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THE PERSON OF CHRIST IN RECENT RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

The high claims of Jesus in our historical sources and the claim of Christianity to finality or to be the absolute religion have proved a difficulty to all modern types of religious philosophy which reject the claim of the New Testament to be a supernatural revelation and which cannot accept the New Testament doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God.

In point of fact all attempts to give a philosophical basis for Christianity which could do justice to its historical element, to the central place of the Person of Jesus, and to the finality of Christianity, apart from Christian supernaturalism, have failed.

We agree with Karl Heim¹ when he says that the attempts to bridge the gulf between the eternal and the historical, and to see in Jesus the central object of religion and in Christianity the final religion, have been along two lines. One is the Hegelian which by a process of logic attempts to see the fulness of the Divine Idea in the form of a popular representation (*Vorstellung*) in historical Christianity. But in the last analysis we have only the *Idea* of Divine Sonship and Saviourhood. Its full and final realization in Jesus is not done justice to, and can never be reached along this high *a priori* road. Just why these ideas could not be realized in many mediators, the Hegelian philosophy of religion can never show. And Heim is right in saying that Hegel was the last great religious philosopher who attempted to deduce from a philosophical system the New Testament idea that there is

¹ "Zu meinem Versuch einer neuen religionsphilosophischen Grundlegung der Dogmatik" (*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, N. F. Jahrgang 4. Heft 6. 1924).

only One Mediator between God and man, viz., Jesus Christ.

Since Hegel every attempt which starts from a religious philosophy and endeavors to take a positive attitude toward the New Testament teaching has been along the lines of either value judgments or Christian experience, and has suffered from the charge of subjectivity. We have previously criticised these attempts,² and need not repeat their examination here.

Troeltsch's view, which we there examined, cannot be said to take a positive attitude. He gave up the idea of "absoluteness" at the supposed demands of the comparative study of religions, and yet at the same time unites with this a value judgment in the old Ritschlian fashion, claiming the highest place for Christ as the revealer of God and for Christianity as a religion. But in his small volume, *The Significance of the Historical Jesus For Faith*, we see what his attitude really was. Jesus has really no soteriological significance for faith. If He did not exist faith in God and in deliverance from sin could do without Him. We need Him only because religion is social and we require a rallying point, or social center of fellowship. We shall not pause now to consider Troeltsch's view. It cannot be said to take a positive attitude toward the New Testament claims, and we have criticised it before in the above mentioned essay.

Two attempts at a philosophical basis for Christianity have recently been made, and we shall examine these briefly. They are those of Rudolf Otto, of Marburg, and Karl Heim, of Tübingen. It is true that these attempts all hail from Germany. But in so far as the high supernaturalism of New Testament Christianity is abandoned, American theology is still, generally speaking, under the dominion of the old fashioned liberalism about which enough has been and is being said.

Rudolf Otto³ in his well known book, *The Holy*, in which he sets forth what he calls the "numinous" or mysterious and

² "The Finality of the Christian Religion," in *Biblical and Theological Studies*, by the Faculty of Princeton Theological Seminary (1912).

³ *Das Heilige*, Elfte Auflage, 1923.

transcendent aspect of the Divine Nature, attempts to relate this *a priori* element in religion to history and to find in Jesus the Son of God, and in Christianity the one final religion. What he means by his "*a priori category*" of The Holy, we have fully outlined in reviewing the book in this issue of the *Review*, and need not go into it here. Suffice it to say that he shows that besides the known or conceivable attributes of God such as consciousness, will, omnipotence, etc., there are "non-rational" and transcendent elements which make up what he terms "the awful mystery" of Deity. To these he gives the name of the *numinous* aspect of God. What concerns us now is to examine how he relates this idea, which he calls "*a priori*," to experience and history, and how he finds it fully realized in Jesus, so that all religion finds its full, final, and absolute realization in Christianity. In discussing this we shall be obliged to repeat some of what we said in reviewing this volume. The historical element in religion, especially historical Christianity, is related to the transcendent or *a priori* aspect, or in other words God is found in Christ, not by means of a supernatural revelation in the sense of the old theology and the Scripture, but in a philosophy of religion and theory of knowledge which rests on Fries.⁴ This discussion occupies the last part of his book. It fails equally with the Hegelian philosophy to do justice to historical Christianity as a redemptive religion finding redemption realized in the Divine Christ. Otto's position is not new; it is the philosophy of Fries applied to the specific question in hand.

