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HERMAN BAVINCK.

The Free Churches of Holland possess at the present moment in Dr. Abraham Kuyper and Dr. Herman Bavinck theologians of genius and of erudition worthy of the best traditions of the Reformed theology. In the autumn of 1898 Dr. Kuyper delivered at Princeton Seminary the L. P. Stone Lectures, and thus for the first time made his voice heard by an English-speaking audience. During the present month Dr. Bavinck is to deliver these Lectures. The circumstance seems worthy of notice; and the occasion seems to call for some introduction of Professor Bavinck to his American audience. The following account of the position he occupies and the work he has done in the churches and for the people of the Netherlands has been derived from an authentic source.—EDITORS.

The Reformed Church in the Netherlands underwent a great change in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Rationalism had already penetrated into the church and caused a tremendous upheaval; but it now made itself master of almost the whole of the church in the form of a moderate supranaturalism. Everywhere the old truths of atonement and regeneration were set aside in favor of new dogmas of the example of Jesus and of moral improvement. The hope was cherished that an end could be put to the old faith by means of official preaching, elementary education

PRAGMATISM, HUMANISM AND RELIGION.

If the search for truth, as Lessing believed, is to be chosen in preference to its complete possession, philosophers should now be happy, for never before has the answer to Pilate's question, What is truth? been more eagerly sought, and never certainly has the true answer appeared to be more doubtful. The responsibility for this state of things lies mainly at the doors of Prof. William James, who, with the assistance of Prof. Dewey, of Chicago—now of Columbia University,—and Mr. Schiller, of Oxford, has advocated with striking success a new theory of truth, of its origin, nature and criterion. The new school appeals especially to the interest and pride of Americans as being the first notable philosophical movement to have its origin on American soil. While the name and in part the doctrine of Pragmatism were first suggested by Mr. C. S. Pierce¹ as long as thirty years ago, it remained for Prof. James to become the recognized champion of the new method, and his adoption of Pragmatism as the name for his own views, in an address in California ten years ago, may be taken as the birthday of the new way of thinking. For the past ten years the new movement has constantly gained in popularity, and the discussion it has awakened has so overshadowed other topics that the word "pragmatism" literally "spots" the pages of the philosophical journals. The controversy has overflowed into the pages of the literary monthlies and the popular weeklies, and has even attracted the attention of the professional humorists, one of whom hits off the new views with the remark, "Th' truth is somethin' that wurruks. If it don't wurruk, it ain't th' truth. . . . Whin th' truth

¹"How to Make Our Ideas Clear." *Popular Science Monthly*, Jan., 1878.

stops wurrukin' it's a lie, an' whin a lie starts goin', it's th' truth."²

The rise of a new philosophy can never be a matter of indifference to religion. So closely are philosophy and religion allied that a new philosophy is likely to have its origin in a religious interest and is quite sure in turn to exert a strong influence upon religious thought. This influence in classical instances has not been exactly what the founder of the new system intended. Everyone knows how Berkeley, in order to refute materialism, did away with material substance, while his own principles were used by Hume to dispense with spiritual substance; and how Kant's destruction of the knowledge of God and immortality to make room for faith has given to agnosticism its strongest weapon. It is not surprising that theology has grown a little shy in accepting the proffered aid of philosophy, and is inclined to cry, "Beware of the Greeks bearing gifts!" In the case of Pragmatism, however, as presented in the recent lectures of Prof. James,³ suspicion is disarmed. Prof. James comes with the conscious mission of mediator between the scientific temper and the religious temper, offering an empiricism which accepts cordially and enthusiastically the facts and theories of modern science and yet gives full recognition to the needs of the spirit. He offers to science a cure for easily besetting materialism and to religion a cure for its remoteness and alleged aversion from facts. For this office of conciliator Prof. James is eminently qualified. His professional standing as a psychologist is of the highest, and no writer of our time has done more to make the study of psychology popular. He has been a pioneer in the application of psychological methods to the analysis of religious experience, and he has spoken and written often and impressively upon the deepest questions of morals and religion.

² "Mr. Dooley on Philosophers." *American Magazine*, Mar., 1908.

³ *Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking: Popular Lectures on Philosophy* by William James, 1907.

