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ARTICLE I.

THE COUNCIL OF APOSTLES AND PRESBYTERS AT JERUSALEM.

The Acts of the Apostles is the first chapter of the history of the Christian Church, the transition chapter from the history of the Church under the Jewish dispensation to the history of the same Church under the Christian dispensation. Although not designed to teach ecclesiastical polity, yet the principles and precedents furnished therein by apostolic precepts and practices are so numerous and specific, that it alone would be sufficient to reveal the constitution of the Church, if there were access to no other inspired writings. Notwithstanding the fact that the voice of inspiration was never heard beyond the first century, yet the advocates of Prelacy and Congregationalism appeal alike to the testimony of the post-apostolic age in support of their respective systems. Thus Mr. Litton, of the Episcopal Church, quoted by Bannerman in his "Church of Christ," makes the remarkable statement that the claims of Episcopacy are strong so long as the appeal is to the post-apostolic age, and become weak only when the appeal is made to Scripture. Canon Venables, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, article *Episcopacy*, furnishes the following still more explicit testimony to the same effect: "It may be desirable here to remove the confusion which may be produced by

ARTICLE III.

GOD'S COVENANT WITH MAN.

I. God's covenant with man is a fundamental fact in man's religion.

What God has done for man, as determining man's religion, is included in two facts: the creation and the covenant. Given the fact that God created all things, and man in his own image, and there emerges for man natural religion—the gift of righteousness. This is the religion of man's first estate. It proceeds upon the principle of do and live—pure moral government. The doing is perfect and personal, the life is contingent, and the *status* a servant. The external light is the works of God, and the internal organ of vision, reason. In addition to the fact of the creation, given the fact of God's covenant with man, and there emerges a modification of natural religion—revealed religion—the gift of goodness. This is the religion of man's covenant estate. It proceeds upon the principle of believe and live. The believing carries a twofold righteousness, a personal and a federal or imputed. The life is justification, and the *status* a son—an organised body of sons in a representative head. The external light is the word of God; the internal organ of reception, faith. The point especially insisted upon under this head is, that this overture of goodness from God is to man, not as fallen, but as God's creature, capable of such "fruition" of God. The sufficient proof of this position is, that this "voluntary condescension on God's part, which he hath been pleased to express by way of covenant," was first "expressed" to man, innocent and upright, in the garden of Eden. It offered to man, innocent and upright, the blessing of justification through a representative head. It still offers to man, guilty and depraved, the same blessing by the same means. It is therefore a fundamental and permanent fact in man's religion. If man's religion, as determined by this fact, is of grace, how can a dispensation of religion, based upon this fact, be called a dispensation or covenant of works?

II. God's covenant with man is of grace.

What God has done for man by covenant is an improvement upon what he did for him by creation. If, in man's first estate, resulting from the fact of the creation, God gave to man all that righteousness required, then what he has done by covenant is of goodness, grace. But the Confession, Sec. 2, says that the first dispensation of this "voluntary condescension on God's part" was a covenant of works. So, Thornwell: "The Scriptures assure us that two such dispensations (Confession: covenants) have been instituted; . . . one called the covenant of works, . . . the other called the covenant of grace." So, Dabney: "There are but two imaginable ways, and but two known to Scripture—grace and works by which a soul can win adoption of life." Likewise Hodge, *et cæteri*. But St. Paul: "And if by grace, then is it no more of works." If it be replied that Paul is speaking of sinners under the covenant of grace and not of unfallen creatures under the covenant of works, then let us call attention to the fact so much overlooked, that this excludes the works made under the present dispensation. But further, if grace for fallen creatures is exclusive of works under the covenant of grace, would not works according to Paul (if of works, then no more of grace) be equally exclusive of grace under the covenant of works, if there were a covenant of works? Was, then, the condescension on God's part expressed to Adam in the garden of Eden a condescension that was in justice due to unfallen man, or was this condescension of grace even to man unfallen? Or does the question of man's moral condition, as fallen or unfallen, have anything to do with the question whether the covenant is of grace or of debt? If it be replied that the condescension is of grace, but the benefit of it—fruition of God, adoption of life—is of debt (conventional merit) to man unfallen, then we ask again, whether what is said to be of debt in the covenant, when the covenant deals with man unfallen may not be said to be equally of debt when the covenant deals with man fallen? In either case, whether the covenant deals with man fallen or unfallen, the reward is of debt to the representative head, but of grace to the members. If the reward in the dispensation called "the covenant of works" is of debt because of the conventional merit of the worker—the first Adam—

