

THE ORTHODOX PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH

MINUTES OF THE THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

MEETING AT
WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
Chestnut Hill, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

MAY 21-28, 1946



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THE ORTHODOX PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH

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THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
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Westminster Theological Seminary
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May 21-28, 1946

TUESDAY, MAY 21st

Tuesday Morning

The Moderator of the Twelfth General Assembly, the Rev. Robert S. Marsden, opened the devotional service preceding the Thirteenth General Assembly at 11:00 a. m., May 21, 1946, in the Library Auditorium of Westminster Theological Seminary, Chestnut Hill, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Mr. Marsden preached a sermon on the subject "Christian Humility," based on Philippians 2:5-8, "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: who . . . humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." Following the sermon the sacrament of the Lord's Supper was administered by Mr. Marsden, assisted by the Rev. Robert L. Vining and the Rev. John Verhage, and by Elders Henry A. Huibregtse, George O. Cotton, Warren Sleighter and William Huber.

Tuesday Afternoon

The Thirteenth General Assembly was called to order at 2:00 p. m. and constituted with prayer by Mr. Marsden.

The roll was called by the Rev. Eugene Bradford, Clerk of the Twelfth General Assembly.

THE ROLL OF THE ASSEMBLY

Presbytery of California

Ministers: William Harlee Bordeaux, Th.D., Robert B. Brown, Henry W. Coray, Robert H. Graham, Bruce F. Hunt, Clifford S. Smith.

Presbytery of the Dakotas

Ministers: Louis Knowles, Walter J. Magee, Melvin B. Nonhof, Russell D. Piper, Delbert E. Schowalter.

Elders: George O. Cotton, William Huber.

Presbytery of New Jersey

Ministers: H. Wilson Albright, Robert L. Atwell, Bruce A. Coie, Edward B. Cooper, Alexander K. Davison, S.T.D., Everett C. DeVelde, Leslie A. Dunn, Donald C. Graham, John F. Gray, Richard W. Gray, Lewis J. Grotenhuis, Edward Heerema, John C. Hills, Jr., Oscar Holkeboer, Walter C. Jent, Edward L. Kellogg, James W. Price.

Elders: J. Enoch Faw, Carlisle Gale (alt.), Robert M. Garrison, Leslie Gibson (alt.), Roy MacGibbon, Matthew McCroddan, I. T. Mullen (alt.), Samuel G. Parker, Samuel Pitt (alt.), Ted Stratton, Sr.

Presbytery of New York and New England

Ministers: Edmund P. Clowney, John J. DeWaard, Burton L. Goddard, Th.D., Raymond M. Meiners, John Murray, Arthur O. Olson, Herman T. Petersen, John C. Rankin, Charles L. Shook, John H. Skilton, Kelly G. Tucker, Robert L. Vining, William Young, Th.D.

Elder: Frank J. Remein.

The Committee cannot regard this solution of the so-called paradox as an adequate explanation of the problem. The question was: How can God make an offer of salvation to those who are foreordained to damnation? It does not explain the mystery of the co-existence of the full and free offer of salvation and foreordination to damnation to make the obviously necessary distinction between the outward call and the inward call. For even after full recognition is given to the truth that God effectually calls only the elect the mystery of God's will in the offer of salvation to the reprobate still remains.

The Committee has no zeal for the word "paradox." But the Committee believes that great mystery surrounds this matter. Even the reprobate are the objects of divine benevolence, compassion and lovingkindness, not only in the gifts of this present life such as rain and sunshine, food and raiment, but also in the full and free overtures of God's grace in the gospel. This truth confronts us with the mystery of the divine will and the believer is overwhelmed with wonder at the unfathomable depths of the divine good pleasure. It may not indeed be said that this mystery should "bother" the believer. It may not even be said that it should cause difficulty for the believer or that the apprehension of this mystery must focus itself in the mind of the believer in the form of an apparent contradiction. But to aver that the distinction between the outward public call and the actual call of the Spirit solves what has been called a "paradox" is, in the judgment of the Committee, to betray a lack of appreciation of the problem involved.

Respectfully submitted,
THE COMMITTEE

The following minority report was presented by Mr. Murray:

**MINORITY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ELECTED BY THE
TWELFTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO CONSIDER THE
DOCTRINAL PORTION OF THE COMPLAINT OF CERTAIN MEMBERS
OF THE PRESBYTERY OF PHILADELPHIA**

In submitting this minority report to the Thirteenth General Assembly I wish to pay very respectful tribute to the other members of the committee with whom I have felt compelled to differ on some parts of the doctrinal portion of the Complaint with which both reports are concerned. I wish also to express my deep admiration for the patient and diligent labour they have expended upon the work assigned to the committee by the Twelfth General Assembly and for the care and discrimination manifest in the report which they have been constrained to make.

This minority report is not to be understood as intimating any basic divergence of theological viewpoint nor as implying that I differ with my fellow committee members on several of the arguments, interpretations and conclusions of the report they have adopted. As will become apparent in the reading of this report there are many points on which there is agreement between both reports. This minority report will therefore necessarily coincide with the report of the committee at some points. The indulgence of the Thirteenth General Assembly is craved for what may appear to be repetition. It is deemed by the writer of this minority report that some apparent repetition is necessary, for even though both arguments coincided at certain points yet the conclusion with reference to the Complaint as such differed. To give a differing conclusion without the argument in support of it would have been distinctly misleading and ineffective. Hence the similarity that may appear at several points.

I. The Incomprehensibility of God

It should be noted that in the part of the Complaint that deals with the incomprehensibility of God the Complaint says: "In expounding Dr. Clark's views we appeal to the stenographic record of his examination before the Presbytery" (p. 5, col. 1). The minority, therefore, like the majority, considers

that the only evidence upon which it is called upon to base a judgment is the stenographic record.

It is the argument of the Complaint that "Dr. Clark's view of the incomprehensibility of God, as presented to the Presbytery of Philadelphia, is not a proper one", "that he is in error" and that his "formulation of this doctrine and the method by which it is reached are out of harmony with orthodox Presbyterianism" (p. 6, col. 3)

In dealing with the argument of the Complaint in support of such conclusions, the minority would respectfully remind the Thirteenth General Assembly that the Complaint is a complaint against the Presbytery of Philadelphia and in its essence is that the Presbytery erred in its decisions to license and ordain Dr. Clark. In the judgment of this minority, therefore, the central question with which the Thirteenth General Assembly will be concerned in connection with the Complaint is whether or not the Presbytery of Philadelphia at its meeting on July 7, 1944, erred in its decisions to license and ordain Dr. Clark. When reduced to its simplest terms this means: was the Presbytery of Philadelphia warranted in sustaining the theological examination of Dr. Clark and in proceeding to his licensure and ordination? The evidence upon which the Thirteenth General Assembly will be called upon to make a decision is the stenographic record of the examination on July 7, 1944.