The *a priori* element in man's religious consciousness must be aroused and called forth, Otto holds. How then, he asks, is religion "experienced"? There must be external historical facts or an "outer revelation," and there must be also a power to recognize the Divine in the external revelation. Otto calls

⁴ Fries and Jacobi accepted the position of Kant regarding the limits of our knowledge of God and religious truth, and prepared the way for the advance beyond rationalism by asserting that man has a special religious faculty, a faith, feeling, or intuitive sense of the Infinite. The latter Fries called *Ahndung* (old spelling of *Ahnung*).

this power "divination," which is the power to discern the presence of the Deity in historical events and persons. This faculty or power is similar to Fries' "intuition" of Deity. Like Schleiermacher, Fries, and DeWette, Otto ascribes such a religious "intuition" to the human spirit. It is actualized, however, only in "prophetic" natures upon which the ordinary man must depend. Jesus above all others had such a prophetic gift. But he was more than a prophet. He was not only the "subject" of divination, but also its "object." Others recognized the Divine in Him. This is true of His first disciples, and it is true today. By reflection on Jesus and the New Testament redemptive history, we experience "salvation," which is independent of historical details. Thus the experience of religion and Christianity rests on this twofold basis of intuitive endowment and external manifestation. And since Jesus is the "object" of this religion, while other prophets cannot be said to be in the same sense, Jesus is *the* Son of God.

What is to be said of this attempt of Otto to find a philosophical basis for the uniqueness and absoluteness of Jesus, and for the finality of Christianity?

In the first place the impossibility of passing from the eternal God to a specific and exclusive manifestation of Him in history by an *a priori* road when the idea of supernatural revelation has been abandoned, is seen in the fact that the result obtained does not rise above the level of natural religion, and can contain no redemptive element. All religion, including Christianity, is traced back to *a priori* or rational elements. This can be seen from what has been said concerning the idea of "divination," and the relation of the religious *a priori* to history. We consider first, then, the way in which Otto relates his idea of "divination" to the historical Jesus. In place of supernatural revelation we have "divination" or the religious "intuition" (*Ahndung*) of Fries. In a word we "intuit" the Divine in Jesus. It is true that Otto says Jesus is more than a prophet with this prophetic gift of divination to see God and show Him to others. Jesus is said to be the

object of "divination" i.e. we see God manifest in Him. But this only means that somehow we feel the presence of God in Jesus. It is really difficult to see how this view differs from the Ritschlian judgment of value so well illustrated in Herrmann's *Communion of the Christian with God*, which Otto would call mere subjectivism. In the last analysis Jesus is only a means by which these vague feelings of Deity or "*the numinous*" are aroused in us. The essential element in Christianity is found in this *a priori* category, not in the historical revelation or the great Christian facts and their interpretation in the New Testament. In this way we might have our religious natures stimulated and so have a natural religion, but no Gospel, no good tidings of salvation. For unless we know that Jesus is Divine, that He died for our sins and rose again, we have no Gospel and no historical and supernatural Christianity. No intuitions, even when called forth by history, can give us Christianity because Christianity is a historical religion. We cannot know *a priori* that Jesus is the incarnate Son of God, nor what He has done for man's salvation. Neither can Jesus be the *object* of religious adoration and trust unless we do know who He was and what He did. The philosophy of Kant and Fries leaves no place for a genuine historical revelation, much less for a supernatural one. But this is precisely what the Christianity of the New Testament claims to be, and no philosophy of religion is adequate which does not at least examine these claims and so determine whether or not, in rejecting them, it has taken into account all the phenomena. We said in the review of his book that his English translator⁵ allies him with the Mystics, and that E. W. von Mayer⁶ calls his religious philosophy a type of rationalism. But it makes little difference. Christianity is not the product of either reason or feeling, and the great Christian facts have a deep redemptive significance. They are more than the occasion of calling forth the *a priori* elements of

⁵ *The Idea of The Holy*, English translation from the ninth edition by John W. Harvey.