much more is the same reward under the dispensation called "the covenant of grace," of debt, because of the conventional—absolute merit of the worker—the second Adam. And if there is a grace element in the first, much more is there a grace element in the second. There is, therefore, in kind, the same essential elements of grace and of debt in both dispensations. As there is much more of grace in the second, so is there much more of debt in it also. The two dispensations, therefore, are one, so far at least as the elements of grace and of debt are concerned. Therefore, to distinguish them as two covenants, calling the one "the covenant of works," and the other "the covenant of grace," can tend only to confusion. It is distinguishing one from the debt element in it, and the other from the grace element in it, while the dispensations themselves do not determine which should be designated from the grace and which from the debt element. It would answer just as well to reverse the names and call the first "the covenant of grace," and the second "the covenant of works." If the first of the covenants is of works, then must the second be of works, for the *same reason*. And if the second is of grace, then must the first be of grace also, for the *same reason*. The second is of grace, therefore the first is not of works. The phrase "covenant of works," as the name of one of God's covenant dispensations, is excluded, and God's covenant with man (as a whole) is of grace; of grace when that covenant deals with man un-fallen as well as when it deals with man fallen. That God should deal with man by covenant at all, is of grace. That God should, in his covenant with man, offer him the blessing of justification, is of grace. That this covenant offer should be by means of a representative head, is of grace. And if for all these reasons God's covenant with man, considered as a whole, is of grace when that covenant deals with man fallen, why is it not also of grace when it dealt with man un-fallen, since, to man un-fallen, it offered the same blessing—justification by the same means—through a representative head, on the same condition, "the obedience of faith" to the members, and "perfect personal obedience" to the head.

III. God's covenant with man is through a representative head.

When God's covenant with man, as "expressed" to Adam in the garden of Eden, is called "a covenant of works," this proceeds upon and leads to a misapprehension of the footing upon which God's covenant plan offers its blessing to man. This first expression of the covenant is constantly spoken of as a legal covenant, as if it offered to individual human beings the blessing of justification on the ground of personal obedience. It is even gravely announced that all that keeps a sinner now from claiming justification on the ground of good works, is the inability of the sinner to produce the good works. This proceeds upon an utter misconception of the footing upon which the covenant plan offers its blessing. It loses sight also of the blessing offered. But we are speaking now of the footing upon which it is offered. It is a leading characteristic of God's covenant plan, that its blessing is not offered upon the ground of personal obedience, perfect or imperfect, but upon the ground of the obedience of the federal head. So that even if it were possible for a sinner to render what is meant by perfect personal obedience, it would not claim the blessing of the covenant, since it is not offered upon this ground. Had the first Adam succeeded as the head of the covenant, his descendants could not have claimed the blessing of the covenant on the ground of their own individual obedience. For the fact is, that a personal obedience that disregarded the righteousness of the representative head as the ground of justification, could not be perfect obedience for man under any dispensation of the covenant. For God's covenant with man, as soon as it is revealed, becomes thenceforth a fundamental element in man's religion, creating an obligation of its own, on the same footing with the obligation grounded by the fact of the creation. So that a personal, individual obedience, that disregarded the righteousness of the federal head, or did not include "the obedience of faith," could not be perfect, because of the very grounds of obligation created by God's covenant plan, modifying God's moral government. So that there is, indeed, no sense in which it is true that the only thing that keeps a sinner from claiming the blessing of the covenant, is his inability to produce the good works of personal obedience. The inability commonly meant is the inability

that results from depravity. But even if the individual to be justified were without sin, if his obedience stopped short of the federal, imputed element in the righteousness demanded by the covenant, it would not claim the blessing. There is, indeed, a works element, a legal element, in God's covenant plan, but the legal element has to do with the head, and not the members.

