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BULLETIN

Paradoxes of the Ministry Today

All Things to All Men

Kerygma and Discipleship

Sermons:

The Light of Men

Prophet and Priest, But Not a King

Freedom and Tradition in Pastoral Theology

Renewal Through Witness

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TILLICH'S SCIENCE OF BEING

WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON

Two generations ago, William E. Gladstone, British statesman and Prime Minister, in the *Nineteenth Century* (1888), reviewed a famous novel by Mrs. Humphrey Ward entitled *Robert Elsmere*. Mrs. Ward for conscientious reasons had abandoned her traditional faith in the Trinity and in the Divinity of Christ and had traced a similar change of belief in the hero of her novel. She and her spokesman seemed happier in a fervent belief in a bare monotheism expressed in lives of devotion to the Christian virtues and in notable service among the people.

Gladstone's review was reprinted in *Later Gleanings* (Scribner's, New York, 1897), and its closing sentence read: "If the ancient and continuous creed of Christendom has slipped away from its place in Mrs. Ward's brilliant and subtle understanding, it has nevertheless by no means lost a true, if unacknowledged, hold upon the inner sanctuary of her heart."

For some time past theological interest has centered in the work of two "offbeat" theologians who have wandered from the path of traditional orthodoxy. They are Rudolf Bultmann of Germany and Paul Tillich of America. Both have a divided allegiance to the new philosophy of existentialism on the one hand and to the teaching of the Old and New Testaments on the other. Our topic is the ontology of Tillich, with only a brief glance at Bultmann. Our main sources are his two volumes on *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, 1951, and Vol. II, 1957; also *Biblical Re-*

ligion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, 1955 (University of Chicago Press). Two volumes of sermons should also be consulted: *The Shaking of the Foundations*, 1948, and *The New Being*, 1955 (both by Scribner's, New York). It will be convenient to confine ourselves to a few leading topics without going into the details of Tillich's wide ranging discussion.

Tillich and Creation

Tillich fully recognizes the value of the Biblical and traditional doctrine of Creation. In what he says about creation we hear the voice of traditional orthodoxy strongly expressed. He says that according to every word of the Bible, "God reveals himself as personal" (*Biblical Religion*, etc., p. 22. All quotations in this section are taken from this book). The doctrines of Christ, of salvation and fulfilment depend on this doctrine. It emphasizes the dependence of all creation on God and the essential goodness of creation. It protects against the two gods, good and evil of dualism, and the idealistic merging of God and man into monism. "It emphasizes the infinite distance between the creator and the creature" (p. 36). It was correct and proper "for Jews and Christians to speak of creation out of nothing. Creation through the word means the personality of God" (pp. 35, 36). Biblical religion in the Old and New Testaments is a religion of personalities. The climax of the argument for the personality of God as the ultimate reality is in the doctrine of Incarnation. The full and final

revelation of God: "God is so personal that we can see what he is only in a personal life" (p. 38). It leaves God in his majesty, his power, in his sharp and clear-cut difference from all his creatures. This sharp difference protects monotheism from polytheism and pantheism. It emphasizes the dependence on God of everything created and, consequently, the essential goodness of creation (p. 35). Of this doctrine he says, "Without it, Christianity would have ceased to exist as an independent movement" (p. 35).

Tillich's praise of the Biblical ontology of Genesis could not be stronger or more admirably expressed, and it seems, to quote Dr. Patton, [to be] "shot from the tense bow-string of conviction." We are astonished, then, to hear a new and authoritative voice from the stage, the voice of Philosophy. It is so directly opposed to the eloquent plea for the Biblical ontology that wonder: Can it be by the same man? The new voice of an impersonal ontology breaks in without ceremony and says of ontology: "It speaks of being—itself as the ground of everything that is, personal and impersonal. It speaks of the identity of the infinite with the finite. It speaks of the finite mind through which the Absolute Mind wills and recognizes himself" (p. 36). The two ontologies, Biblical and philosophical, run parallel but never meet. But it will be Tillich's declared task to show their "profound interdependence" (p. 42).

