

The Princeton Theological Review

JANUARY 1927

THE NAMES OF GOD IN THE PSALMS

The importance of fixing the approximate date and probable authorship of the Psalms arises largely from the bearing of these matters upon the history and religion of Israel. The prophetic authorization of the Canon and the trustworthiness of the historic records depend, also, in large measure upon the time at which the Psalms were written. It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the most virulent and persistent attacks upon the traditional view of the time of the composition of the Old Testament books has been made upon these great lyrical productions. If the headings of the Psalms be reliable, then there can be no doubt that many of the Psalms (seventy-three to be exact) were composed by David, the sweet psalmist of Israel. The main attack of the radical critics on the Psalms, therefore, has been upon the veracity of the headings. In two recent articles on "The Headings of the Psalms,"¹ I have endeavored to show on the ground of the testimony of the Hebrew manuscripts, of the ancient versions, of the language of the headings, and of the contents of the Psalms themselves, that there is no good reason for concluding that they are not what the *prima facie* evidence indicates. In these articles, I pointed out the inconclusiveness of such arguments for late date as are derived from the presence of the words "synagogue" and "captivity," and referred also to the false claim of lateness based upon the presence of alleged Aramaisms in certain of the Psalms. This matter of Aramaisms I have also discussed at length² with a view to proving

¹ In this REVIEW for 1926, pp. 1-37, 353-395.

² In an article, "The Aramaisms in the Old Testament," in this REVIEW for 1925, pp. 234-266.

DOES THE BEHAVIORIST HAVE A MIND?

There is a good deal to be said on both sides of this question. The behaviorist himself assures us that he, or at least the subject of his investigations (for he disclaims introspection), has no mind, no instincts, no will or purpose, in fact no consciousness at all as distinct from bodily reaction to physical stimuli. Stimulus and response tell the whole story, and the response is always of the type of congenital or conditioned reflex action. If the behaviorist should be conscious of his reflex actions he would be acting out of character and would be false to his professed principles. His own answer to the question of our title is in the negative. He does not claim to have a mind, he will not admit that he has a mind as distinguished from the body, and if the stimulus of the question, "Do you have a mind?" should be presented to him, the response to be expected would be an indignant and emphatic, "No."

There is, however, another side to the question. The behaviorist in spite of his protestations certainly acts as if he had a mind. His pursuits are wholly in the intellectual realm. His main business is nothing else than writing books and articles for learned magazines, conducting experiments which demand some mental equipment to estimate their bearing and value, teaching the young idea that there are no such things as ideas, and instructing classes of other minds that there are no minds at all. The behaviorist uses all the weapons in the arsenal of debate, ridicule, assumption of superior intelligence and learning, and calling of names such as "medievalist" and "mystic." His aim, it is true, (although he admits no such thing as purpose) is to convert people to his way of thinking and to affect the thinking processes of the scholastic world in such a way as to bring them all to the opinion that there is no mind; but his manner of doing this is that of the "high-brow" and the intellectual. He is incurably intellectual even when he vilifies the faculty of reason which is the candle of the Lord within us.

Both sides in the discussion should be aware of the fact that the case is so foolish and so absurd on the face of it that it is in danger of being thrown out of court. The behaviorist who maintains that he has no mind cannot help refuting himself every time he utters a word, or frames an argument, or puts pen to paper. The defender of the affirmative on the other hand—who maintains that the behaviorist has a mind—is placed in the uncomfortable position of one who can simply vociferate the obvious. He cannot use effectively the method of *reductio ad absurdum* because nothing in his view can be more absurd than the position with which the behaviorist begins. He can apparently do little more than ring the changes upon the characterizations, “glaringly inconsistent” and “palpably absurd.”

