelations made to the chosen people were disseminated by means of commercial intercourse between Jews and the Gentile world, and that this accounts for the similarities of belief found among so many nations.

B. Gladstone accounts for these similarities by supposing that prior to the dispersion of nations there was a revelation, comprehending not only Monotheism, but even the more distinctive doctrines of grace. But his reasoning is not convincing.

There is no evidence that Theism had its origin in Revelation, understanding by Revelation what the writers just referred to mean by it.

Third Theory: Inference.

It is held by some, in opposition to the doctrine that belief in God is intuitional, that men reach Theism through inference. Thus Dr. McCosh argues forcibly (Intuitions, 377) that Theism does not possess the character of a simple, original, unresolvable belief; and Dr. Flint affirms that belief in God is an inference, though, as he admits, an unconscious inference. He illustrates and maintains his position with great aptness and force. But it is to be remarked:

1. We must distinguish between the vindication of a belief and its genesis. Because we can give reasons for believing in God, it does not follow that we believe in God on account of reasons.
2. Yet it is not to be denied that a belief that can be defended by reasons may be reached through reasons; and it is true that there are cases where men have left Polytheism for Theism through force of reasoning.
3. There is force in the frequent remark that men believed God before they reasoned about him; and this force, though diminished, is not destroyed by Dr. Flint's statement of the doctrine of unconscious inference.

Fourth Theory: Intuition.

The word Intuition here is used in a broad sense, and opinions that differ widely, and are in some cases in open conflict, will be grouped under this head. Different from one another as they may be, they are at one in the statement that belief in God does not owe its genesis either to objective revelation or to a conscious inference.

(1.) Schelling and Cousin.—Both, though in different forms, believed that we have an immediate knowledge of God, the Absolute.

See on this Dr. Hodge's chapter, "Can God be known?" and Sir Wm. Hamilton's "Discussions."

(2.) Jacobi and Schleiermacher. — To have attention turned to the feelings, as an offset to the purely ethical systems in vogue, was of great advantage: yet it was a mistake to call the sense of dependence, God-consciousness. Mansel makes this mistake. (Limits of Religious Thought, p. 115.)

(3.) Calderwood.—This writer says that belief in the existence of one infinite God is a necessary belief. In supporting this he affirms the inconclusiveness of all arguments for the Divine existence—an unnecessary and unfortunate mode of argument, since it stakes the validity of theistic belief on the question of its intuitive character.

(4.) Hodge. Dr. Hodge says that the idea of God is innate. Yet notice: (*a*) He maintains the validity of theistic proof. (*b*) He does not believe that we have an innate idea of the one living and true God. (*c*) He means that men had an idea of God before any act of conscious inference. His position does not differ materially from Dr. Flint's.

(5.) Caird. Though arguing against the intuitive view in its strict sense, Caird must be included under this head when the word is used in the broad sense of this discussion. He holds that it is "necessary for the mind to relate itself to God." Belief in God is not an inference taken into the soul through force of reasons. It is a belief, rather, that flows by the influence of the Divine impulse into the channel of the soul's activities.

These different opinions represent several senses in which the word intuition is used in theistic discussions.

1. By intuition we may mean an immediate knowledge of God. Claims to this kind of knowledge have been sufficiently refuted by Sir W. Hamilton.

2. By intuition may be meant an intuitive, self-evident, and necessary judgment or belief. That belief in God is not of this kind, Dr. McCosh and Dr. Flint have shown.
3. Most men who say that their belief in God is intuitive mean only that we have a constitutional tendency or impulse toward belief in God. This, however, is capable of being represented in different ways. What is the explanation of this impulse, or instinct, or tendency?

(*a*) It may mean no more than the rapid, and so unconscious inference, such as is involved in the recognition of our fellow men. This is Dr. Flint's and substantially Dr. Hodge's view.

(*b*) The idea of God may be the necessary correlative of the idea of the finite, the conditioned.—Cousin.

(*c*) With some the idea of God is a moment in a process wherein God himself is coming to consciousness. Man's thought of God is therefore God's thought of himself.—Hegel.—Caird.

(*d*) Again, the idea of God may be God's testimony to His own existence. Is there any objection to this view of the genesis of an idea of God? We live and move and have our being in Him. Are there not good reasons for believing that it is through the Spirit of God within, and not merely by arguments without, that we derive our first belief in God?

This view would have these advantages, at least:

α. Objective theistic proof is not made unnecessary by this explanation.

β. The theistic belief, not originating in induction, is not conditioned by the probability of inductive proof.

γ. This view accounts for all forms of the *a priori* argument, and justifies, in a measure, the claims that are made on behalf of intuitional Theism.

δ. It falls in with the analogy of subsequent Revelation.

ε. It makes it unnecessary to establish a schism between Adam and his posterity, as to the mode of knowing God.

ζ. It is in harmony with the doctrine of God's omnipresence to believe that His thought is so far confluent with ours, that we know Him through His direct relation to the soul.

III. Discussion of Theism.

Three divisions:

1. The ancient period, extending to the 8th century A. D. Greek and Roman philosophy.
2. The mediæval, extending to the 15th century. Scholasticism.
3. The modern.

I. First Period.

Greek philosophy falls into three divisions: The Pre-Socratic; the Socratic-Aristotelian; the Post-Aristotelian.

The Pre-Socratic period exhibits a developing process of generalization. There is little Theism in it; but it is less Pantheistic, probably, than is commonly supposed.

Assuming that the generalizing process took on two forms in the Ionic School, the mechanical and the dynamic, Anaximander illustrates the latter. Under the idea of τὸ ἄπειρον, he construed the universe in a pantheistic, or as Fortlage puts it, a cosmotheistic sense.

In the Eleatic school, the leading idea was the One τὸ ἕν. As in the Ionic School, the effort of the Eleatics was, to reach unity, but in a different way. Anaximander conceived of the multiplicity in the phenomenal world as modes of existing matter: he was cosmotheistic. Parmenides, on the other hand, reached unity by a process of abstraction, by stripping objects of their predicates. His unity was a logical unity—the highest category, or Being. His system was a Logo-theism. Xenophanes is the theist of the Eleatics. He protests against Polytheism, and ridicules Anthropomorphism. His Monotheism has been called Pantheism, but, probably, on insufficient ground.

The Eleatics give us the earliest form of the ontological argument; and they open the important discussion of the relation of the One to the many. That relation may be represented as that of

(*a*) Genus and Species: Logo-theism.
(*b*) Substance and mode: Cosmo-theism.
(*c*) Cause and effect: Theism.

In the second period of Greek philosophy we find Anaxagoras, who marks an advance in theistic discussion.

Anaxagoras recognized not only the unity of the world, but also its order and adjustments; and these he accounted

for by affirming the existence of a world-ordering νοῦς. He is distinctly complimented by Aristotle for this advance in the explanation of the universe. There is no good reason for denying to Anaxagoras the distinction of being the father of the doctrine of Final Causes; and the fact that, for the most part, he explains phenomena in a mechanical way, does not disprove the fact that, arguing from the analogy of his own intelligence, he referred the order of the universe also to Intelligence.

The Eleatic and the Anaxagorean doctrine differed thus: The Eleatic affirmed the existence of one, necessary Being, the ground of all phenomena; Anaxagoras conceived of the world, not as an existence merely, but as *such* an existence, and suggested a νοῦς as its explanation. The Eleatic saw the world of multitude and sought the unifying principle: the Anaxagorean saw the world of adaptation and sought the organising principle.

Socrates discussed Theism for practical ends; and he was the first among the Greeks, says Oesterley, to do so. His was not the Theism of speculation, but the practical Theism, that had good morals as its motive. His statement of the teleological argument is to be found in the Memorabilia, Bk. I., Cap. 4, and is familiar.

