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By Whom, all things; for Whom, all things.

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THE FINAL PHILOSOPHY.

DR. SHIELDS is a philosopher by taste and an apologist by profession. Admirably qualified for acting in either capacity, he has undertaken to fill both offices at once, and this is the secret of the great excellences and the grave errors of his recent work. Philosophy and apologetics are not coextensive, and any attempt to make them so must end in unduly circumscribing the area of the former or in exaggerating the importance of the latter. "The Final Philosophy" will, in all probability, be misjudged by two classes of readers: some will undervalue it through dislike of what they will regard as the Utopian features of the book; and some will overpraise it as a bold and brave attempt to find a permanent basis for the reconciliation of Science and Religion. The fact is, however, that the writer is nowhere so strong as at the close of his volume, and nowhere so weak as at the beginning: as a philosopher Dr. Shields merits high praise, but as an apologist he is open to serious criticism. His book is written with great ability; it gives evidence on every page of wide reading and rare power of generalization; it fully sustains the author's reputation as a religious philosopher, and though it contains some statements which ought not to pass unchallenged, it is a credit to American authorship and to the institution whence it goes out into the world. It belongs to what Zöckler calls "conflict-literature." The author makes very liberal use of military language, and the picture of a battle scene opens nearly every chapter in the volume. Religion is represented as engaged in a hot contest with science and exposed to the varying fortunes of war. No objection can be made to this feature of the volume, which does

apply equally well to conflict-literature in general; but the habit of discussing apologetical subjects in vague and general terms instead of under the limitations of strict propositional statements is enough to make one concur with Dr. Whedon in the opinion that "the conflict-and-reconciliation business" has been largely overdone.

Science and Religion, Science and Christianity, Science and the Bible—these are three distinct subjects, demanding distinct and separate treatment, and only confusion can arise from a failure to recognize this fact. It does not follow that a man denies the divine origin of Christianity because he does not believe in the plenary inspiration of the Bible. This ought to be more fully appreciated and more candidly stated than it usually is, for the comfort of Christians who live in a state of chronic alarm, and who fear that the very life of the Gospel is threatened every time that an attack is made upon some fact of Scripture. Defend plenary inspiration by all means, but at the same time let it be distinctly understood that the pearl of great price is in safe custody, and that something besides the outer door of inspiration lies between it and the grasp of the infidel. Nor does it necessarily follow that the man who denies the divine origin of Christianity would have any controversy with theists respecting the Being of God or the Immortality of the Soul; and it is a great blunder to represent all the varying divergencies from strict orthodoxy as equally and alike illustrating the great conflict between science and religion. An examination of Dr. Shields' volume suggests several minor points of criticism. His failure to distinguish between the three topics just named is one. Then we look in vain for any analytical investigation of the essential relations which science and religion sustain to each other, or for any reply to those who assert or assume that this relationship is one of necessary antagonism. Dr. Shields maintains that this relationship of antagonism is not normal and will not be perpetual, and the way was open for him to have replied to those whose reasonings assume or tend to the very opposite idea. The difference between science and religion does not, as the authors of the "Unseen Universe" seem to teach, resolve itself into a difference between the questions *How?* and *Why?* For men of religion as well as men of sci-

ence ask the former question, and men of science have no good reason for not asking the latter. Ridicule teleology as they may, men of science have yet to show that it is any more unscientific to say that the eye was made to see with than to say that the telescope was made to see through. Nor is there any schism between science and religion because the heavens declare the glory of God, but not his Fatherhood. Mr. Gibson might as well say that there is a schism between two members of the human body because the eye does not hear and the ear does not see, as to say that there is a schism between science and religion because the one does not teach what the other does. Dr. Winchell has rewritten the history of thought in order to support the opinion that there is a natural and irreconcilable antagonism between intellect and faith, and that this is the explanation of the conflict of science and religion. But how so? Men believe, yet intellect furnishes the reasons for their faith; and men reason, yet their conclusions are often expressed in the terms of faith. Herbert Spencer has also tried to find by analysis the reason for the conflict between science and religion. But he loses religion in the process of experiment. His investigations lead him to the belief that there are two theories of the universe—the *à priori* and the *à posteriori*: so there may be, and two rival philosophies may grow out of them; but to identify religion with an *à priori* theory of the universe is transparently absurd. The attempt to find the origin of the schism between science and religion has failed simply because such a schism does not exist. Individual thinkers can be found who, being scientific men, hold anti-religious opinions. They deny, or at least they do not believe in, the existence of a personal God, and a perdurable personal self; and it is not uncommon for such men to propose terms of reconciliation between science and religion; but it should not be a difficult thing to know how to treat their propositions. Herbert Spencer, for example, has drafted a treaty of peace in substance as follows: Science will admit that there is a Power that transcends experience, and Religion must admit that this Power is unknowable. Science is to be allowed undisputed rule within the sphere of the knowable; Religion is to surrender all claim to the territory occupied by science, and

