

# SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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### ARTICLE I.

#### ON THE MEANS OF PREVENTING WAR.

An Essay on some of the means by which the evil of war may be prevented, may be a not inappropriate supplement to the preceding review.\* The following enumeration of means contributive to that end, may perhaps cover the whole ground :

1. A diffusion of the moral power of Christianity.
2. A direction of the special attention of society to the effects of war, and to the principles of peace.
3. Peace Societies and Conventions.
4. A Congress of nations.
5. Arbitration—both as an habitual resort, and as the subject of special treaties.
6. The disarmament of nations.
7. Unfettered commerce.

It is only to a few of these that we at present address remark ; after which the subject of *civil* war shall receive attention.

I. On the subject of Peace Societies, it is but necessary to exhibit their efficiency. Hear the plea of the American Peace Society, in the following extracts from one of its publications :†

\* See the Mexican War Reviewed, in the July No.

† A tract entitled, " Shall I give to the cause of Peace ?"

like manner, will sing the praises and publish the Gospel of the Redeemer.

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ARTICLE III.

CHURCH AND STATE.

*Alliance between Church and State.* By WILLIAM WARBURTON, D. D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester.

*Lectures on the Establishment and Extension of National Churches.* By THOMAS CHALMERS, D. D. L. L. D.

*The State in its relations with the Church.* By W. E. GLADSTONE, ESQ.

*The Principles of Church Reform; The State and the Church; with other Essays.* By THOMAS ARNOLD, D. D.

*Essay on the Union of Church and State.* By BAPTIST W. NOEL, M. A.

The subject discussed in these works is not one in which the people of this country are immediately and practically interested. The entire separation of the Church from the State was one of the most sublime, as it has proved one of the most successful, experiments of the American Revolution. And though among the problems in political science which have been solved by our national career, this perhaps has received the least consideration from statesmen, both at home and abroad; yet surely no other has worked out larger results, or been conducted to a more favorable issue. It may be doubted whether any question of a political, social or religious nature can be raised, upon which, as a people, we are more perfectly agreed than this. Amidst all the clashings of party politics, and all the jarrings of denominational strife, there is not probably one sincere Protestant among the twenty millions of our population, whether native-born or naturalized, who would consent to the establishment of a National Church.

We have spoken of the divorce between Church and State as an experiment : it is interesting to observe the necessity under which it was attempted, and which was itself no inconsiderable pledge of success. The statesmen of 1776 were no visionary constitution-mongers, like those who are now attempting to fit capricious France to a political costume ; nor were they restless radicals, pulling down existing institutions to make room for model governments of their own invention. The republican form of government which they adopted was fully as much a necessity with them as a choice. The controversy with England was not begun for republicanism, though it ended in it : monarchy was not so much repudiated as liberty was sought. It is highly probable that if any branch of the royal family had resided in this country, and had sympathized with the passionate struggle of a young nation to be both great and free, the conservative spirit of our forefathers would have led to the establishment of monarchy upon these republican shores. But Providence had ordained that a palpable advance should be made, at this time, in the progress of mankind to liberty. There was no titled class, having the prestige of nobility and rank, from which a monarch could be chosen ; and the statesmen of this period dwelt too much in the light of past history not to know the impossibility of lifting a single family from the uniform level of society to permanent presidency over the rest. They were too well skilled in political science not to be aware that the wide interval between the commonalty and the throne must be filled with an intermediate class, who should render the ascent less abrupt and precipitous. In all countries, a dignified and time-honored aristocracy must be found underlying and supporting every throne. All these conditions of monarchy failing, our forefathers showed their practical wisdom in striking the golden mean between the radicalism which invades and overturns only for the sake of remodelling, and that fatal conservatism which, in its blind attachment to inheritance and prescription, resists the progress which it should aim to guide. They did not change the whole political fabric "from turret to foundation-stone ;" but only so far as the pressure of events imperiously called for. As the people were *de facto* sovereign, their sovereignty was acknowledged ; and

yet the country was saved from the savage rule of unlicensed democracy by the establishment of a great confederated republic, with its written constitution, and all those checks and balances which can be furnished in two deliberative chambers, the presidential veto, and State sovereignty.

Precisely by the same necessity which caused monarchy, with its hereditary nobility, to resign to primitive republicanism, did the established Church likewise disappear. Bishop Warburton, among his other splendid fictions of original compacts and treaties of alliance, imagines the State coolly to choose between existing religions (though he maintains that policy should always dictate the selection of the largest); we nevertheless take leave to say that this prudential balancing of conflicting claims never has been, and never shall be, realized. Before a Church can be established by law, it must embrace the overwhelming majority of the population—it must be interwoven with their most pleasing associations—it must enjoy the prestige of a long antiquity. At the period of the revolution, no one Church possessed any of these requisites. Dissent had previously won its way in those countries from which our population was mainly supplied; and the Churches which had sprung up and grown under the very frown of existing establishments, were transplanted here side by side. There was clearly the same impossibility, under the circumstances, that any one of these should take such precedence of the rest as to be established by law, as that a single family should achieve and entail a perpetual dictatorship. There was no alternative but to throw off all alike from any connexion with the State; that no longer sucking the breasts of kings they should live and grow by their own inherent vitality. The wisdom of our ancestors consisted in seeing at a glance the peculiarity of their position—in waiving instantly all prejudices arising from education and habit—in seizing upon the true idea which alone could be realized—and in boldly cutting off what no conservatism could retain. The question of an established Church, like that of a monarchical government, was decided by them not upon abstract principles, however these may now be adduced to justify their decision; but for political reasons, which nevertheless impelled them in the right direction.

But while the controversy upon Church establishments is no longer one which touches our fortunes as a people, there are yet two reasons which invest it with a permanent interest to us. The first is, that it is so closely interwoven with all the questions of European politics; and at no period more than the present prominently engaging the attention of statesmen. The late secession of the Free Church from the establishment of Scotland, under the guidance, to a very great extent, of one who not ten years before was known as the special defender of this policy—and the more recent secession of individuals from the English establishment, as of Mr. Noel and Mr. Shore, together with the treatment they have received from Bishops and Bishop's Courts—are events not easily hidden from the eyes of men. And when, as in England and in Scotland, the dissenters of all classes perhaps outnumber the established, the question cannot always slumber in the recesses of men's thoughts, but will be raised with a view to be answered, how long a union so distasteful shall be perpetuated. It is impossible, therefore, without some knowledge of this subject, to understand the politics of Europe generally, and of the British empire in particular: and to gain this knowledge we must enter somewhat into the opinions and feelings of those who are attached to the policy we have so long discarded. The second reason is, that some topics involved in this controversy we do not ourselves understand as fully as may be necessary. As champions of the voluntary principle, having faith in it to reduce it into practice, it becomes us, for our own credit and for the good of mankind, to guard against dangers which tend to prejudice our favorite theory in the minds of others.

No one can read the above works in the order in which they are arranged, which is indeed only the order of their chronology, without observing the manifest alteration in their tone; a change which is deeply significant of the progress which dissent has made. A progress slow indeed and gradual; but which indicates at every step an immense accession of strength, and a permanency of power not likely to be subject to material fluctuations. If the bearing of an army ever afforded presage of defeat, the altered tone of these advocates clearly prefigures the

doom which they in vain strove to avert. Warburton, the first in the series, takes hold of the subject not only with the composure of a man who knows his own strength, but with the confidence of one secure of general sympathy, and scarcely repressing contempt for his foes. At that day, few serious persons comparatively objected to the establishment on religious grounds; and the battle was waged chiefly against sceptics, who fancied that by this avenue the bulwarks of Christianity could be stormed. Warburton conducts his argument, therefore, with all the clearness, skill, and power for which he is so justly famed; but blurring out occasionally his invectives against the free-thinkers, who seemed to serve for him the office of a court fool to be perpetually bantered. According to his theory, the State and the Church are originally both independent and sovereign societies; having different ends in view, and hence not clashing, although the same persons may be under the jurisdiction of both. The office of the State is to provide for the *temporal* interests of man; that of the Church, for his *eternal* interests—the care of the one is confined to the *body*; that of the other is directed to the *soul*—the one looks upon offences as *crimes*; the other takes cognizance of them as *vices* and as *sins*. He next shows that civil society labors under certain defects for the attainment of its ends; it can only restrain from open transgression, nor always from this without opening the way to crimes still more flagitious; it cannot enforce the duties of imperfect obligation; and further often inflames the appetites which it proposes to correct. Now religion, having the sanction of rewards, while civil government has only that of punishments, exactly supplies these defects; and so the Church becomes necessary, as a complement to the State. The latter, therefore, proposes to the former a union for their mutual benefit; and this amalgamation is termed ‘an alliance,’ to indicate the original sovereignty of the parties. By this alliance, the State pledges itself to endow, protect and extend the Church; and the Church, to lend her whole influence to the State. The reciprocal concessions are that the Church resigns her supremacy by constituting the civil ruler her supreme head, and by submitting her laws to the State’s approval: and the State in compensation gives

to the Church a coercive power for the reformation of manners, and secures her a seat and representation in the national council. The motives which prompt the State to offer, and the Church to accept, these conditions, are that thereby the purity and being of religion are preserved, additional reverence is bestowed upon the person of the magistrate and upon the laws of the land, the Church obtains a coercive power which does not belong of nature to her, and the State is guarded against the mischiefs arising from the original independence of the Church in relation to it. The Church thus established is protected from the assaults of every rival by test-laws, designed only for restraint, and not for punishment; and beyond which a full toleration is indulged to every sect.

This is Warburton's ideal of Church and State. Not that it is the actual process by which the union was effected; but the theory upon which it may be justified.— He is warmly censured by Gladstone, for not recognizing the State as a moral person, having a conscience, and immediately responsible to God. Especially his selection of the largest religious society, rather than the truest and best, as the ally of State, is denounced as sordid calculation. By this same writer, and afterwards by Dr. Arnold, he is also rebuked for taking too low a view of the State, in restricting its office to material and temporal ends. Yet despite these criticisms, Warburton's theory appears to us the most consistent and defensible of all that we have considered. There are, however, very grave difficulties in his scheme, which go far to vitiate it. We may admit, for example, that the State is defective in power to enforce certain duties, and that religion exactly supplies this deficiency; but it is surely a wide leap to infer from this the necessity of an established Church. If we grant the Church to be needed as the external organ, through which this influence of religion shall be exerted, will she not be equally effective in her separate sphere? From her very nature, it is hard to see how the Church shall supplement the State, save as she teaches men their duties, puts a police into every man's breast by arraigning transgressors before the tribunal of conscience, and enforces her teachings and warnings by the awful sanctions of the eternal world. But all these offices she may discharge with

equal if not with greater effect, being disestablished. If she has more power than this, after her connexion with civil government, it is not power which she brings with her, but which she receives from the State; and it seems a vicious circle, to bring the Church to remedy the State's defects, and yet in rendering this service, derive from the State her whole efficiency. If, on the other hand, the Church exerts an influence, simply as she embodies and teaches religion, the State may lose rather than gain, by selecting only one religious society as its ally; while it is the province of each to furnish its quota.

It will also strike religious minds very strangely, that this alliance is necessary in order to preserve the purity and even the being of religion in the world. Hardly less monstrous is the proposition that the State cannot effectually protect itself in any other way, from the mischiefs arising from the Church's independency. We should rather expect a dignitary of the Church to teach that her life is derived alone from her spiritual Head, and to remember the promise which that Head has given, "because I live ye shall live also." As to the maintenance of purity, history would rather teach that the Church has always lost, in this particular, just in proportion as she has become Erastian. But we are concerned, at present, only with the inconsistencies of Warburton's theory as such. If the Church exists as a society, independent of the State, it must be by a life of her own; but to make the perpetuation of this life depend upon union with a foreign body, is simply to deny that inherent life which has just been affirmed. It is a main pillar of his argument, likewise, that these sovereign and separate societies do not clash, simply because they compass different ends by different means. If so, whence arise those mischiefs which the State dreads from the separate action of the Church? Surely the legs of this theory are not equal.

What too does Bishop Warburton mean when he teaches that the State cannot offer protection to the Church, except by compact? "The State," he says, "could not justly offer this benefit, security from all exterior violence, had an alliance never been made."\* If this protection be

\* Alliance between Church and State, vol. 7, works.

only a protection in the monopoly of chartered privileges, it is certainly true that it will depend upon a given contract to that effect. But, then, the main thing to be proved, is whether any Church can be justly secured in the enjoyment of such benefits; and whether the State, in departing from its province, has not become an instrument of oppression to those whom the establishment may exclude. If, on the other hand, the "exterior violence" arises not from rival religions, but simply refers to wrongs which the Church may experience from society at large, surely the State cannot withhold its protection from the Church, more than from any other corporation having vested rights. This would militate against his theory, which makes it the sole business of the State proper to give security of temporal liberty and property.

