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R E V I E W .

Benj. B. Warfield

By Whom, all things; for Whom, all things.

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THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE THEOLOGICAL CURRICULUM.

IT is natural that one should look with an eye of favoritism upon his own department of study, and, in answer to the inquiry as to what topics are of most importance in current religious thought, that he should contrive to get his own subject pretty high up on the list. For this reason it is generally safe to deduct something from the strong statements which are so frequently made by enthusiastic specialists respecting the burning questions in theological controversy. And yet when we take into account the immense literature that is being produced in reference to the philosophy of religion, as well as the organization of societies in the interest of the Christian evidences and the endowment of chairs of apologetics in our theological seminaries, it can hardly be doubted that the border-land of science, philosophy, and religion is, and is likely to be for many a day to come, the arena of great and growing intellectual interest and activity. It is not a sign of the highest religious condition for the church to be expending so much of her energy in the work of defending her supernatural claims, and for inquiries from within her communion to be made on every hand respecting the value of her credentials. It is nevertheless a fact that the present is an apologetic age, and that the apologetic method and spirit are visibly affecting all forms of the church's life. And while it would certainly be better if truth were not challenged, it can hardly be denied that being challenged it ought to be defended; and it ought not to be necessary at this late day to vindicate the wisdom of the church

in giving apologetics a prominent place in theological discipline. The question should rather be whether under the provisions of this department all the work that is necessary for the vindication of Christianity can be done. For the area of apologetic is far wider than many suppose; and it may well be asked whether it is reasonable to suppose that the exceptional qualifications that are needed for dealing with the difficulties raised in Old Testament and New Testament historical criticism, to say nothing of those which come from the side of physical science and speculative philosophy, are to be looked for in any one mind. The question arises then whether it will not be necessary to carry the principle of division of labor a step farther by entrusting the historical and the speculative sides of apologetic to different hands. And if this were contemplated, as sooner or later perhaps it will be, it should then be considered whether this end could not be best effected by establishing a department which should proceed by a method slightly different from that which is commonly recognized as belonging to apologetic proper. And inasmuch as there is a proper place for philosophy in theology, and, moreover, the attacks upon the Christian religion are to a large extent on the outgrowth of philosophical principles, it may be fairly asked whether fidelity to truth does not demand that, as a protection against the evil consequences in all branches of theology of a false philosophy, we should give a recognized place to philosophy in the theological curriculum. It is a matter of minor importance how such a chair should be designated. It may be called the chair of the relations of science, philosophy, and religion; or simply the chair of religious philosophy. In either case it would be easy to anticipate what class of subjects would properly pertain to it; and it would be apparent at once that, while making use of materials that are common to dogmatics, ethics, and apologetics, the professor in this department would proceed under an organizing principle different from those which determine the departments that have just been named.

To some it would seem that, as the apologete is the professed *advocate* of Christianity, the occupant of a chair like the one of which I am speaking might very properly act in the ca-

capacity of a *judge*. Accordingly he might be expected to enter upon his duties with no foregone conclusions, and to divest himself of all dogmatic bias in order that he might act with scrupulous fairness toward the contending parties in a protracted litigation. But this view of the matter results from a misconception of the relations of dogmatic faith to free inquiry, and a forgetfulness of the relations which nearly all theological seminaries sustain to definite confessional theology. It cannot be said that the condition of fair investigation is antecedent and universal scepticism. A man should be ready to see evidence that contradicts his own opinions. But it is not necessary that he should begin investigation without opinions. The scientific man even is not asked to be such a thorough-going Cartesian in his method as to give up every belief as the condition of prosecuting with fairness a new subject of investigation; and the theologian should have as much liberty in this respect as the man of science. If, therefore, he may enter upon his work in possession of distinct and definite opinions, there is no reason why he should not enter upon it believing in a complete system of theology; in other words, there is no reason why his avowal of belief in a distinct type of confessional theology should hinder his quest of truth or prevent him from recognizing evidence whenever he sees it. The fact, therefore, that our theological seminaries are founded, as a rule, in the interests of the doctrine and polity of the communions which they respectively represent, and therefore that professors in those seminaries enter upon their work with foregone conclusions, is the occasion of no real difficulty. For a man should have made up his mind as to the place of Christianity in the world before taking the position of a teacher in a school of divinity, and he can honestly hold his place in an ecclesiastical organization only so long as he is in sympathy with the ends for which the organization exists. Assuming then that the professor of the department to which reference is made comes to his work under the assumptions of a confessional theology, the work before him is one of great amplitude. It will not be necessary for him to construe the title of his chair in the terms of a minimism of theology, and it would be quite correct to say that the whole area of dog-

matic, so far as it impinges upon philosophy and science, is legitimately within his domain.

