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NOTES FROM LECTURES

ON

Theistic Conception of the Universe



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# THE THEISTIC CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSE.

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## NOTES FROM LECTURE I.

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Metaphysical principles already known to you. This course of lectures aims to show their relation to a true theory of the universe. Subject before us is Theism; theism, philosophically speaking is simply one of several possible theories of the world.

Theism? What, in common between Poly-, Pan- and Mono-theist? Application of common name variously modified, shows something in common. How do the three stand opposed to the Atheist? In all theisms common factor is mind. They all teach that mind is the *prius* all existence. A pantheist is no more of an atheist than a polytheist is; and the use of the term materialistic pantheism may be questioned. If a man believe the universe an aggregate of atoms what need has he for the word "God."

It is objected that, as popularly held, theism is anthropomorphic and there is a certain anthropomorphism which we should reject; but there is a sense in which theism and pantheism as well as monotheism are and must be anthropomorphic. This only means that knowledge begins with ourselves; that, in trying to make a theory of the universe we are apt to think according to analogies of our experience and explain change and apparent adjustment and adaptation by the hypothesis of other selfs similar to ourselves.

Fundamental fact of all theisms is an inference from our human self to other selfs or an Infinite self. We distinguish

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generic from specific use of word "theism." Atheism not the antithesis of theism in the specific but in generic sense of the word.

By theism we commonly mean monotheism. Atheist, not a man who is not a monotheist. Atheist, a man who does not admit existence of mind as the *prius* of existence. Word atheism been abused, choice epithet of denunciation. Yet it can't be dispensed with. Must have a meaning as definite as that of theism. Not difficult to say when a given system is atheistic; *e. g.*, a man deserves no credit for theism because he believes in an eternal something or because order with him means "God." When uniformity of nature is another name for God you may call the system atheism, by whomsoever it is advocated. Again when the two entities constituting the universe are said to be matter and force the meaning of force determines whether system is theistic or atheistic. If Force be not an entity then by hypothesis there is but one entity and the system is atheistic. If it is an entity it is either matter or mind or neither. If it is matter, again it is atheistic. If it is neither matter nor mind it is an entity hypostatized by men whose great objection to theists is that they do not stick to what they see. It is a metempirical postulate begged to support an empirical philosophy. If it be the manifestation of mind, or if both matter and force depend on an underlying omnipotent Power which is mind then the system may be theistic.

A totality of things mechanically articulated; that is atheism. A system of things manifesting mind and ruled by it; that is theism. Poly-, Pan- and Mono-theism are here agreed in opposition to atheism, *i. e.*, to materialism.

Scientific progress has made polytheism impossible. Therefore we are practically confined to a choice between three theories of the universe. Shall we hold an atheistic theory? or a pan-theistic which carries the immanence of the Divine mind to a point when it makes it equivalent to the totality of

things and blots out all finite and separate personality ; or a monotheistic theory which affirms the immanence of God without denying that he is separate and distinct from the world of dependent existences and without compromising our own finite personality. To the last named conception of God the general name is now theism. It is theism *par excellence* in the specific as distinguished from the generic sense. Belief in a living God, infinite and personal, is the restricted meaning hereafter to be attached to the word theism. Discussion under two leading divisions. 1st Historical. 2d Constructive. Under 1st division three subjects considered. (a.) Principal forms of existing theism shown. (b.) Inquiry into origin of theistic belief. (c.) A sketch of the history of theistic proofs.

#### A. The Phenomenology of Theism.

1. Chief phases of theistic belief are the theisms of the three historic religions — Judaism, Mohammedanism and Christianity. All three had the same God. Hence all alike interested in inquiry regarding the God of Mosaism. We are not concerned with how the Old Test. came to be a body of monotheistic literature. The facts of scripture regarding O. T. theisms are (a) a people surrounded by polytheism made pupils of God in a monotheistic belief; (b) a perpetual tendency in the history of Israel to relapse into polytheism; (c) The emphasis of monotheistic belief the decalogue and all the Mosaic *cultus*.

Primitive monotheism of Israel derived by Kuenen on ground of several assumptions ; that the Jews reached monotheism by passing thro' intermediate steps of fetichism and polytheism ; that different names for God were names of different divinities ; that reference to new moons, to God's appearing in fire—to worship in high places are so many intimations of a Jewish mythology ; finally that the Law with its strong monotheism was of post-Mosaic authorship.

a. Theism of comparative Theology. Pure theism, some think, is to be the creed of the future. Theism stripped of miracle, prophecy and revelation is commonly held to be the dogmatic residuum of investigations in Comparative Theology.

3. Theism of speculative philosophy. Here God is regarded simply as a hypothesis for giving rational explanation of the universe.

4. Theism of Speculative Theology. Men of this class differed from last-mentioned because they insist upon their Christian name. They eliminate all that is supernatural; identify God with an impersonal intelligence; but still claim to be Christian theologians.

#### B. Genesis of Theism.

Four theories advanced to explain Genesis of our idea of God: 1. Development; 2. Revelation; 3. Inference; 4. Intuition. These are not, however, mutually exclusive; for same belief either an inference when considered as related to believer, or a development as related to an antecedent belief. Truth of theism not affected by question concerning its origin. Suppose monotheism to have been preceded by polytheism and fetichism, and that monotheism is an evolved belief. Evolutionist cannot urge this against truth of monotheism; for if the evolution of a belief is an argument against its truth, it is an argument against the belief in evolution.

I. Development. Genetic relationship, supposed to subsist between monotheism and antecedent impure forms of religious belief expressed in several forms.

1. Theory of Hume. Polytheism, according to Hume, is prior to monotheism. The advance from the one to the other, not due to philosophic reflection and a growing appreciation of the unity of nature, but is explained by tendency to flatter a local deity, to impute greatness, and so, by degrees, to invest him with the attribute of infinity. A view lacking every element of plausibility, and speculatively worthless.

2. Theory of Comte. Primitive man regarded world as a living thing. By an instinctive anthropomorphism, primitive man imputes life to all objects, and primitive religion is fetichism. But fetichism cannot be earliest form of religion however it may be defined. If fetich is worshipped because supposed to be alive, and is supposed to be alive, because the world is supposed to be so, then the generalization, akin to the *anima mundi* of the Stoics antedates fetichism. If fetich is worshipped as the abode of an indwelling ghost, as Lippert thinks, then whence the belief in ghosts? If the fetich is treated as a sort of sacramental means of establishing relations with a divine being, as Happel supposes, then belief in God is pre-supposed in fetich worship. However explained, a general conception conditions this concrete fact, and whether this conception be called the religious consciousness or animism, or belief in God or belief in ghosts, it must be explained upon naturalistic principles before there can be a naturalistic philosophy of religion.

3. Theory of Herbert Spencer. Primitive religion, according to this writer, was ancestor-worship. He tries to show how reverence paid to a deceased ancestor took on, after a while, the form of tree-, plant-, animal-, hero-worship, the worship of heavenly bodies, and finally of one *living and true* God. Spencer's attempt at a naturalistic explanation of religion has serious defects, *e. g.*: (1) To prove his theory he should have shown that when homage was paid to ancestors, no homage was paid to the gods.

(2) He should have shown that filial piety is worship, or such worship as is paid to the gods.

(3.) Because the savage regards God as his father he is not therefore worshipping his ancestors. To make much of the case of Unkulunkuln in this direction, would require him to draw a similar inference from our use of the Lord's Prayer.

(4) Incumbent on Mr. Spencer to show how all forms of religion have grown out of an original ancestor worship.

His attempt to do this resulted as follows: Fetich worship from identification of deceased, with portions of his clothing; idol worship from the habit of making images of the deceased; animal worship from the frequenting of the home of the deceased by certain animals, or from the fact that the deceased had an animal name; plant worship from the intoxicating liquors produced from some plants supposed, by this way, to be possessed by supernatural beings; mountain worship and worship of the sea from the fact that their ancestors came from the mountain or over the sea,—origin in this sense was mistaken for parentage. Easiest part of his undertaking to explain mythology by ancestor worship. He is committed to the Euhemeristic doctrine on this subject; which is, that “the divine man as *conceived* had everywhere for antecedent a powerful man as *perceived*.”

4. Theory of Hegel. Calls for no notice here beyond the remark that since philosophy of Hegel was one of evolution from the ideal side, quite as much as that of Spencer is a philosophy of evolution from natural side, religion was necessarily held by him to have had an upward history; the theistic belief reaching the monotheistic stage only after passing through the intervening forms of fetichism and polytheism.

5. Theory of Max Müller. It is not very easy to determine the position of this author in religious thought. His didactic position does not quite accord with that which his polemic would suggest.

1. In his attack on the Comtean theory of religion, he has conclusively shown that fetichism is not the primitive religion.

2. In his Hibbert Lectures he avows, less heartily than in an earlier work, his belief in a religious instinct; indeed, he practically discards the idea.

(3). The Max Müller of to-day is not the Max Müller of Chips from a German Workshop, and cannot be quoted as the advocate of primitive monotheism or henotheism. For,

when a student of literature, he tells us that Vedic writings show that a belief in *one* God (henotheism) antedated polytheism: as a psychologist asking what religion a man can learn through his five senses, he tells us that whether monotheism be or be not the primitive religion is of no consequence since before man had reached any belief in God he "had already accomplished half his journey." The primitive monotheism pointed to in the Vedas is thus made of no avail by the suggestion that the journey of progress was half done before men came to the idea of God. Max Müller must be classed among the evolutionists; but it must be noted that his recent conclusions regarding primitive religions are in conflict with the testimony of the ancient literature of India which he has brought to the attention of English readers.

(2). Theory of Schelling. He held that primitive man had an intuitive or instinctive knowledge of God; but that his theism was relative, not absolute. From this original relative monotheism have come two streams of tendency, one issuing in the polytheism of the Indo-European world, the other in the absolute monotheism of the Semitic races. His reasons for this view are (1.) It furnishes a natural answer to the question how men became polytheists. Belief in one God did not exclude belief in a plurality of Gods. (2.) Monotheism absolute or belief in only one God is said to be a generalization derived from contact with a previously existing monotheism and through protesting against it.

II. Idea of God due to *revelation*. Not only Watson the theologian, but Gladstone the statesman supports this. The latter traces analogies between Greek mythology and Christianity to the existence of an objective revelation antedating the dispersion of the nations and comprehending even the distinctive doctrines of Christianity. Sometimes incorrectly said that idea of God is due to tradition; tradition originates nothing: tho' the traditional theory as to the diffusion of religious belief is very closely related to theory which makes origin of

religious belief a matter of objective revelation. Strongest objection to this is that of Schelling—that to suppose that man owes his first knowledge of God to an objective revelation would imply a “previous atheism of consciousness.” But whatever doubt there may be as to how Adam derived his monotheism, there can be no doubt that the Bible is the main source of ours.

III. Inference—acknowledging indebtedness to tradition and Scripture for our definite conceptions regarding God there is still room to inquire whether there is not an inferential element in our theistic belief. There is a natural theism—a theism of Reason as well as revealed theism of Scripture. Is this natural theism an inference or an intuition? In answering this the following propositions are submitted :

1. It is admitted that theistic belief is not a simple, irreducible, necessary and universal conviction, but “it (Dr. McCosh) is the proper issue of a number of simple principles all tending to one point.”

2. Belief in God can be vindicated—reasons given for it. Hence, so far as our theism is a reasoned theism there is an inferential element in it.

(3). Since a belief in God can be vindicated by means of the causal judgment there is no reason why the causal judgment might not lead to a belief in God though a man had it not before.

4. Admitting that inference has filled an important place in the history of theism, yet it is true that belief in God however corroborated by reasoning existed long before men made use of the argument from final causes. Prof. Flint admits this but holds that the theistic belief is reached by a process of unconscious inference.