Students of Prof. James' writings can trace the roots of his Pragmatism faintly perhaps in his *Psychology*, with its emphasis upon the motor side of consciousness, but more clearly in his *Will to Believe* (1896). Readers of this volume will not soon forget the stimulus received from its perusal both in the way of moral enthusiasm and of religious conviction. There were hints of pluralism and radical empiricism and a vigorous protest against a "block" universe, but no developed theory of truth or reality calling for assent or rejection; and most readers, we imagine, were content to yield to the spell of one who, with marvelous gifts of style, knew how to lay bare the moral foundations of life and could speak with authority upon its supreme moral issues. The very title of the book was a boon to the homilist already familiar with the author's chapters on "Habit" and "The Will", while the second essay, "Is Life Worth Living?" with its insight into the pathos of existence and yet its fine contempt for those who shrink from life's struggle, may be and has been used like a tract to kindle the moral ardor of youth. The religious philisopher could find in the later essays of the volume, if not a new argument for theism, at least a new and striking statement of the older moral argument, while the Christian apologist would welcome the emphasis placed upon the volitional element in our deepest convictions:

"What think ye of Christ?" friend? when all's done and said,
Like you this Christianity or not?
It may be false, but will you wish it true?
Has it your vote to be so if it can?"

In his *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902). Prof. James explicitly adopts the pragmatic method. It is true that the apprehension of the timid was aroused by hints of a "sort of polytheism" (pluralism) to be developed later by the author, but the weight of his whole investigation was thrown behind the argument, "God is real, since He produces real effects".

What then, we are ready to ask, is Pragmatism? It is

worth while to set down for reference the primary definitions before tracing the development of the doctrine. Pragmatism, says Mr. C. S. Pierce, is the application to metaphysics of the following maxim: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."⁴ This maxim, he says, was suggested by reflection upon Kant's *Critic of the Pure Reason*. Prof. James, adopting this principle, pushes it, Mr. Pierce thinks, "to such extremes as must tend to give us pause", but his definition is not essentially different. Pragmatism is, "the doctrine that the whole 'meaning' of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be true; which consequences would be different if it were untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed. If a second conception should not appear to have other consequences, then it must really be only the first conception under a different name."⁵ ✕

Thus defined, Pragmatism appears as a purely logical doctrine. It is primarily a method of determining the meaning of propositions or conceptions by their assumed consequences. It easily passes, however, into a method of testing by their consequences the truth of propositions already determined to be meaningful.⁶ Opposing theories, when the practical consequences flowing from each are drawn out, may be shown to be only verbally different. If there is not difference enough to make any real difference, the question, it is held, is not worth discussing. A pragmatist in theology, for example, might minimize the differ-

⁴ Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 321.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Prof. A. O. Lovejoy complains that these two meanings of Pragmatism are not kept distinct. *Am. Journal of Theology*, Jan., 1908, p. 118.

ence between Calvinist and Arminian, by insisting that both parties would act the same toward a brother taken in a fault; or might contend, with Mr. Pierce, that there is no real difference between the Catholic and Protestant view of the Sacrament if the effects attributed to it are in both cases essentially the same. Where the derived consequences are plainly different, this difference may furnish the means of deciding that one theory is true and its rival false. That theory is true which will "work" the best in practical life, that is, which promises most in the way of the fulfilment of our desires and the accomplishment of our purposes. Doubt will of course remain as to whether even in metaphysics the practical test of truth, the test by consequences, is the only one which needs to be applied. Prof. James in fact suggests this doubt when, in testing the rival theories of materialism and theism by the difference each would make for the future, he remarks, in brackets, "I am supposing, of course, that the theories *have* been equally successful in their explanations of what is" (p. 97).

We may notice in passing that if Pragmatism is no more than a method of fixing the meaning or testing the truth of various theories, its application to religious problems will be distinctly favorable to the theistic view of the world. If an appeal to consequences is the only means of deciding between conflicting theories—the only test of truth—religion may lose indeed the theoretic supports upon which in the past it has been supposed to depend, but this will be in part at least counterbalanced by the removal of the purely theoretical objections. It is doubtful if Prof. James has done any greater service to religion than by pointing out, in several classical passages of great force, the superiority from the practical and emotional standpoint of the religious over the materialistic view of the world. "Not an energy of our active nature to which it does not authoritatively appeal, not an emotion of which it does not normally and naturally release the springs. At a single stroke, it changes the dead blank *it* of the world into a living

thou, with whom the whole man may have dealings.”⁷ “Our attitude toward concrete evils is entirely different in a world where we believe there are none but finite demanders, from what it is in one where we joyously face tragedy for an infinite demander’s sake. Every sort of energy and endurance, of courage and capacity for handling life’s evils, is set free in those who have religious faith. For this reason the strenuous type of character will on the battle-field of human history always outwear the easy-going type, and religion will drive irreligion to the wall.”