The minority feels constrained to point out that the Thirteenth General Assembly might not have sufficient evidence upon which to conclude that Dr. Clark is in error, that his view is not a proper one, and that his formulation of this doctrine and the method by which it is reached are out of harmony with orthodox Presbyterianism and yet be not only justified in finding but required to conclude that the Presbytery of Philadelphia erred in the actions and decisions referred to above. In other words, the Thirteenth General Assembly may well be required to conclude that Dr. Clark did not in the examination concerned express or formulate a doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God that would warrant the sustaining of the examination and the subsequent decisions with respect to licensure and ordination and that the Presbytery was therefore in error and did not safeguard the purity and peace of the Church in deeming the examination adequate. It is this view of the nature of a complaint in such a case that needs to be borne in mind in dealing with this minority report, for it is with this view of the responsibility of the committee and of the Thirteenth General Assembly in mind that this report has been framed.

The Minority respectfully offers its judgment with respect to the pivotal allegations of the Complaint and also with reference to the main question as to whether or not the Presbytery of Philadelphia was in error in its decisions anent the sustaining of the examination and the licensure and ordination of Dr. Clark. These are presented consecutively under the headings **Allegations** and **Conclusions**.

Allegations

1. The Complaint alleges: "The fundamental assumption made by Dr. Clark is that truth, whether in the divine mind or in the human mind, is always propositional" (p. 5, col. 2). If the Complaint means by this that Dr. Clark conceives of truth as existing in the divine mind in propositional form, then the minority believes that the report of the committee has adduced sufficient evidence to show that the allegation is based on misunderstanding of Dr. Clark's position as set forth in the stenographic record and has argued the case sufficiently to demonstrate that the allegation is not supported by the evidence. On this interpretation of the intent of the allegation the minority would be content to dismiss the allegation as unsupported. The minority does not believe that Dr. Clark could properly be charged with holding that the mode of God's knowledge is propositional.

But, in the judgment of the minority, neither can the Complaint be regarded as charging Dr. Clark with any such position. For such would amount to the charge that for Dr. Clark God "thinks propositionally." And it is not

believed that this is the intent of the Complaint. This conclusion is based in large measure upon what is fully conceded by the Complaint, namely, that the mode of God's knowledge is, on Dr. Clark's position, entirely different from the mode of human knowledge. And, furthermore, the Complaint speaks of Dr. Clark's position as implying that divine knowledge could be resolved into distinct propositions (p. 5, col. 2).

If the Complaint does not mean to charge Dr. Clark with holding that truth exists in the divine mind in propositional form, it must be admitted, however, that the Complaint has been very distinctly unfortunate in its use of terms at this point. The impression most liable to be created by the language of the Complaint is that the Complainants charge Dr. Clark with holding that truth exists in the divine mind in propositional form.

But lest the intent of the Complaint should be misunderstood and lest justice should not be done to what the Complainants have in mind, this minority report interprets the meaning of the Complaint to be that truth in the divine mind consists, for Dr. Clark, in an infinite series of items which can be resolved into propositions. If the allegation of the Complaint is understood in this sense, the minority believes the stenographic record will bear out the allegation.

In the quotations and citations from the stenographic record which follow it must be understood that Dr. Clark's use of the word "proposition" as applied to the divine mind is not regarded as implying that the truth exists in the divine mind in propositional form but rather that Dr. Clark has used the word "proposition" to denote the truth in the divine mind which is expressed or is expressible to us in the form of a proposition. It is in this sense, it is believed, Dr. Clark used the word when speaking of truth in the divine mind and it is in this sense that the use of the word "proposition" is being understood in the allegation of the Complaint. It is in this sense also the word is to be understood in the argument of this part of the report.

The evidence esteemed to bear out the allegation of the Complaint, thus understood, is as follows:

(1) On being asked the question, "Is all truth in the mind of God, capable of being addressed (expressed) in propositions intelligent to the mind of man?", Dr. Clark answers, "I would no (not) know what the word: 'truth' meant unless as a quality of a proposition. I cannot conceive of anything that is of (a) truth that is not a proposition" (2:16ff). It should be noted that this question concerns "all truth in the mind of God." It is in such a context that Dr. Clark replies that truth has no meaning for him except as a quality of a proposition and that he cannot conceive of anything that is a truth that is not a proposition.

Again Dr. Clark answers: "I have already stated there will always be propositions that man will not know and furthermore, if omniscience is supposed to be not only the proposition that God knows, but his manner of knowing them, naturally, we shall never have any knowledge in that manner" (3:6-10). There will always be, it is said, propositions that man will not know. They must therefore be propositions in the divine mind and propositions that will never enter the human mind. In this connection the following references in the stenographic record should also be consulted: 2:10-13; 9:5-24; 20:9-13; 22:14-23; 33:1-24; 37:1-9.

(2) Dr. Clark's answers with respect to the meaning of the incomprehensibility of God serve to confirm the allegation. "By the incomprehensibility of God I mean—that God knows—he knows every propositions (omit the final s) and that those propositions are infinite in number and that we shall not exhaust them when he reveals them to us, one at a time" (27:16ff). "The meaning which I give to the word or phraseology—incomprehensibility of God is that in a sense, he sees all propositions and that there are an infinite number of propositions and the infinite number cannot be indicated and known by us who are temporal creatures" (37:16ff).

In relation to the question, namely, truth in the mind of God there are the following elements in Dr. Clark's statement of incomprehensibility.

- (a) There is an infinite number of propositions in the divine mind.
- (b) God knows all these propositions.
- (c) This infinite number will never be known by us—we shall not exhaust them when they are revealed one at a time.

It is apparent that the infinite number and the knowledge of this infinite number have reference exclusively to truth in the mind of God for such predications do not belong to us. It follows therefore that for Dr. Clark all truth in the mind of God must be conceived of in terms of an infinite number of propositions.

So the allegation that truth in the mind of God must be conceived of in terms of propositions, understood in the sense defined above, does appear to be borne out by the stenographic record.