5. Still we are not sure that the theory of unconscious inference exhausts the problem. Does not follow because reasons can be given for a belief that the belief is due to those reasons. In accounting for the genesis of a belief we may

have to consider the cause behind as well as the reasons before.

IV. Word Intuition as used in this connection will embrace a variety of opinions. It is employed to denote all forms of opinions which give an a priori, or at all events an uninferential account of the theistic concept.

1. The doctrine of Schelling and Cousin, refuted by Sir Wm. Hamilton—that the infinite or absolute is revealed to us immediately by consciousness.

2. Theory of Jacobi and Schleiermacher which builds upon the religious feeling or consciousness of dependence. Yet the consciousness of dependence is not the same thing as consciousness of God. The instinct that prompts us to pray is not the same thing as an intuition of God.

3. Prof. Calderwood says that "belief in the existence of the one infinite God is a necessary belief, that is a belief essential to our nature so that the opposite cannot be believed when the real problem is presented to the mind."

This is too radical a position in the presence of the abounding atheism of our time.

4. Principal Caird disavows intuitionism yet declares that "in all religious experience there are involved feelings and acts which are possible only to spiritual and intelligent beings, which are grounded in certain necessary relations of the human spirit to the Divine and which therefore do not rise accidentally but in conscious obedience to the hidden logic of a spiritual process. It is necessary that mind as mind should relate itself to God." This view does not make belief in God an inference taken up into the soul through force of reasons. Rather it is a belief that flows by influence of a divine impulse into the channel of the soul's activities and is ever pushing itself into fuller, freer and most manifest expressions. For this reason, using the word in a very wide sense, Dr. Caird may be said to be an intuitionist.

In what sense then can our knowledge of God be said to be due to the intuition? (a) By intuition we may mean an immediate presentative knowledge of God. Some may profess to enjoy this, but they can not make it intelligible to most people what they mean by this knowledge. (b) Intuition may mean an ultimate *a priori* belief. This the accepted sense. If belief in God be an intuition in this sense all men ought to have it; the opposite ought to be unthinkable; the proof of it would be impossible. Idea of God can't stand these tests and cannot be called an intuition in the strict sense of the term (c) But ordinarily nothing more is meant by saying belief in God is an intuition than that we have a constitutional impulse Godward: or that there is a universal tendency to belief in God as shown by the almost universal existence of that belief. Undoubtedly this is true and in this sense there is an intuitional as well as an inferential element in theism. Yet how happens it that we have this tendency to theism? It may be (a) that this tendency is a synthesis of inferences unconsciously performed and to which all the elements in our nature have contributed; or (b) that the idea of God is the spontaneous suggestion of correlative truth, the finite implying the Infinite, the relative, the absolute; or (c) that belief in God is a great process of development. These explanations have all been given of the Godward tendency of man. But do they exhaust the possibilities of thought? We are told that in Him we live and move and have our being. May it not be that while we confirm our faith by means of reasons that faith is itself the fruit of a divine contact with the soul? May not God himself be the cause of the concept of God? DesCartes thought so. If this view is correct, then, without holding that belief in God is an *a priori* cognitive judgment, like that of time and space, or cause and substance, it can still be said that belief in God is intuitional, or rather inspirational. Certain obvious advantages recommend

this view. The constitutional impulse so explained would not render unnecessary the proofs for the divine existence, and so we should not be required to give up the proofs or the intuition. The argumentative status of theism on the one hand would not be destroyed through lack of demonstrative certainty, nor on the other hand would believing in God rest altogether on the basis of inductive probability.

In this way we could set a proper value upon all forms of intuitional theisms, and see a soul of truth in each. It makes it unnecessary to establish a schism between Adam and his posterity as to the mode of knowing God. It agrees with the analogies of subsequent revelations. Finally it is consonant with the idea of God's ever present operation to believe that his thought is so far confluent with our thought that we know him through his own presence in the soul. We find, therefore, when we analyze our belief in one living and personal God, that we cannot put an explanation of it under any one of the categories that have been named. It is composed of different elements. Among them will be found the indwelling presence of God himself; the unconscious inference whereby we grasp the idea of dependence, and of the Being upon whom we are dependent in one indivisible synthesis; the historic proofs and elaborate defences of a reasoned theism, and the clear growing and progressive revelation which reaches its climax in the incarnate Logos.

## NOTES FROM LECTURE II.

## C. THE HISTORY OF THEISTIC DISCUSSION.

The theistic problem is as old as philosophy itself. The arguments for theism and the theories opposed to theism are all old. Convenient to consider theistic history under three periods :

- 1st. Ancient period extending to 8th century, A. D.
- 2nd. Mediæval, extending to 15th century. 3rd. Modern.

I. *Ancient Period.*

To know history of Theism in Greek philosophy we must know something about the course of thought in the Pre-Socratic, Socratic-Aristotelian and Post-Aristotelian periods of that philosophy. These are to be considered only as they bear upon the theistic problem. Judged by a very exacting standard of theism, ancient philosophy must be pronounced very defective ; for although the principles which must always underlie, and which, carried to their logical results, necessitate theistic belief, are asserted and defended, we are not always sure that the writers to whom we owe these theistic defences were very pronounced theists themselves. Of Xenophanes, for example, who protests vigorously against anthropomorphic polytheism, and says that oxen and horses, if they could paint, would make their gods like oxen and horses ; and who affirms his belief in one God among the Gods, like to mortals neither in body or mind—we can not tell whether he was a theist or a pantheist. Parmenides was a pantheist or more probably an atheist. Yet these two Eleatics, the one being the theologian, the other the metaphysician of the school, were doing an important work for philosophy. They were learning, as their predecessors of the Ionic school had begun

to learn, the lessons of generalization. The Ionic school were pure physiologists, as Erdmann says. Besides being cosmological in their modes of thought, they were in a sense, materialistic. They saw the world of sense and experience made up of different materials. It was a great step in philosophy for them when they could say: There is an *ἀρχή*—there is one principle to which all the forms of matter are ultimately reducible. Anaximander took another step in metaphysical thinking when he said that this one substance was unconditioned. Not quite clear what Anaximander's *το ἄπειρον* was. Some say the old Ionic philosophers fell into two classes, one representing the mechanical, the other the dynamical theory of the universe; that Anaximander was of the latter class and that his *το ἄπειρον* is the Infinite in the sense of an Infinite mind; in short, that the unconditioned was God in a pantheistic or, as Fortlage puts it, a cosmotheistic sense. He was, however, clearly grappling with the really great problem of the Eleatic philosophy—the relation of the One to the Many. Not necessary to know science or have a mechanical theory of universe that we may be able to draw a line around the totality of things and conceive of this Totality as One. Anaximander in reality did this. So did the Eleatics though the process of thought was more metaphysical; as *το ἄπειρον* had been the watchword of the Ionics so *τοῦν* became that of the Eleatics. Whether they reached theistic conclusions or not they were dealing with a very important part of theistic discussion. To reach the One out of the Many, to grasp unity—is the effort of all philosophy. Yet there are different ways of doing this. One method, that of Anaximander, is to conceive of the multiplicity of the outward world simply as modes of matter. Or can we reach unity by stripping objects of their predicates till we reach substance or rather simple Being. This is a logical unity: the one of the *summun genus*. This we understand to be the system of Parmenides. And, if a world of thought were a

world of things, if a logical universe were a real universe then we might say according to Parmenides, Being= $\equiv$ All= $\equiv$ God. The One of Anaximander : the Many :: Substance : Mode. The One of Parmenides : the Many : : genus : species. The One and the Many may also be related as Cause and Effect. With the pantheist we must hold to an eternal something. The relation of this something to the phenomenal world is what determines the problem in question. While we are not sure that Xenophanes was a theist, yet we have no right to say that he was a pantheist. The Eleatics did not reach theism distinctly because they did not affirm Intelligence distinctly, but they laid the foundation of all subsequent ontological proof. The existence of one infinite, eternal, necessary Being;—this is the Eleatic contribution to theistic discussion.

Anaxagoras marks an era in theistic discussion. He is the Father of the doctrine of Final Causes. He wrote the first chapter in Natural Theology. His God was an Intelligence, or *Noûs* working toward an end. He made a great advance upon the Eleatics who preceded him when he affirmed the existence of a world-ordering *νοῦς*. To compare the Eleatic and the Anaxagorean philosophies; the one saw the world of multitude and sought a unifying principle; the other the world of adaptation and sought the organizing principle. To the one the great fact presented was: The world exists. To the other it was: The world exists for something. When we come to Anaxagoras we are in the Socratic-Aristotelian period, the former being the Pre-Socratic, the following the Post-Aristotelian. Whatever our view respecting his *dæmon* we can not doubt that Socrates was a theist. He was the first, says Oesterley, to address himself to the task of stemming the tide of popular atheism. This he did in plain language and in the presentation of the teleological argument.

It has been said, but upon insufficient grounds, that Plato was a pantheist. This is not a fair inference from the

Timaeus, his most distinctively theological work. The doctrine of causation, the difficulty of believing in an endless regress of finite causes, the necessity of Intelligence to account for the world's order—these ideas all have place in this treatise. His theism embraced probably the following points: (1) It would not be necessary to prove existence of God but for Atheism. (2) The Soul has a natural tendency toward God. (3) The orderly movements of the heavenly bodies justify belief in a divine author of Heaven and Earth. (4) There must be an ultimate, unconditioned Final Cause. (5) The teleological proof set forth in the Timaeus. (6) There is a soul of the world. Man's soul exists before his body. It is the organizing principle under whose direction the body has been built up. The world is an animal, invested like ourselves with a soul by which, as an architect, the world has been built. Plato's analogy would not give us a theism satisfactory to very exacting critics. To some the doctrine of the *anima mundi* is Pantheism. But it is not so necessarily. No man can be a pantheist who believes in the Personality and conscious Intelligence of God and the separate and perdurable personality of man. Plato went beyond the doctrine of *anima mundi*. The world was an animal, round, immense, possessed of body and soul; but the world's soul was itself a creation—the first creation of the Infinite God.

Plato was not a pantheist, and it is hard to believe that Aristotle was. Indeed it is difficult to see how he could use the theistic arguments imputed to him, and fall short of theistic belief. Aristotle enunciated the argument for the divine existence based upon the causal judgment pure and simple. Yet when he affirms the finality of the world there is still doubt whether we are to impute to him a theism implying a belief in one Personal God. When belief in order, in purpose and in the adaption of means to end is affirmed, belief in a Personal God is a matter of such immediate and natural inference that there is the strongest presumption, to

be set aside only by positive proof, in favor of the theistic position.

No name calling for more than passing notice, between Aristotle and Boëthius. Philosophy in the Post-Aristotelian period is represented by the Epicureans and the Stoics by Pyrrho and the New Academy. It passed through the stages of dogmatism, skepticism and eclecticism. A period of large intellectual activity but limited intellectual strength. Its relations to Theism well given in Cicero's *de naturâ deorum*.

Boëthius occupies a place in the history of opinion which makes it impossible to pass him by. He argued from the basis of the idea of the Perfect to the necessary existence of a Perfect Being; following in this respect, Augustine, who also had made a theistic argument on the idea of the highest good and becoming in this way himself the predecessor of Anselm. Köstlin esteems him the real founder of the ontological argument. No reason to doubt his conversion to Christianity, but he was a philosopher rather than theologian, He may be regarded as the bridge between the two forms of ecclesiastical life,—patristic and scholastic.

