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ARTICLE I.

THE METAPHYSICAL POSTULATE OF HERBERT SPENCER'S FIRST PRINCIPLES.

First Principles of a New System of Philosophy. By HERBERT SPENCER. Second Edition. Appleton & Co. 1871.

Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform," etc By Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers. 1853.

The Limits of Religious Thought: Examined in Eight Lectures Delivered before the University of Oxford, in the Year MDCCCLVIII., on the Bampton Foundation. By HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, B. D., Reader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College; Tutor and Late Fellow of St. John's College. First American, from the third London, Edition. With the NOTES translated. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

The corner-stone of Positivism in all its forms is the doctrine, now so fashionable in scientific circles, of the unknowable: and the derivative doctrine as to ultimate causes, whether final or efficient. Since this is so, it is worthy of remark that the founder of French Positivism, M. Comte, has taken this doctrine of the unknowable for granted. There is not a scintilla of proof for it in the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. We are not aware that either M.

ARTICLE IV.

THE SENSUALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CONSIDERED.

The Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century Considered. By ROBERT L. DABNEY, D. D., LL. D., *Professor in Divinity in the Union Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church of the South, Prince Edward, Va.* 369 pp., 12 mo. Anson D. F. Randolph & Co., 770 Broadway, N. Y.

We have here a work on Philosophy from the pen of a divine. What is the significance of this? Nothing; only that it affords an opportunity for levelling a criticism against a species of cant, which affects to exclude this class from the domain both of philosophy and science by remanding them to the province of faith alone. Emancipation from all authority is claimed as the necessary prerequisite for the investigation of truth, which these "slaves to a book" cannot profess, who are bound by their vows to receive its dogmas, as it is said, "*obedientia fracti animi.*" Truths which are wholly transcendental in their nature it may be proper to receive upon the authority of a divine revelation, and within this sphere the theologian must be rigidly confined. If he attempts to cross the line which separates faith from knowledge, he is a trespasser who is guilty of poaching upon a territory strictly forbidden to him. It is quietly assumed that the acceptance of any truth upon any authority whatsoever is in so far an abdication of the reason, which works the forfeiture to employ it in the fields where its excursions are legitimate. It is claimed that the habit of mind induced by the practice of faith disables from bold and independent investigation. A feebleness of intellect ensues, which renders it impotent to trust in its own deductions; whilst the fearlessness is wanting which is so necessary to the explorer who would push his adventures into the regions of the mysterious and unknown. There can be no free movement, it is alleged, in the mind which is shackled with any antecedent beliefs, and which is weakened by compulsory deference to an external and supreme authority. And so the theolo-

gian is incontinently warned away from the field of speculative inquiry, and told to be satisfied with the communion of ghosts and spectres which may peer out from the mist and cloud above him.

Considering, however, the immense contributions to human knowledge in every department which have been made by this proscribed class, and considering the fact that in every age they have been the teachers of the race, instructing it in the art of thinking itself, the eye cannot help twinkling a little at the grotesque humorousness of these allegations. The feeling of merriment displaces that of resentment. Even the milder sentiment of pity is extinguished in the mere fun of the thing. Serious men as theologians are, perhaps, from the very gravity of their calling they more richly appreciate a joke; and the relaxation experienced from this is more than an offset to the insult which is intended.

But to deal seriously with this jest for a moment. It would not be difficult to show that the parties who lie under this interdict possess qualifications and enjoy advantages which singularly fit them for these special investigations. And if they are subject to bias of any sort, or to peculiar mental temptations, this is no more true of them than of other men; whilst the danger of error lies upon the side of caution and safety to a most extraordinary degree. For example, the theologian is brought under the most solemn and recognised obligation to embrace truth whenever it shall be demonstrated as such. The kingdom to which he belongs is the kingdom of the truth; the Master whom he serves declares: "To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth;" and the truth is the only weapon which he is commissioned to wield. We are far from denying to other men that "honesty of reason" which leads them to follow truth for the truth's own sake, and by whatever path she may conduct them. On the contrary, nothing is more cheerfully conceded than that the influence of true philosophy and of correct science is to purge the mind of prejudice and passion; and to make the truth, pure and simple, the loadstone by which its movements are secretly di-

rected. But what we signalise here is, that, in addition to this, theologians are under a public vow which consecrates them to the maintenance of truth; that under a sacramental oath they are bound in loyalty to her throne; that they are anointed as a priesthood to minister at her altar. It would be an unreasoning prejudice that would deny them an equal share in that natural candor which other men claim as an attribute for themselves; whilst they are professionally bound to search for truth wherever she may lie concealed, and to transmute it into the worship which their office compels them always to render. It must not be overlooked that, in their own sphere, they have been called to combat prejudice of the strongest kind, and to overcome the stout resistance of the carnal heart to the authority of God. They have passed through a moral training which has taught them to hold a solemn watch over themselves, and to check every movement of insubordination against the supremacy of truth.

Passing over this initial consideration, the theologian has a manifest advantage, with a mind at rest upon all subjects which transcend the power of reason, in being at leisure to prosecute the search into those things which reason is able to disclose. The history of human thought teaches nothing more clearly than that the subjects of most enduring interest are those which relate to the soul and to God. If we go back to the earliest period, we find the speculative genius of antiquity wasting its strength upon these identical topics, which reason is utterly incompetent to explain. Yet so supreme is the relation in which they stand to man, that, until they were determined, human thought revolved around this moral and religious pole. What God is—whether a personal being outside of and distinct from nature, or only the *anima mundi*, the hidden spring of all its energies and processes; whether matter be eternal, what are its constituent elements, and how it comes to be cast into so many changeful forms; what the soul is—whether distinct from the divine essence, or only the most ethereal manifestation of matter; whether it be immortal, and how it survives the dissolution of the body; whether it will preserve an individual subsistence, or be absorbed into the substance of the Deity—such were some of the themes of absorb-

ing interest intermingled with their physical inquiries; and so they toiled on weaving their cosmogonies, which, like Penelope's web, were doomed to be as laboriously unravelled. All these points are, however, settled for the theologian by a divine testimony. The mind is released from inquiries which reason cannot resolve, to reap the knowledge which philosophy and science shall discover. With their systems of theology and morality constructed, they can turn to nature and gather her responses from a thousand oracles.

