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I. THREE MALIGNED THEOLOGIANS.

Dr. John A. Broadus was fond of telling how his father proved, from the Bible, "there is no God." Calling his son to him and placing his finger over the first line of the 14th Psalm it read, "there is no God." The boy was satisfied, the Bible said it, and that ended it. When his father removed his finger it read, "The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God." It has occurred to us that this is not an unfair illustration of the manner of proof offered in the discussion now pending regarding infant salvation. We wish to set this forth particularly in reference to John Calvin, Dr. William Twisse and Jonathan Edwards.

Calvin formulated and left to the world a system of theology; the sweep of this subject should have corrected what was believed by many, owing to the bearing of certain great doctrines of the Bible on infant salvation, independent of their relation to theology as a whole.

We propose to show from Calvin's writings that he states in language as unmistakable as "there is no God," that infants are condemned, and to prove from the context that the declaration is as foreign and untrue to his mind regarding those dying in infancy, as the above declaration is to the mind and context of the Bible.

These men wrote in times of controversy and much of their writing is controversial and the figure of hypothesis is frequently used. In proving the justice of God's decrees, hypothetical sentences are used too severe not to be rep-

there be at least one such college in each State, that the blessings of the highest Christian education may be brought near the homes of all of our daughters. Let loyal and liberal fathers and sons in our church found and endow such institutions and thus confer upon others the highest benefit, and erect for themselves monuments more beautiful than marble and more enduring than brass.

W. C. CLARK.

A BIT OF SCOTCH PHILOSOPHY.

The conflict, or rather the supposed conflict, between faith and reason, has, for a long time, provoked earnest discussion among thinking men. Some contend, with an air of infallible knowingness, that they have reasoned faith out of the universe; only that, they say, which can be verified by scientific methods, only that which conforms to known law, can be accepted as true and worthy of a place among the facts of human knowledge. In the view of these dogmatists, all else is but the dream of superstition, the shadowy result of tradition, which in the light of modern research, is no longer tenable. The time has come, they believe, to drop faith from our working vocabulary; as the Greek and Roman lost faith in their gods, so we, having outgrown our ancestral ideas, ought to abandon faith as an exploded superstition, and as being altogether contrary to reason.

On the other hand there are those who without laying any claim whatsoever to omniscience, yet as confidently maintain, that faith not only is not the mere child of superstition, but holds a basal place and serves a primal function in our mental constitution: whilst its foundations, being divine, instead of having been demolished, are just as sure and impregnable as ever they were. It is no more unreasonable, they contend, to believe in the supernatural than to believe in the natural, to believe in the reign of moral law than to believe in the operation of physical law, to believe in God's word than to believe in his works.

From this statement of the case it will be seen that the

difference between rationalists and believers (we use the term in its widest sense) is radical. This does not mean, however, that those who give faith a place among our intellectual powers, deny the existence of reason, as those who deify reason deny the existence of faith, or that faith and reason are supposed to come into conflict in any sense whatsoever. They believe, on the contrary, that a careful analysis of human consciousness will show, in place of any conflict existing between the two, that faith if not a part, certainly conditions reason.

It has commonly been thought by Christian apologists that the interests of faith were such as to call for its complete separation from reason, as if the only way to reconcile them were to keep them apart. Now while it may save us from giving any countenance to Rationalism to affirm that faith has solely to do with divine knowledge and that secular knowledge, so called, belongs solely to the province of reason, it does not keep us also from giving countenance to Ritschlianism, a school which practically rules reason out of court in matters of faith and which in order to be consistent with itself, has no explanation to give of Christ as a divine person (more than that he has for us the value of God); has no place for his vicarious death, and altogether ignores the fact of his resurrection. If this is not a case of jumping out of the frying pan into the fire, it looks very much like jumping out of the fire into the frying pan. The truth is, any attempt to divorce these two ancillary powers, however commendable in its intentions, must prove a failure; for though it secures its desired end, it leaves us with Rationalism intact and as ready for the "fray" as ever, besides also having wedded its advocates, however unwillingly, to a new if not to a more dangerous form of error.

The simplest way of showing the true relation in which faith stands to reason lies in our seeing clearly the essential oneness of the mind in its various activities. The mind does not consist of so many compartments—reason being supposed to occupy one, faith another, love another and so

on—but is one inseparable whole, one individual unity. The importance of seeing the mind to be all of a piece, is no less than determinative in its effects. For it follows that if the mind is one in its several activities, the faculties by which we acquire secular knowledge cannot be different from those by which we acquire spiritual knowledge, and hence faith must form the ultimate basis, not only of religious knowledge but of all knowledge.

The proof of this important deduction is ready to hand. Until we believe something we are at a standstill. We have no foundation upon which to build the temple of truth, no point of departure from which to conduct our inquiry after truth. We have to believe something before we can know anything. It matters not what we call those primary truths from which we start our investigations—first principles, axioms, or what not—when we stand face to face with them, reason we find, can afford no demonstration of them; all we have to do, and all we can do is simply to accept them by means of faith. In their last analysis, we repeat, all our science and all our reasonings, so often colored with conceit and arrogance, rest upon these fundamental self-evident truths, which we have to believe and beyond which we cannot go. Therefore we conclude, that if faith thus lies at the foundation of all knowledge, and constitutes the basis of reason, there is and can be, no conflict between faith and reason.

We know not in what new form, nor under what new guise rationalism may appear in the future, but this we do know, that whatever name it may bear, it will prove to be as inconsistent and unphilosophic as it has proved to be in the past. There is nothing, however, to be feared from truth, for the revelation given us in nature and in the world, proceeding as they do from the same mind, must be in harmony.