And this dogmatic attitude, as has been already said, is not incompatible with the exhibition of a philosophic spirit. The incumbent of this as of every chair should be expected to deal fairly with adversaries ; to look difficulties in the face ; to make honest concessions when they are needed ; to argue without *animus* ; and to see both sides of all questions. No good can come through calling hard names. It is argument that tells, not indignation. These are not days of otiose acquiescence in the doctrines of the church. This must be recognized. We cannot compel belief nor punish doubt. We cannot shut up our libraries nor suppress investigation. It is useless to veto thought or write an *Index expurgatorius*. Fairness, patience, a judicial temper, trust in God and reverence for his Word—these are the qualities that should be conspicuous in the teacher of to-day. And when all is done, it is not to his discredit to confess that his case is stronger than the best defence of it can be, and that the true “grammar of assent” is learned by the child of God in the school of Christ and under the teaching of the Holy Ghost.

This is said, however, without any sympathy with some current opinions respecting the argumentative *status* of Christianity. Indeed, one of the important functions of a professorship like the one under discussion would be to show the defensible character of the Christian religion. For it is of little avail for the dogmatician to present the arguments in support of his beliefs, or for the apologete to marshal the Christian evidences, if by the decision of an antecedent question the system of revealed religion is taken out of the range of argument altogether. The defences of Christianity are valuable, but a defence of the defences is needed too. It is a questionable service which is rendered the cause of truth when one form of evidence is magnified at the expense of another, and I have no confidence in the philosophy that first throws the intellect into bankruptcy and then pensions us on an allowance of faith. If God exists, I wish to know the reasons for believing in his existence ; and when I am told that I must be satisfied to believe without

reasons, I simply repudiate the suggestion. If Christianity is a divinely revealed religion, there should be evidence that will accredit it; and when I am told that it cannot be proved true, but that it accredits itself to the religious consciousness, all I have to say is that I have a poor opinion both of the piety and the logic that shuts me up to any such conclusion. We know how Sir William Hamilton undertook to aid faith by destroying knowledge; and we know too how he was met—by no one with more power of logic and more clearness of thought than by Dr. Charles Hodge, whose famous chapter on the knowledge of God stands as a magnificent parenthesis in the progress of his theistic argument. The division of thought that followed the publication of the doctrine of the conditioned is full of instruction, and should serve as a warning. Mansel thought he saw in it the basis of a new defence of Christianity; and Spencer pressed it into the service of agnosticism. The general opinion is that while Mansel's was the better cause, Spencer's was the better served. So true indeed is the remark of Hume's most able critic, that "when the most pious philosophical purpose expresses itself in a doctrine resting on an inadequate philosophical principle, it is the principle and not the purpose that will regulate the permanent effect of the doctrine" (Green: Introduction to Hume, p. 133). We are likely to have another illustration of this truth in the discussions that are now before the church.

It is no new thing to be told that we cannot favor the canonicity and inspiration of the Scriptures, and that historical testimony cannot take us beyond probability. Roman Catholic theologians have urged before to-day, and for the sake of shutting us up to the infallibility of the church, what Protestant theologians are urging at this moment, and for the sake of shutting us up to the infallibility of a personal judgment which they call the witness of the Spirit. The method employed has the merit of appearing to honor the Spirit, and on this account will commend itself to many minds. On this account, too, Dodwell's "Christianity not Founded on Argument" was at first regarded with favor. But it turned out that Dodwell's book was written in the interest of scepticism, and the *subjectivism* that

is current, tho not chargeable with any sinister intent, will, unless I greatly err, prove itself a most disastrous concession to the enemy. To fall back upon faith in the thick of a great conflict is to confess defeat. To declare that truths which are not intuitions are at the same time incapable of defence save by subjective tests is practically to retire from controversy and leave the questions of debate to be settled by the quiet operation of the Spirit of God. Some would call this wise. To invoke any argument seems to such men like leaning on an arm of flesh; and the attempt to show that what we believe is believed for reasons that can be mediated to the understanding of thinking men is considered by them as an unholy alliance between philosophy and theology. It seems to be forgotten by such men that while the witness of the Spirit is the ground of indefectible certitude to the individual, it is hard, if it is not impossible, to make our personal certitude the basis of argument with others. It is forgotten that the strongest reasons for our own convictions are not always those of which we can make the most use when dealing with other minds; and therefore, so far from there being any incompatibility between objective evidence and subjective impressions originated by the Spirit, the one is the proper complement of the other. But it is difficult apparently for some to realize that fair debate between believers and unbelievers must proceed upon the basis of common intellectual conditions and common objective evidence. To support a position by a subjectivity peculiar to one party in the discussion, and especially by a subjectivity that begs the whole question in dispute, or to urge a historic bias as an argumentative make-weight, is simply to argue unfairly. In a certain sense Protestantism is individualism. It affirms the right of every man to read and think for himself, and therefore it affirms his right to very considerate treatment in debate. For himself and *in foro conscientia* the individual Christian may decide and does decide, in addition to external evidence, by the witness of the Spirit; but when he appears in debate and aims at convincing another mind, he must make use of the canons of certitude that other men employ. He may believe that the Holy Ghost has borne witness to truth in the historic