We add but one item further to this running criticism upon Bishop Warburton. He makes it a main advantage accruing from the alliance, that the Church gains a coercive power for the reformation of manners. But is the Church, as a separate society, devoid of discipline and of sanctions? Has she not the right, inherent in every society, of expelling unworthy members from her fellowship? And has she not spiritual penalties with which to support her jurisdiction, graduated from this excommunication down to the mildest form of censure? As a spiritual society, ought she ever to employ any other than a spiritual discipline? And have the civil pains and disabilities, which she borrows from the State, ever strengthened her rule over the conscience, or even over the conduct of men? After all, too, there is no real reformation of manners effected by the Church, save by her doctrines and her purifying influence: in proportion as she is pure, does her influence ramify itself, by means of her members, through all the departments of society. She not only needs not, but is seriously injured by that coercive power derived from the State, for which Bishop Warburton so strenuously argues.

Dr. Chalmers drew his pen to defend Church establishments against a different class of objectors from those opposed by the preceding writer. Religious men, who loved the cause and truth of God, had come to be scandalized at the corruption and slavery of a thoroughly

Erastianized Church. Dr. Chalmers undertook to reduce the idea of an establishment to such simplicity as would seem to meet the scruples of the most conscientious.

In his view, an established Church is simply an endowed Church. Take the following language from his first lecture :

“ We shall assume, then, as the basis of our definition for a religious establishment, or as the essential property by which to specify and characterize it,—a sure legal provision for the expense of its ministrations. \* \* \* \* \* Wherever we have a certain legal provision for the ministrations of Christianity, there we have an establishment of Christianity in the land. It is this which forms the essence of an establishment ; and as such, must be singled out from among all the other accessories wherewith it may happen to be variegated. This idea of an establishment may or may not imply what is commonly meant by a connexion between the Church and the State. If it be the State which maintains the Church, we admit that there is such a connexion—whether this maintenance be their ancient and original gift ; or a grant renewed every year, and which may or may not be recalled by the civil government. But the truth is, the maintenance may have originated in other sources—in the bequest of individuals, or numerous private acts of liberality : in our eyes it is not less an establishment on this account, than if supported by a direct allowance from the national treasury. To realize our idea of an establishment, it is enough that there be legal security for the application of certain funds to the maintenance of Christian worship or Christian instruction in a country ; and this in whatever way these funds may have originated.”

This is not the first instance in which a stupendous system of economics has been built upon a pun ; nor the first instance in which a worthless argument has escaped exposure by sheltering itself under a great name. On this subject, the term “ established ” has a fixed meaning, involving two ideas : that of patronage on the part of the State, and submission on the part of the Church. Dr. Chalmers, by a slight play upon words, changes at once the nomenclature, and with it the whole issue, of this controversy. The object of this clever legerdemain is very apparent : no person objects, on principle, to a certain provision being made for the support of religion, nor indeed to a special fund to endow the Church for this purpose ; although the expediency of such a measure may be ques-

tioned by many. And if this view could be taken of Church establishments, much suspicion and odium would be removed. This, then, is the establishment for which he pleads: a Church endowed by the State, but left wholly independent of the same:

“Although,” he argues, “the Church should be wholly supported by the State in things temporal, and a connexion between them be established thus far, it follows not that this connexion should proceed any further. \* \* \* Although the Church should receive its maintenance, and all its maintenance from the civil power, it follows not that it therefore receives its theology from the same quarter. \* \* \* The Church receives from the State the maintenance of its clergy; and the clergy, in return, give to the subjects of the State a Christian education; but they might and do reserve to themselves the whole power and privilege of determining what that education shall be. For their food and their raiment, and their sacred or even private edifices, they may be indebted to the State; but their creed, and their discipline, and their ritual, and their articles of faith, and their formularies, whether of doctrine or of devotion, may be altogether their own. \* \* \* The Church may submit herself so far to the State as to receive this maintenance, and yet abide as spiritual, as holy and independent a Church as before.”

Even philosophers indulge in romances. Plato amuses himself with the dream of a perfect republic, and Chalmers with the dream of an unfettered establishment.—We certainly are not so ill-natured as to disturb the sportings of a playful fancy; and only complain when these pleasant fictions are passed for sober realities. An establishment of this sort never existed upon earth. But a few years' further experience—years, however, of earnest strife, on the part of the State and of the Church—taught how impracticable was the theory here so eloquently advocated. The secession of the Free Church, with Dr. Chalmers at its head, turned upon this single point, that the State exacted a *quid pro quo*; and patronage was but another name for bondage. It is but candid, however, to state that from the principles of these lectures, Dr. Chalmers never receded: and the Free Church still stands upon the right to demand of the State a complete maintenance, without the imposition of a single fetter. One of the deputations, which visited this country immediately

after the disruption, on being asked if the Free Church had abandoned the principle of an establishment, replied in playful evasion, "we have adjourned that question until the millennium." Yet, whether even in that happy state of the world, civil governments can unite with the Church without enslaving or being enslaved—and whether, in the most perfect state of society, the State should pour its treasures in the lap of the Church, without inquiry respecting the uses which it subserves—are both points, to say the least, which are more than doubtful.

Having framed the conception of a free, yet endowed Church, Dr. Chalmers proceeds to show the advantages it possesses. He is first brought into conflict with a class of political economists, who repeat in Parliament and at the hustings, the lesson they have coned from Adam Smith. Theirs has been termed the system of free trade in Christianity, which leaves in religion as in commerce the supply to be regulated by the demand. The satisfactory reply to this, we give in the following extract from the second lecture :

"It is not with man's intellectual, or his moral, as it is with his animal nature. Although it be true, that the longer he has been without food, the more hungry he is, or the greater and more urgent is his desire of food ; yet the more ignorant a man is, not the greater, but generally speaking the less, is his desire of knowledge. \* \* \* The less a man has, whether of religion or righteousness, the less does he care for them, and the less will he seek after them. It is thus that nature does not go forth in quest of Christianity ; but Christianity must go forth in quest of nature. It is, on the one hand, the strength of the physical appetency ; and on the other hand, the languor of the spiritual, the moral, or the intellectual appetency, which makes all the difference."

We agree that Christianity must go forth into the highways and hedges—not under the direction of the State, but of the Church, to whom this special commission was given.

The third lecture is devoted to the proof of the insufficiency of the voluntary principle. Some of Mr. Noel's statistics will help us shortly to cipher out this problem. At present it is enough to remark the sophistry of the leading argument by which voluntarism is convicted of incompetency. It is that "in the shortcomings of the es-

tablishment, the voluntary principle has had an ample field for the trial of its energies." Yes, when the establishment, with its hand upon the national purse, has thrust aside all competitors, professing to occupy the whole field; and when dissenters have had the burdens of the establishment superadded to the support of their own Churches, then to be twitted with insufficiency because they have not outstripped the State and its ally together—to make voluntaryism, struggling against fearful odds, responsible for all the destitutions in the land—this is such justice as may be looked for in a partisan. But of this more anon.

The remaining lectures are occupied with showing the considerations which should influence the State in selecting one denomination for the national religion, and in detailing the advantages of a territorial establishment. We could not but think in reading the last point that Dr. Chalmers was once more drawing upon a luxuriant imagination, in his glowing picture of the facilities possessed by a parish, over a congregational minister. The former being assigned to a certain district of country, for the religious cultivation of which he is responsible, has the right to approach every family, within its limits, with the offer of the Gospel. The latter, on the contrary, has no charge beyond those who chose of their free will to place themselves under his instructions; of course, he feels himself an intruder whenever he approaches all families besides these. But if these families attend upon Church ordinances no where, what shall hinder the congregational minister from approaching them with as much freedom as the parish minister? Can there be any better warrant than the commission of Christ: "Go ye into all the world and *preach the Gospel to every creature?*" And can the commission of the State, 'go, preach throughout the parish,' be considered superior? Shall the man who approaches the irreligious around him, from love to their souls, be less acceptable, or feel himself more embarrassed, than he whose only differing claim is that he is paid for the service? If, on the other hand, these families have, in the due exercise of private judgment, chosen their own place of worship, what right has the State to commission one, and send him forth upon a proselyting errand? But Dr. Chalmers will say, that the parish

minister, being supported by the State, can preach the Gospel without cost to the poor, and thus attract them to his instructions. But this advantage, secured to one set of religious opinions, is so much injury to another; and this brings up another principle which we will not discuss in this incidental connexion. The territorial establishment is, however, important to Dr. Chalmers for another reason: it assists him in answering the question why the State should endow one Church to the exclusion of another, but little differing in doctrine. It is easy to say why Protestantism should be preferred over Popery by the State, because the differences between them are obvious. But between different branches of Protestants, those differences are slight; and why should one be preferred to all the rest? The answer is partly, that it is for the common good; the advantages of the territorial division cannot otherwise be had; and partly, if these differences are small, why do they exist, and why should they not be sacrificed by a union with that favored by the State. Truly this is modest. Honest convictions of truth are entertained: and when the complaint is that the State employs its tremendous power and wealth for their suppression, the answer is, why do you not conform?

Mr. Gladstone presents this subject from a different point of view still: he approaches it as a statesman.—And it is no small proof of the growth of dissent, that, from his seat in Parliament, Mr. Gladstone judges the State to have “given too certain signs of an inclination to dissolve its connexion” with the Church, and thus that “the mind of the former requires to be exercised on this subject” more than that of the latter. His work, written in Germanized English as it is, should be read by those who desire to see this controversy in every possible light. According to this writer, then, there are four lines of investigation, which conduct alike to the necessity of a national Church. The first is to collect the testimony of Scripture in favor of the union, whether given by precept or by examples; the second is to analyze the nature of the State, and to deduce *a priori* its duty in relation to religion; the third is, to inquire into the necessity of religion to the State, in order to its fulfilling both its higher and its lower ends; the fourth is an historical inquiry,

designed to show the universal consent of mankind to this combination of the spiritual with the civil power.— Thus the argument will be “direct, ethical, consequential and inductive:” the first being “the voice of command”—the second, “the voice of design”—the third, “the voice of penal admonition”—the fourth, “the voice of experience”—and corresponding severally to the formulars, “it is written, it is natural, it is expedient, it is customary.” This foundation is sufficiently broad; yet is not covered by the superstructure. Indeed Mr. Gladstone declines the first altogether; and the historical induction he deems to be superseded by the fact, that the opponents of an established religion do not bow to its decision. He, therefore, pursues it only so far as relates to the history of the English establishment. It is upon the second, or the ethical argument, that he concentrates his strength; and only under this does he pursue a track of thought, varying materially from those who preceded him. As the conclusion he reaches embraces one of the fundamental fallacies under which the whole argument in favor of Church establishments labors, viz: that the State is strictly a moral person, it will be interesting to follow Mr. Gladstone in his own language, as step by step he eliminates it. His starting point is “the oneness of life and action” in the universe, its “absolute and invariable dependence on a centre.” So far as the race of man is concerned, “this cardinal idea of unity, as the fundamental law of beauty and well-being,” was destroyed in the fall. Since that dismal hour, instead of one centre, there are as “many centres and rebellious systems of action,” as there are human beings. The great remedy which God proposes for this evil, is the scheme of redemption: yet, as an “intermediate expedient,” he establishes the law of association, by which they possess “a common or joint life,” reacting against the individualizing and selfish tendency introduced by sin. This common life is found in the family, in the tribe, in the nation, in the Church; and constitutes what is termed the personality of societies, so soon as it “assumes the determinate form of incorporation, and becomes subject internally to a deliberative regulating principle.” But this organization, while it checks one class of evils, introduces evils of

its own, which call for a remedy; and the corrective element is found in "collective religion." The social person, then, whose exponent always is its own recognized organ, is not only capable of religion, as the individual person is, but requires as much to be consecrated by it.

But at this point Mr. Gladstone feels constrained to pause and remove a difficulty which obstructs his further progress. Are there not other combinations among men, equally fulfilling the above definition of social personality, to wit: "incorporation and a deliberative regulating principle?" and shall these, as banks, canal companies, hospitals and the like, feel themselves capable of religion, and bound to be consecrated by it? This leads to a distinction between the degrees of personality in society. The conclusion is that only those associations admit of collective religion which are characterized by the following marks: they must be general, belonging to man as such; they must be natural, so that he is born into them; they must be permanent, so that they are parallel with his own existence; they must be moral, contemplating moral ends, requiring moral motives and restraints, and exercising moral influences. All these conditions meet in the family and the nation; between which a parallel is drawn at some length; and the ultimate conclusion is that the State is strictly a moral person, discharging moral offices, having of necessity a conscience, and only meeting its conscious responsibilities by professing a religion and "offering that worship which shall sanctify its acts."