in consideration of her accommodating nescience is to be treated with great respect and protected in the exercise of her sovereign rights throughout the length and breadth of Don't-know-dom. What Mr. Spencer proposes to accomplish by a division of territory Mr. Frederick Harrison hopes to effect by means of a partnership. He proposes that science shall give religion a share in the kingdom of this world on the express condition that religion will abandon all hope of a world to come. What shall be said to these proposals? The answer is not difficult. Can an atheist worship? Can he pray? Need he have any sense of responsibility? any belief in the immutable distinctions of right and wrong? In any true sense of the word, can he be religious? No? Then there can be no reconciliation of science and religion on such terms as these. These writers would take from religion what feeds it, what it leans upon, what gives it power, and then say they have no quarrel with it. *Solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant.*

Again, it is asked whether there is a conflict between science and Christianity. What is Christianity? Reduced to its lowest terms it is theism *plus* the Incarnation. There are those of course who reject Christianity because it teaches men to believe that Christ wrought miracles, and particularly that he rose from the dead. If such men claim to speak in the name of science, it is clear that the only way of reconciling science and Christianity is by proving that science is wrong in making opposition to the Christian miracles. But it is better to let men speak only for themselves; and the question is whether it is possible to effect an adjustment of the differences between those who do and those who do not believe in the occurrence of the Christian miracles. An unqualified negative is the only proper answer to this inquiry. To give up miracles is to give up the Gospel. Christianity without the miracles would have some value, to be sure; so perhaps had the ground in which the treasure was hid some value for agricultural purposes; but it was not on that account that the man in the parable sold all that he had and bought it. With the treasure in it, it was cheap at the price he paid for it; but as a farm it was no bargain. And the market-value of Christianity, in comparison with other religions, depends upon the presence in it of miraculous

elements. Give up the resurrection of Christ, and then "I care for nothing; all shall go." Discard miracles, and you may give the religion of Christ to some ragman of literature with other cast-off faiths: he perhaps will make an essay on comparative theology out of it; as a religion it is worthless. And it is easy to see what our line of defence must be. Miracles are denied, we are told, because men are so fully convinced of the uniformity of nature. But what is the uniformity of nature? An *à priori* expectation, nothing more, as Mozley and Bowen have so ably shown, that the future will be like the past. Expectations, however, are not always realized; and no one denies a fact which he sees because it was unexpected. Will he deny a fact of which he is credibly informed because it was unexpected? Will testimony prove a fact? Then it will prove an unexpected and extraordinary fact. It is not difficult to believe in miracles if one believes in God. This is substantially Paley's position. But it is not necessary to believe in God in order to believe in miracles, though many think so, and among them, apparently, Mr. Venn. But why should belief in God condition belief in the occurrence of an event in the external world? That it occurs is a matter of evidence; what brought it about is another matter. Hence it is possible to argue: God is, therefore miracles may be; and: Miracles are, therefore God must be. The last word has not yet been said on the subject of certitude; but of this we may be sure: there will be an exposure of the illogical position which a man occupies who says that testimony is to be believed except when it relates to the supernatural, and then the sharp antithesis will be between the truth of Christianity and the general discredit of history. A book which will discuss, with the ability which such a subject requires, the philosophy of human testimony, and defend the miraculous in Christianity without making an argument for superstition or opening the door to credulity, is a desideratum in theological literature.