This distinction seems to be constantly lost sight of, especially in speaking of the first expression of God's covenant with man. When this first expression of God's covenant is called "the covenant of works," the mistake seems to be that of designating the whole plan from what is special to the head. And so, when the whole covenant plan is called "the covenant of grace," this is designating it from what is special to the members. It is true, indeed, that God's covenant plan, as a whole, is of grace. But the phrase, "covenant of grace," is commonly used of what is special to the members. The party of the second part in the covenant includes a representative head and individual members. Some of the provisions of the covenant are special to the head, while other provisions are special to the members. Losing sight of this, and asserting of the whole plan what is true only in reference to what is special to the members, the result is inconsistency of statement and confusion of ideas. When it is said, "the first covenant was a covenant of works," and the condition perfect *personal* obedience, this is asserting what is not true of the covenant as a whole. It is true only as to what is special to the head. And it is as true of the second head as of the first. When God said to Adam in the garden, "this do and live," "that do and die," this was special to Adam as the head. The first head having failed, the terms of the blessing to the posterity are not mentioned. When the covenant thus called "the covenant of works" is further described in the Confession as promising life to Adam, "and in him to his posterity," these words, "and in him to his posterity," bring in what is special to the members; but what is special to the members is not of works nor on condition of perfect *personal* obedience. Was the life promised to the posterity on the ground of the perfect personal obedience of the individuals of the posterity? Then what place is left for the head? This

severs the body from the head. We venture to suggest the question whether it would not contribute to perspicuity to call God's covenant with man "the covenant of justification." This would be designating the covenant from the end contemplated by it. It is the blessing bestowed rather than the means of bestowing it, that seems to be the leading characteristic of God's covenant mode of dealing. This also seems to be the *ultimate* ground of the grace element in the covenant. The blessing—justification—is to the angels as individuals. It is to man through a covenant head. The condition to angels is perfect *personal* obedience. The condition to man is perfect imputed obedience. In either case it is of grace, since it is over and above justice to bestow justification on the ground of perfect obedience, either personal or imputed. The reward of perfect obedience, according to pure justice, is contingent happiness. Who can plead perfect obedience, cannot be condemned. It is of grace that the reward of perfect obedience should be justification. The phrase, "covenant of grace," does not determine the extent of the covenant. It might stop at pardon and contingent holiness and happiness, so far as sinners of mankind are concerned, and still be a covenant of grace. The phrase, "covenant of justification," determines at once the nature of the covenant as of grace and the extent of it as unto justification, without confusing what is special to the head with what is special to the members.

IV. God's covenant with man is unto justification.

That fruition of himself which God condescends to give to man by way of covenant, bestows upon man a grade of well-being additional to that originally involved in the gift of the creation. It is admitted by all that this higher grade of well-being is included in the blessing of justification. Man's nature is so constituted as to awaken within him a consciousness of the need of such a gift of goodness, additional to that which pure justice affords, in order to complete his well-being. This gift of goodness which God condescends to bestow by way of covenant, this is that mysterious unknown which humanity has always felt the need of, without being able to define to itself what was needed. Nor is it possible, in the nature of the case, that natural reason should dis-

cover the supply for this great want of humanity. For the thing sought is not included in the principles of pure moral government, but lies altogether in the will and purpose of God, and therefore can be known only as he reveals it. And what he has been pleased to reveal is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. And the revelation as to what man needs and has always needed to complete his well-being, is included in justification—an ended probation, an indefectible holiness, a confirmed title to eternal life and adoption to sonship in the family of God. This is what man wants and has always wanted in order to experience the perfection of his well-being. And this God from all eternity decreed to bestow upon man. This is the blessing that was offered to man innocent in the garden of Eden, in what the Confession calls “the covenant of works;” and this is the blessing God now offers to man fallen, in what the Confession calls “the covenant of grace.” The blessing of justification, therefore, was not included in the perfection in which man was originally created. When man first proceeded from the creative hand of God, innocent and upright, he still wanted, from the first, this one special thing to complete his well-being. He was innocent and upright and happy, but not confirmed in this state. This treasure of innocence and uprightness and happiness with which he was originally endowed was intrusted to himself, and was held by himself, in contingency with an interminable line of probation stretching out before him, at every point of which he was liable to fall into sin and ruin. The treasure of well-being, therefore, with which he was originally endowed, in order to be complete, lacked this one special thing: justification, pronouncing his probation ended, and his title to eternal life confirmed, and his relation to God that of a son. This finishing touch of his well-being constitutes that fruition of God which the Confession says God of his goodness gives to man “*by way of covenant.*” The Scriptures present the idea of life in a two-fold form—the one contingent happiness in an unjustified state, the other confirmed happiness in a justified state. The one is the reward of pure justice on the ground of personal obedience, according to the principle of pure moral government resulting from the fact of the creation, the other is