It will be seen that the state of mind out of which Pragmatism was born is more than hospitable to the foundation doctrines of ethics and religion. But it will be noticed that the theistic argument so finely expressed in the passages just quoted is really two-fold. Belief in God fits in with and stimulates all the powers of our nature, but further we ought to believe in God because, as the “infinite demander”. He demands our faith and service. Take away the “ought” or the authority of an infinite demand, and substitute the ethics of expediency for the “ethics of infinite and mysterious obligation from on high”,⁸ and the argument loses its pungent appeal. To many readers Prof. James will appear to speak from a lower level, and thus to weaken his theistic position, when he says in his *Lectures*, “‘The true’ . . . is only the expedient in the way of our thinking just as ‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of our behaving” (p. 222). Utilitarianism in epistemology and in ethics naturally go together, but both must face the objections to subordinating one of the great ideals of our conscious life to another. We are ready enough to admit the usefulness of truth and the beauty of truth, to say in poetry, “*Was fruchtbar ist, das allein ist wahr*”, or “Beauty is truth, truth beauty”, or to declare in prose that knowledge is power; but

⁷ *Will to Believe*, p. 127. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

⁸ “All through history . . . we see the antagonism of the strenuous and genial moods, and the contrast between the ethics of infinite and mysterious obligation from on high, and those of prudence and the satisfaction of merely finite need.” *Will to Believe*, p. 213.

this does not mean that we are prepared forthwith to reduce any one of these ideals, truth, beauty or utility, to another. No one has resisted more strongly than has Prof. James himself the attempt of hedonistic ethics to make pleasure the sole object of desire merely because the attainment of desired ends is accompanied by pleasureable feelings.⁹ So we must remember that the end of thought is not necessarily something outside of itself, such as the satisfaction of emotion, simply because the operation of thought is attended by emotional interest. We may explore the world for the sake of knowing. There may perhaps be a paradox of Pragmatism, similar to the "paradox of hedonism" familiar to students of ethics. If the aim of scientist and philosopher had always been utility, if thought had been content to remain merely instrumental to feeling and action, and there had been no enthusiasm for knowledge for its own sake, no search for truth and no propaganda keyed to the motto, "The truth at any cost", the progress of invention itself would have been retarded. This, at least, is intimated by M. Poincaré, when he says in his *Value of Science*: "I do not say: Science is useful, because it teaches us to construct machines. I say: Machines are useful, because in working for us, they will some day leave us more time to make science. But finally it is worth remarking that between the two points of view there is no antagonism, and that man having pursued a distinterested aim, all else has been added unto him" (p. 88f.).

Pragmatism, as we have already hinted, has not been content with its humble rôle as a method of clarifying our ideas or testing the truth of our theories. The Pragmatism whose significance for religion is in question is the Pragmatism of the early definitions reinforced by biology, functional psychology, empirical philosophy and humanistic metaphysics. Hence its interest, and the greater weight of its appeal. It is Pragmatism defined by Prof. James as "first, a method; and second, a genetic theory of what is

⁹ *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 550.

meant by truth" (p. 66), with distinct metaphysical implications, as we shall see. It is Pragmatism described by Mr. Schiller as "a conscious application to epistemology (or logic) of a teleological psychology, which implies, ultimately, a voluntaristic metaphysic".¹⁰ Pragmatism, in fact, in order to defend its own territory, has naturally been led to wage an offensive warfare. A utilitarian test of truth will obviously be greatly strengthened by a demonstration of the practical or instrumental origin of truth. If truth originates as a means for the control of experience, as an instrument to guide to useful action, then the obvious test of truth will be its success in the accomplishment of its practical purpose. Theories will not only be proved true because they work, but will become true when they work. "Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events" (p. 201). In other words, the true can be construed entirely in terms of the expedient. The true, as already noticed, "is only the expedient in the way of our thinking" (p. 222), and truth therefore, being subordinate to expediency, will look to expediency as its sufficient criterion. It follows also that truth becomes a teleological conception. It is to be defined primarily not as a static relation of our ideas to an already existent reality, but in terms of a purpose yet to be accomplished. So far as the notion of correspondence or agreement is retained, it is to be interpreted, we are told, in a "large loose way" (p. 215).