What now is meant by saying that there is a conflict between science and the Bible? Simply this: The Bible, as it is commonly understood, presents a view of the universe differing in various particulars from the views entertained by some who regard the universe from the exclusive standpoint of

observation and experience. The question is, whether the Bible has been misunderstood, or is in error, or whether those who oppose its teachings are mistaken. The reply to these questions does not appear to involve any great scheme for the reconciliation of science and religion, as so many suppose, nor is there any reason why the particular proposition, "some men, etc.," should be changed into the universal proposition, "all men, etc.," by the fallacious device of personifying science and writing it with a capital S. But granting that there is a conflict between science and the Bible, it is evident that one's opinion respecting the area which it covers will depend, in a measure, upon the importance which he chooses to attach to certain so-called scientific hypotheses. If everybody who has an anti-scriptural hypothesis in his head is to be taken notice of, it will be easy to prove that every question is an open question, and that the whole Bible, alike as to its contents and its credentials, is the subject of a direct assault on the part of science. Dr. Shields has made this mistake; and the impression which his book is likely to produce upon the mind of a reader will be that every article of faith is involved in the conflict between science and religion. On a matter of as much moment as this, however, Dr. Shields should be allowed to speak for himself. The following are his words :

"Despite our general belief that all religious truths and scientific facts will be found accordant, yet at present there is no doctrine which is not staked in some theory, and no theory which is not staked in some doctrine. If we hold the one we must let go the other, while if we give up either we may lose both. What becomes of our theory of the heavens if we hold that the worlds were commanded full-born from nothing? and yet, if we hold that they have been slowly evolved from nebulae, where is our doctrine of creation? What becomes of our theory of the earth if we hold that it was made in six days of twenty-four hours? and yet, if we hold that it has been developed through unmeasured time, where is our doctrine of the Sabbath? What becomes of our theory of races if we hold that they descended from Adam and Eve? and yet, if we hold that they sprang from indigenous centres, where is our doctrine of the divine image and the fall of man? What becomes of our theory of the soul if we hold that it is independent of the body; and yet, if we hold that it is interwoven with the body, where is our doctrine of immortality and the resurrection? What becomes of our theory of society if we hold that the millennium will be sudden and miraculous? and yet, if we hold that it will be historical and natural, where is our doc-

trine of the second coming and judgment of Christ? What becomes of our whole theory of religion if we hold to a special and supernatural revelation? and yet, if we hold to one that is natural and universal, where are all the distinctive doctrines of Christianity? Whatsoever we may hold in religion is so adventured with whatsoever we may hold in science as to put in peril the very life of truth and virtue."

Dr. Shields is minutely and extensively acquainted with the history of opinion, and with the present drifts and tendencies of thought. He seems to have no difficulty in assigning every man to his proper place in a classification, and his thorough knowledge of individual thinkers contributes greatly to the value of his generalizations. Nowhere does he exhibit more completely his thorough mastery of the materials pertaining to his department than in the chapters in which he gives an account of the attitudes of thinkers of the present and of former times in relation to the questions debated between science and religion. Yet his love of logical completeness, his fondness for antithesis, his desire to have a sustained thought throughout the merit of his book, have proved in some instances an injury to his argument, and have given his book the appearance, now and then, of a ledger-account, where the figures are made to balance by putting amounts arbitrarily into the columns. Still nothing can be neater than his classification of parties in reference to the relations they sustain to the religious problems which are the subject of debate :

"Of such parties the two most marked are those who are averse and those who are inapt to the great work of harmonizing the knowledge of man with the knowledge of God; and these parties are again subdivisible according to the kind and degree of such aversion or unfitness. So that as we proceed four distinct classes will emerge into view, in the order in which we name them : 1st, The Extremists, who would render science and religion hostile and exterminant; 2d, The Indifferentists, who would have them separate and independent; 3d, The Impatients or Eclectics, who would combine them prematurely and illogically; 4th, The Despondents or Sceptics, who would abandon them as contradictory or irreconcilable."

The reader must turn to the pages of Dr. Shields to see how many men are placed in one or another of these four classes. It is not necessary to ask whether he has fairly represented all to whom he refers or whether he has stated correctly all the facts which he has adduced. In a book where so many names are

cited and so many facts are referred to, it would be strange if a mind with microscopic tastes could not discover some error. There is, however, a more important question to ask, and it involves one of the principal points of criticism to which this able book is exposed. What is the logical conclusion to which, if Dr. Shields is correct, the student of the Bible is driven?