Against this sweeping conclusion a formidable objection lifts its stern front; in this view of the matter, the State would seem to be immortal, and capable of reward and punishment in a future life; and corporations after all may have souls. Mr. Gladstone says they have; at least "they have souls as much as they have bodies, and it will hardly be said they have neither." But admitting that these "public persons are confined to the sphere of this world," their obligations are not thereby destroyed. It is further contended that States enjoy a quasi immortality in their indefinite succession though different generations: and should these pleas fail, inasmuch as retribution is more strictly and immediately enforced upon States than upon individuals, this may be substituted in lieu

of the sanctions of a future judgment. The State then stands before us a moral person, having the same obligations which press upon the individual conscience, and is bound to profess a religion. But religion is embodied and rendered visible in the Church; the State therefore fulfils this duty, like the individual, by connexion with the Church. And as Mr. Gladstone recognizes only the Church with three orders and an uninterrupted apostolic descent, he is at no loss to decide with what religious society the State should be united. In this way he readily escapes from the "sordid calculation" of Bishop Warburton in choosing simply the largest society; and is disembarrassed of all those difficulties under which Dr. Chalmers labors in attempting to justify the State in the endowment of Episcopacy in England, and of Presbytery in Scotland. As the Church (we mean of course **THE** Church of Mr. Gladstone) has not only apostolic truth, but an apostolic descent in "a divinely appointed though human line," it brings to the State that permanency which is so requisite, and to which the sects can never lay claim.

We will not pursue this author further: as from this point he treads in the same path with others, presenting the stereotype argument against the sufficiency of voluntarism to supply a country with the ordinances of religion; and the stereotype defence from the charge that the alliance corrupts and enslaves the Church. It is obvious that independent of the main issue which Mr. Gladstone creates, his theory is open to minute criticism upon several of its points. For example, his grand doctrine that social organization in the family, tribe, &c. was simply corrective of that centrifugal tendency occasioned by sin, does it not include the idea that social relations formed no part of man's original condition in his estate of holiness. How will Mr. Gladstone undertake to show that but for sin, or if men had retained their primitive integrity, they would never have existed in families and even in nations? Again, the idea that association in the State is an "intermediate expedient" preparing men for the work of redemption, the great remedy against sin, seems utterly to confound all the offices of the State and the Church together. But we forbear all special comments: the argument of Mr. Gladstone is one consistent whole, leading to

an important, though we believe, a false conclusion. We waive all criticism until we shall be able to discuss at length this great question of the personality of the State.

It is refreshing to pass from the cumbrous and foreign style of Mr. Gladstone to the elegant and classical diction of Dr. Arnold. Although presenting his views in a briefer and more fragmentary way than the other, a style clear as amber discloses without an effort his meaning. We select Dr. Arnold not merely because he is a beautiful and popular writer, whose influence is as widely diffused as that of any recent English author, but because he is the bold expounder of another principle equally fallacious with that of which Mr. Gladstone was the patron. It is that the State has for its end—not as Warburton taught, the protection of life and property—but the more general end of promoting, by all methods, the moral and intellectual improvement of men. This is his language, speaking of the State: “Our physical wants may have led to its actual origin, but its proper object is of a higher nature; it is the intellectual and moral improvement of mankind, in order to their reaching their greatest perfection, and enjoying their highest happiness.”\* Since the confusion existing in men’s minds as to the true office and aim of the State is one main source of the endless discrepancy of opinion respecting Church establishments, we shall hereafter subject it to a special examination. At present, we wish the reader simply to observe how directly this principle led Dr. Arnold to avow the most glaring Erastianism. As the end and aim of the Church are defined by him in precisely the same terms, it follows that the two societies are identical. To employ his language:

“Thus the State, having been enlightened by the knowledge of the Church, becomes a society seeking the same end which the Church sought. And this was my meaning, when I said that in a country where the nation and government are avowedly and essentially Christian, the State or nation was virtually the Church.”†

How fully Dr. Arnold deserves to be considered the special representative of a certain form of Erastianism will appear from another extract:

\* Principles of Church Reform. Miscellaneous Works, p. 331.

† Fragment on the Church. Appendix II. p. 186.

When a State "chooses for itself the true religion, it declares itself Christian. But by so doing it becomes a part of Christ's Holy Catholic Church: not allied with it, which implies distinctness from it, but transformed into it. But as for the particular portion of this Church which may have existed before within the limits of the State's sovereignty,—the actual society of Christian men there subsisting—the State does not ally itself with such a society—for alliance supposes two parties equally sovereign—nor yet does it become the Church as to its outward form and organization; neither does the Church on the other hand become so lost in the State as to become, in the offensive sense of the term, secularized. The spirit of the Church is transfused into a more perfect body, and its former external organization dies away. The form is that of the State, the spirit is that of the Church; what was the kingdom of the world has become a Kingdom of Christ, a portion of the Church in the high and spiritual sense of the term; but in that sense in which 'Church' denotes the outward and social organization of Christians in any one particular place, it is no longer a Christian Church, but what is far higher and better, a Christian kingdom."\*

It is well to observe at what expense this blessing of a national Church is to be enjoyed. To most of our readers it will be a sufficient refutation, better than any argument of our own, simply to know that by this union the Church ceases as a spiritual body to exist: she is transfused into the State, and the two so thoroughly interpenetrate each other, that the Church becomes a "Christian kingdom," and the State becomes a "portion of the Church."

This low view of the Church probably led to the comprehensive scheme which Dr. Arnold gravely proposes as a remedy for "the monstrous evils of sectarianism." He judges it possible to construct the articles of doctrine, the ritual of worship, and the form of government, upon such a scale, as shall comprehend nearly every class of religionists, and thus take away all occasion of dissent. For example, the different sects in England, Baptists, Methodists, Independents, Presbyterians, agree in the belief of certain fundamental truths: the existence of God and his providential care; the mission, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ; the scriptures revealing God's will as a rule of faith and practice; the immutable distinction between

\* Fragment on the Church. Appendix II. p. 177.

right and wrong, &c. Now a scheme of doctrine so drawn as to express these general and admitted truths, devoid of technical and controversial phrases, might embrace all classes but the Quakers, Romanists and Unitarians. In the lapse of time, by softening whatever in the national creed seems harsh to them, the best portions even of these three classes may be gained over to so Catholic an establishment. How far this writer would be willing to concede so as to win dissenting minds to a national creed will appear from an extract:

“If an Arian will join in the worship of Christ, and will call him Lord and God, there is neither wisdom nor charity in insisting that he shall explain what he means by these terms; nor in questioning the strength and sincerity of his faith in his Saviour; because he makes too great a distinction between the divinity of the Father, and that which he allows to be the attribute of the Son.”\*

It might not be amiss for the reader to ask himself what use a creed, or a Church either, can subserve, when a double sense may be knowingly put upon every word that is uttered.

In regard to the ritual of worship, Dr. Arnold considers absolute uniformity to be unnecessary and hurtful. Some persons are attached to a liturgy; others can endure none but extempore prayers; while others still have an ear for both. As his plan of reform is designed for England, his proposal is that once on the Sabbath the English service should be employed; but in the other parts of the day, the parish minister should be permitted a wide discretion. If dissenting ministers with their congregations shall be gained over to this comprehensive Church, he would have the ministers supported from the national treasury, aided if necessary, with the free-will offerings of the people. And the more completely to cement the religious associations of the nation, he would have the parish Church answer for all: the different tastes and convictions of different classes to be met by appointing different hours of service—so that “the same roof which had rung at one part of the day with the rich service of a regular choir, should at another resound with the simpler but not less impressive singing of a mixed congregation.”

\* Principles of Church Reform. Arnold's Miscellaneous Works, p. 285.

The only remaining difficulty is to organize a form of government equally enlarged. We say to 'organize,' because the idea does not seem to be entertained for a moment that the Church has a form of government prescribed by divine authority; but such a form as may "die away" when its "spirit is transfused into the more perfect body" of the State. Taking Episcopacy as the basis, Dr. Arnold's inventive genius seeks to supple it so that it shall become flexible and elastic enough to fit every sect. In order to show the necessity for Church reform in England, a singular confession is made, valuable to us as showing the delapidation into which the Church must fall by alliance with the State: "it has come to such a point of actual dissolution that it has been made a question what the government of the Church of England is."\* The first improvement suggested is to admit to the functions of the ministry persons of every degree of education, and from the highest to the lowest class in society. The second improvement is to popularize the government by giving the laity a greater share in its administration. This latter end is gained by the suggestion of such details as these: the dioceses are to be made smaller, by contracting and multiplying them—leaving the Metropolitan Bishops alone the right to sit in Parliament; each Bishop is to be supported by a council, consisting both of clerical and lay members; dissenting ministers (with the exceptions, of course, of Romanists, Quakers and Socinians) are to be included in the establishment, and to be maintained by Easter offerings levied on all Church members; existing benefices are not to be disturbed, as they are vested rights; but all patronage must be simply recommendatory, the Bishop's council sitting in judgment upon the candidate's qualifications; and those who stickle for the right to choose a pastor are to be allowed its exercise. These innovations are thus summed up under heads, which we only condense: 1st, reducing the size of the dioceses; 2d, a council of clerical and lay members co-operating with the Bishop; 3d, the institutions of diocesan general assemblies; 4th, the admission of persons to the ministry destitute, in some cases, of a University education; 5th,

\* Principles of Church Reform. Arnold's Miscellaneous Works, p. 287

the election of ministers, in certain cases, by the people, and the checking of patronage by granting the right of disallowing a presentee; 6th, Church officers, lay and clerical, as a substitute for district visiting societies. It is hard to characterize a scheme so nondescript as this; or to decide what principle of cohesion holds together the heterogeneous parts of a system which can be likened to nothing in heaven or earth, save Nebuchadnezzar's image. We are presented with a doctrinal creed couched in such vague generalities as to define nothing, and yet allowing a double sense in the interpretation of what little it does utter. We have a ritual, which yet settles no form of worship, but comprehending the widest diversities which taste, conscience or caprice may engender. We have finally a government, which it is impossible to class in any category known hitherto among men—a curious amalgam of Episcopacy without prelacy, of Presbytery without courts, of Independency without the brethren. The last result of all is a Church composed of members who have not a single principle in common, except it may be a fraudulent use of terms invented solely with a view to conceal differences; and a State, that endows and propagates a Christianity from which the very heart and core has been extracted—in other words, we have the nation christianized by an infidel Church.

The Essay of Mr. Noel is written upon the other side of this controversy; and he deserves to be noticed in connexion with the preceding writers, if only for the profound impression which his work has produced upon the dissenting population of England at least. Mr. Noel has every advantage from position to speak with effect on the side which he has espoused. His honorable birth, the respectability of his talents, the honesty of his character, and the purity of his life during the many years in which he has been a worthy representative of the most worthy portion of the English Church, are all passports to public confidence. He has moreover attested the sincerity of his convictions upon the subject which he discusses, by the most severe and costly sacrifice to which he could well be called. To abandon a Church he had so long cherished—to resign old associations and to form new, at a period of life when it is so difficult to transplant ourselves—to be

exposed to the sharpest criticism of those whose cause he has cast from him—these are sacrifices, which as they call for nerve to encounter, are at least evidences of honest conviction of mind. We are not aware that any one has ventured to impeach the purity of Mr. Noel's motives or the sincerity of his conclusions, in his recent secession from the English Church; and we think it will be hard for the advocates of the union to silence the battery which he has opened upon the English establishment. The work is nevertheless open to the criticism passed upon it by a writer in the North British Review, that it looks at the question of a National Church too exclusively in the light in which it is presented in England; and thus the reply to far the larger portion of it is, that the evils reprehended are not essential to the idea of an established religion; but only accessory to it in the particular form in which that idea has unfortunately been realized in the English Church. This however is easily explained: although there is not a single allusion to himself in the whole book, it was written evidently with a view to justify before the British public his own secession. It is divided into two parts; the first being devoted to a consideration of the *principles* of the union; and the second, to its *effects*. Under the former of these divisions, Mr. Noel undertakes to show, in opposition to Mr. Gladstone and others, that the State is incompetent, from its very constitution, to order the affairs of a spiritual Church—that the parallel is altogether false which is run between the family and the State—that all history condemns the union as disastrous in its results—that the argument is fallacious which supports the establishment from the Mosaic law—and that neither the prophecies of the Old Testament, nor the injunctions of the New, infer the necessity of a National Church. From these more general principles Mr. Noel passes to others more in detail, and which are particularly recognized in the English establishment; aiming to show that the State's supremacy, the maintenance of ministers from the national treasury, patronage and coercion, are all condemned by the word of God. Under the second great division of his work, Mr. Noel exhibits the practical workings of the system, in the evil influence exerted upon Bishops, Pastors, Curates, private members, and

upon dissenters. As for ourselves, we were most interested in the succeeding chapter; in which are described the effects produced by the union upon the number of ministers, upon their distribution, upon their maintenance, upon the doctrine they teach, upon the discipline of the Churches, the Evangelization of the country, and the like. We feel greatly indebted to this author for the collection of his facts and for the statistical form in which he presents them, so well adapted to the comparison we design to institute. We have always suspected these things to be as Mr. Noel describes; but with his aid, we shall be able to humble the arrogance of those boastful theorizers who have assumed as a necessary truth and as a historical verity, the utter insufficiency of the voluntary principle.