To establish this position Pragmatism has extended its conquests in two directions, seeking to bring under its sway (1) the realm of facts and (2) the realm of principles. "Wedged tightly" (as we are told the mind is) "between the coercions of the sensible order and those of the ideal order" (p. 211), between given facts and necessary principles, Pragmatism has tried to show that neither of these coercions is as rigid as it seems. The facts may be very different when seen from a different viewpoint and for a different purpose, and the "necessary" principles may be

¹⁰ *Studies in Humanism*, 1907, p. 12.

primitive guesses or postulates so constantly verified as to have hardened into principles by thought. If over and above the world of finite selves there exists an Absolute being, or independent of our perception or our purpose there exists an ordered cosmos or external world, the relation of knowledge to such a being or such a world will be primarily static rather than dynamic, and the "correspondence theory" of truth will by the very weight of attraction be apt to draw away our allegiance from any subjective test of truth. The great need of man if he is to make his way amid such an environment is to know "things as they are", and theories will be useful in proportion as they are true. It is plainly to the advantage of a doctrine that makes truth consist in utility to do away with the sphere of independent existence or to make it as small as possible. Again, the realm of principles will prove refractory to a practical theory of truth if there are self-evident and necessary truths, not of empirical origin, and neither needing nor admitting of confirmation by experience. Some form of empiricism will therefore be more congenial to Pragmatism than an *à priori* view of the principles of knowledge.

In the pragmatic invasion of the two-fold realms of fact and theory, Mr. Schiller and Prof. Dewey have proved able lieutenants to Prof. James. Mr. Schiller's most striking contribution was his brilliant essay on "Axioms as Postulates" in *Personal Idealism* (1902), in which he argued that axioms of thought were as empirical in origin and as much in need of verification as any of the postulates of science or of ordinary life. While avowing his allegiance to the Pragmatism of James, Mr. Schiller gave to his own views the name of Humanism. Humanism may perhaps be regarded as a more genial and glorified Pragmatism, and in spite of the objection to borrowing a name already attached to a great historic movement, it is admirably adapted to describe a doctrine which adopts Protagoras' motto, "Man is the measure of all things", emphasizes the emotional and practical basis of all theorizing, and teaches that human expe-

rience is the most important part, if not the whole, of reality. Mr. Schiller thinks that the older empiricism's account of the origin of axioms is inadequate because it represents the mind as passive—as a mere sheet of paper. Rationalism, on the other hand, cannot be accepted because it ignores the biological and psychological setting of knowledge. The element of truth in the two theories is united in the statement that necessary truths are “prior to experience as postulates”. Axioms and postulates differ in age rather than in origin. Some postulates were made so early, worked so admirably, and were so generally accepted, that, in the course of time, they have acquired the supposed marks of *à priori* truth, necessity and universality.

Mr. Schiller recognizes the difficulty of getting the mind started upon its career. There cannot be mind without mental equipment, nor can there be postulation without something to postulate about. He assumes an “actively inquiring mind”,¹¹ and a sort of *ὕλη* or matter which cannot be wholly idealized. The principle of identity is used as his first illustration of the application of his theory. The mind starts, he says, with a “concrete given identity of self-consciousness”,¹² but this “proves unequal to the requirements of a social life, and needs on this account to be sublimated and idealized into a concept that transcends the given”. In a sort of Platonic myth, he describes the second meeting of Edwin with Angelina, in which, for the first time apparently, Edwin makes the postulate of identity; but before Edwin could assume that a given object was the same he must have had a mind already categorizing objects as the same or different. Without such a capacity to start with it is hard to see how there could be any “actively inquiring mind”, distinguishing, comparing and inferring, or in fact any mind at all. The extremes of empiricism and rationalism have this in common that, given the sensational elements of knowledge, the mind, whether a *tabula rasa*

¹¹ *Humanism*, 1903, p. 357.