⁶ *Theologische Rundschau*, July-August, 1917, pp. 214 ff.

religion. They claim to be, and, if there is to be any historical Christianity, they are, the supernatural work of God for man's salvation. Deprive them of this claim, and you deprive them of everything which renders them specifically Christian.

In the second place the concluding chapter on "The Religious *A Priori* and History" shows the same tendency to do scant justice to the historical facts of Christianity. The contrast between the *a priori* religious principle and its outer manifestation is the same, Otto says, as that between general and special revelation. We would be inclined to disagree with him that all natural religion is *a priori* in its basis. We have the revelation of God in nature, for example. But this is not the point now in question. It is true, as Otto maintains, that special historical revelation is organically related to, and based upon, general revelation. Special revelation extends over the ground covered by general revelation and adds a sphere of soteriological and trinitarian truth not contained in general revelation at all. Also, it is without significance to call Jesus God if we have no idea of God apart from Jesus. But the part history plays in this relation to the *a priori* or innate religious elements, is, after all, only the occasion of calling them forth, according to Otto. In a word *a priori* elements of knowledge are not ready made in the mind; they need historical experience to call them forth. But if this is all, then nothing can be called forth which was not already contained in the *a priori* element, and this, as we said is bare natural religion. There are, according to Otto, three stages of the religious consciousness. First, that of most men, who have only the "predisposition" to religion. Second, the prophetic stage when the prophetic power of "divination" enters, so that the prophet can point others to God. This stage was realized supremely in Jesus. Third, there is a stage of "revelation" beyond this: "We can look beyond the prophet to one in whom is found the Spirit in all His fulness, and who at the same time in His Person and work has become the object of divination, in whom Holiness is openly manifest.

Such a one is more than prophet.—He is the Son.”⁷ This is a real attempt to see in Jesus more than a prophet, and to make Him the *object* of faith. But from Otto’s philosophical premises we do not see how it can mean more than the indefinite Ritschlian statement that Jesus is the supreme manifestation of God in human experience. If so, He may be called a Son among other sons, but not *the* Son in any supreme, exclusive, and metaphysical sense. Even if He be more than a prophet, He is not the divine Son of the New Testament writings. This is only to say again that the rational *a priori* principle is the all important thing for Otto, and the historical Jesus only its illustration. It is on a Kantian and Friesian basis, but it does not seem to differ essentially from the Hegelian view.

Consequently Otto fails to ground the exclusiveness and finality of Christianity. Karl Heim makes some pertinent remarks on this point.⁸ He points to this exclusiveness and absoluteness of Christianity as a fact which is not comprehensible from the philosophical presuppositions of Schleiermacher, or the religious *a priori* of Troeltsch and Otto. This element, which Heim calls “intolerance,” he finds an original datum of the history of religion and especially of Christianity. From Otto’s standpoint, Heim says, it is conceivable and necessary that the innate religious disposition of man should individualize itself in many prophets. But it is inconceivable how any one should claim to be the supreme and final revealer of God. This element of Christianity, he properly says, stands outside the boundaries of the religious *a priori*, i.e., man’s innate religious nature. One might do away with this, Heim continues, as a “hateful malformation” of religion were it not for the fact that “every sentence of the New Testament breathes forth this intolerance” or the ex-

⁷ *op. cit.*, p. 199.

⁸ Karl Heim, “Otto’s Kategorie des Heiligen und der Absolutheitsanspruch des Christus-Glaubens” (*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1920, Heft 1). Also the article already referred to, “Zu meinem Versuch einer neuen religionsphilosophischen Grundlegung der Dogmatik,” pp. 1 ff.

clusive claim of Christ. If such an essential element of primitive Christian faith is inconceivable from Otto's philosophical premises, Heim adds that it may cause us to pause and ask whether the trouble does not lie in the philosophy with which we approach the study of the historical facts. We can at the most, from such a philosophy, reach the "idea of a saviour" which could be manifested in a number of historical forms, but not in one Saviour alone. We can say there are not only average men who are religiously receptive, there are not only prophets who show us God, there are sons of God in whom we see manifested qualities of the Divine nature. In a word we can call Jesus *a* Son, but not *the* Son. And it is, as Heim says, characteristic of the New Testament to see in Jesus *the* Son of God, God's only Son. Between this New Testament idea and the philosophies of Schleiermacher, Troeltsch, and Otto, Heim sees a broad gulf. The passage from the rational *a priori* to the historical is incomprehensible. We think Heim is right. We believe that his criticism of this passage over the high *a priori* road is convincing and will prove difficult to answer.

