

THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW

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I.

PRESENT HINDRANCES TO MISSIONS AND THEIR REMEDIES.

THE cause of Foreign Missions is manifestly growing in favor with its friends, and possibly in disfavor with its enemies and critics. The number of its friends is steadily increasing from year to year. They are greatly reinforced from the ranks of the young. The prayers of Christian mothers who have been enlisted in the work of Foreign Missions for the last twenty-five years have been answered, not only on the mission fields, but in the enlarged knowledge and quickened interest of their own sons and daughters here at home. Students' Volunteer Movements, Inter-Seminary Missionary Conventions, and Christian Endeavor Societies are the results. And very naturally under such circumstances an increased interest is taken by many pastors and churches; and the preaching of an earnest missionary sermon, or the holding of a missionary congress in Synod or Presbytery, is a much more frequent occurrence than formerly. Theological instruction in our seminaries has never before placed so much emphasis on the work of Foreign Missions.

But on the other hand there is also an increase in the forces opposed to Foreign Missions. The enemies of the cause are multiplied; they are more outspoken; they are more inventive of objections; they are more bitter; and this, perhaps, for the reason that the work of missions has assumed greater proportions, and by its success has challenged increased attention among intelligent men and women of all classes. The secular magazines and newspapers have found it worth while to discuss the subject—its progress—its economics—its diplomatic bearings—the burden and bother of it

II.

SOME ASPECTS OF RECENT GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.

THE state of philosophy all over the world to-day is one of criticism rather than construction. The spirit of the age with its determination to search everything before it constructs, has made no exception in the case of philosophy, and philosophy in Germany is no exception to this rule. There is no continuity or development of ideas to be found, such as was seen in the great constructive periods.

Philosophy has always been characterized, broadly speaking, by the presence of one of two great aspects—the ontological and the empirical. Thought in the exercise of the ontologic insight tends to fix its gaze on reality, and from this standpoint to descend into the sphere of phenomena which are regarded in the light of the reality-intuition. The empirical intuition or insight, on the other hand, turns steadfastly to the observation of phenomena, too often only to become dogmatic in the negation of the existence of higher categories, and in the application of its own categories in the higher sphere. The preceding century in Germany was characterized by the prevalence of the ontologic aspect of thinking, owing to the influence of Hegel; and the first aspect of German thought of which we shall speak is a reaction from Hegel and an attempt to combine these two methods of thinking. There has been an attempt to do full justice to the categories of science, and at the same time to construct a metaphysic with principles of its own, in the light of and upon the categories of science. This tendency has recognized the impossibility of any intuition of Absolute Being, such as would justify a deduction therefrom of the course of the world; but it has at the same time acknowledged that the presuppositions of all science are metaphysical in their nature, and has attempted to take these scientific categories and show their metaphysical implications, pointing out how a synthetic construction can be made by and through an analytic study of the scientific categories. Lotze* says that while the history of thought has shown the folly of neglecting experience, yet experience alone cannot give what philosophy seeks. Science,†

* Lotze, *Metaphysik*, Einleitung.

† Lotze, *ibid.*, p. 3.

for example, must postulate the uniformity of nature, which is a metaphysical presupposition. Moreover science cannot penetrate into the nature of the forces and elements whose modes of behavior she investigates; so that this is left for metaphysics, which he claims must serve that interest which the thinking mind takes in learning the inner real ground of phenomena that makes their chainlike combination possible. On the other hand, the *à priori* construction of a world-system appeared as folly to Lotze;* and he shows that no such *à priori* knowledge of reality is possible as would justify a deduction of the course of phenomena. Thus we see exemplified in one of the deepest of modern thinkers, the tendency to combine the ontologic and empirical aspects of thought; and Lotze's whole system is an attempt to show by an examination of scientific categories the underlying world of metaphysical reality.

The attempt to think out a world-view in the light of science has taken two directions, a theistic and a pantheistic one. Taking up first the theistic side, we may take Lotze and Ulrich as examples.

