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I.

THE MINISTRY.

TO one who reads the New Testament carefully, with a view to ascertain what it teaches in regard to the organization of the Church, it is obvious that apart altogether from the ordinary members there were official members, known by such names as deacons, elders, bishops, pastors, teachers, and ministers. Seven men were on one occasion appointed to serve tables and to provide for widows in the daily ministrations. Elders were appointed by Paul and Barnabas in the newly formed churches of Lycaonia. In the church at Antioch we find prophets and teachers, and in the church at Philippi bishops and deacons. The Thessalonians had those who labored among them and were over them in the Lord, while the Hebrew Christians had some who ruled over them and watched for their souls. Churches were not permitted to remain for any long time without such officers, and till they were supplied there was something "wanting."

Between these and the private members of the Church, the Scriptures draw a marked line of distinction. These officers have names peculiar to themselves. They are set apart to their work with the laying on of hands. They have distinctive duties to perform. They are promised, in case of being diligent and faithful, a special reward. Not only so, but there are special duties which the ordinary church-members are enjoined to perform to these officers: they are to acknowledge, to esteem, to remember, to obey, and to support them. All these considerations show that at a time when the Church was under the guidance of the living apostles of Christ, there was a clear line of demarcation between teachers and taught, the rulers and the ruled.

## VI.

### THE METAPHYSICS OF OUGHTNESS.

THE idea of oughtness is an ethical atom. It cannot be resolved into simpler constituents. Every attempt to derive "ought-not" from "better-not" has failed. We feel that we ought: this is an ultimate psychological fact. Of every ethical system, therefore, we must ask whether it will give us an obligatory morality. Failure in this respect on the part of the systems taught by Mill, Bain, Spencer and Stephen, must be regarded as proof of their inadequacy until it can be shown that the word "ought" has no legitimate place in ethical science; until, that is to say, it can be shown that "ought" does not stand for the categorical imperative, 'Do this,' but for the hypothetical imperative, 'Do this, if you wish to secure certain results.' It is, however, as impossible to rob oughtness of its authority as it is to discover its genesis in our experiences of pleasure or pain. Clifford's fiction of a "tribal self" is so baseless that, rather than adopt it, later writers of the school to which he belongs have preferred to let the idea of moral obligation go unaccounted for. Clifford, however, saw (what Spencer and Stephen seem not to have considered) that the idea of obligation unexplained is a standing menace to the ethic of evolution. In his fanciful attempt to show the naturalistic genesis of the idea of oughtness Clifford reveals his knowledge of the strength which this idea contributes to the cause of intuitional morality. Intuitional morals are poorly defended, we may be sure, when the categorical imperative is assigned to a subordinate position. If it were successfully shown that the feeling of obligation has grown up gradually in experience, or that it stands only as the symbol of "a strong ideal avoidance," we should have to admit that Utilitarianism had made a very dangerous encroachment upon the territory of Intuitionalism. The advocate of Intuitionalism has, therefore, the deepest interest in the purely psychological question touching the genesis of conscience; and the failure of empirical philosophy hitherto to account for moral obligation may well encourage us to believe that the cause of Intuitionalism is safe for many a day to come. The psychological side of the question, how-

ever, is not the only one that has interest for the student of ethics. Indeed, it is not the one which possesses chief interest, for in dealing with it the intuitional philosopher is acting mainly on the defensive. The idea of oughtness seems so self-evidently simple and indecomposable that there would be no need of dwelling upon this fact were it not that the advocates of empiricism are under a necessity imposed upon them by the exigencies of their theory, of trying at least to trace the genesis of this idea to simpler elements of experience. Assuming, however, that oughtness is an ultimate psychological fact, we must consider it in its metaphysical aspect. And since the title of this article is "The Metaphysics of Oughtness," we shall do nothing out of the way if we begin by giving some account of what metaphysic is. If to the professed student of philosophy such an explanation should, as in all probability it will, seem superfluous, it is enough to say that a great many readers are, or ought to be, interested in fundamental questions in moral science, who nevertheless are not professed students of philosophy.

✦ As good a way as any of arriving at the meaning of metaphysic is to begin by considering the demand made sometimes by scientific men that science shall concern itself simply with phenomena. Reducing knowledge to the method of science, as Mr. Lewes phrased it, means dealing with everything as if it were amenable to the senses, and rejecting everything that is recalcitrant to this mode of treatment. We understand what this demand is, and how absurd it is. For, suppose that it were possible to treat mental facts as physical facts; suppose we could weigh love or apply the calculus to pleasure and pain; we should not have succeeded in reducing everything to the method of science. We should have succeeded in saying, perhaps, that we take cognizance of nothing that is not measurable in the terms of mathematics. But what of mathematics? That science is not empirical, and not only is it not empirical, but our empirical knowledge would not amount to much if we did not have this *a priori*, this metempirical science to apply to it. So you might say with regard to the sciences of pure observation, 'Let the facts be gathered, and let them be classified and reduced to system, and let us deal with psychological facts in the same way that we do with physical.' You have a statement, as the result of such a process, of what is; you have a tabulated and classified inventory of facts. And if it be said that all there is of knowledge is such an inventory, we reply by asking how you came to make this inventory, why you are shut up to certain methods, and how it comes to pass that there is such agreement among men in regard to method and content in the matter of classification. It will come out before long that there

are certain necessities of thought that determine these things, and that but for these necessities the work of classification could not have proceeded. Similarly, if one should say that logic is a tabulated account of the laws of thinking, we should say, 'Yes. It is a writing down of the facts as I find them about the necessities I am under when I think.' And in that sense you might call logic an empirical science just as geology is. But in another sense it is not. For while the laws of thinking may be revealed in experience, they are not derived from experience. A man must be a logician by nature before he is one by profession. So that logic, like mathematics, is not only a science that resists the demand that all knowledge be treated in the terms of what is seen and can be measured, but it is the organon of those sciences which have for content what can be weighed and measured. There is, then, a basis for the distinction between what is a matter of experience and what is a condition of experience.