But what, we ask, does Heim offer us himself to bridge this gulf? What is his position on the relation of the eternal God to His historical manifestation, of philosophy to faith and history?

Heim asserts that we must have a philosophical basis to ground Christian faith and to connect the *a priori* religious idea with the historical Christ. Between these two factors must come a third which he had worked out in his *Certitude of Faith* and now develops in a recent article⁹ in reply to criticisms of R. Paulus.¹⁰ Paulus claims that all that is needed

⁹ *Glaubensgewissheit*, 3 Aufl., cf. also the article, "Zu Meinem Versuch einer neuen religionsphilosophischen Grundlegung der Dogmatik," especially pp. 417 ff.

¹⁰ R. Paulus, "Geschichtliche und übergeschichtliche Grundlagen des Glaubens," in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1922 Heften 3. u. 4; Paulus' view also will be found in his book *Das Christusproblem der Gegenwart*, 1922, p. 159. But see also p. 164 where Paulus claims a uniqueness in Jesus not to be found in any other; and again p. 127 where

is a recognition of the superhuman in the second factor, the historical Christ. This will account for the Christian view that Jesus is *the* Son. But Heim replies that it will never account for the idea that the final destiny of all humanity is centered in Jesus alone. Paulus' idealistic philosophy and Christianity cannot be harmonized and in the end we have a set of religious symbols on the one side and a number of historical examples on the other. In Paulus' language, "Christ is a symbolical expression for the saving and reconciling presence of God." Paulus does not save historical Christianity by a parallel historical line of thought which seeks to give finality to the entire Christian movement. Philosophical Idealism and historical Christianity are left side by side. The "superhuman" element in Jesus can be found, according to Paulus' admission, in Laotse, Gotama, and Plato. Here we are brought into contradiction with the New Testament, Heim says, and we must choose between mysticism apart from history, or admit that salvation is in Christ alone and that He is *the* Son. Paulus seeks to find an "intensive finality" in Jesus but his philosophical principles can never make room for it.

In place of all such attempts Heim gives a speculative view which he claims will furnish a basis for Christian faith. Heim's idea, briefly summarized, is as follows. The manner in which all previous Systematic Theology has sought to pass from the religious *a priori* to historical Christianity is a false attempt to escape from the situation in which we find ourselves as a fallen race estranged from God. This has introduced a fundamental contradiction or antinomy which runs throughout all our knowledge, and this fact must be frankly realized and admitted. The peculiarity of our situation consists in the fact that we have necessarily two mutually exclusive "pictures" of our entire world of experience. One is the "neutral picture" of scientific

Paulus reverts to the former position for which Heim criticised him. In fact Heim is right in saying that Paulus says both yes and no to the question of the absolute significance of Jesus for faith.

objectivity, free from all individual "perspective." It is universal, relativistic, or as we would say naturalistic. The other is the picture "with perspective." It is a true and necessary view, but arises in us only when we are willing to make the necessary sacrifice of "neutrality" and "objectivity." It has an absolute center of value to which everything must be related, and from which everything must be viewed. The "painfulness" of our situation lies in the fact that these two "pictures" of reality or world-views are absolutely mutually exclusive. They cannot be harmonized, and this fact must be recognized. Of course the human mind is forced to seek to escape from this "curse" which rests on human knowledge, and the weightiest of such attempts is that of philosophical Idealism which regards the concrete, individual, "perspectivistic" view as but a symbol of the objective or philosophical and scientific view. But all such attempts have proven failures. The most that we can do to bring any unity into our experience is to point out that these two contradictory aspects of our knowledge, the conflict between which we experience so painfully in the religious sphere, runs throughout all our knowledge. This "law of perspective" is universal in its reach. It finds its simplest illustration in sense perception. If we look out of our window on the landscape, we see things and objects in perspective from our standpoint. But we are involuntarily obliged to abstract from our standpoint and think of the objects as they are in themselves. Both aspects are necessary, and both are irreconcilable. But while they are irreconcilable, they are inseparable. We cannot help making in thought this abstraction from our own view-point. (One of the American neo-realists has called this the "egocentric predicament.") But when once we have realized this fact, Heim continues, we are in a position to understand why human thought has been driven to seek to harmonize and bring unity into our knowledge, and how all such attempts are hopeless. The most common of such attempts rests, he says, upon a mythological conception of the soul, and a distinction between an "inner world" and an "outer world," or

