THE PRESBYTERIAN
AND REFORMED REVIEW

No. 19—July, 1894.

I.

THE MOSES OF THE CRITICS.

MOSES had gone up into the thick darkness, fire, and smoke, which covered the summit of Sinai. The people had waited in vain for his return. Days and weeks had passed, a month and more had elapsed, still there were no tidings from him, and no sign of his reappearance. "And when the people saw that Moses delayed to come down from the mount, the people gathered themselves together unto Aaron, and said unto him, Up, make us gods, which shall go before us; for as for this Moses, the man that brought us up out of the land of Egypt, we know not what is become of him" (Ex. xxxii. 1). Their excited minds pictured him as hopelessly and forever gone; he would never be seen, nor heard from again. Thus in the imagination of the critics the Moses of the Bible has disappeared from view. And with loud acclaim they are chanting the praises of the mystic symbols E, J, D, P and R, which they have set up to fill the vacancy created by the removal of Israel's great leader. The advance of critical science has in their opinion entirely changed the aspect of affairs; and the history of that whole period must be reconstructed on a new and different basis. Let us briefly consider what the critics propose to substitute for the Moses that has been taken from us. The theme proposed is the Moses of the critics, or Moses as the critics represent him.

The Moses of the Bible is a clearly defined, conspicuous and commanding personage. Saved from threatened death in his infancy by an interposition of Providence, which secured for him a training at the court of Pharaoh without weaning his heart from his own

VI.

THE KANTIAN THEISM.

KANT'S great constructive work in Epistemology was the analysis of experience to show those principles which are necessary in order to render it possible. He shows that the activity of mind is necessary to knowledge, and that the connected experience which constitutes knowledge only exists in relation to self-consciousness through the categories. But if we discover self-consciousness with its activity and categories and then arbitrarily presuppose that they are individual and human, differing essentially from that which is universal, then that which was to give us reality and objectivity shuts us off from it. Kant did this. After having shown that objects cannot exist out of relation to a mind, he presupposes that knowledge is a mechanical process, the putting together of separate factors. Hence, under the necessity of choosing which of his factors is the real one, he says that reality is that which affects our senses, so that the next step is to say that self-consciousness, as known, is merely a phenomenon of the internal sense, and the synthetic activity of self-consciousness only a logical notion. Then, of course, the breach between knowledge and reality can never be closed; all the work ofmind is individual and subjective; the impression of sense, which Kant has shown cannot exist alone, is the only source of content for the categories; so that the real world lies as a sphere of dead "things in themselves" which are unrelated to mind, the unknown mysterious causes of sensation, while supersensible reality is still farther removed from the sphere of the knowable.

Accepting, however, the spirit of Kant's teaching, we will be led logically to reject his doctrine of the limits of knowledge. If self-consciousness is a spiritual activity, how can it be unreal? And if things exist only in relation to a mind, what ground have we left for the assumption of a reality unrelated to mind and supposed to lie in a sphere external to thought? That which we know is the real, and the spirit of Kant's own teaching should prevent us from postulating any other reality.

Let us apply this to the problem of Theism. According to Kant's false presuppositions, God must be entirely separate from the

world and the human spirit, standing in external and mechanical relations to each. Of course, if men accept this view, everywhere must there be altars "to the Unknown God"—yes, and to the unknowable God. If God is to be knowable, He must be immanent in man and nature, a self-revealing Spirit. It was this truth that Hegelians and the Neo-Kantians grasped. But they took Kant's self-consciousness considered as a logical notion and raised it to universality, thus making the Absolute, which we call God, merely an immanent thought-process in nature, which only reaches complete self-consciousness in man, and which never transcends this finite world and human spirit. The results of this are obvious. If the supernatural be reduced to the spiritual; if all idea of a God who is transcendent as well as immanent be lost; what Bible doctrine does not lose all its meaning? The supernatural basis of Christianity is shaken and Christ Himself becomes merely the person in whom a spiritual power reaches its highest form, and who, instead of being the sacrifice for sin, is merely the apostle of evolution by self-sacrifice, who gave power to His teaching by a martyr's death.

It is clear then that God must be both immanent and transcendent if we are at the same time to know Him and believe His revealed Word to us. But only a self-conscious personal Spirit can be both immanent and transcendent. It is important, therefore, to hold fast to the grounds of Theism, which have been too often given up since the Kantian criticism. We will endeavor to follow the grounds of Theistic belief and Kant's noted criticism.

The question, then, is whether the Absolute of Philosophy is God.

The question now comes up as to whether there is any *a priori* reason for believing that this is so. Reason gives an affirmative answer. Her supreme category is Unity. A complete and absolute Unity must be attained. Now there are the spheres of nature and of freedom. But nature is independent of our finite wills. If therefore all we can say is that Absolute Being exists, the dualism between nature and freedom cannot be done away with. The only possible unity is one where the ends of freedom are realized in nature, and this can be only if nature is controlled by a Unitary Being which is active for ends, directing nature for the realization of these ends of freedom. Mechanism is not chance but law, and the idea of law includes in it that of an end. Thus mechanism leads by necessity to Teleology, and the only unity is a teleological one where self-conscious intelligence and will is subjecting Mechanism to its own ends. The supreme unity is found when Mechanism and Teleology harmonize in the nature of a Being who is the source of both moral and natural law. Reason is satisfied only where the

heart is satisfied, in the belief and knowledge that above all is one personal, self-conscious Spirit, the Absolute God who has predetermined all things for the realization of His own glory and the well-being of humanity. Kant recognizes this *a priori* necessity. He argues * that the Absolute must be conceived as one and individual because it is the primal source of all things; and in another place,† he tells us that the highest unity is a teleological one so that Intelligence must be predicated of the Absolute. In fact the connecting link of Kant's whole system is Teleology. He sets forth Nature and her categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason;* and after leaving noumena beyond the reach of knowledge so that we cannot even say that they exist, he shows us that they exist and opens up the world of freedom in the *Critique of Practical Reason;* but he connects the two spheres in his *Critique of Judgment* by means of the Teleological judgment which reflects on nature as though she were subject to a Supreme Intelligence and realizing the ends of freedom. But with Kant an *a priori* necessity is only a subjective one. To say that anything is *a priori* with him is equivalent to saying that it is subjective only, and he seeks to show that all arguments *a posteriori* with reference to this question are fallacious. He grants what has been given *a priori*, but only as a subjective necessity, and then shows the dialectical procedure of Reason in the Theistic argument.