Lotze gave a spiritualistic, and attempted to give a theistic world-view. In the first book of his *Metaphysics* he seeks to show that reality is spiritual. In the first place, he says that to be is to stand in relations.† The thing which stands in relations is not a mere indeterminate substratum, but is to be conceived as possessed of a nature of its own, capable of acting and being acted upon. The concept of a living spirit alone satisfies this. Further, one of these reals is in constant change, and yet at the same time must be conceived as identical with itself; no dead identity, however, but a living identity in change. This can only be conceived of a spirit which can appropriate the different changing states and through them all preserve its identity. Reality then is spiritual. Lotze goes on to argue for the existence of God from the interaction of these real beings.‡ Like the monads of Leibnitz, they cannot really work one on the other, for this would presuppose that one of these real beings should go out of itself and pass over the gulf separating it from all others, or else that some effect should pass from one to the other; both of which ideas are unthinkable. What really happens is that, upon a change taking place in one, another change takes place in another one. Now this cannot take place through a preëstablished harmony as Leibnitz held, since this conception is too mechanical to explain how every minute change in one thing could be accompanied by a corresponding change in the others. This relation of interaction can be conceived only if these beings are parts of one all-embracing Being. Then the change in one part is

* Lotze, *Metaphysik*, p. 10.

† Lotze, *ibid.*, Bk. i, chap. 5.

‡ Lotze, *ibid.*, Bk. i, first three chapters.

due to a change in this Being, which is felt in all its parts. This Being is a personal Spirit, and all changes are determined according to a world of worths, the idea of the Good being supreme. Mechanism is the form in which we cognize these ideal relations, and the cosmological or scientific categories are the forms in which these ontological realities appear to us.*

Of course the crucial point for determining whether or not Lotze has attained a theistic position, is to be found in his conception of the relation of God to finite spirits. This Infinite Being he expressly says is a personal Spirit, but the real beings with which he started have become mere parts of this Absolute Spirit. How then, we ask, is a real and personal existence of the finite spirits to be maintained? Pfeiderer † has shown that Lotze's position cannot be reconciled with theism. Suppose, he says, in substance, we hold to the reality of the finite parts: then the One Being which contains them can no longer be the personal God, but merely the sum of these parts. If on the other hand we hold to the personality of God, the parts become merely ideal differences in the divine thought. It is easy to see that Lotze's system is in unstable equilibrium between pancosmism and akosmism. The cause of this is that the relation between the relative and absolute is not adequately conceived. It cannot be represented as one of whole and parts. A further reason is pointed out by Pfeiderer in the fact that Lotze does not conceive the world as the result of the Divine Will, which is the outgoing power of God creating a world outside Himself. The world with Lotze is not willed in the sense of an outgoing causal energy, but the Divine Will is conceived as passively giving assent to a thought of the world. Here we find that Ulrici ‡ has gone further than Lotze. His Being which binds together finite beings is not conceived as a substance which contains them as its parts, but as an Absolute Cause putting forth a creative energy, and standing in this creative relation to finite existences, and yet binding them into a system.

Such systems illustrate plainly the attempt to take the categories of science and show their metaphysical implications. This indeed is one of their main characteristics. We have, however, dwelt on their content as attempted expositions of theism, since this is rather more important than their more formal aspect as examples of metaphysics on a scientific basis.

The pantheistic side of the tendency to found philosophy on a scientific basis, has taken the form of a kind of Spinozism in the light of modern scientific theories. Spinozism was pure intel-

* Lotze, *Metaphysik*, Bk. ii.

† Pfeiderer, *Die Religion*, p. 25.

‡ Ulrici, *Gott und die Natur*, Abschn. 5; also Pfeiderer, *Die Religion*, p. 255.

lectualism, and consequently had no room for the concepts of will or energy. The Relative was conceived as existent from all eternity as a mode of the Absolute. No energy, no movement, a closed and lifeless system, Spinozism unchanged would seem hostile indeed to modern science with its concept of evolution and development. It was necessary then that the concept of energy be connected with the Absolute through the idea of its nature as volitional, in order that it might be more favorable to modern science. Philosophy starting with Spinozism must find some way by which in the sphere of Absolute Being to do away with the everlasting parallelism of thought and extension, leaving it only in the phenomenal sphere; thus giving supremacy to the spiritual side in order that Spinoza's mechanism might be avoided, and at the same time making thought subordinate to volition so that the modern doctrine of evolution might have a chance. This tendency is well illustrated in Paulsen,* and it may be well to pause long enough to see with what success Paulsen has met in attempting to escape from Spinoza's parallelism in the absolute sphere, and in attempting to add will, and indeed to make it fundamental. A brief survey of Paulsen's remarks in the domain of the philosophy of religion will reveal to us moreover what sort of a religious philosophy this doctrine of scientific pantheism leaves us, and will give us an insight into a very widespread view of religion.