¹² *Personal Idealism*, p. 99.

or fully furnished with innate ideas, inevitably construes these elements within the framework of certain principles. These principles belong to the very structure of the mind, or are inevitable and universal ways of grouping sensational elements. In Pragmatism, however, there is something accidental in the growth of these principles of common knowledge. A postulate is something, we are told, growing out of a specific situation and made by an individual. If the same postulate should be made inevitably and by everybody at the very beginning of experience, the postulate would differ only in name from an *à priori* principle. In the accounts of Schiller and James, at any rate, the fundamental postulates which have hardened into axioms of thought were made originally each by some individual and then gained social currency by spreading from mouth to mouth, from mind to mind. James' thesis is that "our fundamental ways of thinking about things are discoveries of exceedingly remote ancestors" (p. 170). More at length he says: "When we look back, and speculate as to how the common-sense categories¹³ may have achieved their wonderful supremacy, no reason appears why it may not have been by a process just like that by which the conception due to Democritus, Berkeley or Darwin, achieved their similar triumphs in more recent times. In other words, they may have been successfully *discovered* by prehistoric geniuses whose names the night of antiquity has covered up; they may have been verified by the immediate facts of experience which they first fitted; and then from fact to fact and from man to man they may have *spread*, until all language rested on them and we are now incapable of thinking naturally in any other terms" (p. 182f.).

By analogy we might expect to find some men or races who did not use these principles of common sense, just as there are still some logicians in the pre-darwinian stage of

¹³ A list of these is given on p. 173: "Thing; The same or different; Kinds; Minds; Bodies; One Time; One Space; Subjects and attributes; Casual influences; The fancied; The real."

thought and some people even who insist that "the sun do move", but we strongly suspect that such people never existed. The prehistoric genius who discovered the distinction between the same and different, and imposed this distinction upon the thinking of all men for all time, was at any rate greater than Berkeley, Darwin or Democritus. His happy guess was the most important event in the history of thought, but our difficulty is in conceiving how our ancestors who lived before his time did any thinking at all.

Prof. Dewey and his co-laborers of the Chicago school¹⁴ start out from a patient and instructive criticism of current logical theories (Lotze, Bosanquet and Bradley), and find that these assume at the outset a chasm between thought and its object which thought is afterward unable to bridge. The traditional logic of idealism placed empty thought forms over against a sensational matter essentially foreign and forever inaccessible to thought. The result is thus happily expressed elsewhere by Prof. Dewey: "The ancient myth of Tantalus and his efforts to drink the water before him seems to be ingeniously prophetic of modern epistemology. The thirstier, the needier of truth is the human mind, . . . the more surely the living waters of truth recede."¹⁵ To escape this situation it is insisted that thought and its object are not absolute distinctions, but that each has meaning only as a function within a wider experience; and that the function of thought in its characteristic exercise of judgment is to readjust or transform experience so that a condition of tension or unrest is followed by one of satisfaction or harmony. A concise statement of the more ultimate philosophical bearings of the *Studies* is to be found in the preface. There, after emphasis upon the close connection between the act of knowing and affection, appreciation and practice,—“hence the intimate connections of logical theory with functional psychology”—Prof. Dewey states as the conviction of himself and his colleagues, “that since Reality must

¹⁴ *Studies in Logical Theory*, 1903.

¹⁵ "Beliefs and Realities", *Phil. Rev.*, March, 1906, p. 113.

be defined in terms of experience, judgment appears accordingly as the medium of thought through which the consciously effected evolution of Reality goes on; that there is no reasonable standard of truth (or of success of the knowing function) in general, except upon the postulate that Reality is thus dynamic or self-evolving, etc." (p. x). In common life he shows that the exercise of reflection is to meet some specific difficulty, to bring about some desired end, and he adds that this point of view "knows no fixed gulf between the highest flights of theory and control of the details of practical construction and behavior" (p. 9). This instrumental theory of knowledge or truth is strengthened by an appeal to evolution. "The entire significance of the evolutionary method in biology and social history is that every distinct organ, structure, or formation, every grouping of cells or elements, has to be treated as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation. Its meaning, its character, its value, is known when, and only when, it is considered as an arrangement for meeting the conditions involved in some specific situation" (p. 15).