the reward of goodness on the ground of the righteousness of a federal head according to the modification of pure moral government resulting from the fact of the covenant. No little confusion results from overlooking this distinction between *life* "under the law" and *life* "under grace," *e. g.*, the question of the lawyer and the answer of the Saviour. The usual interpretation is that the Saviour in his answer to the lawyer—"This do and thou shalt live"—reannounces the covenant of works. In our view the idea of a covenant of works, in the sense of a covenant offering the blessing of *justification* to individual human beings on the ground of their own individual obedience is unknown to the Scriptures. When the lawyer repeated to Christ the law of moral government, Christ replied to him, "This do and thou shalt live." Was this offering the man the blessing of justification on the ground of personal obedience to the law? Was this, as Hodge says, a "reannouncement of the covenant of works"? And was this the covenant made with Adam in the garden of Eden? Christ does not say, "This do and thou shalt have justification," but "This do and thou shalt live," viz., the life of contingent happiness in an unjustified state: thou shalt not be condemned. A guiltless creature under God's moral government cannot be condemned, neither under pure moral government can perfect personal obedience claim the blessing of justification. Therefore, when our Saviour said to the lawyer, "This do and thou shalt live," he did not announce a covenant of works as Hodge says: that is, he did not announce that justification is accessible on the ground of individual personal obedience. Instead of this he merely announced the law of pure justice, the law of pure moral government. This interpretation proceeds upon the assumption that the word *life* has a double meaning. Practically, to say to a sinner, "This do and thou shalt live," serves as a schoolmaster to lead us to Christ. For a sinner cannot produce the perfect obedience which God's moral government demands for *contingent life*; therefore all need Christ. The answer of the Saviour is from the lawyer's standpoint. The lawyer had no higher idea of life than that of contingent happiness. Christ answers him according to the idea he has, using the word *live* in the sense that

the lawyer used it. This is the *practical* interpretation. There is, however, a deeper theory in the Saviour's answer than the lawyer had in mind: it is that which results from taking the word *life* in its highest sense and comprehending in the condition which he states—"this do"—the condition of the gospel covenant. The love which is the fulfilling of the law cannot be perfect without taking in and approving all the facts from which moral obligations arise. But these facts include God's overture of goodness expressed by way of covenant. But the love which approves of God as he reveals himself in the covenant of justification includes "the obedience of faith." The first or practical interpretation serves to convict the mere legalist of sin (this is Paul's standpoint in Romans), the second or theoretical interpretation convicts of sin and sets forth the way of salvation at the same time. The self-righteous man, therefore, who expects to be *justified* on the ground of his own personal obedience bases his expectation upon what neither God nor justice ever promised. The very best that pure justice could do for personal righteousness, even if it were perfect, is to bestow contingent happiness. God has never offered the blessing of *justification* upon any other ground than that of federal imputed righteousness. Neither does God offer the blessing of justification to individual sinners as individuals, but as members of the mystical body of Christ the head. The best that God or justice could do for the self-righteous man, even if his own righteousness were perfect, would be to bestow upon him that contingent happiness, in the *status* of a servant, which belonged to man of right and justice before any covenant was entered into with him, offering the blessing of justification. The same principle applies to the professing Christian who expects his own good deeds or gracious exercises of soul to form part with the justifying righteousness of Christ the head. Let it be borne in mind, therefore, that God's covenant with man is unto justification, not merely unto contingent happiness.

V. God's covenant with man after the fall is continued in a modified form through Jesus Christ the second Adam as the representative head.

The relation between God and man is determined by what God

is to man or has done for man, in connexion with what man is to God or has become as to God. Man having become, as to God, a sinner, God's covenant with him must be modified to suit this new moral condition of man, and the specific form of man's duty to God is determined henceforth by these two new facts, that man is a sinner and God is a Saviour. As God's purpose of goodness to man in his first estate of innocency and uprightness must needs be revealed to man, so if this purpose of goodness still continues to man in his second estate of guilt and depravity, this also must needs be revealed to man. . God's covenant with man, therefore, has been revealed in two successive forms. It was first revealed to man innocent and upright with the first Adam as the federal head. It was, after the fall, revealed in a modified form to man guilty and depraved with the second Adam as the federal head. The form of the covenant, in the first "expression" of it, differs in some of its details from its form under the second "expression." This difference is due to the entrance of sin. Sin having entered, a mere human being is no longer competent for the place of federal headship. Hence under the second form of the covenant, the federal head is God-man. Also, in consequence of sin justification includes pardon, and faith includes repentance. With the first Adam as federal head under the first form of the covenant, what was actually incurred was condemnation in guilt and depravity. This fatal result of the covenant in its first form being from the beginning known to God, a second federal head was, from the beginning, appointed to represent us and to obtain for us the blessing of justification from a state of guilt and depravity. The failure of the first Adam remanded the race back to the relation sustained to God before this overture of goodness by way of covenant, with the addition of guilt and depravity. Now, if the principles of pure moral government admit of the first Adam's standing for the justification of his posterity from a state of contingent innocency and uprightness, then those principles of pure moral government admit of like provisions for man's justification from a state of condemnation in guilt and depravity, provided there can be found a second federal head competent to fulfil the conditions which the principles of God's