By far the largest part of our knowledge is empirical: we get it through experience. Let us in a rough way consider what is meant by empirical truth. We have sensations: modifications of consciousness effected through our bodily organism; we have perceptions: the recognition of existences outside of and objective to ourselves. A classification of our perceptions, or, rather, the application of the laws of thought to our perceptions in any sphere of observation, will give us the science of that sphere of observation, as in geology, chemistry, astronomy. Such sciences are empirical. The knowledge that we obtain whatever method be employed is of the phenomenal. Let the observer now turn his gaze inward. He is still observing what he sees, what appears—phenomena. And if he observe accurately, tabulate exhaustively, classify logically, and, in so far as he be able to do so, account for these phenomena, he will give us the science of mind. It will be an empirical science quite as much as geology is. It will state the results of observation carried on in the territory of mind. Psychology is an empirical science; metaphysics a metempirical. And it will appear that in psychology, as well as in physics, there is a metempirical residuum which these sciences, as such, are not called upon to deal with. It is this metempirical residuum which constitutes the matter of metaphysic.

Among the things that we know we distinguish. We are sure of many things, but not of everything in the same way. Of some facts we feel sure because we are informed upon the authority of those who know. Other truths we know because we see that they are necessarily involved in what we know already. If a man should tell us that he had succeeded in making an isosceles triangle with unequal

angles at the base, and should offer to prove it by actual measurement with a pair of compasses, we should pronounce him a charlatan and a fool. For when deductive logic is fairly inferential it is demonstrably and imperiously so. There are, however, other elements of knowledge for which we can give no reason. Of most of our beliefs touching the facts of consciousness or the external world, we can give some account; and we are satisfied when we can say that this is true because it necessarily follows from something else that is known to be true. But it is clear that this regress cannot go on forever. We must come by and by to something that is true in and of itself without regard to anything else. And so we find that there are beliefs that we cannot give any account of, that we cannot dispossess ourselves of, that not only do not grow out of experience but that condition the possibility of experience. It is important for us to make this matter clear to ourselves, for we are now on the water-shed of the two great streams of philosophic thought that afterward flow so far apart. Hume said that all knowledge is the outgrowth of sensation. The empirical philosophy of the present day, the philosophy of Spencer, for example, builds upon Hume's foundation.

We are to believe, then, that once upon a time there was somebody who was a stranger to such ideas as Time, Space, Cause, Substance, and Personal Identity. But this somebody had a sensation. Out of this sensation has grown up our present system of organized knowledge. Let us interrogate this man who never had an idea until he had a pain. I should like to ask him where the pain is. Is it in the extremities, or nearer the centre of his organism? He cannot tell: he has no idea of Space, no 'here,' no 'there.' I would like to know when he was taken with it; but still he cannot tell: he has no idea of Time. I would be glad to know if he has had more than one such sensation; but he does not know: he has no idea of succession. Ask him, further, if he has this sensation now. He replies by asking what you mean by 'now.' But if he does not know he has it now, how does he know he had it yesterday? He has no memory, for memory implies both Time and Personal Identity. Suppose, however, he says that he has this sensation, how does he know that the pain at the beginning of the minute belongs to the same man who has it at the end of the minute, seeing that he has no idea of Personal Identity? And suppose he can say 'I.' What does 'I' mean? 'I feel a sensation.' What do we understand by that? Most of us would say that there is something that thinks, feels and wills. The thinking may be different, the feelings may vary at different times, but the thinker, the feeler is the same.

There is something standing under and supporting these changing phenomena. 'I' means something as we use it, for we have the idea of Substance. But this man, who has but a single sensation, has no idea of Substance. What can 'I' stand for in his case? Now, it looks as though a man who only had sensations, but could not locate them, could not compare them, could not say, 'they are mine,' could not say 'now' and 'then,' 'here' and 'there' regarding them, could not be said to have much experience. Indeed, it is difficult to see how a man could have a sensation without being able to say that it was here and not there, or realize 'now' as to having it without realizing 'then' also. Kant, therefore, made a strong argument against Hume when he said that certain ideas did not come out of experience, and proved what he said by showing that the simplest experience would have been impossible if these ideas had not existed beforehand.

All knowledge is either derived by inference from antecedent knowledge, or is self-evident and intuitional. All inferential knowledge ultimately leans upon intuitions. It follows, therefore, that the fate of all science and philosophy is involved in the fate of the underlying intuitive or *a priori* knowledge. Hence the logical order, not the chronological, of investigation must be an inquiry into the meaning and value of these *a priori* cognitions and beliefs. Absurd as it may seem, the first step logically in the acquisition of knowledge is a rigid inquiry whether knowledge is possible. For, if all knowledge rests on first truths, and first truths turn out not to be such, or not to be known to be such, then first truths not being known nothing is known, and our magnificent sciences are only card-castles blown down by the breath of the metaphysicians. The Critique of the Pure Reason, every one must see, therefore, is the first work to be done by way of preparing to build the Temple of Knowledge. This is the work, no more, no less, which Kant undertook. This, together with the masterly way in which he did it, is what gives his treatise such fundamental place in philosophic literature.

The study of the *a priori* elements in knowledge, or, to speak in broader terms, the theory of knowledge, constitutes a part of metaphysics. And if the idea of oughtness be included among these *a priori* beliefs, we are bound not only to record the fact and give it a place among phenomena in the science of psychology, but we are bound to discuss its meaning as one of the *a priori* factors of our life, and such a study is rightly called a metaphysical inquiry.

Whether there be any other scope for metaphysic—whether, in other words, besides taking cognizance of *a priori* beliefs, metaphysic deals with metempirical existence, depends altogether upon the out-

come of the Critique of Pure Reason, by whomsoever this critique is attempted. To be sure of being clear in regard to this point, let us turn our attention to another stage in the Kantian philosophy. Kant, as we all know, refuted Hume by showing that the mind brings to experience the categories by which it judges experience. This was Kant's signal service to philosophy. But when Kant found himself face to face with the ideas of Time, Substance and Cause he said: 'I have these ideas. I am necessitated to have them. These ideas are intuitions. But what of that? I have never seen Substance. I have never seen Self. These are entities which, if they exist at all, certainly transcend my experience. I do not say that such entities do not exist. Some of these ideas do not stand for entities, but only for forms of thought, and those which do stand for entities stand for things which I do not know as they are in themselves. These ideas are the rubrics of my thinking. They are the traces in which I must consent to go, and therefore there is no use trying to get rid of them. The subjective necessity of these ideas I am very sure of. Whether they have objective value is another matter.' This was where Kant gave occasion to those who charged him with Idealism, and where, at all events, he justly stands credited as joint-author with Hume of modern Agnosticism. Those, therefore, who say, with Kant, that we cannot get outside of the circle of subjectivity in regard to the meaning of our *a priori* ideas, repudiate Ontology, and Ontology, though not the whole of Metaphysic, is a very important part of it. For if the Critique of the Pure Reason, the first part of Metaphysic, which is a theory of knowledge, is not led out into the sceptical conclusions of Kant, it must lead on to what is the second part of Metaphysic—that is, to Ontology, or the science of Being. So that if we say that Metaphysic is the science of Knowing and Being we shall not be so far astray.