Plato has been charged with Pantheism; and his confused sense respecting Personality, his interchangeable use of the words God and Good, and his want of nice discrimination between the First and the Final Cause, constitute the basis of this charge, which Prof. Jowett says is untrue. The Theism of Plato embraces the following points:

1. But for prevalent Atheism, there would be no need of proving God's existence.
2. The soul has a natural tendency to believe in God.
3. The orderly movements of the heavenly bodies suggested to him a Divine author and presence.

The distinction now made between order and ends in nature was understood. This argument (the Cosmological) is found in the tenth book of the Laws.

4. But in the Timaeus he argues teleologically, from the adaptation of means to ends in our bodily organism.
5. The ætiological argument, pure and simple, was also recognized; though it is the distinction of Aristotle to have developed it.

6. The incommensurable character of mind and matter leads to the argument for a universal mind. His view approaches the doctrine of the *anima mundi*, and this may be the basis of the allegation that he was a pantheist. But the doctrine of the *anima mundi* is not Pantheism.

Aristotle found arguments for the existence of God in the religious consciousness of men, and in the order of the world. His great argument, however, and the one most characteristic of his philosophy, is found in his doctrine of a First Mover. There is, he says, first that which is moved but does not produce motion; secondly, that which both moves and causes motion; and, thirdly, that which is unmoved and produces motion. This first mover is incorporeal, immovable, without parts or passions. It is pure energy; Absolute Being; God. God has no end outside of Himself. He is his own end. God's thought does not find its object out of Himself. Thought and thinker are one. His thought is the thought of thought.

Aristotle has given us, says Zeller, the first scientific foundation for Theism, inasmuch as in his system the definite thought of a self-conscious intelligence in God is not due to a merely religious idea, but is rigidly deduced from the principles of his philosophical system.

Yet, as Zeller goes on to shew, it is difficult to say what Aristotle held, regarding the relation of God to the world; and this difficulty has led some to say that his Theism was, in reality, a Pantheism, that is to say, was not Theism at all.

No one has recognized finality in nature more distinctly than Aristotle. He was as cognizant as Paley of the adaptation of means to ends. But finality in nature does not seem to shut him up to the necessity of conceiving God as a designer. Nature, he says, has a tendency to realize the good. God, says Aristotle, moves the world as the loved object moves the one loving. And this, by some, is construed to mean that God is the efficient cause, only as He is the final cause. This, again, is capable of being understood in a sense that destroys the distinction between God and the world; that is to say, is a purely pantheistic sense. Is God only another name for the order, the finality, manifest in the world? If so, the Aristotelian doctrine *is* pantheistic.

Or does the order and finality exhibited in Nature exist as a *prius* in the thought of God? This would be theistic, and this seems to be Aristotle's idea, for he says "the world has its principle in God, and this principle exists, not merely as a form immanent in the world, like the order in an army, but also as a self-existent substance, like the general in an army." (Ueberweg, I, 163.) See, also, Sir Alex. Grant's Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. I., 283.

The Epicureans found their proof of God's existence in the universality of the belief. This was not the argument *e consensu gentium*, nor was it, as Cicero supposed, the doctrine that belief in God is innate. The *πρόληψις* of the Epicureans was held to prove God's existence, by showing that the gods universally manifested themselves to men by direct contact in sleep. The Stoics, with their doctrine of the *anima mundi*, are frequently quoted as pantheists. Yet notice that they believed in the separate personality and immortality of the individual soul, as well as in an intelligent, world ordering soul of the world.

The conflicting sentiments of the Stoics, Epicureans, and philosophers of the New Academy, were brought out in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*, the one work on Natural Theology that antiquity has furnished us. After the time of Cicero, Greek philosophy was affected by Oriental influences; but though it became more Theosophical, no contribution to theistic discussion seems to have been made. Among the church fathers, Clement and Origen denied the possibility of proving the existence of God, and placed this belief among the *a priori* elements of knowledge. Athanasius recognized the moral argument as the strongest. Augustine argues from the relatively good, great, and true to the absolutely and infinitely good, great, and true. His discussion of the highest truth enters largely into the discussions of a later day. Boethius, (474 A. D.), in his *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, enlarged upon the same idea. He was the precursor of Anselm in this field, and is said by Köstlin (Stud. u. Krit., 1875) to be the founder of ontological theistic proof.

2. SECOND PERIOD.

The conditions did not exist in the ancient world for the production of a reasoned Theism and of elaborate treatises in Natural Theology. These conditions are,

1. The antithesis between Natural and Revealed Religion, the result of our having the Bible.
2. The existence of Dogmatic Theology. For when our knowledge of God is systematized, the question whether God exists, at once becomes a *locus*.
3. The polemic relations of Theism to anti-theistic theories.

These conditions began to be realized in the Scholastic philosophy, and they have been realized increasingly ever since. The theistic discussions of Scholasticism are, for the most part, a repetition of the arguments found in Greek philosophy. Aristotle's argument based on motion, the argument based on the highest good, etc., etc.

Two books, only, come to us from Scholasticism, devoted specially to Theism: *Anselm's Proslogium* and the *Theologia Naturalis*, of Raymond De Sebonde.

Scholasticism falls under two periods: John Scotus Erigena, Roscellin, Anselm, and Abelard mark the first period; Thomas Aquinas, Occam, and Duns Scotus, the second. Platonic philosophy was dominant in the first period. The Aristotelian in the second. Anselm and Aquinas, respectively, represented these periods. Anselm was the heir of Augustine and Boethius; as the former had argued on the basis of the highest Truth, and the latter on the basis of the relative and the imperfect; so Anselm's Theistic proof in the Monologium proceeded under the belief of the highest Good.

Dissatisfied with the Monologium, Anselm attempts in the Proslogium to make a complete demonstration of the existence of God. The key to the argument is found in a phrase which he uses in the beautiful prayer with which the treatise begins: Thou art that *quo nihil majus cogitari possit*.

1. Anselm's statement and Gaunilo's reply.

We believe that God is that than which a greater cannot be conceived. But that which exists *in re* is greater than that which exists *in intellectu*. Therefore when we say that we believe in a being than whom a greater cannot be conceived, we must think of a Being existing *in re*. For if God did not exist *in re*, we could think of him as existing *in re*, and this would be greater. But we are thinking of a being than which a greater cannot be conceived. Again, God cannot be thought not to be. For if the Being of whom we

think can be thought not to be, we can think of a Being who cannot be thought not to be, and this would be greater. But we are thinking of a Being than whom a greater cannot be conceived. Gaunilo replies by saying, substantially, that what exists subjectively does not necessarily exist objectively. Between the greatest Being *thought* as existing and the greatest Being *actually* existing, there is a wide difference. Then follows his famous illustration of the island.

Anselm replies by saying that his argument is unique; that it applies only to the Being, *quo majus non cogitari possit*; that if Gaunilo could find anything to which his reasoning would apply except this being *quo majus*, etc., he would make him a present of the lost island.

2. Criticisms of the Anselmian proof. See Runze: *Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis.*

(*a*) *Assumptions.* Fortlage, Hasse, and others say the whole discussion depends on the Realism that underlies it. Others say that Anselm first gets his idea of God from Revelation, and then seeks to legitimate it by reasoning. Then again it is said that his argument is an attempt to give dialectical certitude to an idea derived through the witness of the Holy Ghost.

(*b*) The *aim* of the Anselmian proof has been criticised. Schelling says that Anselm tried to prove God's existence as if God were an individual to be coördinated with other individuals, whereas He is the ground of all Being. But Anselm is not open to the charge of holding a merely mechanical Theism.

As little force is there in the objection that we cannot prove God's existence *a priori* and deductively, because God, being the *summum genus*, cannot be included in a higher genus.