life of the church ; but with the unbeliever this argument will be of little avail : and with the believer even it must be used carefully, or else under the guise of a corporate Christian consciousness we may bring back into the bosom of Protestantism the doctrine of corporate infallibility, which was discarded at the Reformation.

Nothing, however, is here intended that would disparage the doctrine that the Holy Spirit bears witness to the Truth. God undoubtedly will take care of his church. The Bible certainly carries on its face the marks of its intrinsic majesty and divinity. The Holy Ghost is the great Apologete. The increasing army of Christian men is the great bulwark of the church against the encroachments of infidelity. But it is true nevertheless that Christianity can be defended, and ought to be defended, by argument ; and instead of sympathizing with the cavalier treatment of the older apologists, which is so common, I believe that Principal Cairns gave utterance to golden words when he said that "Christianity is not promoted by changing either its type of doctrine or its style of evidence" (*Unbelief in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 279). Argument is not unavailing. It was useful in the deistic battle of last century ; it is needed in the theistic battle of this. The church is not wasting her resources when she equips her seminaries ; when she endows her professorships of divinity and her lectureships in apologetics.

There is a power even in her commanding attitude which sometimes even her enemies will admit. "You cannot talk of ignoring St. Paul's Cathedral," says Mr. Bradlaugh ; "it is too high." Let the church so present the claims of the Gospel as to extort concessions like this and make men say, We cannot ignore the Gospel. We cannot ignore its arguments. We cannot ignore the cathedral of Christian doctrine. It is too high. Its solid walls, its stately towers, its storied windows, its shining pinnacles arrest attention and command the admiration of the world. This, however, imposes upon us great responsibilities. We must defend, but we must have a theory of defence. We must argue, but we must have an organon. We cannot postulate ultimates and put an easy end to controversy. We must

be prepared to follow when the discussion leads, as lead it assuredly will, to fundamental questions in the philosophy of belief.

Of course there is a sense in which it is wrong to approach the Bible with foregone conclusions. It is not a treasury whence men may cull appropriate mottoes for the garniture of their own excogitations; nor have they any right first to think out a doctrine and then, as the manner of some has been, prove that the Word of God agrees with it. The old method of rationalistic dogmatism is of course to be rejected. Yet there is, nevertheless, a place in theology for human thought. There is a philosophy of defence. There is also a philosophy of organization. The results of study are to be classified, and as there is no inspired system of classification the principles that are employed in other inquiries must be turned to account. Moreover, tho each doctrine of our faith is supported by its own array of proof-texts, and may be separately proved by induction, it is equally true that while the laws of thought remain as they are it will be impossible to avoid the deductive process which, when one proposition is given, leads through the mediation of a second to its inferential relations to a third doctrinal statement. And as it is impossible to receive contradictory statements as true, so it is impossible to avoid the attempt to organize by deductive logic the separate doctrinal inductions. In other words, if we think, we must think in accordance with the laws of thinking, whatever the subject of our thinking may be. We may organize the teachings of the Bible after a genetic method and under the category of time; or we may regard the doctrines as co-existing members of a great doctrinal system. And for the sake of distinguishing these methods, we may call the one Biblical, and the other systematic, theology; but the latter is as Biblical as the former, and the former is not less philosophical than the latter. In both cases logic gives the form and Scripture furnishes the matter. And when it is borne in mind that tho logic may change relations it cannot invent facts, it will appear that a Christocentric method in dogmatic, excellent as that method is, can of itself make no change in our dogmatic system. No doctrine can be added; none can be obliterated; no

change in the statement of doctrine can take place as the result of transposing the several dogmatic units and changing their relations in space. So far as doctrine is unaffected by order, changing the order is a harmless thing; and so far as doctrine conditions order, the doctrine must be abandoned or modified before the order can be changed.