In Paulsen we find a system of naturalistic pantheism. The relation of the relative to the absolute is that of phenomenal manifestation to ground, and the concept of the supernatural is ruled out. The system is primarily, as has been said, Spinozism, read in the light of modern science; while fundamental differences from Spinoza come out, betraying the influence of Schopenhauer and Wundt. The first point in this system is the doctrine of the parallelism between nature and spirit. Here we have the two attributes of Spinoza. This is brought out in the criticism of materialism.† There is no causal relation between physical phenomena and those of consciousness. When a sensation, for example, occurs, the physiologist can account for all the energy in a closed physical circle; but there are the conscious phenomena left unexplained. Every physical event has its corresponding psychological side. This would have as its consequence, Paulsen says, the theory of "Allbeseelung," or the theory that there is a spiritual side to nature both inorganic and organic. Paulsen appeals to the speculations of Fechner. He seeks to show that the attribution of soul-life to any one but one's self is an inference; and that there is no reason why this should not be made in the case of plants. He uses the name of the botanist von

* Paulsen, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*.

† Paulsen, *ibid.*, pp. 77 ff.

Nägeli, and in the inorganic sphere cites Zöllner's work on comets. We have not space to present his argument. He then goes on to say * that the new psychology favors this view. Herbart's psychology was a sort of atomic theory with ideas as the atoms, so to speak. Since then the new psychology, especially in Wundt, has shown that will or impulse is the original and fundamental factor; and this would fit in with the theory of "Allbeseelung." Impulse, and in man will, are fundamental. So far, however this only constitutes the parallel side to physical phenomena. With Spinoza, intellect was the fundamental factor on the spiritual side of the parallelism and Spinozism was pure intellectualism. Thought and extension are the known attributes of the one substance which has an infinite number of attributes. Paulsen here departs from Spinoza. The spiritual side is will. Now, he says † that the spiritual side is the one to push into the metaphysical sphere. It is real, while the physical world is its appearance to our sensibility. Epistemological considerations, therefore, make him an idealist; and we have already seen how he conceives the nature of spirit. The cosmological problem is the question of atomism, theism, and pantheism, that is the question as to the relation of the parts of reality. After ruling out atomism he considers theism, rejecting it and advocating pantheism, because, as he claims, theism contradicts the modern scientific doctrine of evolution. The teleological argument he conceives as directly contradictory to the causal series, while the hypothesis of an "Intelligence working from outside" has been overthrown. Pantheism must be true when we consider the fact that Darwin's principles, or any principles of natural science, are only *modi operandi*, and need as their presupposition the "will to live." Moreover in view of the fact of the unity of all things and the further fact that an immanent impulse does not do violence to the natural causal series, we must decide in favor of pantheism. Idealistic pantheism is true because there is a meaning or teleological worth in every causal series and in the world as a whole, though finality is by no means intentionality.

A few remarks by way of criticism may not be out of place. In the first place a disputed theory in epistemology seems rather insecure ground of escape from the mechanism of Spinozism, and for the assertion that of the two parallel sides, nature and spirit, the latter is real and the former phenomenal. But secondly, Paulsen's grounds for the rejection of theism cannot endure criticism. His conception of theism is mechanistic. He speaks of it as holding to an intelligence working entirely from without, and not through the

* Paulsen, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, pp. 116 ff.

† Paulsen, *ibid.*, p. 239.

series of natural causes; as not immanent as well as transcendent. He also misconceives the teleological argument in claiming that it would have to give the final or ultimate end, and that life, fullness of life regardless of quality, is the end, easily showing that nature is not a system of means to that end. He does not seem to realize that the substance of the teleological argument is that the series of natural causes appear as though directed by an intelligence working through them, and that all scientific principles, such as those of Darwin for example, are only empirical formulas seeking to explain the mode of action of some real or ultimate cause, and not themselves causes. That this is the nature of scientific principles he seems to realize well enough, however, when he seeks to show that they need as their presupposition the will to live. He advocates a finality without intentionality; but this does not give us the principle of insight, the need of which drives us to the assertion of finality. Finality with Paulsen is merely what is perceived as having worth for the will, after it has happened. The will is blind, however, and reaches the result through blind striving. But the question comes up, Why then did its striving plus the work of the environment conspire to bring about a result which has worth? and what is that by which we determine a thing as having worth? Finally, it is hard to see the reason for inferring that will must be fundamental in the absolute sphere because Paulsen believes it to be so in the relative. It is hard to see why this blind will is necessary to the scientific doctrine of evolution, and why theism is contradictory. Blind will or impulse cannot help the natural causes. It can at best supply energy; but if the natural causes or modes of operation of this force are merely expressions of its ways of working and not directing causes for this energy whose *modi operandi* they are, then we need the postulate of intelligence as well as will.