(*c*) Objections based on the *method* of Anselm. It was a mistake to seek to prove God's existence by syllogistic process. God, says Fischer, is metalogical. Great unanimity of thinkers on this point. In fact, however sure we are of God's existence, when we try to prove it, we only transfer, it is said, the assumption from the conclusion to the premises.

But there is no corresponding unanimity in regard to the particular fallacy in the reasoning of Anselm. Identity of premises, circle, *petitio principii*, four terms, not to speak of other fallacies, have all been laid to his charge.

(*d*) Vilmar denounces the Anselmian proof in the interests of revealed truth, as the "most glaring illusions of a most vicious pride." This, if valid against Anselm, is valid against all reasoned Theism.

3. Remarks on the Anselmian proof.

Anselm may be considered as reasoning from any of these premises:

(*a*) What exists *in intellectu* exists *in re*. A Being *quo majus*, etc.

This would justify Gaunilo's objection. But this is not Anselm.

(*b*) What is necessarily *in intellectu* exists *in re*. A Being *quo majus*, etc.

This would make superfluous the statement that to exist *in re* is greater than to exist *in intellectu*. Again, this is not Anselm.

(*c*) What is necessarily thought to exist *in re*, does exist *in re*. But a Being *quo majus*, etc. Therefore, etc. This is the Anselmian position; and the minor premise clearly needs proof. Anselm tries to prove it. His argument is the one attempt in history to give dialectical objectivity to an idea of the Infinite. Hence the attention it has attracted. The nerve of the argument is in the statement, "What exists *in re* is greater than what exists *in intellectu*;" and since we are necessarily led to think of a Being than which a greater cannot be conceived, we are supposed to be necessarily led to think of such a Being as existing *in re*.

To which it may be replied:

1. That the predicate existence adds nothing to the concept; and so it may be denied that a thing *in re* is greater than a thing *in intellectu*.

1. That if a thing *in re* were greater, then the conclusion would be either that a Being *in re* existed *in intellectu*, which is absurd; or that the Being *in intellectu* was not a Being *quo majus*, etc.; since it was not as great as the Being *in re*.

Aquinas devotes two pages in his *Summa* (*quæstio* 2) to the existence of God and adduces five arguments:

1. From motion. It is Aristotle's agument for a first mover, and really means that a first cause which is not a physical cause, is the only true cause.

2. The argument based on the efficient cause—an implicit statement of the aetiological argument.
3. The argument *ex possibili et necessario*. There must be some necessary Being, having its cause of existence in itself, and therefore eternal.
4. The argument *ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur*. Virtually, Augustine's argument as to the highest truth.
5. The argument *ex gubernatione rerum*: a compact statement of the teleological argument.

The last of the Schoolmen who deserve notice here is Raymond de Sebonde, (1334 A.D., about), whose epoch-making book was the first systematic treatise on Natural Theology. Raymond's book is an unsuccessful attempt to prove from nature the doctrines of revealed religion. He affirms that God has given us two revelations: *creatura* and *Scriptura*. His book is entitled *Liber Creaturarum*. Best account of his system given by Matzke.

3. THIRD PERIOD.

The publication of Descartes' discourse on Method, in 1639, marks the transition to the modern period in theistic discussion. Of his Theism there should be no doubt, for he says: "By the name of God I mean an infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, omniscient, omnipotent substance by which I and all other things which are, if it be true that these things exist, have been created." Dr. Runze, in his recent history of the ontological proofs, complains that his Theism is too Deistic, in this respect contrasting with Anselm. Saisset, on the other hand, in his Modern Pantheism, begins with Descartes. His criticisms are acute. But Descartes' doctrine of continuous creation, together with his determinism, do not suffice to prove the charge of Pantheism. Mahaffy also gives probably too much weight to a casual remark of Descartes, that "the Deity might be identified with the order of Nature."

Before noticing the Cartesian argument, consider this remarkable statement: "I very clearly see that the certitude and truth of all science depends on the knowledge alone of the true God, insomuch that before I knew Him, I could have no perfect knowledge of any other thing." His argument is, that unless I know God I know nothing; since, if

there be no God, how do I know that my senses do not deceive me. This is substantially Sir W. Hamilton's argument for the veracity of consciousness. But is this not reasoning in a circle? If I must know God before I can know anything, how can I ever know God? Confidence in our knowing powers must condition confidence in our knowledge of God.

Descartes did not fall into such a palpable fallacy. Rightly or wrongly, Descartes was as sure of God's existence, as of the truths of geometry. But it is conceivable, he says, that he is imposed upon in the very constitution of his nature. That is, he sees that the reasonings in geometry are true, on the supposition that there is such a thing as truth, and that this postulate conditions them. Is not this Cartesian position our own position in the debate of to-day? The theistic hypothesis is the only guarantee, in other words, of our intellectual integrity. We can cast discredit upon all processes of thinking, by a theory of knowledge that destroys the possibility of knowledge: or we can make belief in God the presupposition and postulate of all knowledge. This is not reasoning in a circle.

Descartes made use of three arguments for the existence of God.

1. From the idea of a Perfect Being. He sought to show that existence was implied in the idea of a Perfect Being. "I found that the existence of the Being was comprised in the idea, in the same way that the equality of its three angles to two right angles is comprised in the idea of a triangle." This argument is not as acute as Anselm's, and is equally open to criticism.

2. From the causal judgment in accounting for his own existence. This is exhibited under several forms.

(*a*) My continued existence from moment to moment requires a cause as much as my beginning to exist

(*b*) The cause of my beginning to exist is either self-existent, or is also a caused existence, and so back in the regress of causes till we come to a first cause.

(*c*) But, really, my parents are not the cause of my existence: *i. e.*, of my mind. "It does not follow that I am conserved by them, or even that I was produced by them, in so far as I am a thinking being." Creationism, in other words, is, according to Descartes, the only rational explanation of the origin of the soul.

3. From the causal judgment, as accounting for the idea of God in man. It was impossible, he said, that the idea of a Perfect Being should originate with himself, an imperfect being; and "it but remained that it had been placed in me by a nature which was, in reality, more perfect than mine, and which possessed within itself all the perfections of which I could form any idea: that is to say, in a single word, which was God." (Method 77).

With the exception of the first, which is the ontological, or Anselmian argument, the Cartesian proofs are *a posteriori*, the second being the application of the causal judgment to the author's own contingent existence; and the third, which contains the distinctive feature of Cartesian Theism, affirms that the existence of God will alone explain belief in God.

Kuno Fischer (I., 307) represents the Cartesian proofs as proceeding according to the following stages: (1) The idea of a Perfect Being; this not significant unless necessary: (2) the idea necessary; even this no guarantee of objective reality: (3) the idea the product of the Perfect Being, for the imperfect being could not have originated it. There is, therefore, a God, for the idea of God is the revelation of Himself.

The ontological and the "anthropological" proof, as Fischer calls it, go hand in hand. The union of the two makes the difference between the Anselmian and the Cartesian proof. There is, doubtless, great force in this combination; but, as Köstlin says, the combination is Fischer's not Descartes'. Note, also, that Descartes held that the belief in God is an 'innate idea,' notwithstanding his statement that it is an effect, the cause of which is God. Compare this with what is said above on the genesis of the idea of God: Intuition.

Pantheist as he is, Spinoza is usually cited by the historians of Theism. Indeed, Schwegler regards his doctrine as the "most abstract Theism." This is wrong. Spinoza will be discussed later, under Antitheism. Notice the common ground between Theism and Pantheism, as illustrated in Spinoza's proof of God's existence. Both use arguments based on cause; both, the principle *ex nihilo*, etc. Both affirm the necessity of a ground of all being. To both the contingency of the phenomenal and the individual are apparent. The difference, primarily, respects the relation of

the One and the Many; and, secondarily, the predicates which are to be affixed to the One (See below, Samuel Clarke). Malebranche should be mentioned here, with the query whether he should be regarded as a theist or pantheist. Bowen stands by him as not being a pantheist. (Mod. Philosophy, 84).