In relation to the amiable author himself, who, in his trying position, has been able to disclose enormous abuses without the slightest infusion of bitterness, we confess to a particular regret when it was rumored that he was about to identify himself with one of the existing bodies of dissenters in England. It seemed to us that if his mission was to overthrow a union which was simply desecrating to the Church of Christ, that mission could be more certainly accomplished by his maintaining an independent position and becoming the nucleus of an evangelical, disestablished Episcopal Church; and we anticipated a growth for this secession of Noel, Shore, and others, not inferior to that which was attained by the secession in former years of the Erskines and Fishers from the Scottish establishment. Whether Mr. Noel is a man equal to such an enterprize, it is not necessary to inquire. The perusal of his Essay has satisfied us, that he has receded as much from Episcopacy as from the Establishment; and that the honesty of his character and the sincerity of his convictions necessitate the step which otherwise would be a matter of regret.

This article, sufficiently long to bring to a close, has assumed on the anvil a different form from that at first designed. Our purpose was to have entered at once upon the discussion of the points involved in this controversy. But as, in this country at least, it has been so long considered "*res adjudicata*," and we hear so often the wonder expressed, upon what grounds it is pretended to retain and

justify the alliance of Church and State, it seemed not unfit to present the historical view given above. The careful reader will perceive that very grave questions have been sprung in the preceding review: is the State a person, capable of religion? What is the end for which civil government was instituted? Cannot the Church exert an influence upon the State, as a co-ordinate institution and independently of an alliance? Is the voluntary principle insufficient, as boldly alleged, to propagate religion in a country? Does the voice of past ages cry out for a national Church, and how is this the voice of nature? Does the Jewish Theocracy afford a precedent in favor of the connexion between State and Church? Do the Millennial prophecies set this union before us as a necessary feature of Christ's universal rule upon earth? The answer to these questions must be reserved for another article, in which they may be thoroughly discussed. In the meantime, it is hoped the synopsis already given of the views of leading writers in favor of Church establishments may not prove unacceptable nor uninteresting to the reader.

## ARTICLE IV.

## ETHNOGRAPHY.

*Rev. George Howe D.D.*

1. *Mithridates, oder allgemeine Sprachenkunde, mit dem Vater Unser als Sprachprobe in bey nahe funfhundert Sprachen und Mundarten, von JOHANN CHRISTOPH ADELUNG. Mit Wichtigen Bajtragen Zweyer grossen Sprachforscher, fortgesetzt von Dr. JOHANN SEVERIN VATER, Professor, &c. 4 Banden, 8vo. Berlin, 1806—1817.*
2. *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind. by JAMES COWLES PRICHARD, M. D. F. R. S., M. R. J. A., &c. 4 vols. 8vo. London, 1836—47.*
3. *Vergleichende Grammatik des Sanskrit, Zend, Griechischen, Lateinischen, Litthanischen, Gothischen und Deutschen; von FRANZ BOPP. 4to. Berlin, 1833.*

# SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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### ARTICLE I.

#### CHURCH AND STATE.

In a preceding number of this periodical a statement was given of the leading theories by which many seek to justify the union of the State with the Church. These theories have been drawn only from writers who profess to recognise the two organizations as distinct from each other, however inaccurately they may have defined the boundaries of either. It is scarcely necessary to apprise the reader, that on the one and on the other side of this intermediate school, are to be found two opposite poles of doctrine. The first may be said to find its ablest representative in the philosopher of Malmesbury; though as there is nothing new in error, Hobbes simply revived and modified the exploded dogmas of Democritus, which were propagated still later by the Epicureans. Regarding human law as the only source of moral distinctions, he consistently enough considered the Church the mere creature of the State, spoken into existence only as an instrument to accomplish the ends of civil policy. The second extreme is that held by the Romanists, who make the Church, on the contrary, engulf the State; as may be seen from the writings of Bellarmine, and others of the same communion. The extravagance of both these opinions is the best guarantee that they will never prevail. The former, we may hope, is already abandoned to the

corruption and worms which must at last feed upon the wretched carcass of infidelity. The latter will scarcely disturb the American reader, unless he has the mischance of falling in with the angelical doctor of Romanism in this country, the neophyte Brownson; who, in his next metempsychosis, may perchance turn up in the person of a Mohammedan Mufti. Dreaming theorizers may fling their speculations from their lattices upon the busy world; but the strong and practical sense of mankind will scarcely consent that the State shall swallow the Church, or the Church engulf the State. Those writers who admit these two institutions to be distinct in their origin, and yet contend that they both aim at a common end, are more likely to influence public opinion; and with these the whole controversy must in our day be waged.

The design of the present article will be to follow the path of investigation already opened in a former number of this Review, and to examine the principles which were at that time sprung from cover.

I. We are first brought into contact with the extravagant doctrine of Mr. Gladstone: that the State is strictly a moral person, having a conscience, and bound to profess a religion, and to sanctify its acts by a worship of its own. That we do not misrepresent this author will appear from his own language:

“In the government and laws of a country we find not a mere aggregation of individual acts, but a composite agency, the general result yielded by a multitude of efforts, each of which in part modifies, in part is absorbed amid the rest. This composite agency represents the personality of the nation; and as a great distinct moral reality demands a worship of its own, namely the worship of the State, represented in its living and governing members, and therefore, a public and joint worship.”\*

This conclusion he reiterates as follows:

“I return then to the position that as the nation fulfils the great conditions of a person—a real unity of being, of deliberating, of acting, and of suffering; and these in a definite manner and upon an extended scale, and with immense moral functions to discharge and influences to exercise, both upon its members and extrinsically; therefore it has that kind of clear, large and conscious responsibility which can alone be met by its specifical-

\* Church and State, vol. I. p. 93.

ly professing a religion, and offering, through its organ the State, that worship which shall publicly sanctify its acts. That which by its governing organ it professes specially, it must encourage and maintain throughout its inferior members, as a part of such profession itself."\*

This language cannot be misunderstood. The State in its corporate character is just as truly capable of religion, which it is just as fully bound to profess, as are the individuals which compose it. It is obvious that if this opinion holds, all further argument is superseded. The advocates of the Union need be at no pains to prove the insufficiency of voluntaryism, nor to defend their favorite scheme from the charge of corrupting the Church. The union of Church and State is simply a necessity, and nothing more can be said to purpose. If the State has a conscience and is under obligation to perform acts of worship, then an established Church is required, as the visible embodiment of the State's religion and the recognized organ of the State's worship. Nor are we left in doubt as to the exclusiveness of this National Church, since as a part of its profession itself the State must maintain through its inferior members what its own organ may happen to dictate. If the most iron spiritual despotism is not erected upon this foundation, it must be from softening influences which come from without, and not from any checks in the system itself.

It is not difficult to point out the fundamental fallacy of so monstrous an error: it arises simply from the ambiguity of the term person as applied to designate the State; and consists in employing this word in its secondary and metaphorical use, with a meaning, however, which attaches to it only in its primary and proper signification. A person properly implies an individual; an entity separate from every other, having its own consciousness and will. It is thus defined by Mr. Locke:

"To find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing at different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it."†

\*Church and State, vol. I. p. 105.

† Essay on the Human Understanding, book 2d, ch. 27, sect. 9.

In like manner Archdeacon Paley :

“ That which can contrive, which can design, must be a person. These capacities constitute personality, for they imply consciousness and thought. They require a centre in which perceptions unite, and from which volitions flow ; which is mind—and in whatever mind resides is a person.”\*

Every etymology of the word—whether we derive it from “ personuit,” the issuing of sound through the mouth piece of a mask, first applied to the mask itself and then to the conception of an individual character ; or from the combination of the words *per se una*—impresses upon us this idea of individuality of being. Now when the word person is transferred from the individual to designate a society, it must be employed in a figurative sense, and because of some analogy discovered between the two. As all the individuals of a society are bound by some common tie, and thus in a certain sense become one, the analogy between this unity of the society and the individuality of a single being, warrants the figurative use of the word person to indicate this resemblance. Again, as individuals linked together in society concentrate their minds upon a given point and agree in a common conclusion, which is carried out in a joint action, this agreement of many minds so resembles the unity of a single mind, that it may be expressed by the metaphorical use of the word person. It is manifest, however, that this transfer of the word is justifiable only so far as the resemblance shall hold. It is precisely here that Mr. Gladstone commits his first capital blunder. His definition of the social person is just enough ; a society, says he, is a person “so soon as it assumes the determinate form of incorporation and becomes subject internally to a deliberative regulating principle.”† His error consists in employing the term person in a sense which is not included within his own definition. Incorporation gives to a society a unity resembling the individuality of a single being ; and “the deliberative regulating principle” can only mean that power in many minds to debate and to concur, which is analogous to the power of thought and of will residing in a single mind. So far the analogy holds—and upon the

\* Natural Theology. Ch. 23.

† Church and State, vol. I. p. 63.

ground of this analogy we consent to speak of the social person. Now, reasons Mr. Gladstone, if "the nation fulfils the great conditions of a person," then "its clear, large and conscious responsibility can only be met by its specifically professing a religion." But what are these great conditions of a person which the State fulfils, as Mr. Gladstone himself establishes them? Manifestly the above definition includes but two, incorporation and deliberation; as in this very connexion he specifies, "a real unity of being, of deliberating, of acting, of suffering." Yet his conclusion embraces a third condition, in regard to which he has traced no analogy whatever between a society and a person. He is guilty of the gross paralogism of reasoning from two conditions in his premises, to a third and entirely distinct condition in his conclusion. The State is a person, because, like an individual, it is one and can deliberate; the individual person is bound to be religious and to worship God; therefore, the State is bound to profess religion and to worship God—that is, because the State is like the individual in two particulars, it must bear all the responsibilities of the individual in a third particular, in regard to which, for aught that appears, there is no affinity between them. He was bound to show that the analogy holds just as truly between the religious capacities of the State and of the individual, as between the other two characteristics; and then, if it pleased him, he might have applied the term person to the State on this ground also. Instead of which, he has exactly reversed this process: he argues from the figured use of the word person in analogies that do hold, to a resemblance on a third point in which the analogy fails entirely.

Mr. Gladstone seems himself to become alarmed at the swiftness of the current which is sweeping him on to most portentous conclusions. He has the sagacity to perceive that the same mode of reasoning will establish the same conclusion in regard to all associations to which the term person in its metaphorical sense may be applied. He feels that his readers will be startled at a doctrine which renders it imperative upon Banking and Canal Companies to profess a joint religion; and seeks relief from this absurdity by inventing a distinction of degrees of personality. In the case of those associations the

personality is intermittent, occasional, conventional, and conversant only with material interests; while that of the State is general, permanent, natural, and moral in its ends.\* Upon this alleged difference he affirms a collective religion to be necessary to the latter, though not predicable of the former. This distinction without a difference, purely fictitious as it is, betrays the decrepitude of the theory, of which it was an after thought. Personality, where it exists, is entire, and does not admit of degrees. A Rail Road Company, for example, is as truly a person, quoad its purposes, as ever the State can be, quoad its purposes. Nor does the fact that it is conventional, and looks only to physical results, in the least degree affect the integrity of its personality. As far as it is a person at all, it is a person entire. The State may comprehend wider interests; but cannot be more perfect as a person than other associations within the scope of their interests. His theory remains still under the pressure of the difficulty, of which this awkward explanation is an humble confession; and his logic will force us to ascribe consciousness and conscience to a Fire Company just as necessarily as to the State.

As though but half persuaded himself, Mr. Gladstone introduces another limitation. He says, "the State is properly, and according to its nature, moral; conversant with moral subject matter, and fruitful of moral influences." The inference is, that as a moral institute, religion becomes essential to it; while it may not be necessary to conventional associations "conversant only with material interests." That is, if we understand the distinction here made, the State deals with the relations of men *among themselves*, while these conventional societies deal only with the relations of men *to things*. But would not a profounder reflection have taught that our relation to things at last resolves itself into a relation to persons; and so a moral basis must underlie every association of whatever character? This truth seems to be recognised by Dr. Lieber in his Political Ethics, when he says: "Property, a relation between an individual and a thing, becomes a matter of right, a jural relation, only inasmuch as others are excluded from that property: it signifies, therefore,

\* Church and State, vol. 1, pp. 71, 94.

again a relation between two individuals."\* The State deals with "moral subject matter," because it defines and guards the rights of men relatively to each other. So with every other association upon earth, though perhaps in a less degree than with the State. Where, then, is the ground for so wide a distinction as is made the basis of Mr. Gladstone's argument? Both have respect to rights—to rights at last between individuals, and both alike must have a moral basis, because neither of them could exist but for the moral relations of men to one another. So this second limitation fails equally with the other; leaving these "conventional societies," by virtue of their personality, under the same imperative necessity with that "great moral reality, the State" to profess religion, and to engage in a joint and public worship.