It should be understood that this conclusion is that deemed warranted by the evidence contained in the stenographic record. It is not contended that this is necessarily Dr. Clark's position. Other factors requiring modification of this conclusion might appear if the interrogation had been continued. But again it is necessary to be reminded that it is with the evidence provided by the stenographic record of the examination of July 7, 1944 that this report is concerned.

There is, however, one part of the stenographic record that appears to contradict this conclusion. These are the statements in 27:23-28:21. It would appear that the question asked in 27:23-28:4 is directly the question with which we are now dealing, namely, whether truth in the mind of God is confined to propositions. If so, then Dr. Clark's answer is that he cannot undertake to answer this question for he says, "I am not prepared for that question at all." This would seem to be a complete refusal on Dr. Clark's part to affirm what was repeatedly affirmed in other places. But this can hardly be the case. For on other occasions he is unequivocal in affirming that all truth in the mind of God consists of propositions.

Closer examination of the question asked on 27:23-28:4 will show however that the question being asked is not whether all truth in the mind of God is capable of being expressed in propositions but rather "God apart from His Creation, let us say, in His knowledge of Himself, is also confined in his knowledge, the (to) propositions which of themselves are necessarily finite." It should be distinctly noted that this is a question bearing upon the knowledge of God. With respect to the knowledge of God Dr. Clark refrains from saying that God is confined in His knowledge to propositions. His answer is, "You are trying to get me to define intuition, or intuitive knowledge. Now, Mr. Andrews made a certain description of it which is satisfactory to me in ordinary conversations, but to make a definition, there is no possibility of mistaking such a tremendous job (of mistaking how tremendous a job it is). I am not prepared for that question at all."

The judgment of the minority is that this answer of Dr. Clark does not contradict the other position taken by Dr. Clark, namely, that all truth in the mind of God consists of an infinite number of propositions. The reason for this judgment is that when the word knowledge is used the mode of knowledge or the manner of knowing is brought into consideration as well as the infinite number of objects known. Dr. Clark would therefore naturally have understood the question to concern a definition of the method of knowing, and to define God's method of knowing, namely, intuition, is an entirely different matter which he quite properly refuses to undertake. But quite consistently with that refusal he could still maintain on his own definitions and assumptions that all truth in the mind of God consists of an infinite number of propositions. For the latter concerns simply the objects known and not the method of knowing. Hence this part of the stenographic record, though it might at first appear to contradict the allegation, does not necessarily do so.

Furthermore, this part of the stenographic record confirms the position taken above that truth, for Dr. Clark, does not exist in the divine mind in propositional form but nevertheless consists of an infinite number of items which are expressible in propositions. The form in which truth exists in the divine mind concerns the mode of God's knowledge, but the infinite number of proposi-

tions concerns the objects of God's knowledge. It is with the objects of God's knowledge that the allegation of the Complaint is concerned and Dr. Clark's refusal to define the mode in no way affects the question with which the allegation deals. In Dr. Clark's language the objects of God's knowledge consist of an infinite number of propositions and God can reveal any one of these propositions to his creatures.

2. The Complaint alleges: "Dr. Clark holds that man's knowledge of any proposition, if it is really knowledge, is identical with God's knowledge of the same proposition."

The Complaint in this allegation cannot include the **mode** of knowledge in the word "knowledge." For later on the Complaint acknowledges that Dr. Clark "freely recognizes a fundamental difference between the mode of God's knowledge and that of man's knowledge. . . . We gladly concede this point and have reckoned with it in what has been said above" (p. 6, col. 2). It must therefore be in some other sense that the word knowledge is used.

If the Complaint means by the word "knowledge" the object known, then the allegation is undoubtedly correct. Dr. Clark makes clear that he knows of only two points on this subject, the method of knowing and the object known. The method of knowing as respects God and man, he says, is "entirely different." But the object known is the same for man as it is for God (18:16-23). It does not appear however that the Complaint can mean by "knowledge" the object known.

The minority comes to this conclusion on the following grounds.

(1) It is surely the proposition, in the esteem of the Complaint as well as for Dr. Clark, that is the object known and if so the Complaint could not speak of the knowledge of the proposition and mean by "knowledge" the proposition itself. There must be a distinction between the knowledge and the proposition. Otherwise the phrase "the knowledge of the proposition" would have no meaning.

(2) Nowhere in the Complaint is it argued that the object of knowledge is different in respect of God and man. There is good reason to conclude that the Complaint was not interested in contending that the object of knowledge is different and therefore not identical.

(3) The subsequent argument in the Complaint could hardly be conducted in the language used if the word "knowledge" were used as synonymous with the object known.

It must be concluded therefore that the word "knowledge" is being used in this allegation not in the sense of the **mode** of knowledge, as understood by the Complainants, nor in the sense of the object known, as understood by the Complainants.

The minority does not find that the Complaint has made explicit the sense in which the word "knowledge" is used, as distinguished from the mode of knowledge, on the one hand, and the **object known**, on the other. This is a regrettable defect especially since Dr. Clark made very plain that he knew of only two points on this subject. Notwithstanding this defect it may be concluded that the Complaint means by knowledge the **content** of knowledge. The word "content" appears repeatedly in the Complaint and in the stenographic record (8:21; 9:1; 10:21; 11:1; 18:14; 53:21). The minority feels justified in con-
sense in which the word "knowledge" is used, as distinguished from the **mode** and **object**.

The issue therefore seems to be as follows: The **method** of knowledge is entirely different—on this both Dr. Clark and the Complaint agree. The **object** of knowledge is the same—this Dr. Clark affirms and the Complaint does not appear to call in question. The **content** of knowledge is different—on this the Complaint is insistent and it contends that the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God is radically impaired if the qualitative difference at this point is denied or not jealously guarded.

It is precisely here that great difficulty emerges. The Complaint alleges that for Dr. Clark the **content** of knowledge is identical in the case of God and

man. But Dr. Clark does not acknowledge the existence of content as distinct from mode, on the one hand, and from the object known, on the other. He knows of only two points—mode and object known. On this analysis it would seem that the allegation of the Complaint cannot plead support from the transcript because nowhere in the transcript does Dr. Clark deal with the content. How, it may be asked, can the contention of the Complaint, be maintained when Dr. Clark says nothing respecting the identicalness or the difference of the content of knowledge?