Leibnitz, with his doctrine of monads and of pre-established harmony, was led naturally to consider the teleological facts of the world. Finality is necessarily part of his system. Only two views were possible. His thought might terminate on the *order*, calling it God; or he might seek a *cause* of this order, and so be a theist: and a theist we believe him to have been. The Cartesian proof was characterized as an "imperfect demonstration," and Leibnitz said that Descartes ought first to have proved the *possibility* of God's existence. He was the originator of the once common method of arguing the fact of God's existence from the possibility of His existence.

Locke is the author of a theistic argument, based on the existence of the human mind, which "Physicus" makes the subject of elaborate criticism. Briefly stated it is: (*a*) Since something is, something must always have been; (*b*) And there has been a knowing being from all eternity, or else there was a time when there was no knowledge; (*c*) If there was a time when there was no knowing being, it is impossible that any knowing being ever could have been. That is to say, only mind can be the cause of mind.

Locke's argument deserves consideration. It presents to us a choice of hypotheses. Either God the *prius* and postulate of all intelligence exists; or else there was a time when there was no knowing being in the universe. And though the advocate of evolution would not say that it is as impossible for mind to be the product of matter as for the three angles of a triangle not to be equal to two right angles, yet he must choose between an Infinite Intelligence and some maximum finite intelligence. (See Kirkman. *Philosophy without Assumptions.*) How knowledge could ever have arisen had there not been an eternally existing knowing being, is a question that has not been answered since Locke's day; and, slightly changing the form of Locke's alternatives, may we not say that his argument still presents to us the choice between Theism and the most thoroughpaced Agnosticism?

Schwegler represents Samuel Clarke as belonging to the School of John Locke, but scarcely on sufficient grounds. (See Encyc. Brit.) Clarke's argument is often represented as ontological, but it is hardly that. It is a combination of *a priori* and *a posteriori* arguments. The steps in the argument are these:

(*a*) Something has existed from eternity.

(b) That something is immutable and independent.

(*c*) Existing without external cause of its existence, it must be self-existent; *i. e.*, necessarily existent.

(*d*) What its substance is we do not know; but some of its attributes are demonstrable.

(*e*) The self-existent must be infinite, must be eternal, must be one, etc.

So far Spinoza would have made no objection. The problem of Theism is to invest the One with intelligence and free will. Clarke admits the difficulty of doing this by *a priori* arguments, though it is easily done by *a posteriori* reasoning. He uses, therefore, the ordinary aetiological argument, employs Aristotle's argument from motion, and affirms the impossibility of matter producing mind. Clarke's argument is strong one. Not new, but a new synthesis of old arguments, and deservedly holds classical rank in theistic literature.

Kant's criticism of theistic proofs marks an era in the literature of this subject, because it was the first attempt to state and classify all possible arguments for God's existence; because it is the most thorough criticism of these proofs to be found anywhere; and because of the effect produced by it—some, as a consequence, falling back on authority, others on intuition.

The criticism embraces these points:

1. That there can be but three arguments open to the speculative reason, in proof of God's existence: the ontological, the cosmological, and the physico-theological.

2. That each argument, in turn, is open to criticisms that are fatal to its claim to be a proof of God's existence.

3. That the cosmological and teleological are ultimately resolvable into the ontological; so that, strictly speaking, all speculative proof is the proof commonly known as the Anselmian, or Cartesian.

The only points that concern us are (2) and (3).

Kant criticises the several proofs in succession. His objections to the ontological argument are, in the main, those already referred to. (See Anselm.)

(*a*) The illustrations of correspondence between subjective and objective, have been drawn from *judgments*, not from *Things*. Thus, in that of the triangle, the proposition is not that the triangle exists, but that if it exist, its three angles, etc. So of the perfect Being.

(*b*) It is absurd to introduce into the conception of a thing cogitated solely in reference to its possibility, the conception of its existence. This he shows by asking whether the proposition, this thing exists, is analytic or synthetic. If it is analytic, we must either identify our thought and the thing, or else we must assume that the thing exists, so making it a predicate which is repeated in the proposition. If, however, it is synthetic, there is no contradiction in removing the predicate. But the ontological argument proceeds on the assumption that the proposition is analytical.

(*c*) Kant says, also, that existence is not a real predicate—distinguishing between a logical and a real predicate. A real predicate adds something to the concept. Existence does not do this. If existence were a real predicate, there never could be a correspondence between the concept and its object, since the object would always be greater than the concept.

Kant's objections against the ontological argument are valid, so long as dialectical objectivity is sought by means of it. But Kant does not set aside the argument found in the irresistible tendency of the mind to think of an Infinite Being, of which the ontological argument is only a syllogistic expression. Kant's "dollars" and Gaunilo's "island" are, so far as this is concerned, hardly analogous to this necessary idea of the Infinite.

The cosmological argument is characterized by Kant, as containing a "perfect nest of dialectical assumptions."

Among these dialectical assumptions are to be found the following: (1) That the doctrine of cause and effect transcends experience. (2) That an infinite regress of finite causes is impossible, etc.

But the strongest objection to the cosmological argument is that it is identical with the ontological and therefore falls under the same condemnation.

The objections to the teleological argument are not formidable, and may all be conceded without destroying the value of the argument which Kant describes as "the oldest, the clearest, and the most in conformity with the common reason of humanity." Reserving the right to criticise the argument on the ground that it proceeds on a basis of analogical reasoning, he calls attention to the following points:

1. The order and harmony of the world evidence the contingency of its *form*, not of its *matter*. It is impossible therefore to deduce a creator of matter; the most we can get is an arranger of matter—an architect.

2. From the order and harmony of the universe we may infer the existence of a cause proportionate thereto. That is to say: we cannot infer from the order of the universe that the cause of that order is infinite. To this it is necessary to reply that every theistic argument is not intended to prove the whole theistic position, and that the infinity of God can be reached through other arguments than the teleological.

The least noticed, but most subtle form of the Kantian criticism of the theistic proofs is that in which he attempts to reduce them all to the ontological. In making this attempt he not only fails, but betrays inconsistency. For after speaking of "that unfortunate ontological argument" in most disparaging terms, he identifies with it the teleological argument which he had spoken of as one that "always deserves to be mentioned with respect." But it is difficult to see how Kant establishes the identity of these three forms of argument.

The physico-theological argument, he admits, entitles us to infer a cause *proportionate* to the "order and design visible in the universe." But he says, this cause must be regarded as the conception of an all-sufficient being. But an all-sufficient being we cannot infer from the order and design visible to us, *i. e.* from experience. And so after admiring the wisdom and other attributes of the author of the world's order, we leave the ground of empiricism and infer the contingency of the world from the order that is observable in it. From this contingency, and by the help of transcendental

conceptions alone, we infer the existence of something absolutely necessary, and "still advancing, proceed from the absolute necessity of the first cause to the completely determined or determining conception thereof, the conception of an all-embracing reality."

This is Kant's account of the way in which the "physico-theological, failing in its undertaking recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological argument."

But observe: these three arguments may supplement each other, and may severally contribute to the support of the theistic position without being identical. Kant's argument only goes to show that they are mutually auxiliary. He fails to make out the identity of the physico-theological and the cosmological proof.

For, if the order and finality of the universe demand as a cause proportionate thereto an all-sufficient being, the physico-theological argument by this very concession must be held as offering a fair proof of the existence of such a being. In that case it is clearly under no obligation to the cosmological argument. If, on the other hand, as Kant would seem at first to imply, the order and finality of the world demand a cause only proportinate thereto; if that is to say, they do not necessarily demand an infinite or all-sufficient cause: then it is not an objection against the physico-theological proof that it will not justify us in inferring an all-sufficient cause; and again, it is not under obligation to, and still less is it identical with the cosmological argument.