For the general terms science and religion substitute the specific terms hypotheses and dogmas; for it is between these that the conflict exists. Every hypothesis is staked in some doctrine. No one believes that science and religion, in the broad sense of those terms, are hostile or exterminant, and no one can help believing that in that same broad sense they are independent. The ideas of hostility, independence, premature combination, or hopeless separation, refer to rival hypotheses and dogmas. Notice again that the several hypotheses and dogmas are not distributed among these four classes, the Extremists dealing with some, the Indifferentists with others, etc. But each of the four deals with all the problems of astronomy, geology, anthropology, etc., so that if the four classes above named be represented by the large letters of the alphabet, and the rival hypotheses and dogmas by the small letters, the leading chapters in the first part of the "Final Philosophy" will appear to be constructed according to a very simple arrangement, thus: *A a, b, c, d; B a, b, c, d; C a, b, c, d; D a, b, c, d.* What is true, then, of any one hypothesis and dogma is true of all, and the author, it will be remembered, condemns the attitude assumed by each of the four classes in reference to the problems in debate between science and religion. Suppose, then, that the doctrine in question is that of creation as opposed to the hypothesis of evolution. A Christian says, "I am an Extremist; I shall oppose the hypothesis." But our author says, this will not do. "I will be an Indifferentist, then, holding the dogma, but ignoring the hypothesis." Again, the writer says, this is not philosophical. "Then I will combine the hypothesis and the dogma, and this will place me among the Eclectics." But our author would say that efforts of this sort are premature. Finally the Christian says, "I will give up the doctrine, for I see no way of reconciling it with the hypothesis." But this proposition is open to

objection with all the rest. What, then, should he do? He must not attack the hypothesis; he must not hold the dogma; he must not combine the hypothesis and the dogma; he must not give up the dogma. Is it possible to conceive of a condition of more unqualified scepticism than that in which this unfortunate inquirer would be left? And when it is remembered that the rival hypotheses and dogmas cover the whole field of revealed religion and embrace even the question whether a revealed religion is possible, it is safe to say that Dr. Shields has made the strongest plea for an agnostic theology which has been presented to the English-speaking world in the present generation. It is true that the author looks without alarm upon the failure of former schemes of reconciliation, because he has confidence in the umpirage of philosophy. His reasoning may have the effect of shutting men up to the necessity of invoking the aid of the Final Philosophy if they would save themselves from a state of nescience; but other men may not be as sanguine as he is respecting the final philosophy.

As it is so easy to be misunderstood, the writer of this article is at pains to say that his criticism concerns the logic of the book and not the attitude of its author. Dr. Shields has expressed in a single sentence what he believes, and all devout students of the Bible will agree with him. "Religious creeds and scientific theories," he says, "come into actual conflict not because of any actual disagreement between the facts of nature and the truths of Scripture, but solely because of some false exegesis on the one side or some wrong induction on the other." This, however, is a belief which the author entertains in spite of his argument, and if his argument is sound his belief has no good reason for its existence; for a supernatural revelation is one of the dogmas which stand opposed to scientific hypotheses, and it is one which, according to the author's specific averment, cannot be regarded as settled. The Eclectic's method of reconciling science and religion is premature and illogical, he says,

"for we are only in the first stages of the great reconciliation. Fiercer strifes may await us in the more undeveloped sciences than any we have survived. If astronomy could make such warfare, at the mere outposts of revelation, when it dwarfed the earth into an atom in space; if geology, at

the walls of the fortress, strikes such a panic now that it threatens to reduce man to an ephemeron in time ; and if anthropology is actually jarring the foundations with its effort to degrade him to an autochthon in the scale of being ; what may we expect when at length the citadel is assailed by those mental and moral sciences which, having human nature for their subject, and involving all the great questions of human duty and destiny, shall impinge upon the most peculiar topics of inspiration, upon the actual contents as well as credentials of the heavenly message ?”

We are to look, then, for greater objections to the Bible from the mental and moral sciences than any that geology and astronomy have offered. Yet Dr. Shields speaks in terms which fall little short of ridicule of those who ignore or reject the astronomical and geological objections, or who even undertake, during the present phase of the controversy, to form a definite opinion by combining the scientific hypotheses and religious dogmas. How is it that he can justify his own confidence in the Bible when even greater attacks are to be made against its credentials than as yet have been made against its contents ? How does he manage to go into theological bankruptcy with a snug fortune hid away in the doctrine of inspiration ? What will he do ? Will he accept the logic of his book and avow agnosticism ? or will he hold the inconsistent position of believing what his argument goes to show he has no right to believe ? This would be the Hamiltonian philosophy over again, of preaching the faith which he had first destroyed. History, however, teaches us that an author’s faith is no protection against the mischief which his logic may do. Mansel’s piety did not prevent his Bampton Lectures from being quoted in support of anti-theistic doctrine ; and if the “ Final Philosophy ” does not share the fate of the “ Limits of Religious Thought,” it will be because there is on this side of the water no Herbert Spencer with wit enough to capture this piece of artillery and turn it against the citadel of Christianity.