Let us see how a science of Knowing ends in a science of Being. We have, then, as ultimate facts of our mental nature, certain *a priori* ideas, among them those of Cause, Substance and Personal Identity. Every possible object of sensation or perception stands related to these ideas. The universe submits at once to the natural dichotomy represented by 'me' and 'not-me.' Every new event, by a necessity of thought, is regarded as having a Cause, every phenomenon as related to some Substance. If, then, we are not wilfully sceptical, we are bound to have a theory of things, we are bound to apply to phenomena the categories of Cause and Substance. Conceiving of phenomena as successive, as dependent and conditioned, we apply the judgment of causation, and ask whether we shall take the infinite

regress alternative or the unconditioned First Cause alternative. Applying to phenomena the category of Substance, we ask what lies behind the phenomena of intellect, feeling and will; what lies behind the phenomena of extension and motion. The psychologist need not busy himself with anything more than the phenomena of mental life. If he go beneath these phenomena to discuss the nature or prove the existence of mind he becomes a metaphysician. The physicist also need not go beyond the phenomena of the physical world. These are open to his inspection. They can be weighed, measured, counted, treated with re-agents, put into retorts, and, speaking generally, be made the subject of calculation and measurement. Whatever be the true theory as to the ultimate constitution of matter, his results will not be affected. He is not prevented, of course, from dealing with the problem of ontology, and therefore he may have his theory as to the existence or non-existence of matter. In that event, however, he becomes a metaphysician. Now, it is quite evident that one's ideas of oughtness would be very much affected if he should hold a materialistic or a pantheistic, as opposed to the Theistic, theory of the universe. And as any theory of the universe implies an Ontology, and as Ontology is metaphysic, the metaphysical aspect of the idea of oughtness is a matter of very serious concern. By the metaphysical aspect of the idea we mean an explanation of the nature, scope and implications of moral obligation considered as an ultimate truth; and the relations which the idea of moral obligation sustains to leading theories of the universe. For reasons which will be evident enough as we proceed, we shall reverse this order, though it is the natural order, and consider, in the first place, the relation of the idea of moral obligation to theories of the universe.

If we attend to the specific differences that characterize philosophical systems we shall have to admit that there are many theories of the universe. Generically speaking, however, we shall not be far astray if we say that there are three leading theories of the universe. We do not include Agnosticism among these, for Agnosticism, so far as it is a theory, is the theory that a theory of the universe is impossible. According to one of the theories referred to, the world (including phenomena of mind and matter, and irrespective of the question as to the dualism of mind and matter) stands as finite and conditioned causally related to one Infinite First Cause. This is Theism. According to the other two, this dualism of Creator and creature, God and the world, conditioned and unconditioned, is blotted out. Instead of a Dualistic we have a Monistic theory. Treating, now, the totality of things under this Monistic conception,

we may regard it as an aggregate of material atoms which sustain relations to each other and move. This is Materialism. If it is thought best to define this system by showing its relation to the idea of God and to that of the world we may say indifferently, each being as true as the other, that it is an atheistic or a pancosmic system. Or, conceiving of this Monistic system not as matter, but as mind, as many do, all that seems to be material will be treated as sense-illusion. Matter as stuff, as hard, impenetrable entity, possessed of extension, is not. The so-called phenomena of matter are really manifestations of spirit. Such a theory of the universe is antipodally related to the one just referred to. It is not Materialism, but Spiritualism. If we wish to define this system also by showing its relations to the familiar conceptions of God and the world, we may say—and it does not make much difference whether we employ one or the other form of expression—either that it is a pantheistic or an acosmic system.

The question before us is the relation of the categorical imperative to these theories of the universe. Suppose, for example, that the Pantheistic system were true. According to this system, there is one substance; all is that one substance: all is God. All phenomena are modes of this substance. All physical change and all mental change—that is to say, all phenomena in extension and in thought—take place necessarily. So-called choice, self-direction, and volition are chimeras. Under such a conception, of course, human conduct ceases to be a matter of self-determination, and therefore ceases to be a matter about which obligation can be affirmed. We can say regarding it what is or will be, but not what ought to be, for in the idea of oughtness there is involved not only an obligatory Ideal, but a Free Agent.

If, however, instead of being a Pantheist a man become a Materialist, he reaches the same conclusions, so far as ethics are concerned. I am told, for example, that I ought to be honest. And without raising the question as to why I ought to be honest, or making the distinction between the categorical and the hypothetical imperative, suppose I admit that I ought to be honest. When you say and I concede that I ought, it is conceded that I can. It is taken for granted, that is to say, that I am a self-determining agent, and that Will stands for something. But what become of Will and spontaneity under the materialistic conception of the world? There are certain chemical constituents that enter into my body, certain molecular changes going on in my brain. Given the molecular changes, there come out certain so-called psychical acts of memory, volition and feeling. Turn the barrel of the music-box, and there

comes out music. Given the mechanism of the music-box or the hand-organ, you know in advance what tunes will be played. Ask, now, your Italian's monkey to improvise on his master's hand-organ and treat us to a new air : you make a demand that is luminous with propriety compared with the expectation that a man shall direct his own conduct when by 'man' you mean only a certain number of material atoms sustaining organic relation, and by 'conduct' you mean only the modes in which these atoms act and react on one another. Thought is as mechanical as digestion ; conduct is as purposeless as soda-water ; and in all creation it would be hard to find a more glaring incongruity than there is between the feeling of obligation, on the one hand, and the knowledge, on the other, that man, like every other part of nature, is bound hand and foot in the iron grip of necessity.