It appears to the minority, however, that what the Complaint means by content, Dr. Clark must have in mind and that he must include it either in the mode of knowledge or in the object known. Furthermore it appears to the minority that some further distinction than that intended by the Complaint on its construction of the meaning and scope of the terms mode and object is demanded. Dr. Clark himself speaks of the knowledge of the proposition. He speaks of God as knowing or seeing everything in its infinite relations at a glance. There appear to be in this latter statement three elements—(1) knowing or seeing, (2) everything, (3) at a glance. "At a glance" surely applies to the mode of knowledge, "everything" applies to the object known, and there remains the actual "seeing" or "knowing." In other words, there is the way in which God sees, there is what God sees and there is the seeing itself. It appears to be the third element that the Complaint means by content and it contends that Dr. Clark in this matter fails to make allowance for, and in fact denies, the qualitative difference between the divine knowing or seeing and the human knowing or seeing within the sphere of those propositions that man actually knows.

The minority regards it as very important to maintain this difference in the quality or character of God's knowing at every point, not only in connection with those things of which man is totally ignorant but also in connection with those objects of knowledge that are known by man. This report maintains that when man knows the very truth yet his knowledge of that truth is never to be equated with God's knowledge of that same truth and that this difference respects not only the difference in mode of knowing but also the actual knowing itself. It maintains in Scripture terms that God is perfect in knowledge and that this perfection that must be predicated of the divine knowledge covers the whole of His knowledge and applies at every point however infinitesimally small may be the point considered. This perfection can never be predicated of human knowledge however true that knowledge may be and however identical it may be, as respects object, with that which is known by God. There is therefore a quality of divine perfection that applies to the divine knowledge at every point that can never be predicated of human knowledge at any point. The minority therefore maintains that the Complaint is undoubtedly correct in insisting upon the qualitative difference between the divine knowing and the human knowing at every point where God's knowledge and man's knowledge concern the same object. The perfection predicable of God's knowledge is a quality or character inhering in it or attaching to it that arises from God's transcendent and incommunicable perfection of being and attributes.

While the minority endorses the insistence of the Complaint at this point and regards its contention as an important element in the doctrine of God's incomprehensibility, the minority cannot conclude that the allegation of the Complaint that Dr. Clark denies this qualitative difference is supported by the evidence supplied by the stenographic record. The reason why the minority has arrived at this judgment is that it is not apparent that what the Complaint means by the content of knowledge Dr. Clark includes in the object known. Two things are abundantly clear: (1) the allegation of the Complaint must be based on what Dr. Clark repeatedly asserted with respect to the object known; (2) if what Dr. Clark says respecting the object known includes what the Complaint means by the content of knowledge, then the allegation of the Complaint is supported by abundant evidence in the transcript.

It is, however, at this point that the minority judges that it is not at

all certain that the Complaint is justified in assuming that what Dr. Clark says respecting the **object known** must be regarded as applying to what the Complaint means by the **content** of knowledge. It appears that it is distinctly possible that what the Complaint means by **content** Dr. Clark includes under the **mode** of knowledge. The minority cannot prove that this is the case. But so far as the stenographic record is concerned it appears to be distinctly possible.

Furthermore, the other expressions which Dr. Clark uses in connection with the mode of knowledge create the very distinct impression that he has more in mind in the use of the word "mode" than the Complainants have in mind when they use that same word. In 3:9, 10 he speaks of God's "manner of knowing" propositions and says "we shall never have any knowledge in that manner." In 17:23-18:2 Dr. Clark understands a question regarding "difference in kind between the knowledge of God, subjective, and the knowledge that human beings have or possess" as a question that respects the difference of mode which he says is entirely different. In 18:17ff. he uses the phrases "method of knowledge—knowing" and "method of knowing" which, in the case of God, is entirely different. In 27:6-9; 28:5-10 he accepts, for ordinary purposes, the formula "God sees everything in all its infinite relation(s), all at one glance" as a description of God's intuitive knowledge. In 53:15-19 he says that our knowledge of a revealed proposition "does not make our knowledge so that we are of the character of God's knowing which we will never possess." Finally there is the very significant answer in 31:9, 10, where, in answer to a question whether man knows a proposition exactly the same as God knows it, he says, "No, I said the proposition is known, that is, a known proposition is the same proposition, that is very different."

It seems to the minority, as to the majority of this committee, that there is evidence in favour of the conclusion that when Dr. Clark used the word "mode" he understood the word in a much more inclusive sense than is intended by the use of the same word in the Complaint. No theological objection can be urged against this inclusive use of the word, especially when dealing with the divine knowledge. And while it is very important that the qualitative distinction between the divine knowledge and human knowledge be maintained this distinctiveness can be preserved on the twofold division, provided the necessary elements are included under the word "mode." Since this is so, it is possible that the qualitative difference between the divine knowledge and the human knowledge for which the Complaint contends and which the minority heartily endorses and regards as a distinction jealously to be maintained may be adequately and fully preserved on Dr. Clark's construction simply because he may include the knowing as well as the mode of knowing in what he calls the mode or method of knowledge. If so, then the qualitative difference is preserved on Dr. Clark's construction, because, the mode, he says, is entirely different.

On these grounds the minority concludes that this allegation is not supported by the evidence contained in the stenographic record.

3. The Complaint alleges: "Dr. Clark does not base his doctrine of incomprehensibility upon the distinction between God as infinite and man as finite (cf. 45:24f), nor on the consideration that, if God were fully to reveal himself to his creatures, the creatures would themselves have to be God (cf. 46:16ff.). It is based solely upon the judgment that man as a temporal being cannot be conceived as receiving an infinite number of revelations" (p. 6, col. 1).

In connection with this allegation the minority feels constrained to observe that the statement, "if God were fully to reveal himself to his creatures, the creatures would themselves have to be God," is regrettably infelicitous. In the fact that God's knowledge is never revelational but essential an absolute distinction marks off the divine knowledge. The very fact of revelation draws the line of distinction so that it is improper to speak even hypothetically and for the sake of argument of a full divine self-revelation as implying that the recipients would themselves have to be God. So it is not surprising that when Dr. Clark was asked (46:16ff.) whether he would subscribe to the statement, "'God cannot fully reveal himself to his creatures'—because in that case, these

creatures would themselves have to be God," he answered, "Well, I would not have given that reason, that is such a peculiar way of putting it."

Regarding the other parts of the allegation the minority finds that there is a good deal of evidence in the transcript to support the allegation. It is clear that Dr. Clark affirms that it is God's "incomprehensibility which prevents him from disclosing all knowledge that he has" to us who are temporal creatures (37:19ff.).