What, then, is the author’s method of effecting a reconciliation between science and religion ? Briefly stated, it is the “ umpirage of philosophy.” What that is it may not be so easy to say, but the following passage throws some light upon the subject :

“ The position taken in the last chapter is that the numerous unsolved problems now in debate between scientists and religionists are neither purely scientific nor merely religious, but properly philosophical questions, to be kept within the province of philosophical minds, and to be wrought as fast as they are settled into the ultimate philosophical system. We cannot decide them as mere theologians, appealing to Scripture alone ; we cannot decide them as mere scientists, appealing to nature alone ; we can only decide them as philosophers, lovers of all knowledge and truth, embracing both nature and Scripture in our view, sifting the evidence brought by their respective disciples, and then basing our conclusions upon that evidence, even though it should be against our previous opinions and wishes. This was also expressed in a more figurative manner by personifying the opposing interests of science and religion, and representing philosophy as an umpire between them ; not any individual philosopher between any individual scientist and religionist ; nor yet any particular system of philosophy to which both might appeal as a standard ; but simply that philosophic mind, genius, or spirit which in the whole race of true philosophers has ever sought, and still seeks, with more or less thoroughness and success, to mediate between conflicting sects and schools, to distinguish their truths from their errors, and to derive from them the final system of perfect knowledge.”

1. Does the umpirage of philosophy mean the arbitration of philosophers? If so, it is open to the four objections which I made three years ago when the chapter entitled “ The Umpirage of Philosophy ” was published as a memoir read before the Philosophical Society at Washington. These objections, with the author’s replies, are to be found at the close of the first chapter of the second part of the volume. The first of those objections was that the philosopher is supposed to approach the subject with the foregone conclusion that the Bible is true, in which case the arbitration proceeds by begging the gravest question now before the world. The author meets this objection by saying that “ the only parties that can be supposed to need or accept reconciliation are the scientist and the religionist, not the atheist and the theologian, not the infidel and the Christian, who could never agree and preserve their distinctive characters.” But this does not harmonize with a statement in the same chapter, where it is said that among the problems upon which the umpirage of philosophy is to be tried we have “ as the issue of modern metaphysical thought, at the one extreme, an optimism which seeks to identify the revealed Jehovah as the one absolute Reason, the first and final cause of a perfected creation ;

and at the other extreme a pessimism which would exhibit the developing universe as an abortive paradox beginning and ending in hopeless contradiction." The only answer which can be made to these four objections is that the umpirage of philosophy has no reference to a specific class of men called philosophers, and this the author makes. He would probably agree with Sir George Cornewall Lewis in the remark that "whatever deference is justly due to great names and competent judges, they are not to be regarded as infallible—as the oracles of a scientific religion, or as courts of philosophy without appeal."

2. Does the "umpirage of philosophy" mean the exhibition of a philosophic spirit? This seems to be the author's meaning in the passage cited above, and no exception can be taken to it. It is certain, for instance, that neither Genesis nor Geology is the only source of information regarding the cosmogony; that access to a Hebrew Bible is not enough, and access to a geological cabinet is not enough; but that the truth must be sought by a full, fair, and patient study of all the evidence in the case, whether that evidence be found in Semitic roots or Silurian rocks. But if this is all that the author means he is only giving a new name to a very old idea in speaking of the umpirage of philosophy. And if this is what he means there is no good reason for objecting to the theological geologists or the geological theologians who undertake to show the exegetical bearing of geology on Genesis. Such efforts are declared to be premature, however, and it is intimated that no definite and final conclusions can be looked for until a broad, comprehensive, and summative science is projected which shall proceed upon a logical organization throughout all the sciences.

3. Is it then the final philosophy which is to be the umpire? This view of the matter would be in keeping with the general drift of the discussion; but as the final philosophy has not yet made its appearance, it would follow that the problems with which it is to deal are open questions, and may so remain for many a day. In other words, if this is what the umpirage of philosophy means, agnosticism is the only position open to any man who would not be an infidel or a bigot.