But Mr. Gladstone has committed a second blunder not less pervading nor less fatal than this. He has wholly confounded the term moral with the term religious. After proving that the State is a moral person, he considers that he has succeeded in proving it also religious. Yet the two terms are far from being identical. A writer whom we have already quoted, distinguishes between them thus:

"If religion means all that appertains to man's relation to God, it is evident that as it is not an individual relation to any other human individual, it cannot in its very essence ever become a matter of the State; because the State has to do with jural relations only, and these must exist between man and man."†

This distinction we regard as eminently just: religion is exclusively an individual matter, because it simply considers man in his relations to God and the Divine law.—However it may define and regulate the *social* duties of men, its jurisdiction extends over these only as in neglecting them men transgress the commandment of God, and are responsible for their trespass upon his authority.—In no part of his book, more than in this, is Mr. Gladstone obnoxious to the severe but just censure of Mr. Macaulay in using "language grave and majestic, but of vague and uncertain import;" and which, with his singular felicity of illustration, he compares to that "trans-

\* Vol. 1, p. 216.

† Dr. Lieber's Political Ethics, vol. 1, p. 216.

parent haze through which the sailor sees capes and mountains of false sizes and in false bearings, and which is more dangerous than utter darkness." That we may not be suspected of exaggeration, let the evidence of this author's extravagance be furnished in his own language :

" Religion is applicable to the State, because it is the office of the State in its personality, to evolve the social life of man, which social life is essentially moral in the ends it contemplates ; and which can only be effectually moral when it is religious. Or, religion is directly necessary to the right employment of the energies of the State as a State."\*

It is impossible to estimate the harm which is done in the world by what Mr. Macaulay terms this "obscure sanctity" of style. Unhappily serious minds, the most likely to be captivated by its solemn and sepulchral tones, are too unsuspecting to distinguish always between religion and cant. There is a religious jargon afloat among men, found frequently upon the lips of the most flippant, which passes for the true language of Canaan, while it is only a dialect of Babylon. A few of the catch-words of Christianity, profusely employed, serve as countersigns which gain admission for spies into the camp of Israel.— If Mr. Gladstone means simply that the nature of God is the ultimate source of moral distinctions, and that the Divine law is, therefore, the authoritative standard of duty—if he aims only to say that men who refuse to govern their conduct and to regulate their opinions by the teachings of Revelation, are, in so far, disqualified for the duties of legislation ; and that rulers are as certainly accountable to God for their public as for their private acts—we cordially and fully agree with him. But he evidently intends no such common-places as these. He is at special pains to distinguish between the State *as State*, and all the individuals which compose it ; between the public duties of the one, and the private and personal responsibilities of the other. He speaks freely of "the Statesman laying aside in his public function a part of his individuality ;" and of "his acts as being done without an agent, unless the nation, the moral person of the State, be that agent."† He infers from this that "the responsibilities of the nation are not satisfied by the indi-

\* Church and State, vol. 1, p. 93.

† Ibid, p. 92.

vidual piety of its members.”\* He terms the State “a reflective agency conversant with moral subject matter, involving of necessity a conscience, which is *ex vi termini* the regulator of moral offices;”† by which—though in what sense it is hard to discover—it is invested with the attributes of mind and of conscience, capable of weighing reasons, and of feeling the pressure of obligation.—With unshrinking steadfastness to his theory, he does not stagger to endow it, in a very undefinable way, even with a soul; and to attach a strictly retributive character to public calamities, by which they become to the State a substitute for the sanctions of a future judgment.‡ Within its own limits the State has a mission to perform in propagating religion, as strictly obligatory as the mission of the individual Christian, to extend the Gospel to all mankind.¶ As a moral unit, it must worship God with a devotion separate from the homage which is rendered by all the individuals which compose it.§ Now all this is preposterous, unless Mr. Gladstone will advance a step further and maintain that the State is a living entity, and has a conscious existence; which will bring it within the category of an individual—and we may then agree with him that it has “the same specific obligations which attach to an individual conscience, owning the law of Divine obedience.”¶ If, with his characteristic hardihood, he had openly carried his speculations to this conclusion, his argument would have passed harmlessly into the number of those singular hallucinations, which the most gifted minds, over-ridden by a single idea, sometimes put forth in the form of overwhelming paradoxes. We will not trifle with the reader’s understanding by attempting to show that the State has no substantive existence; but is only a name given to define a relation in which a body of men stand to one another. It is an outrage upon language, to speak of a national conscience as separate and distinct from the consciences of the Ruler and his subjects.

That the individual alone can be the subject of religion, would seem to be almost intuitively evident. We

\* Church and State, vol. 1, pp. 91-128. † Ibid, p. 89. ‡ Ibid, pp. 105, 107.  
 ¶ Ibid, pp. 111, 112, § Ibid, pp. 93-110-128-129. ¶ Ibid, p. 110.

cannot predicate religion of any who have not a soul in the most strict and proper sense of that word; a soul capable of receiving communications from God, comprehending duty, and conscious of its subjection to the Divine law. This reasonable being we find further to be endowed with an immortal life which the law brings under mortgage: "the soul that sinneth, it shall die." He accounts to God for all his purposes and acts, and as a responsible agent receives in a future world those rewards or punishments which he may deserve. He is capable of becoming depraved, and also of renewal and of sanctification, if God is pleased to manifest his Grace in so doing. All these things enter into the idea of religion, as that idea is realized to us in the government of God; and not one of them—neither capacity for obedience and for transgression, nor accountability, nor the power of being depraved and of being redeemed and regenerated, nor capacity for endless bliss or eternal sorrow—can be affirmed of any but an individual being. Unless, then, the State, in its corporate character as State, has a soul—is immortal—can fall from holiness into sin—can be the subject of a spiritual birth—can stand at the bar of judgment—and suffer eternal damnation—it is not a subject of religion. Mr. Gladstone cannot be permitted to slur over these issues in a single paragraph. He must distinctly assume them as necessary parts of his theory, or it disappears like "the baseless fabric of a dream."

The source of this whole error, pervading the writings of others besides Mr. Gladstone, is the constant merging of individuals into that great abstraction, the State, and confounding things that differ. If for example the nation sins—say, in the violation of solemn treaties or in waging an unjust war—who is the party to be charged with guilt? The State, as State, replies Mr. Gladstone; which is accordingly visited with just retribution by public calamities. But will it be maintained that the individual rulers who perpetrate these wrongs are not immediately and personally responsible to God for the same? Are these not personal sins which call for individual repentance, without which they will be surely punished in the day of final account? But upon Mr. Gladstone's hypothesis, that these are "acts done without an agent, if the

moral person of the State be not that agent," it is hard to see how this private responsibility can be maintained. As for the public calamities, which may come in the form of famine, or pestilence, or in the defeat of armies; these are not visited upon that abstraction, the State, but upon individuals throughout the length of the land; who as represented in their rulers, are regarded "*participes criminis*," and answerable also for the wrong. If we attend carefully to the manner in which God administers his government among men, we shall find that those sins committed more directly against himself, he mainly reserves for punishment in a future state of being; but those vices and sins which tend to the destruction of human society, he checks and avenges also by immediate and kindred punishments. Drunkenness and uncleanness, for instance, are personal offences; but as their prevalence would soon bring society to an end, he holds them under a measure of restraint by early and visible penalties. These penalties are not designed as a substitute for the retributions of another world; but, in addition to them, they constitute a part of his providential arrangements, by which he holds society in being, for the accomplishment of his other and higher purposes. Among these providential checks and restraints are we disposed to class those calamities which fall upon communities of men. They are not a substitute for the strict retributions which will fall upon rulers and legislators for their public sins committed as functionaries; but are designed to indicate God's providential control over communities, and to preserve them from premature and utter extinction. If, too, as in our national Congress, the divine blessing is invoked, through a Chaplain, upon its deliberations, it is not, as Mr. Gladstone supposes, the nation, which as a moral unit offers a State-worship to God; but these functionaries, as individual men, recognise their individual dependence upon God, and confess their personal responsibility to him. As statesmen, engaged in the discharge of difficult duties, they acknowledge their need of divine direction, precisely as they should do in their own more private affairs. They by no means "merge their individuality" into the moral person of the State; but as individuals they recognise the truth taught by all history,

that counsellors, who break away from the divine law, become Ahithophels whom God "appoints to defeat." In like manner, when governments appoint chaplaincies in the army or in the navy, it is not because as missionaries they are employed in the propagation of religious truth; but because the public service has removed men from the situations in which they could seek religious offices for themselves. The State has no right to extinguish the religious nature of those whom it employs, nor to wrest their religious principles from them. Yet as the public service necessarily removes men from their homes and their sanctuaries, it simply seeks to alleviate the sacrifice by the compensation of a chaplaincy. So too, when the chief magistrate recommends a public fast or public thanksgiving, he does not, as the High Priest of the nation, offer a national worship; but simply as the representative of a Christian people, and merely as their voice, he gives utterance to the general sentiment pervading the hearts of all, which calls for the recognition of God in his providence. The worship at last is that of individuals who are brought into concert.

We forbear to follow Mr. Gladstone into the practical consequences of his theory; partly because that theory is original only upon the points which we have already discussed; and partly because those consequences have been portrayed by Mr. Macaulay, with that piquancy and power of illustration, which are the peculiar attributes of his pen. The reader will agree with us that the ethical argument drawn from an analysis of the nature of the State, is a stupendous failure; and that the support, which it was designed to bring to the doctrine of an established Church, fails with it.

II. The second and far more common defence of the union is based upon the assumption that the State has in charge the whole well-being of men, and may lawfully use all the agencies which can contribute to this result. Of course, as religion is the most important of these agencies, it is inferred that the State must have control over it, and must endow a Church as the instrument for applying it. By writers of this class the definition of the State given by Aristotle is eagerly adopted; *πολις γινομενη μεν του ζην ενεκεν, ουσα δε του ευ ζην*—a breadth of definition which leaves

margin enough to draw along the most magnificent conclusions. Hooker, for example, in his *Ecclesiastical Polity*, teaches that "the Church and the Commonwealth are personally one society; termed a Commonwealth, as it liveth under whatsoever form of secular law or regiment—a Church, as it hath the spiritual law of Jesus Christ." Dr. Arnold, as we have already seen, makes the State and the Church mutually interpenetrate each other—so seeking the same end as to become really identical. "Wherever," says he, "the nation or government is avowedly Christian, the State or the nation is virtually the Church." Burke, too, in his splendid language, describes the State as "a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection; a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living and those who are dead, and those who are to be born."\* Coleridge likewise recognises this as at the base of his singular theory. His conception of the State is that of the union of three great estates; the first is that of the land-owners, or possessors of fixed property, whose conservative influence brings permanency to the nation; the second is made up of merchants, artizans, &c. whose influence secures progressiveness and personal freedom; while in the king or executive, as the beam of these scales, "the cohesion by interdependence and the unity of the country are established." The third estate, made up of those whose business it is to "secure a continuing and progressive civilization," is supported from land which he assumes historically to have been reserved, in the original distribution of territory, for national use; and which he therefore terms "the Nationalty." This third estate is divided into two sections: the first of which remains at the Universities, the fountain heads of learning, and is employed in enlarging the knowledge already possessed; the second and much larger division is distributed throughout the nation as the guides and instructors of the people. This third estate he terms the National Clerisy or Clergy, and in its idea is wholly secular, and distinct from the Church of Christ. Christianity comes in, however, as "a blessed accident, a providential boon," "a most

\* Reflections on the Revolution in France.

awful Godsend." As theology is the *prima scientia*, the Church may well undertake the functions of this National Clerisy; "two functions not requiring nor necessarily implying two functionaries." The two are therefore in fact identified; and the National Reserve is devoted to the support of Christianity, upon the condition that the Church shall discharge the office of the National Clerisy. Yet though their functions are thus consolidated, the two institutions are separate in idea, and may become so in fact. The National Clerisy may be destroyed by the impropriation of the Nationalty, and still the Church of Christ remain intact. This striking theory, characterized by that originality which marks it as the speculation of a profound thinker, we have not subjected to critical examination, for an obvious reason. A perfect autocrat in his use of language, Coleridge makes the national Church a very different thing from that against which we are now arguing. It is, in his conception, a wholly secular matter, and identified with the Christian Church by a sort of accident, only because those who constitute the latter are particularly available for the uses of the former. It is obvious, however, that, with the other writers with whom we have classed him, he distinctly assumes the object of the State to be the very indefinite one of promoting, in every conceivable way, the highest happiness of men; the *eu ζην* of Aristotle. It remains to show that this happiness cannot be promoted while man's religious interests are neglected, and the argument in favour of an establishment is supposed to be complete. The State cannot compass its ultimate end until it brings religion home to every subject; and for this purpose it endows and commissions the Church. We shall inquire directly into the legitimacy of this inference, even admitting the premises, which we are scarcely prepared to do.