In the immediately preceding statement of the meaning of incomprehensibility, however, he says, "incomprehensibility of God is that in a sense, he sees all propositions and there are an infinite number of propositions and the infinite number cannot be indicated and known by us who are temporal creatures" (37:17ff.; cf. 27:18ff.). Likewise in answer to the question, "Is there any reason why God could not reveal every proposition concerning himself?" Dr. Clark says, "In a certain sense, we are temporal creatures, and that will never be exhausted" (34:4ff.). Again Dr. Clark says, "Because we are temporal creatures, that is what makes the impossibility of revealing all propositions—not that by itself" (i.e. not that it is one member of an infinite series) (37:5ff.). Furthermore in answer to the question, "Would you say just for that reason, because God is infinite and man is finite, for that reason, man cannot comprehend God?", Dr. Clark replies, "I don't think that is sufficient reason. We do not know God because—that is, we do not know every attribute or proposition of God because we are temporal" (45:23ff.). And finally in answer to the question, "You say that God cannot reveal an infinite number of propositions concerning himself, is that correct?" the answer is, "We are temporal and we (will) always be temporal and never will have everything revealed by God because those two things go in conjunction, one with the other" (52:12ff.).

It is in the judgment of the minority rather obvious that Dr. Clark when interrogated as to the reason for God's incomprehensibility repeatedly asserted that the reason resided in the fact that we are temporal creatures and will always be temporal and that therefore we can never exhaust an infinite number of propositions. The transcript therefore evinces that this is the position of Dr. Clark as set forth in the stenographic record.

There is, however, one observation that needs to be made. It is in connection with Dr. Clark's answer on page 46:2ff. The question addressed is, "would you say just for that reason, because God is infinite and man is finite, for that reason, man cannot comprehend God?". Dr. Clark answers, "I don't think that is sufficient reason" and then proceeds, as quoted above, to say that the reason is that we are temporal. Admittedly it is difficult to know from the written record what was the exact intent of "sufficient reason". It might mean that the infinitude of God is not in itself the whole of the reason why we cannot comprehend God. If Dr. Clark here intended to assign to the infinity of God part of the reason for incomprehensibility then the Complaint is incorrect in saying that Dr. Clark's doctrine of incomprehensibility is based solely (*italics ours*) upon the judgment that man as a temporal being cannot be conceived of as receiving an infinite number of revelations". For Dr. Clark would allow the infinity of God some place.

But if Dr. Clark meant by "sufficient reason" that the infinity of God was not an adequate reason for God's incomprehensibility and that the real reason resided in man's temporality, then Dr. Clark's answer could be interpreted as ruling out the infinity of God as the proper reason, in favour of that which he immediately proceeds to affirm as the proper reason, namely, that we are temporal creatures.

In any case Dr. Clark repeatedly and unequivocally accords to the fact that we are temporal creatures the reason for God's incomprehensibility and the minority deems it quite warranted to say that according to the stenographic record Dr. Clark's doctrine of incomprehensibility is "based upon the judgment that man as a temporal being cannot be conceived of as receiving an infinite number of revelations".

Conclusions

The minority respectfully submits to the Thirteenth General Assembly that in the judgment of the minority the doctrine of incomprehensibility presented by Dr. Clark to the Presbytery of Philadelphia on July 7, 1944, as set forth in the stenographic record, is not such as would warrant the Presbytery of Philadelphia in sustaining the theological examination of Dr. Clark and in proceeding on that basis to his licensure and ordination. It is the judgment of the minority that the Presbytery of Philadelphia erred in this particular and was therefore remiss in failing to guard the purity and peace of the Church. In arriving at this judgment the minority is not alleging that Dr. Clark is in error and that he holds a doctrine of incomprehensibility at variance with the Word of God and our subordinate standards. The question with which the minority is concerned is the doctrine presented by Dr. Clark to the Presbytery. The minority is not concerned with the doctrine Dr. Clark now holds or then held. It is not concerned with the answers that would or could have been given by Dr. Clark if the examination had been continued or had been conducted along other lines. It is concerned with the statements made by Dr. Clark as constituting the evidence then available to the Presbytery on the basis of which the decisions to proceed to Dr. Clark's licensure and ordination were taken. And the minority submits as its judgment that Dr. Clark's answers and statements regarding this point of doctrine were not such as would warrant positive decision and action with reference to licensure and ordination.

The grounds upon which the minority bases this judgment are as follows:

(1) On two occasions, as quoted in this report already, Dr. Clark stated what he understood the incomprehensibility of God to mean (27:18ff.; 37:16ff.). It is that God knows all the propositions, that they are infinite in number and that, because we are temporal creatures, we shall not exhaust them when he reveals them to us one at a time. This statement is deemed inadequate for the following reasons:

(a) In connection with the incomprehensibility of God it at best states it in terms simply of the knowledge that God has. It should be understood that the knowledge God has of himself and of all things is an important element in his incomprehensibility from whatever aspect that knowledge is viewed. But it appears quite an inadequate view or statement of incomprehensibility to regard it simply from the aspect of the knowledge of God in relation to our knowledge. It is thought rather that the incomprehensibility of God should be stated in terms of the transcendent glory and mystery of the being, relations, perfections and counsel of God. The knowledge of God is but one aspect of that transcendent mystery. It is deemed to be a fundamental datum of theological thinking and of true faith that when the concept of incomprehensibility is mentioned the mind immediately fixes upon the sum total of God's glory and perfections and, when we are asked to give a statement with reference to it, it is in terms of the incomprehensible mystery of God's being, perfections and counsel that the statement is made. Especially should this be the case in a theological examination such as is required in our Church for licensure and ordination. What is missed in the answers given is a satisfactory and unequivocal expression of this fundamental datum: Since the interrogation was directed so pointedly to this matter it should be expected that the candidate would give direct, explicit and spontaneous expression to this fundamental element of thought and of faith.

The minority deems it an error on the part of the Presbytery of Philadelphia that it failed to elicit from Dr. Clark a statement along these lines before proceeding to licensure and ordination.

(b) The stenographic record shows that Dr. Clark does not claim to be able to prove from Scripture that all truth in the mind of God is capable of being expressed in propositions. Yet in the statement made with reference to the meaning of incomprehensibility it is this formula that is used. It will surely be conceded that it is unsatisfactory to state the doctrine of God's incomprehensibility in terms of a formula that is not itself derived from the

teaching of Scripture. Even should it be granted that incomprehensibility is to be stated in terms of God's knowledge and therefore limited to that aspect of God's perfection, this manner of stating the incomprehensibility of God's knowledge would not be satisfactory. For by what warrant may we affirm that the objects of God's knowledge consists of an infinite number of "items" expressible in propositions?