This seems so clear that I cannot avoid the impression that behind the purely logical question respecting the order of precedence in which doctrines should be presented there is an organizing principle which determines it; and that organizing principle may involve a very serious modification not of the dogmatic method, but of the matter of dogmatic as well. Both Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians have been moving away, as Rábiger shows (*Theologik*, s. 157), from the positions occupied in the Reformation period. In both communions there has been a strong tendency to find authority for speaking in the present tense instead of appealing to tradition or the letter of Scripture. Rome has found her organizing principle in the perpetual miracle of papal infallibility, while the tendency in Protestantism is to find it in the infallibility of the religious consciousness. And whether this corporate and subjective infallibility be formulated in the terms of freedom or dependence, whether it be through the speculative intellect or the religious consciousness that the attempt is made to centre theology in the historic life instead of in the record of that life, the effect is just the same: dogmatic theology ceases to be a fixed body of truth to be ascertained by exegesis.

It becomes a historic life finding its highest expression in the Incarnate Logos, but manifesting itself in the Christian consciousness of the church, the interpretation of which is the chief function of dogmatic, as a branch of theological discipline. It is only by some such interpretation as this that I can understand the distinctions which speak of orthodoxy and orthodoxism, the schemes of dogmatic reconstruction, and the frequent assertion that every age must have its own theology.

An author's place in the great family of dogmaticians must sometimes be understood before we can set a proper value upon his words. For there is a great difference between the dogmatic

of ecclesiastical tradition, the dogmatic of papal infallibility, the dogmatic of the religious feeling, the dogmatic of the speculative intellect, and the dogmatic of Biblical exegesis. And as foregone conclusions will shape the place of doctrines in a dogmatic system, so also will they determine the place of dogmatic itself in the system of theological discipline. And in view of the rapid multiplication of theological essays, it is of great practical importance that theological students should have a scientific knowledge of theological encyclopædia, by which is meant not merely an ingenious distribution of the departments of theological study, but a scientific exhibition of the principles that have controlled, as well as those which should control, theological method. For men are giving us their conclusions without their premises. They are giving expression to taking words regarding Christian dogma which those who are filled with the enthusiasm of new thoughts are trying to harmonize with the old theology. They will find that they cannot add the new cloth to the old garment. They will find that statements which impressed them at first so favorably, and carried on their face such professions of devotion to Jesus, require a far more sweeping reconstruction of their theology than they dreamed of. It is very important at this moment that the doctrinal affinities of some of these new things that are brought to our ears should be made plain. For if, as Prof. Ferrier has so brilliantly shown, "the only light of any truth is its contrasting error," it is also true that in order that error should be recognized as such it must be seen in its relations to the system of which it forms a part. There is a clear and fundamental distinction between the dogmatic and the apologetic attitude. It is a mistake to say that the Christian religion as a supernatural and revealed system is incapable of defence save on the basis of an inspired and infallible Bible, true and important as the doctrine of inspiration is. But it is a far greater mistake to carry the method of apologetic into dogmatic theology and say: "Because this is all that is needed for the defence of a supernatural theology, this, therefore, is all that is of value in belief." This is to make the *minimum* of apologetic, the *maximum* of dogmatic. And this is the evil tendency of the hour.

There is close affinity between the speculative thought and the religious life of a people. The influence of a dominant philosophy shows itself in theology. Aristotelianism, Cartesianism, Kantianism, Hegelianism, and now positivism, have been in succession the philosophic forces in theology. In this land the influence of speculation on dogma has been conspicuous. To write the history of the theology of New England is to write the history of its philosophy. Its philosophic interest was developed out of theological exigencies; its theological discussions have flowed in the channels of philosophical speculation. And with the memory of the evils that have followed the intrusion of philosophy into theology before their minds, it is not strange that men are suspicious of philosophy. No wonder, when they remember that speculation has destroyed the historic meaning of every Scripture fact; that confessional dogmas have been made the categories under which a pantheistic philosophy has been rubricized; no wonder, when they think of the dreary homilies on the decrees and disinterested benevolence, that the demand is heard for a Biblical theology. By all means let the demand be met. Let us have Biblical theology in the technical sense of the term; and let our dogmatic theology continue to be a theology of exegesis and not a theology of tradition and speculation. The fact, however, still remains that philosophy and theology have uniformly sustained very close relations to each other; and the history of these relations will teach some important lessons. It will show that the philosophy of the college insensibly affects the theology of the seminary; that to shape the philosophy of a people is to shape its jurisprudence, its ethics, its theology, the ministrations of the pulpit, the teaching of the Sabbath-school, and even the fireside instruction of the home. It will show that between these great departments there is an intimacy that ecclesiastical authority can neither interrupt nor control. The pope may relegate us to Aquinas, and Father Harper may write even more interestingly still concerning the philosophy of the school, but whether Aquinas or Spinoza will be the master-metaphysician of the next generation is something that lies beyond ecclesiastical control. It will show us, too, that while *a priori* speculation has done injury