The analogy which is employed to justify this conclusion, is the control of the State over the education of the people. The State exercises this control, because education is necessary to man's highest developement and happiness; and as religion is necessary in a far higher degree, *ex fortiori*, the State may and should control it. It has the same sort of right to endow a Church which it has to found a University. The reader does not need to

be informed that there are many who insist that the whole business of education should be remitted to individual enterprise and to voluntary combinations formed for this end—who resist as much the State's prerogative of directing the education as the religion of the country. To such, of course, this analogy will fail to carry conviction. We do not propose, however, to embarrass our present investigation with any discussion of this point. We would simply remark incidentally that a line of proof may be opened in favour of the State's undertaking, to a certain extent, the work of education, independent of the broad principle upon which it is ordinarily grounded. No one hesitates to admit the propriety of naval and of military schools, as necessary parts of the national defence. They are obviously just as necessary as a line of battle ships, or a series of military posts. Indeed these latter would be useless without competent officers who shall employ them for the purposes of their construction. Upon substantially the same principles may National Universities be justified. The State has as much need of jurists and legislators as of seamen and soldiers—of judges on the bench and statesmen in the council chamber, as of generals in the field and commanders in the fleet. As careful and elaborate training, too, is required for civil as for military functions. If it be replied, that but few of those who obtain a University education actually fill these public stations, so but few who pass through severe military discipline ever become generals. In either case, opportunities for knowledge must be afforded to a large class, in order to insure the selection of a few competent to occupy public trusts. We may go a step further. As every free government is of necessity self-government, there must be a modicum of intelligence pervading the masses of society, before the nation is fit to be intrusted with its own liberty. History affords no more melancholy lesson than the folly of committing the power of self-government to a people wholly unfit to exercise it. In order, then, to its own preservation, the State may be compelled to carry instruction down through all grades, even to the lowest—to teach the masses at least so much that they may understand and appreciate the charter by which all their privileges and rights are held, and form an intelligent

judgment upon all the great issues brought before the country. In obedience to the fundamental law of self-protection, it may perhaps be the duty of the State to furnish a scheme of education sifting down from the highest to the lowest strata in society, and ranging from the extensive curriculum of a University to the elementary teaching of a primary school. But the argument will here be retorted, that if education is necessary to fit a people for the exercise and preservation of freedom, is not religion of transcendently greater necessity? We grant freely that it is. We admit that without the influence of religion, men can never be brought into subjection to any government—that without it, rulers will always be tyrants, and subjects always rebellious. But it is one thing to admit that religion is necessary to the existence and perpetuation of the State, and a far different thing to admit that the State should furnish and control it. It is here that we begin to discover a wide distinction between education and religion, as they relatively affect the State. If education, in a wider or narrower sense, is necessary to the State, it may be the State's duty to supply it, because there is no organization framed expressly for this office. But if religion is necessary to the State—as we assuredly believe it is—it is *not* the State's province to provide it, simply because another organization exists by divine appointment, whose sole vocation is to exert and to diffuse this influence. Taking then the widest definition of the State—making its object as indefinite as the loosest declaimer may desire—and granting that one of its peculiar functions is to conduct the whole business of education—it does not follow that it has the same control over religion. The simple fact that the Church is a divine institution, appointed expressly for this end, bars the inference which is so confidently drawn. Here, then, we take our stand. Religion being necessary to the State, if it were left without provision, would fall from necessity under the care of the State. But if the State were competent to this trust—or if it were the design of God that it should assume it—we do not see the call for another and separate organization, which either must lie idle or do a work of supererogation. All those views which make the State the instrument of promoting man's highest welfare

in every way, assigning to it no definite functions, tend to make it the *το παν*—the universal society engulfing every other. The Church may cease to exist, or become henceforth a part of the State's machinery. The argument drifts by a strong logical current upon the breakers of Hobbes' infidel doctrine, that the Church is but an engine of the State, having no authority of her own, and commissioned to no work by her divine head.

So far we have reasoned upon the concession that the broad definition of the State given above is the true one—if definition that can be called, which assigns to it no functions that are at all distinctive. We have chosen to take the outposts of the argument, before putting the fortress itself in siege. Admitting the State's prerogative to regulate the whole education and refinement of the people, we simply deny it an equal right to control religion; because this is made the vocation of the Church—an institution co-ordinate with the State, and equally the ordinance of God. Our position, however, becomes stronger, when we recall this concession, and insist that the State exists *with defined powers and for a specified end*. We frankly acknowledge our preference of the clear, well-marked theory of Warburton, above all the misty speculations we have been considering. We agree with him that the State has for its object the conservation of life and property; taking this phrase in the wider sense in which Warburton himself intended it—and not in the close and technical meaning which his commentators have forced upon it. The State is instituted for civil and temporal ends. It protects the person of the citizen, secures the avails of his industry and talent, throwing its shield over all his relations and rights so far as they pertain to this lower world—and in this way becomes the *conditio sine qua non* to his full development, individually and socially, as an active, intelligent, yet dependent being.

The State is doubtless a far more interesting object of contemplation, reposing in dim magnificence, its gigantic outline scarcely seen in the shadow of its great but undefined attributes. But as a working instrument, it needs to be realized to us with its prerogatives accurately bounded and its contour sharply defined. Indeed these vague representations seem to us to tend to a political Fourier-

ism more injurious, because projected on a larger scale, than the socialism which breaks up the domestic circle. Communism, with results which could easily be foretold and need not be described, seeks to destroy the family economy and to melt mankind down into one huge mass. What better result can attend the effort to merge all political and religious associations into one, and to make the State one great commune, in which men shall rather herd than live together? This question finds its answer in the national workshops of France; in that anomalous state of things, where artizans with weapons in their hands thunder at the door of the State, demanding employment, or at least support. The well-being of society is best promoted, not by consolidating all interests and confounding all distinctions, but by an accurate division of labour and of responsibility. Men will sooner reach the perfection of their nature, where the State and the Church shall respectively define, and conscientiously discharge, their separate functions.

Nor do we concede the position assumed by Warburton, that although distinct in their origin and separate in their aims, the State and the Church become more efficient by an alliance. The Church effects her spiritual ends by spiritual, not carnal, means. Her armour is truth; and her appeal is to conscience. She takes cognizance of sins, and her penalties operate only upon the religious nature of men. Christianity with its holy instructions, the godly example of its subjects, and its gracious control over the heart, seeks to make men better *as men*; and, therefore, better in all their social relations—better in the family, in the neighborhood, in the State. But the moment the Church seeks alliance with the State, and borrows civil pains and penalties, she simply loses, on her part, that spiritual control which her peculiar mission gives over the conscience; and the State, on its part, becomes more complex in its construction, and impeded in its action—while the virtue of both becomes gradually sapped by a connection which is as unnatural as it is unholy. Believing sincerely that these institutions are not identical in their aims, but are two distinct and co-ordinate societies looking to wholly different results—believing further, that the Church, the body and spouse of Christ, is “in a separate precinct” from the State—we do not hesi-

tate to conclude in the strong language of another, that by "logical consequence the connexion between them is adulterous and accursed."

III. We pass now from these general defences of the Union to one more particular and practical. It is alleged that the voluntary principle—to which every disestablished Church must be remanded—is wholly inadequate to supply a nation with the ordinances of religion. The alternative lies, of course, between drawing upon the State's resources on the one hand, and a distressing destitution of Gospel privileges on the other. This assertion, however, is a direct impeachment of that wisdom which has framed the Church. That an institution should be created by God for the most important of all ends, should be surrounded by the most solemn of all sanctions, should be called to discharge the most pressing of all obligations—and yet that it should be constitutionally incompetent to the work assigned, seems to us a monstrous proposition. Yet it has been hazarded; and that by persons, who if not restrained by the antecedent improbability of the allegation itself, should have been rendered cautious by reverence for the Church of God.

"Of all the parts of this subject," says Mr. Gladstone, "probably none have been so thoroughly wrought out as the insufficiency of the voluntary principle."\*

"Its general law," he slanderously affirms, "is to provide for those who can pay for the provision, and does not contemplate or tend towards supplying on a large scale the wants of the really poor."†

And still again,

"I believe it is beyond dispute that it was not until the State had become the auxiliary of the Church, in the period of the Roman empire, that she was able to strike her roots throughout the remote and rural districts, as well as those of dense population, and to give universality to her sway by draining off the whole of the votaries that so long continued to crowd the rival worship of the temples."‡

For the application of this fact, if not for the fact itself, he was probably indebted to Dr. Chalmers, who employs it in a similar connection in his work on Church and College establishments,§ in which he seems very much in

\* Church and State, vol. I. p. 207. † Ibid. p. 209. ‡ Ibid. 214. § p. 234.

earnest to prove the incompetence of the voluntary principle. It is painful to accuse so good and great a man as Dr. Chalmers, of want of fairness and candour; yet we have rarely read an argument more destitute than his of these noble qualities. This heavy charge against the Church of Christ, of being efficient only while leaning upon the State's protection, he sustains by alleging that while the population of Scotland had increased from one million to two millions and a half, yet the voluntaries had not overtaken more than one-third of this increase, leaving still a gross population of a million unsupplied with the gospel.\* To say nothing of the want of frankness in overlooking the burdens laid upon Dissenters in supporting the Establishment, as well as in sustaining their own Churches, why should *they* be held alone responsible for this vast destitution, when by the very terms of the union it devolved upon the established Church to supply it? With what righteousness "was it left, till within these four years, to the energies and efforts of internal voluntarism to meet and make provision for this enormous deficiency?"† Has Dr. Chalmers made it appear that the Dissenters did not their full share in reclaiming these moral wastes, by reaching that half million of souls whom he admits to have been supplied upon the voluntary principle? And while rebuking the voluntaries for the partiality of their efforts, had he no censures for the Church of the State, in almost wholly neglecting the trust *committed particularly to it*, and leaving the religious supply of the country just where it was in the days of John Knox? It certainly is strange that he should employ an argument which cuts both ways, and has a keener edge against the Establishment, than it can have against voluntarism. It seems a just retribution, that while his argument ungenerously seeks to weaken the confidence reposed in the voluntary principle, it should put shame and confusion of face upon the Establishment forever.

In another particular, Dr. Chalmers stands more seriously convicted of injustice. The voluntarism against which his book is directed, is not that for which the opponents of an established Church chiefly contend. He

\* Church Establishments, p. 272. † Ibid.

makes a wide and just distinction between voluntarism *internal* and *external*. The former is identical with the free trade principle, which leaves, in religion as in commerce, the supply to be regulated by the demand. For this theory we have no sympathy; we abandon it to the tender mercies of Dr. Chalmers, and stand by, consenting, while he hews it to pieces. Christianity is essentially aggressive in its character. It does not remain at rest; but attacks every form of religious error, rejecting all compromise, until it shall subdue the world. The people of God are required not only to supply themselves with religious ordinances, but also to furnish the same to those who are destitute. The commission of the Church binds this duty upon her in the following terms—"go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature." Teachers of Christianity must be sent—Churches must be erected—and the whole apparatus for evangelizing men, must be afforded to the poor and guilty everywhere. In a word, what Dr. Chalmers scholastically terms voluntarism *ab extra*, against which he says not a word in his whole book, is precisely that voluntarism for which all Dissenters plead; with the exception of those who have imbibed the doctrines of a certain school in political economy. He has indeed written down the free trade principle, which insists that those destitute of the gospel shall be left in their destitution until their own sense of want shall drive them to create religious privileges; while the voluntary principle asserts the duty as well as the power of the Church, by free will contributions, to maintain and propagate religion. What fairness there is in confounding the two the reader can judge for himself. We are willing to give up the argument against Establishments, so soon as it shall be proved that the Church is constitutionally incompetent to this work, or so soon as it shall be shown by fair history that she has failed to do it. Upon what principle, we ask, "did the word of the Lord," in the days even of Paul, "sound forth not only in Macedonia and Achaia, but also in every place,"\* so that the gospel in the apostolic age was conveyed throughout and beyond the borders of the Roman empire? Upon what principle were the

\* 1 Thes. 1: 8.

conquests of Christianity achieved during the first three centuries, and that too in the face of violent persecution, so that in the days of Constantine it had outgrown Paganism, and was chosen in preference to it as the religion of the State? We dismiss without remark the gratuitous assertion of Mr. Gladstone that

“Christianity found its way up to thrones, incorporated itself in systems of law, and arrived at the summits of society by the miraculous impulses of its original propagation; whose vibrations had been measured no doubt with reference to the space they were to traverse.”†

When he shall substantiate by historical testimony the continuance of a miraculous power in the Church beyond the apostolic age and its perpetuation to the fourth century, we will stop to consider his deductions from so potent a fact. But no positiveness of assertion will stamp upon an unsupported conjecture the impress of historic truth. Upon what principle did Dr. Chalmers disprove his own allegations, when after a century of torpor, Christian people in Scotland waking up to this awful destitution, he succeeded in building nearly 200 Churches, and presented them to the Establishment? Upon what principle was the endowment of the Free Church achieved, whose glorious results entitle Dr. Chalmers and his coadjutors to be ranked with the Hendersons and Melvilles who fought, in earlier days, for Christ's covenant and crown? By the magic of what principle were 800 Free Churches built almost in a day, with hundreds of manses and schoolhouses—to say nothing of a college with its appropriate furniture? What spring was touched when “from their deep poverty” a Christian people raised a sustentation fund sufficient to endow anew their exiled and persecuted Church? Surely there was a providence in selecting that man to demonstrate most fully the efficiency of voluntaryism, who had most belied it as a thing powerless and weak! It was the crowning glory of Chalmers's life, that his last and sublimest acts should erase the words he did not wisely write.