But it is clear from the introductory remarks on knowledge that this identification of *a prioriness* and subjectivity is groundless. The fact that a truth is *a priori* necessary by no means proves that it has no objectivity, nor does it even leave us powerless to claim for it objectivity. The fact that it is *a priori* is strong evidence of its objective truth. And it is also true, as has been shown, that Kant's separation between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* in knowledge is false. They are two aspects of truth which is a unity. Therefore the *a posteriori* must not conflict with the *a priori*, and if we find that it does we may be sure that one or the other is not genuine. If it be true, then, that *a priori* we must say that the Absolute is self-conscious and personal Intelligence, then it is of the very greatest importance that this be justified *a posteriori*, that is, in experience; for if this be not possible we may well question our supposed *a priori* necessity. Now the *a posteriori* justification of our belief in the existence of the Absolute and of our determination of it as personal self-conscious Intelligence, is the Theistic argument. The arguments of which this is composed are *a posteriori* with the exception of one aspect of the Ontological argument. The question

* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Transcendental Dialectic," Bk. ii, chap. iii, § 2.

† *Critique of Pure Reason*, Appendix to the "Transcendental Dialectic."

before us, then, is as to whether or not the Kantian criticism has overthrown the historic Theistic arguments.

There is one point, however, which should be carefully noted before estimating the weight of Kant's criticism. It is that the idea of God which he uses as the object of these arguments is very different from the God of Theism when rightly understood; and also very different from the God which we might infer from what Kant himself has admitted as an *a priori* though subjective necessity. The God of Theism is a self-conscious and personal Spirit and this realizes both the ideas of immanence and transcendence. Now as we are seeking the *a posteriori* justification of that which we have determined *a priori*, of course this same idea of God which has been reached *a priori* should be the subject of the Theistic argument. Moreover since Kant has admitted the *a priori* necessity of determining the Absolute as intelligent and personal, such a God could be immanent as well as transcendent, and such a Being should have been made the subject of his criticism. But such is not the case. The God which is the subject of his remarks on the Theistic arguments is the God of eighteenth-century Deism, and of course they avail against this. His theory of knowledge was marred by its mechanistic character, and so the objects of knowledge come to have a mechanism about them and exist apart from consciousness. God stands apart and in a purely external and mechanical relation to the world and man. The idea of God which he gives * has three elements. First the sum total of the possibility of all experience. Second the conception of an *ens realissimum*. And in the third place the attributes which we get by what he calls "hypostatizing" the idea; that is, he argues that from it all things derive their reality and so it is regarded as primal. A primal Being must be one and simple. Then we regard it as the ground of all things, and cogitate the whole sum of our experience as an individual whole, giving the idea of individuality, and so reach the idea of God. Now nothing could be more mechanical than this. God is not the sum total of all existence regarded as a whole and individual. He is not a sort of mine or fund of reality from which we draw. He is not a sum total of all reality as though reality were, as a house, made of different mechanically constructed parts. God is a spirit existing in spiritual relations to His finite creatures. It was just such a mechanical and pantheistic definition as this which lead Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel into so many difficulties. Dr. Runze † speaks to the point on this mechanical

* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Transc. Dialect," chap. iii, § 2.

† Runze, *Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis*, p. 81.

conception. He says that the mechanical conception of a sum total which limits God to a mere aggregate, is not interchangeable with the idea of the Highest Being. "Much rather," he says, "does the highest reality lie at the foundation of the possibility of all things as a cause and not as a sum total."

We must carefully bear in mind that it is God, a living Spirit who exists in spiritual relations to us, whom we are seeking; and not a God who is afar off, and in merely mechanical relations to us or else out of all relation.

The Theistic arguments, Kant's treatment of which we are now to examine, are four in number. There is the Ontological argument which tells us *a priori* that if the Absolute or Necessary Being exist we must predicate infinity of all its attributes, and identify it with the All Perfect Being; and *a posteriori* this argument expresses the truth that God through this perfect idea has spoken in and to the consciousness of humanity, so that His existence may be inferred as the cause of this idea. Next there is the Cosmological argument which proceeds from the contingent to the necessary, and thus from this we infer the existence of a necessary Being which the Ontological argument on its *a priori* side tells us is the Most Perfect, the Infinite Being. Then there is the Teleological argument, which argues from the adaptations of means to ends in nature to design, and thence infers that Intelligence is to be predicated of the Absolute. Lastly we have the Moral argument, which from our moral nature and the supreme categories of Morality infers the moral nature of the Absolute.

The most notable and important fact with reference to these arguments is their vital connection with and mutual assistance of each other, while at the same time each preserves its own identity in the performance of its special function. They are parts of one whole, which cannot stand hostile criticism if separately required to perform the whole task. Thus the Cosmological argument gives us the existence of the Necessary Being, but nothing more. The Teleological and Moral arguments give us attributes of this Being, while we leave experience and say *a priori* that these attributes are infinite and so identify the Absolute with God. Therefore these arguments can neither be separated nor identified. They have been most happily likened to a bundle of twigs, which when bound together the strongest arm cannot break, but when separated may be broken by the weakest. They are the *a posteriori* ground of that firm conviction that the Absolute of Philosophy is the God of the Bible, and together with the *a priori* ground of this same belief they change it into a reflective knowledge by which man's reason bids his heart take courage as it faces the assaults of skepticism.

Kant first criticises the Ontological argument.* He discusses it in its *a priori* form. Anselm† is the author of this, so we must look to him for a statement of it. He gives it thus: "And we believe that Thou art a Being than whom a greater cannot be conceived. . . . . And certainly that than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot be in the intellect alone. For if it be in the mind only there can be thought a Being existing in reality also, which is greater. If therefore that than which a greater cannot be conceived is in the mind only, it follows that that, than which a greater cannot be conceived is that, a greater than which can be conceived: but certainly this cannot be. There exists, therefore, beyond a doubt a Being than whom there can be no greater, both in thought and in reality." Anselm's reasoning is simply that if we could conceive the non-existence of that than which a greater cannot be conceived, then a greater could be conceived, which is a contradiction. But, of course, this is after all merely a necessity of conception founded on the impossibility of conceiving the opposite. It asserts a contradiction in the removal of existence as a predicate, asserting that it is contained necessarily in the concept. Now Kant's first criticism is that the arguments which have been drawn to show the correspondence between thought and things have been taken from judgments, not from things. This criticism attacks the argument as though Anselm's position were that what exists *in intellectu* exists also *in re*. But this is not his argument, as Dr. Patton‡ shows. His argument is, as has been stated, that existence is necessarily in the concept of the Perfect Being. Kant realized this, and proceeded to criticise the argument in this form by showing the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments, and that being is not a real predicate. He argues as follows: If there is a contradiction involved in the denial of this predicate, it must be contained in the concept; and must therefore be a merely logical predicate and so say nothing as to reality: therefore though the annihilation of this predicate involves a contradiction, both subject and predicate may be together suppressed without contradiction. But if the judgment is to express existence, that is if being is a real predicate, it must add something to the concept and so its removal will not involve a contradiction. Moreover existence is not a real predicate or there never could be a correspondence between the concept and object, the object always being greater.