It is idle to declaim against this. Just in so far as modern speculation undertakes to settle these points it encounters the same obstacles, walks in the same circuit, and lands in the same confusion with the old. And just in so far as modern Atheism attempts to disown and to deny them will the obstinate spectres refuse to down at its bidding, but reappear to haunt the conscience and alarm the fears of mankind. The Schismatics who rend the fair body of truth, by the effort to put reason in antagonism to faith and science against revelation, would do well to remember the historical date of the inductive method which has wrought such reform in the systems of philosophy; that Wiclif and Huss and Jerome were forerunners of Copernicus and Galileo and Tycho Brahe; that Luther shattered the idols of the Church before another iconoclast arose and smote the idols in the temple of science; and that Tindal's translation of the English Bible preceded, by nearly one hundred years, the publication of the Novum Organon. If any fact is established beyond dispute, it is that the world had no system of philosophy or science, nor was the path of discovery rightly opened in either, until the Bible was brought forth from its concealment and shed its benign influence upon the human intellect. This authenticated fact, that the restoration of the Scriptures to their lawful supremacy antedated the rise of true philosophy, refutes the slander that the two are irreconcilably at feud.

The mental discipline, too, of the theologian preëminently fits him for the researches of reason. It would be pertinent here to observe that the inductive method which builds up a true science is precisely the method for building up a true theology. Just as

the materials of the one are scattered in magnificent disorder through the fields of nature, so the materials of the other lie undigested and fragmentary upon the pages of Revelation. The same patience, diligence, and caution, are required in collating the facts in both, and in the construction of the system founded upon them. In both alike man is but an interpreter to decipher the record, and to read the lessons of truth written alike on the page of Nature and on the page of Scripture—the two Testaments in which God is revealed to man. The same faculties of mind are brought into play; and in the study of theology these are sharpened to their finest edge. The most refined distinctions require to be drawn; shades of thought need to be carefully separated; the most anxious sifting of testimony is demanded, and the closest examination of its meaning and force; a constant verification of their conclusions must be made by reference to the facts and principles from which they spring. This is precisely the intellectual discipline by which men are trained to prosecute successfully the researches of science; and the due consideration of this diminishes the wonder that divines are so eminently successful who happen to turn their attention to physical studies.

So far as philosophy is concerned, there is no occasion for surprise, since the two departments are not so much conterminous, as that theology implicates philosophy through and through, and raises most of the questions which the latter seeks to answer. It is simply impossible for one to be a complete theologian, without being in almost an equal degree a logician and a metaphysician. A fair preacher a man may be, simply delivering to others the message of grace which he finds in the word; but he cannot compass the science of theology and soteriology, without an acquaintance with the very truths which fill the speculations of every philosophic school.

But we find ourselves pushing into large discourse what was intended only as an allusion, which should gracefully introduce the author and the book whose names are prefixed to this article. We shall seek to make amends for our indiscretion by not making the work under review a mere hook upon which to hang an

independent disquisition; but, by a faithful rendering of its text, to excite the reader's desire to possess and master the volume for himself. In executing our task, we shall adhere to our author's forms of expression even where this is not indicated by marks of quotation. The necessity of the case will compel us often to roll up the language, and to run sentences together.

A genuine book bears always the "image and superscription" of the author; it is, in the language of Milton, "the pure extraction of the living intellect that breeds it;" and Dr. Dabney is just the last of men to fail to put the stamp of his own individuality upon his writings. All who are familiar with his mental attributes will find them breaking forth from every line and every page. In this age of mechanical authorship, where the water is simply emptied out of one bucket into another, it is no slight pleasure to get hold of a book that comes to us with thoughts directly from the mint in which they were coined. All of this author's characteristics are here. That wonderful subtlety of mind which penetrates to the core of a subject, and distinguishes between the nicest refinements of thought; that incisiveness of expression which cuts the thought so clean, even to its furthest edge; that firmness of grasp and positiveness of tone which belong only to those of the strongest convictions; that honesty of mind which leads to the embrace of what is held to be the truth, and a corresponding fearlessness in its defence; and that glow of indignation against the wickedness and impudence of error: all these make the book the impression of the man who wrote it. We think it was Adam Smith of whom the incident is told, that when a certain indifferentist, who always extenuated error, left the room, he exclaimed: "I breathe more freely now that he is gone; he has no indignation in him." Dr. Dabney is not constituted to be one of these neutrals. What he believes he believes thoroughly; and his blows against falsehood and wrong go out straight from the shoulder. In the work before us his indignation only warms against what would stir any honest heart; and the reader easily surrenders himself in sympathy with the burning invective levelled against those who subvert the foundations of order and virtue in the world.

As may be inferred from the title, the volume is throughout strictly a criticism. We do not mean by this that it is negative in its character, destructive rather than constructive. The author is of too positive a build to be content with the work of demolition. And one of the most valuable portions of his treatise is where he sets over against the system he destroys that which must occupy its room. But the leading design is a complete exposure and refutation of the sensational, or, as he prefers to term it, the sensualistic philosophy of the day. This is done with a thoroughness which makes the book a real contribution to our philosophical literature. Its range is so entire over the subject in its historical developments and connections that even those antecedently familiar with it are refreshed by the conspectus of it as a whole, whilst the discussion of the several parts is sufficiently full to leave the tyro under the necessity only here and there of resorting to the larger commentaries to supply the exposition which to him may be occasionally too brief.