A university president in the Mid-West recently said that in taking up administrative duties he was compelled to commit intellectual suicide, and another president in the East admitted that he had become a “talking machine.” If the personalities of these two presidents should be merged into one—if the intellectual suicide should be turned into a talking machine—it is to be feared that the resulting utterances would not be very significant. The behaviorist is a kind of dual personality. On the one hand he claims (or admits) that he has no mind or will or purpose, but on the other hand he says that “the interest of the behaviorist in man’s doings is more than the interest of the spectator—he wants to control man’s reactions as physical scientists want to control and manipulate other natural phenomena.”¹ As a behaviorist he has no mind of his own and no purpose of his own and as a strict determinist he cannot control his own conduct, but in his efforts to reduce psychology to a natural science he wishes to control and predict the conduct of everybody else. There must be a contradiction here somewhere. The behaviorist cannot play both rôles at once. But if there is an inescapable contradiction or mental twist in the behaviorist’s mind in his

¹ John B. Watson, *Behaviorism*, p. 11.

fundamental assumption that " 'consciousness' is neither a definable nor a usable concept,"² we fear that there may be a moral twist in the kind of conduct he wishes to produce and control. If the behaviorist should be allowed full sway in regulating conduct, we fear that the result would be thoughtless activity, and meaningless behavior, and conscienceless conduct.

Psychology is no longer merely an academic discipline fitted to provide pleasant mental exercise for the classroom. It has entered our homes and our business as well as our schools, and has invaded the realms of ethics, jurisprudence and religion. The salesman in approaching his prospect or seeking to become a super-salesman, the corporation executive in selecting his personnel and in promoting efficiency, the advertiser in attracting the public, the struggling clerk aspiring to the presidency of his concern, the statesman who would prevent war and the reformer who would repress crime, the young man in search of a wife and the mother anxious for the upbringing of her children,—all are invited to sit at the feet of the psychologist. The educator with his methods and projects and programs of study is peculiarly at the mercy of the psychologist, and the Church is beginning to realize that her whole program of religious education may, for good or evil, be profoundly modified under the influence of popular psychological theory. As a thoughtful student of the subject has said: "In the new educational enterprises of the Church a matter of utmost concern is the selection of a psychological basis on which the new program is to stand. A choice between the schools has to do with something more important than methods and materials. It has to do with the maintenance or the abandonment of certain elements of the Christian religion which have heretofore been considered essential."³

When the behaviorist seeks by logical argument to abolish

² P. 3.

³ W. A. Squires, *Psychological Foundations of Religious Education*, pp. 30, 31.

logic, and from his platform of mechanistic determinism announces his ambition to control the thought and conduct of the world, we are tempted to attribute his inconsistencies to mental obtuseness or perversity, and following the advice of the Wise Man to "answer a fool according to his folly." This, however, is not to deny that the behaviorist in his experiments has made contributions of value to psychological science, or that in spite of his disclaimer of introspection he has sometimes shown a shrewd and penetrating insight into human nature.

It will prove instructive to glance at the newest book in the field of psychology, *Psychologies of 1925*, containing lectures given at Clark University in 1925 and in the early months of 1926 by leading psychologists. Their names in alphabetical order are Madison Bentley, Knight Dunlap, Walter S. Hunter, Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler, Morton Prince, William McDougall, John B. Watson, and Robert S. Woodworth. McDougall of Harvard tells us that the mechanists in psychology would have us believe that men are "Robots," this name being applied in a recent play to ingeniously constructed machines in the shape of human beings. McDougall adds that "the view that men are merely such Robots is now being dogmatically taught to thousands of young students in the psychological departments of the universities of this country."⁴ He finds that this view is now enjoying an alarming popularity, and that the spread of this way of thinking among psychologists has gone so far that those who do not accept it are regarded as "cranky persons wedded to medieval metaphysics" and as "queer survivors from the dark ages," incapable of joining in the triumphant march of modern science. The behaviorists may be Robots in whom reflex action takes the place formerly assigned to reflection, but they are sure that their reflexes are right and that the reflexes of others, the upholders of rival theories, are wrong. They differ also from the real Robots in the fact that,