## *II. Mediæval Period.*

The Scholastic philosophy falls into two periods. John Scotus Erigena, Roscellin, Anselm and Abelard mark the first era; Thomas Aquinas, Occam and Duns Scotus the second. Platonic philosophy and particularly Neo-Platonism was prominent in the 1st period; Aristotelian philosophy in the 2nd. Anselm and Aquinas respectively in the two periods represented theistic discussion. Anselm was a Platonist; Aquinas an Aristotelian. The one argued from the general to the particular; the other *vice versa*. The one argued *a priori*; the other *a posteriori*. We may criticise the logical validity of the *a priori* proofs of the divine existence; yet we can see how Anselm and Des Cartes were led by the concept of the Infinite to affirm the existence of God. From the simple propo-

sition *ex nihilo nihil fit* the passage is easy to the statement that something exists *per se*. And what exists *per se* must contain in it potentially all dependent existence. Admitting that there is some basal being that is Infinite and Self-existent; then we must either abstract all attributes from it, or unite all in it, or affirm some and deny some; or else affirm entire ignorance of any of its attributes, *i. e.*, that necessary Being exists but that it is unknowable. Erigena, Spinoza, Anselm and Herbert Spencer represent these different modes of construing necessary being.

Dr. Patton agrees with Anselm, though the attempt to defend the position syllogistically may be unsuccessful. He prefers to say that the finite implies the infinite; and that our ideas of Truth, Beauty and Goodness are broken lights. To be sure this proves nothing; it is possible to construe the world from a different standpoint. Construed from the standpoint of empiricism all ontological argument may seem chimerical. But why should empiricism be the only road to knowledge? Anselm in his monologium developed his 1st argument for God's existence from the idea of the highest good; following Augustine who had argued on the basis of the highest Truth. He mixed up the causal idea with the realistic conception and so Hasse very properly describes the monologium as a cosmological discussion; for while the argument is conducted under the terms of the highest good it is really an argument proceeding upon the basis of the formula *ex nihilo nihil fit* and is intended to show that there is a self-existing being including in himself the potentialities of all being and therefore the being to whom all actual and phenomenal existence is to be referred. In the Proslogium he aims to make an argument carrying demonstration in its face. Let us first state Anselm's argument including Gaunilo's reply; secondly, the objections urged against the Anselmian proof; thirdly, offer some criticisms respecting it.

1. Anselm's argument. We believe, says he, that God is that than which a greater cannot be conceived. But what exists *in re* is greater than that which exists *in intellectu*. Therefore when we say that we believe in a being than which a greater cannot be conceived we must think of a being *in re*. For if it did not exist *in re* we could think of it existing *in re* and this would be greater than the one of which we are now thinking. Again God cannot be thought not to be, *i. e.*, His existence is a necessity of thought. For if the Being of whom we are thinking can be thought not to be, we can think of a Being, who can not be thought not to be, and this would be greater than the Being of whom we are thinking. Gaunilo's objection is, that it does not follow because I think of a being than whom a greater cannot be conceived that such a Being actually exists and even though the thought of a Perfect Being does imply His existence; the argument would only prove not that the Being exists *in re* but that it must be thought to exist *in re*. But between the greatest being thought as existing and greatest Being existing there is a wide difference.

2. Objections to Anselm's argument. Among these we have (1.) Assumptions. Realism is said to be the underlying assumption of the argument. He assumes that the relatively and partially good of experience partakes of the absolutely and completely good of Idea. It is said moreover that Anselm assumed his conception of God derived from Revelation and then tried to prove it by reasoning: whereas pure ontological deduction however valid could never give us more than the metaphysical unity of the universe. In short Anselm's argument supposing it to be valid would never yield more than the existence of a self-existent, eternal and infinite something or *universum*. There is great force in this. (2.) The aim of the Anselmian argument has been criticised. Schelling objected that Anselm was trying to prove that God existed as an individual co-ordinate with other individuals instead of regarding him as the ground and support of all dependent ex-

istence. Little force in the objection of Jacobi and Spencer that we can not deduce God by an *a priori* process of reasoning because deductive proof proceeds from the general to the less general ; and God being the highest being cannot be put into a higher category. Nothing in Spencer's objection that we can not know God because we can not include him in a higher category. Why should knowledge be defined in this way ? Why should it be knowledge to say that C and B are contained in A and not knowledge to say that A contains B and C.

(3.) Objections based on his method. A mistake, others say, for him to have put his proof in syllogistic form ? God is metalogical. This objection not valid. God is metalogical in the same sense that the north-west passage is metalogical. His existence can be arrived at argumentatively only by an application of the laws of thought to the facts of experience. All shades of thinkers including Kant and Schleiermacher, Dr. Hodge and Prof. Bowen agree that we can not proceed from idea of God to His objective existence. All see a fallacy in Anselm's method but differ as to its nature.

(4.) Some think the attempt of Anselm to prove existence of God was incompatible with revelation. This objection might be regarded as a protest against Natural Theology in all its forms.

3. Examination of Anselm's argument. We have, he says, *in intellectu* a Being than whom a greater can not be conceived. Anselm does not say we have idea of a Perfect Being nor that we can form a mental image of the Infinite. He doesn't inquire how this idea is derived, nor say that we have the belief that the Infinite exists. But he says : 'We have this idea—of a Being, etc.' We can't help admitting this. But has every fancy an object corresponding to it ? Do subjective conceptions insure objective realities ? Anselm undoubtedly meant that the conception was not only a thought but a *necessity of thought*. And he was striving to find a

bridge whereby to pass to the statement that this necessity of thought was a necessity of thought as to an objective fact. But in order that the argument should proceed to actual existence this necessity of thought must be a necessity of thought as to an object *in re* and not to an object *in intellectu* merely. But how will Anselm show that this necessity of thought is a necessity as to objective fact? The nerve of the argument is found in the 2nd sentence. 'But that which exists *in re* is greater than that which exists *in intellectu*.' And therefore when I say that I think of a Being than whom a greater can not be conceived I must mean a Being existing *in re*; otherwise I would think of a Being *in re* and this would be greater than the Being of whom I was thinking before. But by hypothesis I was thinking of a Being than whom a greater can not be conceived. Clearly the value of the Anselmian proof depends upon whether existence is a predicate. Has Anselm added anything to the conception of the Being than which a greater can not be conceived by adding existence to it? Anselm's proof differs from all other forms of ontological argument in that it makes the necessity of thinking about the Infinite cover the necessity of thinking that the Infinite has objective existence. Undoubtedly we can not put out of our minds the idea for which the word Infinite is the equivalent. But the necessity of the idea and the idea of the necessity are two very different things. Having the idea of the Infinite we may reasonably say that the Infinite God is the cause of the idea. God as a metaphysical objectivity was in his view the cause of the idea of God which he had. Anselm desires to make this metaphysical objectivity a dialectical objectivity. He may be considered as reasoning from any of these premisses;—(a.) What exists *in intellectu* exists *in re*: A Being than which a greater can not be conceived exists *in intellectu*. ∴ Such a Being exists *in re*. This would justify Gaunilo's objection. But this is not Anselm.

(b.) What is necessarily *in intellectu* exists *in re*, A Being than which, &c., exists *in intellectu*. ∴ Such a Being exists *in re*. But this would make superfluous the statement that to exist *in re* is greater than to exist *in intellectu*. Again this is not Anselm.

(c) What is necessarily thought to exist *in re* does exist *in re*. A Being than whom a greater can not be conceived is necessarily thought to exist *in re*. ∴ Such a Being exists. This is the Anselmian position; and the minor premiss clearly needs proof. Could it be proved his argument would be impregnable. The nerve of the argument is in the statement that what exists *in re* is greater than what exists *in intellectu*; and since we are necessarily led to think of a Being than which a greater can not be conceived, we are supposed to be necessarily led to think of such a Being as existing *in re*. It which it may be replied (1) That the predicate existence adds nothing to the concept and so it may be denied that a Being *in re* is greater than a Being *in intellectu*. (2) That if a Being *in re* were greater then the conclusion would be either that the Being *in re* existed *in intellectu*, which is absurd, or that the Being *in intellectu* was not the Being than which a greater can not be conceived since it was not as great as the Being *in re*.

Aristotle was the sovereign philosopher throughout the 2d period of scholasticism and his influence was exerted mainly through Arabian philosophers like Avicenna, who brought his philosophy through Latin translation to the notice of the Western mind. Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Occam were the most prominent names, but Aquinas towered above them all. Thomas Aquinas was the most broad-minded of the schoolmen. The proofs which commend themselves to him are given in this second question of the *Summa*. 1. From motion. What moves must move of itself or from another; that other must move of itself or by another. This can not go on *in infinitum*. There must be a first mover.

2. The argument based upon the idea of an efficient cause. A direct as the other was an indirect statement of the aetiological argument.

3. The third argument is simply the statement that there must be a necessary Being having the cause of its existence in itself.

4. This argument is based on the use of superlatives and is akin to those already noticed as advanced by Boethius and Augustine respecting the highest truth and highest good.

5. The fifth is a short and compact statement of the teleological argument. Some things, he says, though destitute of intelligence operate more or less with reference to an end *propter finem*. Moreover they act generally in the same way, so that they follow what is best. Hence it is evident that they attain their end not by accident but by intention. What is destitute of intelligence does not, however, tend to an end unless directed by an intelligent agent, as an arrow by an archer.

During the decline of scholasticism there were few names worthy of mention in the history of Theism. One writer—Raymond de Sebonde, a Spanish physician born 1334 A. D., deserves more than bare mention. Raymond's "Natural Theology" is epoch-making in this respect that it is the first attempt to write a systematic treatise upon this subject. His method it is true is that of the philosopher but his creed is the creed of the church. He teaches very erroneously that all that is necessary to faith can be learned from nature; but that this implies no skepticism on Raymond's part may be gathered from his preface which begins with a salutation to the most blessed Trinity, the Virgin Mary *et totius curiae coelestis*. And that his appeal to nature had no agnostic implications may be inferred from the statement that the Science to which his book is a contribution—the science of the book of the creatures teaches every man to know really and without difficulty everything necessary to man alike concerning man and concerning God. And whatever in Holy Scriptures

is said or taught is through this science infallibly known so that the human intellect with all certainty and security, any doubt being removed, assents to the whole of Holy Scripture. Raymond's book was but little known until attention was turned to it by the Essays of Montaigne. In the 18th century it was generally lost light of, but in the opening pages of Grotius' great work, *De veritate Christianæ religionis*, Raymond is quoted with great respect and referred to as one of his own predecessors in the field of apologetics and as one too who had handled his subject *cum magna subtilitate*. Attention is now being turned to him again and his book would form a most admirable text on which to found an essay on the proper relations of Natural and Revealed Religion.

## NOTES FROM LECTURE III.

This lecture finishes history of theistic discussion.