But the issue now joined as to the practical efficiency of the two systems, admits of being decided by statistical

† *Church and State*, vol. I. p. 238.

facts. Let us see what supply the established Church of England has furnished for the growing religious wants of that country: and this Establishment, we may remark, unites all the conditions necessary to make the test a fair one. The English people are earnest, persevering, and full of enterprise; the State has boundless resources from which to draw; and the English Church is, by no means, deficient in the *esprit de corps*, requisite to carry forward a great extension scheme. The facts we shall present are taken from Mr. Noel's recent work on the union of Church and State; and which, so far as we know, have been received without contradiction where, if untrue, they could be most easily disproved. As our object is to ascertain how far the English Establishment addresses itself to overtake with the Gospel the *increasing* population of the country; we select the two manufacturing districts of Lancashire and Yorkshire; in which, from the nature of their employment, the population doubles itself in less than forty years.

In the district of Lancashire, embracing 1,224,708 souls, the State has built, since the year 1800, 25 Churches with 34,985 sittings: which, with 83 Churches having 93,918 sittings, built before 1800, make a total of 108 Churches with 128,903 sittings—the entire supply which is furnished by the State, and which brings the Gospel within reach of only one tenth of the population. In the same district, however, there have been built, since 1800, by voluntary contributions, 92 Episcopal Churches with 92,345 sittings; also 472 Dissenting Chapels with 243,339 sittings; making a total of 564 Churches and Chapels with 335,684 sittings, built, since 1800, upon the voluntary principle. Add to them 96 Dissenting Chapels with 59,445 sittings, built before 1800, and we have the supply furnished by voluntaryism to be 660 Churches and Chapels, with 394,629 sittings; which would bring the Gospel within reach of one out of every three and a half of the whole population. The comparison then will stand thus: the State furnishes 108 Churches, accommodating 128,903 persons; voluntaryism furnishes 660 Churches, accommodating 394,629 persons: being an excess of the latter over the former of 552 Churches, seating 265,726 hearers. Setting over, however, to the credit of the Es-

tablishment, the 92 Episcopal Churches, the fruits of the voluntary principle within its pale, and balancing the Churches against the Chapels, there will still be an excess in favour of the latter of 368 Chapels with 81,536 sittings.

A similar result will attend an examination of the relative supply afforded by the two systems in the woollen district of Yorkshire, with a population of 844,563. For these souls the State has built, since the year 1800, 29 Churches, seating 31,526 persons; which added to 87 Churches with 72,784 sittings, built before 1800, make the supply, afforded by the State, to be 116 Churches with 104,310 sittings; according to which, the State gives the Gospel to one-eighth of the whole gross population. Upon the voluntary principle, there have been built, since 1800, 51 Episcopal Churches, accomodating 32,426 sitters, and 501 Dissenting Chapels with 216,448 sittings. The 116 Dissenting Chapels with 136,736 sittings, built before 1800, make the entire supply, furnished by individual zeal, to be 668 Churches, with 385,610 sittings—affording the Gospel to one out of every two and one fifth of the gross population. That is to say, the State furnishes 116 Churches, reaching 104,310 of the people; voluntaryism furnishes 668 Churches, reaching 385,610 of the population—being an excess of the latter over the former of 552 Churches with 281,300 sittings. Setting over again to the credit of the Establishment, what the voluntary principle has achieved within its pale, and balancing the Churches against the Chapels, the excess in favour of the latter will still be 450 Chapels with 146,615 sittings.—Taking the two districts together there will be an excess of 818 Chapels with 228,181 sittings, to be credited to the voluntary principle, over what is furnished by the established Church; and this result obtains, though we have not substracted, as in strict justice should be done, the fruits of individual zeal within the pale of the establishment. Mr. Noel sums up the final result in the following language:

“If, by any sudden catastrophe, all the ministers and schools of the Establishment, in these manufacturing districts, were to vanish, nearly two-thirds of the evangelical instruction, now given to the people, would remain.”\*

\* Union of Church and State, p. 268.

There is another light in which these facts should be viewed. It is a common argument in support of the Union, that an established Church can equalize the religious supply of the country, which cannot be done upon the opposite system. The State having a paternal oversight of the whole country, can appoint Ministers and erect Churches just where these are most needed, and where the people are the least able and willing to supply themselves; who must, in the nature of things, be neglected upon the voluntary principle, "whose general law," Mr. Gladstone affirms, "is to provide for those who can pay for the provision." Let us see how far actual facts bear out this *a priori* reasoning. In the three agricultural counties of Norfolk, Rutland, and Suffolk, with a gross population in 1831 of 705,756, the established Church stationed 1250 of her clergy; the Dissenters placed 352: while in the three manufacturing and civic counties of London and Middlesex, Lancashire and Yorkshire, with a gross population of 4,066,513, the established Church stationed 1298 ministers, and the Dissenters 1934. Thus it will appear that the State afforded to these divisions, respectively, about the same measure of supply, the difference between them being only 48; and this, notwithstanding the population in the manufacturing counties is nearly six times as large as in the agricultural. A Pastor is provided for each 564 persons in the one district, and for each 3132 in the other. The distribution of the Dissenting clergy is found to be far more equitable. The population of the manufacturing region is nearly six times that in the rural; and the Dissenting ministers are also nearly six times more numerous in the former than in the latter—the proportion in each case being about the same.

The conclusion to which we are brought by this survey of the achievements of voluntaryism, both in England and Scotland, as compared with those of the National Church, is so far from being unfavourable to the former, that if we were called upon to select a field in which the voluntary principle had more fully demonstrated its efficiency than in another, we would point to Britain, and be willing to stake the issue upon its triumphs there.—However great its efficiency in this country may be—and we shall presently turn to this topic—it has been fettered

there by restrictions, and has laboured under burdens, which can never be imposed upon any single class here. It will tend further to vindicate the voluntary principle from this charge so inconsiderately preferred, to ponder what it has accomplished in these United States of America; where, in Dr. Arnold's judgment, "the evil spirit of Sectarianism has wrought his perfect work."\* This country, moreover, presents, on many accounts, as fair a test to the capacities of voluntaryism as any other upon the globe. Its action is here unimpeded by the counter-efforts of any opponent; it works upon a vast scale, having a continent to traverse; and a sufficient period of time has elapsed to develop somewhat largely its results.—On the other hand, it has had obstacles of a peculiar nature to surmount. A sparse population stretching over an almost unlimited territory—its attention distracted by the multifarious objects which, in a new country, call for consideration—the partial resources which it can command among a people whose wealth has had no time to accumulate, and among whom it is constantly shifting hands—the multitude of sects which too often expend their strength in ungenerous rivalry among themselves, instead of concerting together to cover the land with the institutions of religion—the constant influx of foreigners, whose strange habits and jarring languages throw great impediments in the way of evangelical labours—the almost incredible rapidity with which the population is increasing, as well by the fecundity of the natives as by the immigration of strangers—the new territories thrown daily open, constantly enlarging the field of exertion, and carrying off the frontier when it has scarcely been reached—and the perpetual flow and change of the population, never "remaining in one stay," but unsettling what has just been established—these are among the difficulties which press upon the Churches of Christ in this country, in their efforts to evangelize it. Yet, in the face of all these obstacles, an amount of supply has been furnished to its religious necessities, which, viewed in the aggregate, almost staggers belief. It is unnecessary to enter much into detail, since the facts lie around us, open to the in-

\* Principles of Church Reform, Miscel. Works, p. 270.

spection of every observer. A mere outline, which could be much more fully drawn, must suffice.

In 1844, when the population of these United States was estimated at eighteen and a half millions, there were no fewer than 16,682 ministers in the various Evangelical Churches alone, to supply it; not including the local preachers in the Methodist, nor the licentiates in the Presbyterian and Baptist Churches. This will afford an average of one minister to each 1100 souls; and under the instructions of this ministry it is estimated fifteen of the eighteen millions of the population were actually brought.\* Dr. Baird, from whom these statements are borrowed, estimates that not fewer than 950 Church edifices are annually erected by Protestant Evangelical denominations; which number will swell to 1100 annually, if the sanctuaries of Unitarians, Universalists, Romanists and others be included.† He further computes the annual expenditure for the support of ministers at more than five millions of dollars; and the annual outlay for Church building and incidental expenses, at more than two millions of dollars. If now we take into view the arrangements in each of these denominations, to raise up an educated ministry—to support Evangelists in frontier and destitute settlements—to disseminate, by presses and colporteurs, a religious and denominational literature—and to propagate religion in foreign parts, (for which last object a half million of dollars is annually raised,) we carry over another large item to the credit of the voluntary principle. Let it be remembered that three fourths of the one hundred Colleges in the land, all the existing Theological Seminaries, and a vast multitude of schools, have, during the last half century, been endowed mainly by free-will contributions; and in view of all this the final estimate of Dr. Baird will not appear extravagant, that upon the voluntary principle eleven millions of dollars are annually realized to promote religion at home and abroad. It adds significance to these facts, too, to remember that those persons who freely contribute these sums to religious purposes, are also engaged in vast civil and commer-

\* Religion in America, by Dr. Baird, Book 6, ch. 17.

† Ibid, Concluding Summary.

cial schemes, in order to develop the resources of a new country, and to build up to maturity and strength an infant nation. We confess to but little taste for statistics, and believe that at best they only approximate the truth. But leaving a wide margin for error in the many items which swell this aggregate, a general impression of power rests upon our minds; we begin to form some idea of that mighty principle, concealed from view, which moves so many arms over so large a circle of duty and enterprise. We are willing to commit this meagre synopsis of facts without comment to the reader. It does not require to be enforced by argument. However much we may deplore the shortcomings of voluntaryism, if the only hope of a lost world is in a Church which is pensioned by the State, that hope is truly forlorn.

IV. The next defence of the union of Church and State, more frequently suggested than elaborated, is its universality among all nations and through all periods of time. This universality is supposed to be the voice of nature, indicating the general sentiment of mankind in its favour; and the argument shelters itself under that famous aphorism of Aristotle's: *ο γαρ πασι δοκει, τουτο ειναι φαιμεν ο δ' αναιρων ταυτην την πιστιν, ου πανυ πιστοτερα ερει.* The argument is, however, more specious than solid. This general consent is a strong presumption of truth, when it is shown to proceed from the unbiassed judgment of men. If no extraneous influence has been at work, and each mind has been left to its free action, then a spontaneous agreement in any conclusion can only be explained upon the supposition that it is intuitively true. Obviously, however, the doctrine of an established Church cannot be ranked among the propositions that are self-evident; since it is not only denied, but as we have shown in the preceding section, most extensive operations are founded upon this denial. It has been maintained by Archæologists, that the early founders of governments sought to draw respect to their authority and to perpetuate their power, by imbedding their polity in the religious feelings and associations of their subjects. They claimed, for example, to be inspired of the national Deities—to be commissioned to the special work they undertook—and sought in this way to fence their institutions around with divine sanctions. For this

end, they united the highest religious, with the highest civil, functions; the chief magistrate held in one hand the imperial sword, and in the other the sacrificial knife; and the whole worship of the nation was taken under the care of the State, which appropriated its revenues to the propagation of the national religion. We have, then, in the interposition of civil rulers, an extraneous influence to account for the origin of an Establishment—the State strives to make the religious nature of men the foundation upon which it shall build its power—and the National Church is but a part of the machinery by which it rules. Let it be remembered now, how much one government fashions itself after another, and it is easy to see how the first should become the mould into which succeeding ones should be cast—and how upon the principle of association alone, the union of Church and State, once gaining foothold among nations, should be handed down in unbroken succession from the earliest times even to our own day.