In the sphere of religion, Paulsen says that while his pantheism is contradictory to the belief of the Church, yet it is not contradictory to true religion; as can be seen when we realize that its essence is a feeling of humbleness and fear before God, and a trust that the All-One is the All-Good, and that the world is one vast teleological scheme, with the Good as its goal.* We do not deny that these elements do enter into the religious consciousness; but we are convinced that though it is very complex, yet its deepest notes as studied in humanity, are desire for union and communion with God, accompanied by a sense of isolation from Him through sin, and need of reconciliation. These are phenomena found universally in the human consciousness and not merely the teachings of some sect. Such being the needs of the religious consciousness, the

Paulsen, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, p. 251.

philosophy of religion having given us the deepest notes in religion, must look to the Atonement of Christ as the only means of satisfaction for these needs; and as Paulsen's pantheism leaves no room for a God who is separate from us and to whom we are responsible, it cuts away sin and leaves unexplained the feeling of guilt. Moreover it leaves no room for a Christ who is God, and the Atonement in its deepest meaning would be for him a superstition.

In his attempt to reconstruct Spinozism in the light of modern science, Paulsen has taken the standpoint of a philosopher. The same tendency, viewed from the standpoint of men of science, exerts a very large influence in Germany. The concept of energy and the doctrine of evolution are used in an attempt to construe the world in a monistic and naturalistic manner, and the parallelism of Spinoza is invoked to escape the charge of materialism. First the inorganic, then the organic, and finally consciousness with the moral and religious life—all resulting from the same first principle and developed by one law.

Haeckel* provides an example of this world-view of scientific men who have become metaphysicians. Haeckel's philosophy is a naturalistic pantheism. It is monism. By monism he means "that there lives one spirit in all things, and that the whole cognizable world is constituted, and has been developed in accordance with one common fundamental law."† He emphasizes the essential unity of inorganic and organic nature, the latter having developed from the former at a comparatively late period, there being no absolute distinction between them any more than between animal and man. "Similarly, we regard the whole of human knowledge as a structural unity; in this sphere we refuse to accept the distinction usually drawn between the natural and the spiritual. The latter is only a part of the former (or *vice versa*); both are one."‡ Haeckel cites, in proof, the evolution of knowledge in the human race, showing what he terms the advance from anthropomorphism to monism. Then he cites the law of the conservation of energy and of matter. Uniting energy and matter he starts with "animated atoms." Here he goes on to show the results of the evolution theory evolving the organic from the inorganic, and consciousness from this. "Immortality in a scientific sense is conservation of substance, therefore the same as conservation of energy as defined by physics or conservation of matter as defined by chemistry."§ He expects that he will be accused of materialism, but asserts that this is a mere "party word," and spiritualism

* Haeckel, *Monism as Connecting Religion and Science*, English translation by J. Gilchrist.

† Haeckel, *ibid.*, p. 3.

‡ Haeckel, *ibid.*, p. 4.

§ Haeckel, *ibid.*, p. 50.

would apply to his view just as well. Here we see Spinozism—matter and spirit parallel. Finally, we can represent God “as the infinite sum of all natural forces.”*

We have not space to review this *Weltanschauung* critically, but one point may receive critical attention. If energy is united to matter, is the system truly monistic? And if the development be always forward and upward, what must be the nature of this energy? Who knows but it may have intelligence—or even moral insight—and that this view, which would be called neither materialism nor spiritualism, may find, that if it should put forth any ideas as to the world-development they would be indicative of either materialism or spiritualism?

We have seen how the reaction from Hegel, and the assertion of her rights by outraged science, led to a philosophy on a scientific basis, and that the reaction has taken both a theistic and a pantheistic form. This reaction from Hegelianism has taken also a different form. If on the objective side science had been neglected, so too on the subjective side had Kant's criticism of the faculty of knowledge been disregarded; so that the second aspect of German thought to which we shall turn our attention is the reaction from Hegel on the subjective side, or the return to Kant and the assertion that the Kantian limits of knowledge are not to be overstepped. This brings us to the study of Neo-Kantism. The return to Kant and the contention of Neo-Kantism that the constructive developments from him were not in accord with the spirit of the master, is perhaps the most prominent aspect of recent German thought. It has had its various representatives, giving it different phases; but we must get at the main idea before taking notice of any minor differences.