It is unfortunate, the critic could remark, that the "Absolute Mind" when it planned and carried out the stupendous enterprise of Creation, was deprived of the advice and consent of a senate of finite spirits because no finite spirits yet existed.

Under this new system, Tillich acknowledges, the way is open for the dualism and monism from which the Biblical ontology gave protection. Two morals may now be safely drawn: first, that with his bitter hostility to the supernatural he can admit no real doctrine of Creation; and second, that there are two Tillichs, two souls within a single breast, or one and the same great scholar suffering from a type of schizophrenia in the broadest sense, attached with almost equal fervor and equal conscientiousness to two incompatible and mutually exclusive ontologies, one leading to an abstract and impersonal and speechless and loveless Being, and the other who created the world by his word and out of nothing in the effortlessness of his omnipotence.

The early Greek thinkers and the philosophers from Plato and Aristotle down have been seeking for Ultimate Reality. As philosophers they cannot and will not appeal to revelation, although Plato in the *Phaedo* reports that Socrates advises Simmias and Cebes to take the best of human opinions and thus sail, not without risk, over the sea of life, unless we have some divine word. People in university circles have all known devout philosophers and scientists but have never heard them sing, in passionate praise to Being itself. Why should they? First, because Being is an abstraction from the innumerable beings in the world and is itself on the side of the finite and cannot reach the ultimate, and the philosophers who do their best work in moments of detachment and reflection regard passions and emotion as obstacles to clarity of thought. What can Tillich do in the circumstances? Fortunately he has discovered a short cut to Ultimate Reality,

and uses it constantly and skillfully in his argument. An ultimate concern is the key to Ultimate Reality. There is no doubt of its utility as pointing to the truth but much as to its infallibility. The concern must be passionate and unconditional, a matter of life and death. It must grasp us or be grasped by us with our whole being, not by reason alone. Tillich thinks that there may be such concern for being-itself as the psalmist had when he exclaimed, "My soul is athirst for God, for the living God" (Ps. 42:2). I believe it is plain that if God is the Creator of all things, visible and invisible, that being-itself, abstracted by the human mind from finite things, must fall on the finite side and further is so uncertain in meaning and closely allied, as we shall see, with Nothingness that it cannot be a matter of life and death. Ultimate Concern is too enigmatic, too subjective, too changeable from group to group and from one period in an individual life to another to reach as high as heaven or as deep as the Everlasting Arms.

Examples easily suggest themselves. Thus C. S. Lewis, in his book, *Miracles*, 1947, says that he was at first an atheist with a "passionate conviction" that miracles never happened, but then he became a Christian with an equally passionate conviction that the Gospel miracles are historical. Similarly Reinhold Niebuhr in his *Beyond Tragedy*, 1937 (pp. 289, 290), speaks of his radical change of view on the Resurrection since twenty years ago. Muslims have as much concern for their creed as Christians, and many observers say that the Communists have more. Tillich's radical change in the matter of the Fall (see next section) may be a

case in point. It is possible that Tillich's short cut to Ultimate Reality may be like the by-way into which the Pilgrim was led and which ended up with Doubting Castle and Giant Despair.

Tillich and the Fall

In the philosophical situation today what stands out with most startling emphasis is the fact that the new school of Existentialism has given powerful support to the Biblical doctrine of the Fall. Existentialism, as Tillich has rightly said, is a description of the human predicament. The result is that the writings of the living existentialists without exception are dotted with such terms as estrangement, anguish, anxiety, care, dread of death or nothingness and guilt. Meaninglessness is bad enough, but it is the least of our troubles. What are all of these dreadful terms but a modern translation of the old-fashioned "estate of sin and misery" into which men have fallen?