⁴ P. 275

as we have seen, they have far-reaching and revolutionary plans for the application of their doctrine not only in the sphere of psychology but in the fields of education, philosophy, ethics and jurisprudence. Look first at the application in the realm of philosophy. Holding that all the objects in our environment are ultimately electric charges, W. S. Hunter adds that "so likewise is the human animal and the aggregations of human animals which make up society. If the phenomenon of a storage battery is a matter of electrons and protons, so is the phenomenon of family life."⁵ Hunter is naturally indignant with the older psychological method "which is inseparably bound up with the ancient philosophical concepts of mind and consciousness as aspects of the universe which differ from the physical."⁶

John B. Watson, the recognized leader of the behaviorist group, finds a "mystical" element even in Hunter's exposition. He is uncompromising in his purpose to rule mind and consciousness out of the picture, and in the interest of behaviorism would revise ethics and jurisprudence, and would apparently do away with the church and religion altogether. It would be interesting to see what kind of a code of ethics the new "experimental ethics" of behaviorism (which Watson admits does not yet exist) would formulate. It would be still more interesting to discover the kind of behavior in the moral sphere in which the principles of behaviorism when freely carried out actually eventuate. Watson would like to make some profound changes in the field of jurisprudence. He would do away with punishment in the rearing of children and the treatment of criminals. He tells us that "punishment is a word which never ought to have crept into our language"⁷—which raises the question whether the man who first introduced it ought not to have been punished. Watson is at pains to emphasize the fact that "the behaviorist is a strict determinist."⁸ It follows then, as he declares in italics, that "the child or adult has to do what he does. The only way

⁵ P. 90.

⁶ P. 107.

⁷ P. 71

⁸ P. 71

he can be made to act differently is first to untrain him and then retrain him." Naturally the untraining and retraining must be done by the behaviorist; the other people or psychologists of other schools have no power to retrain the behaviorist. There are of course no criminals in the usual sense of persons who have committed acts that deserve punishment. There are only "deviants," and these are of two kinds, the insane and the "socially untrained." The insane should be sent to the asylum and the socially untrained should be sent to school. We may remark here that even Watson has not been able wholly to emancipate himself from the ideas of free-will, responsibility and desert, so deeply imbedded in our thought and our vocabulary. He will allow a gentle rap on the knuckles of the child if promptly administered; and if the socially untrained deviants through obtuseness or obstinacy refuse to take on the training that will fit them to re-enter society, he would even for "ten to fifteen years or even longer" make them "earn their daily bread, in vast manufacturing and agricultural institutions, escape from which is impossible."⁹ "Strenuous work sixteen hours per day," Watson naively adds, "will hurt no one." Of course it is insisted that the care of such deviants should be in the hands of behaviorists. Such a reform in criminal jurisprudence, Watson admits, is only a pious dream "until all the lawyers and jurists decide to become behaviorists." Now since every lawyer and jurist together with every other adult "has to do what he does," what probability is there that any lawyer or judge will "decide" to change his mind and act differently? The only way to reform the lawyers and jurists is to put them where they deserve to be, in a "school" (not a prison of course for this would savor too much of the "religious theory" of retaliation) where they could be restrained while they are retrained and be made to work for sixteen hours a day, until under the gentle tutelage of behaviorist wardens they come to see the error of their ways

⁹ Pp. 71-74.

and give evidence of true repentance for doing what they couldn't help doing. Like other mechanical determinists who would do away with the guilt or fault or responsibility of the offender against society, Watson can only transfer these notions of guilt and responsibility from the criminal to his social environment. It is our own "fault," he says, that is the fault of parents, teachers and others of the group, if individuals "go wrong" or deviate from set standards of behavior.

If the insane should be placed in asylums and the socially untrained in schools, how can we tell which is which? If it be found that an alleged criminal does not know what he is doing, how does he differ from anyone else? If he does know what he is doing, then there is something—knowledge or awareness or consciousness—that is of a non-material character and is distinct from, and over and above, his bodily action. Again, how can the behaviorist distinguish between the socially trained and the socially untrained? Let us suppose that a gun is discharged and a person is killed. How is the behaviorist, who denies that purpose influences behavior, to distinguish between accidental homicide and deliberate murder? The whole question, as Prince points out, is whether there is "criminal intent," and the question is unanswerable on behaviorist principles. Carl Murchison, the editor of the volume, makes a point as old as the reply of Zeno to his thieving slave when he insists elsewhere that a philosophy of rigid determinism "is sheer nonsense when applied only to the individual offender and not also to the community which contains him. If it has been determined by circumstances that an individual commits a crime, let it also be determined by circumstances that a social community will strike back with sure and swift punishment."