In the light of what has just been said, it is easy to understand the meaning of the question, Have we any Ethic? It may mean, Can we command conduct categorically and regardless of consequences? This will depend upon the question whether the categorical imperative is capable of being reduced to lower terms. That, however, is not the idea that is in the minds of those who are asking this question at the present day. Understanding by ethic the science that deals with the regulation of human conduct through the will, the question, Have we any Ethic? means, Is it worth while to tell a man to do this or that? to seek—either through the idea of obligation or from motives of self-interest—to change his behavior? If what a man will do depends upon his physical constitution and environment, he has nothing to say in the matter one way or the other. Herein lies the most serious objection to the evolution ethic. It has tried without success to account empirically for the idea of obligation. It is a phase of Utilitarianism urging morality upon men through the very insufficient motive of regard for the health and happiness of the social organism. Really, however, if it be true to its premises, it has no right to make any appeal at all. For if the doctrine of evolution, as taught by those who are most anxious to make an ethical application of it, were successfully applied to ethics, the science of ethics would cease to deal with what ought to be, and confine itself strictly to what is. Ethic, in other words, would simply be significant of that branch of science which deals with the natural history of conduct.

If we are to have a science of morality that shall seek to determine what men ought to do, we must have a theory of the universe that recognizes the separate existence of finite minds. The rights of Personality and the existence of obligatory morality stand or fall

together. And since no consistent theory of Personality can be held which does not involve a theistic view of the world by logical consequence, we may say, without exaggeration, that Theism conditions the possibility of ethical science. The question regarding the relation of oughtness to theories of the universe is thus narrowed to a consideration of its relation to the theistic view of the world. Two points will be considered in this connection: We shall ask, first, how far the idea of oughtness is corroborative of Theism, and, secondly, how far the hypothesis of Theism is properly interpretative of oughtness.

The moral argument is very generally conceded to be one of the strongest in support of our belief in the existence of God. Some, following Kant in this respect, allow little weight to any other. This argument has a twofold place in theistic discussion. It contributes predicates to our conception of the Divine Being whose existence is vindicated on other grounds; and it is itself an independent witness to the existence of the Divine Being, though there is room for inquiring how far one is logically consistent in falling back upon the argument based upon conscience after rejecting that based upon the causal judgment. Being satisfied that the facts of the universe can be rationally explained only upon the hypothesis of a Being infinite in power and wisdom, we cannot resist the belief—here, as before, arguing according to the analogy of our nature—that this Being has moral attributes, that He is holy, just, and true. These moral attributes are given us through our Conscience. But in so far as they are only predicates given to a Being whose existence is otherwise ascertained, they presuppose the results reached by other modes of argument. It will be held, however, that this argument has independent and constructive value; that in and of itself it establishes the existence of the Divine Being as well as clothes him with moral attributes; and this is true. The argument based upon the idea of moral obligation and immutable righteousness is a very strong argument for the existence of a moral Governor—that is to say, the presence of the Conscience in man is most rationally accounted for by the hypothesis of an infinite moral Governor. Broadly distinguished as the moral argument is from the argument *a contingentia mundi* and the argument from design, it is nevertheless, like both of these, an application of the doctrine of the Sufficient Reason. And it is very questionable whether those who can do without the hypothesis of God in order to account for physical phenomena will be under the pressure of any peculiar logical necessity that will call for the hypothesis of God to account for moral phenomena. Apart, however, from the bearing of the phenomena

of Conscience upon the underlying idea of the Sufficient Reason, it is undoubtedly true that the moral nature of man furnishes a distinct type of argument for the existence of God. We feel that we are under obligation to do Right. This is the testimony of Conscience. It is argued that this idea of obligation is not rationally satisfied except upon the hypothesis of a Being who sustains the relation of Moral Governor, and that the idea of Right as unmistakably points to the nature of God as the norm or standard of Right. This is undoubtedly true. Professor Flint and Cardinal Newman have both presented this argument with great power. I cannot agree, however, with Professor Flint in supposing that the argument is entirely independent of the current discussions concerning the genesis of conscience and the meaning of moral obligation. Assuming that the ideas of ought and of right are *a priori* ideas, the theistic argument based upon them is sound and good. If conscience cannot be shown to have been generated out of experience, it most unmistakably points to the theistic conclusion. But it is too much to say that the argument for Theism is the same no matter what the genesis of conscience may have been. For what is that argument? Briefly, this: We feel ourselves under a law commanding us at all cost to do Right. Obligation cannot change places with expediency. Duty is not determined by self-interest, but is shaped by an undeviating law of Right. Who enunciates that law of Right? Who has put us under the spell of this Categorical Imperative? We answer, God. Now, it is as clear as day that this argument derives its whole value from the interpretation we put upon the words Right and Ought. But suppose we accept the naturalistic theory as to the genesis of these ideas. Suppose we understand that 'ought' meant originally what is best for us and that 'ought-not' only meant dread of punishment. Suppose, in a word, we accept Bain's or Spencer's account of the genesis of these ideas; will it be possible for us to avoid putting a different meaning upon them? It will be said, perhaps, that no matter how the idea of oughtness originated, it is here, and it has a definite meaning. It may be said that, though oughtness once stood for prudence, it does not stand for prudence now. It may be said that whatever the genesis of the feeling may have been, the feeling is not now exchangeable for any other feeling. That is all true. I grant that no natural history of the idea of obligation can make that idea equivalent to the idea of prudence. But though emotionally I may not be able to dispossess myself of the feeling of moral obligation, I may nevertheless intellectually be able to see that this feeling is not worthy of any particular respect. And most assuredly, when I come to believe that oughtness as I experi-

ence it is only transformed prudence, I shall not suppose that a metaphysical argument can be built upon it in proof of the Divine existence. It is a mistake to say that the argument based upon conscience has nothing to do with the current theories as to the genesis of conscience; it has everything to do with them. Given the intellectual character of the idea of moral obligation, and the theistic argument based upon Conscience is irresistible. Hence the importance of showing that the intuitional character of oughtness has not been successfully assailed.