Now in order to estimate the force of this we will state three positions which may be held with reference to the Ontological argument.

*Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Transcendental Dialectic," chap. iii, § 4.

† Anselm, *Proslogion*, Caput ii.

‡ Patton, *Syllabus of Lectures on Theism.*

1. There are those like Anselm who hold that it is an *a priori* demonstration of existence.

2. There is the view of Leibnitz,* who believes that Anselm's argument needs to show first that the idea of a Most Perfect Being is possible, that then the conclusion follows, and that this is done when it is shown that there are no contradictions involved in this Idea conceived as existing.

3. There is the position which we have indicated, that the *a priori* side of the argument is not designed to prove existence, but to show that the Necessary Being of the Cosmological argument is the Infinite and Perfect Being of our idea. And *a posteriori* this argument is to express God's witness to humanity of His existence, through this perfect idea.

Now the first of these positions Kant has successfully overthrown. His arguments against any *a priori* demonstration of God's existence merely from the idea are unanswerable. There are *a priori* reasons, but from the mere concept a demonstrative proof in the Anselmian way is not possible. He has also been successful against the position of Leibnitz; for if the possibility of the idea is to be shown by the mere absence of all contradiction, Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments will rise against us, and the Leibnitzian view will not differ from the Anselmian. But against the third position Kant's arguments can have no force. He has made two errors in his criticism. He has taken the *a priori* side of this argument, which is only designed to identify a certain idea with the Necessary Being of the Cosmological argument, and has required that existence be shown *a priori*. But that which is the far greater mistake is the fact that he has neglected the *a posteriori* side of the argument altogether. DesCartes is the author of this aspect of the Ontological argument. He gives the Anselmian proof, but also argues that the idea of God is Perfect and Infinite, and that therefore God must be its cause. He says,† "And, in truth, it is not to be wondered at that God, at my creation, implanted this idea in me, that it might serve, as it were, for the mark of the workman impressed on his work; and it is not also necessary that the work should be something different from the work itself; but considering only that God is my Creator, it is highly probable that He in some way fashioned me after His own image and likeness, and that I perceive this likeness, in which is contained the idea of God, by the same faculty by which I apprehend myself; in other words, when I make myself the object of

* Leibnitz, *Thoughts on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas.*

† DesCartes, *Discourse on Method and the Meditations,* Meditat. 3, also *The Principles of Philosophy,* Part i, § 18.

reflection, I not only find that I am an incomplete, imperfect and dependent being, and one who unceasingly aspires after something better and greater than he is; but, at the same time, I am assured likewise that He upon whom I am dependent possesses in Himself all the goods after which I aspire, and that not merely indefinitely and potentially, but infinitely and actually, and that He is thus God." Kant has done away with an *a priori* demonstration of the far-away God of the eighteenth-century Deism. But he has left untouched the Ontological argument as the grand expression of the truth of Mysticism, the truth that God is near, and that the consciousness of humanity is a God-breathed consciousness with a God-given idea. Negatively, He speaks to our spirits in the feeling of weakness and dependence which grows into the reflective knowledge of our finitude. In the dissatisfaction with the world and ourselves we see that we are not of earthly origin, that there is in us that which comes from a source above Nature, and that we can have been produced by no natural process. And all this would not be possible if God had not inspired our consciousness with the positive idea of Himself as the Father of our spirits. In ourselves we feel His presence, and then know it; in the world we see an Ideal that is not of the world. God as a self-conscious and personal Spirit can be thus near to us. The strongest and most spiritual minds in all ages have felt His presence, and have testified to the truth of Mysticism. God is truly present to the consciousness of humanity both in its idea of Him and in its aspirations after Him. He has spoken to men, and Rationalism can never dissuade them from belief in this truth.

Kant next criticises the Cosmological argument. This is the argument from the contingent to the necessary. Aristotle is its author. He argues* for the existence of a First Mover, thus regarding the world under the category of motion, as contingent. Kant gives the argument so as to include the finite ego under the category of contingency. He gives the argument as follows:† "If something exists, an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now I, at least, exist. Therefore there exists an absolutely necessary being." The argument, he says, proceeds thus. "A necessary being can be determined only in one way, that is by only one of all the opposed predicates; therefore, it is completely determined by its concept, and there is only one concept which can completely determine a thing *a priori*, that is the concept of an *ens realissimum;* therefore, as this is the only concept by and in which we can cogi-

* Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. ii, chap. vii.

† Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Transcendental Dialectic," chap. iii, § 5, *sq.*

tate a necessary being, therefore a supreme being necessarily exists."

Now, in order to meet the Kantian criticism of the Cosmological argument, we must have a clear idea of its function and relation to the Ontological argument; that is, to the *a priori* side of that argument, which it is to be remembered Kant always means, and which for convenience we will refer to as the Ontological argument in discussing Kant's criticism of the Cosmological. The Cosmological argument gives us the existence of a necessary Being, but cannot determine the nature of that Being. The Ontological argument *a priori* shows us that if such a Being exists its nature must be of a certain character; but it cannot give *a priori* demonstration of the existence of this Being. Now Kant makes an error similar to that which he made in criticising the Ontological argument. He criticised that argument as though it were designed to demonstrate *a priori* the existence of a Being corresponding to its concept. Now we see that he states the Cosmological argument as though it were meant to perform not only its own work, but that also of the Ontological argument in the determination of the nature of the necessary Being. That which he terms the first part of the argument shows that an absolutely necessary Being exists. Now, instead of seeing that this is all that is required of this argument, he proceeds to add the Ontological argument as a second step in the Cosmological; and then states as his first point of criticism, that experience, that is the Cosmological argument, merely aids Reason to make the first step to the existence of the necessary Being; and that we must turn away from experience to the conception of an *ens realissimum* to determine the properties of this Being, so that the Cosmological argument becomes the Ontological. Now it is perfectly true that the Cosmological argument is insufficient by itself; but Kant should have realized that the inference to the existence of a necessary Being is all that this argument can be legitimately required to do. Moreover, when, after adding the Ontological argument in its *a priori* aspect as a second step in the Cosmological, he says that reason believes that we may infer the existence of a necessary Being from the concept of an *ens realissimum*, he seems to have forgotten that he has admitted on the very same page that "experience is held to aid reason" in showing the existence of a necessary Being, and that he himself added this second part "to determine the properties" and not to demonstrate the existence of this Being. We see, then, that Kant's first criticism of this argument consists in putting the Ontological and Cosmological arguments together and criticising each because it cannot perform separately their joint task. He tries also to bring out this same

criticism by logic. He says that the *nervus probandi* of the Cosmological argument is the proposition that every absolutely necessary being is an *ens realissimum;* and if this be true, since all *entia realissima* are alike, it follows that this proposition may be converted simply, and we have the proposition that every *ens realissimum* is a necessary being; and this proposition being determined *a priori* by concepts, we have the Ontological argument. In short, he says that in the identification of the *ens realissimum* with the necessary Being, we assume that we can infer the latter from the former. But this is not true. It is difficult to see why the Cosmological argument, in turning to the Ontological to determine the nature of the Necessary Being as Infinite in its attributes, after having shown its existence, must proceed on the assumption that the Ontological argument must show *a priori* the fact of existence.