The first difficulty in philosophical writing arises from the ambiguity of the terms which are of necessity employed. To invent a vocabulary which shall be exclusively its own would be to create a cipher wholly unintelligible, save to the initiated. The only resort is to take up the language in common use, which must, however, be transfigured from the popular into a technical and scientific sense. It must begin with the definition of its terminology; and the reader is thrown into inextricable confusion who fails to adhere rigidly to the same. In his opening sentence, therefore, our author is called to disclaim the popular signification of the word "sensualistic," as meaning simply "the predominance of the animal appetites," and to define it as "the philosophy which finds all its rudiments in sensation," which "accounts for every general and every abstract judgment, as an empirical result of our sensations, and consistently denies the validity of any *a priori* ideas." The distinction is one readily apprehended, and cuts the line of demarcation very distinctly between itself and every other system. We do not know why the more usual title of "sensational" is discarded for "sensualistic" throughout this volume. We would prefer the former,

perhaps because it is more familiar to our ear. But both are equally equivocal, and needing to be purged of their ordinary meaning. When strictly defined, either will subserve the purposes of disquisition.

Although it is the Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century which is to be brought under review, it eminently subserves our author's purpose to introduce this by a brief survey of the speculations of the preceding age. Most fortunately, the first writer who is struck is the author of "the Leviathan," whose reckless spirit did not hesitate to push his system to its necessary conclusions; thus "anticipating," says Dr. Dabney, "all the fruit which history has subsequently shown the system is fitted to bear." With Hobbes, "sensations are the principles of knowledge, and all knowledge is derived from them. Thus memory consists in our having a sensation that we have had a sensation. Imagination is a sensation which continues with feebler force, after its cause has ceased to act: * * * and all the acts of generalizing, naming our ideas, comparing, and reasoning, are but associations of these sense-perceptions." The next step, of course, is to "generate the emotional and voluntary powers of the soul." "Conceptions are only certain movements excited in a substance within the head. This movement is propagated also to the heart, and either concurs with or retards the vital movement there. This concurrence we call pleasure; this retardation we call pain. * * * Love and hatred are only these feelings of concurrence or retardation again, relatively to their objects. * * This concurrence draws towards its object, which is desire, and the opposite retardation repels, which is aversion and sometimes fear. The oscillation between these is deliberation; and the last desire or fear in this series of oscillations, being the most vivid, becomes volition. Of course, there can be no liberty of the human spirit, which is the passive victim of any objective impression ordained for it by fate or a mechanical necessity."

The scheme of ethics, evolving itself from these principles, can be easily anticipated. That is good which pleases us, and

that is evil which displeases; "there exists no goodness, absolutely considered, without relation; there is no uniform standard of moral right, no moral motive except selfishness, and conscience is as thoroughly obliterated as the existence of the fairies." The political theory of Hobbes is determined by the same principles. Self-interest being the only motive of rational conduct, the conflict which this brings on betwixt man and man makes his natural state one of constant warfare, until, enlightened by experience, he discovers the necessity for repressing this strife, which upon this theory can be accomplished only by force. This then becomes the essence of government, which must be absolutely despotic.

Such is the line upon which this philosophy was first projected, from which it has not materially deflected, though the refinements of later thinkers have made the system a marvel of ingenuity—as curious a specimen of metaphysical joinery as perhaps the history of Philosophy can show.

Dr. Dabney thus sums up its conclusions, as these are delivered over by the philosopher of Malmesbury to his successors: "In consistency, it must include a denial of spirit, of God, of all *a priori* judgments, of the reason and abstract ideas, of all moral distinctions, of free agency, and of civil liberty. It leaves man, in reality, only sense-perceptions, appetites, and associations thereof, presenting them in apparent modifications of memory and experience." "The sole plausibility," he adds, "of Hobbes' description of human nature arises from his tacitly assuming the fact of *man's depravity* to construct a sort of *saturnine travesty* of his practical principles and actions."

In the order of time, Mr. Locke falls next under review; under the cover of whose fundamental mistake philosophical heresies find shelter, which he himself would have openly repudiated. "The fatal vice of his method," according to our author, "was that he started with a hypothesis as to the origin of the cognitions of which he found the mind possessed, instead of reaching these as the final induction from the facts of consciousness." He argued from the faculties we possess for acquiring ideas against the supposition that we have any which are innate;

and pushed this conclusion, which is recognised to be sound, so far as to exclude with them any innate principles of cognition, a proposition which the reader perceives to be very distinct from the first. In Mr. Locke's system, the two sources of all the operations of the mind are *experience* and *reflection*. But experience means only that which is given through the senses, and the reflective process is only the mind's operation upon this objective experience. At last we have only what was originally derived from sensation. Dr. Dabney points out most clearly the pervading fallacy here, in the utter confounding the *occasion* with the *cause* of our ideas. It may be true that experience gives the opportunity for the mind's putting forth its powers of cognition, while it neither bestows these capacities nor establishes the laws under which they act. This distinction is one of the key-notes of this criticism, at the sounding of which the spectral apparitions of this false philosophy are compelled often to retreat. It is scarcely necessary to follow the remorseless logic which proceeds to show the fatal consequences of these assumptions in destroying the value of that *a posteriori* argument for the existence of God which Mr. Locke so highly valued, but which, on his principles, Dr. Dabney most triumphantly proves can yield us nothing beyond a Demiurgus; and in upsetting his moral theory, as grounded only upon law to which obedience is rendered from fear of the penalty and a hope of advantage. We entirely concur in the remark with which Dr. Dabney dismisses Mr. Locke—that "the havoc which this sensualistic philosophy makes in the foundation of ethics presents one of the most crushing refutations." Those speculations cannot be true which lead to the subversion of all rectitude, and mislead the race as to the highest functions of their nature.