Tillich has felt the trend, and with admirable candor, insight, and common sense, has confessed in a later publication, *Love, Power, and Justice* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1960, p. 25), that "estrangement presupposes oneness." More explicitly a year earlier in his *Theology of Culture*, he says: "In the Christian tradition, there are three fundamental concepts. First, *Esse que esse bonum est*. This Latin phrase is a basic dogma of Christianity. It means 'Being as being is good.' Or in the biblical mythological form: God saw everything that he had created, and behold, it was good. The second statement is the universal fall—fall meaning the transition from this essential goodness into existential estrangement from

oneself, which happens in every living being and in every time. The third statement refers to the possibility of salvation. . . . These three considerations of human nature are present in all genuine theological thinking: essential goodness, existential estrangement, and the possibility of something, a 'third,' beyond essence and existence, through which the cleavage is overcome and healed" (pp. 118, 119). These three stages in an authentic theology are evidently successive. Tillich's present testimony is more effective because in his two volume *Systematic Theology* he held firmly the view that Creation and the Fall were simultaneous. He formerly thought that we were compelled to believe that creation and the fall are coincident. "Creaturally freedom is the point at which Creation and the Fall coincide" (*S.T.* I., p. 256). "There is no point in time and space in which created goodness was actualized and had existence." There is no utopia in the past and will be none in the future. "Creation and estrangement are identical" (*S.T.* II, p. 44). There is no need to discuss the point for in later publications Tillich gives it up and shows that he cannot continue to believe that a loving God would create man in estrangement, if not in hostility to himself. It is plain that Tillich cannot continue to believe it.

In Tillich's present view of the Fall it is an historic event and there was a time in the history of humanity, before sin by man had entered into the world (Rom. 5:12) when the way is opened to believe that in history at its end "Christ will appear a second time, not to deal with sin but to save those who are eagerly waiting for him" (Heb. 9:28).

Tillich's Being and Nothingness

The topic of the relation of Being to non-being or Nothingness has assumed major importance in recent years. The shadow has become of greater importance than the sun which casts the shadow, as in the story of the man who made, he thought, a shrewd bargain with the devil on the promise of great wealth and the gift in return of his worthless shadow—and his soul. When the boys jeered after him on the sunny street, and people avoided him as a sinister figure and his fiancée broke her engagement, he discovered that with his shadow he had thrown away all hope of happiness in life.

The story would have no point were it not for the paradox that what has no value or even existence has usurped the leading role in philosophical drama which might well be called with Shakespeare "much ado about nothing," but has been named in euphemism "existentialism." When the critic wants to be sure of a laugh he will parody the familiar hymn and sing: "How sweet the name of *Being* sounds in a believer's ear."

Tillich's name is often associated with that of Bultmann. Both are called existentialists, and they do not, to my knowledge, disown the soft impeachment. To be an existentialist is no reproach or advantage to a theologian, since this school of thought is completely neutral in religious faith. A glance at Pascal and Nietzsche, both called precursors and morning stars of existentialism, will show the extremes which may be found in religious attitudes. Thus Pascal says: "Jesus Christ is the Center of everything and the object of everything; and he who does not know him

knows nothing of the order of the world, and nothing of himself."

Nietzsche says repeatedly that "God is dead." Karl Jaspers, in his definitive biography of Nietzsche, (translated into French, but not into English) declares that in this saying the philosopher did not make himself an atheist but aimed to clear the road for a "higher region" beyond good and evil. Jaspers believed that Nietzsche with this power could elevate the race by "severity, violence, slavery, tempter's art and devilry of every kind—by everything wicked, terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and serpentine in man" (*Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 44). The title of the work from which this quotation is drawn is significant.

Kierkegaard, the founder of existentialism, was a Lutheran and Marcel is a Roman Catholic. Both would vote for the Ten Commandments, of which the sixth protects my life, the seventh my wife and family, the eighth my property, and the ninth my good name. Tillich is strong on the ethical emphasis in both testaments. "Biblical ethics means standing in ultimate decision for or against God" (*Biblical Religion*, p. 46).