between consciousness in opposition to "objective reality." This is a great mistake, Heim thinks. Kant has shown that we cannot thus hypostatize the self and separate it from its conscious states in which are united both aspects of reality falsely called inner and outer. In this fallacious way we are led to assign the world-view which has our own necessary perspective to the sphere of the "subjective," and to regard the neutral or scientific view as objective. In this way we are led into all manner of difficulties.

If we admit this false distinction, Heim continues, we are led to seek by it to escape the difficulties inherent in our religious knowledge. If this so-called subjective attitude is necessary to the human spirit, and if over against it is an objective view, then in regard to our knowledge of God two opposite conclusions are drawn. Either we take the subjective view-point seriously and value the human spirit and its view-point higher than nature, and then, following Ritschl, we seek a moral proof of God's existence and assert the deity of Christ in a judgment of value, supposing we have overcome the neutral, scientific, or so-called objective point of view according to which Jesus is only a man, miracles impossible, and Christianity only relative. Or, on the other hand, we do not take the non-neutral, so-called subjective point of view seriously, but recognize as valid only the neutral, objective, naturalistic view-point. Then all value judgments are worthless, Jesus is no longer the central personality of human history, miracles are impossible, and a pure relativism and naturalism is all that remains. As long as the "perspectivistic" point of view is relegated to a mythical "inner world," this result is unavoidable. In fact in this way we escape from any question as to the existence of God Himself. By the first alternative we seek faith in God and Christ in an unjustifiable manner. By the second alternative we seek to escape all religious questions in an equally illegitimate way.

Let us then abandon this above described great source of error, continues Heim. Let us give up the vain attempt to

escape from the necessary conditions of our human knowledge. Then at once the "law of perspective" ceases to be a mere psychological law and becomes a universally valid law. When we do this we get a world-view which can form a basis for the belief in Christ which the New Testament presents. We have at last found a philosophical starting point, universal in its scope, which can do justice to the Christianity of the New Testament which regards Christ as *the* Son of God, and the *only* Saviour of men. In all theological systems since Hegel, this necessary non-neutral or "perspectivistic" point of view is dragged in as an after thought to save Christian faith. Here it is recognized from the start as a necessary part of all human knowledge. Hegel's attempt to relate the Absolute to history in a logical way is recognized as a false attempt to escape from the antinomy which is essential to human knowledge in our state of estrangement from God. We cannot escape. On the one side stands relativism with its neutral objective point of view, and the Person of Jesus loses the position He occupies in Christian faith. On the other side stands the non-neutral and perspectivistic view, and Christ takes His place as *the* Son of God and the object of Christian faith. Neither view-point should be related to the other; neither subjected to the other. Each must be thought through consistently. But we can only attain the world-view of faith as we ever anew pass over the "abyss" of offence which the absolute claims of Jesus arouse on the basis of the "relativistic" view of the world. But once we seek to lessen this "offence" of Christianity, Christian faith at once loses its power to conquer the world.

This is, briefly put, Heim's view. What is to be said of it? In our attempt to escape *a priori* logic shall we flee to the refuge of a necessary antinomy? Can Christian faith survive on this philosophical basis? These are the questions which we shall now seek to answer briefly.

The most important thing to say and the fundamental criticism of Heim's view is that knowledge and belief cannot survive a final antinomy or contradiction. The law of contra-