Kant fails equally in the attempt to identify the cosmological and ontological proofs. The cosmological argument proceeding empirically, infers the existence of a necessary being. But it gives no information concerning the nature of that being. It leaves experience in order to seek a conception adequate to that of a necessary being, and finds it in the *ens realissimum*.

If now Kant had said there is an *a priori* as well as an *a posteriori* element in the cosmological argument, no objection could be made. But he says that in identifying the *ens realissimum* with the necessary being, we are returning to the ontological argument. For, he continues, when we say that the conception of *ens realissimum* is adequate to the conception of a necessary being, we assume that we can infer the latter from the former. The argument which pro-

fesses to be cosmological and to proceed from experience is thus covertly ontological (Critique, Meiklejohn's trans. p. 373).

But this is not the case. The conception of an *ens realissimum* is that of a being necessarily existing. But that is no proof that the necessary being exists and the cosmological argument does not proceed upon that assumption. The most that can be said is that the ontological argument gives us the conception of an *ens realissimum* as of a being necessarily existing, but is impotent so far as proving the existence of that being is concerned; that the cosmological argument proves the existence of a necessary being but that it cannot give any determinate conception of that being; and that the two arguments unite in the theistic proof. Closely related they undoubtedly are, but identical they are not.

In other words: *A priori* we know that if a necessary being exists it must be *ens realissimum;* but from the idea of *ens realissimum* and its corresponding conception of ne-necessarp existence, we cannot pass to the objective reality. *A posteriori*, however, we are led to infer the existence of a necessary being.

THEISM.

PART II. CONSTRUCTIVE.

The two questions to be dealt with in this division of our subject are (1) the existence of God and (2) the relation of God to the world.

I. The Existence of God.

Notice the proper argumentative attitude in reference to theistic proof.

1. In giving a reasoned account of theistic belief we do not prejudge the question as to its genesis. The question is: Given an antecedent belief in God, due to whatever cause, whether that belief can be corroborated by argument.

2. We do not undertake to demonstrate the existence of God. Physicus says that theism is not rationally probable. We affirm that it is. We maintain that theism can be rationally justified and that atheism is unreasonable.

3. The theistic argument is complex and cumulative. In theistic proof each argument gives adequate reason for the theistic conclusion; but this conclusion is strengthened by the congruity and concurrence of all the arguments.

The theistic proof may be arranged under three principal divisions. First: Argument based on idea of cause; Second: Argument founded on our moral nature: Third: Argument based on idea of the Infinite.

Division I.—Argument Based on Idea of Cause.

Regarding the world under the concept of causation, we may consider it first as contingent: secondly as a cosmos; thirdly as exhibiting finality. Argument based on the causal judgment will therefore take 3 forms: Ætiological, Cosmological, Teleological.

A. The Ætiological Argument.

This treats phenomena simply as *contingent*, and may be considered in two ways: as applied to the totality of phenomena or as applied to specific phenomena. We, therefore, consider first:—

Basis of Theistic Inference in the Totality of Phenomena.

Syllogism. Every effect has a cause. The world is an effect, &c. But is the world an effect? Difficult to prove this if by 'world' we mean the substance of the world. Hence some say the ætiological argument is useless because it assumes the non-eternity of matter. But we are not required to raise this question. The world of our experience is one of phenomenal successions in time and co-existences in space. Does this world demand a first cause; if so what cause? Answer to this depends upon what is meant by causation. We notice therefore the leading theories of causation.

1. Mill's Theory. Mill (J. S.) says that "the very essence of causation is incompatible with a first cause." "The cause of any change is a prior change." "When I speak of the cause of a phenomenon I do not mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon." By causation Mill means only the relationships of phenomena in time-successions. His theory being conceded the impossibility of inferring a first cause undoubtedly follows. But to his theory in its relations to theism we offer these objections.

(*a.*) Cause and effect express relations (according to Mill) between *phenomena*. God as first cause is thus ruled out by definition.

(*b.*) Cause and effect express time-relations of phenomena. It is the fact that A is the invariable predecessor under certain circumstances of B that makes it possible to call A the cause of B. But the essence of causation is not in invariable relationship of succession for this invariability might be preserved where there is no suggestion of cause and effect.

(*c.*) Mill is shut up to an infinite regress of finite causes. A cause is only a phenomenon and every phenomenon that begins to be has a cause.

(*d.*) There can be no law of cause and effect under conditions where the law of the uniformity of nature is not in force. Were events to happen without regularity, there would be in Mill's view a suspension of the law of cause and effect. But no: the occurrence of an event makes it imperative to call for a cause. It is the fact that the event *has happened*, not that it has happened regularly that makes it necessary to ask for its cause.

(*e.*) Mill violates the principles of his own empirical philosophy and contradicts his doctrine of causation by appealing to what he calls a permanent element in nature. "There is a nature, a permanent element and also a changeable; the changes are always the effects of previous changes. The permanent existences so far as we know are not effects at all." Query: 1. If knowledge is limited by experience what do we know of a permanent in Nature?

2. If this permanent, which is not an effect, be "cause or con-cause of everything that takes place," how can it be true that every cause is also an effect?

(*f.*) It would be impossible, as Mr Shute has shown, according to Mill's definition of cause, ever to discover a cause. For, according to this doctrine, the cause of a phenomenon is not a single antecedent and necessarily related phenomenon: but that phenomenon as conditioned by all the circumstances near and more remote which have effected it.

Mill's doctrine amounts to saying that the physical universe at any one moment is the effect of all physical antecedents for all past time. Clearly from this view of causation we can infer no first cause. If the only causes of phenomena be themselves phenomena demanding causes in explanation of them, then an uncaused cause is absurd.

2. Theory of pure physical causation. If the factors of the universe be matter and motion, then cause can only mean the phenomenal antecedents necessary to certain consequents. And we conclude (1) every physical phenomenon is necessarily determined by physical antecedents: (2) there has been an infinite regress of physical antecedents: (3) all so-called free actions have been physically determined. A first cause in the sense demanded by theism is impossible. Moreover the free action of our own wills is obliterated and our volitions take their place in a row of physical antecedents.

3. Theory of the persistence of Force. As taught by Spencer it is the doctrine that all forms of existence are the manifestations of a power at once omnipotent and incomprehensible. "In this consciousness of an omnipotent power we have that consciousness in which Religion dwells, and so we arrive at that point where Religion and Science coalesce" (Spencer). We agree with Diman in saying that the doctrine of a first cause has not been wiped out by the doctrine of force. If the idea of causation yielded

this and nothing more, that there is an incomprehensible but omnipotent power that is the ultimate cause of all phenomenon, we should use this as the basis of a theistic argument. But there are objections to this view of causation. It is half way between theism and materialism. If Force be an entity distinct from matter and its manifestations the difference between this theory and theism is that force is not invested with the attributes of Intelligence. The theory as thus understood is semi theistic and consistency will require it to advance to the full theistic position. If on the other hand, Force be not an entity but a term expressing rate or ratio of motion, work done, &c., the theory resolves itself into that of pure physical causation. This again is physical determinism, and to be complete, must include mind and will. If, however, volition be not capable of physical explanation, as it is not, then we have a large area of effects which cannot be explained by the doctrine of the persistence of Force. Physical causation in other words is not the only causation.

4. Accordingly we have the common doctrine of dual causation which recognizes will as a cause—a first cause, and physical phenomena as second causes. It is held by many that personal agency is the type of all causation: that we speak of physical causes because we impute to matter a power akin to that of which we are conscious when we effect change by the exercise of our wills. But whatever be the truth respecting the nature of physical causation the theistic argument based upon cause derives its force from our experience of personal agency. The ætiological argument is simply the Aristotelian argument for a first mover. From our experience of power and from our belief in regard to the inability of matter to originate motion, we are led to believe that however related to one another physical phenomena may be, there must behind them all be a will as the original cause of motion.