Kant also makes the following objections to the Cosmological argument:* First, that the transcendental principle of causality is only valid in the sensuous world, because the purely intelligible or intellectual conception would never produce a synthetic, that is, an objective proposition. The answer to this objection is the rejection of his doctrine of the limit of knowledge. Thought is synthetic of itself, and it is not the object of sense which makes it so. And it is obviously false reasoning to argue that, because in scientific cognition the content of the category is given in the sphere of experience, therefore, this is the only kind of causality admissible. Of course, if we define causality as invariable sequence and then say that this includes all causality, we rule out the Cosmological argument by definition. But his doctrine of causality as merely invariable sequence is inadequate for science; how much more so, then, must it be for metaphysics, and how unfair its application in this sphere. We cannot use a purely mechanical and physical category when we have reached the sphere of spirit. The contingent involves the necessary, but a caused cause is still contingent. Our idea of causation is not fully satisfied with a cause that is itself caused, as is the case with every cause in the relative sphere; and the mind must find its type of causation in the causality of will determined by motive and character, but free from physical necessity. If this be not admitted, the alternative is physical necessity, and this leads to, or rather involves, materialism. The categories of science may be used with no materialistic implications at all; they have their legitimate sphere. It is only when the metaphysician tries to use them that materialism ensues. Thus Mr. Spencer, in trying to explain the universe by relative and material forces, *ex*

*Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, "Transcendental Dialectic," chap. iii, §5, p. 374.

hypothesi shuts himself off from any valid inference to the Absolute, and his postulate of the Unknowable has nothing on which to rest. If it is manifested in the material and relative force which explains the universe, the implication is materialistic as to the nature of ultimate reality; or if this Unknowable is entirely apart from the relative force which explains things, then why postulate it? This is merely to show the danger of making physical categories do metaphysical work. However, in making the inference of the Cosmological argument, we go beyond the sphere of natural causation in the very idea of the argument, which expresses the necessity of the existence of Absolute Being.

Kant's last objection to this argument is that the impossibility of an infinite series of causes is assumed, and that this is a principle which cannot be justified. This is simply a statement, in a slightly different form, of the principle of which we have just been speaking, or, more accurately, may be inferred from this principle,—that everything contingent must have a cause. The highest category of causation is not satisfied with anything but a non-contingent and uncaused cause. The stage of scientific cognition is not denied when we assert this; but that which we recognize as real in one stage of reflection, is seen at a later stage to be not the ultimate reality; and while we admit the reality of the one we may reflect upon it as only a partial view of reality and go on to higher categories. If, then, we are to admit the validity of our highest spiritual categories,—and we must if any knowledge at all is to be possible,—we must admit that an infinite series is impossible. Kant goes on in this same chapter to explain the dialectical illusion substantially as follows. On the supposition that something exists we cannot avoid the inference that something necessary exists. But let us form any conception whatever of a thing, nothing prevents me from cogitating its non-existence. We may thus be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary basis, while at the same time we cannot cogitate any individual thing as absolutely necessary; and the conclusion is that neither necessity nor contingency are properties of things, but merely subjective principles. In other words, we may be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary basis, and yet because we cannot find this among any of these contingent things, we conclude that these principles are only subjective, or else we break down in contradiction. Obviously, the conclusion does not follow. If we try to find the Absolute as one of the series of contingent things, we find that we can cogitate none of these as necessary. But it is just for these very contingent things that we are seeking a basis that shall not be one of them. If we try to cogitate the Absolute

Spirit after the analogy of the world-series we can reach no result; but when it is shown that it is a false supposition that all objectivity for knowledge is given by sense, then we need not conclude that principles which transcend the sensuous sphere are merely subjective. We are groping for Being where everything is Becoming; and trying to find a changeless resting place where decay is a principle as well as beginning to be. If we search in the right place, we shall find that Absolute Being is not far from every one of us. Only we should be careful to let the brightest, truest light within us show us where to look.

The Teleological argument next meets the Kantian criticism. This argument, which Kant calls the Physico-Teleological, from the adaptations which are observable in Nature infers design, and thence attributes Intelligence to the Absolute Being. This argument Kant says deserves to be mentioned with respect. He says,* "The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of order, variety, beauty, and conformity to ends, that whether we pursue our observations with the infinity of space in one direction, or into its illimitable divisions in the other, whether we regard the world in its greatest or its least manifestations, even after we have attained to the highest summit of knowledge which our weak minds can reach, we find that language, in the presence of wonders so inconceivable, has lost its force, and number its power to reckon, nay, even thought fails to conceive adequately, and our conception of the whole dissolves into an astonishment without the power of expression, all the more eloquent that it is dumb." Kant's criticisms of the Teleological argument in the *Critique of Pure Reason* are two in number, and arise as before from the fact that he requires this argument to do the work of three. He says, in the chapter from which we have just quoted, "We cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to a demonstrative certainty and to a reception on its own merits, apart from favor or support from other arguments." Now we do not make this claim for it. We neither claim for it "demonstrative certainty," nor that it can be considered apart from other arguments. Let us see exactly what can be expected from it in its organic connection with the other arguments.