It does not follow, however, from what has just been said, that the theory of a naturalistic genesis of conscience destroys all moral argument for the existence of God. I distinctly hold that, were the evolutionists to succeed in giving us an account of the rise and development of conscience, we should still have a moral argument, and a very important moral argument, for the existence of God. But it should be said that it would be a very different argument from that which is commonly employed. Let it be granted that all conduct, as the evolutionists say, is in the terms of pleasure and pain. Let it be granted that under the operation of felicitic impulse men have evolved the regulated social behavior which they call morality. Then this involves certain indubitable facts that deserve attention. For it turns out that under the impulse to seek pleasure men have evolved an Ideal which stands for the goal at which they would fain arrive. They value life and the things of life by their bearing upon this Ideal. They are seeking happiness, yet they have evolved a canon of conduct that sticks stubbornly in the breast of every man—defying analysis and resisting all efforts at eviction—and according to this canon conduct is not to be approved because pleasure-giving, but because it is right. They love pleasure, but feel under obligation to do right. They find that when they do what they ought to do they are happy, and that when they seek happiness at the expense of duty they miss it. They are moving on and up toward the realization of this Ideal. They are fostering hopes that need Immortality for their realization. How is it that these two ideas—the Right and the Good, these two impulses—the love of Happiness and the sense of Obligation, are so harmonious? How is it that they conspire to the realization of what we feel, and cannot but feel, is the highest type of manhood? How is it that we have these ideas of high and low? What is the significance of moral Ideals? What explanation is there of the trend of destiny toward their realization unless it be that there is an Infinite Being, whose nature is the norm of Right, whose law is the correlative of our sense of obligation, whose directing agency explains the path of history?

Though evolution were to give us an explanation of conscience, there is a teleology in human history and in the upward movements of the human spirit that finds no adequate explanation except through the hypothesis of an Infinite God. But, as was said a little while ago, this is not the old argument based upon the conscience. That old argument needs as its presupposition the intuitive basis of conscience. That old argument I believe in because I believe in the intuitive elements that underlie it. The question is: Given oughtness as an intuitive idea, what is the most rational way of accounting for it? It is not necessary to say that the voice of conscience is the voice of God, or that God is speaking to man when he realizes the idea of moral obligation. But on the supposition that God exists, that He stands related to man as a moral Ruler, that man is the subject of his law, and that man is to be brought into harmony with the Divine will and nature, it is clear that man must know that certain conduct is right, and that Right is obligatory. The sense of oughtness would then be a natural correlative of man's relation to God as a subject of God's moral government, and the sense of Rightness would be a natural correlative of his relation to God as the norm or model of his behavior. We cannot ask why we ought, perhaps, without getting involved in the difficulties of the infinite series. But we can explain oughtness without doing this. I can say that oughtness means in me the subjective counterpart of God's government over me; and that moral obligation is accounted for adequately and rationally by the hypothesis of God the infinite and righteous Ruler of the world. In this way the word 'ought' contributes to the theistic argument, and is corroborative of the theistic position.

How far does Theism help us to arrive at the meaning of the sense of moral obligation? This is the next question to be considered. It may appear to some that this question is not materially different from the one that has just been dealt with. Indeed, it may be said: 'You prove the existence of God because oughtness implies a Being to whom you are under obligation, and you propose to prove that oughtness implies obligation to God because God is a moral Governor. You reason in a circle.' This would be a just criticism if the only argumentative support of Theism were the idea of oughtness. But this, of course, is not the case. The feeling of obligation points directly, as has been said, to God as its objective correlative. Kant does not say this. He makes a moral argument for Theism, but not this, though many seem to think so. Acknowledging the force of the categorical imperative, Kant turns himself to the task of unfolding its meaning. But he does not make a theistic

argument out of it. In the judgment of the majority of theistic writers, however, the feeling of moral obligation has no explanation short of the theistic hypothesis. And this interpretation of the idea of moral obligation is greatly strengthened by the fact that the existence of God is known through other channels. There are a great many who cannot hold, with Dr. Calderwood, that we have an *a priori* belief in one infinite, personal God, who nevertheless are quite ready to affirm that belief in God is so natural to man that he entertained it long before he constructed arguments in proof of the Divine existence. There is undoubtedly a constitutional tendency Godward, explain it as we may : let it be held that there is a process of unconscious inference in the belief, or that this constitutional belief is accounted for by the inspirational presence of God Himself in the soul, the fact remains that belief in the Divine existence was entertained prior to any reasoned or deliberately formulated defence of the Divine existence. Theistic arguments do not originate Theism, they only defend an already existing Theism. Too much is made, however, of this constitutional tendency Godward when it is made the basis of a disparaging estimate of the theistic proofs. Proofs in the sense of demonstrations, of course, they are not ; but proofs to the extent of being rational defences of Theism they undoubtedly are. The argument *a contingentia mundi*, from order, from design, from conscience, from the idea of the Infinite, are all good arguments. They make Atheism absurd. They put Theism upon the basis of a reasoned and a rationally defensible belief. Taking Theism, then, as a belief that is capable of rational defence by means of several independent lines of argument, we return to the consideration of oughtness. Assuming, on the ground of the evidence that certifies the belief, that one infinite personal God exists, we say that since we stand related to God as the Author and Preserver of all things, we cannot help putting a meaning upon the idea of oughtness of which we find ourselves possessed. Accordingly, when we undertake to unfold the meaning of moral obligation we cannot ignore the fact that it is most suggestive of God and of God's law ; we cannot be oblivious of the fact that we also believe in the Divine existence. We are obliged to say that the idea of oughtness within us is the direct counterpart of the Divine government without us. And so the idea that is corroborative of Theism will be likewise interpreted by Theism.

But the meaning of oughtness is the second topic to be dealt with in this discussion. We naturally turn to Kant for help in this part of our undertaking. He gave us the expressive phrase, the Categorical Imperative. Writers who are very suspicious of his Critique of

the Pure Reason are very well pleased with his Critique of the Practical Reason. Theologians who think that he has helped the cause of scepticism by his criticism of the theistic proofs are never tired of praising his moral argument, and of quoting Kant as the great advocate of what some are disposed to call the strongest argument for the existence of God. Kant, in fact, is regarded by many as the man who has lifted up the standard of intuitional ethics, as the man who has made the stoutest protest against all forms of Epicurean and calculating morality. And when they quote Kant's great expressions about the two things that filled him with awe—the starry sky above him and the moral law within him—they seem to be pretty sure that they have the great philosopher of Königsberg on the side of intuitive morals and the ten commandments. It would be a surprise to some to be told that Kant's ethical system, instead of being a reproduction of the ten commandments, has really only one commandment, and that in order to find application for that he has to fall back upon considerations of happiness and general well-being which he had previously repudiated; and, moreover, that the logical outcome of Kant's doctrine of autonomy is the ethical individualism expressed in the words: Obey your conscience.