Before going further it may be worth while to glance at the historical antecedents of behaviorism and at the criticism which it directs against other psychological schools, and then we may look a little more in detail at the objections which may be made against behaviorism itself.

In taking up the book of Clark University lectures we are bewildered by the present variety of conflicting theories in the psychological field. We find here represented Schools of Behaviorism, Dynamic Psychology, Gestalt, Purposive Groups, Reaction Psychology, and Psychologies called Structural. One lecturer, Knight Dunlap, says: "The announcement of a new book on *The new psychology and the preacher* might, so far as anyone could predict in advance, be a treatise based on the Freudian or some other psychoanalytic system; it might be an exposition of 'new thought' or some other vagary of the Quimby brood; it might be an application of the theories and methods of 'intelligence testing'; it might be propaganda for the theories and practices of M. Coué; it might be one of the numerous embodiments of phrenology under its more recent name of 'character analysis'; it might be a book on psychic research concerning spooks and other magical notions; or it might be one of the less easily nameable nostrums which strut before the public in borrowed plumage, calling themselves 'the new psychology'."¹⁰ Dunlap himself, in contrast to the host of pseudo-psychologists and to the older "Malebranchian psychology," is an exponent of "scientific psychology" which does away with the superstition that "mind" is "distinct from, but miraculously related to the body."¹¹

In tracing the pedigree of behaviorism we find that in the past generation at least four different schools of psychology, each of them associated with some movement in science or philosophy, have successively held the field. There was first the psychology of the soul, and this soul had "faculties" such as memory, imagination, will and so forth. It was then objected that the assumption of a soul was unnecessary for purposes of science and that the separate faculties were abstractions, and it was maintained that the proper study of the psychologist was consciousness, or conscious states or processes in more or less close association with brain con-

¹⁰ P. 309.

¹¹ P. 312.

comitants. The soul according to James had "worn out both itself and its welcome," and according to Wundt it was "a metaphysical surplusage for which psychology has no use." Later there arose the functional psychology, studying the mind or consciousness as a servant of the organism and as a means of adjustment of the organism to its environment. Finally the behaviorist, denying the utility of introspection, banished consciousness entirely from the psychological field or reduced it to a name for the relation between the nervous system and its stimulating environment. We may remind ourselves that the psychology of consciousness and its processes (or of ideas and their associations) was stimulated by the growing knowledge of brain physiology, and its philosophical background was the traditional English empiricism coming down from Locke and Hume. The functional psychology was an application of popular biological categories to the study of mind, and it was associated with the pragmatic movement in philosophy. Behaviorism was an outgrowth of the study of animal behavior, and its philosophical affinities are with eighteenth century materialism and with the New Realism which in its revolt from subjective idealism would define consciousness as a name for the relation between the object and the nervous system.

Behaviorism is a sort of "psychological materialism," to borrow a phrase from Dr. Patton's recent volume. It first dismissed the consciousness of animals and then of human beings as inaccessible to knowledge, and holds that when we attempt to peer into the secrets of our own "minds" all we discover is a feeling of flexed muscles, of visceral movements, and of laryngeal movements associated with spoken language or "silent" language. Consciousness as something distinct from bodily movement does not exist. It is either a myth or is only another name for the relation between the bodily organism and the physical stimulus. Plainly behaviorism is directly opposed to the fundamental convictions of religion, that there is a spirit in man and that the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding, and that there

will be a conscious existence of the individual after the death of the body.