The Cosmological argument shows us that a Necessary Being must exist, and now by the Teleological argument we infer that it must be possessed of Intelligence wonderfully great, which the Ontological argument on its *a priori* side shows to be infinite. The Teleological argument, then, is to show that the cause of the world is an Intelligent Cause, and this is all that can be legitimately required of it. In order to indicate how it does this we cannot do better than quote

* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, "Transcendental Dialectic," chap. iii, § 6.

from this same chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason:* "The chief momenta in the physico-teleological argument are as follows: First, we observe in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of purpose, executed with great wisdom, and existing in a whole of a content indescribably various, and of an extent without limits. Second, this arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things existing in the world, it belongs to them merely as a contingent attribute; in other words, the nature of different things could not of itself, whatever means were employed, harmoniously tend towards certain purposes, were they not chosen and directed for those purposes by a rational and disposing principle in accordance with certain fundamental ideas. Third, there exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause, or several, which is not merely a blind, all-powerful nature, producing the beings and events which fill the world in unconscious fecundity, but a free and intelligent cause of the world. Fourth, the unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of a reciprocal relation existing between the parts of the world, as portions of an artistic edifice, an inference which all our observation favors, and all principles of analogy support."

In this chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant makes two criticisms of this argument. The first he expresses thus—"According to the physicoteleological argument the connection and harmony existing in the world evidence the contingency of the form merely, but not of the matter, that is, of the substance of the world. . . . . This proof can at the most therefore demonstrate the existence of an architect of the world whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the material with which he works, but not of a creator of the world, to whom all things are subject." Now in the first place this objection involves asking too much of this argument: all that is sought from this argument is to show that the Absolute Being, of whose existence as the cause of all relativity we are assured on other grounds, is possessed of intelligence. This would be a sufficient answer to Kant's criticism, but we may go even farther. Dr. Flint* says that this objection can be urged, only if order were not of the very essence of matter itself, and not merely something superimposed in the arrangement of it. "Science," he says, "shows that the order in the heavens and in the most complicated organisms is not more wonderful than the order in the ultimate atoms themselves. The balance of evidence is that order penetrates as deep as matter itself."

Kant's second criticism is that from the order in the world we can infer only a cause proportionate thereto. We can conclude therefore from this argument, only that the Intelligence and Power of the

* Flint, *Theism*, Lect. vi.

world-cause is very great; but not that the Intelligence is infinite and the Power absolute; and they must be so determined, as such a predicate as "very great" gives no determinate conception of this Being, nor does it inform us what it may be. Empirical considerations failing to give this determination to the concept, we accomplish this by falling back upon the Cosmological argument, which is the Ontological in disguise. "After elevating ourselves to admiration" of the power and wisdom of the world's author, and finding that we can advance no farther by this method, we proceed to infer the contingency of the world from the order in it and then argue from its contingency to the existence of a Necessary Being, and thence to the concept of the *ens realissimum*. This objection obviously arises from the demand that the Teleological shall alone do the work of all three arguments, and it only gives an illustration of their unity and organic connection. When Intelligence has been predicated of the Absolute, this argument has performed its function. When once this is done all materialistic explanations of ultimate reality become impossible, and we are then obliged *a priori* to say that this Intelligence is infinite. Thus it refers directly to the *a priori* argument and not indirectly through the Cosmological as Kant says. It does not, then, depend on this argument, much less is it identical with it. It needs only the Ontological argument on its *a priori* side for its completion, while the Cosmological argument needs both the other two.

Kant's criticism, then, amounts to showing the connection of these arguments, since his objections may be all classed under two heads: First, those criticisms which do not rest on the separation of the arguments, but which we have seen only to avail against the mechanically conceived God of Deism, but not against a God who is a Spirit at once immanent and transcendent; and secondly, those criticisms which rest on the separation of the arguments, and the requirement of one to do the work of all; and these we have shown to be unfair. We may learn from this that every road, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*, will lead us to some aspect of Absolute Being. In God are all things, and every line of reasoning must culminate in Him; while no one way can lead us to the whole truth, which is so vast that the human mind can never hope to comprehend it. The inspired writer was only expressing the sense in which we must all be Agnostics, when he said: "Canst thou by searching find out God?" And yet it is because "He is not far from every one of us" that we apprehend Him in everything.

We have yet, however, to consider Kant's most subtle criticism of the Teleological argument. This is given in the *Critique of Judgment* where it is discussed much more elaborately than in the *Critique of*

Pure Reason. This criticism is that finality is merely a subjective principle of reflective judgment.

In order to make clear his somewhat confused discussion it will be necessary to state a little more precisely the steps in the Teleological argument. Lotze* has hit the nerve of the design argument, though his criticism of it does not seem just. He says that the argument is involved in a piece of circular reasoning, because it rests on the assertion of the improbability of certain results happening if they were not designed; but that this improbability holds only if we presuppose design, for then things which resulted without being designed would seem exceptions to the general rule; but if we do not presuppose design, then all this improbability vanishes; for the argument, says Lotze, rests on the belief that "what is without purpose, perverse and irrational, has a better title itself to existence, or is more likely, as such, to be real, than what is not so." This is not true. The design argument makes no presuppositions as to what is or is not likely to exist in such and such a case; nor does it presuppose design; but without any preconceived ideas at all, upon observation of the wonderful adaptations in nature, it argues that it is highly improbable that this could have happened if it had not been designed. Of course this is not demonstration, and it is open to critics to deny this improbability on which the argument rests; though we do not believe that they can show adequate grounds for this denial. However the nerve of the argument is this improbability just mentioned; and the argument is primarily, as has been remarked, "to design" and not "from it."

Three distinct steps may be traced in the argument. First, observation shows order, harmony, adaptation, and law in Nature. This rests on observation, and is not denied by those who will not admit finality. But, in the second place, is this order and adaptation finality? Are there ends in Nature? Can this order be explained by mechanical causes alone? The order and system is too vast and complex to have been produced by chance, but will not mechanical law and efficient causation explain it? Now we see phenomena where the results seem to have required such an extraordinary and complex combination of circumstances and mechanical causes, and where there is such an agreement of the present with the future, as Janet† puts it, that we are compelled to believe that this wonderful combination could not have been brought about if the idea of the end did not exist in the cause and determine the means. Now we have a direct knowledge only of the nature of our own acts, but here we find a direction of means to ends. But the actions of other

* Lotze, *Philosophy of Religion*, chap. i, §§ 10, 11.