This, however, is true, and it will become apparent as we go on. We cannot appreciate Kant's explanation of oughtness without knowing something of his whole ethical system. Let us consider some of the salient points in that system. (1) Kant says there is nothing good but a good will. Of inclinations, tendencies, desires, feelings, Kant makes no mention in any way appreciative of their importance. He emphasizes will. To be good is to have a good will. There are systems of theology of American origin the authors of which, in all probability, owed little or nothing to Kant, in which the same emphasis is laid upon the will. But it should be noticed that this sentence, "nothing good but a good will," is the corner-stone of the Kantian ethic. (2) "An action done from duty derives its moral worth not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but ~~by~~ <sup>from</sup> the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place without regard to any object of desire." Kant's protest against all calculating morality is wrapped up in this sentence. It is common for writers to say that the moral quality of an action resides in its motive, and as that is good or bad the action is good or bad. Kant does not say that. He says that there are *a posteriori* springs of action, and actions done with reference to them are not moral. A man, for example, gives money to an hospital. He may do it to gratify vanity, or

because he is in deep sympathy with suffering and wishes to relieve it. But whether the motive be a selfish desire to advertise his benevolence or an unselfish desire to relieve suffering, his action has no moral worth. It is done with reference to the consequences. Moral action must be done at the bidding of an *a priori* dictate of the will. This *a priori* maxim of the will is a law, is a command, and, constituted as we are, means obligation. (3) And so Kant says that Duty is the necessity of acting out of respect to the law. Where there is a conflict between inclination and obligation the right rule, of course, is to follow obligation. But Kant's *dictum* means more than that. It means that if inclination and obligation are parallel, so that in doing as I ought to do I do what I like to do, my action is deserving of no moral consideration if done because I like to do it. If I see a child overboard and debate the question of duty, hesitate and feel reluctant, but from a sense of duty jump overboard and save its life, I do a moral act. If, on the other hand, without having duty emerge into conscious thought—if because of a humane, an unarguing impulse, I go to the rescue, I am acting from inclination, not from a sense of duty, and my act has nothing moral about it. So that, if a man were to develop a character that would lead him impulsively, spontaneously and without hesitation to do what the law commands, while he would be the more sure on that account to do right acts at all times, he would by so much as he loved to do right abate his claims to be considered as acting morally. Duty, then, is acting out of respect for the law. What law? If a given line of conduct is law for one it ought to be law for all. The law voices itself in the categorical imperative. What is it? Kant says: (4) "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This is the way Kant finds universal morality. Right or wrong in each concrete case is determined by asking whether we should be willing to have the action proposed in each case made universal. Shall I make a promise that I do not intend to keep? Kant asks, What would be the result if every man were to do that? My neighbor has means enough to live without working and he loves idleness. May he live in idleness? Kant asks again, What would be the effect if everybody lived in idleness? His test in every case is the inquiry whether the proposed course of conduct is capable of being made the rule for all men. If not, he decides against it. Many, we imagine, have applied Kant's maxim who never learned it from Kant and long before they ever heard of Kant. Every year multitudes act in obedience to the maxim *abstine a fabis*, and keep away from the polls; and every year the argument is used against those who do not vote, that

if everybody should act as they do we should be in a bad way politically. Those who say this are really repeating Kant's categorical imperative. The objection to Kant's position here is so obvious that it cannot but occur to every reader. Hegel criticised Kant long ago, and Schurman has criticised him recently in similar terms. The point of these criticisms is that in spite of his repudiation of a calculating morality, Kant has surrendered to Utilitarianism. There is no room for doubt on this head. Why, for instance, may I not let my neighbor's family starve? Their poverty is no concern of mine. Perhaps the human race will be all the stronger if the weak go to the wall, and if this attempt to interfere with the law of the survival of the fittest by seaside excursions for poor people's teething children were abandoned. Why is it wrong for me to refuse sympathy and help? Because I cannot make that refusal a universal maxim. Why not? Why should it not be a universal maxim? What is Kant's answer? Let us remember Kant says that when I do duty I do it without regard to consequences; I must not consult personal advantage or the advantage of others; I must not be moved by inclination. Why not make it, then, a universal maxim that poverty and distress may be neglected? Because, says Kant, if it be made universal I may be the first to suffer: "Cases might occur in which he would have the need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which by such a law of nature sprung from his own will he could deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires." The bottom drops out of the morality based upon duty for duty's sake, as Kant preaches it. He tells us that we must do duty for duty's sake, must act out of respect for the law and not from inclination or calculation of consequences. We ask him to state the law, and he says: Act only on a maxim fit to be universal. We ask him to give us a maxim fit to be universal, and he replies by giving us one that proves its fitness for universality by being conducive to personal advantage or general well-being. His ethic as to form is intuitional and of the "high priori" order, disdaining calculation and regard for consequences. As to matter, however, it out-Mills Mill in Utilitarianism. Now, a form is good provided it have content. But of what use is it without content? Act only on maxims fit to be universal: this is a very pretty vehicle for moral precepts to ride in. It glitters with the sheen of a severe simplicity. Outside and inside we read such confidence-inspiring mottoes as: Duty for duty's sake; The autonomy of the will; Down with Utilitarianism. The Mill coach, the Bentham coach and even the somewhat modern Spencer coach, look small and uninviting alongside of Kant's. And Kant sits on the box with an air that seems to say, 'None of your

common passengers for me.' Let us see who gets in. Here is maxim number four of the ten commandments, and here are numbers six and seven and eight. They all give Kant the go-by. These are maxims fit to be universal, but they have too much dignity to submit their claims to universality to empirical tests. They come in their own right, taking orders from an infinite norm of right. Their rightness, and therefore their worthiness of all acceptance does not depend upon the rules that we are taught to apply in the Kantian ethics. The Kantian coach is likely to drive away empty, beautiful in form but void of contents; or else, which is the other alternative, it will force Mill and Bentham out of the business, and Kant will crack his whip as he drives off with a lot of plebeian passengers in the shape of ethical maxims gathered from utilitarian morality.