Enough has been said to show that Prof. Dewey has presented his theory in an instructive and highly persuasive way. Two points may be singled out for remark, his appeal to science, especially evolutionary science, and his humanistic metaphysics of reality as experience. At first sight, indeed, there is a lack of harmony between the two sides of his theory. If reality is experience, what becomes of the pre-human and pre-organic ages with which geology, for instance, deals? This is a question which Prof. Dewey finds it a little difficult to answer. If reality "must be defined in terms of experience", and judgment is "the medium through which the consciously effected evolution of experience goes on", Prof. Dewey's theory of evolution appears to be not so much one of the evolution of knowledge as of evolution through knowledge. If to be is to be experienced, and reality is transformed through knowledge,

there seems to be no place left for the pre-human and pre-experiential evolution of which science treats. While the emergency is met¹⁶ by assuming for the "non-contemporaneously experienced" scientific facts another or secondary kind of reality, "an earlier reality", "the earlier portion, historically speaking, of what later is experience", some doubt of the entire compatability of Prof. Dewey's theory of reality with "reigning biological conceptions" may remain and the consignment forthwith of all rival logical theories to a "pre-evolutionary" stage of thought may appear unwarranted.¹⁷

It should be noticed that Prof. Dewey's view of reality as experience has been as influential in the development of Pragmatism as his instrumental theory of judgment. It may be said to have become a cardinal doctrine of Pragmatism on its metaphysical or religious side. If reality is experience, and judgment transforms reality, we are ready to believe with Prof. James that "the world stands really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands. Like the kingdom of heaven, it suffers violence willingly. Man *engenders* truths upon it" (p. 257). Pragmatism, which was at first "completely genial" (p. 79), entertaining any hypothesis, has now become metaphysical, and therefore interesting. It "concerns the structure of the universe itself", and the universe is said "to be growing in all sorts of places, especially in the places where thinking beings are at work" (p. 259). "All 'homes' are in finite experience: finite experience as such is homeless. Nothing outside of the flux secures the issue of it. It can hope for salvation only from its own intrinsic promises and potencies" (p. 260).

¹⁶ "Reality as Experience": *Journal of Phil.*, etc., May 10, 1906.

¹⁷ In an appreciation of the work of Spencer (*Phil. Rev.*, March, 1904, p. 175), Prof. Dewey says: "A thoroughgoing evolution must by the nature of the case abolish all fixed limits, beginnings, origin, forces, laws, goals. If there be evolution, then all these also evolve, and are what they are as points of origin and of destination relative to some special portion of evolution."

We see how easily Dewey's theory of reality as experience passes into the Humanism of Schiller and the "pluralistic pragmatism" of James. Humanism, with its homeless flux of finite experiences, would seem to set a bar to religion, which asserts a reality over and above the flux; it would seem to defeat the purpose of the *Lectures* to mediate between the scientific or "tough-minded" and the religious or "tender-minded" temperaments. All three of our authorities, however, whether or not with perfect consistency, are ready to defend the legitimacy of religious faith. Prof. James, without coming to terms with the avowed Humanism of his preceding chapter, boldly declares, "I firmly disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is the highest form of experience extant in the universe" (p. 299). But while Humanism does not exclude religion, as perhaps it might if strictly construed, it determines its form. In a world growing at various points, with finite experiences assuming a semi-creative role; in a world left to work out its own salvation, God may be properly viewed (as Prof. James says that professed monotheism really regards him) "as but one helper, *primus inter pares*, in the midst of all the shapers of the great world's fate" (p. 298). The center of gravity in religion is changed. Instead of human dependence, which cries, "Lord, on thee our souls depend", the emphasis is now on divine dependence. The power, perhaps, as is elsewhere suggested, the purpose of God to achieve the victory of the good needs reinforcement by the faithfulness of man.¹⁸

These finite experiences, so highly exalted by Pragmatism, may possibly prove a source of embarrassment when their relation to one another is considered. Reality is experience; but whose experience? Doubtless that of A, B, C and all finite selves. But how can B with his experience

¹⁸ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 519. "Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here below to their own poor over-beliefs may not actually help God in turn to be more effectually faithful to his own greater task?"

become a reality to A? Unless the pragmatist becomes frankly a solipsist, as many of his critics insist that he ought to be, this question may become troublesome for both the metaphysical and the logical sides of his theory. The experience of A cannot enter except as a transcendent factor into the experience of B. Without this factor B can have no knowledge of A's experience, but only perhaps a vague "feelin' for you". In a community of finite selves known to each other, knowledge has already started on the road to transcendence, and for each finite knower reality transcends experience.