5. Volitional theory of causation. It is held by many that the only real cause in the world is a will. Whether this volitional theory of causation be accepted or not, and whether an infinite regress of physical antecedents be thinkable or not, it is certain that the mind naturally seeks for a case of real beginning. We are not satisfied with a cause that is also an effect. It is certain that the only thing in experience answering to this demand is our will. So that contemplat-

ing the world of phenomena—antecedents and consequents—we are left to accept an infinite regress of physical causes, or to believe that physical change is directly or more remotely related to the will.

The argument *a contingentia mundi* concerns phenomena. It does not concern itself with the question of substance or the eternity of matter. The non-eternity of matter may be argued on the ground of the law of parsimony (that is, theism being conceded, there is no need of believing in the eternity of matter), as following from the doctrine of the dissipation of energy, or on the ground of a dynamic theory of matter: but it is not necessary to know that atoms had a beginning in order to come to the theistic inference through the doctrine of causation. We consider next:

Basis of Theistic Inference in Specific Phenomena.

Certain phenomena, because they cannot be accounted for by antecedent physical phenomena, suggest, if they do not require, the hypothesis of the divine intelligence for their explanation. Existence of life and the human mind are examples of these. Arguments for divine existence based upon the human mind have been presented in two forms; by John Locke and Sir Wm. Hamilton. Locke's argument, given in Part I., criticised by Physicus, who says that we have no proof that only mind can produce mind: and moreover, that it is as inconceivable that mind should be the cause of matter as that matter should be the cause of mind. This, however, is easily said, and for reply, each must refer to his own consciousness.

Hamilton's argument is founded in the incommeasurable character of the attributes of mind and matter. From mind in man he found the passage easy to mind in nature. Hamilton erred in discouraging all other theistic proof. But his argument is not without force, and it cannot be answered except by teaching physical determinism. In other words, unless materialism succeeds in making men skeptical about their own minds there will always be an open way from mind in man to the mind of God.

B. The Cosmological Argument.

Distinguish between the argument based on order and that based on final causes. All cases of finality are instances

of order, but all instances of order are not adaptations of means to ends. Neither the cosmological nor the teleological argument is affected by a mechanical explanation of the facts of the world. In cosmological argument we see order and infer a plan antecedently existing in an intelligent mind. In the teleological argument we see adaptation of means to ends and infer finality, and also infer mind as the cause of that finality. The cosmological argument, that is to say, the argument based upon order, proceeds upon the assumption that order is the product of mind. The order of the world is a great fact. Time, number, rate, ratio and volume, are all matters of most definite and precise nature, and the physical world is an exhibition on the grandest scale of mathematical relations. The fact of order is undeniable. Some explanation of the fact is demanded. Theism is the natural explanation. Those, however, who deny the theistic inference offer the following substitutes for it:

1. The theory of Chance. Suppose we were to concede the possibility that by a purely fortuitous concourse of atoms the cosmos might have resulted. How much would theism be damaged? We should say that the credulity of the atheist was amazing. "Imagine," says Venn, "some being not a creator, but a sort of demiurgus who has a quantity of materials put into his hand and he assigns them their collocations and lines of action blindly and at haphazard; what are the odds that such a world as we actually experience should have been brought about in this way?" His answer is that "all the paper which the world has hitherto produced would be used up before we got far on the way in writing them down."

2. The theory of law. The Duke of Argyll shows in his *Reign of Law* how we advance from the mere conception of order to the idea of force or power in explanation of the order. We are not satisfied to say that bodies move with a certain regularity—we seek an explanation of this regularity and embody it in a formula. Then we are not satisfied with the formula—but we impute the fact to a force which we call the Law of Gravitation. But however the word Law is used, it does not affect theism, for if it be not used in some transcendental way it means only the order of sequence. If it means more than order it is because it has been hypostatised and treated as an entity. So that the idea of law leaves us where we were before. We must be content to do

without an explanation of the world's order, or we must find an explanation in Theism. The world's order is proof of mind. "That which it requires thought and reason to understand must itself be thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or express must be itself mind." This is Baden Powell's way of putting the cosmological argument.

3. Theory of the persistence of force. A mechanical conception of the universe is in the highest degree theistic provided that mechanical conception does not include mind. The objection made by Physicus proceeds upon the assumption that mind has a physical genesis. The theory of the persistence of force, carried to its logical conclusions, reduces the universe to matter and motion. If mind in man be denied, the Divine mind, of course, will not be believed in. No proof of the Divine existence can survive belief in the human mind. The theory of the persistence of force when carried the length of materialistic monism, blots out the theistic argument as Physicus shows. It blots out belief by blotting out the basis of belief. But it blots out the possibility of rational belief in anything including the persistence of force.

C. Teleological Argument.

Commonly known as argument from final cause or design. By final cause is meant the end for which a thing or an event exists. Distinguished thus from efficient cause which always means the agency by which anything is brought about. Following Janet we consider the teleological argument by instituting two inquiries:

1. Is finality a law of nature?
2. What is the cause of this finality?

I. Is finality a law of Nature? Consider first, the nature of the process by which we are led to believe that there are ends in nature: Secondly, the specific proofs in support of finality; Thirdly, the objections to the doctrine of finality.

1. Nature of teleological argument. Porter holds (inclusively) that the idea of final cause is an intuition. Mill says that it is an inductive argument according to the method of agreement. The latter view probably correct. We are under no necessity to ask for the final cause as we are for the efficient cause of every phenomenon. In teleological reasoning we argue analogically. The argument

has two stages. In the first place we know from our experience that a certain ideal future to be brought about stands related to certain means necessary to the accomplishing of this result. A and B are related to each other as means and ends. Passing from our own consciousness to facts outside of consciousness we see phenomena related in a way that irresistibly suggests the relation of means and ends: we say B was the final cause of A. The first stage in the argument ends in the realization of finality as a law of nature. The phenomena of the world look *as if* they were respectively means and ends. The next question is as to the cause of the finality. Again we revert to our experience and since the only finality of which he have any knowledge is that of a purposing mind—in other words, since finality implies intentionality in our conscious experience the inference from finality to intentionality is rational if not necessary.

2. Specific evidence of finality. The proof of finality consists in the cumulative force of a great multitude of *as ifs*. It looks *as if* the wide domain of nature were a great system of ideals, as if striving toward an end were the great characteristic of nature. To prove finality we begin with the purposive action of which we are ourselves conscious. Then we see actions of our fellow men which seem to be dictated by purpose and directed to attain an end. Descending a step, the actions of the lower animals irresistibly impress us as purposive. Lower still we come to a point where the action as definitely suggests adaptation though we do not credit the animal with intention. Analogy thus suggests that action with reference to results whether consciously or unconsciously is every where manifest throughout animal life. We turn then to the relation of organ to function; the relation of the eye to vision. We find that there is a close and apparently premeditated relation between organ and organism, organism and environment. We argue: These adaptations are not accidents. They are intentional. They bespeak purpose and designing mind. The same teleological trend of things is manifest in the world. Things in the world sustain a relation of lower and higher. Finality in nature is proved by showing that there is the closest analogy between the relation of part and part, and part and whole, in the organic world, that there is between means and ends in the sphere of our purposive action.

3. Objections to the doctrine of final causes. These fall under three classes.

1. Irrelevant objections:

(*a*.) Bacon's often quoted objection does not apply to final cause as a fact, but to the search for final cause as a scientific method. All that Bacon says may be conceded.

(*b*.) So of Des Cartes' objection. He says we are ignorant of ends. So we are. And if we were pretending to know the final cause of every event the objection would be valid.