### III MODERN PERIOD

To student of philosophy leading event in modern civilization is the publication of the Discourse on Method in 1637. DesCartes an intellectual King. Born in 1596; Educated at Jesuit school of LeFleche; in Paris, in the army; studying philosophy; orthodox in theology but a systematic skeptic in philosophy; planning method of doubt and at same time going on a pilgrimage to our Lady of Loretto; absorbed in meditation and on this account leaving Paris that he loved for the unlovely city, Amsterdam; dividing his time between controversy with Calvinists of Utrecht and correspondence with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia—these facts are the story of his life up to the time when the commands of Queen Christiana of Sweden were laid upon him and he was told that she wished to hear his philosophy from his own lips. Died of inflammation of lungs Feb 1, 1650. Prof. Huxley commends two features of his philosophy: his method of doubt and his belief in the automatism of brutes. Passage from automatism of brutes to that of man not difficult. DesCartes was a Dualist; believed in mind and matter; was also a Theist. "By the name of God I mean" he says, "an infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, omniscient, omnipotent substance by which I, and all things which are if it be true that there are things which exist, have been created." This definition ought to satisfy the most exacting theism and should have protected him against the charge of Pantheism. Yet Saisset in his "modern Pantheism" begins with DesCartes and his criticisms are acute and worthy of attention. DesCartes no more of a Pantheist than Jonathan Edwards. He was a determinist;

he held to immanent theism; he made Providence equivalent to continued creation but he made a sharp distinction between finite and infinite. Nor was he a materialist. Mahaffy intimates that DesCartes identified God with the order of the world. Two conflicting opinions here, the one representing Him as believing that Providence is continued creation and the other as advocating a system that needs no creator at all. Before referring to the specific forms of the Cartesian proofs of Divine existence we notice DesCartes' position respecting the relation of Theism to knowledge. He had argued that the idea of God was as certain to him as the propositions of geometry. But he might doubt the results of Geometry. His senses might deceive him. His only guarantee that he was not imposed upon in the constitution of his being was his confidence in God. So he concluded that his knowledge of God conditioned the possibility of all knowledge. DesCartes rightly charged with reasoning in a circle. For if I can not know anything till I know God how can I know God? Confidence in the knowing power of the mind must condition any discovery of God as an object of knowledge. I must know in order to know God. Yet DesCartes' position, involves a great truth. Suppose he had succeeded in putting the argument for Divine Existence on the same basis as the truths of Geometry: these truths could be doubted if he believed that his nature was mendacious; which means simply that the truths of Geometry are true provided something else is true; that they depend upon an underlying postulate or supposition, namely, that there is such a thing as Truth. Therefore when Des Cartes said belief in God was as true as the truths of Geometry, he really said that in regard to the latter as well as the former, there was a possibility of doubt. For the truth of both stood in the possibility of truth. While logically we may say he was reasoning in a circle, yet deeper reflection will show that a great truth was wrapped up in the statement that God is the pre-supposition and postulate

of all knowledge. Let us grant the thinkableness of a universe proceeding under naturalistic conceptions. Grant the possibility of the enthronement beyond successful challenge of an empirical philosophy—one that can never say “I know”, but can only say “perhaps.” Then this would seem to be true. The Intuitional philosophy can only be shaken by establishing the philosophy of naturalistic evolution, which in the very act of being established proves the uncertainty of all so-called truth. How then will Evolutionists get out of their dilemma? If Evolution be true it destroys the certainty of knowledge and then how can they know it to be true? And if they do not know it to be true how can they assail the *a priori* elements of knowledge? We must know in order to know that we do not know; we must know in order to know that intuitionalism is in error. Granting, however, that empiricism leaves us without any criterion of truth; that under a process of naturalistic evolution both consciousness and belief and so belief in God are naturalistic developments and that these beliefs are no guarantee for the existence of the objects to which they refer, for this is what the most pronounced empiricists would say, what under these circumstances shall we do? Do just what Des Cartes did, *i.e.*, posit God not indeed as given in consciousness but as a working hypothesis. Take the facts and say, here are two theories of the universe. One proposes to build the physical world, conscious life and praying man out of material atoms. If it be true it leaves me without any certainty, any explanation of history, any interpretation of conduct, any ground for belief in God, any exceptional respect for Christianity. Then there is the theory of the universe which supposes that the ground of all being and the explanation of all phenomena is a Personal God. If it be true, we may find his method in the world is one of progress. Intelligence rising on the ladder of life and culminating in man. If this is a true account it is only what we might expect if there be a God. The hypothesis of God gives unity

to thought. Such congruity between this belief and other correlated facts that our confidence in this strengthens our belief in other truths. If, having to choose between the materialistic hypothesis with its conclusions and the theistic with its conclusions, we take the latter and say—We believe that our nature bears testimony to God and that God is the guarantee of our intellectual integrity. We go out from ourselves to Him. We come back from Him to ourselves—if we do this we are doing what Des Cartes did. We are saying: our belief in God is the presupposition and postulate of all knowledge. We take a theistic view of the world and that view prevents us from casting discredit upon the fundamental processes of thinking. Turning to the specific forms of Cartesian proofs we have (1) The argument based upon the idea of a Perfect Being. Under this conception he sought to demonstrate the Divine existence by showing that existence was implied in the idea of a Perfect Being. This argument not as acute, however, as Anselm's and it is equally open to criticism. (2) In the second proof Des Cartes uses the causal judgment in accounting for his own existence. Argument exhibited under several forms. Thus, (a) My continued existence requires a cause as much as my beginning to exist; (b) The cause of my beginning is either self-existent or it is a caused existence and so back in the regress of causes till we come to a first cause; (c) But really my parents are not the cause of my existence, *i. e.*, of my mind. In short creationism according to Des Cartes is the only rational explanation of the origin of the soul—and this implies that since finite mind exists now there has been an infinite mind in existence from all eternity. 3. Application of the causal judgment to the idea of God existing in the mind of man. Impossible that idea of Perfect Being should originate with an imperfect being. Excepting the first which is the Anselmian, the Cartesian proofs are a posteriori, the second being the application of the causal judgment to the author's own contingent existence; and the third

which contains the distinctive feature of Cartesian theism affirms that the existence of God will alone explain belief in God.

The method of Des Cartes published in 1612: the critique of Kant in 1781. Between these dates some names merit more than passing notice. Leibnitz, though Schwegler treats his theism with contempt, was essentially a religious philosopher. Spinoza might be compared to the Eleatics, Leibnitz reminds one of Democritus. He was an atomist and emphasized the many. Not a materialist though and his atom not a material atom. His monad the unit of the universe. The monads of different orders existing in a rising scale from lowest organism to highest archangel. Nothing *per saltum* is a principle with Leibnitz. He was the father of modern doctrine of evolution. Such is the pre-established harmony between these independent monads that though each acts independently they all act so as to bring about the existing cosmos. Finality, the adaptation of means to ends, the harmony resulting from the interaction of monads in this vast plane of being is naturally a prominent idea in Leibnitz' system. But two views are possible on the subject. He might allow his mind to terminate in the finality of universe and call this God—as Matt. Arnold defines God to be a stream of tendency. Or he may ask; what is the cause of this finality? Not possible to admit finality and stop short of intentionality if one is logical and consistent. No reason to believe that Leibnitz denied intentionality in a world which impressed him so fully with its finality.

Leibnitz and Locke corresponded on the subject of innate ideas. Yet Locke was no materialist, because he denied innate ideas. He believed in mind as distinct from matter and the incommensurable character of the two is the basis of his argument for the divine existence. "There was a time," says he, "when there was no knowing being and when knowledge began to be or else there has also been a knowing

being from all eternity. If it be said that there was a time when no being had any knowledge when that eternal being was void of understanding, I reply that then it was impossible that there should ever have been any knowledge; it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge and operating blindly and without any principle should produce a knowing being as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right angles." We have to choose between alternatives. Either all that is, is due to a self-existing, omniscient Being, the source of all existence or else there was a time when there was no knowledge and no knower and man is the measure of the intelligence of the universe.

Dr. Samuel Clarke, was a Cartesian rather than one of the school of Locke. He was a man of diverse talent. Was an epicure and loved his joke. Born 1675, died 1724. He argues: Something exists; something must have existed from eternity. That something is independent. It must therefore be self-existent. We know its attributes but not its substance. It must be infinite, eternal and must be one. To all this Spinoza would have made no objections. Difficulty begins when he attempts to invest this infinite being with the attributes of intelligence and free will. Here Clarke admits the *a priori* argument will not suffice. Makes use here of three familiar modes of reasoning regarding divine existence. Repeats Aristotle's argument from motion. Denies possibility of an infinite regress of finite causes. Scouts the idea of thinking mind springing out of unthinking matter. His arguments partly ontological and partly teleological. Spinoza and Clarke, to a certain extent, follow the same reasoning. Spinoza emphasized substance; Clarke, attribute. Spinoza felt necessity of believing in necessary *one* as contrasted with the Infinite *many*: so did Clarke. But Spinoza's one was totality; Clarke's one was cause. Spinoza's one included, Clarke's excluded the many. Clarke's was a good argument but not a

demonstration. It was a new synthesis of old arguments and so takes classical rank in history of theism.

Student of philosophy supposed to know relation of Locke to Berkeley and of Berkeley to Hume and of Hume to Kant. Hume awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumbers. Without inconsistency Kant may be quoted as an intuitionist and an agnostic. He is the forerunner of both Hamilton and Spencer; the defender of *a priori* truth and the master-metaphysician of the skeptics. He was poor and deserves our highest admiration for preserving his intellectual independence at the expense of bodily comfort. In this respect was like Spinoza who ground lenses for a living that he might be free to think. Kant's Criticism in the Critique of Pure Reason, of the arguments for existence of God mark an era in historic discussion. Since the publication of the Critique the tendency with those whose faith was strong enough to save them from atheism, has been to fall back upon feeling and intuition or else to relapse into the bosom of *authority*. Kant's criticism embraces three points. (1) That there can be put three arguments open to the speculative reason in proof of God's existence; the ontological, the cosmological and the physico-theological. (2) That each argument in turn is open to criticisms that are fatal to its claim to be a proof of God's existence. (3) That the cosmological and teleological are ultimately resolvable into the ontological so that strictly all speculative proof is the proof known as the Anselmian or Cartesian.

To the ontological argument Kant objects as follows: (a) The illustrations of correspondence between subjective and objective have been drawn from *judgments* and not from *Things*. Thus in that of the triangle the proposition is not that the triangle exists but that if it exists, its three angles, &c. So of the Perfect Being. (b) Absurd to introduce into conception of a thing cogitated solely with reference to its possibility the conception of its existence. Shows this by asking

whether the proposition "This thing exists" is analytical or synthetical. If it is analytical we must either identify our thought and the thing or else we must assume that the thing exists, so making it a predicate which is repeated in the proposition. If, however, it be synthetic, there is no contradiction in removing the predicate. But the ontological argument proceeds on the assumption that the proposition is analytic.

(c) Existence is not a real predicate as distinguished from a logical predicate. A real predicate adds something to the concept. Existence never does. If existence were a real predicate there never could be a correspondence between the concept and its object since the object would always be greater than the concept. Cosmological argument characterized by Kant as maintaining "a nest of diabolical assumptions." Among them are the following: (1) That the doctrine of cause and effect transcends experience. (2) That an infinite regress of finite causes is impossible. Reserving the right to criticise the teleological argument on the ground that it proceeds analogically, Kant calls attention to following points. 1. The order and harmony of the world prove the contingency of its *form* not of its matter. Impossible to deduce a creator of matter; can only get an arranger of matter—an architect. 2. From order and harmony of world we may infer the existence of a cause proportionate thereto. *i. e.*, we can not infer from the order of the universe that the cause of that order is infinite.

Kant's most subtle criticism and that in which he is least successful is where he attempts to show that the cosmological and teleological proofs resolve themselves into the ontological. Legitimacy of criticism on ontological argument, unhesitatingly conceded. But this thought of God, this great conception of the infinite is common property of the race. And what in common minds takes the form of religious feeling or a vague sense of dependence, in clearer minds takes on the form of epoch-making arguments

for existence of God. Kant's criticism of the ontological arguments leaves untouched the great fact that the thought of God is a constitutional tendency. Kant admits this tendency. "It is very remarkable," he says, "that in proportion that something exists, I cannot avoid the inference that something necessarily exists." Why do we have the necessity of thought? Did men rise to this high concept under hallucination and in error or is the subjective the witness within of the great "I am" without? Of course if knowledge is defined as coming only from experience, we do not know God. God is a met-empirical, which means we can not see Him. Dr. Sterling says: "Strange as it may appear, this is Kant's sole reason why we do not know God, why we do not know the soul. We can not see God or hear Him; we cannot smell the soul or taste it."