From the most remote antiquity, governments have been chiefly despotic, and the governed have lived in abject submission: would it be wise to infer that the general sentiment of mankind declares for a state of bondage and repudiates freedom? Would it be conclusive in this case to reason from the imperfections of society, from grievances tolerated only because they cannot be abated, to a moral approbation of the same? Wherever, too, religion is involved, the presumption arising from general concurrence becomes materially impaired, if indeed it is not more frequently *prima facie* evidence of falsehood rather than of truth. The overwhelming majority of men in all past time have been “wholly given to idolatry,” rejoicing in the fictions of their own mythology more than in the truths of God; yet most certainly, there is but one God, who hath made the heavens and the earth. All men instinctively oppose the truth as it is in Jesus, the stupid Hottentot, and the subtle Hindoo, as well as the trained sceptic; does this universal opposition to the gospel create such a presumption of its falsehood, that it should at once be discredited? Ever since the fall, “the understanding is darkened,” and men do not receive or obey the truth. Because of our depravity, religion is always prone to lose its spirituality, and become a thing of forms, a

moral institute, to be classed among, and compared with, the devices of men. When its true province is forgotten, it may be perverted to any degree whatever. Our conviction is that men have declared with such unanimity for an Established Church, because they have been ignorant, not more of the true nature of religion than of the true ends of government. This has ceased to be the soul's commerce with God, and has become a mere bargain with priests; it has been robbed of its control over the conscience and affections, and addresses itself to the imagination, or still more sordidly, to the interests of man. It has exchanged its spiritual power over men's hearts, and has sunk into a mere matter of human authority. Mr. Gladstone decides rightly, not to pursue the inductive argument for our conviction, since "the appeal is entered to a different tribunal." A question of this magnitude must be decided, not by the doubtful history of past generations, but in accordance with the great principles it involves. If there be no teaching in God's word which is authoritative, we must reason from the true nature of the two institutions, and from the ends they seek to compass. This ground we have already covered: from their nature, they can never coalesce; and their ends are such as each can attain alone in its proper sphere. To this presumptuous appeal, which would bind forever upon the world the errors of the past, we make a twofold answer: that we can find a first cause for the amalgamation of Church and State in the desire of the latter to build itself into the religious nature of man; and this union once established has been perpetuated by prescription and association. So that the alleged uniformity of action establishes no presumption of its propriety, nor can we interpret it as the voice of nature uttering only what is true. Again, we reply, that since mankind have conspired always to corrupt the true religion, the general favour manifested to a National Church originates the suspicion that this is only a device by which Christianity, through a treacherous alliance, is to be rendered powerless.

V. The advocates of the union draw an argument from the Scriptures, which divides itself into two branches; the first is the example of the Hebrew Commonwealth, which is supposed to afford a justifying precedent; the

second is an appeal to the prophecies relating to the millennial period.

We will dismiss this topic with but one or two cursory observations; both because we do not wish to overstep the limits of the reader's patience, and because the field which it introduces is almost illimitable, as soon as we enter into details. In regard to the Jewish Theocracy, it could be easily shown that essential differences exist between it and any Church Establishment since known among men. The whole power, both civil and religious, vested exclusively in Jehovah—not merely in the general sense in which all power belongs to Him, but growing out of the peculiar relation in which He was pleased to assume that people to Himself. The State was simply the husk or shell thrown around the Church, singularly constituted as that was; and the deduction from this economy is far more powerful in the hands of those who advocate the supremacy of the Church over the State, than in the hands of those who exalt the State to complete superintendency over the Church. It can be shown that the Jewish Kings had no jurisdiction over the Church—did not appropriate the revenues of the State to the support of the Priesthood—did not employ their power in exacting the tithes which Jehovah had made the peculium of the Levitical order—and had no agency either in appointing to, or in deposing from, religious functions.—But omitting all considerations of this kind, it is a sufficient reply that this Dispensation was wholly extraordinary, appointed to fulfil a temporary office, and was distinctly abrogated by the Messiah at the period of His advent. The principle of an Ecclesiastico-political organization, if ever it was incorporated in the Jewish Economy, was then expressly cancelled. He declares his kingdom to be henceforth not of this world—distinguishes between the things which are to be rendered unto Cæsar, and the things to be rendered unto God—warns his servants to put the sword into its sheath—and teaches that the weapons of their warfare are not carnal, but spiritual. This unequivocal withdrawal of the Jewish Establishment, and this clear separation of his Church as entirely spiritual in its aims, revoke the grant, if indeed

the Church ever possessed it, to ally itself with the civil power.

In relation to the Millennial Prophecies, it cannot be overlooked that the argument founded upon them assumes an exposition which is obstinately contended. The declarations that "Kings shall be nursing fathers, and Queens nursing mothers to the Church"—that she "shall suck the milk of the Gentiles"—and that "Kings shall minister unto her"—may mean simply that these persons shall become the subjects of Divine Grace, and bring the influence which station gives them in forwarding the cause of the Redeemer. Before they can establish any connection between civil governments and the Church of Christ, it must first be shown that this spiritual interpretation is void, and that these terms must be understood in their most full and literal extension. The argument drawn from the Saviour's personal advent and reign cannot be admitted, till this doctrine is itself incontrovertibly established. We say nothing now upon any of these points, sufficiently difficult and perplexing of themselves, without being entangled with the vexed question we are now discussing. It is enough for our purpose to say that an argument drawn from disputed premises, is rarely convincing: and there can be no end of disputation, when the discussion is only removed from the inference, and warmly renewed upon the premises from which it is deduced. Granting, however, the prediction that "the kingdoms of this world are to become the kingdom of our Lord and of His Christ" to be literally accomplished in the personal reign of the Saviour, in which he will assume temporal as well as ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the nations—that will be confessedly an extraordinary Dispensation, of which we can at present form no adequate conceptions. To Christ belong rightfully the kingdom and the glory; and if in His own person He shall visibly unite temporal sovereignty with Headship over the Church, we assuredly say Amen: but we can scarcely allow our opponents to reason backwards from a future and extraordinary Dispensation, to times and circumstances so essentially varying, as they are with us.

We bring to a close our discussion of this really complex and difficult subject. We have no new theory to

project upon the relations of the State to the Church. Indeed all speculation is precluded by the very simplicity of our creed ; which is that the two institutions should work on harmoniously, each in its own sphere doing its own work, and without thwarting the plans of either. The State protects her citizens in the enjoyment of their religious privileges ; and the Church enjoins upon her members the Christian duty of reverence to "the powers that be." It is rather from those who seek to amalgamate these societies, than from us, that ingenuity must be expected. It is for them to frame theories on which to reconcile discordant materials—so to mingle the iron and the clay that the product shall not be "partly strong and partly weak." The object which we proposed to ourselves was limited to a review of the schemes which have been invented for this end, and an analysis of the principles upon which these are constructed. There are some special objections urged against the voluntary scheme which we would be glad to examine in detail : but the limits of a review will not suffer the notice of more than two ; and these we select, not so much for the purpose of refutation, as for salutary caution to those who boldly advocate the voluntary principle.

It has been said that the separation of the Church from the State tends to make the latter Atheistical. Lawgivers and magistrates inducted into office without religious tests will cast off all restraint, and the affairs of the nation be conducted upon the most infidel principles. The distinction is again overlooked between the nation and the State. The latter, as a unit, is incapable of religion, as we have endeavoured to show ; the former, as embracing individuals, may and should be Christian. Legislators and governors are under the same individual responsibility with other men ; and in their public functions, as well as in their private relations, are bound to make God's word a lamp to their feet and a light to their path. If laws unfriendly to religion are enacted, or if wise laws be unjustly administered, the guilt will be laid where it justly belongs. And if the people, from whom in free governments power flows, suffer their representatives to abuse a public trust—to employ the influence of their high station to demoralize the nation—they become accessaries

after the fact. It requires to be shown whether the absence of religious tests tends so much to make the State Atheistical, as the requisition of them from unqualified persons, to make the State a hypocrite—and whether the results are not equally pernicious. It is certainly far more easy to debauch the consciences of men, and make them familiar with perjury and blasphemy, than to erase the fundamental ideas of religion from their minds. We deny, however, that it is the State's province to be the organ or exponent of the religious convictions of the nation. We for example, are a Christian people, a Christian nation; the laws framed for our government respect us as such; and our rulers represent to some extent this religious element: not indeed by formal, public, official acts, carrying out the religious opinions of their constituents, but in refraining from any legislation or government which shall compromise their religious character. Yet since the charge has been laid against the voluntary scheme, that without a National Church, the State tends to open disregard of all religion, let those who wish well to voluntarism see that the charge may not be sustained. Let the effort be to leaven the whole mass of society with religious principles, for the obtaining a sound religious public opinion—which, more than tests and sacraments, will constrain public officers at least into a decent demeanour to the religion of Christ, and to the hearty recognition of it as the greatest of all the elements which go into the character of the nation.

Again, it has been urged as the opprobrium of voluntarism, that it secures no adequate support to the ministry. There is room, however, for the inquiry whether an Established Church does better. Taking the English Establishment for the comparison, we should say not; although it must be admitted that the Scotch Establishment, from the simplicity of its worship and the parity of the clergy, would present a more favourable case. The total nett income of the English Establishment, according to Mr. Noel, was in 1836, £3,439,767: which, if equally distributed among the 12,923 clergy, would yield the very fair average of £266. But when it is remembered that the incomes of Bishops and Archbishops range from £4,000 to £15,000, that a large sum goes to the Ca-

thedrals, and that the benefices vary exceedingly in value, the statement of Mr. Noel is not surprising :

“1619 Clergymen receive £1,319,650 ; 10,112 Clergymen receive £1,155,030 : that is, 1619 Clergymen receive more from the State than 10,112, who do nearly all the work. 1619 Clergymen who have got the prizes of the Establishment, have an average of £808 ; and 10,112 of the working Clergy have an average of £114. The 1619 have salaries seven times larger than their more laborious brethren.”\*

If the voluntary principle does not ensure equality of support, or even a fair distribution, surely it is not for Establishments to throw the stone. In our own country, many causes conspire to render ministerial support generally too inadequate. We are certainly far from censuring those laborious and self-sacrificing men who, yielding to a controlling necessity, “labour with their own hands that they may not be chargeable upon any ;” yet it is a reproach to the Church, when her ministers are laid under such necessity ; and a grievous loss to her when their thoughts and time and strength must be directed from their holy vocation to be occupied with tables. It becomes us, when boasting of the fruits of voluntaryism, to remember this scandal yet resting against it. May the time soon come when it shall be manifested that no better treasury exists than the hearts of God’s people, and no richer endowment for the Church than the Grace to consecrate her substance to Him who hath purchased her with His own blood !

Finally, the controversy now pending between Free and Established Churches, we conscientiously believe, is remitted to Christian denominations in this country for ultimate decision ; but it must be closed not by words or arguments, but with the higher demonstration of incontestible facts. Never, since Apostolic times, was a wider territory afforded for the trial of the energies of voluntaryism ; and never a period in which it was put to a severer test than the present. It must not only fill the interstices still occurring in the older settlements ; but it must penetrate on the South the fields which a few years have opened to the very borders of Mexico—it must tra-

\* Union of Church and State, p. 287.

verse the Northwestern territories, rapidly filling with a hardy population; and destined shortly to become an integral portion of this confederacy—it must follow the shoals of emigrants into the new regions of California, where an empire has sprung up almost literally in a night. All this it must do, and that at once. The Evangelist with his roving commission, the colporteur with his printed message, and the Christian Pastor with his Church, must be apace with the most forward of the pioneers, who shall fell the primeval forest in the most remote sections of this land. If not, the advocates of a National Church will be furnished a triumph by our supineness which their own achievements have failed to win. It were a fatal mistake to suppose that the voluntary principle has already accomplished such results amongst us as shall forever vindicate it from the charge of incompetency. This problem is yet only in the course of demonstration: we are but in the midst of the high argument. Should the various Evangelical denominations relax at this point their exertions—should they hereafter fail to overtake our growing population, and extending territory, with Gospel privileges, barbarism and irreligion will sooner or later flow back upon us from the frontiers of our land, and with its fearful tide sweep away the institutions which seem to be firmly established. If indeed in the Providence of God we have been appointed the guardians of the voluntary scheme, we can only discharge our sacred trust by energetic efforts to cover this continent, even to its extremities, with the ordinances of religion. Upon this career, we are happy to know the Church of Christ has already entered. We cherish with delight the conviction that the largeness of spirit with which she has entered upon these Evangelical labours, is but the earnest of still more liberal endeavours; and that the success already attained is only the pledge of the final triumph of voluntaryism.