The being of God is the central problem of Tillich's *Systematic Theology*, I & II. Kierkegaard, deadly enemy of Hegel, had an implicit ontology when he spoke of the infinite qualitative distinction of God from all other beings. Tillich in his ontological argument uses constantly the term "being-itself," and very often "the power of being." Being is a broader term than God. It does not distinguish but includes two kinds of beings, finite being—an abstraction from the multiplicity of beings—and an eternal, self-existent living God and Creator. The "power of being" thus is am-

biguous. It can mean the power of God or a powerless abstraction from finite beings—impersonal, speechless and loveless. "God is love" is not derived from psychoanalysis or from dissection of Dasein, but from revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

Tillich sees a tree in his back yard and says that it "exists only because it participates in that power of being which is treehood" (*S.T.* II, p. 11). But can the putting on of the 'hood,' treehood, ever make a tree? I see from my window an enormous spruce tree towering over its neighbors and carrying up with it a tremendous weight of trunk and branches against the downward pull of gravitation. As I gaze on my tree I can only say with the poet in profound and reverent conviction, "Only God can make a tree." We must be careful and not go back to the pre-Baconian age of science and change the nature of a thing into its efficient cause.

Tillich is still hopeful of the effort to assimilate the apostolic tradition and the modern mind. Others—Schleiermacher, Hegel and modern liberals—have failed. But, he says, "There is no choice for us. We must try again" (*Biblical Religion, etc.*, p. 57). In every period that we know, and worse times are predicted for the future, the modern mind is too frivolous, too self-centered, too much a lover of self, lover of pleasure and of money, and too little a lover of God to make this possible. "If any one loves the world, love for the Father is not in him" (I John 2:15). His view of the polarity of faith and doubt makes him bring together things that are poles apart, makes him mix oil and water. He is following here the dictum of a great revolutionist, Lenin, whose collected works show that he is no mean

controversialist. The principle is that dialectics is the unity of opposites.

We are reminded of Shelling's *System of Identity*: Object and subject, real and ideal, nature and spirit are all identical in the absolute.

Tillich's view of faith and doubt as correlates—that faith holds or hides doubt in its heart—obscures the distinction between truth and falsehood. Tillich says: "Faith and doubt do not essentially contradict each other. Faith is the continuous tension between itself and the doubt within itself" (p. 60). What kind of faith is he speaking of? It is not the kind of faith which Abraham had when he believed that God could raise the dead. It is not the faith which Moses had when he endured as seeing him who is invisible when God made a slave race his chosen people and delivered them from a mighty empire by a mighty hand and a stretched out arm.

It is not the faith which found expression in the inspired eloquence of Romans, Chapter 8. God is on our side, and his love is assured to us by facts of history which have never been successfully denied. Christ died and he rose again the third day. Our hope is a living hope based upon these facts and upon the revelation that he is now upon the throne, ever living to make intercession for us. Then the organ with all the stops open peals forth in a glorious crescendo, and the chorus bursts forth in a triumphant challenge to all the forces of the universe and all the powers of evil to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

It was not the faith of the early Christians which placed the Cross above the Roman eagle, proud emblem of imperial power, Bishop Wescott, studying em-

peror worship, says of the early Christians that their witness to an unseen world was "a pledge of a nobler freedom than had ever been realized among men: that the belief in God, as made known to them in Christ, was the one safeguard against utter slavery."

Harnack, in his great work *The Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*, declares: "Now, for the first time, that testimony rose among men, which cannot ever be surpassed, the testimony that *God is Love*."

The vacillating faith with which Browning's Bishop Blougram, over his wine cups, pictures

A life of doubt diversified by faith,
so easily interchangeable with
A life of faith diversified by doubt,

is as different as possible from the faith which is a matter of life and death to him who possesses it. The Master told his disciples not of a faith which could be discussed lightly in detachment over the wine cups, but of a powerful faith which could move mountains and move the arm that moves the world (Matt. 21:21, 22). The Apostle Paul, a prisoner at Rome and in the imminent prospect of death, had the faith to declare to Timothy, "I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded, that he is able . . ." (II Tim. 1:12). Shall I say also that it is the faith of Tillich when he quotes with profound admiration and appreciation both in his systematic work and in his printed sermons the passage in Romans 8 alluded to above?