(*c*.) Irrelevant, also, the objection that the doctrine of final cause assumes that man is the final cause of creation. It is surely not necessary to hold that every thing was made for man, because man's eye was made for seeing.

(*d*.) Nor can we get rid of final cause, because some have abused it. Some have treated every possible use of an organ as an intended use, and in this way have heaped ridicule upon teleology.

2. Biological objections.

It is said that the doctrine of final cause is hard to reconcile with the rudimentary and useless organs to be found in animals. To this objection it is replied:

1. It is not affirmed that *every* detail of organization was meant to serve a useful purpose. 2. We do not know that an organ has no uses because we do not see its uses. 3. Obvious finality in a multitude of cases is not set aside by apparent lack of finality in other cases. 4. These rudimentary organs are explainable without denying teleology; and by some are so explained so as to give emphasis to the teleological idea.

3. Objections urged by the anti-teleological evolutionists.

Whether evolution be true is not the question. If true, is it contradictory to teleology? Can it dispense with teleology?

Janet and others hold that evolution, in the first place, does not contradict teleology. The process of evolution, conceding the truth of the hypothesis, is only a mode of the Divine procedure. That is to say the order, the adaptations, the harmonies of the world are here and are manifest, and they suggest God, whatever the process may have been by which they have been brought about. But two questions are to be distinguished. It is one thing to say that the doctrine of evolution tolerates theism, and another thing to say that it gives support to theism. If belief in God can be arrived

at through other channels, undoubtedly it is possible to say, and it is the correct thing to say, that evolution is only the mode of His working.

But the more important question is, whether evolution, in itself considered, is or is not antagonistic to teleology. This question has been specifically raised in regard to Darwin's doctrine of the *Origin of Species*. Upon this subject two things are to be said:

(*a.*) That the unmodified Darwinian doctrine of tendency to indefinite variation in all directions as the foundation of species ends in giving us a chance world, so far as biology is concerned. It is anti-teleological, therefore.

(*b*) That if variation be not in all directions; if there has been a law of variation; a law of selection manifest; if it is in accordance with some inner law of development that the present system of ordered life has grown up, there is a teleological principle evidently at work in nature. This view is held by many, and this is what Janet means when he affirms that the doctrine of evolution cannot dispense with teleology.

II. What is the Explanation of the Finality in Nature.

To this question four answers have been given: 1. Subjective finality. 2. Immanent finality. 3. Unconscious finality. 4. Intentional finality.

1. Subjective finality. This is Kant's doctrine which Janet interprets to mean, that while finality is a necessary hypothesis given the conformation of the human mind, nothing warrants us to suppose that this hypothesis has an objective foundation in reality. This is simply the doctrine of relativity. Upon this we remark:

(*a.*) If we were under the necessity of seeing finality in every thing, then subjective finality would be the best guarantee of objective finality. It would be an *a priori* truth.

(*b.*) But there is no such subjective necessity. And since we see finality in some things and not in others, there must be some objective ground for this distinction.

2. Immanent finality. The Hegelian doctrine affirms finality, but credits it to the activity of nature and denies a personal God. Kant paved the way for it by noticing two important points of distinction: First. That works of art and those of nature differ in this respect, that in the former

the agent stands outside of his work; while in nature it is different. Nature has a formative, reparative and reproductive power which distinguishes her works from those of human art. Secondly, Kant made the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic ends. It is by emphasising extrinsic ends that teleology has fallen into disrepute. An organism may serve some external and extrinsic purpose; but it is itself the realisation of an end in exhibiting a certain type of organic existence. An ideal has been realised in the organism, whatever external end it may afterwards serve. Hegel emphasised intrinsic, or immanent, as opposed to extrinsic finality. Upon this subject, we remark:

(*a.*) The Hegelian doctrine is an unequivocal concession in favor of the teleological argument.

(*b.*) We must distinguish between finality and the cause of finality. Hegel agrees with the Theist in affirming the fact. He differs with him in his explanation of it. There is nothing in immanent finality to interfere with legitimate teleology. Theism is not compromised by immanence.

(*c.*) Though the distinction between external and internal ends be a valid one, it is impossible always to separate one from the other. Our bodily organization is a system consisting of the adaptation of part to part. The eye is a system. The several parts of the body are systems. Each system realises its end as being a system. But the whole body realises its end as a system only by the coördination and adaptation of systems to each other.

(*d.*) Hegel affirms that the finality of the world is not conscious and free, but only the activity of nature. This, however, is not argument.

3. Unconscious finality. This is the doctrine of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, and differs little from that of Hegel. It admits the finality of nature; affirms intelligence as accounting for that finality, but maintain that this is an unconscious intelligence. This theory protests against an anthropomorphic conception of God, and gives us a zoömorphic conception of nature.

4. Intentional finality. If it is true that finality is stamped upon nature, the question is whether it is more rational to say that this finality is the product of a blindly operating nature, or that it is the result of intelligent foresight and intention. By so much as the latter is more rational, by that much is theism more worthy of our consideration than the

substitutes for it that have been under consideration. Theism is that theory of the universe that explains the adaptation of means to ends in the universe by the doctrine of intentional finality.

Division II. Argument Based on Conscience.

The word conscience stands for both the ethical and the religious side of man's nature. Accordingly the theistic proofs suggested by the word may be considered under two heads.

A. The Ethical Argument.

Prof. Flint does not think that the moral argument is concerned with the questions now under discussion regarding the genesis of conscience. His position seems to be that we must choose between theism and absolute skepticism. If conscience tells the truth there is moral obligation and a moral governor: if conscience does not tell the truth authoritative morality is at an end. Professor Flint is probably wrong in supposing that this theistic discussion can ignore current debate on Ethical questions.

The great topics of Ethical study are: 1. Duty; 2. The Good; 3. Virtue. (*Janet. Moral Science.*)

I. Ethical Argument Based on Idea of Duty.

The two ideas under duty are *ought* and *right*. If these ideas are ultimate, the theistic inference is natural. It is held by some that they are not ultimate. Thus:

1. Some, as Schopenhauer, say there is no legitimate place in ethics for the word duty. It is claimed that we may describe men as they are, and classify them as kind or cruel, but that the word ought has no meaning.

2. The ideas ought and right are held to be derived from Law (Hobbes, Bain). Conscience is an imitation in the individual life of the social forces without. A human government is a system of commands and penalties. Moral law is derived from it. Ought means the expedient. A feeling that I ought not, is only "a strong sense of avoidance"—a dread of penalty. No theistic inference from Idea of Duty, if this be correct view.

3. The Utilitarian theory. (Bentham, Mill.) Egoistic Hedonism makes that conduct right which makes me happy.

Universalistic Hedonism considers the greatest happiness of the greatest number. To Egoistic Hedonist you say, "Conduct can never be obligatory. It must always be in terms of pleasure." But to Universalistic Hedonist you say, "Why am I bound to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number." He postulates obligation in the Utilitarian maxim. But he does not explain it. Explained it must be, however, if intuitive morality is to be successfully attacked.

Utilitarianism has to settle first whether the "greatest happiness" formula is a generalization expressing an altruistic instinct or a generalization expressing an altruistic duty. If the former, it ignores the idea of oughtness; if the latter, it postulates it. In neither case does it explain it.

4. The Ethics of evolution. According to this theory, morality is simply the conduct necessary to the continued existence of society. It may be asked, however, first: how it happens that the idea of obligation has been evolved in connection with the evolution of a morality, which is only one of expediency. Second: what is to be said to the man who is told not to do wrong because doing wrong will damage social tissue, if he says that he does not care anything about social tissue? Evolution ethics cannot be obligatory; but evolutionists cannot get rid of the fact that the idea of obligation is here.