In defense of Dr. Clark's answers before the Presbytery it might be said that the interrogation gave a very unhappy direction to the examination and to Dr. Clark's thought as it was focused on the question of incomprehensibility. The minority is willing to grant that this may well have been the case and that Dr. Clark's mind may have been directed into channels along which he could not readily have given a more comprehensive and adequate statement respecting God's incomprehensibility. In such a case one cannot but appreciate the psychological difficulty. But if this was the case it must be remembered that the Presbytery was ultimately responsible and the Presbytery cannot be relieved of its responsibility to have secured from Dr. Clark an adequate statement on incomprehensibility by laying the blame for the inadequacy of Dr. Clark's answers upon the direction given to the interrogation. On this assumption the Presbytery should have insured that the interrogation would have been given a direction in which it would have been natural for Dr. Clark to give adequate answers.

(2) The minority cannot regard the Presbytery of Philadelphia as free from fault in not pressing to a satisfactory clarification and issue the characteristic tendency of Dr. Clark to construe all truth in the mind of God in terms of an infinite number of propositions or, to be more exact, in terms of an infinite number of "items" expressible in propositions. It appears to the minority that on Dr. Clark's construction all the objects of God's knowledge are of that character. This report does not contend that it is improper to speak of the infinite number of God's thoughts (cf. Ps. 40:5; 139:17, 18). Neither is it contended that it is necessarily improper to speak of the infinite number of propositions in the divine mind if we are thinking of the thoughts of God to usward. But it appears a tremendous assumption without warrant from Scripture and therefore fraught with dangerous speculation impinging upon the doctrine of God to aver that all truth in the mind of God is capable of being expressed in propositions. It may be that Dr. Clark is using the word "truth" in a very limited sense as meaning simply that within the compass of divine knowledge which is expressible in propositions intelligible to man and therefore not descriptive of all that comes within the compass of God's knowledge. But if so it will surely be granted that this is an unusual restriction of the meaning of the term, "all truth in the mind of God." It would hardly be expected in a theological examination. Consequently the Presbytery of Philadelphia cannot be regarded, in the judgment of the minority, as having brought this question to a satisfactory issue in the examination. In view of the importance of the questions involved this is deemed to have been mandatory.

(3) On a few occasions Dr. Clark was asked quite pointedly the question as to whether we could know God completely or have an exhaustive and comprehensive knowledge of his attributes. It seems rather strange that the answer was not a direct and unhesitating negative. On being asked, "Can we know the love of God fully and comprehend it fully?" The answer was, "I don't know what you mean—can we experience it, do you mean?" Then the questioner became more explicit and emphatic: "No, can we have a comprehensive and exhaustive knowledge, intellectual understanding of it—not just a knowledge that God is love. Can we know the love of God comprehensively and substantially (exhaustively)?" The minority would expect that the answer to this question would have been an unqualified "No." So it is perplexing to find the answer to be, "The only kind of knowledge which I am familiar—is the knowledge of the propositions, knowledge is the possession of truth, and the only truth that I know anything about is—a proposition.

"If you are talking about something else, I don't know just what you are talking about" (see 22:10ff.).

Again in answer to the question whether "in this life or the next, God's creatures will ever have the same knowledge of God that he has of himself" the immediate answer is, "I think right now we have items of knowledge exactly identical, two plus two, equals four" (32:24ff.). Again we should have expected a directly negative answer to the question. But the answer is in terms of propositions known by both God and man (See also 52:8-11).

It must not be forgotten that Dr. Clark elsewhere emphatically asserts that we shall never be able to comprehend God. It is not in the least contended that the stenographic record leaves any doubt regarding this. For in answer to the question, "Would you say that man would never comprehend God or would you say that man cannot comprehend God, or, would you say both?" Dr. Clark answers, "Oh, both—they seem to me to mean the same thing." And Dr. Clark says repeatedly that since we are temporal creatures we shall never be able to exhaust the infinite number of propositions that God knows. Furthermore, his final answer to the question, whether the creatures will ever have the same knowledge of God that he has of himself, is, "it is necessary to say that the Bible indicates that we shall continue forever to learn" (33:23f.).

It still, however, appears strange that the pointed questions respecting exhaustive knowledge were not answered with direct negatives. Dr. Clark had taken the greatest care to make clear that in his judgment (and we think rightly so) the object of knowledge was the same for God and for man. But since on the occasions quoted above the questions were directed very pointedly to the matter of comprehensive and exhaustive knowledge we should expect that the Presbytery of Philadelphia would have required directly negative answers.

(4) Although it is not at all certain that Dr. Clark did not include in what he meant by **mode** or **method** or **manner** or **character** of knowledge what the Complainants are properly so jealous to maintain, namely, the qualitative distinction between the content of the divine knowledge and of the human, even when the object is identical, and though there is some evidence to show that he does maintain this qualitative distinction yet it appears to this minority that the Presbytery of Philadelphia erred in not continuing the examination to the point of ascertaining whether this distinctiveness characterizing the divine knowledge was maintained by Dr. Clark. It should be understood that the minority is not charging Dr. Clark with the error of not maintaining this very important distinction. It simply finds, since this question was repeatedly raised in the course of the examination, that the Presbytery does not appear to have been alert to insure that the distinctiveness was maintained so that no ground for dubiety would remain.

(5) Though Dr. Clark in the examination concerned very properly states in connection with the infinity of God that God is not limited or bounded by anything outside himself (11:6,17,18; 14:15-21) and though full account must be taken of this in any evaluation of Dr. Clark's position as set forth in the stenographic record, yet appeal is made to the infinite series in mathematics (11:23,24; 15:19-23; 21:13-16) as providing us with an example of how we may easily understand what is infinite. It should be noted that this appeal is made in contexts that deal with the infinity of God. It appears to the minority that, when dealing with the infinity of God, a sharp line of distinction should be drawn between God's infinity and the infinity of which we speak in connection with created things. There is nothing absolutely infinite but God. The infinity of mathematical series is that of **non tot quin plura**, not so many but that there can be more. To argue from our understanding of an infinite series in mathematics to our understanding of God's infinity is to confuse what should be jealously distinguished and it is to apply to God's infinity a category in terms of which it cannot be understood. The Presbytery of Philadelphia ought surely to have manifested jealously for the maintenance of this distinction.