Kant says the argument based on design is very old, very respectable and not very satisfactory; but it turns out to be unsatisfactory only by first assuming that it undertakes to do what does not belong to it to do. It does not prove the contingency of matter. Does not shut us up to the creation of matter. Only gives us at best an intelligence capable of using existing materials so as to produce the existing world of order and adaptation and we do not know whether it would require infinite power to do this. Suppose this to be all we ask the teleological argument to do for us, what then becomes of the objection to it? Instead of any damage having been done we are disposed to take the concessions which the thinkers make to the theistic position to the effect that the order and harmony of the universe give ground for the belief that there is a Being who is equal to the task of making the world. Whether he made it out of pre-existing materials or whether he be infinite are questions not involved in the argument of design. If we have been using the word demonstration too freely, it is as well to be told it is too strong a term. An error, though, to suppose Kant's criticism

has destroyed the possibility of Natural Theology. Some undoubtedly will take his arguments as the best support for their own position. Roman Catholics will say: Can not have religion without authority. Leave the church and you must go to atheism. Kant has shown the incompetency of Natural Theology. Extreme Protestants will say: We have no knowledge of God outside of Bible. Church can not give certitude. Kant has shown that Reason can not. It is the Bible or Atheism. Skeptics will say; Protestantism revolted from the Church and took its stand on an infallible Bible and now it turns out that the Bible is no more infallible than the Church. The Protestantism of Protestant religion falls back upon Deism, upon natural religion. But, Kant has destroyed the foundation of natural religion by showing the weakness of the theistic proof.

An unworthy proceeding to make an *in terrorem* argument for Holy Church or Holy Scriptures by accepting for a moment the suggestion that our moral constitution and the facts of nature are not able to lead us to a belief in a Personal God.

## NOTES FROM LECTURE IV.

Remaining lectures deal with constructive side of theistic discussion. Notice briefly our argumentative attitude so far as theistic theory of universe is concerned. (1). In giving a reasoned account of theism we do not prejudge the question as to its genesis. To say that certain arguments support theistic view of the world does not mean that those arguments have originated this view of the world. Question is whether, given an antecedent belief in God, due to whatever cause, that belief can be corroborated by arguments. (2). Do not set out to demonstrate existence of God. Demonstrative process begins and ends in thoughts. Can reach deductive certainty from syllogisms in every mood and figure, but it is the certainty of form not of matter. Logical process as thorough with the letters a b c as with the logical entities "Socrates" and "Balbus." Of course you can apply mathematical reasoning to material phenomena and on the hypothesis of uniformity of nature predict an eclipse of sun or moon during the year. But sun may be darkened or moon turned into blood before that time comes. We don't know. We see what is. We predict with greater or less probability what will be. But when we are reasoning about God we are going outside our thoughts: beyond the experience of our senses. Are affirming existence of a Being whom we do not see on the strength of phenomena that we do see. Dismissing idea of demonstration and using word proof to mean that which justifies belief we start out to prove existence of God: that is to show that atheism is unreasonable. Question is, as Physicus well says, whether theism be rationally probable. Must bear in mind that the theistic argument is both complex and cumulative. Strength of all the arguments not to be judged by strength of each taken separately. In the theistic proof each argument gives adequate reason to rest in the theistic conclusion; but theistic conclusion is strengthened by congruity and concurrence of all the arguments.

These arguments may be grouped under three principal divisions: First: Argument based on idea of cause; Secondly: Argument founded in our moral nature; Thirdly: Argument based on idea of the Infinite. We consider these in order named:

Theistic proofs: Division I. Arguments based on cause. Regarding the world under concept of causation we may distinguish between three ideas presented to our notice. May consider world 1st as contingent; 2nd as a cosmos; 3rd as exhibiting finality. General arguments based on the causal judgment will therefore take 3 forms, the aetiological, the cosmological, and the teleological.

#### A. The aetiological argument.

This considers phenomena simply as contingent. Does not regard them as existing in certain collocations or as serving a purpose. Are simply phenomena that have begun to be and therefore that demand a cause. Two ways in which this aetiological argument may be considered. It may be applied to the universe considered as a totality of phenomena; or to specific types of phenomena in the universe. We shall do both. First consider the *Basis of Theistic inference in the totality of phenomena*. Syllogistically expressed the argument is: Every effect has a cause: The world is an effect. ∴ The world had a cause. But is the world an effect? Difficult to prove this if by world we mean substance of which world is made. Hence some say aetiological argument is valueless because it assumes non-eternity of atoms which we know nothing about. But we are not required to raise this question. The world of our experience is one of phenomenal successions in time and a co-existences in space. Do these demand a First Cause and if so what cause? Answer to this question depends somewhat on meaning of causation. We notice, therefore, leading theories of causation.

1. John Stuart Mill's Theory—He has distinctly said (three Essays on Religion) "that the very essence of causation as it exists within the limits of our knowledge is incompatible with a First Cause." This grows naturally out of his idea of a cause: "The cause," says he, "of every change is a prior change." His doctrine of plurality of cause and effect contributed to proper understanding of cause and effect. But Mill's doctrine of causation has an element open to adverse criticism. By causation he means only the relationship of phenomena in time-succession. "It is a universal truth that every fact which has a beginning has a cause. . . . . " "When I speak of the cause of a phenomenon I do not mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon." "The law of the universality of causation consists in this that every consequent is connected in this way with some particular antecedent or set of antecedents. Let this fact be what it may, if it has begun to exist it was preceded by some fact or facts with which it is invariably connected." We criticise not the conclusions from his doctrine of causation but his doctrine itself. (a) Cause and effect express relations between phenomena. As God is not likely to appear as a phenomenon he is ruled out by Mill's definition. (b) Cause and effect refer to the time-relations of phenomena. It is the fact that A is the invariable predecessor under certain circumstances of B that makes it possible to call A the cause of B. But suppose same time-succession between phenomena were preserved while each phenomena (the series being represented symbolically by a row of billiard balls) was produced by a separate cause or all by same cause. How would Mill's theory work? (c). He is confined to an infinite regress of finite causes. For he says a cause is only that which is a phenomenon and every phenomenon that begins has a cause. (d). It follows that there can be no law of cause and effect under conditions where the law of uniformity of nature is not in force. Thus he supposes that in some parts of the universe events may

happen without regularity, and regards this as equivalent to suspension of law of cause and effect. But this shows absolute disregard of psychological facts. Suppose such a reign of chaos were to occur; should we not feel bound to ask of each event what was its cause? (f). Mr. Mill violates principles of his own empirical philosophy and at same time contradicts his doctrine of causation by appealing to what he calls a permanent element in nature. "There is," he says, "in nature a permanent element and also a changeable; the changes are always the effects of previous changes. The permanent existence, so far as we know, are not effects at all," though, as he afterwards adds, "they are causes or concauses of every thing that takes place." Contrary to his previous statement in his logic that a cause is also an effect he says here that this permanent element which is not an effect is the cause or concause of everything that takes place. (g). Furthermore, as Mr. Shute has shown, it would be impossible according to Mr. Mill's definition of a cause ever to discover a cause. For suppose that series of phenomena be  $A A_2 A_3 A_4$ . The cause of  $A_4$  is not simply  $A_3$ , but  $A_3$  as modified by peculiar circumstances and collocations, and so in reference to  $A_2$ , &c.; so that in seeking for the cause of  $A_4$  we have to consider not only  $A, A_2, A_3$ , but all the circumstances that condition their separate phenomena. We admit, therefore, that upon Mr. Mill's definition of a cause we can make nothing out of argument a contingentiâ mundi, but we do not accept Mr. Mill's idea of cause. Assuming phenomena are so related as to be capable of mathematical expression, if we know the entire past we might know the remote future. Physical causation in exact sense of word would, it is true, be plural and more too. For, any given physical phenomenon would be conditioned by the entire series of phenomena for all time past. Physical universe at any one moment is mathematical expression of all physical antecedents of all time. Mill's doctrine of causation does not satisfy demands of causal

judgment. It is a postulate not as to the necessity of a cause but as to the certainty of events. We say if any event occur it must have a cause. He says if any event occur it must have occurred in a certain ascertainable relation to other events and in accordance to the law of uniformity. If the only causes of phenomena are themselves phenomena demanding causes in explanation of them then an uncaused cause is absurd. But there is no reason why a cause must be a phenomenon, except the inadequate one of Mr. Mill. Martineau puts it well: "Phenomena demands causes; entities do not." Entities as such do not—otherwise cause of God would be asked for. But new entities, contingent entities, do.

2. Theory of pure physical causation. Reduced to its lowest terms, the world that is open to inspection of physicists is (1) matter (2) motion. Matter, whatever be the the true theory, will remain the same phenomenal manifestation of attributes in certain collocations. Now matter moves and motions of matter molar and molecular are what mathematical physicists take cognizance of. Matter is and matter is discrete—not continuous. If factors of the universe be matter and motion: then cause can only mean the phenomenal antecedents necessary to certain consequents. We conclude (1) every physical phenomenon is necessarily determined by physical antecedents; (2) has been an infinite regress of physical antecedents; (3) all so called free actions are physically determined. A first cause in sense demanded by Theism is impossible under this view of causation. Moreover the free action of our own wills is obliterated and volitions take their place in a row of physical phenomena. To this theory of causation strongest protest offered by our own consciousness of being free agents. Insufficiency of this theory is shown by the disposition to hypostatize force and treat it as an entity distinct from matter or the motions of matter.

3. Theory of persistence of force.—Sir Wm. Hamilton says: "When an object is presented phenomenally as com-

mencing we cannot but suppose that the complement of existence which it now contains has previously been, in other words that all that we at present come to know as an effect must previously have existed in its causes, though what these causes are we may perhaps be altogether unable to surmise." Prof. Bain regards this statement as a remarkable anticipation of law of persistence of force given by Herbert Spencer as follows: "The quantity of matter in the universe can not really be conceived as diminished any more than it can be conceived as increased . . . . the annihilation of matter is unthinkable for the same reason that the creation of matter is unthinkable and its indestructibility thus becomes an *a priori* cognition of the highest order." This a more natural view than that of Mill. Does not identify cause and mere uniformity of sequences or make the essence of causation consist in invariability of time-succession. Does not condition predicates cause and effect on an observed uniformity. The doctrine is burdened with difficulties, but, at least, teaches that all forms of existence are manifestations of a power at once omnipotent and incomprehensible. "In this consciousness," says Spencer, "of an omnipotent power, we have that consciousness in which Religion dwells, and so we arrive at that point where Religion and Science coalesce." We agree with Prof. Diman that doctrine of a first cause has not been wiped out by doctrine of force. Suppose the idea of causation pure and simple yielded this and nothing more, that there is an incomprehensible but omnipotent power that is the ultimate cause of all phenomena (this is Spencer's position) we should use this as laying a foundation upon which a theistic structure would be built. So far forth this conclusion would be in the direction of a theistic view of the world. But there are objections to this view of causation. It lies half way between theism and materialism and consistency requires it to go on to the one or back to the other. If Force is an entity distinct from matter and all phenomena manifestations of it: there is

no difference between this view and theism save that it does not invest force with the attributes of Intelligence. If, however, Force be not an entity but a term expressing rate or ratio of motion, work done, &c., then the theory resolves itself into that of pure physical causation. The universe at any moment has been physically conditioned and determined by the past. This is physical determinism which to be complete must include mind and will. We come now to automatism. Practically the outcome of doctrine of persistence of force when it is taken as the explanation of all physical phenomena. It is certain that some physical phenomena are the direct result of physical antecedents unless volition be capable of physical explanation. If volition be not capable of physical explanation we then have a large area of effects not explained by doctrine of persistence of force. Hence we must hold that physical causation is not the only causation.