A characteristic of behaviorism is the boldness of its negations and the thoroughness with which it disposes of the spiritual or non-material element in man. The soul with its faculties, the mind with its categories, the will with its purposes and freedom, consciousness with its processes and concomitant brain processes, ideas with their associations, and even the instincts with their evolution are all thrown upon the scrap-heap. Behaviorism has not only cleaned house but has moved out of its house. One behaviorist, Hunter, would give over the term psychology to the exponents of antiquated methods, while coining the term "anthroponomy" to describe behaviorism or the "science of human behavior."¹² We recall the witty criticism directed against Hume, that he went outside his house and looked in at the window and could find no one at home. The behaviorist has not only gone outside his house, but has closed the shutters and moved away.

The defender of spiritual realities and values will find something instructive in the behaviorist's critique of his predecessors and rivals in the psychological field. The same methods by which the psychology of ideas or of consciousness disposed of the soul as a spiritual entity are adopted by the behaviorist in disposing of ideas and consciousness altogether. If the soul was inaccessible to knowledge, so also is the mind or consciousness as a separate entity. If the old-fashioned faculties and functions were abstractions or myths, so also are the more modern ideas and their associations. The weapons used by the psychology-without-a-soul are now turned against itself by the psychology-without-a-mind. Watson insists that consciousness is "merely another word for the 'soul' of more ancient times," and that the metaphysical implications of the two terms are identical.¹³

¹² P. 83.

¹³ *Behaviorism*, pp. 3, 5.

Behaviorism is in fact psychology without a soul reduced to absurdity.

It is interesting and somewhat comforting to notice further that some popular and ultra-modern theories which have been regarded as hostile to a religious view of things are by behaviorism buried as deep as the old soul-psychology. Empiricism with its exploiting of impersonal ideas, physiological psychology with its concomitance of conscious process and brain process, epiphenomenism which treated mind as a fly upon the fly-wheel of matter, psychophysical parallelism which chained mind to matter without allowing it any influence upon the movements of matter, Freudian psychoanalysis which substituted the unconscious wish for the "will that can," and even evolutionary ideas of mind which assimilated the mind of man to that of the brute, are all junked without ceremony to make way for the up to date machinery of behaviorism.

The behavioristic materialist takes a short method with the spiritualist. He rightly fears that consciousness even if cast in the modest rôle of epiphenomenon may by some ingenious turn assume the leading rôle. The only safe way is to exclude it from the cast altogether. Consciousness may start the voyage as a stowaway in the cargo of mechanism, but there is always danger that it may mutiny and take command of the ship. Consciousness may be tied securely to brain process, but Bergson may be right when he says that conscious activity overflows brain activity on all sides. Consciousness may be merely an instrument of adaptation in the struggle for existence, but in the end the servant may become the master and the development of mind and freedom may be seen as the end of the whole process. The only safe way for the mechanical behaviorist is to exclude altogether this uncomfortable and dangerous intruder, consciousness. "Nowhere is it necessary to introduce the concept of consciousness, or experience, conceived as another mode of existence, or as another aspect of the physical world."¹⁴ Of course the

¹⁴ Hunter, p. 104.

intelligence tests will have to go, for there is no such thing as intelligence; and it is to be hoped that the reactions to the College Entrance Board examinations now demanded of young students will be greatly simplified.

The behaviorist has to do his fighting on two fronts. On one front are the introspectionists, the purposivists, and the metaphysical and theological opponents of materialism; but on the other front he finds arrayed against him the popular evolutionary and psycho-analytical schools. Watson is contemptuous of all that has been written about the evolution of instinct and the classification of instincts. Instinct is defined as "a combination of congenital responses unfolding serially under appropriate stimulation." What we call instincts are for the most part "learned" or "conditioned" reflexes. Going as he admits beyond the evidence, Watson holds that there is no inheritance of mental traits or aptitudes, and he makes training and environment all-powerful. Human beings of all geological ages, of all races and conditions have the same set of unlearned responses—"be it in Africa or in Boston, be it in the year six million B.C. or in 1925 A.D."¹⁵—and these responses are due to the material out of which men are made and the way this is put together. Most of the treatises on instinct have been written by the "armchair" psychologists who have not studied the behavior of young animals or babies from birth. The Darwinian geneticists "are working under the banner of the old 'faculty' psychology."¹⁶ In fact the whole concept of instinct has become "academic and meaningless," and "actual observation thus makes it impossible for us any longer to entertain the concept of instinct."¹⁷

The behaviorists and the Freudians were quite friendly ten years ago, but now no love is lost between the two schools. Psycho-analysis is in fact introspectionism and introspectionism raised to the *n*th degree. The Freudian delves

¹⁵ P. 3.