The French Condillac pushes these doctrines to their extreme in assuming that every process of the soul is reducible to one single principle, and that is sensation. The metaphysical jugglery by which this is accomplished is curious to contemplate. If the mind has but one sensation, or one that dominates over others which fade out, there is *attention*. If the sensation belongs to the past, there is *memory*. Wherever there is a double

sensation, we have *comparison*, and with this *judgment*. The attention is carried from one object to another in considering their qualities; this is *reflection*. *Abstraction* is only the attention directed to a single quality of an object, disregarding the rest. *Reasoning* is only a double judgment; *imagination* is only reflection combining images. Everything, in short, is generated from sensible impressions, and the magical term of "transformed sensations" explains the entire process. For the faculties of the will are produced in the same way with those of the understanding. Every sensation is pleasant or otherwise. This transforms itself into *desire;* and from the modifications of this proceed the passions, such as love and hatred, hope, fear and joy; while *volition* itself is only an absolute desire for what we think within our power.

It is unnecessary to follow the system in its ethical exposition, for, resting upon precisely the same basis with the preceding, we should only repeat the same statement of its necessary consequences.

The transparent fallacy of this whole scheme is exposed by our author when he shows that "in the obstinate and blind resolve to generate everything in man's soul out of simple sensation, the analyst practically leaves out the soul itself." "If *feeling* is the one original power of man's soul, how is a system of cognition to be built upon it?" The scheme "leaves out that rational consciousness which is essential in order to sense-perception." "That which makes all the difference between impression and perception is the intelligent *Ego;* if the subject of the sensation has not *seen* it in his rational consciousness, it has not been a sensation, but a mere organic vibration, a function simply animal and unintelligent." This critical discrimination Dr. Dabney then applies to the several parts of Condillac's theory, showing its entire falsehood in detail. The limited space allowed to us in these pages forbids that we shall follow him in this minute analysis, which is pursued with an exhaustive thoroughness that suffers not a shred of the entire fabric to remain. For the same reason we must pass over the searching exposure of the gross Helvetius, who sought under the sanction of this

philosophy to canonize vice itself, as well as St. Lambert, who, without amending these principles, covered them under euphemisms that somewhat veiled their indecency. The most impressive commentary upon the moral results of such teaching is found in the horrors of the French Revolution, the leading agents in which were as thoroughly imbued with its spirit as they had completely embraced its doctrines.

The book deepens in interest as it takes up the more modern speculations of this school of philosophy. The chapter which is devoted to the criticism of the two Mills, father and son, the reader will confess exceedingly difficult of condensation in the few paragraphs in which we are compelled to dispose of it. The elder Mill "undertakes to construct a complete science of the human mind and will of two elements—*sensation* and *association*." It is in the use of the latter that we are to find the distinguishing characteristic of his system; since "by means of this, we shall see him create every primitive judgment, every *a priori* idea, every rational and intellective faculty, and all the powers of the will." The two ties of association are previous coëxistence and succession; for sensations are in the mind synchronously or successively, and the ideas which are only "the copies of sensations" must follow the same order. We shall discover the reason for this when it is applied to the exclusion of all *a priori* ideas and powers. Evidently, in long trains of associated ideas, some will be less vivid to the mind and finally drop out of the view. Originally necessary as links in the chain, the mind, in abridging its processes of association, forgets them and comes at length to err as to the real source of some of its conceptions, which has given occasion for inventing *a priori* principles in order to explain them, but which, as abhorrent to this system, are after this fashion accounted for. Then as the two classes of association are always either synchronous or successive, the association comes to appear necessary, which is the explanation of what in other schools are termed necessary beliefs.

The dialectic skill with which the subjective power of the mind itself is evaded is seen in the definition which is given of *conception*. As an idea is only the "copy or trace of a sensa-

tion," so a conception is only the taking up several simple ideas into a complex, which is only the return of a train of associated ideas. When we think a horse, for example, it is not the real concrete animal, as we imagine from inseparable association, but only the ideas clustered together of color, figure, size, &c. In the same way all the powers of the mind are resolved into this one principle of association. The imagination is denied all creative or constructive power. An image is simply a train of associated ideas, and all modification of structure in the imagination is due simply to the fading out of some of the links in the association itself. So classification, and abstraction, and memory, are only instances of association more or less complex. Belief is only inseparable association, and what are called "necessary beliefs" are simply judgments of invariability in the associations experienced. Our idea of duration is the result of an observed succession in our own consciousness, and the relation of past, present, and future arises by association. Space is but the idea of extension, emptied by abstraction of the feeling of resistance. The infinite is only the indefinite; the cause is nothing more than the immediate invariable antecedent; and what we call power in the cause is only an expression of our inability to separate in thought what by constant recurrence have always been presented together. Our belief in our own identity is the result of experienced impressions indissolubly associated. The most astounding fact of all, however, is the theory which is propounded of the will. As muscular movements are often produced automatically by sensation, as in sneezing or involuntary winking, and as ideas are only copies of sensation, so all voluntary movement must be referred to these in the form of *motives;* and "every case of volition, however conscious, is regarded by Mill as virtually automatic, save that the idea which immediately moves the muscles is also known in consciousness." Such, says Dr. Dabney, is "the stark fatalism which would reduce man's free agency to a cheating illusion."