4. Accordingly we have common doctrine of dual causation, which recognizes the will as a cause—a first cause, and physical phenomena as causes likewise—second cause. We take our personal experience of power and causation and impute an agency similar to our own to matter. This view of causation is more suggestive of theistic inference than any that have been considered. For clearly there is one effect, viz.: a volition, which is not a physical phenomenon, and there are some physical phenomena which are not due to physical antecedents, and the only real cause actually known is personal agency. We see phenomena invariably related: we infer a causal connection. In the exercise of volition we know ourselves as causes. Our own experience of agency as to the exercise of will shows us, that however related to one another physical phenomena may be, there must be behind them all a will as the original cause of motion: as Aristotle says, a first mover. Very natural, therefore, to hold that the human will is the true type of causation.

5. The Volitional Theory of Causation.—Whether an infinite regress of physical antecedents be thinkable or not it is certain that the mind naturally seeks for a cause of real beginning. Not satisfied with a cause which is also an effect. Also certain that the only thing in our experience answering to a first that is to say a real cause is our will. The passage from our own will as the cause of motions we set up, to an infinite will the cause of all physical change, is natural if not necessary. Grant that law of interchange of motion is as true of our bodily organism as of other physical phenomena. But it is a fact that by a fiat of one's will motion is inaugurated. In the *nisus* of voluntary effort of which one is conscious there is absolute beginning of a set of motions setting out therefrom. Go now into sphere of molar and molecular physics. Motion: rates of motion: motion calculable in foot-pounds: motions interchangeable. Explain all this by Force. Still you have motion followed by motion, antecedent by consequent, none the less so because calculable. But question comes as to beginning of all this? You can choose an infinite regress or find an originator in a will of which your own will is the type. We take the latter view. Find in our own agency the only case of a real beginning of which we have any experience.

Argument *a contingentia mundi* as dealt with now concerns phenomena. It is really the old Aristotelian argument for a first mover. Does not concern itself with substance nor with question of the eternity of matter. Non-eternity of atom may be argued on ground of the law of parsimony (that is, theism being conceded, there is no need of believing in eternity of matter), as following (though this is not conclusive) from doctrine of dissipation of energy or on ground of a dynamic theory of matter; but it is not necessary to prove the atoms had a beginning in order to come to the theistic inference thro' doctrine of causation.

*Basis of theistic inference in specific phenomena.*—Certain phenomena, because they cannot be accounted for by antecedent physical phenomena suggest, if they do not require, hypothesis of a Divine intelligence for their explanation. Existence of life and of human mind are examples of these. Argument for Divine existence based upon existence of mind has been presented in two forms by John Locke and Sir Wm. Hamilton. Both forms criticised by unknown writer, Physicus. Grant, says Mill, an unknown mind caused my mind. That only puts the difficulty farther back. "The creating mind stands in as much need of another mind as the cause of its existence as the created mind." But, it is existence of a conditioned, contingent, dependent mind that calls for an explanation. Does not follow, though, that a mind that never began to be should need still another mind as its cause. Mill repeating his old argument. We are minds. Only mind can produce mind. This is the argument. But Physicus asks what proof there is of this second statement. We say the contrary is inconceivable. Conceivability may not be the best of truth but inconceivability is a good reason for not believing an unsupported proposition. But, says Physicus, it is as inconceivable that mind should be the cause of matter as that matter should be the cause of mind. This is easily said but it is an appeal to consciousness which every man must make for himself. Locke gives reasons why matter is not the cause of mind. "Whatever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it and actually have at least all the perfections that can ever after exist . . . it necessarily follows, therefore, that the first eternal being cannot be matter." Does not that seem to be true? Compare the two hypotheses and ask which commands the assent of reason best.

From argument as presented by Locke, Physicus turns to that presented by Sir Wm. Hamilton, whose argument was this: I know that I am free: that whatever be the connection

between mind and body I know that I am not determined in my choice by my body. I am conscious of a free personality that is taken out of the row of physical antecedents and consequents. Mind in its action is *toto cælo* different from matter. And in the microcosm of mind and body I have an argument for the supremacy of mind over matter in the macrocosm. One way to destroy force of this argument, namely, by teaching physical determinism. Physicus assumes that physical determinism is established and with this established the fabric of Hamilton's Theism disappears. But in spite of Physicus' attempt to make use Hamilton's seeming vacillation between freedom and necessity, the Hamiltonian argument is really a good one. Give us the priority of mind and its independence in the microcosm and we will believe in its priority and independence in the macrocosm. This is Hamilton's argument. Physicus does not touch it and it can not be touched till the phenomena of mind have been explained in the terms of matter.

## NOTES FROM LECTURE V.

From argument based upon contingency of the world we pass to that based upon the order of the world. Mr. Hicks in his "Criticism of the Design arguments" proposes to call this the eutaxiological argument—not a bad designation. Some inconvenience in calling this argument from order the cosmological, because it has been so generally in literature of Theism to designate the argument a *contingentia mundi*. Nevertheless we shall use the old term rather than the new one of Hicks.

## B. THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

A distinction between argument based on order and that based on final cause. All cases of finality are instances of order; but all instances of order are not adaptations of means to ends. Neither the cosmological nor the teleological facts in the world are affected by the question of a possible mechanical explanation of them. Granting that the physical antecedents of any organism are such that the organism down to the minutest detail can be predicted or is necessitated: that the past gives a mechanical explanation of the eye and the hexagonal cell and of the correlation of form and function in the animal world. Still the mind will feel itself irresistibly impressed with two great classes of facts. It will see the cosmical facts of order, harmony and proportion: and the teleological facts of adaptation and adjustment. Observing hexagonal cell of the bee, its uniformity and regularity, it will ask the question—How? And observing on the other hand, its adaptation to a purpose, it will ask the question—Why? The theistic argument will say (1) That admitting the certainty of result to be contained in chain of physical causation it is nevertheless impossible to believe that these great cosmical facts could have occurred without agency of an Intelligent

mind whose thought they express. (2) Admitting all that is claimed in behalf of certainty of physical causes we can not avoid the conclusion that the adjustment of means to ends is part of a great scheme of Providence. Arguments in both cosmological and teleological forms are the same; they proceed upon same principles; are alike independent of question of mechanical antecedency. In cosmological argument we see order and infer a plan antecedently existing in an intelligent mind. In teleological argument we see adaptation of means to ends and we infer finality and hence also infer mind as the cause of that Finality. Cosmological facts suggest God as a great Lawgiver so that that the uniformities of nature are manifestations of his uniform will. Teleological facts suggest God as a great architect knowing the end from the beginning and in all details of his structure adapting means to ends. Consider now the facts which form basis of arguments from order. Is very natural to conclude that what requires thought to understand is itself the product of thought. When the logician finds that nature has same systematic way of exhibiting phenomena both in time and space that he has of arranging of his own thoughts: that his impulse to grasp phenomena in bundles and refer them to some principle of uniformity has been anticipated and that there is the closest correspondence between his mental life and these material co-existences and successions it is very natural that he should say that these two are the product of mind. Physical world is full of testimony like this. Time, number, rate, ratio, volume are all matters of a most definite and precise nature and physical world is an exhibition on the grandest scale of mathematical relations. Not strange that this order should be held as a proof of mind. Fact of order is undeniable. Some explanation of the fact is demanded. What substitute is proposed by those who deny the theistic explanation?

1. The theory of Chance. Under this we deal not only with what is popularly called chance but also with question

as to the application of doctrine of probabilities to the theistic argument.

(a) Suppose the word chance represented some sort of metaphysical entity or agent, the antithesis of design ; and it were asked whether world were made by chance or design. And suppose we concede that by a purely fortuitous concourse of atoms the cosmos might have resulted. What would theism suffer by such a concession? We should say that the credulity of the atheist was simply amazing. Not likely that many have this idea of chance and think that chance is an agent. If there are such Mr. Venn has expressed their view in the only form which will make it intelligible. "Imagine some being, not a creator but a sort of demiurgus who has had a quantity of materials put into his hand and he assigns them their collocations and their lines of action blindly and at haphazard ; what are the odds that such a world as we actually experience should have been brought about in this way?" His answer is that "all the paper which the world has hitherto produced would be used up before we got far on our way in writing them down."

(b) No one takes this view of chance. There is no such thing as chance. The falling of the leaf as much determined by mechanical causes as the path of the planet. Nothing really casual. Could we really see relations of antecedents and consequents we should see that what seemed most casual was antecedently determined. Chance is direction which we can not see. Here then we come to doctrine of probabilities in it application to natural theology. It must be understood that the doctrine of probabilities has nothing to do with the question *how* an event occurs. Strictly speaking it has to do with a single question. It undertakes to tell us the exact number of chances in favor of or against the occurrence of a certain event, all the probabilities in the case being known. The calculation of the odds will therefore give us the exact mathematical expression of the expectation we ought to enter-

tain of a certain event happening. The difficulty in applying the doctrine of probability to the case of the universe lies not only in our inability to count or calculate the permutations of all the atoms of the universe: but in the fact that we can not get back to the point where the cosmos is still future and where chance is just about to empty her great dice-box. For there is a great difference between the improbability before and improbability after the event has occurred. In another place in his *Logic of chance* Mr. Venn says that "Probability has nothing more to do with Natural Theology either for or against it than the general principles of Logic or Induction have."

(c) Makes a great difference in the application of the doctrine of probabilities whether you contemplate event before or after its occurrence. Illustration: 150 seats in the room and 100 men in class. Chances very small that Mr. A. will occupy a certain seat but they are capable of mathematical expression. Yet coming into the room after class were seated we would not be surprised if a given seat were occupied nor if it were empty. Now men say that when we consider the world we are considering the event after it has happened but are trying to apply a set of reasonings that would have force only if we would get at some point of observation before the event happened—and that therefore an argument against fortuitous origin of the cosmos based on probabilities is absolutely worthless. To illustrate this objection.

Suppose we put 100 numbers into a hat, and taking them out one by one blindfold the order should read 1, 49, 78, 3, 19, &c., &c. That would be no surprise. They must come in some order. The possibilities are limited. This is one of them. Nothing in it to suggest that the drawing is not fortuitous. But suppose before I begin to draw I ask: What is the likelihood of my drawing these numbers in the order named? The chances of my drawing that order would be immensely small. Now, says the objector, you are trying to show the non-for-

tuitous character of the world by an appeal to probabilities; but you are guilty of a fallacy; you are trying to apply to the actual world rules that apply to a potential world. I grant, he continues, that given the world's factors in atoms as about to be shaken up and spilled out the probabilities are immensely against their making this particular cosmos. But seeing that these atoms must take some particular form, I see no reason why they should not take this form. This is the objector's case. It does not help the doctrine of a fortuitous origin of things; but it serves to illustrate Mr. V.'s position, that theistic argument has nothing to do with the doctrine of probabilities. If, however, objector's argument is good, so far as world is concerned, it ought to be good in reference to smaller matters—the letters of the Iliad for example. And if we still find that our unwillingness to entertain the idea of a fortuitous origin holds its ground, it must be because of some reason not found in calculus of probability. No reason for surprise if the casual drawing of letters of alphabet from a hat should give me a poem, or an essay, or a metaphysical treatise. The surprise, we are told, is out of place. It is a transfer of feelings to one set of conditions that are proper only under another. If the argument is good as to world it is *a fortiori* good as to Iliad. What is your answer to it? Our answer is, that so far as probability is a calculable thing it has reference to the constituent elements of the world, and of the Iliad, as so many units capable of so many permutations. That the possible permutations constitute basis of calculation as to an antecedent probability of occurrence of a *given sequence*. But that it is impossible after a sequence has occurred to make any rational application of law of probability. The surprise we feel in the imagined case of drawing letters of Iliad is not measured in terms of calculus of probabilities, but is due to something else. There is another element of which doctrine of probabilities takes no account. The Iliad is expression of thought; it is the record of mind. Impossible for us to believe that

mechanical forces working blindly should have so arranged these letters as to have yielded these results. The calculus of probabilities takes cognizance of numbers; it can not measure mind. What is true of the Iliad is true of the world. Doctrine of probabilities can not show, after the occurrence of an event, how it occurred. In this argument we are not calculating the chances of an event before it occurs; we are saying that, having occurred, it gives unmistakeable evidence of having been produced by mind.