¹⁶ P. 6.

¹⁷ P. 32.

into the mysteries not only of consciousness but of the subconscious and the unconscious. He deals with dreams, with suppressed wishes, and with unconscious complexes. He is naturally *persona non grata* with the behaviorist, and the Freudian emotions go the way of the evolutionary instincts. The elaborate writings of the Freudians, enough in the past twenty years we are told to fill a good-sized room,¹⁸ are consigned by Watson to the waste basket.

"The history of modern philosophy," says Will Durant in his *Story of Philosophy*, "might be written in terms of the warfare of physics and psychology." But in recent times these two antagonists seem to have changed sides. The physicists have been spiritualizing matter, interpreting it in terms of energy and even of will, while the psychologists have been busy in banishing soul and spirit and even consciousness and purpose from the universe. President Butler of Columbia University has said that "psychology has demonstrated its capacity to become both frivolous and inconsequent;" and in his latest annual report he maintains that "The new and numerous Philistines are the proud discoverers and professors of a new doctrine of behavior which finds nothing to behave and no purpose in behaving. Where they have touched education they are reducing it to a costly pantomime." But perhaps we ought to distinguish between varieties or schools of behaviorism. McDougall distinguishes three schools, the Strict Behaviorists, the Purposive Behaviorists, and the Near Behaviorists. We are not concerned with the purposive behaviorists, although it must be recognized that some psychologists can use the term "purpose" as if it were something inherent in the object rather than the subject. E. C. Tolman, a purposive behaviorist, is careful to state that his own doctrine is "not a mere Muscle Twitchism of the Watsonian variety."¹⁹ If the strict behaviorists may be called muscle twitchers the near behaviorists should be termed "steam whistlers." Thus Morton Prince (in the volume of

¹⁸ P. 37.

¹⁹ P. 279n.

lectures before us) reminds us that Huxley as long as fifty years ago spoke of consciousness in brutes and then in men as only a collateral product of the working of the bodily mechanism, and "as completely without the power of modifying that working as the steam whistle, which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine, is without influence upon its machinery."²⁰

The near behaviorists do not deny that consciousness exists, but adopting the Huxleyan automatism they have as little to do with consciousness as possible and do not allow it to do anything. The strict behaviorists, of whom Watson is the principal spokesman, do away with mind or consciousness altogether. Watson will not admit that mental states exist and he says that behaviorism ignores them just as chemistry ignores alchemy. "The behaviorist does not concern himself with them because as the stream of his science broadens and deepens such older concepts are sucked under, never to reappear."

By his assumption that there is no such thing as mind or consciousness the behaviorist has thrown out a protective mechanism that is impervious to the weapons alike of argument and of ridicule. When he reduces instincts to the congenital responses of fear, love, anger, etc. (he apologizes for the continued use of these "literary" terms), or to love behavior, rage behavior and fear behavior, it is useless to point out to him that there is a conscious content in these primary responses and a great gulf fixed between them and purely mechanical action. When Watson says again: "By 'memory,' then, we mean nothing except the fact that when we meet a stimulus again after an absence, we do the old habitual thing—that we learned to do when we were in the presence of that stimulus in the first place,"²¹ we would waste our breath if we insisted that we could never recognize the stimulus as the same nor the response as the same without the aid of the discarded memory. And when, further, responses and re-

²⁰ P. 200.

²¹ *Behaviorism*, p. 190.

flexes are substituted for purpose it is idle to declare, using the words of John Dewey, that "complete adaptation to environment means death. The essential point in all response is the desire to control the environment." The trenchant arguments of J. B. Pratt in his *Matter and Spirit*, of Lovejoy in his "Paradox of the Thinking Behaviorist,"²² and of McDougall and Prince in the volume we have been considering seem to make no dent in the behaviorist's armor. Perhaps our only refuge is in the hope that you can't fool all the people—even all the psychologists—all the time.