Enough has now been said to show that there is a want of harmony between the author's strong statements regarding the

unsettled problems of religion and his own avowals of a dogmatic faith. This confusion runs all through the volume, and is the effect of a failure to state with precision what the reconciliation is which is sought for. For it is one thing to reconcile thinkers and another thing to reconcile thoughts. If the problem is: Given certain open questions in science and religion how shall the truth be known?—Dr. Shields has no right to his belief in the Bible before the “umpirage of philosophy” has settled the questions pertaining to its credentials and contents. But if the problem is: Given the fact that men differ how shall they be made to think alike?—Dr. Shields, believing in the inspiration of the Scriptures, may invoke, if he chooses, the aid of philosophy or philosophers in order to convince an unbelieving world. But philosophy would be an advocate rather than an umpire then. Assuming that our author had in his mind the reconciliation of antagonistic parties rather than the solution of open questions, his consistency is saved; but it is saved at the expense of sacrificing the reasoning of his book and of giving up the idea of “umpirage.” But it will not do to assume that we know the truth on all the questions which are debated between the friends of the Bible and the advocates of science: we should then be too dogmatic; nor will it do to say that wherever there are conflicting hypotheses and dogmas there are open questions in respect to which we cannot say, we believe: we should then be too agnostic. The fact is, that the questions which our author has confused deserve separate treatment.

First. How should we deal with the conflicting hypotheses and dogmas to which our author refers? They do not all stand upon the same level, and need not all be treated in the same way. A philosophical system may be so wild that a Christian (the truth of the Bible as an evidenced and established fact being here assumed) may very properly reject it, because it is in manifest opposition to the Scripture. Must a man hold in abeyance his belief in God until some second Lord Bacon comes along to settle the dispute between Pantheism, Positivism, and the Bible? Or a Christian thinker may very properly take the position of an Indifferentist: unable to meet scientists on

their own ground, he may yet be confident that their hypotheses cannot by any latitude of interpretation be made to harmonize with the Bible. Again, great service may be rendered to the cause of truth by such writers as Guyot and Dawson, and they would be classed among the Eclectics; in fact they are cited as such in the chapter which condemns this eclecticism as "specious," "partial," "illogical," "unscientific," "narrow," "premature," "visionary," and "vague." Once more, the dogma that the heavens are "a canopy of blue or an illuminated dome" has disappeared in the presence of the incontestable facts of science; and so far as this particular subject is concerned, the whole Christian world, with the exception of Mr. Jasper, must be classed among the Despondents. Instead of uttering words of condemnation against each of these four classes of thinkers, and so immuring the Christian world in a dungeon of dreary nescience until some knight of philosophy sounds the note of deliverance, it would be safe to say that by dividing the work of reconciliation among the Extremists, Indifferentists, Eclectics, and Despondents, it can be accomplished satisfactorily and without much delay. Or, to put the matter in another form: It is not strange that a book which exposes so many surfaces to criticism should encounter opposition. When the Bible has to meet the objections of the astronomer, the geologist, the archæologist, the ethnologist, the historian, and the metaphysician, and show cause why it should not be cast aside as worthless when from any of these quarters it is charged with inaccuracy, we may expect that it will give its defenders a great deal to do. And when it is remembered that by far the greater number of objections to the Bible do not consist of facts in the material world which are alleged to contradict the statements of Scripture, but of unproved and unprovable hypotheses, to explain facts which are already accounted for and explained in the Scripture, no false delicacy should prevent a man from opposing the hypotheses because they are unscriptural. And when Scripture and science deal with the same subjects it is safe to predict that they will not disagree when it is understood that Inspiration is not responsible for false renderings, and that science is not a synonym for hasty generalization. But it is only within a narrow area that any

concessions to science on the side of exegesis can be expected ; and it is within this area that the issue is joined between traditional interpretation and alleged scientific fact. Dr. Shields has exaggerated the opposition between science and the Bible by giving weight to every philosophic vagary and scientific speculation, and allowing them to stand in a position of rivalry to the Bible. In this way the whole Bible becomes a sealed book, which no one is worthy to open who has not been instructed in the Final Philosophy.