In order to understand Neo-Kantism we must state, very briefly indeed, Kant's position. Kant had reacted from the Wolffian formalism and had turned toward experience. But he found that skepticism was the result of Hume's view of experience, because it was sensationalistic. He therefore sought to discover rational and *à priori* elements in experience, which coördinate it, relate it to a subject, and bring order into it. In short, he sought the elements in experience which render it possible. But these *à priori* principles he believed to be of a purely individual and subjective character and to apply only to impressions of sense which come from a world of things in themselves; so that our knowledge is phenomenal, and there is a world of reality excluded from us. Thus the rubrics of Kantism are the things in themselves, the impressions of sense, the *à priori* categories which inform the impressions, the idea

* Haeckel, *Monism*, p. 78.

of the ego or subject to which the categories bind the impressions, and whose activity they are, together with the doctrine of their subjectivity and the consequent limit of knowledge. It is not difficult to see that this doctrine is in unstable equilibrium and could be developed from either of its two sides; and this is what was done. The movement of transcendental idealism took the ideal rational element and made it an ontological principle, a universal reason, thus escaping the Kantian limits and phenomenism; while the movement of transcendental realism took up the "Ding an sich" and sought to ignore the Kantian limit and to determine the nature of this real element starting from the Leibnitzian doctrine of monads.

We are now in a position to understand the main idea of Neo-Kantism, and the meaning of the modern cry, "Back to Kant." In the first place, Neo-Kantism asserts that the thing in itself is not a true factor of Kantism, when we understand its spirit aright. Kantism just means that we must speak of nothing extra-mental, everything being content of consciousness; and the problem of knowledge must mean the search for the universal rules according to which we ought to combine our ideas and impressions, that is, in the words of Windelband, "knowledge is normal thinking." The difference between Kant and the previous philosophy, they affirm, consists in the fact that, before Kant, knowledge was supposed to be a copy of a world of external things. This idea of knowledge, Windelband* says, led the naïve mind to suppose that knowledge was an exact copy of reality. But a little reflection showed that knowledge could not be an exact copy of reality. Physiology with its doctrine of specific energies helped toward this conviction. The idea of the mind as being a mirror is absurd in itself, says Windelband; † for how can it be so when a mirror presupposes some one to look into it? But granted the mind is a mirror and an object is reflected in it, what a wonderful mirror it must be to look into itself and see objects reflected there and sometimes even get a glimpse of itself. Science, then, takes the view of certain forces in an external space, which impinge on our nerves and by our sensibility are turned into colors, sounds, in short, into the world of our sensible experience. But then this view also is full of metaphysical presuppositions. It presupposes the extra-phenomenal validity of the causal category, the externality of space, and minds in space. In short, it is no nearer to a conception of the true Kantian idea than is the naïve consciousness.

And so Windelband, with the other Neo-Kantians, says, as we have seen, that we must altogether cease to ask after any object of knowledge outside of consciousness, and must seek within

* Windelband, *Präludien*, chap. on Kant.

† Windelband, *ibid.*

consciousness for an object to which to relate our impressions. This is a rule according to which we ought to bind them together. There are different rules of combination, such, for example, as those of the association of ideas by which our ideas and sensations are bound together in a way of natural origin. But among all ways of natural origin is one which, though none the less psychical in origin, gives us a rule according to which we must think if we would attain to truth. This object of knowledge is also the formal element, and thus has Neo-Kantism reduced the matter or content of knowledge to its form. But in the second place, having reduced all to the formal element in experience, Neo-Kantism goes on to claim that the movement of transcendental idealism, which gave this ideal side ontologic value, is not in accordance with the true spirit of Kantism. We have an ideal rule for binding the content of consciousness, and this is expressed in certain categories. But whether or not they are anything more than subjective rules, we can never say, and any answer to such a question would lead us to metaphysics right away; and Kantism means the critical study of epistemology and the denial of the possibility of metaphysics. Windelband* says, in speaking of this "rule" of thought, that it is a rule for binding ideas together, and then goes on to say: "Whether it is anything more—that we know not, and that we need not know. If this rule be founded on an absolute reality independent of all ideation, in a *Ding an sich*, if it belonged to a higher idea or transcendent apperception, or an absolute Ego, this we can never know. It is enough for us to grant that in our association of ideas it gives a difference between truth and error, which rests in the fact that only those connections of ideas which are to be recognized as giving truth, happen according to a rule which ought to hold for all." Very much the same *à priori* and disregard of the thing in itself is to be found in Liebmann.†

To speak briefly of more specific differences among Neo-Kantians, we may separate them into those who hold that the world of ideas or metaphysical reality is indispensable in ethics, though it has no scientific value; and those who hold that all metaphysics is illusory and may be dispensed with for ethics also—that is practically as well as theoretically. Among the first class may be named such thinkers as Windelband and Lange, and among those of the second kind Laas. We shall speak only very briefly of these men. We find Windelband maintaining that Kant held up not only a

* Windelband, *Präludien*, p. 135.