moral government must demand for our justification from the state in which we now find ourselves as the result of Adam's representation in the garden.

Here these two questions arise: 1st. What is the moral state in which man now finds himself? 2d. What must God's moral government demand for the justification of moral creatures in this state? As to the *first* question, the testimony is, first, that all mankind are dead in trespasses and sins; and second, that the penalty is suspended under respite. One object of the covenant with man was to fix a point in the line of probation at which justification might take place, and so man's destiny be no longer a matter of contingency and doubt, but of confirmed certainty. at this point in the line of probation, two alternatives were placed, life and death. Continuance in perfect obedience up to this point in this line of probation, would secure the blessing of life confirmed for ever in holiness and happiness, which is justification. Disobedience would secure death, confirmed for ever in sin and misery. The covenant thus provided for man's bringing his probation to an end, either in life or in death, either in justification or in condemnation. The testimony is that the probation of the first head ended in his eating the forbidden fruit. This act was a disobedience, and a disobedience amounting to a repudiation of God as his God, as revealed both in the fact of the creation and of the covenant. Having thus ended his probation in condemnation instead of justification, he had this remaining prospect before him—to bear the penalty in sin and misery for ever. But here the provisions of the covenant under the second head begin to take effect. The second Adam assumes the probation of the race with all the consequences upon it of the fall of the first Adam. Dr. Dabney: "The second Adam perfected for his people the line of probation dropped by Adam." Again: "The second Adam steps into the place vacated by the fall of the first, takes up the work where he dropped it." Again: "The covenant which fell through in Adam's inept hands was successfully accomplished in Christ's." In virtue of this continuance of the covenant under a second federal head, a respite is granted, the penalty is lightened and partially suspended. To what extent

the penalty is lightened to the whole race, is not easily determined; but in general, whatever evil the human race suffers in this world, is of the penalty; and whatever good it enjoys, is of the lightening of the penalty. The two fundamental and essential elements of sin, viz., guilt and depravity, are of the penalty. The depravity is total and the guilt responsive. That the depravity is only total and not absolute, is of the lightening of the penalty; so also of the responsive guilt. The moral state in which we find ourselves, therefore, in this world, is that of condemnation unto death in guilt and depravity, with a respite looking to justification through a second Adam as the federal head of the same covenant that "fell through in Adam's inept hands."

Now, the *second* question is, What must the principles of God's moral government demand of this second federal head, as the condition of man's justification from a state of guilt and depravity? And here the testimony, from the nature of the case, is evident, that in addition to what was required of the first Adam, the second must take away sin, both as to its guilt and as to its depravity. "For this the Son of man was manifested, that he might take away sin." This is what devolved upon the second Adam in addition to what was required of the first. The first Adam represented innocent and upright creatures; the second Adam represents guilty and depraved creatures. Therefore, the obedience of the second Adam must needs include the suffering of the penalty. And since the penalty upon the soul that sinneth is death, therefore the obedience of the second Adam must be an obedience unto death, an obedience that shall satisfy the precepts of the law for the acceptance of man as righteous; an obedience involving a death that shall satisfy the penalty of the law for man's sin. This is the "perfect personal obedience" which is the condition to the second Adam of man's justification from a state of guilt and depravity. This is the righteousness which, at the bar of God's moral government, is demanded of one who would represent us a second time in the covenant in which the first failed. As to the other question, whether there can be found one competent to fulfil this condition for us, the glad tidings which we call *the gospel*, is that Jesus Christ is thus competent,

and has actually fulfilled this condition as the second Adam of our justification from a state of guilt and depravity. Thus God's covenant with man after the fall is continued, in a modified form, through Jesus Christ, the second Adam, as representative head.