There is, however, another question in regard to which we naturally desire information. The assertion that duty consists in acting out of respect to the law makes it necessary, as we have seen, to ask what the law is; it is not less necessary to ask what is the source of the law. And upon this subject Kant says: (5) "The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of all duties which conform to them; on the other hand, heteronomy of the will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is, on the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof, and to the morality of the will." It is not difficult to see what Kant means here. The will must be self-legislative and not take its law from another. There is a sense in which this is true. Suppose, for example, the law is, "Thou shalt not steal," and the justification of this law is that regard for property has been found, in the long run, to be advantageous to the individual as well as the community. This law is not the outcome of my will exercising its autonomy, but is a generalization coming to me from without, and seeking to control my actions by consideration of consequences. Clearly, if I am honest, I am honest because it pays to be honest. Suppose that the law takes the form of a command from the sovereign power against smuggling. I, for example, am returning from a European trip, and there are various articles more or less portable and possibly capable of being kept from the eyes of the Custom-House officers. I am disposed to run the risk, but, on the whole, think it not wise. I have complied with the law. I have not bought the laces and gloves and jewelry and other things that would have assured me a fond greeting on this side the sea. But why? Because I was afraid of being detected. I did duty not out of respect to law, but out of regard to consequences. If, however, from the secret places of my soul there had come the com-

mand, 'Thou shalt not break the law of the land,' I would have done duty for duty's sake. Let us, then, go further. We receive a command from God imposing the duty of chastity. That law can come from no higher source; we know it does come from that source. Suppose, however, that one admits that this is God's law, and is still under strong temptation to violate it. He says, 'This is God's law, but if I break it what will happen?' He remembers that God's law is given with sanctions; that a life of the kind contemplated can have but one end; and so he says, 'I will not risk my soul, I will not peril my hereafter.' What, now, is he doing? He is calculating. He is showing prudence. He is putting the pleasure of this life in one scale, and the misery of the next life in the other. He is weighing the here and the hereafter. No one can deny that he is doing a wise thing, but he is not doing duty for duty's sake. He is illustrating virtue of a kind contemplated by Paley in his well-known definition of virtue. He is utilitarian, and egoistic at that. He has been consulting his happiness, and he differs from the grossest Epicurean mainly in the fact that he has a higher conception of happiness and has in imagination extended the arena of happiness into eternity. He has what Bradley calls the music-hall conception of duty. But suppose that, besides recognizing the law as a command from without, this law were also uttered as a mandate of our own will, and were felt to be obligatory regardless of consequences. Then we should say that the seventh commandment is a law which has the force of a categorical imperative. It is to be obeyed apart altogether from the question as to what effect disobedience will have upon us. It is easy to see what Kant means, therefore, by repudiating heteronomy of will, and why he insists that moral law shall be self-legislated. His reason is that any law which has its source outside of self will always give rise to the question why we should obey it, and compliance with it will always be out of regard for consequences. That there is an element of truth, moreover, in Kant's doctrine of the autonomy of the will can hardly be denied. On the other hand, let us see what comes of autonomy of will when left to itself.

I, then, am a sovereign, legislative will; so we are to believe. Nothing is law for me that is not self-legislated. I am to obey law, but only such law as I first make. There are several difficulties here. I legislate honesty, it is true, but suppose I legislate theft. Then duty consists in acting out of respect to the law of theft. What is to tell me that honesty is fit and theft unfit to be legislated? I must settle that in one of two ways. I must have a supreme norm of right, or else I must take the empirical way of finding out what is

best by asking whether it is the honest community or the thievish community that I prefer to live in. If I take the latter plan I surrender my *a priori* morality, and am no better than Spencer, Mill, and the empiricists generally. This is exactly what Kant does. If I seek for a norm of Right I make a concession to heteronomy. I pay deference to an external will. This is exactly what, as a Theist, I am bound to do. And this only shows that we must have a theistic basis for morality, or else accept some form of the happiness theory of ethics. Kant's attempt to find a *via media* utterly fails.

Again, I am to legislate the command that I am to obey. This is Kant's *dictum*. Then everybody must do the same thing. And yet I am to legislate maxims fit for universal application. When I say 'I ought,' I mean you and everybody ought. When you say 'you ought,' you mean that I and everybody ought. This is all very well, provided we all hit upon the same maxims. But it is quite possible that we shall not, and if not, then what? I know I do right, let us suppose, when I do what my will legislates, no matter how much others may differ from me, and I know that in declining to do as I do they do wrong. To be sure there are compensations in connection with this flexible and egoistic morality, for if I think that the world is wrong the world will take revenge upon me by thinking that I am insane. We are in the midst of difficulties, but they are the outcome of the Kantian ethic. Kant's great desire to save his maxim of 'duty for duty's sake' has led him astray. His ethical system says, 'Obey the moral law out of respect to the law.' If you ask what the moral law is, it is replied, 'Act according to maxims fit to be universal.' If we ask who is to say what maxims are fit to be universal, the natural answer is, 'Every man must settle that for himself.' Fichte, therefore, says, 'Do what you think is right;' and in saying this Fichte is carrying Kant's doctrine to its logical conclusion.

The law, being given by the will of each individual in the exercise of its autonomy, it is natural to ask why it is not obeyed. Kant attempts an answer to this question, and it is the final explanation of Kant's idea of oughtness. These are his words: "What makes categorical imperatives possible is this, that the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, in consequence of which, if I were nothing else, all my actions *would* always conform to the autonomy of the will; but as I at the same time intuite myself as a member of the world of sense, they *ought* so to conform, and this categorical ought implies a synthetic *a priori* proposition, inasmuch as, besides my will as affected by sensible desires, there is added further the idea of the same will, but as belonging to the

world of the understanding, pure and practical of itself, which contains the supreme condition according to reason of the former will."