† Janet, *Final Causes*, Bk. i, chap. i.

men resemble our own in every particular, and it seems as if they were directed to ends. Then the acts of animals while differing from those of men in that we do not ascribe any intentionality to them, which is not the question here as should be carefully noted, yet resemble them in being apparently directed to ends. Next, the relation between organ and function, organism and environment, is a witness of adaptation. In view of all this we conclude that finality is a law of nature. But, in the third place, does finality involve intentionality? Can we infer intentional finality and hence a conscious and intelligent cause of it? Here we argue that intentional finality is the only rational view. For since it is nature which forces us to admit finality, it cannot be merely subjective. We have left, then, as a cause of finality, either Nature itself or conscious intelligence. We know by our own consciousness that intelligence is a sufficient cause for it, and we know that it is characteristic of our intelligence to act for ends; but of unconscious finality we know nothing; so we conclude that it is more logical to infer conscious intelligence than that of which we know nothing, not even its possibility. Either the First Cause is absolutely unknowable or else this much anthropomorphism is necessary. It is the fact that we are created in God's image that enables us to know him. So that anthropomorphism is the assertion that His nature is in us to an imperfect degree, and not an imputation of our nature to Him; and it is difficult to see why Zoomorphism should be preferred to this. We are now concerned, however, not with the Philosophy of the Unconscious, but with Kant's doctrine of subjective finality; but because of the difficult nature of his discussion of this, we have outlined these steps in the argument in order that we may use them as guides in our examination of the Kantian doctrine, to which we now proceed.

As to the first step in the argument, the order and adaptation observable in nature, this he recognizes and presupposes in the *Critique of Judgment*, directing his whole discussion to the last two steps as stated. He asks whether this adaptation is "purposive," and whether we can infer an Intelligent Cause of the world. But he mingles these two points in the discussion, sometimes considering both at once and sometimes going from one to the other, so that we will endeavor, for the sake of clearness, to separate these points, and to present a brief statement of his views on each of these points, as given by him in the *Critique of Judgment*.

But before examining his theory of finality, we must see what the assumption of order and harmony involves. Dr. Flint* takes the position that it is merely a kind of finality; but Janet† and

*Flint, *Theism*, Lect. ii. †Janet, *Final Causes*, Bk. i, chap. v.

Diman* make order the basis of a separate argument for intelligence, so that even though we cannot infer finality from order, we may use the latter in our Theistic argument. Kant takes this order for granted, and then says that mechanical causes explain it, except in some cases where mechanism breaks down and where we must conceive an Intelligent Cause. Janet has made this mistake also, and Dr. Patton† has criticised him for it. The relation of intelligent causation to mechanism is not that the former comes in when the latter breaks down. There is a deeper relation than this. We ask, even where things are explained by mechanical causes, what is the cause of these causes? The Cosmos is a vast system of mathematical relations and dynamic sequences apart from any question of finality. Now we cannot propose mechanical law as the explanation, because it is precisely this law which we are seeking to account for, so that this would be begging the question. Law itself is the thing to be explained, and our alternatives are chance and intelligence, so that if we abandon the former we are driven to the latter. There is no other alternative, since we have seen it to be a *petitio principii* to hypostatize law, making a metaphysical entity out of it for its own explanation. And no more can we hypostatize chance. So that it seems that intelligence is the only possible conclusion. The world, considered as a Cosmos, is nearly as wonderful as when considered under the category of finality. It seems, then, that Kant's admission of the reign of law makes the concession which the Theist wishes, even though finality could not be proved. The argument from finality, however, is a still stronger evidence of intelligent causation, so that it is of the greatest importance to the Theist in giving the *a posteriori* side of Theism. We proceed, therefore, to a critical examination of the Kantian doctrine of finality.

In considering the question which has been given as the second step of the argument, whether we can infer finality from order and adaptation observed, Kant seeks to show that finality is merely a subjective principle of the reflective judgment. Its origin he explains substantially as follows:‡ The Understanding legislates *a priori* for knowledge of Nature as an object of sense. The Reason legislates *a priori* for the causality of freedom in the supersensible sphere. But the supersensible must be able to determine the sensible in regard to the causality of freedom, because the effects must take place in the sensible world, and although the possibility of this cannot be comprehended, it must be presupposed. The

*Diman, *The Theistic Argument*, chap. iv.

†Patton, *Syllabus of Lectures on Theism*.

‡Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, translation by Bernard, Introduction and Division 2.

effect in accordance with the concept of freedom is the final cause which ought to result in the natural world, hence the conditions of its resulting are presupposed in Nature. The Teleological judgment does this, and thus bridges the gap between the phenomenal and noumenal spheres. Therefore, it is a necessary judgment. But what is its nature? Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained in the universal. Now, if this universal be a necessary concept which renders experience possible, as do the categories of the Understanding, then the judgment is called a determinant one. But if we have only a particular empirical law, and try to find the concept for it, then the judgment which makes the subsumption is called a reflective judgment. Such a judgment cannot borrow its principle from experience, for it is seeking a necessary principle; nor can it get it from the Understanding, for then it would be a determinant judgment; therefore the faculty of judgment must itself supply this principle *a priori*. The principle is this. For reflection on Nature, if this is to be possible, the same *a priori* certainty must be conceived to be in the particular laws of nature as in the universal ones. They must be considered as if they proceeded from an Understanding, though not our own, so as to render possible a system of experience embracing the whole of nature; in short, nature must be conceived as purposive. Here are Kant's own words:* "As universal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding which prescribes them to nature, although only according to the universal concept of it as nature; so particular empirical laws, in respect of what is in them left undetermined by these universal laws, must be considered in accordance with such a unity as they would have if an Understanding, though not our Understanding, had furnished them to our cognitive faculties so as to make possible a system of experience according to particular laws of nature. Not as if in this way, such an Understanding must be assumed as actual, for it is only our reflective judgment to which this Idea serves as a principle, for reflecting, not for determining; but this faculty thus gives a law only to itself and not to nature." This concept, then, is only necessary for our understanding; and whether or not it is true objectively we cannot say, because it arises from the peculiarity of our understanding. It is the peculiarity of the human Understanding, says Kant, that it is discursive, that it proceeds from universals to particulars. But as these are undetermined by the universal concept, in order that they may be subsumed under it Reason demands that they be conceived as purposive. But Kant goes on to say that we must recognize the possibility of an Understanding which is intuitive and not discursive.

* Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, translated by Bernard, Introduction, ‡ 4.

Such an Understanding would intuite the whole and its parts in one act, so that there would be no necessity for any distinction between final and efficient causes, but the whole could contain the possibility of the parts, and itself be merely the result of them as causes; but in accordance with the peculiarity of our Understanding the whole must be considered the result of the parts, and it is impossible that it should contain the ground of the possibility of the parts, so that the idea of the whole must contain the possibility of the form and adjustment of the parts, and this idea of the whole is a purpose. So Kant concludes that finality is merely a concept necessary for our minds. This constitutes the nerve of his objection to the Teleological argument; for when we come to consider the two criticisms which he makes on the third step of the argument, that of the inference to an Intelligent Cause of finality, we will find that this same doctrine of subjective finality is repeated, and that it is the only one of the two criticisms which could have any weight. So that this second point being established, the Theist would have gained his point as far as Kant is concerned. Of course, in a treatise on Theism the doctrines of Hegel, Schopenhauer, and von Hartmann would also have to be considered.