VI. God's covenant with man is ministered through the revelation of it.

Sinners of mankind become a party to the covenant by union with the federal head, and this union is by faith. And since faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God, therefore the covenant is ministered through the revelation of it. Faith sums up the duty which man owes to God as revealed in the covenant. The obedience of faith completes the union between the head and the members. And since the party of the second part is thus constituted of a body of members in a federal head, the promises of the covenant to the head are, in measure, to the members; and so also of the *principle* of obedience. This peculiarity of the party of the second part in the covenant seems to be a source of trouble to theologians. Some, for the sake of perspicuity, distinguish between what they call "the covenant of redemption" and "the covenant of grace." In our view, it would contribute to perspicuity, in the first place, as we have already intimated, to call God's covenant with man "the covenant of justification." Then, if a distinction of the kind referred to were made at all, it would, in our judgment, contribute to perspicuity to represent the covenant of justification as consisting of two parts, called, respectively, "the covenant of works" and "the gospel covenant." The phrase, "covenant of works," would indicate the legal or works element in the covenant of justification, and the phrase, "gospel covenant," would indicate the special grace element. The works element for the head, and the grace element for the members. This distinction would apply to the covenant of justification in both its forms, *i. e.*, with man unfallen and with man fallen. There is, in substance, the same legal element in what the Confession calls "the covenant of grace," that there is in what the Confession calls "the covenant of works;" and there is, in substance, the same gracious element in both.

But the point upon which perspicuity is sought is, "Who is the party of the second part to the covenant?" We answer, the party of the second part evidently consists of a head with a body of members. Now, this party of the second part may be considered *separately*—either as to the head, apart from the members, or as to the members, apart from the head—or it may be considered as *one whole*, and this from two points of view: either as to the head with the members, or as to the members in their head.

Considered separately, if it is desired to contemplate the head under the covenant as the principal party, apart from the members, then the portion of the covenant thus contemplated might, for the sake of convenience and perspicuity, be called "the covenant of works." The phrase, "covenant of works," is a "concise and convenient expression for" the part which the head performs in the economy of God's covenant dealing with man. On the other hand, if it is desired to contemplate the members as the secondary party of the second part, separate from the head, then the portion of the covenant thus contemplated might, for the sake of convenience and perspicuity, be called "the gospel covenant." The gospel is the revelation of the plan of justification involved in the covenant, setting forth the covenant offer, and the seals thereof. The form of this gospel covenant before the coming of Christ in the flesh, is different from the form of it after; but the substance of this portion of the covenant is the same before and after the advent. The difference in the form before and after Christ, we would distinguish not as "in the time of the law," and "in the time of the gospel." It is the gospel all the time. What is called "the law," or "the legal covenant," is only the legal element in the covenant, and pertains to the head. *The members must not try to fill the place of the head.* This is the force of the New Testament argument against the legalist. The legalist seeks to dispense with a federal head. On this principle, "Christ is dead in vain." If (the) righteousness (which the members seek) were by the law (which specifies what is required of the head), then Christ is dead in vain. The person thus establishing his own righteousness would sever himself alike from the body and

the head. Both the Old and the New Testaments set forth the terms of the covenant both to the head and to the members. The Old Testament typical sacrifices, for instance, set forth what the head was to do, and the New Testament history what he has done. And both Testaments also set forth the terms on which the members become with the head a party to the covenant of justification. If, therefore, it is deemed desirable to consider the covenant in its essential parts, and to give these parts a distinguishing name, then, in our view, the parts of the covenant are determined by the parts which constitute the whole of the covenanting party of the second part. These parts of this whole are, first, the head, and second, the members. If it be deemed desirable to give to these essential parts of the covenant a distinguishing name, then, in our view, that portion of the covenant in which the head is concerned separately from the members should be distinguished as "the covenant of works," and that portion in which the members are concerned separately from the head should be distinguished as "the gospel covenant," and both together constitute the one "covenant of justification."