For the instrumental logic these other selves also may prove embarrassing. A candidate for office, through his up-to-date campaign manager, makes a thorough canvass of the intention of voters in doubtful states or districts. The aim of the canvass is distinctly practical, but the canvass will be useful only if a true report be rendered. The truth of the canvasser's report will be independent of its usefulness. It will be just as true whether it leads to a dangerous "overconfidence" or to an unwarranted despondency, or whether it leads to the vigorous measures needed to secure victory. The intention of the voters at a given time simply is a fact, whether the manager knows it or whether he likes it or not. It is not changed in one way or another merely by being known,—it is not transformed. The relation, then, of the voters' state of mind and the manager's knowledge is static. The truth of the report will not consist in its utility or lack of it, but simply in its correspondence with the voters' intention. It is not true because useful, but will be useful only in case it is true. Pragmatists are ready to admit that the existence of other selves is a convenient hypothesis; but it would appear that a world of other experiences, existing independently of a given knower, will require a place in logical theory for a purely correspondence view of truth, as much as would a real external world or a real Absolute.

The notion of an external world causes Mr. Schiller some

trouble. The assumption of ordinary experience of an "external world" "works splendidly" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 459), but since the whole is an "intra-experiential affair" (James), our terms must be interpreted "pragmatically", *i. e.*, "not too literally" (p. 461). Elsewhere, in speaking of determinism, the author says that a postulate "may continue to be serviceable even after it has been discovered to be false" (p. 397). What then becomes of serviceability as a criterion of truth? Plainly, it must not be pushed too far: its edge must not be turned against a humanistic metaphysic which says "Reality is experience" (p. 463). In an earlier chapter he says that "to recognize the pragmatic reality of an unpleasant fact means nothing metaphysical, and entails no serious consequences" (p. 189). One is in doubt whether to infer that there is a realm of truth sacred from profanation by the pragmatic test, or whether, if this test is the only one, there is no reliable means of distinguishing between the doctrines that are serviceable and true and those that are serviceable and false. Mr. Schiller suggests that the reality of our present world may finally vanish like that of the dream world when we wake. He also says that "'pragmatic' recognition of the external world may not be final, because it does not serve our ultimate purposes" (p. 203). But if all the theories which work splendidly now can be appealed to the august but rather shadowy tribunal of final or ultimate utility, we are left for the present with no very workable test of truth.

Pragmatism, full-grown and fully armed, is not as we have seen, a single or simple doctrine. Among elements entering into the making of it may be mentioned the dominating influence of the evolution theory, the rise of a functional psychology, the alleged inadequacy of the older logics, the failure of the current philosophies to satisfy personal needs and aspirations, the extraordinary progress of modern science as contrasted with an apparent deadlock in philosophy, the development of a non-euclidean geometry, the discovery of chemical elements which seemed to throw

doubt upon accepted generalizations, the theological influence of Kant especially as mediated through Ritschl, the practical spirit of the age, and possibly the tendency of human nature to disparage metaphysics as so much barren logomachy, but not to be quite content without a metaphysic of one's own. But while these elements were in solution and ready to crystalize into a new philosophy, it would be unjust and ungracious in dealing with a doctrine of Humanism to deny full recognition to the personal influences through which the crystallization has taken place—the brilliant dialectics of Schiller, the literary grace of Dewey, and, above all, the moral earnestness and picturesque persuasiveness of James. Whether the three stars in this galaxy will long remain in conjunction; whether the influence of Pragmatism upon religious thought will be superficial or profound; whether in its attitude toward religion it will go through the familiar process of developing a left and a right wing; these are questions which the future must decide. In the meantime, we may, in closing this paper, set down in a rather summary and dogmatic fashion what seems to us to be its value and significance for religion.

1. It has done a service to religious thought by vitalizing philosophy and bringing up in a new form and with fresh interest the recurrent problems of human thought, the problems of the one and the many, of being and becoming, of intellectualism and voluntarism, of faith and reason, of empiricism and rationalism, of a utilitarian and an intuitive morality, of a moral monism or dualism of pluralism in the constitution of the universe, of idealism, realism and skepticism, of predestination and free-will.

2. It is the outgrowth and expression of a protest, coming from philosophy itself, of emotional and practical interests against the alleged tyranny of the reason. It champions the rights of personality against the depersonalizing tendency of an empiricism on the one side, which construes it under mechanical categories, and an absolutism on the other, which pretends to transcend it.

3. Its attitude toward religious faith is distinctly friendly, and it has given to faith a new philosophic standing. Against agnosticism, which declares that belief without evidence of a scientific sort is the unpardonable sin, it has asserted the right to believe, at one's risk, in the central affirmations of religion. Faith cannot be the foe of reason because faith is involved in the exercise of reason itself. Interests and emotions, instead of being always sources of error, are in fact the sources of all truth. Both science and religion begin with postulates of faith, and transmute them through the verifications of experience into axioms of reason. "The identity of method in Science, and Religion is far more fundamental than their difference" (*Humanism*, p. xv).