According to the teaching of this passage, man sustains a relation to reason and a relation to sense. Looked at from one point of view, man is simply a part of nature, nature being the word that stands for the mechanical articulation of phenomena which are successively conditioning and conditioned. If we wish to explain any event in the outward world, such as the position of a grain of sand or the growth of a vegetable, we account for it by its antecedents. These antecedents existing, the phenomena could not be otherwise than they are. We say, in other words, that phenomena are caused. Now, if we can account for physical change in this way, why not for mental change? Why are my actions not predictable? Why do they not come under the same law of antecedent and consequent? Kant says that as *phenomenon* man is a part of nature. In one sense he and all his actions belong to the sensible world; and if that were all there could be no morality, no propriety in categorical imperatives. You might as well say ought to the north wind. But this is not all of man. Besides being a part of nature, he is above nature. He belongs to the intelligible world. He is *phenomenon*—you see that part of him; he is also *noumenon*—out of sight that part of him is, but it is still real. And in this super-sensible sphere man is free. If man belonged only to the intelligible world, then all his actions would conform to the principle of the autonomy of the will. He would not only legislate, but he would obey. One would think that the will that legislates would obey, since it is the same will. Yes, in a sense, and in a sense, too, not the same will. It is the will considered as Intelligible, belonging to the world of Reason, that is sovereign; it is the will considered as belonging to the world of sense, as, in fact, a part of nature that is subject. As Schurman puts it, interpreting Kant, "Man as *phenomenon* receives the law; man as *noumenon* gives it." Here, then, is the self or will in the sphere of reason giving law to self or will in the sphere of sense, and encountering opposition—the opposition that comes from the inclinations and the desires. This opposition emphasizes the command. The emphasized command is a sense of obligation, a feeling of *oughtness*. This feeling is not only a recognition of the Imperative, but is its recognition with a consciousness of reluctance. It will be very difficult to accept or perhaps even to understand Kant's distinction between the phenomenal self and the noumenal self, and yet it is easy to follow him when he says that the feeling of oughtness is evidence of opposition to the law. We can easily imagine that if our whole nature were attuned to the law, if all our inclinations were

in harmony with the law, we should not be so conscious of obligation. Hence Kant can very consistently say that an act done without regard to law, though done in accordance with law, is not moral. It is not infra-moral. It transcends morality. It is supra-moral. A being wholly in sympathy with right is a holy being, but not, in Kant's judgment, a moral being. We can say what God will do, and, seeing that his nature is holy, must do, but not what God ought to do. Kant says this. And so, though it may seem to be paradoxical, there may be truth in the statement that the more moral a man becomes the less moral he is, and that the climax of morality would be the abolition of morality. This, however, only means that the man who makes such a statement has chosen to limit morality to conduct done out of respect for law as law, and to maintain that the idea of *oughtness*, whenever realized in consciousness, carries with it some element of opposition to law. It will then follow that while the growth of holy character implies a growing inclination toward good which insures the doing of good, it is at the same time in every stage of it a step in the direction of supra-morality.

The Kantian ethic is very different from the Hegelian ethic, yet in his account of the idea of oughtness Kant seems to have been very closely followed by some who are trying to revive Hegelianism in England. If, for example, in place of the phenomenal self and the noumenal self of which Kant speaks, we substitute a finite and a universal self, we shall have the basis upon which Bradley constructs his very interesting "Ethical Studies." With Bradley, as with Hegelians in general, the end of morality is "self-realization," self-realization in a goodwill. And the idea of oughtness is simply the indication of a struggle between the good and the bad self, is simply an indication of the difficulty—yet of the obligation—of realizing the universal self. It is like reading Kant over again to find Bradley saying, "No one ever was or could be perfectly moral; and if he were he would be moral no longer. Where there is no imperfection there is no ought. Where there is no ought there is no morality. Morality aims at the cessation of that which makes it possible; it is the effort after non-morality, and it presses forward beyond itself to a super-moral sphere, where it ceases, as such, to exist."

For the Universal Self which the finite self is striving to realize, and with which, in a sense, it is identical, substitute the word God. Say that man is seeking to be like God, or that God is seeking expression in and through the organs of man's personality, and we have a religious but an Hegelianized interpretation of oughtness.

It is not necessary to resort to the transcendental conception of the

noumenal or the universal self in order to account for a matter apparently so simple as that of moral obligation. And yet there are undoubtedly valuable ideas in the ethical systems just referred to, which may be of use to us in the moral problem with which we are dealing. Unless our nature enunciate the moral law we can have no other morality than one of convenience and expediency. Kant's doctrine of the autonomy of the will teaches a great truth; but, after all, it is only the truth that a command, though the Lord's command, coming to us from without, would not make us moral beings unless we had a moral nature. An external command operating upon us through our fears might control conduct, but the conduct would not be moral. To be moral it must be self-legislated; that is, the command must reach us through the conscience. We must be able to say, 'We ought.' What is the feeling of oughtness, indeed, but the autonomy of the will in exercise?

On the other hand, it is just as true that a law that had no higher sanction or authority than the individual will would not suffice. It might be said that, since I felt the obligation, the obligation was there, and that ended the matter. But it would not end the matter. I might feel the obligation, but I should examine the feeling, and if I found that it emanated from no higher source than my own will, and referred to no moral system outside, I should probably feel that this subjective morality which claims to be only regulative could not be even that. And so autonomy in and of itself is an unsatisfactory explanation of oughtness. It is not in autonomy alone or in heteronomy alone that the true explanation is found, though there is truth in both. So, too, there is truth in the statement that morality has self-realization for its end, for the 'ought to be' implies an 'is not' that is obligatory.

Nothing is gained by leaving the metaphysic of ethic that Theism suggests for that which Kant or Hegel will give us. The elements of truth which their systems contain are more simply expressed and more rationally accounted for when we adopt the common Christian doctrine of the moral government of God. We feel that we ought: we also believe in God. If God exist and we are subjects of His moral government, it is natural that He should give us a moral nature, and that moral laws should issue from that nature. The sense of obligation is witness to our subjection to moral law, which, notwithstanding the autonomy of our will, has its abiding justification in the nature of God, and is fit for universal application. As Dr. Martineau well says, in his "Types of Ethical Theory": "If it be true that over a free and living person nothing short of a free and living person can have higher authority, then it is certain that a

' subjective ' conscience is impossible. The faculty is more than part and parcel of myself ; it is the communion of God's life and guiding love entering and abiding with an apprehensive capacity in myself. Here we encounter an ' objective ' authority without quitting our own centre of consciousness ; an authority which at once sweeps into the wildest generality without asking a question of our fellow-men ; for an excellence and sanctity which He recognizes and reports has its seat in eternal reality, and is not contingent on our accidental apprehension ; it holds its quality wherever found, and the revelation of its authority to one mind is valid for all."

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