But if the party of the second part be considered as *one whole*, then the covenant will be considered as one, and the gospel or the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments will be the charter of the covenant, containing its stipulations, conditions, and promises. And the covenanting party of the second part is the head with the members, or the members in their head. This gives two points of view from which the covenant may be contemplated. It is perhaps the number of standpoints from which the whole subject may be viewed that gives rise to confusion. The members covenanting in their head is the point of view from which the plan of salvation is principally presented in the Scriptures. This is the point of view that determines the language of the Confession in the words: "Wherein (in the covenant of grace) he freely offers to sinners life and salvation by Jesus Christ." From this point of view the condition of the covenant to the covenanting party of the second part (the party being the members in their head) is "the obedience of faith." Sinners become a party to "the covenant of justification" when they give the consent of faith to ful-

fil this condition. This is the covenant engagement on our part, of which the Lord's Supper is the seal, or one of the seals, baptism being the other. The whole of this obedience is characterised by faith, that is, by the fact that the knowledge involved in it is knowledge received by faith, hence called "the obedience of faith." The knowledge of which faith is the source (for faith is a source of knowledge just as reason or the five senses are sources of knowledge and the knowledge once received into the mind through this source determines the mind or the will just as any other knowledge received through any other source)—the knowledge of which faith is the source is the knowledge of what God proposes to do for us by covenant; or, as over and above what simple pure justice would require. The obedience to which this knowledge determines the will is *evangelical* as distinguished from that which is merely *legal* or *natural*. This evangelical obedience rendered constitutes evangelical righteousness, or what Paul calls "the righteousness of faith." The great fundamental fact to be borne in mind concerning this righteousness is, that it is twofold in its nature and in its object. It includes *the righteousness of justification* and *the righteousness of personal holiness*. The first is wrought exclusively by Jesus Christ as our head and representative and becomes ours by the consent of faith to become a party to the covenant through or by means of him as our head and representative in the covenant. He thus becomes the mediator of the covenant. He mediates the covenant between us and God; that is, he works the righteousness on the ground of which we become a party to the covenant. And he works in us the righteousness of personal holiness by which we are willing in the day of his power to be a party with him in the covenant. Hence we say "in the Lord have I righteousness and strength." This part of the righteousness of faith, viz., the righteousness of justification, we, in becoming a party to the covenant, bind ourselves to render by means of Jesus Christ as our surety. Hence the propriety of his blood being the seal of the covenant. His blood shed on Calvary sealed his own part in the covenant as our federal head, and when we receive the symbol of his blood in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, we seal our part in the covenant

by means of him as our head and representative. This, then, is the way we render that part of the righteousness of faith which is demanded as the ground of our justification, and this is the way we seal our covenant engagement with God to render this part of the righteousness of faith. We covenant to render to God the suffering that shall satisfy the penalty of the law for our sins, and to render the perfect obedience to the precepts of the law which shall be meritorious ground of the acceptance of our persons as righteous. But all this righteousness, active and passive, of our justification we render not by ourselves personally—hence boasting is excluded—but by our federal head by whom we become a party to the covenant. Hence we thus do not make void the law, but establish the law—the law, if you please, of the covenant of works. This explains the vexed question of the legal element in the old dispensation and also in the new. It is the federal head that has to do with the works element of the Mosaic ritual as a condition of life. It shows to the members the rule of duty and the condition of life for the head. This part of the righteousness of faith is the meritorious part of the righteousness of justification, on the ground of which God, on his part, in the covenant binds himself not only to bestow the blessing of justification itself, including pardon and adoption, but also to bestow all that special regenerating and sanctifying grace whereby we are enabled unto the other part of the righteousness of faith which consists in personal holiness, and is our good works and reward. In the sacrament of the Lord's Supper we covenant and seal our covenant engagement with God to exercise this personal holiness and to perform these good works. The righteousness of faith, therefore, as we said, is distinctly twofold: it includes the righteousness of justification satisfying the penalty of the law for our sins and satisfying the precepts of the law for the acceptance of our persons as righteous. This part of the righteousness of faith is rendered by Jesus Christ our head and representative. It becomes ours, as a party to the covenant, when we give the consent of faith to become a party to the covenant and partakers of the blessing of justification through Christ as thus representing us. We thus by faith hold up to God Jesus Christ as our representative, ful-