to truth, there is nevertheless a place, if not for it, at least for metaphysic in theology. In order to exhibit the proper relations of theology and philosophy, one must perform a double duty. Speaking in behalf of theology, there is a long history of invasion to be recited, conquered territory to be reclaimed, and the right of theology to the unmolested enjoyment of her God-given domain to be insisted on and defended. Speaking, on the other hand, in behalf of philosophy, it will be his duty to show the real service that she may render Christian truth, and, guarding against the impression that her former faults are to be punished with perpetual banishment or penal servitude, to say in the words of the reformed theologian Mursinna: *Philosophia non est ancilla sed potius soror theologiæ.*

The word philosophy is used, however, in a somewhat broader sense than that of *a priori* speculation, and, in antithesis to theology, to mean the method that reaches truth through inference and argument, as opposed to that which receives it by direct divine revelations. In a broad sense, then, we say that Christian theology is a matter of revelation and not of philosophy. And yet our system of theology begins with a theistic conception of the universe. There are a few who would say with Watson that we owe our knowledge of God to the Bible, and who would therefore depreciate the theistic proofs; for there are some men who always imagine that it is a mark of special respect for the Bible to teach that we can have no knowledge of God without it.

But men honor the Bible most when they believe what it says; and therefore believe that the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork. There are few who would wish to see the teleological and the moral arguments for God's existence taken out of the books of systematic theology. Yet these arguments are not Biblical. They are as truly philosophical as are the arguments that support any scientific hypothesis. Here, then, we have a reasoned theism—a theory of the universe which, however it originated, is at least defended by the application of the laws of thought to the facts of the external world. We have an inferential as opposed to an informational knowledge of God; and to this extent we have a philosophical factor in our theological system.

There is, then, an empirical and philosophical element in theology, at least in so far as theology makes use of argument in support of the belief in God; for just so far as theology finds an argument for the existence of God in the facts of nature does it give an interpretation to the facts of nature.

Reasoned theism has a subjective and an objective side—a side that relates it to philosophy and one that relates it to science. This would naturally be the place, therefore, to speak of the relations of science, philosophy, and religion. And if I sympathized with many who are so fond of referring to what they call the “conflict” of science and religion, I should at this point indicate that the work of a professor in the department referred to in this article would consist very largely in the attempt to establish amicable relations between the three great powers that have been named. But it must have already appeared that the work pertaining to a chair of religious philosophy has a far wider scope than that of drafting treaties of peace between personalized abstractions; and it ought not to be a very difficult thing to understand the reasons for those differences of opinion on religio-scientific subjects which have given rise to what has come to be known as “conflict-literature.” Having two accounts of the same phenomena, one empirical and the other revealed, it is easy to see that through misunderstanding of Scripture or premature generalization in science there may be an apparent discrepancy between them. It will be pretty generally agreed, I think, that in so far as science deals with facts in the phenomenal world false theories must be left to the slow dialectic of time, or be dealt with by men who have a right to speak with the authority of specialists in the several departments of scientific investigation. And it is just as clearly recognized that between the facts of science and the metaphysical inferences that are based upon them the difference is very wide.

The student of science who is aware of the unreached heights and the unfathomed depths of his special department may well resent the patronizing tone of omniscience with which the theologian sometimes speaks of the facts of nature. But the modest student of nature is also well aware that when he goes into the arena of metaphysics he is occupying a position where his

knowledge of phenomena gives him no exceptional advantage. It is not too much to say that the great questions of debate between science and religion transcend the sphere of the empirical, and that the great differences of opinions on religious questions are those which lie at the roots of our intellectual life. A sound metaphysic is therefore the presupposition and postulate of theology as it is the presupposition and postulate of science itself. We are debtors alike to science and philosophy, and we can as little afford to spare one as the other from our theological curriculum.