2. The second substitute for theistic inference respecting order of the world is the doctrine of Law. This is presented as a satisfactory explanation of facts of the world; and some writers seem to think theistic belief is rendered unnecessary by the generalization that everything is under law. Do not try to make theistic argument out of juristic use of word Law and say that every Law implies a Law-giver. We use word Law in the scientific sense. How far does this generalization offset theism? Duke of Argyll is an earnest theist but also an earnest believer in the reign of Law. Nothing exempt from its rule; "Not one of the countless varieties of form which prevail in the clouds and which give to the face of heaven such infinite expression. Not one of these but is ruled by Law—woven or braided, or torn or scattered, or gathered up again and folded—by Forces which are free only within the bounds of Law." The Duke gives four different uses of word Law in the Sphere of Science and shews how in each case we advance from mere conception of order to idea of force or power in explanation of the order. Thus we are not satisfied with the fact that bodies move with a certain regularity; we seek an explanation of this regularity—a formula which will embody it. And we not only seek to embody the fact of motion, say in gravitation, in the ascertained mathematical formula; but we impute the fact to a force which we call Law of gravitation. Now we may say that Force is metaphysical and that we have no

right to hypostatise entities to explain uniformity. If we do that Law means simply uniformity of sequences. Then it does not explain anything but only explains a part. We shall say, however, that these manifestations due to some agency and we shall give a more transcendental meaning to word Law. Shall employ it to express not the order of the phenomena but the explanation of that order. Going the full length of inference we find that Theism is the only explanation of that order. Must choose between an order that is thus explained and one which is explained by reference to a designing mind. The cosmological argument is thus admirably expressed by Baden Powell in his "Order of Nature." "If we read a book which requires much thought and exercise of reason to understand but which we find discloses more and more truth and reason as we proceed in its study and contains clearly more than we can at present comprehend then undeniably we properly say that thought and reason *exist in that book* irrespectively of our minds and equally so of any question as to its author's origin. Such a book confessedly exists and is even open to us in the natural world. Or to put it under a slightly different form:—when the astronomer, the physicist, the geologist or the materialist notes down a series of observed facts or measured data this is not the author expressing his own ideas, he is a mere amanuensis, taking down the dictates of nature: his observation book is the record of the thoughts of *another mind*; he has here set down literally what he himself does not understand or only very imperfectly. \* \* \* \* That which requires thought and reason to understand must be itself thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or express must be itself mind."

3. The third objection to the theistic argument based on the order of the world is the doctrine of the persistence of Force. Physicus puts this forward as the strongest which theism has to encounter. With the persistence of Force an established fact, Powell's theistic position, Physicus

thinks is without support. Let us see what he means. "What conclusions are we driven to accept? Clearly looking to what has been said in the last two sections that from the time when the process of evolution first began, from the time before the condensation of the nebula had shewed any sign of commencing—every subsequent change or event of evolution was necessarily bound to ensue—else force and matter would not have been persistent." Now what does this come to? Simply this: that if we could have been present when the process of evolution began and could have been gifted with eyesight keen enough and mathematical powers of sufficient scope we should have seen that in the condition of things there and then the whole future of things was provided for. Suppose that were true. Would it destroy theism? If we had been present and had been constituted as we now are, should we not have looked backwards as well as forward, and while we mathematically predicted the future should we not have asked how this came to be? Should we not still have been necessitated to demand some Power behind phenomena as the cause of these phenomena. A mechanical conception of the universe is in the highest degree theistic, provided that mechanical conception does not include mind. The real objection which Physicus makes is after all one which blots out mind or rather gives it a mechanical genesis. For if you object that order impresses you as the work of mind, Physicus replies: "according to the theory of evolution human intelligence like everything else is evolved." And he continues: "Granting that as a matter of fact an objective macrocosm exists, and if we can prove or render probable that this objective macrocosm is of itself sufficient to evolve a subjective microcosm, I do not see any, the faintest reason for the latter to conclude that a self-conscious intelligence is inherent in the former merely because it is able to trace in the macrocosm some of those orderly objective relations

by which its own corresponding subjective relations were originally produced." Physicus continues: "How such a thing as a conscious intelligence is possible is another and wholly unanswerable question." Physicus then is a materialist. Matter is and matter moves, and the movements of matter under the formula of evolution have given us the cosmos. Mind is the product of evolution. Here then we have to distinguish. Does Physicus mean that there is an entity mind as he believes that there is an entity matter and that mind has been evolved from matter? If so then he agrees with rest of world in affirming dualism of mind and matter and it is only a question which is the *pius* of the other. No difficulty in choosing between these alternatives. Does he believe that mind is a function of matter; and that there is no entity mind; but that in the thinking, reasoning being called Physicus we have only so many atoms in relation to one another? Then Physicus is a materialistic monist. If, therefore, what he calls mind, meaning himself, be only matter, it is not strange that he should not believe in the mind of God. If he, the thinking being, is only a series of molecular motions, then he the mind, does not exist. We can agree with Physicus however, in saying that we can not hold on with confidence to our belief in God's mind after belief in my own mind is gone. If one is not justified in believing in his own mind as the subject of his thoughts and the substratum of his purpose, he may be excused, if he doubt a purposing, and intelligent, supreme and Infinite mind. You can not be a materialist and a theist at the same time. But if man the thinker is evolved: if he is himself the physical side of matter, matter construed subjectively, then we should like to know what knowledge is. If man is matter=atoms; if man, the thinker, does not know himself; has been mistaken about himself, is irredeemably led to believe in mind, and to see mind in the objective world; and if it turn out that he is wrong about himself, his mind, his convictions regarding mind

in nature, how does he know that he is right about matter? about the persistence of force? The persistence of force, when carried the length of materialistic monism, blots out the theistic argument, as Physicus shews. It blots out belief by blotting out the basis of belief. It is a very inconsistent sort of philosophy that first repudiates metaphysics and affirms that we know nothing but phenomena; which then construes the world and writes history in terms of matter; which even accounts for mind under the formula of materialistic evolution, and yet at the last denies the charge of materialism, denies the dualism of mind and matter, and affirms a monistic theory of the universe in the terms of a hypostatized something that is neither mind nor matter. If, then, materialism be absurd, as most men concede; if there be not two substances, but one; then this one, which is the basis of the monistic theory—is what? Why, if there must be a thinker before a thought, a feeler before a felt, a knower, before a known—there can be no way of construing a monistic philosophy which is not suicide except it be that which takes the feeler, the thinker, the knower as the basis of monism. A theory of the universe that leads every man to say all things are like me, is a theory which makes mind the only existence. For mind is the name we give to what in the case of each of us we call me. Wriggle as men may mind is bound to be the prius of all existence. Let mind be—let mind rule and we shall call that mind God.

## NOTES FROM LECTURE VI.

### C. THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

Commonly known as argument from final cause or the design argument. First understand what is meant by final cause. By final cause is meant the end for which a thing or an event exists. Thus distinguished from efficient cause which always means the agency by which anything is brought about. If, in regard to an event—say an eclipse—you ask the question, Why? the answer will give you the cause. If, in regard to an object like a locomotive, you ask, What for? the answer will give you, not the agent who made the engine, but the purpose for which it was made; and you will express this in other terms by saying that the final cause of a locomotive is railway travel. The thing is conditioned by the purpose which it is meant to serve. And this purpose is thus metaphorically conceived of as a cause. Strictly speaking, a final cause is not a cause at all; it is not an agent. Absurd to put mechanical causes and final causes into antithesis and to speak of God as a final cause. A final cause never answers question, How or Why; it always answers question, for what? With this understanding of meaning of final cause, we enter upon two-fold inquiry suggested by Janet:

1. Is finality a law of nature?
2. What is the cause of this finality?

#### I. *Is Finality a Law of Nature?*

Deal with this question by considering: First. The nature of process by which we are led to believe that there are ends in nature. Secondly. The specific proofs in support of faculty. Thirdly. The objections to the doctrine of finality.

President Porter holds, in his Human Intellect, that final cause is an intuition. He defends this by six reasons, which are not conclusive. We are not under any necessity to ask regarding an event

what end it serves, as we are to ask what brought it about. On the contrary, design argument is a case of analogical reasoning. As Mill says, it is an inductive argument according to method of agreement. We pass from our own experience analogically to the inference that the arrangements and collocations are the result of intention. Argument has two stages. In the first place, we know from our own experience that certain ideal future to be brought about stands related to certain means necessary to the accomplishing of this result. A. and B. are related to each other as means and ends. Passing from our own consciousness to the cognition of facts outside of consciousness, we see phenomena related to each other in a way that irresistibly suggest the relation of means and ends, and we accordingly say that B. was final cause of A. To be sure, we are not as certain of this relationship in matters outside of consciousness as we are of matters of consciousness. Finality, in short, seems stamped upon nature. The next question is to account for this Finality. A. and B. look as if they were means and end. Again we revert to our own experience, and since the only finality of which we have any immediate knowledge is that of a purposing mind—in other words, since finality implies intentionality in our conscious experience, the inference from finality to intentionality is natural and almost necessary. Accordingly, let us consider the specific proof of finality. When we ask whether there is finality in nature, we mean to ask whether an ideal future conditions physical phenomena. How can we tell? We can only interrogate physical phenomena by comparing them; by asking whether a given hypothesis will account for them, and whether objections can be urged against the hypothesis. The proof of finality consists in the cumulative force of a great multitude of *as ifs*. Reasoning according to analogy, it looks *as if* the wide domain of nature were a great system of ideals, as if striving toward an end were the great characteristic of nature. We must begin where Janet did, in shewing the proofs of finality, with the purposive action of which we are all conscious. In our purposive life we form ideals which condition and determine action. We see action performed by our fellow-men that seem to be dictated by purpose and directed to attain an end. We impute to them a teleological meaning, and say that they are conditioned by an ideal

future. We descend a step. Actions of the lower animals strike us irresistibly as purposive. The dog certainly acts as if he had a purpose, and those who say that incipient religion and morality are to be found in the dog ought not to object if we go the length of imputing finality in some sense of conscious purpose to the dog's action. We do not say that the dog, ant and bee have an ideal consciously in view, and that they accordingly adopt means to ends. We are conscious of intelligence and purpose in ourselves; we infer it with certainty in other men; we infer it with strong probability of truth in some animals below man, and we come to a point where the action as definitely suggests adaptation of means to ends, though we see no reason to credit the animal with consciousness. But is the finality less because it is not attended with a consciousness of the end to be attained? Analogy thus suggests that action with reference to results, whether consciously or unconsciously, is everywhere manifest throughout animal life. We turn then to relation of organ and function; the relation of eye to vision; of stomach to digestion; of the whole secreting system to the functions of life. We are at once on the familiar ground of Natural Theology. We consider also the relation of organ and organism, and the suggestion of finality meets us there. We find that there is a close and apparently premeditated relation between organ and organism, and this is paralleled by the correspondence between organism and environment. With the thinkers of all ages we should say: These adaptations are not accidents—they are intentional. They bespeak purpose and a presiding mind. In all these instances of adaptation of organ to function, organ to organism, organism to environment, the physical antecedents have been shaped with reference to the ideal future. The same teleological trend of things is manifest in the world. For study of the world shows that things sustain relations of lower and higher. Scientists see prophecies of the higher in the lower. An optimistic evolutionist, looking for a sociological millenium, would say that there is an upward tendency; that nature is moving toward a goal; that she is rising on stepping-stones of her dead self to higher things. Along this line of argument theologians conduct the proof that there is finality in nature. That proof consists in shewing that there is the

closest analogy between relation of part and part, part and whole ; in the organic world that there is between means and ends, in the sphere of our own purposive action. Thirdly. Let us consider objections to doctrine of final causes. These objections, not as formidable as in their usually unclassified form they sometimes appear to be, may be considered under three heads. Objections of the first class are clear cases of *ignoratio elenchi*. They are irrelevant, because they do not bear on the particular point we are discussing. Thus :

(a.) May concede all Bacon has said without feeling that design argument has been affected. No right to begin an inquiry, whether there be soda in the sun by asking what good soda would do there. The physicist wishes to discuss causes not final causes.