filling for us and *we fulfilling by him* the righteousness of our justification. This is one of the advantages of considering the covenanting party of the second part as one. . . What is done by either the head or the members is *seen* and *felt* to be done by the one whole consisting of head and members. The prevailing Scripture representation is that the covenant of justification is with the members in their head, the members covenanting to render both the righteousnesses, the one by Christ the head, the other themselves in their own persons as the expression of their gratitude to God and as acting out the life received from God under the covenant. As to the meaning we give the phrase "righteousness of faith," we would say *first*: Let it be held fast for ever that the phrase "righteousness of faith," sometimes called "the righteousness of God," carries prominently the idea of the righteousness wrought out by Jesus Christ, which is imputed to us and received by faith as the sole meritorious ground of our justification. We would say *secondly*: That the phrase, "obedience of faith," in Rom. i. 5, and xvi. 26, by common consent means that obedience which is personal as distinguished from that which is imputed. Hodge says: "The subjective sense of the word faith is so predominant in the New Testament, that it is safest to retain it in this passage." "It is that obedience of which faith is the controlling principle." This obedience rendered constitutes a righteousness—the righteousness of faith. Heb. xi. 33, with Acts x. 35. "By faith wrought righteousness"—the righteousness is personal. Faith works a twofold righteousness, one personal, one *by means* of a representative surety.

VII. General remarks.

Now, with the view we have given of God's covenant with man, what becomes of what the Confession calls "the covenant of works" and what theologians generally call "the covenant of works"? We answer, when our Confession of Faith and our orthodox theologians following the Confession speak of the "first covenant which God made with man" as a "covenant of works" "on condition of perfect personal obedience," this is a mere *side* remark which is inconsistent with the general tenor of the teaching of the Confession of Faith, and inconsistent with the general

tenor of the teaching of our orthodox theologians. As a specimen of the teaching of our orthodox theology on this subject, let us hear Dr. Dabney. We shall hear him at one time speaking of the covenant made with man as a "covenant of works," and actually discussing the question whether the covenant of works is abrogated, or whether Christ reannounced it to the lawyer as a covenant still in force, whereby, if its condition could be fulfilled, justification might be secured under it. At another time and in another connexion we shall hear the same Dr. Dabney saying that "the covenant that fell through in Adam's inept hands was successfully accomplished in Christ's." And much more to the same effect. Now, what covenant was it that fell through in Adam's inept hands? Dr. Dabney: The same that was successfully accomplished in Christ's. But the covenant successfully accomplished in the hands of Christ is the covenant of grace. How, then, was it the covenant of works when it was in the hands of the first Adam? If the covenant in the hands of the first Adam was a covenant of works, then what Christ accomplished was the covenant of works. This is only one specimen of the inconsistency of statement that pervades the whole of our orthodox theology. Hodge says the phrase "covenant of works" is a "concise and convenient expression for the eternal principle of justice." 2 Cor. iii. 6. And the eternal principle of justice (he says) is *do and live*, and that, when Christ said to the lawyer, "This do and thou shalt live," he reannounced the covenant of works. This would make Dr. Dabney say that Christ "successfully accomplished" the eternal principle of justice. Now, as we understand it, the eternal principle of justice, or the principle of *do and live*, knows nothing of a point in the line of probation at which justification might take place. Here is the great oversight. If the covenant with Adam did not promise the blessing of justification, how did it better his condition? He could do and live before. If it left him where justice left him, it was not of goodness or grace, and therefore "the fruition of God" of which the Confession speaks, which God offered to man by covenant, amounts to nothing. Moreover, the eternal principle of justice, or of *do and live*, deals with individuals according to their

personal righteousness, but the covenant with Adam offered the blessing of justification to individuals as members of a body organised in a federal head, and on the ground, not of personal, but of imputed righteousness. The truth is, the phrase "covenant of works" is a concise and convenient expression for the self-righteous idea of justification upon the ground of individual obedience. But this blessing, upon this ground, neither God nor justice ever offered; and there is no such thing as the covenant of works other than as the eternal principle of justice is involved in the covenant of justification, specifying what God's moral government must require of the federal head of that covenant.

K. M. MCINTYRE.

ARTICLE IV.

THE VITAL CONNEXION BETWEEN REVELATION
AND SOUND LEARNING.

Of the objections brought against Christianity by its enemies, none is more popular in our age than its supposed hostility to scientific discovery and sound learning. For a long time this opposition was confined to the learned, but now it is extending among the simple. By the universal diffusion of newspapers, the words of the wise and their dark sayings have become the common property of mankind. The latest discoveries of science and their supposed correction of the mistakes of Moses and the prophets afford occasion for many an infidel sneer in the drawing-rooms of the polite and the cabins of the poor.

The alleged grounds of this opposition are various. Because the methods of investigating historical truth differ widely from those adopted by the students of physical science, the patrons of the latter are fond of challenging the conclusions of the former. In response to this challenge the treatises on theology which appear from time to time are prefaced with a formal and elaborate reasserting of the arguments in rebuttal of the testimony of