Secondly. Assuming the truth of the Bible as to its credentials and its contents, how are the differences between scientists and religionists to be reconciled so that the former shall not deny the teachings of the Bible, and the latter shall not deny the teachings of science? This is the question which many readers of the volume under review will suppose that Dr. Shields has had in his mind, and they will on that account approve of the answer which he has given. When the question is put in this way, no objection can be made to the "umpirage of philosophy." There can be no doubt respecting the real importance of the work which such men as Winchell, Cocker, Cook, and others are doing. There is a great work of synthesis to be done, and Christian thinkers should have their full share in it. It is conceivable that a systematic exhibition of the facts of nature and of revelation would by its very symmetry give visible proof of the harmony of science and religion. And both for the sake of science and of religion the establishment of chairs of philosophy as distinct from chairs of science, mental, moral, or physical, or chairs of metaphysic, would be a very important addition to the college curriculum. In all this Dr. Shields is right, though he is probably too sanguine in his expectations respecting the effect of the umpirage of philosophy upon the unbelief of the world.

As the reconciliation of science and religion is to result from the umpirage of philosophy, so a true philosophy, in the judgment of our author, is to be the fruit of a reconciliation of the rival systems of Positivism and Absolutism. Assuming that Positivism is the same as inductive science, Dr. Shields is right in saying that it is not necessarily antagonistic to

religion ; and assuming that the Absolute means God, his discussion of some recent phases of the theistic controversy is just and able. But Positivism is not the same as inductive science, and there are more than "five" questions which can be asked about the Absolute. One is, What is it? and our author forgets apparently that it has received a great many answers. But these chapters are not referred to here for purposes of criticism. They show a very just appreciation of the relations of these philosophies to religion. Dr. Shields has looked at Positivism and its rival from one point of view ; but there is another which is just as important. He looks upon the parted waters of these philosophic streams, and sees the Final Philosophy in their future union. He knows, however, that they were once united, and no one knows better than he does the causes which have produced on the one side a current of monistic idealism, and on the other a current of monistic materialism. Nothing in the sphere of religious philosophy is more important than the question, What is knowledge? For if, as Hume says, knowledge is a feeling or a recollection of a feeling, it is impossible to recognize any bond between a succession of feelings ; impossible to recognize feelings as successive ; impossible to recognize this feeling as *a* feeling ; impossible to say "this" or "that," "here" or "there," "now" or "then," in reference to feelings, for to do so would be to speak of relations, and relations are not feelings. And so Mr. Green says pithily, "A consistent sensationalism must be speechless." Hume is the recognized metaphysician-in-chief of the Positivists, and the proper reply to Positivism is that which shows its inconsistency. It cannot make its attack on Christianity except by denying that there are *à priori* ideas which antedate experience, but it cannot take this step without committing suicide. "Experience cannot possibly be the parent of science ;" nay, without the *à priori* ideas which the mind brings with it and applies to what are called the facts of experience, there can be no experience ; and the defence of these *à priori* ideas is as necessary to the science which denies them as it is to the religion which the denial of them tends to overthrow. When the Positivist says that he knows nothing about cause or substance, and hence nothing about God or the soul, he

means that all knowledge comes through the senses, and that phenomena are the only legitimate objects of inquiry. The refutation of his position must consist in the demand that he carry the principles of his master to their logical conclusion, and when he does this he will be "speechless." The two postulates of religion are a personal self and a personal God. Positivism denies both ; and Absolutism is just as bad. Professor Caird, for instance, rejects the common belief of mankind in mind and matter because mind and matter are abstractions. He rejects them, that is to say, because we have no experience of them. Grant that we have none. Has he had any experience of absolute being? And is it good reasoning, first to reject mind and matter because they transcend experience, and then assume that what are called by these names are only the phenomenal manifestations of an absolute something which also transcends experience? Distinct as these philosophies are, however, they occupy a certain common ground. They are both monistic ; and antithetical as they may appear to be, the passage from one to the other is not impossible. Pantheism, says Ebrard, is the way to materialism. See this illustrated in Strauss and Feuerbach. Positivism has its affinity with Idealism. See this illustrated in Mill's examination of Hamilton, and in Huxley's lecture on Descartes. And the practical effects of the two systems are very much the same. Mr. Harrison is a Positivist ; Mr. Bradley is a Hegelian. Both protest loudly against egoistic morality ; both insist on the importance of religion as distinct from morality, and both, by their philosophy, would destroy the possibility of either. For in order to authoritative morals there must be obligation, and in order to an effective code of morals there must be an adequate reason for recognizing obligation. But how a positivist can have an obligatory system of morals it is hard to conceive. The genesis of obligation out of expediency, of "ought-not" out of "better-not," has never been effected. Mr. Bradley will say "ought" as loudly as anybody, and make fun of all attempts to hatch "oughtness" out of utilitarian egg-shells ; but what does "ought" mean when the identity of God and man is affirmed? Mr. Harrison's philosophy leaves us no God, and Mr. Bradley's no self distinct from God. And