† Liebmann, *Analysis der Wirklichkeit*, chap. entitled "Die Metamorphosen des Apriori."

norm for thought, but also a norm according to which we ought to act if we would act rightly, and also a norm by which we ought to feel if we would feel rightly, and so grounded a philosophy of morals and æsthetics.* Lange† says that materialism, useful and indispensable as a principle of research, is untenable and unfruitful as a world-view or theory and must be supplemented by a formal idealism. Furthermore, above the world of sensible experience is the ideal world of worths, the "Ideal Welt des Sein Sollenden." These ideas have no scientific value, yet they possess a moral worth which makes them more than mere phantasies. Laas,‡ on the other hand, holds that all metaphysical ideas are illusory, and also that they can be dispensed with practically. There are longings and aspirations which lead us beyond the sensible world, but just as physics does not go into the world of transcendent reality, so also must ethics seek to determine the moral good without entering this region.

We have seen how Kant separated the form and matter of knowledge, and how Neo-Kantism reached an idealistic result by the identification of form and content in such a manner that the former swallowed up the latter, the material element being thus practically set aside. In recent works on the theory of knowledge, there has been a tendency toward a more realistic position which has taken a twofold form. The first form of this tendency of which we shall speak, has been an attempt to find a formal principle of knowledge with a transsubjective validity or reference. There is a necessity for a knowledge of transsubjective truth which is born of our moral necessities, and also an invincible belief in the possibility of such knowledge. These two facts are strong enough to throw grave doubts on the premises of subjective epistemology. Volkelt§ shows that mere experience regarded in a positivistic sense can yield no principle of knowledge, and that all attempts to ground knowledge have really gone beyond this sphere into transsubjective regions. He argues that we must seek in experience a principle with transsubjective reference which shall be a bridge between knowledge and reality. Volkelt finds this in a logical necessity for objective reference of the subjective forms of thought. The subject in thinking has the feeling that objective necessity and not his pure subjectivity is speaking out of him. Hartmann says that no necessity can be found which would ground knowledge, and remarks that if we had thought-forms with objective validity then

* Windelband, *Präludien*, chap. on Kant.

† *Vid.* Falkenberg, *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, p. 460.

‡ *Vid.* Falkenberg, *ibid.*, p. 462.

§ Volkelt, *Erfahrung und Denken*. *Vid.* von Hartmann, *Kritische Wanderungen durch die Philosophie der Gegenwart*, chap. vii.

necessary thought connections could be held to the objective, but that Volkelt's principle builds no bridge to the objective sphere. Volkelt realized this difficulty, and admitted that his principle gave only the content of the transsubjective, while the fact that the thought-forms have objective validity is added as the result of an intuitive belief. But as this point of objective validity is just the crucial point, it can be seen that, after all, Volkelt's position is really what Hartmann terms naïve realism. Hartmann seeks to solve the problem by claiming that a dynamic relation exists between subject and object, and that our knowledge principle is to be found in an objective causality.* It is not difficult to see, however, that the objective validity of the thought categories, of which causality is one, is exactly the point in question, so that Hartmann cuts the knot of the question without untying it.

If then a solution of the problem is not to be found in the formal side alone, let us turn to the consideration of the relation of form and content, and examine briefly the second aspect of the tendency toward a more realistic theory of knowledge. This is found in the opposite of the Neo-Kantian idea of the reduction of the matter of knowledge to its form. It is the tendency coming from psychologists toward, in its extreme form, the reduction of the form of knowledge to its content, while, in a more moderate form, it denies the possibility of Kant's separation of the form and content of knowledge. We will not pause over the extreme form of this tendency, since one can easily see that the reduction of the form of knowledge to its content would amount to a purely sensationalistic empiricism like that of Hume, and would result in the same skepticism. It will not do to go on as though Kant had never lived; and if we are to hope for any solution of the problem we must turn to the more moderate form of this tendency.

Prof. Stumpf† shows that the separation of the categories from space and time is impossible, and says that if, for example, we separate the concept of causality from that of time it is impossible to see why only the earlier can be the cause of the later and not *vice versa*. He shows that the categories are immanent in space and time. He shows further the impossibility of the separation of matter and form in perception, and brings out the fact that a spatial element is involved in sensation, and comes with it just as do the other qualities. The separation of form and matter in the Kantian sense, he says, takes away the possibility of predicating the former of the latter and of referring different impressions to special spaces.

* Hartmann, *ibid.*, chap. vii.

† Stumpf, *Psychologie und Erkenntnisstheorie*. Aus den Abhandlungen der K. bayer. Akademie der Wiss., i. cl., xix. Bd., ii. Abth., p. 8 ff., 17 ff., 30 ff.