4. It should be of service to religion so far as it protests against verbal quibbles and against a one-sided intellectualism; so far as it decries, like the practical St. James of Scripture, a dead orthodoxy, a faith that makes no difference to conduct or any doctrine which is not alike "the child of faith and the mother of duty", and so far as it insists that religious truths are truths to live by. While discarding all authority, all absolute truth, it claims a close kinship with Christianity.

Over against these aspects of Pragmatism which are favorable to religion may be mentioned some points of apparent weakness or inadequacy to meet religious needs.

1. Its religious appeal is to a rather narrow circle of minds, to those so buoyant and self-reliant that in a "vulnerable" universe, a universe with only a "fighting chance", they feel that they can fight its battles not so much with Divine assistance as by giving aid to the Divine. Since its appeal is to a moral aristocracy of the strong and the robustious, and it comes not to call sinners but the righteous, and confesses that it "has no saving message for incurably sick souls"¹⁹ it can hardly be that "finally victorious way of

¹⁹ *Journal of Phil.*, etc., IV, p. 20.

looking at things" which James says "will be the most completely *impressive* way to the normal run of minds" (p. 38).

2. With this very problem of "sick souls" its dealing is inadequate. It is indeed a distinction of Pragmatism that its leading advocate has grappled with the problem of pain and suffering, with the "tangled, muddy, painful and perplexed" (p. 21) facts of experience. Every reader must admire Prof. James' sympathetic touch as he deals with these facts, and must applaud his protest against an easy-going optimism which overlooks them, and a callous indifference which is unmoved by them. It may still, however, be suggested that a still more radical empiricism might face the facts of sin and moral disorder even more boldly, and that a religious doctrine which is to be true because in the highest degree useful, must call sinners as well as the righteous, and must offer some remedy for sick souls. The facts of pain and suffering, as construed by a writer quoted on page 22, "invincibly prove religion a nullity". Prof. James, facing these same facts, makes the venture of faith and believes in a religion of meliorism; that the world, though now in a state of flux, without elephant or tortoise to rest on, can yet be made better if the power (and purpose?) of God are reinforced by the moral energy of man. Why may not a still stronger faith, facing steadily the same facts, so "tangled, muddy and perplexed", make the great venture and cry, "Who shall separate us from the love of God?" and assert a universe built on "rocks all the way down?"

3. The central convictions of the religious and moral life are man's dependence on God and man's responsibility to God. For neither of these does "pluralistic pragmatism" provide an adequate basis. If an *ad hominem* argument may be admissible, it cannot be denied that coincident with the growth of Prof. James's Pragmatism there has been a modification, if not a decline, in the quality of his theism. In place of the doctrine of God as the "Great Companion" (*Psychology*), or as the "Infinite demander" (*Will to Believe*), in place of the ethics of "infinite and mysterious obli-

gation from on high", we have vague hints of polytheism, suggested limitations upon Deity, expediency exalted as the highest category in morals, and a world where there is no guarantee of the final victory of the Good. The motive in all this has doubtless been to vindicate the value and significance of the finite moral struggle, as against forms of Absolutism which reduce finite experience to illusion or deprive the moral life of its meaning. But surely it must not be necessary to destroy or weaken obligation in order to vindicate freedom. Freedom, in fact, in its moral aspects, is but the corollary of obligation. "If the (moral) foundations are destroyed, what shall the righteous do?"

The religious limitations of Pragmatism are best expressed in Prof. James' own words. Here, as we have found elsewhere, he is his own most searching critic. With a deep moral insight and with admirable frankness, he declares, in contrasting theism with materialism, that the notion of God "guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. A world with a God in it, to say the last word, may indeed burn up or freeze, but we then think of him as still mindful of the old ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that, where he is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final things. This need of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs of our breast. . . . Materialism means simply the denial that the moral order is eternal, and the cutting off of ultimate hopes; spiritualism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order and the letting loose of hope" (pp. 106, 107). The ontologic thirst of religion is just this need of an immortal love, of a power that can save and can assure the victory of the good, of an eternal moral order, and this need, it must be admitted, neither a flexible truth, nor an evolution without laws or goal, nor a universe ultimately dependent on man, can adequately supply.

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