diction is a fundamental law of human thought. Do away with it and we are inevitably led to a thorough going scepticism. We can believe in things that we cannot fully comprehend and even in those that we cannot clearly see can be harmonized. But we cannot believe in two views which we clearly see are contradictory. We cannot be convinced of the truth of a proposition on one set of grounds and at the same time be convinced of its falsity on another set of grounds. The law of contradiction is unescapable in every sphere of our knowledge. Charles Hodge, among many others, showed this very clearly,¹¹ both in discussing the proper function of reason in religion and in criticising the Christian Agnosticism of Mansel. In the former place he says, "Christians concede to reason the *judicium contradictionis*, that is the prerogative of deciding whether a thing is possible or impossible." He says that among impossible things is that one truth should contradict another. "That reason has this prerogative," he continues, "is clear from the very nature of the case." "Faith includes an affirmation of the mind that a thing is true. But it is a contradiction to say that the mind can affirm that to be true which it sees cannot by possibility be true. This would be to affirm and deny, to believe and disbelieve, at the same time." Recently it is the merit of Friedrich Traub to have emphasized the same truth.¹² There are matters in our religious knowledge which he thinks involve seeming contradictions, but he holds that we are bound by the laws of thought to seek a harmony or at least to believe such a harmony possible. Otherwise belief is impossible. This is what we wish to emphasize. It is not merely that complete scepticism would result from giving up this fundamental law of contradiction; it is that it is psychologically impossible for belief to arise or exist under such circumstances. It is simply that we cannot believe to be true that which we see to be false.

¹¹ *Systematic Theology*, vol. I, pp. 51, 352.

¹² "Das Irrationale" (*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1921, Heft 6).

If this be the case then it follows that if the religious and Christian or "perspectivistic" world-view be true, the "neutral" or so-called scientific, *i.e.*, relativistic and naturalistic view, must be false, and *vice versa*. We cannot believe them both; and if this contradiction is an ultimate result of our thought, we can believe nothing.

But it should be noted, secondly, that there are not two such necessary views. There is of course, to take Heim's illustration, the "picture of the world" which we get from sense perception. Then there is the "picture" or conception we get by the process of abstraction from and criticism of this view from the standpoint of natural science apart from the concreteness of our sense perception point of view. But the two are not contradictory, and what is more the second is a construction of our minds equally subjective with the other point of view. In no case and in no department of our knowledge can we get outside of ourselves and view things as "they are in themselves," that is as God sees them. To do this our knowledge would have to become like that of God. It is to demand the impossible. We are bound to trust the laws of belief which God has implanted in our mind or to acknowledge an utter scepticism.

Turning to the sphere of religious knowledge, we would remark thirdly, that the effect of sin upon our knowledge, according to both Scripture and experience, is spiritual blindness, and not, as Heim asserts, the "curse" of contradictions or antinomies. Our natural knowledge of God has been darkened, but not destroyed. The laws of our thought have not been rendered untrustworthy. What we need is not resignation to antinomies but spiritual illumination. This is the clear teaching of Scripture which not only asserts that our minds are darkened; that we are spiritually blind and in need of spiritual illumination; but which also recognizes with equal clearness the prerogatives of human reason in matters of religious belief. And to this Scriptural teaching our experience gives abundant witness.

Finally we should note that the view which Heim calls "neutral," "unperspective," and "relativistic" in the religious

and Christian sphere is neither necessary nor true: it is just naturalism. By this we do not mean simply the philosophical sense of the term or the "mechanistic conception" of the Universe, but the view which denies to God the power to intrude in the sphere of second causes and produce effects due to His Omnipotence alone. Now what should be carefully observed is that this naturalistic view is neither a necessity of thought nor a legitimate result of genuine empirical science, whether of nature or mind. It is a piece of philosophical or speculative dogmatism. The writer of this article sought to show this in the essay on the "Finality of the Christian Religion," above referred to. It has recently been clearly and forcefully put by Bishop Gore.¹³ He tells us rightly that if we believe in an Infinite Personal God, the Creator and Ruler of the Universe, we may believe in supernatural Christianity, and can approach the evidence for belief in the supernatural Christ of the New Testament without naturalistic basis. We will not repeat the discussion we gave in the above mentioned essay. We said that all anti-theistic views must deny Christian supernaturalism, but that the theist in the full sense of that term can believe in it. We sought to examine the two main reasons why many theists reject it. A truly theistic philosophy of religion and an adequate theory of knowledge are the fundamental demands of Christian Apologetics today. But into these great matters we cannot now enter. Our purpose in this article has been the more modest one of examining the relation of recent speculation to the Person of Christ, and of criticising the religious philosophy of two leaders of German thought, Rudolf Otto and Karl Heim, as a basis for belief in the Christ of the New Testament.

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¹³ *Belief in Christ* (1922), p. 3 f. See also his previous volume, *Belief in God*.