The younger Mill, though recoiling from the hardy consistency of the elder, in not venturing to construct generalisations without comparison, or memory without judgment of self-identity

prior to it, retained nevertheless the fundamental errors of his father's system. They both agreed in regarding causation as nothing more than constant, immediate sequence, in denying any intuitive judgment as axiomatic, and in recognising no truths save as they are empirically established. The exposition of the several points of their common system our author accompanies with strictures which reveal an exquisite subtlety of mind and the power of cleaving betwixt the nicest shades of thought. Without any attempt at reproducing all this, for which the reader must be referred to the book itself, we will simply indicate the line of his criticism. In the first place, he shows the absurdity of attempting to construct the *powers* of the mind out of a single accident qualifying it. For "if there be this law of habit called association, there must be powers that shall operate under it. As in physics, a force must exist in order to be the subject of any regular method, so in psychology, the faculty must be given in order to come under this habit of association." In the next place, he undermines the corner-stone on which this philosophy rests by showing the doctrine of inseparable association to be baseless. On the contrary, the most inseparable association will arise out of a single instance, without frequent concurrence of the same ideas; whilst, on the other hand, ideas are easily separated which have always been connected, as when one living in the tropics first is made acquainted with the phenomenon of ice. The inference is unavoidable that something deeper than association must exist to explain these facts. In the third place, he shows the tendency of these speculations to Nihilism as their last result. We quote our author: "The mind, says Mill, is entitled to no cognitions save those which come from sensation. Hence, we may admit objective properties, but not objective substances. We are conscious of impressions and ideas which are copies thereof; but we are not directly conscious of spirit. Therefore, we must define our sentient being as 'composed of points of consciousness;' and what the world calls objective matter, as only 'a permanent possibility of sensation.' Thus mind and matter both vanish into two trains of impressions." Even this is not all. "If consciousness tells us that we cannot know

real substance apart from its properties, she tells us as absolutely that we cannot know properties, save as the properties of a *subjectum*. So that if our cognition of subject is invalid, a valid cognition of properties is also impossible. Where, then, are we left? Without either real object, or real subject, or any real cognition, on the dreary coast of that ocean of *Nihilism* to which the idealism of Hegel passed, and in which the empirical philosophy of Hume perished in the blank of universal scepticism."

Then fourthly, Dr. Dabney proceeds to show that, upon this theory, knowledge would be impossible. "In reducing mental affections and consciousness to feeling, intelligence is impossible." Nay, further, "there can be no sense-perceptions, no ideas." "It is only as consciousness refers the impression to self, intelligent subject, that idea arises." But let this suffice, as illustrative merely of the dialectic skill with which this critic hunts a philosophic heresy out of its most secret hiding-places.

It is apparent that we must pass over the intervening chapters until we reach the writer's analysis of the evolution theory, which was to us the freshest part of the book. The popular treatises of the day have put the intelligent reader in sufficient possession of this theory. But we have nowhere seen the several steps of its development so clearly traced, nor so compactly grouped, nor the relation so distinctly revealed, which this form of scientific research sustains to the sensational philosophy of which it is born. Let us trace these connections a little, under the guidance of our author. "The heart of the evolution theory," says he, "is that *the series contains within itself a natural power of differentiating its effects, at least slightly.*" Under this principle, the old law, of like producing like, is modified. Thus the leading postulates are "the law of *Heredity*, by which the progeny reproduces all the essential points of the parents, whether originally generic or newly developed; the law of *variation*, by which such differences in individuals accumulate until they give rise to a distinct variety; and the law of *equilibrium* in nature, whereby the individuals and species best adapted to existing conditions survive, and the less fitted perish." These principles

are summed up in the terms, "natural selection" and "survival of the fittest." That is to say, "in the reproduction of likes by likes, there would be a slight differentiation of successors from predecessors, in any series of animated nature. This difference at one step might be almost infinitesimal, might result in nothing permanent through a myriad of instances, and only evolve something stable in the species, in advance of its prior points, in the ten thousandth case. Yet if we postulate a time sufficiently vast during which the law has been working, the result may at length be the evolution of the highest from the lowest form of animal life." By this theory, it is declared, the teleological argument for an intelligent Creator drawn from the contrivances in the organised world, is totally exploded.

The first advocates of this theory were not avowed Atheists. The author of "The Vestiges of Creation," for example, "professed to recognise a Creator, and the evidence of his final causes, as fully as the theologian, and taught that the powers of evolution in organised beings were originally infused by him, and intelligently directed to evolve the creatures designed." And even Dr. Darwin "supposes that we shall have to look to a Creator to give us the animated germ to start with." But other writers soon dispensed with this disagreeable necessity altogether; which leads us to the progressive developments of the system. "Dr. Darwin requires only his laws of evolution and the rudimental forms of animal life, to construct animated nature." Of course, this creates "the necessity of evolving man's spiritual nature out of the instinctive animal functions of the brute." The next step was "to identify animal with vegetable life." This Dr. Huxley does by the origin of both in what he calls "protoplasm," which is the "physical basis of life;" and which is composed of oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon, chemically united, just as water is composed of two volumes of hydrogen and oxygen gas. And just "as a certain aggregation of these four elements is protoplasm, the basis of all life, so the higher vital functions, including those of mind, must be explained by the same force acting in a more complicated way."