Possibly we may find a vulnerable point in one of Watson's favorite illustrations, used in his lectures in *Psychologies of 1925* and in his *Behaviorism* (1925), for the purpose of proving that "psychology is a natural science—a definite part of biology."²³ "I have in my hand a hardwood stick. If I throw it forward and upward it goes a certain distance and drops to the ground. I retrieve the stick, put it in hot water, bend it at a certain angle, throw it out again—it goes outward, revolving as it goes for a short distance, turns to the right then drops down. Again I retrieve the stick, reshape it slightly and make its edges convex. I call it a boomerang. Again I throw it upward and outward. Again it goes forward revolving as it goes. Suddenly it turns, comes back and gracefully and kindly falls at my feet. It is still a stick, still made of the same material, but it has been shaped differently. *Has the boomerang an instinct to return to the hand of the thrower?* No? Well, why does it return? Because it is made in such a manner that when it is thrown upward and outward with a given force it must return (parallelogram of forces)."²⁴ The application is obvious. "Man is made up of certain kinds of material—put together in certain ways. If he is hurled into action (as a result of stimulation) may he not exhibit movement (in advance of train-

²² *Philosophical Review*, March, 1922.

²³ See p. 34 of the former volume, from which we quote.

²⁴ Pp. 12, 13.

ing) just as peculiar as (but no more mysterious than) that of the boomerang?"²⁵

Sometimes the boomerang returns to smite the thrower. The two objects compared, boomerang and man, differ in several essential respects. The man knows what he is doing when he makes the boomerang, and he makes it for a special purpose, so that something beside the boomerang illustration is needed to banish consciousness and purpose from the universe. Perhaps the mechanical action of the boomerang will illustrate action of the simple reflex type, but even this is doubtful. Kurt Koffka says that "Marina dissected the inner and outer muscles of the eyes of monkeys and connected them crossways. An impulse sent to contract the external muscle of the right eye ought now to result in a movement toward the left and *vice versa*. The monkey should look to the left when a bright spot appears at the right. In reality, however, nothing of the kind took place. As soon as the wounds healed the animal moved his eyes as normally as before the operation. Thus the conception of a merely contingent connection between situation and response breaks down even at the reflex level."²⁶

It is fortunate that the boomerang cannot "deviate" or be guilty of "socially untrained" conduct, but this emphasizes the fact that it cannot be trained to make "learned" or "conditioned" responses. What a world of mental activity in both learner and teacher may be concealed under the term "learned responses"! Why cannot the boomerang learn? Another difference, and one that opens the gap between man and boomerang still wider, is that a man, if he is a behaviorist, can alter or condition the actions of people, if he can catch them young enough, to an indefinite extent. If the behaviorist had his way with children the babies would stop crying (except when in actual pain) and would no longer be frightened by black cats or other animals, the preachers would stop preaching, the introspectionists would stop introspect-

²⁵ P. 13.

²⁶ P. 131.

ing, the judges would leave the bench, psychology would become "a natural science," and everybody would be happy. It is a paradox that people who insist upon putting on others the strait jacket of "strict determinism" reserve for themselves the liberty of influencing the thoughts and conduct of their fellows in a way that almost approaches omnipotence. When it comes to pass that boomerangs begin to instruct and reform their fellow boomerangs and teach them to deviate from the path of "congenital response," then the analogy between boomerang and man, between boomerang and behaviorist, will be more convincing.

Another striking fact, not to overdo the matter, is that a boomerang cannot talk. We strongly suspect that man is a talking animal because he is a thinking animal, and we recall the statement of Max Müller to the effect that "the formation of language attests from the very first the presence of a rational mind." To be on safe ground the behaviorist should stop talking and, as one of his critics advises, "content himself with relaxing and contracting his muscles." As soon as the behaviorist (even if it be in Carnegie Hall at two or three dollars per ticket) begins to debate the question, "Is Man a Machine?" he *ipso facto* ceases to be a machine. He should not only stop talking, but should stop being conscious that he is stopping. The only consistent behaviorist is the behaviorist when he is asleep and not dreaming.