The word Philosophy is used in this article with a great deal of latitude, it must be confessed, yet with a latitude justified by very good usage. It is used as the synonym of logic. It is used to signify a method so that the exhibition of a system according to its organizing principle would be the philosophy of the system. It is used to indicate *a priori* or speculative reasoning, and is applied specially to systems of thought that follow the deductive rather than the inductive method. It is employed as the antithesis of revelation, and refers to any mode of reaching truth aside from the interpretation of Scripture.

It is sometimes the same as psychology, tho in the stricter application of the word it is metaphysic; that is, as Shadworth Hodgson says, it is, "the ultimate subjective analysis of motions which to science are themselves ultimate" ("Philosophy of Reflection," vol. i. p. 45). In all these senses of the word philosophy, rightly or wrongly, has had and has to-day a place in theology.

And there is yet another sense in which the word Philosophy is used. For as it describes the primary, so it expresses the final stage of knowledge. It is the name which men give to their work when they undertake to articulate the facts of the phenomenal world under some all-comprehensive generalization. And so we have the philosophy of Hegel and the philosophy of Comte. Nor have we a right to complain because such ambitious attempts are made; for some generalization there undoubtedly is that will express the totality of truth; or in other words, there is some explanation of the universe;—tho we make bold to say that any philosophy is incomplete which does not

recognize that the Almighty has left his footprints in this world of things, and that the Lord of Glory has taken his place in the sequences and successions of human history. Call this final statement what we please, science, philosophy, theology, it must proceed under a theistic conception of the universe ; it must be shaped under the category of purpose ; it must have a place for the Incarnation ; and it must take cognizance of the future of the individual in the life to come as well as of the future of the race in the "life that now is."

But the fact that the word Philosophy is used with such breadth and diversity of meaning may suggest the difficulty of defining its place in a theological curriculum. And a difficulty there may undoubtedly be in determining the precise scope of such a department, whether it be known as that of religious philosophy, or philosophical apologetics, or the relations of science, philosophy, and religion. There are, however, some topics that call for special discussion, and that belong more properly to the department of which we are speaking than to any other. To the incumbent of a chair such as the one under consideration it would fall to exhibit, at least in outline, the historic relations of philosophy, science, and theology ; not in the form of a history of doctrine, nor yet in the form of a history of free thought ; not with the minuteness of Zöckler in his history of the relations between theology and natural science, nor yet after the fragmentary manner in which this work has been so often attempted. It should embrace the age of the Apologists and the influence of scholasticism. It should show the formative principles of the era of the confessions ; the effect of the Cartesian philosophy ; the anti-confessional drift, which has been brought about by the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy ; and lastly, tho not of least importance, it should deal with the special contributions to the history of opinion which have been made in our own land.

But in addition to this historico-critical work there is an important constructive work to be done. And under this head the philosophy of belief will occupy a very conspicuous place. At the bottom of all belief or disbelief there lies a theory of knowledge and belief. A philosophy of sensation will lead to

atheism, but only because it will lead to universal unbelief. The physicist has the same interest as the theologian in the conservation of the *a priori* elements of knowledge. For a sensational philosophy that will leave us an objective firmament as the field of astronomical explorations, and an objective earth as the arena of biological study, and objective other selves whose lucubrations I can read in the bimonthlies and the quarterly reviews, but which undertakes, because it is a philosophy of sensation, to eliminate God from the category of Being, is a philosophy of unmitigated absurdity. It is with such a philosophy that we have to deal. It tells us that our beliefs in cause, substance, and moral obligation are generalized experiences, and it is none the less objectionable because through the doctrine of evolution it seeks to mediate between the intuitional and the associational theories of knowledge by telling us that the same idea may be both an intuition and an inference—an intuition for the individual and an inference for the race. A great work has already been done in defence of our primary beliefs, and Dr. McCosh has especially placed all the advocates of intuitional philosophy under lasting obligation for his elucidation of this subject. But we have not yet seen the end of controversy, and it looks now as tho the discussions of the next generation were to be as important as any that have preceded it. For the free, finite, perdurable, personal self is the very citadel of truth. We must defend the *a priori* elements of knowledge. We must defend them not as relatively but as absolutely true. We cannot hold an egoistic idealism. We cannot take some point of vantage and, watching the phenomenal world march past in grand review, exclaim: "This after all is only the phenomenal aspect of what I call myself." We cannot hold a philosophy which to be consistent should go on to say that the silent stars die out whenever I go to sleep; and when dissolution comes, to me comes then the funeral of universal Being. And if instead of making the individual self we make the universal self the basis of our philosophy, we shall still find that we have made evangelical Christianity impossible. And when I am told that along a purposive route and through the stages of historic growth rising on itself in the ascent of life the universal self has

struggled for expression, until in thinking, praying man it comes to recognize itself; when the individual self, the self of analysis, reaches out unto and realizes the universal self, the self of synthesis,—it does not save me from the disastrous consequences of such a faith to be reminded, as I am reminded by Mr. Wallace, that this philosophy is a theology throughout. It makes no difference how my personality is obliterated, whether by pantheism or materialism, the effect is just the same. And when it comes to the question whether Christian life shall be strangled by the python of Hegelianism or the python of positive philosophy there is but little to choose.