suppose that obligation does exist, what does it amount to if a shot-gun will place a man beyond the reach of retribution? Destroy the piers on either shore of Niagara, and leave the bridge suspended in mid-air. This is a trifling feat of engineering skill compared with the attempts which these philosophers are making to maintain religion and enforce morality after denying the existence of an immortal self and a personal God. Professor Shields well says that "between the Hegelian universe of bare ideas and the Comptean universe of dead facts, there is, in sooth, as little to choose as between a ghost and a corpse." A sound metaphysic conditions the possibility of religion. Mr. Hodgson may ridicule what he calls "church-philosophy;" there can be no church without philosophy. Defend the substantial dualism of subject and object: this will give us a perdurable self; and this again, as Mr. Hutton has remarked, will "open a broad way into Theism."

Dr. Shields does not pretend to have constructed the philosophy which gives the title to his book. This will be a disappointment to some; for they will feel that the outcome of the volume falls short of the promise with which it began. Others again who may have opened it with the feeling that the title is ambitious will be gratified as they approach the conclusion to know that the author, after giving a name to that supreme architectonic study which is to include all the sciences, has presumed only to sketch in outline what he thinks must be its method, while he frankly says that the detailed construction of it must be the joint labor of many minds for many years. The work of building up the scattered elements of knowledge is one of great importance, and there is no reason why the Positivists should monopolize it. It is time that some should undertake to do, from the standpoint of Theism and in the interests of Christianity, what Fiske and Lewes and Spencer are doing in the interests of Positivism; and it is gratifying to know that there is at least one Christian thinker whose mind is turned in this direction. That the time is now ripe for the inauguration of the *Philosophia Ultima* is not indicated by the present condition of scientific research; and that this continent is the predestined arena in which the kingdom of philosophy is to be established, is an idea for which patriotic reasons may be

given, though it is not justified by any existing pre-eminence of American thought. But these are small matters. The mistake of Dr. Shields has been in allowing the title of his chair to influence his conception of the Final Philosophy. It is an error to suppose that the reconciliation of science and religion is the true function of philosophy. The effect of it is in the first place to magnify the opposition of science and religion, and so enlarge the area of apologetics; and in the second place to put unphilosophical elements into the very foundations of the philosophic structure.

A comprehensive philosophy must deal with truth as truth, and all that pretends to be truth must submit to the proper tests of certitude. Question-begging alliterations like Reason and Revelation, Faith and Philosophy, are bad enough in popular apologetical literature. But they should be banished from books of a more serious nature, and certainly they should have no place in a great summative science such as the Final Philosophy ought to be. Such a philosophy must co-ordinate the facts of the several sciences, and express the broadest generalizations which that co-ordination will furnish. Here it must follow the method of Comte rather than that of Hegel. It must also be a critical study of the conditions of knowledge—an inquiry concerning human understanding; such a study will reveal the fact that there are *à priori* ideas, and a sound philosophy will not send them away in disgrace by saying that they are “metempirical.” And thirdly, among these ideas substance will hold no mean position, and in the inevitable dualism of mind and matter we shall have a metaphysic which Mr. Lewes may not be able to reduce to what he calls “the method of science.” What that great summative science shall be called is a matter of minor importance. Call it philosophy if you will, and thereby indicate the spirit in which truth should be sought. Call it science if you wish to have it understood that in it is to be seen a systematic exhibition of what is known. But if the topic with which it is chiefly concerned is to determine its name, then its most appropriate title will be Theology. A comprehensive philosophy must regard the spheres of moral and material order under some unifying category. That category is God. The true conception of the universe, as Dr. Cocker

shows, is the theistic conception. "Theology," as Dr. Winchell says, "is the granary in which the fruitage of philosophy and science is garnered." And this is also the view of Dr. Shields, for he says: "As the universe, the totality of existence, acquires intelligibility, becomes a cosmos instead of a chaos, only when it is viewed as the creation of a Creator, so the sciences can only be resolved into a system by means of theology."

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