(6) In the judgment of this minority there is an important distinction between the incomprehensibility of God, on the one hand, and our complete dependence upon revelation for any knowledge of God, on the other. This distinction appears to be blurred in the examination. In answer to the question, "How then are there any judgments and ways past finding out?", Dr. Clark

replies, "I would explain that by saying no endeavor on our part can discover certain truths about God but these truths can be obtained only by revelations (omit s) and we cannot solve (search) them out on our own incentive, on our own steam—if I may use that phrase" (20:7-13). The incomprehensibility of God applies to those truths in connection with which God has given us the fullest revelation and so our complete dependence upon revelation for all knowledge is not in the least to be identified with incomprehensibility. We are dependent upon revelation but when God reveals truth to us then we know that truth which we could never know by our own speculation or searching. The unsearchable, on this meaning, becomes known by revelation. But the incomprehensibility of God never becomes known in the sense in which the unsearchable becomes known through revelation. In fact the more we expand the circle of our knowledge through revelation the more we increase the circumference of our contact with the incomprehensibility of God. The Presbytery of Philadelphia should have been alert to this distinction and should have proceeded from Dr. Clark's answer to make sure that the two doctrines were carefully and clearly maintained in their distinctiveness.

This final point in the judgment respecting failure on the part of the Presbytery of Philadelphia is closely related to the first. The concept of incomprehensibility developed by Dr. Clark in the examination, as reported in the record, conveys the notion that the incomprehensibility of God consists in the fact that there is an infinite number of unrevealed propositions and that this number will never be exhausted. This can well be coordinated with the notion of unsearchability expressed in the stenographic record (20:9-13). For it would mean simply that there is an infinite number of propositions that we cannot discover on our own incentive. But this is not by any means to be identified with the doctrine of incomprehensibility.

III. Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility

In dealing with that portion of the Complaint that concerns "the relation of divine sovereignty and human responsibility to each other" it needs to be pointed out that there is very little that is relevant to this question in the stenographic record. The Complaint cites only two passages (3:11-4:7; 47:13-16). The Complaint bases its argument upon the article "Determinism and Responsibility" by Dr. Clark, published in the issue of *The Evangelical Quarterly* for January, 1932, and avers that considerable attention was given to this question in the first examination and that reference was then made to the aforesaid article (p. 10, col. 3).

The minority would call attention to a contradiction in the Complaint in this connection. In the concluding paragraph of the Complaint the complainants request that the Presbytery acknowledge that various views of Dr. Clark as set forth in the meeting of July 7, 1944, "with which this Complaint is concerned, are in error and in conflict with the constitutional requirements for licensure and ordination" (p. 15, col. 3). But in the part of the Complaint that deals with divine sovereignty and responsibility the argument of the Complaint is based upon what is alleged to have occurred at another meeting of the Presbytery.

The minority is in doubt as to the effect of this contradiction. But since the Twelfth General Assembly directed the committee to consider the doctrinal portion of the Complaint and since this is part of the doctrinal portion, the minority regards it as part of its commission to study this part also.

The minority is proceeding on the assumption that certain relevant parts of the article "Determinism and Responsibility" were brought to the attention of the Presbytery of Philadelphia in the first examination and this report deals with the parts of the article with which the Complaint is concerned.

At the outset it may be stated that the minority regards the following points of doctrine as important and basic to any treatment of this question.

1. God is sovereign and in the exercise of his sovereignty foreordains whatsoever comes to pass.

2. Human responsibility rests upon divine sovereignty.
3. Human responsibility inheres in the fact that man is a free moral agent.
4. God's foreordination of man's free acts does not deprive man of his free agency and responsibility. Though predetermination arises from the divine decree and though certainty of occurrence is effected in the divine providence, yet the decree is executed in the divine providence in such a way that freedom and responsibility are not impaired or destroyed. The free agency of man is the means through which the decree is executed in the divine providence and so free agency operates within the sphere of the foreordained providence of God.
5. It surpasses human understanding to discern how the foreordination of God as executed in His providence, on the one hand, and the free agency of man, on the other, operate so that the one does not interfere with or curtail the other.
6. The believer accepts both truths and rests in the conviction that there is no contradiction, even though it surpasses his power of analysis to understand how both perfectly cohere in the all-comprehending providence of God.

Dr. Clark maintains, in the article cited, that Calvinistic determinism is consistent with responsibility. In this he is without question correct. He also holds to free agency in the sense that a man is a free moral agent when he acts in conformity with his nature (*op. cit.*, p. 16). But he also holds that the concept of freedom introduced to guarantee responsibility is useless (p. 22). It would appear that Dr. Clark includes in this concept of freedom that is useless as a guarantee of responsibility not only the freedom of contrary choice, which he rightly rejects but also the concept of free agency, which he properly espouses. For he says: "it is well to note and emphasize that the reason—and has anyone found any other real basic reason?—for introducing the concept of freedom, either in its most extreme form of power of contrary choice or in some more modified form, is to hold man morally responsible" (p. 16). He then proceeds to argue: "Could it be shown that man's responsibility does not necessarily depend upon freedom, theology would be freed from an annoying problem." These quotations show that when Dr. Clark says that the concept of freedom introduced to guarantee responsibility is useless he means not only the freedom of contrary choice but also the freedom of free agency defined above.

The intent of Dr. Clark is therefore to show that responsibility does not depend upon freedom and it is on the basis of this disjuncture that he claims to harmonize determinism and responsibility on the basis of Calvinistic Christianity. The solution, Dr. Clark avers, resides in the fact that a man is responsible because he may be justly punished by God. "This definitional truth is the key to the explanation of why a man is responsible for the act God determined him to do" (p. 20). "God is sovereign; whatever He does is just, for this very reason, because He does it. If He punishes a man, the man is punished justly and hence the man is responsible" (p. 21). Hence, according to Dr. Clark, the inscrutable mystery so often regarded as associated with divine sovereignty and human responsibility has been solved.

The minority cannot regard Dr. Clark's analysis as a solution of the problem for the following reasons:

(1) The question of free agency is integral to the question discussed, for responsibility rests upon or inheres in free agency. Only a free moral agent can be morally responsible.

(2) It is no solution of a problem to eliminate one of the factors which enter into the situation.

(3) Dr. Clark has eliminated free agency as not germane to the question because in his esteem responsibility does not depend upon free agency.