Kant's doctrine of finality is open to the following objections:

In the first place the deduction of the principle of finality in nature from a necessity of connecting nature and freedom is a mistake. This is taking finality in its *a priori* and spiritual significance as referring to ultimate moral ends, and trying to introduce, or rather force, it into the sphere of observation and natural phenomena. This highest category of Reason has its proper place as we have seen, but not in the *a posteriori* argument from final causes. The concept of finality in nature, that is the finality inferred from the adaptations of means to ends in nature, cannot be deduced *a priori* from the concepts of morality. Any attempt to derive one of these teleological concepts from the other must lead to confusion, and it has led Kant into an unfair criticism of the *a posteriori* argument in question, because, having deduced the principle *a priori*, the argument would have to presuppose a knowledge of ultimate ends in the spiritual sphere. But this argument does not presuppose any knowledge of these, and is grounded entirely on observation, inference, and probability; so that Kant's criticism of it because of our ignorance of ultimate ends is groundless and arises from the confusion pointed out. In the second place, his doctrine of the subjective origin of finality is open to criticism. We have seen how he sought a more specific origin of this principle than the one just mentioned. The principle is a rational tendency due to the peculiar nature of our understanding, which is

discursive and not being able to intuite the whole and its parts must use this principle in the subsumption of particulars under universals. Now, of course, if the principle of finality in nature were *a priori* in the same sense as is that of causality, that of conditioning experience, then it would be objective; but this we concede to Kant is not the case. But we deny his statement that experience cannot prove it, and believe that he is wrong in making it merely a rational tendency. If by experience he mean direct observation, then this does not give the principle; but it is an inference from this with all the weight of probability upon probability until it almost reaches necessity and certainty. Finality is forced upon us by our observation of nature. It is a demand of Reason upon occasion of experience and therefore objective. Says Dr. Patton,* "If we were under the necessity of seeing finality in everything, then subjective finality would be the best guarantee of objective finality. It would be an *a priori* truth. But there is no such subjective necessity. And since we see finality in some things and not in others there must be some objective ground for this distinction." Trendelenburg also shows a contradiction at this point of Kant's argument. Here is his view, as summarized by Janet:† "If finality were a necessary form of our knowledge, as space and time are necessary forms of our sense intuition, all things would appear to us in the relation of means to ends. But no, according to Kant, the help of finality is called in when the explanation by efficient causes no longer suffices; it is the object itself which forces the mind to quit the road it was following. It is then the object which determines when we must apply the purely subjective principle of finality." The demand for this principle is occasioned by observation of nature. It is true, as Kant says, that our minds being constituted as they are we must conceive nature thus. But this is not a sufficient guarantee of its subjectivity. The assertion that it is, is merely his assertion of the relativity of knowledge, which postulates without grounds the existence of a reality which is not the object of consciousness. Knowledge implies a knowing mind, it is the mind's grasp of objective truth. We cannot say then, that because it requires a mind to know, knowledge is subjective. The knot of the question is whether or not there is any connection between our minds and their principles of knowledge, and Universal Reason which is the ground of all things. If we deny this connection, absolute skepticism must be the result. This objection of Kant to finality on the ground of its subjectivity finds its strongest answer in a criticism of his theory of knowledge. We conclude,

* Patton, *Syllabus of Lectures on Theism.*

† Janet, *Final Causes.*

then, that finality is an objective fact which demands our acceptation and calls for explanation.

With reference to the third step of the Teleological argument as stated, Kant's criticism is twofold.

The first one is this: * After criticising the doctrines of Epicurus, Spinoza, and of Hylozoism, he says of Theism that, while it is the best of all systems because it ascribes the purposes of nature to Intelligence, it nevertheless does not establish its claims, because it rests its inference on the basis of finality, which has been shown to be only a subjective principle. The second criticism, given in the section entitled "Physico-Theology," is this: † However far Physico-Theology be pushed, it can never disclose the ultimate purpose of creation, because it does not extend its inquiries beyond experience. It is based on inquiries into the purpose for which nature exists, and on this the concept of a Supreme Intelligence rests. Our ignorance of this ultimate purpose prevents us from inferring an Intelligent Cause of finality.

The first objection, that finality is merely a subjective principle, has been already dealt with; and we have seen that finality is a real truth to be explained, and, as Kant says, granting this, Theism seems a more reasonable theory than those of Epicurus and Spinoza and, we may add, than that of Hegel.

The second criticism was that the argument presupposed a knowledge of the ultimate end for which nature was created; and that our ignorance of this vitiates the argument, since from the knowledge of contingent ends in nature we cannot infer an Infinite Intelligence. With reference to this, it may be said that this *a posteriori* argument does not seek to infer Infinite Intelligence, but only to show that the First Cause is possessed of intelligence. It therefore does not presuppose any knowledge of ultimate ends; but from the wonderful adaptation of means to ends in nature, the mind concludes that the cause of all this must have been an intelligent cause. When this is done this argument has performed its special function. This last criticism is irrelevant, because it requires the argument to prove too much.

As long as men continue to seek adequate reasons for the phenomena about them this argument will continue to have weight, in spite of the subtle criticisms of philosophers. Men never can be made to believe that this vast and wonderful cosmos resulted from chance or that mechanical law is self-explanatory. Neither will they believe that it resulted from the evolution of an immanent principle which reaches self-consciousness only in man, and so can-

* Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Bernard's translation, § 73.

† Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, § 85.

not be "external to anything;" no more will they believe that their firm conviction is a mere vagary resulting from the peculiarity of their mind. The belief will always exist that Conscious Intelligence is at the beginning of things as well as that it is their ground, immanent in nature and man, yet external to both. The supernatural can never be reduced merely to the spiritual.

The conclusion from all this would seem to be that the position reached *a priori* is confirmed by *a posteriori* considerations. That we get a true view of reality, no matter which of the two standpoints we take. That they thus agree is strong evidence of the truth of each.

To leave the consideration of any aspect of Kantism without including the results of the *Metaphysics of Ethics* and the *Critique of the Practical Reason* would be unjust and would give no adequate conception of his system. In an age when the commands of duty had been reduced to maxims of prudence or of inclination, he raised his voice more powerfully than any other to show the sacredness of duty; for in spite of the Utilitarian way in which his categorical imperative voices itself, this is given as a test rather than a ground of Rightness, the ground being found in man's noumenal nature, which connects him through freedom to Reason Universal. The autonomy of the will is the basis of his Ethics, and is open to severe criticism; but he certainly did uphold duty as against a calculating morality. And furthermore he showed the necessity of a Metaphysical basis for Ethics. We will have to consider, then, very briefly, his Ethical teaching, and here of course only so far as it bears directly on Theism.