The only remaining gap to be filled is that between organic and

inoganic life; when Mr. Tyndall comes to the relief with the revival of the Atomic system of Democritus, and Herbert Spencer with his doctrine of material force. "There is but one cause in the universe, *force;* and there is but one kind of effect in the universe, *motion.*" Out of these the whole universe, material and spiritual, is constructed. This *force is universally persistent,* and only transmuted out of one form into another; and from this universally persistent force all other ideas are derived. For example: "Our notion of space is our 'consciousness of coexistent positions;' position being simply the *ubi* of a force. Our notion of matter is a consciousness of coexistent positions that offer resistance—resistance being the manifestation by which force reveals itself to us." "Time is but experienced succession. Our notion of material motion is the consciousness of matter in successive positions in time." In this manner, these *a priori* notions are all empirically generated. With one or two additional principles in regard to motion, we can see the whole process of world-making. "Motion is always along the line of least resistance." "It is in its nature oscillatory." "As matter concentrates, motion dissipates itself; and as motion concentrates itself, matter is dissipated." "Force does and undoes it all—concentrating matter and dissipating motion, or dissipating matter and concentrating motion." Such is the theory, in its salient features.

In the two lengthy chapters devoted to its consideration, the reviewer pursues it through all its windings with a remorseless inquisition. The first impulse is to protest against these wild conjectures put forth in the name of science, whose proud boast is that it is knowledge, and accepts nothing upon trust, and against the enormous demand upon our credulity, when we are asked to believe "that blind unintelligent force should exhibit more thought, choice, and wisdom than all the philosophers in the whole world will attain unto." There is, too, a scathing exposure of the inconsistency of those who scout all metaphysics, and yet are obliged to assume an *a priori* principle as the foundation of their speculations; as when Herbert Spencer assumes the universal persistence of force; and the absurdity of a proposition claimed to be necessary and self-evident, being historically reached

as a final deduction from a multitude of experiments. The *reductio ad absurdum* is further pressed, in the tendency of this Sensualism, to run into the extreme of Idealism. "Mechanical action is motion of masses, and mental action is motion of molecules. Mind-power will some day be literally correlated to material forces, as caloric in water has been to elasticity in steam. We must not, then, think of matter as a something dull, gross, passive, simply ponderable, opaque, and inert, but as the refined *habitat* of force, the invisible universal cause."

Not content, however, with these more general considerations, Dr. Dabney attacks the system in its details. If, for example, Mr. Tyndall takes refuge in the doctrine of the concurrence of atoms, the reviewer wishes to know, upon the admission of the infinite divisibility of matter, how we shall ascertain when we have got down to the atoms which are ultimate and permanent. If Dr. Darwin assumes myriads of failures in this blind *conatus* of nature towards an improvement, Dr. Dabney asks why no trace can be found of any of these abortions in all the fossil remains which are discovered; and he reproduces the crushing refutation by Hugh Miller, who avers "that some of the fossils discovered by him in strata so old as to have been supposed too old for any organised life, were of quite well developed vertebrata." Thus Palæontology, Dr. Dabney insists, delivers its testimony against the whole theory. Not only so, it utterly breaks down under the total absence of verification in its facts. "No man has ever changed any inorganic matter into a living vegetable, without the help of a preëxisting vegetable germ; nor vegetable matter into animal, without an animal germ; nor animal into human, save by the aid of a human germ." "In all the duration of human history, moreover, the animals have evolved nothing essentially different from their earliest faculties." Dr. Dabney consistently argues that "the process should be going on now as well as in all the past;" nay, it "should proceed with geometrical progression; and man should have advanced by this time to faculties as essentially different from those of Homer and Moses, as their's are different from the ape's."

We are simply skimming, in a sort of bird-like flight, over th

surface of these chapters; rather indicating the general line of criticism, than attempting to reproduce it. The book is too compact to be condensed. Its method only can be illustrated; beyond that we attempt nothing. So far, our author's task has been to demolish, rather than to construct. He has subjected the false system to the furnace heat of the severest criticism, under which it has been utterly dissipated. The reader who is not familiar with metaphysical researches, would, however, be wholly bewildered if left by the author to flounder in a conclusion so negative as that which results from a purely destructive criticism. He will turn, therefore, with a sense of relief to the remaining portion of the treatise, which places in contrast a sound and spiritual philosophy. In four elaborate chapters, which together compose more than one-third of the volume, Dr. Dabney discusses "the spirituality of the mind," "the validity," and "the origin of *a priori* notions," and "the philosophy of the supernatural." These topics are discussed, of course, chiefly in reference to the preceding controversy, but at the same time with a freedom which allows a wider range. We shall only attempt to give the reader some idea of the method pursued by our author.

The argument for the spirituality of the mind is drawn from the facts of consciousness. This he attempts to define in such a way as to exclude whatever is in dispute between the parties. All will agree that consciousness is "a cognition which the something that thinks has of its own thoughts, feelings, and volitions"—"that no mental modification can be so in the mind as to be subject of observation and inference, without being in the light of our self-consciousness." It is plain, moreover, that we "are equally indebted to this one faculty for our cognitions of the objective and the subjective." The quiet assumption of the sensualistic philosophy is preposterous, "that only objective facts in consciousness are observed experimentally. For if this faculty is trustworthy anywhere within its proper limits, it is trustworthy everywhere within the same;" and "the subjective cognitions revealed in consciousness are even more truly facts observed, because it is only through these that the objective becomes experiential." Now "consciousness implies a being which is conscious.

Man's knowledge of himself as conscious, thinking substance, is *a priori* to, though implicitly present in, all his other thinkings. He knows his own thinking self first"—the *ego*—while "the sensations from the objective side he is necessitated to refer to real objective being the *non-ego*." But then may not the two be distinguished from each other, and yet both be matter? Just here comes in the argument that mind must be spiritual and not material. Dr. Dabney dwells upon the *singleness* of the mind as contrasted with the plurality of material objects; "the simplest material substance is constituted by an aggregation of parts, and may be conceived as divided. The lightest has some weight; the smallest some extension; all have some figure. But consciousness says that the thing within us, which knows, feels, and wills, is simple." "Moreover, every act and affection of the mind is known in consciousness as having complete *unity;*" while "we are taught by our senses that all qualities and affections of material masses are affections of their parts aggregated"—as, for example, "the whiteness of a wall is the whiteness of a multitude of separate points in the wall," etc. He sums up the argument under this head in the following terms: "The law of the reason compels us to refer this complete contrast of attributes to a real difference of subject. While we name the *ego*, spirit, we must call the objective something else, matter. The latter has extension, parts, weight, resistance, figure, and usually color, with other secondary properties. The former has none of these, but singleness, indivisibility, identity."