During the middle years of this century our philosophical schools have been haunted by the specter of non-being, nothingness, nihil, or whatever we may call it and the ghost has never been laid. What are we to do about it? Tillich

himself admits that "the correlation of ontology and Biblical religion is an infinite task," which means that he has not solved it. For he says on the same page: "*Against* Pascal I say: The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and the God of the philosophers is the same God. He is a person and the negation of himself as a person" (From *Biblical Religion, etc.*, p. 85). The tasks he assigns himself is not only "infinite," it is impossible so long as he keeps turning contradictions into correlates, and so long as he, with his contemporaries, Heidegger and Sartre, finds a place for nothingness in the conception of God or rejects God altogether.

Tillich believes that there are a few "converted" philosophers who have a "regenerated reason" and that some of them have an ultimate concern for Being or being-itself, thus pointing to ultimate reality. But Being is the last abstraction from a host of finite beings and belongs therefore, we have argued, in the finite sphere and cannot be ultimate. This abstraction then, whether assumed by Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, or Tillich, cannot reach the ultimate which can only be the ground of all existence and can only be found in God. Biblical religion, whether expressed in scriptural passages (John 1:3, Col. 1:16, 17; Heb. 1:2, 3; I Pet. 3:22) or interpreted in the creeds, confessions, rituals, hymns and prayers of all the leading branches of the Church, shows that God created all things by and through the eternal Word, and is the Lord of all Being and all history, Lord of everything with which science deals, Lord of nature, and Lord of the destiny of men and of nations and empires and civilizations. No non-theistic existentialist can unite upon a credible and consistent ontology which

must reach to the ultimate ground of all existence, which is God. No ontology of this type can offer us a God that we can pray to and worship, or a God that can hear and answer prayer. Nothingness is usually regarded as something evil, something that ought not to be. It is associated with the last enemy, death, and the fear of death. What more frightening and frightful nightmare could there be than when one dreams that he is falling headlong into the bottomless pit of extinction? Barth shows clear insight in seeking to remove Nothingness as far from God as possible. The only concession he makes is to say that this nameless Nothing is what Jesus Christ destroyed by his work on the Cross. Whether this is the last word that can be said on the subject I cannot say. At any rate Biblical religion asserts that "God is light and in him is no darkness at all" (I John 1:5).

Tillich and the Gospels

The last unkindest cut of all is when Tillich assails the integrity and truth of the Gospels and invalidates the charter of the faith of the Church. Listen carefully when he says:

"Miracles cannot be interpreted in terms of a supernatural interference in natural processes. If such an interpretation were true, the manifestation of the ground of being would destroy the structure of being, God would be split within himself, as religious dualism has asserted. It would be more adequate to call such a miracle 'demonic,' not because it is produced by 'demons,' but because it discloses a 'structure of destruction' (See Part IV, Sec. I.). It corresponds with the state of 'being possessed' in the mind and could be called 'sorcery.' The Supra-naturalistic

theory of miracles makes God a sorcerer and cause of 'possession'; it confuses God with demonic structure in the mind and in reality" (*S.T. I.*, p. 116).

If I use an *ad hominem* argument and insist that the "split" is in Tillich himself my only excuse will be that he asked for it. In order to save space my comments on the above passage, to adopt a musical figure, will be in an abrupt *staccato* style rather than in the more smooth and leisurely *legato*.

1. It is dangerous for a theologian to set limits on what can happen in nature, or what could happen in Galilee during the ministry of Christ, especially when this restriction has already been removed and outmoded by the advance of science. We refer to the postulated and inviolable "structure of being."

2. In recent years two powerful hammers have been beating against the anvil of the trustworthiness of the Gospels, Bultmann's hammer of demythologizing in Germany and Tillich's hammer of deliteralizing in this country. To one who has studied the course of Criticism from Reimarus to Wrede and beyond it is difficult to believe that the anvil will be destroyed. "The anvil wears the hammers out, you know." If one law of nature can because of interference repeal all the other laws, then the tree which bore Newton's apple could not have risen one inch from the ground.