Dr. Clark would apparently allow that if responsibility depends upon free agency then the problem would remain. The minority regards the disjuncture made by Dr. Clark as impossible and therefore regards the problem as persisting.

Dr. Clark's statements to the effect that, whatever God does is just and, if He punishes a man, the man is punished justly and is therefore responsible, are profoundly true in themselves. But the minority regards the

statement that man is responsible because free as equally true and strictly relevant to the question concerned. Implied in the very statement, "God punishes a man" is the free moral agency of man. The free moral agency is presupposed in the punishment inflicted.

Dr. Clark's analysis and alleged solution are deemed therefore to be fallacious. In the judgment of the minority the fallacy of the analysis and alleged solution is in the category of error of which the Presbytery of Philadelphia should have taken cognizance in the examinations for licensure and ordination. The error consists in Dr. Clark's failure to base responsibility upon free moral agency and by false argument claiming to solve the mystery associated with divine sovereignty and human responsibility.

It is necessary to point out, however, that the minority cannot endorse some of the allegations of the Complaint. For example: "The most charitable, and no doubt the correct, explanation is that Dr. Clark has come under the spell of rationalism. It is difficult indeed to escape the conclusion that by his refusal to permit the scriptural teaching of divine sovereignty and the scriptural teaching of human responsibility to stand alongside each other and by his claim that he has fully reconciled them with each other before the bar of human reason Dr. Clark has fallen into the error of rationalism" (p. 12, col. 1). Dr. Clark has indeed fallen into the error of eliminating from a situation one factor which is most pertinent and basic. His logical analysis was at fault and his theological construction of certain elements of truth erroneous. But such errors do not necessarily betray rationalism. Again the Complaint says that Dr. Clark's "rationalism leaves room at best for only a temporary subjection of human reason to the divine Word" (idem). This charge can scarcely be regarded as justifiable. In the article concerned, Dr. Clark was dealing strictly with data of divine revelation, namely, divine sovereignty, human responsibility, and free agency. In dealing with these elements his error consisted in failure to bring them into proper correlation with one another and therefore of doing prejudice to the truth involved in their proper correlation. But in the judgment of the minority, this error cannot justly be described as subjecting the divine Word to human reason. Faulty reasoning is not necessarily described as rationalism though faulty reasoning may lead to rationalism or may proceed from it. The error involved has serious consequences for theological development and for practical application but, in the judgment of the minority, it need not be labeled as rationalism and as a subjection of the divine Word to human reason.

General Observations

The minority would respectfully draw the attention of the Thirteenth General Assembly to the fact that the questions with which this report of the minority is concerned, as well as the latter part of the report of the Committee on the matter of the free offer of salvation to the reprobate, relate to a phase of Christian thought and teaching that is of grave concern to our Church, namely, the place that the transcendent mystery of God's being, perfections, counsel and will should occupy both in our thinking and in our theology. It is basically for the reason that adequate recognition does not appear to have been given to this truth in the evidence with which this report is concerned that the minority has felt constrained to submit this report. The minority report, therefore, is not concerned simply with phases of truth which stand in no immediate relation to one another but rather with phases which concern a fundamental datum of Christian thought and devotion. It is the judgment of the minority that the Presbytery of Philadelphia did not evince the requisite jealousy in respect of this fundamental datum and that the adjudication which the Thirteenth General Assembly will be called upon to give anent the Complaint must be based upon careful consideration of this central question.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN MURRAY

It was moved that while this General Assembly does not find that all the allegations and arguments of the "Complaint against Actions of the Presbytery of Philadelphia in the Matter of the Licensure and Ordination of Dr. Gordon H. Clark" are supported by the relevant evidence, nevertheless, in respect of the matter complained against, this Assembly does find that there is ground for complaint against the Presbytery of Philadelphia and declares that the Presbytery of Philadelphia at its meeting on July 7, 1944, erred in the decision to sustain the examination in theology of Dr. Gordon H. Clark, in the decision to proceed to license Candidate Gordon H. Clark to preach the gospel, in the action of licensing him, in the decision to deem the examination sufficient for ordination, and in the decision to ordain Dr. Gordon H. Clark at a subsequent meeting of the Presbytery called for that purpose.

It was moved that the above motion be considered seriatim.

The Assembly recessed at 5:47 p. m., and was led in prayer by Mr. Holkeboer.

THURSDAY, MAY 23rd

Thursday Morning

A devotional service, conducted by the Rev. Walter J. Magee, was held at 9:05 a. m.

The Assembly was called to order by the Moderator at 9:29 a. m. and opened with prayer by Mr. DeWaard.

The minutes of May 22nd were read and approved as corrected.

The Moderator made the following rulings:

(1) No member of the Assembly who is a member of the Presbytery of Philadelphia shall be permitted to vote on motions which concern the disposition of the Complaint.

(2) No member of the Assembly who, though no longer a member of the Presbytery of Philadelphia, was a member of that judicatory within the period from July 7, 1944 to March 19, 1945, and who participated in the decisions and actions concerning the licensure and ordination of Dr. Clark which have been complained of, or the actions and decisions concerning the disposition of the Complaint, shall be permitted to vote on motions which concern the disposition of the Complaint.

(3) Motions framing the disposition of the matter are a participation in the disposition of the matter.

The motion that the question on the floor be considered seriatim was carried.

It was moved that the first part of the motion, viz., the part ending with the words "erred in the decision to sustain the examination in theology of Dr. Gordon H. Clark," be adopted.

It was moved as a substitute that in view of the consideration of the report of the Committee we dismiss the Complaint.

The Moderator ruled this motion out of order. On appeal the Moderator was sustained.

It was moved to amend the motion on the floor to read as follows: While this General Assembly does not find that the allegation of the "Complaint against Actions of the Presbytery of Philadelphia in the Matter of the Licensure and Ordination of Dr. Gordon H. Clark," that Dr. Clark's views as propounded to the Presbytery were in serious error, is supported by the relevant evidence, nevertheless, in respect of the matter complained against, this Assembly does find that there is ground for complaint against the Presbytery of Philadelphia and declares that the Presbytery of Philadelphia at its meeting on July 7, 1944, erred in the decision to sustain the examination in theology of Dr. Gordon H. Clark.

The Moderator ruled that Mr. Kuiper's remarks on the question were in order. Appeal was made from the ruling. On motion a standing vote was taken and the ruling of the Moderator was sustained.