His next argument is, that "materialism contradicts our immediate consciousness of *free agency*." This cannot consist merely in "the opportunity for the muscles to effect, without obstruction, the impulses from within emitted by the something that thinks; for there is a conscious free agency as to emitting the impulse from within. The very essence of the case is, that the something which thinks forms self-determinations." "Force is blind, unintelligent, and necessitated; choice is intelligent and free. Whenever we exercise moral and rational self-command against the attraction of some vivid impression on the senses, we have a clear evidence of the subjective and spiritual seat of the will." Dr.

Dabney proceeds to show that "force and volition cannot be equivalent and transmutable powers;" but even further, that volition is the original, and the only original, spring of material force—so that we pass easily by analogy to the conclusion "that all natural forces have the same origin in the will of the supernatural mind, God."

The argument against materialism drawn from our *moral judgments*, is similar to the preceding. "No man thinks of holding a blind material force to a moral responsibility. But we know that we are responsible, and that this implies a rational spontaneity in acting"—and "this conviction of responsibility in conscience is universal, radical, unavoidable, and intuitive."

The objections to all this reasoning urged by Materialists are considered by the author, and are easily parried. If it be asked, for instance, why the *brain* may not be the subject of this consciousness, the answer is, "that while the properties and functions of brain-matter are material, qualified by extension and divisibility, those of consciousness are spiritual, simple, and indivisible." "We know, too, that our brain, like other matter, like the eye-ball, is objective to that in us which thinks." "If the brain, again, is the mind, how is it that the mind, like the brain, is not dual, why have we not normally a dual consciousness?"

If it be urged that "material affections, which are not a unity, have this seeming unity to our conception—as a musical tone which is yet a numerous series of successive vibrations"—the answer is, that "the oneness is only in the perception of it; only as it becomes a mental affection, does it assume unity, which proves most strongly the unifying power which belongs to the mind alone."

If it be alleged that a parallel argument will prove brutes to have distinctive spirits, Dr. Dabney replies "that this is an objection *ad ignorantiam*;" whilst the evidence is pretty conclusive that "brutes lack what is most essential to a rational personality," viz., "moral judgments and sentiments, the æsthetic faculty, and the ability to construe the contents of their own consciousness to themselves in any rational order."

We will close this article, already too long, by a slight recapitulation of what our author has to say upon "the validity and origin of *a priori* notions;" in which two chapters the reader will find the clearest illustration of his critical sagacity, as well as of his mental independence. "*Addictus jurare in nullius verba magistri*," Dr. Dabney collides as freely with Sir William Hamilton, in what he regards as unsafe and extravagant speculation, as with Darwin and Herbert Spencer in their reckless and unauthorised assumptions.

The Hamiltonian doctrine, for example, that it is impossible to think the infinite, is greedily seized by Spencer to rule out God and to refer all effects to a single power, eternal force. Our author happily retorts that Spencer's ideal matter and force are just as unthinkable; and that nothing is gained, upon his own hypothesis, but the substitution of one for the other. But passing this by, the argument for the relativity of our knowledge is presented thus: all cognitions are such, only as they are known in consciousness—the essential condition of which is the distinction of the *Me* and the *Not-Me*, the perceiving subject and the perceived object. If, then, nothing is known except as it is in relation, how are we to cognize the unconditioned? This doctrine Dr. Dabney combats with several very sharp distinctions. He admits that "cognition takes place by means of some relation; but not that the cognition is *merely that relation*." For example: In the relation of cause and effect, it is by means of the sequence that the mind sees efficient power in the cause; but reason refuses to confound this with the mere relation, through which it is known. He "does not, therefore, concede that human cognitions are only relatively valid"—"whilst the impossible something-nothing, the unconditioned abstract, is unknowable, he does not concede that an Infinite Being is unknowable." Knowledge is relative, in so far as through relation it arises; but the knowing, and the means of the knowing, are quite distinct. By this distinction he meets the extreme view of Mr. Mansel in his "Limits of Religious Thought," that God's nature is not cognizable. However true this may be of the Pantheistic conception of God, an absolute being which cannot be in relation with any

other being, but in which the Creator and creature, matter and spirit, finite and infinite, are contradictorily identified—it is not true of the God of the Bible. "True, he does not need to be related to other being in order to his existence; but he has entered into relations, as Creator, Ruler, Benefactor, Revealer—and in doing so, has become cognizable to us; not completely, yet truly cognisable within certain limits."

Dr. Dabney next assails the terms in which Hamilton speaks of our primitive judgments, which he describes as *incomprehensible*. Very true, says the reviewer, in the sense that they are not comprehended under any prior truth, for the simple reason that they are themselves first truths; but not true, in the sense that they are *inconceivable*. And here is to be found the pith of his own doctrine: "that our specific ideas and judgments are conditioned upon the mind's *a priori* rational power of forming certain abstract notions. Thus we only cognize body in *space*, an event in *duration*, an effect from the *power* of its cause, moral responsibility in *spontaneity*, phenomena in *subject*, qualities in *substance*," etc. "Each of these notions will be found as ultimate in simplicity, as it is *a priori*." "The reason is possessed of its own cognitive powers, and the abstract notion is in order to the idea of the concrete."