A valid defence of Christianity must be a defence of knowledge as knowledge. It is bad enough to offer us an unauthorized faith, but it is worse to give us our choice, as Mr. Balfour does, between two inevitable doubts. No service is rendered either science or religion by an attempt to show that there is no valid reason for either, but that we are free to hold to them through what he calls the "practical need of both." This, however, is a large subject, and its development would involve not only the discussion of fundamental truth, but also the processes of proof; the laws of evidence; the province of analogy; the influence of authority; the ethics of belief; the distinction between probability and certitude, and the place of both in religion. In short, it would be the logic of theology. Next in logical order would come the discussion of theism; and we need not say how much interest centres here. The constructive side of the theistic discussion has lost none of its importance in recent years; for while mere illustrations of design in nature cannot be said to meet the exigencies of current debate, the discussion of the teleological principle is becoming more and more important. And when we find men admitting the teleological principle, but denying the theistic conclusion to which it logically leads, it is impossible to avoid the feeling that their anti-theistic utterances are after all important concessions to the theistic position. But anti-theistic literature abounds in these concessions, and when we read of Matthew Arnold's "Stream of Tendency," Spencer's "Unknowable," Schopenhauer's "World as Will," and Hartmann's elaborate defence of finality as the product of uncon-

scious intelligence, we may well ask if the theists with their belief in one personal God are not in possession of the only hypothesis that can save the language of these writers from the charge of meaningless and idiotic raving.

And it is easy to see how large an area of polemic the theistic discussion involves; for not only are objections to be answered, but rival theories of the universe are to be examined. There is the system of pantheism, which organizes the phenomenal world under the conception of God and denies the separate personality and freedom of finite minds. There is the system that does not get outside of the phenomenal self, and so finds its creed shrivelling into a barren agnosticism. And there is, finally, a system that undertakes to articulate the phenomenal universe in the terms of matter, and ends in giving us not only a mechanical world without, but a mechanical mind within. It ends in automatism. It ends in explaining the music of Beethoven, the painting of Raphael, the sculpture of Thorwaldsen, and the cathedral monument of Sir Christopher Wren as the purposeless play of blind material atoms. And when it does this it commits suicide. When mind is reduced to automatism, schism is introduced into our conscious life. You cannot, as Professor Herbert has so ably shown, take intentionality out of matter without taking it out of mind. The materialist cannot help purposing; he cannot help believing that his actions are the realization of purpose; and yet purpose is a word for which his theory of the universe has no use and which it cannot explain. "Consistent materialism," says Mr. Green, "should be speechless." And Mr. Green is right. Consistent materialism is egoism. The self is the solitary tenant of a lone universe. It has no logical right to call any other self its companion, for of that other self it has no knowledge. The soul is a caged bird. It is the function of a true theory of Knowing and Being to open the doors of that gilded cage, and when this is done, with little help from us, but under the irresistible tendency of an instinct born in heaven, this poor, pining, imprisoned thing will fly away to God.

Nor must we overlook the fact that the atheism of to-day is possessed of great industry and intellectual activity. Remem-

ber that this world has been ruled by theistic conceptions. Its literature has been written, its governments maintained, its social institutions established, under the dominating influence of this conception. If atheism is to succeed it has a great revolution to accomplish. And there are sad indications that the men who, like Professor Clifford, believe that the "great companion is dead" already see the natural consequences of their creed. They must reconstruct history and explain the Bible according to the principles of naturalism. They must have a system of criminal jurisprudence to match their automatism. They must take obligation out of ethics and say with Bentham that the word *ought* ought not to be in the dictionary. Life with them is the life that now is, and it is a question whether it be worth living. The poor man will make the best of this world, and as matters cannot be much worse he will take the chances of socialism, nihilism, and regicide. The man of learned leisure will look out of despairing eyes upon a world that gives no pleasure and a future that has no hope. Pessimism will be his philosophy, consentaneous suicide his gospel of peace for a suffering world, a "calculus of hedonics," to use Mr. Sully's phrase, that shall assure him of a slight surplus of pleasure over pain, the one mitigating circumstance in the discomfort with which he looks upon the problem of life.