This fact, together with the other given by psychology also—that is that a spatial element is given in sensation—shows that Kant's doctrine conflicts with the ascertained results of psychology; and epistemology, while its task is different from that of psychology, must not stand in conflict with the ascertained results of this science. Stumpf goes on to the discussion of the concept of necessity in nature, and says that Kant is right in his contention against Hume that we cannot abstract it out of things, so to speak. He claims, however, that Kant is wrong in holding that we add it to things as an *à priori* form. Stumpf maintains that necessity attaches to the content of certain judgments, and we get the idea of it by abstraction from these. Then we make the assumption that there is a corresponding necessity in nature, in order to explain her, and this assumption is warranted by the further investigation of nature.

Before leaving the subject of epistemology, a few words by way of criticism will not be out of place. Certainly Kant's identification of the form of experience with the subjective process of knowledge is untenable and separates the form entirely from the matter of knowledge. The process is the psychological question, and both form and matter belong to the content of perception and cognition. The categories of the understanding are immanent in space and time, and these in the sensations. But this fact, that psychologically the form and matter of perception come to us in the same way, does not do away with the other fact, that ontologically there is a distinction between them, and that the formal elements in the content of knowledge are ontologically the order or form-giving elements which make an objective cosmos possible. Ontologically they are the forms of a Universal Mind, though psychologically we apprehend them genetically. When we have said all that the psychologist can, the task of accounting for their universality and necessity remains; and it is just at this point that Stumpf's theory seems unsatisfactory. Necessity he derives from thought, and necessity in nature, he says, is an assumption. But it is just this assumption of science that epistemology must seek to explain and justify; and she must not pass it by as science may. Stumpf has simply left the great problem of epistemology unsolved, and has, like Volkelt, made an assumption, which it is the business of the theory of knowledge to justify. Epistemology can solve this problem in no other way than by holding to the difference between the formal and material elements in the content of knowledge; and by maintaining that the formal elements ontologically are active creative functions, and that their universality and necessity can only be explained in this way. We cannot allow, for example, Stumpf's claim that space has no more of an order-giving function in the objective world

than degrees of intensity have. Space gives an external order to sensations, while degrees of intensity have not this function ontologically. The solution of the problem of knowledge will have to be sought by allowing the psychologist to account for the rise of the formal elements in consciousness, and by maintaining that their meaning as expressed in their universality and necessity makes them ontologically different from the material elements, and can be explained only by granting that they are active functions of mind.

The third and last aspect of modern German thought, of which we shall have space to speak, is that of Pessimism, which arose in Germany as still another form of reaction from the Hegelian philosophy. We have seen that there was a reaction against Hegel's neglect of science and a construction of philosophy on a scientific basis. We have seen also how there was a reaction from his absolutism as regards the question of the limit of knowledge, a reaction which took the form of a reassertion of the Kantian limit as seen in Neo-Kantism. And now the third form of reaction is one against Hegel's thorough-going rationalism. Idealism said, the world is my idea, and to know the world I must know my own true self. Idealism with Kant had individualistic limits, and Hegel had said that this truest innermost self is an infinite spirit or idea realizing itself in all of us so that we all have the same world. Universal reason is at the bottom of things. Then from an idea or notion Hegel sought to deduce the course of phenomena. But then when we reflect on phenomena we find caprice, irrationality and evil everywhere present: and so Schopenhauer, finding some difficulty in deducing all this from Absolute Reason, went to the opposite extreme and put caprice at the heart of things.

We must learn the roots of pessimism in Schopenhauer, its great modern originator in the West, though we have mentioned it as an aspect of more recent German thought, because of his recent followers, such men as Frauenstädt, Bahnsen and Deussen. Let us look briefly, therefore, at Schopenhauer's theory as given in his work, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. The world is my idea or representation in which reality becomes individualized and separated in the forms of space, time, and causality, which have no validity outside my representation. The world in these categories is idea. Therefore no cause can be sought for my experiences beyond myself. But what am I really and fundamentally? What is my own true self? My own true self is beyond the phenomenal manifestation in the intellectual forms, and when these are all taken away I find that I long and strive and suffer, in short I am will, that is, will understood as covering my whole active and appetitive nature. This capricious will is one with that will at the heart of all things, and

individuality is only the result of the manifestation of this in the subjective forms of space and time, thus being true only in my idea or representation. This capricious, striving will is doomed to misery by its own nature because it can never be satisfied, and having attained one thing only wishes for something else. Hence there ensues a ceaseless, restless striving, and life must necessarily be one great unsatisfied longing and a pendulum swing between restlessness and ennui. This will, however, capriciously creates an enemy. It manifests itself in intelligence, and this, when it has reached the stage of artistic contemplation, looks as it were intuitively on the will, understands it through and through from a dispassionate standpoint, and resigns itself to the necessity of the case ceasing to strive and to will to live. This is the only way of salvation.