(b.) Same is true of Des Cartes' objection. He says we are ignorant of ends. So we are. And if we were imputing a final cause to ever event, the objection would be valid. But we are not. We say that organic nature has an appearance of finality. It looks as if certain physical coincidences were conditioned by an ideal future by an end.

(c.) Equally irrelevant is the objection that the doctrine of final cause assumes, that man is the final cause of creation. Surely, is not necessary to hold that every thing was made for man, because it is held that the eye was made for seeing.

(d.) Nor because some have abused final causes by urging *a priori* that certain hypotheses could not be true, because, if true, they would serve no good purpose are we to get rid of the argument from final cause. Nor because some have ridiculed teleology by treating every possible use of an organ as an intended use, does it follow that teleology deserves no consideration.

Second-class of objections come from the quarter of biology. In opposition to the claims of teleology that organs are related to functions as means to end, we are told that there are rudimentary organs that are never developed, and that cannot be used without inflicting injury on organism of which it is a part. We are asked to make this fact harmonize with the general doctrine of teleology. But these facts are not a serious objection. For does it follow that other cases of design are to be discredited, because, in some facts

we fail to see the signs of beneficent contuance? Must we deny finality where we do see it, because there are cases where we fail to see it.

Many ways of replying to objections to this class; *e. g.*:

1. We do not affirm that every detail of organization is designed to serve a useful purpose. 2. We do not know that an organ has no uses because we do not see its uses. 3. Obvious finality in a multitude of cases is not set aside by a case of apparent want of finality. 4. These rudimentary and useless organs are explainable without denying teleology. Suppose they are survivals of a past condition of things? The Evolutionist would say that: This would be a good reason why, though useless and rudimentary, they should exist. Their presence would not affect teleology unless evolution affects teleology. Suppose that, while each species is due to the creation of God, there is a uniformity of type in the natural world? That would account for the organs, and be a good reason why they should exist. But their presence would not destroy teleological significance of other facts. The point that concerns us is not how these organs came into existence. The question is, Whether, being here, they cancel teleological significance of all other facts whose usefulness and adaptation are conceded? We believe they do not.

Thirdly. Objections to the design argument, of the third class may be expressed by saying that the effect has been taken for the cause. This is the way the Epicureans expressed it. We say—this is an illustration of what they meant—that vision is the cause (final) of the eye, when we know that the eye is the cause (efficient) of vision. This was the objection urged by Maupertius. Substantially that of the anti-teleological Evolutionists. The question is not whether evolution be true. Answer to that may be left where it belongs. Suppose it were true, is it contradictory to teleology? Can it dispense with teleology? These are most important questions that natural theology has to answer.

Scientifically speaking, evolution means simply a process. When scientific man undertakes to explain the process he begins to deal with metaphysics. Scientifically speaking, the question is, whether species have originated separately and distinctly, or whether they

sustain genetic relations to one another. This is a form of larger question, whether all the forms of complex phenomenal existence have followed simple forms of existence, along in a line of infinitesimal changes. If it were true that God built the universe by the process known as evolution, would it not still be a question how God operated? If evolution were the mode of His working, you would see what you see now. You would see order. You would see organ and function as if made for each other. You might say that species developed, one out of another, by change of environment, &c. But here is a fact. There is order in the organic world. There is a logic of classification. There is an upward tendency. There is now, at all events, a purpose in man. You may say that we and our fellow-men are not adapted to our environment in order to live, but, that, happening to suit the soil, we do live, the present order of things being nature's happy hit after millions of experiments. If you do this you say again this is a chance world. Or you may say this order, adaption and upward movement are intended. If you take the latter view, effect of evolution upon teleology is simply to put a great many physical antecedents between the ideal and the attainment of the end. We see but one objection to teleological idea in view of evolution. That is the large amount of waste. Why do we have so many abortive structures? Why do so many races die in order to get one to live? Why did not God make organs perfect and species without intervening links? Theological question, Why he did not, may be postponed till it is shown that he did not. But if he did not—if in all life up to the life eternal, the law of selection holds good—what is waste? By what right do we say that all the abortive structures were in order to secure the good ones? Not only does teleology not suffer at the hands of evolution, but evolution cannot dispense with teleology. Try and construe the organic world according to doctrine of evolution without teleology. Then it follows that the world of organic life, which has been a scene of war, pillage and bloodshed, has become a world of order by the bare chance that right conditions of organism and environment combine. Or do you help matters if you say that these adaptations can be explained mechanically. Do you destroy finality by a mechanical explanation?

And if you explain the relation of organs and organism mechanically, so as to get rid of finality, may you not explain, mechanically, the instinctive actions of lower animals—those which involve self-defense and protection, of the young and foresight of the future. Why stop there? If they are mechanical, are not the dog's acts mechanical? Could we not suppose that what seems purposive is only mechanical? Where is the line between mechanical acts in the ant and intelligent acts in the dog? And if your analogy fail in the case of the dog, how do you know it will not fail in regard to your fellow-man? How do you know that his so-called purposive act is not mechanical? You would say, doubtless, Because he can talk. But how do you know that your own purposive actions are not mechanical? Here is your trouble: If you admit finality in your own action, where will you stop? What right have you to stop in the downward aspect of things? On the other hand, if you admit that what appears to be finality in organisms is only mechanical, where does mechanism stop in the upward aspect of things? Evolution does not deliver us from necessity of choosing between chance and purpose in explanation of the world. But, possibly, those who admit finality will not be ready to concede the theistic inference which accounts for that finality. We come, therefore, to consider the second of the two questions into which this discussion falls.

## II. *What is the Explanation of the finality in Nature?*

To this four answers have been given, which we well considered, under following heads:

(1.) Subjective finality. (2.) Immanent finality. (3.) Unconscious finality. (4.) Intentional finality,

1. *Subjective Finality.*—This is Kant's doctrine, which Janet sums up thus: "In a word finality is an hypothesis, and even a necessary hypothesis, given the conformation of the human mind; but nothing warrants us to suppose that this hypothesis has an objective foundation in reality, and that an understanding that should penetrate to the very principle of nature, would still be obliged to conform to it." This simply doctrine of relativity over again. It is saying our knowledge is limited to our circumstances.

As things go we are impressed with finality of nature, but if we had a more minute acquaintance with nature we might have a different opinion. Upon subjective finality we remark :

(a.) If we were under necessity of seeing finality in everything, then subjective finality would be best guarantee of objective finality, and discussions about its objective value would belong to same class as objective validity of cause and effect.

(b.) But since there is no such necessity, we do not see finality in everything. If, then, we see finality in some things and not in others, there must be some objective ground for this distinction, and finality cannot be altogether subjective.

(c.) Finality is not the less finality because it is brought about through mechanical causes. As true of beauty as of the eye.

(d.) Finality in nature being simply an hypothesis to explain a fact, the question is, whether it is more reasonable to believe in it or to reject it. Does not affect the question to distinguish, as Kant does, between æsthetical and teleological finality. For the judgment of finality is same in all cases. Invariably it takes form of adaptation of means to ends. Whether an object exhibit finality may depend on way we look at it, and finality may be subjective in that sense ; but in no other. Thus, one may say that there is correspondence between his judgment and certain forms, and that to the pleasure-giving correspondence he gives the name of beauty. In this way he makes the beauty subjective and eliminates the finality. Or, he may say, "This is a beautiful world," and in this case he makes beauty objective, and it becomes at once apparent that beauty is one of the ends nature has had before her. If you give beauty an objective place in the world, you will do with it as you do respecting form and function ; you will reason analogically. You will say, "This art of nature anticipates the art that copies nature." You will go from the copies to the original. You will not impute the copy to industry and effort, and the original to chance and the fortuitous concurrence of atoms.

2. *Immanent Finality.*—The Hegelian doctrine affirms finality, but credits it to the activity of nature, and denies personal God. Kant paved the way for it by noticing two important points of distinction: First. That the works of art and those of nature

differ in this respect, that in the former the agent stands outside of his work ; while in nature it is different. Man makes the parts of a watch, but they sustain no organic relation to each other. Nature, however, has a formative, reparative and reproductive power which distinguishes her works from those of human art : Secondly. Kant made the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic ends. To say that small fish were made to furnish food for the large ones is to give the external end of the small fish. And the teleology that builds mainly upon extrinsic ends is very apt to expose itself to merited ridicule. But we are not obliged to emphasize extrinsic ends. Suppose we emphasize the internal ends. Small fish is made to be eaten perhaps. But it is made to live first ; to exhibit a certain specific form of organic existence. An ideal has been realized in that organism, whatever external end it may afterwards serve. This means that the forms of nature in the organic and inorganic world are the realization of an ideal. No need of supposing that an end has some extrinsic reference in order to constitute an end. Hence, the Hegelian doctrine of immanent finality upon which we remark.

(a.) That whatever view be taken as to the mode in which finality expresses itself, the Hegelian doctrine affords an unequivocal concession to doctrine of final causes.

(b.) Must distinguish between finality and the cause of finality. Hegel agrees with the Theist in affirming the fact. He differs with him in the explanation of it. Nothing in immanent finality to interfere with legitimate teleology. Nature gives no evidence of a worker from without. Theism not compromised by Immanence.

(c.) Though distinction between external and internal ends be a valid one, it is, nevertheless, impossible, always, to separate one from the other. Our bodily organization is a unity which consists in the adaptation of part to part. The body is a system. The eye is a system. The several parts of the body are systems. Each system realizes its end in being such a system. But the whole body realizes its end as a system only by the co-ordination and adaptation of systems to each other.

(d.) When Hegel, affirming finality, affirms that it is a finality which is not conscious and active, but only the activity of nature, he is not arguing, but only affirming.

3. *Unconscious Finality*.—This is the doctrine of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, and differs little from that of Hegel. It admits the finality of nature, affirms intelligence as accounting for this finality, but maintains that this is an unconscious intelligence. Advocates of this view are zoömorphoic, and undertake to explain nature by watching instincts of animals. Do not know what an unconscious intelligence is that adapts means to ends and directs the whole teleological trend of nature without purpose and without knowing what it does. Schopenhauer has given us the choice of conceiving God as like men and explaining finality by purpose and conscious intelligence, or making nature in the likeness of the brute and explaining finality by instinct. By so much as the former is more rational than the latter, by that much is Theism more worthy of our consideration than the substitutes for it that have been under consideration. And Theism is that theory of the universe that explains the adaptation of means to ends in the universe by the doctrine of

4. *Intentional Finality*,

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