The relation of Theism and Ethics he conceived, we believe, inadequately. The true relation between them, or the moral argument for Theism is, briefly, this. The three fundamental categories of Ethics are Moral obligation, the Right, and the Good. Our consciousness tells us that we are under an unconditional obligation to conform our conduct to a certain standard of Rightness and to realize a certain end or *summum bonum*. This is all that our moral consciousness tells us, but there must be some ultimate metaphysical explanation of these categories. Beginning with the fact of moral obligation, we see that to give this any empirical deduction would result in reducing it to a hypothetical imperative; and to make the will absolutely and unconditionally legislative for itself must result either in a philosophy of caprice which would explain away the categorical imperative, or else in the Ethical Pantheism of Fichte. The only adequate explanation of the categorical imperative, therefore, is one which distinctly separates the Absolute and Relative wills; regarding moral obligation as the Will of God binding His

creatures to Right, which must consequently be explained as His nature, and to realize the good, which must embrace human well-being or perfection and happiness, and God's glory. That the Absolute must be possessed of moral attributes is thus the testimony of moral phenomena. Let us now examine Kant's doctrine of the relation of Theism and Ethics. He lays down what he believes to be the two great foundations of Ethics in his *Metaphysics of Ethics*. He tells us* that from experience we can never tell of an action whether it is objectively right only, or whether it is also subjectively right, that is, done merely out of respect for the moral law; but that we conclude that whether or not there are actions of this latter kind cannot be the question, and that Reason itself, independent of all experience, tells us what ought to take place, and that this imperative is categorical. This imperative, being a fact of consciousness, must have some explanation which will render it possible. He lays down the principle of the autonomy of the will as the ground and explanation of the moral law. The will must legislate for itself by an *a priori* maxim, because all heteronomous theories are inadequate, empirical principles being unable to give a categorical imperative, and the rational principle of perfection being too indefinite, while the theological view of connecting the moral law with God would necessitate an "intuition of the Divine Perfection" which we cannot have. So he concludes that the moral law in our consciousness is the "*ratio cognoscendi*" of freedom, while freedom is the "*ratio essendi*" of the moral law. This being the case, we expect some superficial conception of the connection of God and Morality. It is found in the consideration of the *summum bonum*. This is the material category of Ethics, and Kant shows† that it must include happiness as well as virtue,—"worthiness to be happy." It is here that the existence of God can be shown. Kant gives this in substance as follows:‡ Man ought not to seek happiness, but he ought to realize it. But happiness is the harmony of all physical nature with one's end. Now the acting, rational being is not the cause of nature, and there is no necessary connection between virtue and happiness. Therefore the supposition of a supreme Moral Cause of nature, a Holy Will, is necessary in order to connect necessarily the two elements of the *summum bonum*. We must therefore predicate moral attributes of God. Thus the moral law leads through the conception of the *summum bonum* to religion. The moral laws are recognized as Divine commands, not in the sense that they are right because God wills them, but because He is holy, and His will is in accordance with them.

* Kant, *Metaphysics of Ethics*, Abbot's translation, Preface, § 2.

† Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Bk. ii, chap. ii.

‡ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Abbot's translation, Bk. ii, chap. ii, § 5

Now in the first place, God stands in such a doctrine in too external and superficial a relation to Ethics. He is brought in merely in order to get over a difficulty in harmonizing the elements of the *summum bonum*. The categories of Moral obligation and Rightness can be explained without Him. This leaves us with a theory of freedom which is caprice, and instead of explaining moral obligation explains it away. On the contrary we know that the imperative speaks to us with all the constraint of an Absolute Will commanding our own, and cannot be explained as our noumenal self determining our phenomenal self. God, with Kant, becomes the moral governor because He has a holy will which perfectly obeys this principle of Rightness which is external to and above Him. All this difficulty arises because Kant thinks that if we explained the moral law by God's will it would make it arbitrary. He does not seem to see another alternative, that God's will and nature cannot be in opposition. God must will these laws because they are the expression of His nature. It is the fact of the determinism of the divine will which makes a necessity of the Christian Mystery in the Incarnation and Atonement. Surely as far as arbitrariness is concerned nothing could be more so than Kant's theory. It is just because God is the *ratio essendi* of all the ethical categories that we ascribe to Him a moral nature. The objection that we can have no "intuition of the divine perfection" could be urged only if God were entirely different from us and out of all relation to us. But it has been seen that the Self-revealing Spirit which a true Metaphysics gives us, can be like us because we have been formed in His image. It is this truth that makes all knowledge possible, and Agnosticism must be the result of denying it. In order to know nature, we must determine our series of states of consciousness in time in relation to a relating and unifying self-consciousness which cannot be part of the series; and this in turn must be a true copy of that self-consciousness which makes nature possible. If then our noumenal self carry with it a moral ideal so must God also be conceived as possessed of moral attributes.

But even passing any defects in Kant's theory, we may ask, Upon what does it all rest? What is his ground for asserting that the Practical Reason opens up the noumenal sphere? Kant says* that it is not opened to knowledge. Freedom, God and Immortality are not matters of knowledge but only deducible from the Moral law, which is the one point where the noumenal world enters our consciousness. But we may well ask what special right it has to this unique position. Examination of consciousness will show us that the necessity accompanying our theoretical principles is just as strong

*Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Preface.

and true, just as universal. It would seem, then, that we must admit the validity of our theoretical principles in the noumenal sphere, or else become agnostic in Ethics also. Kant's position is not logical. He is not logically constructive. Yet through all, this was his aim, this was the spirit of his whole system.

The ruling categories of eighteenth-century thought were those of individualism, mechanism, and sensationalism. These had such a hold on the human mind that it seemed as if Philosophy was to be forever impossible. Knowledge must be explained mechanically and sensationally, or its possibility denied. Morality must be reduced to physical necessity, or at best to a calculus of prudence. Religion was an empty name. Kant lived and thought just at this time. He gives noble expression to the power and worth of the human spirit. He illumines everything with the light of self-consciousness. He brings out the *a priori* elements in knowledge. He places morality above prudence. He causes the great movement of German Idealism. In short he makes possible the whole intellectual life of the nineteenth century. He rises, an intellectual giant, tearing himself from the fetters of the preceding thought; and though he is held back half chained, as it were, by the very bonds whose power he fought so nobly to break, and did break, yet the first step was the hardest to take, and he must be classed with the world's great thinkers whose influence has been positive and constructive. He will always be, as Dr. Stirling says, "der ehrliche Kant."

PRINCETON. C. WISTAR HODGE, JR.