Theism on its philosophical side is a theory of the universe, but on the side of our religious nature it is belief in a Being whose personality is set over against our personality—a Being upon whom we are dependent and to whom we are responsible. It contains materials, therefore, that belong also to the department of the philosophy of religion; and yet the philosophy of religion is a subject that especially at the present day deserves separate treatment at least to the extent of what Pfleiderer calls the psychology of religion. This is a question which the evolutionists should not monopolize; for if religion is the fruit of fear or superstition, or be a form of homage to dead ancestors, the religious feeling cannot be an ultimate fact in our nature, and cannot be appealed to in support of doctrine. We are interested as Christians in showing that these interpretations of religion are wrong. And conceding even that the

religious consciousness is an ultimate fact in our nature, or that it is the inspiration of the Almighty that fills us with the thoughts of the Infinite or with the feelings that find outlet in prayer, the question still arises whether this divine influence ever transcends the sphere of naturalism; whether, that is to say, there has ever been such an interruption of the uniformity of nature that we can point to certain exceptional facts and say: "These are special, supernatural, miraculous exhibitions of the divine presence." The gravest questions are involved in this inquiry. If with Kuenen and Tiele we answer No, we must conclude that our Christian religion has reached its purest form through successive stages not of progress merely, nor of development merely, for this is true, but of a naturalistic development—a development which compels us to reconstruct history so as to show that the religious life revealed in the Bible has in all its phases and in all its periods been conditioned and determined by its antecedents and environments. If the essence of religion is the religious feeling, how can we ever get out of this circle of subjectivity, or say anything else of Christianity than that it is one of the forms in which a universal religious consciousness has been exhibited? And believing that Christianity is exclusive and is entitled to paramount authority, we must either say with Mulford that Christianity is not a religion, or else we must say that knowledge as well as feeling enters into its essence. Supernaturalism—I mean Revelation—is the condition of an exclusive Christianity, and it is an important element in the conservation of theism. I am far from saying that without a revelation there can be no religion of any sort, and I am far from saying that without a revelation there can be no knowledge of God. But when men give up revelation they will find it easier to give up theism. This is not reasoning in a circle, and at all events men need to be reminded that the reasoning in a circle may not be good, reasoning in straight lines is intolerably bad. Arguments act and react on each other, and it is the congruity of all arguments that constitutes the best and final argument. Pure theism is not the solution of the world's problem. The man who has given up Christianity is on the road to atheism. The man who is dissatisfied with

the Christian religion is likely to find himself without any religion at all; and the logical outcome of no religion is no morality. For this reason, were there no other, the discussion of fundamental ethics should have a place in theological studies. This, as we have been recently reminded, is just now the "whereabouts of philosophical activity" (*Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, April, 1881). The question in ethics is the possibility of ethics. The question of the hour is not whether God is the logical correlative of our consciousness of moral obligation; nor whether happiness or holiness is the chief end of man; nor whether conscience is intuitional or developed out of a "strong sense of avoidance." It is not expressed in the utilitarianism of Mill, nor in the altruism of Spencer. It does not reveal itself in the paradoxes of Sidgwick, nor in the transcendentalism of Bradley. It is the question whether there can be any guarantee for the purity of home or the stability of the social organism under a philosophy which makes man an automaton. Mr. Frederic Harrison indicates his appreciation of the religious problem when he speaks of "the mighty assize of religions which this generation and the next are to try out" (*Nineteenth Century*, August, 1881). He is right in supposing that the time has come for the trial of the issue. We have had enough of demurrers and continuances; enough of answers and replications; enough of rejoinders and surrejoinders. The time has come when men must face the question of the possibility of morals. They must decide between a metaphysic that leads to an absolute vacuum in knowledge; absolute irresponsibility in morals, absolute mechanism in life; and a metaphysic that will secure the separateness, the sovereignty, the morality, the immortality of the soul. With the soul assured, the way to God is plain. If God is, a revelation of God may be. With the possibility of revelation conceded, the proof is sufficient. And with a proved revelation before us, it is easy to understand that in God we live and move and have our being; that the path of history has been the unfolding of his purpose; that the order of nature is the movement of his mind; that the work of the philosopher is to rethink his thought; that Christianity is the solution of all problems; that the blood of Christ removes the

blot of sin; that the church is the flower of humanity; that the Incarnation of the Logos is God's great achievement; that Jesus is the brightness of his Father's glory and the express image of his person; that in him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, and that by him all things consist.

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