We suspect that what the behaviorist has in mind when he denies the existence of mind or consciousness is an objection not so much to the existence as to the efficiency of consciousness. With proper scorn and in italics Watson remarks that "no psychologist today would like to be classed as believing in *interaction*.—If '*mind*' acts on body, then all *physical laws* are invalid."²⁷ The editor of the Clark University volume, Carl Murchison, shrewdly remarks that he is convinced "that experimental methods are largely instances of the more or less systematic theories of the experimenter."

²⁷ *Behaviorism*, pp. 242, 243.

The shortcomings of the behavioristic psychologists are due to the philosophy of materialism and mechanism which underlies their psychology. It is this that leads them sedulously to avoid "anthropomorphism" even when dealing with human nature, and to side-track at all costs the problems of knowledge, of purpose and of the psychophysical relation.

Consciousness—that is, efficient consciousness—is the Great Intruder in a mechanical or naturalistic scheme of the universe. At all costs it must be kept from doing anything, and the only safe way to keep it from doing anything is to exclude it from real existence altogether. Huxley's "steam whistle" theory was only partially satisfactory, and the theory of parallelism, which was popular twenty years ago but is now rather *démodé*, while it effectually side-tracked consciousness and kept it from any influence upon events in the physical world, at least allowed to it a quasi-activity in its own sphere. The method of the modern psychologist is more drastic. He ignores the very existence of consciousness. In haughty disdain he passes it by without recognition. If compelled to notice it at all he at once merges it into the organism on the one hand or the environment on the other. If a behaviorist of the Watson school, he identifies it with bodily movement, especially laryngeal vibration. If an evolutionist of the Dewey school, he characterizes it as a quality of the "real object." The same motives that induce the naturalistic theologian to deny miracle and the supernatural, so as to shut out the activity of a personal God from nature, history and experience, operate with the naturalistic philosopher or psychologist and lead him to exclude an efficient consciousness from his scheme of things altogether. The result is what may be called an intellectual apostasy in our intellectual centers and our great universities. The intellect in circles in which it should magnify its office, that is in the departments of philosophy and psychology in our universities, sees fit to abdicate its throne, and to immolate itself upon the altar of materialism and mechanism. The young people in our schools are forbidden to believe in that essen-

tial quality of human nature which distinguishes man from the brute. They are forbidden to look backward in memory, or inward in introspection and self-examination, or forward in purpose, or upward in worship. They are asked to accept a philosophy which makes the philosopher (to borrow a phrase from Durant's *Story of Philosophy*) "an automaton automatically reflecting upon his own automatism."

After all the strongest indictment against behaviorism is not that it is hopelessly inconsistent and palpably absurd but that it obliterates all moral distinctions. What sort of behavior will behaviorism legitimately promote? This is the most important question when multitudes of the youth in our colleges and universities are being taught its principles. The plain fact is that morality as a binding restraint upon human conduct and with it reverence for life and for the sacredness of human personality are by the progress of behaviorism "sucked under, never to reappear." If the conduct of man is first assimilated to that of the animal, and then the behavior of both animal and man is further reduced by a rigid determinism to the type of mechanical action, if un-social conduct is simply that which the majority dislikes, although a more enlightened minority may think it desirable for its purpose, then the safeguards thrown by morality and religion around human life and the family relation and the obligations of law and the rights of property are broken down. Then the legitimate fruit of behaviorism in the sphere of moral behavior is indicated by the statement of one of the principles in a famous murder case, that it is as justifiable to kill a human being for the purposes of science as to stick a pin through a beetle.

What is needed today is, to use an expression of the late Professor Ormond, the "re-ification of the Ego." When consciousness goes conscience goes with it, and when free-will and responsibility are denied their place is taken by lawless individualism and an ethic of self-assertion.

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