The word ought is a stumbling-block in the way of all empirical thinkers. We grant that if ought could be reduced to lower terms, it would be hard to base a theistic argument upon it. But the attempt so to reduce it has hitherto proved unsuccessful. The same may be said for the word right. Oughtness and Rightness are the two irreducible words concerned in the idea of duty. To what do they point?

1. Some stop with the consciousness of obligation, and see no theistic implications in it. They recognize the categorical imperative as a psychological fact, without attempting any metaphysical inferences.

2. Some say that Right means conformity to the fitness of things.

3. Some hold that there is a principle of right to which God and all moral things are coördinately related.

4. Others, again, say that morality depends upon the Divine will.

5. We believe that the idea of oughtness and rightness both witness to the Divine existence.

Assuming that God exists as a moral governor, these ideas would be the natural correlatives of that truth. The sense of oughtness would be the natural correlative of man's relation to God as a moral governor, and the sense of rightness the natural correlative to God as the norm and model of his moral existence.

II. Ethical Argument Based upon the Idea of the Good.

By the Good is meant the Desirable. What is the relation of Good to Duty?

a. Does Duty supersede the Good? Is it not possible to have a law of duty defining conduct and also an unrealized ideal inspiring it? Duty, as a matter of experience, does not supersede Good.

b. Is the Good subordinated to Duty? Can we say the desirable is doing Right? Though Duty be regardless of consequences, consequences enter largely into the motives of life. There is in life an aspiration after the ideal as well as conformity to law.

c. Can the Dutiful be subordinated to the Good? Is obligation conditioned by consequences? Can we say that we ought to do right because doing Right makes for our highest happiness? No. This resolves obligation into expediency. This substantially is Janet's system of "rational Eudemonism."

Duty and Good are coördinate. Both have place. What then is the Good? What is the Desirable? Is it wealth, power, fame, luxury? In short is it pleasure? Suppose with Descartes and others, we say it is the perfection of our being and its accompanying happiness, then there is an ideal that we desire to realize? There is an ideal Good. What are we to infer?

The Pessimist will say that this is the misery of human nature that it sighs after unrealizable ideals.

But if we are not pessimists we shall regard the irresistible idea of the Good as prophetic of its realization. This can only be if we are immortal. Immortality therefore, says Kant, is a postulate of our moral nature. This can only be through the agency of a purposing and all-controlling Being who shapes all ends. God, says Kant, is the postulate of our moral nature.

It is hard to separate the thought of an ideal Good as the measure of our perfection from that of an Absolute Good as of a being who realizes in himself all perfection. See Janet: *Moral Science*. Harris: *Philosophical Basis of Theism*.

Again: The idea of Duty regardless of consequences and the idea of the Good concerned altogether with consequences are both factors in our moral life. They might be in conflict. Suppose the felicific conduct were the wrong conduct. Suppose doing right always made us miserable. How does it happen that duty and the good are in such complete accord? We get happiness by doing right, yet we are not to do right for the sake of happiness. Theism will account for this harmony. We do not know how otherwise it can be accounted for. If God proposes to bring about the blessed perfection of the individual it is not strange that what with Him is an end should be foreshadowed in man as the good. And if this perfection is to be brought about through performance of right conduct it is not strange there should be this harmony between Duty and Good.

III. Ethical Argument Based on Idea of Virtue.

Duty says what we ought to do. The Good what we desire to become. Virtue is the realization of Duty in character. Under the word Virtue we have not the bare category Right, but the category filled with content. We say this or that is right. How has this category of Right been filled? How, for example, do we know that truth telling is right? Is it by Intuition, Revelation or Evolution? If through the first or second the theistic inference will not be doubted. Suppose it is by the third. Then how does it happen that the same process of evolution which has named as virtues the lines of conduct most promotive of social well-being has also generated the feeling that well-being is not the reason for performing the conduct. How does it happen that evolution has singled out certain felicific conduct as virtue and has also generated the maxim of obligation which tells us to do duty without regard to happiness. How does it happen that the natural history of virtue can be written under the hypothetical imperative: "This is what you must do *if* you wish to be happy"; while the maxim of virtue is the categorical imperative: "Do this, come what may."

There are two ways in which ethic of evolution may be regarded. On the one hand, if *oughtness and rightness* be

solved into simpler constituents, you have no ethical atom in either of these words, and can build no theistic argument on them.

On the other hand, if society has been gradually moving from the simple to the more complex, and has developed these ideas of duty and good, fundamentally distinct, yet so harmonious, it is not possible to account for the development of these ideas, their harmony and their union in virtue, without resorting to a teleological explanation—in short, without presupposing God. The ethic of evolution does not destroy, but it changes the form of the moral argument.

B. The Religious Argument.

Under this would properly be discussed: 1. The psychology of religion. 2. The metaphysical inferences. It would appear that religion is not exclusively a matter of intellect, feeling or life, but the synthesis of all. And the inference to a being the objective counterpart of the universal religious tendency would be the outcome of the common argument *E consensu gentium*.

Division III. Argument Based on the Idea of the Infinite.

Distinguish between (1) the idea of the infinite, and (2) the theistic significance of the idea.

1. The idea. Dr. McCosh puts it among the intuitions. Locke and empirical philosophers generally account for it by exercise of imagination in connection with experience of the finite. But whatever the conditions under which the idea emerges as a fact of consciousness, it complies with the canons of intuitionalism. The idea is not limited in application to time and space. We cannot conceive of any degree of knowledge as exhausting the knowable. We speak of infinite truth, holiness, justice. So used, the word infinite does not differ much from the perfect or the absolute. We cannot realise dependent, finite, contingent existence without thinking of infinite, perfect, absolute existence. We cannot conceive the infinite in the sense of making a mental image of it. On the other hand and in another sense, we cannot help conceiving of it.

2. Its Theistic Significance.

1. Schelling taught that the infinite or absolute is immediately known. This view was repeated by Sir William Hamilton, who showed that according to the definitions of the words absolute and infinite, the infinite cannot know and cannot be known; cannot, because that a knowing absolute and a known absolute, is no absolute at all.

2. Hamilton's doctrine of Nescience. See Dr. Hodge's chapter, *Can God be Known?* Hamilton tries to show that we can have no knowledge of God; that we must take our choice between inconceivables, with the assurance that these inconceivables being contradictory propositions, one or the other must be true; and having made it easy for us by his law of the conditioned to believe the inconceivable, he tried to make up for our lack of knowledge by logical vindication of our faith. Mansel followed in his *Limits of Religious Thought*, designed to be a new apologetic, and intended to show that the difficulties of theology are only those of all thought, that since we must believe the inconceivable in philosophy, we may believe the inconceivable in theology. The most popular application of the Hamiltonian philosophy is not found in Mansel's apologetic, but in Spencer's agnosticism.

3. Dr. Calderwood holds that we have an intuitive knowledge of an infinite personal God. He cannot be said to have succeeded. Men do not have the same sort of intuitive belief in an infinite God that they do in regard to time and space, or there would be no atheists.

4. We do not immediately know the Infinite. Nor is it true that we cannot think of the Infinite except under contradictory attributes. Nor do we have an intuitive and necessary belief in the objective existence of an infinite Being. Nevertheless the idea of the infinite is an important factor in theistic inference. We have this idea. It emerges in connection with every experience of what is finite and relative. It is involved in every degree of empirical excellence, as the norm or standard of excellence. We cannot think of Right or Good without thinking of an absolute norm or standard. The infinite or absolute is another word for the ideal. What interpretation shall we put upon this ideal? The question is not how we get it, but what it means. We believe that it is a strong confirmation of

the theistic view of the world, partly because of the large place it holds in the human mind and partly too because of the inevitable impression into which we fall if we conclude there is no objective norm, no absolute standard by which all upward growth is measured, by which all relative truth and goodness is judged.