Among the more recent disciples of Schopenhauer, the most uncompromising in his pessimism is Bahnsen.* His doctrine of the will and picture of life are even darker than those of Schopenhauer. The inner contradiction of the will with itself is to be found throughout the whole of existence. The will has in itself a fundamental contradiction. At every moment it wills itself and denies itself at the same time. Whenever, therefore, a will is satisfied in so far as it is positive, it must also be unsatisfied in so far as it is negative. Moreover, in Schopenhauer's theory was to be found the possibility of moments of peace through pure passionless contemplation or intuition of reality; but Bahnsen says that if the will is the ground of things and intelligence merely its phenomenal product, the two cannot be in direct opposition. Intelligence only makes the mockery of life sharper and clearer. Bahnsen shows, perhaps, more clearly than any one the mockery of a world where intelligence is absolutely ruled out, so far as having any positive function is concerned. A younger disciple of Schopenhauer is Deussen. Want of space forbids us dwelling on his doctrine. His metaphysic is that of Schopenhauer, and the way of salvation, he also believes, is to be found in the denial of the will to live. He says:† "We have reduced all becoming and all being in nature to an operating, all operating to a willing, and have denoted the principle of this willing, which shows itself in various forms in conscious and unconscious, animate and inanimate nature, by the word will. In doing so we found that the will, which is the thing in itself and with that the ultimate principle of all being, is unknown to us as it is in itself. We know it only from a particular side, namely so far, as in affirming or willing individual exist-

* This account of Bahnsen is taken from the lectures of Dr. Simmel, of the University of Berlin.

† Deussen, *Elements of Metaphysics*, Eng. tr. by Duff, p. 245.

ence, will is objectified as this universal in the phenomenal forms of affirmation, time, space and causality. Now it is in some way conceivable, even *à priori*, that will—since as thing in itself it is not subject to causality, and consequently lies outside the sphere of all constraint—should be capable not only of a willing, but also of its reverse, namely, of a not willing." When the will wills itself, it does so to appear as individual under the forms of time, space and causality, and this is egoism, being the cause of selfishness and sin. Not willing is resignation which is religion, and begins with justice or the recognition that all are alike parts of the One Will, ending in æstheticism, resignation and the denial of the individual self. Frauenstädt, also, is in the main a follower of Schopenhauer, but modifies his doctrine by bringing in a principle of unconscious intelligence, thus leaning toward the doctrine of Hartmann.

It has been our aim all along to present a few phases of recent German thought rather than to give much space to criticism; but we will add a few general remarks on pessimism. Pessimism has grasped and made clear a great empirical truth of life, namely, that life is not all ease and pleasure, but that sorrow and pain play a large part in human life. It has cleared the atmosphere of all shallow optimism which denies the reality of evil. And in doing this it has done service to humanity; for surely life is no play wherein we are merely to seek and attain enjoyment, and life attains its deepest spiritual meaning in the struggle against evil. But then it is one thing to find a great empirical truth, and quite another thing to make a metaphysical principle out of it. Evil exists and its origin has always baffled philosophy. It is in the world, a fact to be reckoned with; but while recognizing its reality we need not affirm that it is the ultimate and only real factor in the world, for good exists and evil is only part of reality after all. Both are real, but which shall be identified with the Being at the ground of things? If evil, then that ideal self or conscience in every one of us is far more of a mystery than evil would be for a theory which holds that the good is supreme, and evil, while real, comes from the "mutability" of relative existence. Evil exists to be overcome, and the final judgment of the problem must be teleological, that is viewed from the outcome. Faith must say, even when nearly overcome with weariness in the struggle, that evil exists to be overcome and that the end shall be the good. But that evil ever can be overcome without the Divine intervention given in Christianity cannot be believed.

We have spoken of three aspects of recent German philosophy, all reactions from Hegelianism which held sway during a large part of the preceding century. There are many other aspects which

we must leave untouched. The first two of those of which we have spoken are probably the most prominent, and Neo-Kantism the most widely spread. It can at least be seen, even from this brief survey, that the age is critical and that philosophy has to take account of more scientific facts than ever before in her constructive work, and that therefore it will be more difficult than in the time of Hegel. But thought will always concern itself with the same old problems, and the construction, when it comes, will surely be along the lines laid down by the great thinkers of the past, though it may embrace and explain more.

PRINCETON.

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