The attempt to replace in the form of *belief* what is denied as a valid cognition, Dr. Dabney vigorously repels. According to Hamilton, "the primary data of the reason are incomprehensible, but they are held by faith. First truths we believe; conclusions deduced from them, we know." This position is denied. "The difficulty does not exist of knowing our legitimate primitive and infinite notions as valid cognitions. But if it did, this tender of a belief in them, which is something distinct from knowledge, would be only mischievous." The twofold objection is urged: first, "that the word belief is too ambiguous." "Its proper sense is a conviction grounded in trust." But, asks Dr. Dabney in this case, "trust on whom? The only answer is, on my reason. But my reason is myself. This is not a faith, but knowledge, there being no other witness but my reason, which is myself." And secondly, that "if the ultimate facts of consciousness are

given less in the form of cognitions than of beliefs, then the deductions of them are less cognitions than beliefs." The stream cannot rise higher than its fountain. We are not sure but there is here a little play upon words, such as too often occurs in metaphysical speculation. As to the precise issue raised by our author, he is unquestionably right. But there is a generic sense in which we use the word faith. By the constitutoin of our nature, we are obliged to accept these primary truths as the starting point of all reasoning, and as the tests by which all our deductions are verified. As Mr. Stewart terms it, they are "*regulæ philosophandi*;" necessarily accepted in the trust which we are obliged to repose in our mental constitution. And this accounts, we suppose, for the fact that they have been so constantly designated as "fundamental and primary beliefs." The truths themselves are, as represented by Dr. Dabney, recognised as knowledge, but by a necessary trust in that mental constitution which compels us so to receive them.

From the validity of these *a priori* notions, Dr. Dabney proceeds to discuss their *origin*. He has assumed hitherto, that "though arising upon the occasion of some connected perception, these are determined from within by the constitution of the mind, and not from without, by the power of the objects of sensation." This, then, as the advocate of the Rational philosophy, is what he must undertake to establish. It is no slight presumption in favor of his view, that Sensualism itself is unable to construct a system of cognitions without the aid of primitive judgments, which it affects to discard. If all ideas are derived from sensation, then the validity of sense-perceptions must be assumed as axiomatic. Positivism, again, builds upon the fundamental postulate, that all "phenomena are subjected to invariable natural laws." How can there be comparison between any given sensations, without assuming the identity of the intelligence which perceives them? "Our abstract notion of space is the mental *locus*, which must be given by the mind itself, in order to think the idea of body;" and "when we speak of succession, we have already formed the notion of time." In this forcible way, the argument is wrenched out of the hands of his antagonist.

"The accepted tests of a primitive intuition," says Dr. Dabney, "are three: that it shall be a *first truth*, not learned from any prior premises; that it shall be *necessary*, immediately seen to be such, that it not only is true, but must be true; and that it shall be *universal*, true of every particular case everywhere and always." If our primitive beliefs can abide these tests, the case is made out; and it is incumbent upon the Sensualistic school to show that they cannot—which accordingly it rashly undertakes to do. It is objected, that they fail under the first test: in that "they are learned by every man, in the course of his own observation, like all inductive truths." "But why," says our author, "is the experimental instance the occasion of the mind's seeing the necessary truth? It is only because the concrete case is the means which enables it to apprehend the real meaning of your abstract enunciation." "Moreover, sundry intuitive truths are incapable of being experimentally inferred. Divergent straight lines, we are sure, will never enclose any space, though infinitely produced; yet who has ever inspected an infinite straight line with his eyes?" "How has he (the Sensualist) learned that sensational experience is itself true? Only by a primitive judgment of the reason."

In applying the second test, every objection founds upon a false definition of what is a *necessary* truth. If we answer that it is one the denial of which involves a contradiction, the same may be said of all truth, and does not distinguish such as are *necessary*. If it be defined as a proposition the falsehood of which is inconceivable, the difficulty is that "the antecedent probability of any statement depends very greatly upon our mental habits, associations, and acquirements." But all evasion is cut off by a correct definition, "that a *necessary* truth is one the denial of which is immediately self-contradictory." "We do not call a truth *necessary*, because, negatively, we lack the capacity to conceive the opposite thereof; but because, positively, we are able to see that the denial of it involves a self-evident and immediate contradiction."

Against the third test, it is urged that there is debate which are first truths, and that some long held to be such are now dis-

carded. To which the author replies, that this only proves the human mind to be an imperfect instrument. The same objection would lie against the validity of all empirical truths, as to which mistakes are constantly made. "The fact still remains, that there are axiomatic truths which no sane man can dispute, as that the whole must be greater than one of its parts." "There must be a ground for this uniformity, else the uniformity would not be. The cause of uniformity again, must lie in human minds, because it is there we find the results. What is it except universal *a priori* laws of the reason?"

Dr. Dabney further vindicates the originality and immediacy of these primitive judgments, by exposing the blunders into which his opponents are driven when attempting to explain the logical force of the syllogism; and still further, by maintaining the thesis, "that *it is only by postulating final causes we can have any foundation whatever for an inductive science, leading us to any general laws of natural causes.*" Through these interesting pages, we will not, however, attempt to follow him.

We must abruptly terminate this article, just at the point where the reader's appetite is whetted for more. Our object is to drive him to the book itself, of which this is a review in the old-fashioned style, which we are sorry has gone so much out of vogue, and whose object is to give a relish of what some abler mind has produced. It has not been the writer's privilege to be thrown into that personal intimacy with the author of this volume, which would knit to him the sweet affections of the soul. But we have a broad attachment to him, as a bold and honest lover of the truth for the truth's own sake. We rejoice in the gifts with which he is so richly endowed; and in the grace given him, now in the maturity of his knowledge, to use his grand powers for the glory of God and the welfare of his fellowmen.