3. When a man is at the end of his rope and finds that he cannot save himself and knows that no man can by any means redeem his brother, then he will look to the supernatural and the mighty works of God as his only hope for this life and the next, and will look to the Resurrection of Christ which gives death its death blow and kindles the

sure and certain hope of everlasting life through Jesus Christ our Lord.

4. Enormous industry and energy have been expended in the past century and a half in the search for the "human-historical" Jesus underneath the text of the Gospels. In Latin there have been three stages in the course of that great effort. *Aut Deus, aut non bonus* (God or not good); *aut Deus, aut non sanus* (God or not of sound mind); *aut Deus, aut ignotus* (God or unknown and unknowable). Remove the miraculous from the narratives and no outlines of any definite figure remain. Turn to the teaching and only a faint whisper is echoed from the Galilean hills. The failure to draw from the Gospels a credible picture of a non-miraculous Jesus has built up a cumulative argument of great power for the truth of the Gospel miracles.

5. The cure for science when it seems to invalidate religion is more and better science. Tillich when he makes his oracular diatribe against miracles quoted above, is, if I understand him, living in the Newtonian, not the Einstein age. His untouchable "structure of being" (I must qualify again by saying if I understand him) seems to imply a block world, making our universe a block universe of matter and motion, a rigidly deterministic mechanical universe of matter and motion, and making man into an automaton. In plain English this is not an up-to-date science.

Newton's laws of motion and of matter afterward hardened into the strictly mechanical view of the universe. My fellow townsman, Albert Einstein in Princeton, is my authority for saying that this theory is no longer a postulate of science.

Einstein practically preached its fu-

neral sermon when he said that the advance of electrical science has "caused a complete breakdown of the belief that all phenomena can be explained mechanically." And again that "the new quantum physics removes us still further from the old mechanical view, and a retreat to the former position seems, more than ever, unlikely" (Einstein and Infeld, *The Evolution of Physics*, 1938, pp. 125, 309).

Science, to make way for its own advance, removed the strait jacket from the spirit of man, and opened a wide avenue for the freedom of God in the exercise of his grace.

6. Some would discard all the deeds of Jesus but save his words out of the wreck. Let us see how what he began to do and to teach are separable. Bultmann in his *Jesus*, 1929, saved the words of Jesus from the wreck, but said that if Jesus of Nazareth never existed it would make no difference to his religious life. Tillich in his printed sermons says that Jesus is not the truth because his teachings are true, but the other way about. His teachings are true because he is the truth (*The New Being*, p. 70). Look for a moment at the eleventh chapter of Matthew, containing the most intimate disclosure of his relations to God in the Synoptic Gospels and the great invitation to burdened man. When the Baptist sends to ask, "Are you he that is to come?" the answer of Jesus was his works. "The blind receive their sight and the lame walk, lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, and the poor have the good news preached to them" (Matt. 11:5). The guilt of the cities where his mighty works were done was that they were blind to the meaning of his redeeming works (Matt.

11:21-24). If the works were false, so were the words (See also John 15:22-24.).

7. I must say a word about the Resurrection where a volume would be more adequate. Tillich rejects the physical theory, although he says it is the most beautiful, and the psychological theory of visions, and proposes a "Restitution Theory." This is that some disciples who had fled to Galilee became convinced the New Being into whom the "man Jesus" had been transformed, could not have been defeated by his death as a criminal. This subjective experience, followed by others, was the origin, overlaid by legendary matter, of the faith in the Resurrection. Tillich's Resurrection theory means a man-made resurrection instead of a raising from the dead by the power of God. (References are too numerous and need not be given.) The restitution theory is weak, made by disciples in Galilee who had never investigated the empty tomb. In a couple of places Tillich supports the judgment that his theory is weak. "It (the theory, while he thinks adequate) must also be considered a theory. . . ." It remains (he says candidly) "in the realm of probability, and does not have the certainty of faith" (*S.T. I.*, p. 58). He adds that "the attitude of the New Testament and especially of the non-literalistic Apostle Paul justifies the theory of restitution" (*ibid.*). Was Paul non-literalistic when he said that Christ died, was buried, arose on the third day, and appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve? (I Cor. 15:3, 4). Was he non-literalistic and could be accused of "literalistic distortion of symbols and myths" (*ibid.*, p. 152) when on the way to Damascus the Risen Lord spoke to him in his child-

hood's language, in words twice repeated before Agrippa and before the mob in Jerusalem, and reported again by his most intimate friend, Luke (Chapters 9, 22, and 26)? Who in the world could have invented those words of identity with the church, "Why do you persecute me?" words which burnt themselves into Paul's memory and changed the course of his life and the history of Europe? A noted French New Testament scholar, Maurice Goguel, has found the source of the four Gospels in a narrative written during the eighteen months before the conversion of Paul which closed with the passion and left out both the Resurrection and the Great Commission in Matt. 28. I am ready now to rest my assurance of Jesus' resurrection upon a single argument, until it is refuted. Who at this period would have written such a "gospel" of bad news as is contemplated? Would the Jews who hated Jesus and wanted to forget him? Would the Jews who were bitterly disappointed by the hoped for political Messiah? Would the Christians and Apostles who, before they saw the empty tomb and the marks in the hands of the risen Savior, were in deep despondency and despair? Who would think of writing the life of one who died seemingly in defeat and disillusion and ended his life in desertion, darkness and blood? I am glad that there are "many proofs" (Acts I:3), the most convincing and irrefutable among which are the empty grave never accounted for, the appearances to a number of well-known people who lived long after the event, and then our fellowship with the Father and with his Son, Jesus Christ, who has promised to be with us all the days. It is good for us to see how broadly based is our cer-

tainty of the resurrection. It is well for us to walk about Zion, to tell the towers thereof, to mark well her bulwarks and consider her palaces that we may tell the generation following. This God is our God forever and ever. He will be our guide even unto death.

It would strengthen my hypothesis of the two Tillichs if time and space permitted us to place in parallel columns what he says in his *Systematic Theology* and in his printed sermons. It is my misfortune that I have never heard him preach. In his ecstatic mood and his moments of illumination he has insights, as when he is in the pulpit or preparing for it, insights that can illumine and inspire his hearers and readers. Comparison between his two moods show that contradictions have no terror for him. Is the relation between the two teachings correlation or polarity? He is certainly equally sincere and conscientious in both roles. His divided loyalty is a challenge to the psychologist. He has two sermons on healing, one of them with the text (Matt. 10:1) that Jesus gave his disciples authority "to overcome unclean spirits, to cast them out, and to heal every disease and every infirmity." There can be no doubt, as I see it, that Jesus was conscious of having miraculous power which he never used for his own advantage. In the second sermon he says that "the woman who encountered him," a chronic invalid for many years, "was made whole, the demoniac who met him," who broke bonds and fetters was the terror of the neighborhood, "was liberated from his mental cleavage" (*The New Being*, p. 43). These cases were surely miracles; they are wonderful, they were signs of his redeeming pow-

er and part of it, and of destroying the work of the devil and restoring lost integrity of personality.

Miracles are not excess baggage, they are not the cargo which may be thrown over to lighten the ship, they are the *ballast* which keeps the ship steady amid the shriek of the tempest and the surging of the waves. They are the breaking through of the spiritual into the natural order for a redemptive purpose. They answer the questions of our deepest and most passionate and most personal concerns: Does God exist? Can he save me?

We are reminded often that no final appraisal of Tillich's work should be

made until his third volume appears. Then we may hope that the differences between the two Tillichs may be made less glaring. When we remember Augustine's *Retractions*, the changes in Barth's views since he wrote his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, changes which all thinkers are expected and permitted to make, and the radical and profound change which he himself made in his interpretation of the Fall, we hope that further study, reflection and experience will cause him to make changes, even radical changes, in those aspects of his teachings which, while interesting in their novelty, cut deeply into "Biblical religion."